Category: Analysis

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Gawthorpe, Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are likely to discuss many issues as they meet this week in Beijing. But alongside trade, technology and the war in Iran, one topic of conversation will stand out – the future of Taiwan.

Taiwan has long been a sensitive issue in Sino-American relations. Beijing regards the island as a breakaway province which must be reunited with the mainland. The United States has long opposed such a step. Yet in recent months, Trump has fuelled speculation that he may be ready to change key aspects of US policy on the issue, potentially granting Beijing long-sought concessions.

Trump’s apparent readiness to make these moves means that Taiwan is one of the issues on which we might see the most significant policy developments at the summit. And that could happen simply through the famously voluble president uttering just a few simple words.

The president’s policy towards Taiwan has been inconsistent and seemingly more malleable than that of previous administrations. Advocates for Taiwan point out that his administration recently approved the largest ever US arms sale to the island. But at the same time, he has sowed doubts about the strength of his support for Taiwan’s independence.

US policy towards Taiwan has traditionally been based on two principles. The first is “strategic ambiguity”, which means that the US declines to explicitly state whether it would actively use its military to defend Taiwan from attack by China. This policy is supposed to deter China while also discouraging Taiwan from formally declaring its independence from Beijing.

The second principle is the “one China policy”. According to this policy, the US recognises Beijing as the legitimate government of China, while opposing any violent solution to its dispute with Taiwan. It also retains robust informal links to the Taiwanese government in Taipei.

Observers are concerned that Trump may water down these principles during his summit with Xi. For instance, he might state that the US not only “does not support” Taiwanese independence but actively “opposes” it. Or he might double down on previous comments he has made indicating that whether or not Xi invades Taiwan is “up to him”.

Trump has also explicitly stated that he will discuss future US arms sales to Taiwan with Xi during this week’s summit. This violates one of the so-called Six Assurances that the US has upheld towards Taiwan since the 1980s, and which were endorsed by the US Congress in 2016.

Even securing a discussion of arms sales would be a victory for Xi, who would welcome an opportunity to chip away at the Six Assurances. Presumably he would then try to weaken the US commitment to the other five, which include a US commitment not to change its position on Taiwan’s sovereignty.

More concretely, if Xi succeeds in making US arms sales to Taiwan a legitimate topic of negotiation in Sino-American relations, then he could head them off in the future by offering the US concessions in other areas. For instance, if Trump or a future president asks Beijing for its help settling a conflict like that in Iran, Beijing might demand an end to US arms sales to Taiwan as the price.

High stakes

Given Trump’s reputation as a formidable China hawk, his attitude towards Taiwan may seem surprising. But it’s actually part of a longstanding pattern.

In relations with China, Trump has arguably always prioritised economic issues, while appearing less concerned about the security of America’s regional allies. He has also raised doubts about whether Taiwan is even defensible. In his first term, he reportedly told aides that: “Taiwan is like two feet from China. We are 8,000 miles away. If they invade, there isn’t a fucking thing we can do about it”.

Trump is also both highly transactional and less focused on abstract principles of foreign policy than most previous presidents. He views America’s support of allies such as Taiwan as a gift that it gives them, one that is often not worth the cost. If he can achieve a concrete victory for himself today by trading away support for Taiwan tomorrow, he may well be willing to do so.

All of these developments matter because they make a violent conflict between China and Taiwan, potentially ultimately involving the US, more likely. If Trump makes concessions to Xi, it will be the latest signal that US support for Taiwan is wavering. That made be read in Beijing as permission to violently change the status quo. Even though such an act might belatedly then be met with force from Washington in response, it is made more likely by Trump’s stance today.

Even worse for Trump, the summit comes at a time when American power and the wisdom of its long-term strategy are being visibly called into question in the Middle East. The US is bogged down in an intractable conflict and has severely damaged its deterrent capacity in the Indo-Pacific by burning through advanced munitions at a high rate. Trump’s personal unpopularity is also rising at home amid the war and its economic fallout.

This weakened position makes it even more likely that Trump will want to strike a deal with Xi to help end the war in Iran or ease trade tensions to help the economy at home. Taiwan may be the price of that – and, ultimately, peace.

Andrew Gawthorpe is affiliated with the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

– ref. Trump-XI summit: US president says he will discuss arms sales to Taiwan – breaking decades of US policy – https://theconversation.com/trump-xi-summit-us-president-says-he-will-discuss-arms-sales-to-taiwan-breaking-decades-of-us-policy-282894

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simon Usherwood, Professor of Politics & International Studies, The Open University

The government has set out its legislative agenda for the new parliamentary session in the king’s speech. Our panel of experts reveals the key points.

Measures to ease high living costs

Jonquil Lowe, Visiting Academic, The Open University

Surveys suggest that the cost of living is still a major concern for UK households, with energy and food prices topping the list of worries. In response, some campaigners have called on the government to use the energy independence bill announced in the king’s speech to break the link between electricity and gas prices and volatile global gas prices. And they want it to provide support, especially for low-income households, to switch away from heating homes with fossil fuels.

Among other measures, the bill aims to ensure landlords upgrade their properties to reduce tenants’ energy bills. These kinds of measure need to be introduced urgently if they are to save households from heftier energy bills expected this winter.

Other cost-of-living reliefs are welcome, although their impact may be small. For example, a move to “strengthen ties with Europe” may ease food inflation by reducing red tape and border checks on some imported foods.

The leasehold and commonhold reform bill (carried over from the previous parliamentary session) will help owners of leasehold flats and houses by capping ground rents at £250 a year, and then reducing them to a negligible amount after 40 years. Meanwhile, the social housing renewal bill aims to increase the stock of affordable social homes.

A ‘Bresignation’ bill: options for UK-EU closer relationship remain limited

Miriam Sorace, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics, University of Reading

The government clearly recognises that to improve the UK’s economic and trade security, strengthening ties with the European Union is paramount. But public attitudes are still characterised by “bresignation” rather than wholehearted “bregret”.

While support for rejoining the EU sits at around 55%, this obscures deep polarisation and strong conditionality. Support drops sharply in rejoining scenarios that require the UK to relinquish its previous opt‑outs, notably euro adoption and participation in the Schengen agreement on free movement. These would probably be among the concessions demanded by the EU, given public opinion across member states. Support for rejoining the single market (48%) or the customs union (50%) lags behind support for rejoining the EU and remains highly polarised.

The least polarising and most popular option is a broadly defined “closer relationship” with the EU, supported by around 63% of the public and even attracting a sizable minority (40%) of Reform UK voters (and 56% of previous Leave voters). Yet this plea reflects a degree of wishful thinking. Given the UK’s and EU’s red lines, marginal adjustments to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement are the only real options short of the various rejoin alternatives.

The status quo is widely disliked (only 33% prefer the current UK-EU relationship), but there is no other politically viable alternative to tinkering around the edges. “Closer relations” is not a concrete policy: it’s the default expression of living under sub-optimal constrained choice. In other words: “bresignation”. The UK is likely to remain locked into a status quo of continual negotiation with the EU for the foreseeable future, unless public opinion shifts towards accepting the significant concessions required to initiate rejoining negotiations.

Tourist taxes – England plays catch-up

Rhys Ap Gwilym, Senior Lecturer in Economics at Bangor University’s Business School

England is set to become the 26th country in Europe to introduce a tourist tax. The overnight visitor levy bill, announced in the king’s speech, follows recent moves in Scotland and Wales allowing local authorities to tax overnight stays.

In Scotland, Edinburgh will lead the way, adding a 5% levy to accommodation bills from July 24 this year. In Wales, Cardiff intends to introduce charges from April 2027: £1.30 per person per night in hotels and Airbnbs, and 75 pence in campsites and hostels. Such measures have proved controversial, with strong opposition from parts of the tourism industry.

The UK government has framed this as “the first step in a new era of fiscal devolution in England”. In practice, it is a modest one. Revenues are likely to be small relative to existing local taxes and mayors may place greater weight on reforms to council tax caps or business rate retention.

That said, international evidence suggests well-designed tourist taxes can work. Even modest revenues can help fund destination management, ease pressures on local communities and improve the visitor experience. The detail of the legislation will ultimately determine whether England achieves these gains.

Plans to make it easier to align UK law with EU agreements

Simon Usherwood, Professor of Politics & International Studies, The Open University

For all the talk from Prime Minister Keir Starmer of putting the UK at “the heart of Europe”, the proposed European Partnership Bill is a relatively modest and technical move. It would give the government powers to make adjustments to domestic legislation to ensure it complies with agreements being made with the EU. This would apply to those currently under negotiation (like youth mobility, food and veterinary standards, or emissions trading) or those that might be considered in future.

This streamlines a process that would have been necessary in any case, and remains reliant on those EU deals actually being struck. So there’s nothing particularly remarkable about the content. However, the repeated mention of “where it benefits the national interest” highlights how the government is trying to package this as something more.

Decisions about when to align are necessarily attached to decisions to sign up to deals with the EU, not to whether to make the domestic adjustments (which international law would consider to be an obligation). Much like Starmer’s flowery rhetoric in his speech on Monday, the substance doesn’t really match up.

Nationalising steel for security – but debts could burden the taxpayer

Phil Tomlinson, Professor of Industrial Strategy and Regional Development, University of Bath

Plans to nationalise British Steel offer some comfort to UK steel workers in the form of preserving jobs and providing stability. More pertinently, the move represents a renewed willingness for the state to intervene in a strategically important industry facing financial difficulties, high energy costs, fierce global competition and the challenges of the green transition.

Steel is a critical element in UK sectors such as car manufacturing and defence, infrastructure projects like railways, and low-carbon technologies including wind turbines. Nationalisation should offer the UK a degree of security over steel supply in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical climate.
The risk is that British Steel continues to lose out in global markets and makes substantial losses. This will impose a huge financial burden on the UK taxpayer, at a time when public finances are tight. But public ownership could align steel production with the UK’s broader industrial strategy goals, such as infrastructure development and net-zero targets.

And state financing could allow for long-term investment in new electric steel furnaces and decarbonisation. In the future, the government could use other levers to ensure a market for British Steel, such as strategies which favour UK-sourced, low-carbon steel for green infrastructure projects.

Plans to clean up our rivers and seas could be watered down

Alex Ford, Professor of Biology, University of Portsmouth

Water bills are rising, public anger over sewage pollution has not abated, and the government has now set out a major overhaul of water regulation in England and Wales in the king’s speech.

The proposed water reform bill signals a shift in emphasis. Rather than focusing solely on water companies, the legislation aims to address pollution more broadly, including contributions from agriculture and industry. This is a welcome change. The bill also promises a more unified regulatory system to end the fragmented oversight that has characterised the sector for decades.

Yet despite the language of reform, the vision looks less like a radical reset and more like a reboot of privatisation. This focus will worry campaigners, as it suggests continuity with an economic model widely blamed for under-investment, rising bills and environmental harm.

Immigration bill to tighten rules on right to family life

Joelle Grogan, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, University College Dublin

The government says the new immigration and asylum bill will “tighten the application” of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Article 8 right to family life is inherently restricted, and both national courts and the European Court of Human Rights generally defer to government migration policy. So more detail of the bill in future will be welcome.

The background briefing notes state that Article 8 is stopping the removal of those living illegally in the UK, saying that 86% of people from January to September 2022 who raised rights-based applications in detention were released. However, this highlights the lack of data – both on how many removals have been stopped by the ECHR and its connection with the number of illegal arrivals. Research on available data on the ECHR and foreign national offenders indicate that numbers are very low.

The bill will define family life to ensure that it is limited to the core family unit of spouse, parents and children. But the European Court of Human Rights emphasises the “dependence” of one family member on another (for example by providing sole financial support) in migration cases as the trigger for Article 8. So by defining “family unit” without the condition of “dependence”, the government may unintentionally widen the definition rather than narrow it.

Simon Usherwood has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, as a Senior Fellow of the UK in a Changing Europe initiative.

Alex Ford has received funding from UKRI research councils, EU, charities and industrial partners including the water industry.

Joelle Grogan, Jonquil Lowe, Miriam Sorace, and Phil Tomlinson do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. State opening of parliament 2026: experts on plans for cost of living, EU ties, tourist tax and more – https://theconversation.com/state-opening-of-parliament-2026-experts-on-plans-for-cost-of-living-eu-ties-tourist-tax-and-more-282895

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Domenico Vicinanza, Associate Professor of Intelligent Systems and Data Science, Anglia Ruskin University

Nasa is developing ways to use nuclear power to send spacecraft to their destinations. Nuclear propulsion could greatly reduce the journey time to Mars, perhaps cutting a voyage of more than six months to three or four months.

The idea of nuclear propulsion in space goes back to the cold war. But Nasa has been pursuing it more aggressively since Jared Isaacman took over as the agency’s chief in December 2025. Isaacman is a well-known advocate of the technology and says it can “truly unlock humankind’s ability to explore among the stars”.

In March 2026, the agency even announced an uncrewed, nuclear-powered mission to the red planet, targeted for late 2028.

Every spacecraft begins its journey fighting Earth’s gravity by burning chemical fuel. Rockets mix fuel with an oxidiser, ignite them, and force the expanding gas through a nozzle. According to Isaac Newton’s third law, when gas pushes downward, the rocket gets an equal push upward.

Chemical propulsion is powerful, reliable, and quite simply the only practical way to leave Earth’s gravity. But it comes with a severe limitation. Rockets must carry both their fuel and, in most cases, the oxidiser needed to burn it.

That means much of a rocket’s mass at launch is propellant, not payload. The longer and more ambitious the journey, the more propellant is needed, and the heavier the rocket becomes.

Mars is far enough away that a long journey time, the threat to astronauts from cosmic radiation, the mass required to carry life-support systems and constraints on the return journey all pose serious problems for planning a mission.

This is why engineers keep looking for more sustainable alternatives to chemical rockets.

Two technologies

Nasa’s space nuclear propulsion programme distinguishes between two main
approaches: thermal propulsion and electric propulsion.

Nuclear thermal propulsion follows a three-step process. First, the nuclear reactor inside the engine splits uranium atoms to generate massive amounts of heat. Second, liquid hydrogen is pumped through the reactor core, where it flash boils and expands into a high-pressure gas. Third, this super-heated gas is blasted out of a nozzle at high velocities to push the spacecraft forward.

According to the US Department of Energy, nuclear thermal propulsion can reduce travel times to Mars by up to 25% and, more importantly, limit a crew’s exposure to cosmic radiation. It would also widen the launch windows in which spacecraft can feasibly fly to Mars.

These depend on alignments of Earth and Mars that come along every couple of years. Greater flexibility with launch windows would allow astronauts to abort missions and return to Earth if necessary.

Nuclear electric propulsion, on the other hand, uses a nuclear reactor to generate electricity. This powers a type of engine called an ion thruster that accelerates charged atoms (like xenon) out of a nozzle. If nuclear thermal propulsion is the sprint approach, nuclear electric propulsion is the marathon option. Nuclear electric propulsion produces very low thrust, but it can run continuously for years.

This fuel efficient technology is perfect for sending robot explorers or heavy cargo (like habitats and food supplies) to Mars months before the humans arrive. In deep space, a small thrust applied for a long time can matter enormously.

A chemical rocket is like a powerful kick. Nuclear electric propulsion is more like a persistent hand on the shoulder.

It could make it easier to move heavy cargo through deep space, provide abundant onboard power, and remain effective far from the Sun, where the energy available to solar arrays is weaker.

This is the main idea behind Nasa’s Space Reactor-1 Freedom mission. SR-1 Freedom is a nuclear electric propulsion mission, which Nasa is currently targeting for launch in December 2028.

It would be the first nuclear-powered interplanetary spacecraft. It will journey to Mars to prove that nuclear energy can provide the sustained, high-efficiency power needed for deep space travel.

On arrival at Mars, roughly one year after its launch, SR-1 Freedom is expected to deploy the Skyfall payload. This is a set of small helicopter drones that will scout the Martian surface.

Nasa says the mission will establish nuclear hardware that can be used on other flights. It could also create a regulatory precedent and activate an industrial base for future systems based on nuclear fission.

For human exploration, the combination of both nuclear electric propulsion and nuclear thermal propulsion is very attractive. Because nuclear electric propulsion is incredibly fuel-efficient, it can move massive amounts of weight (habitats, years of food, rovers, and life-support machinery) using very little propellant.

It might not matter so much if cargo takes more than nine months to arrive on Mars. But our fragile human bodies mean that longer stays in space increase the risk of cancer from cosmic radiation and cause bone and muscle loss.

The second of these issues is because bones and muscles are not being exercised in microgravity. Nuclear thermal propulsion provides the high thrust needed to reach Mars in three to four months, drastically reducing these health risks.

Steep path

Despite the clear benefits, the path to the launch pad is steep, and the 2028 launch of SR-1 Freedom appears incredibly ambitious. A nuclear electric spacecraft needs a reactor, shielding, heat management, power conversion, radiators, electric thrusters, control systems and fault tolerance. Each of these components of the mission requires testing and careful integration for them to work together.

Reactor heat must be controlled without damaging other components. Thrusters
must operate reliably for months. Other factors can interact in ways that only emerge when spacecraft subsystems are put together. If SR-1 Freedom is to make its December 2028 window, Nasa has very little time to assemble a mission that would normally require years of design, integration and review.

Nuclear propulsion has spent more than 60 years somewhere between engineering reality and technological myth – even though the physics has always been sound.

What has proved harder is making the technology safe, affordable, licensable (able to meet regulatory safety standards) and ready to fly on a real mission schedule. So far, the US has launched only one fission reactor into orbit, SNAP-10A, in 1965.

SR-1 Freedom could create the pathway for more capable systems to follow. Nuclear electric propulsion will not make Mars easy. But it might start to break down barriers to travelling to Mars, and that is a prospect we should be excited about.

Domenico Vicinanza does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nasa bets big on nuclear engines to cut journey times to Mars – https://theconversation.com/nasa-bets-big-on-nuclear-engines-to-cut-journey-times-to-mars-282748

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Trudy Meehan, Lecturer, Centre for Positive Psychology and Health, RCSI University of Medicine and Health Sciences

Whether you call it an Irish goodbye, French leave or filer à l’anglaise (leave in the English style), as the French prefer, the act of quietly slipping out of a party without fanfare is a familiar social impulse. The Brazilians called it sair à francesa (French style), the Germans a Polnischer Abgang (Polish departure), and Australians call it ninja bombing. Whatever name it goes by, the concept is the same: one moment you’re there, the next you’ve vanished into the night without a drawn-out round of explanations, hugs and promises to catch up soon.

The pattern is telling: every culture has a term for it, and every culture blames someone else. That collective deflection suggests we already know, on some level, that slipping out unannounced is a social transgression.

But for those of us with anxiety, that silent exit isn’t rudeness. While etiquette traditionalists will probably insist that leaving without saying goodbye is a social no-no, some psychologists argue that it’s a coping strategy. Here’s why sneaking out without saying goodbye might be the healthiest decision you make all evening.

When you break it down – and let’s be honest, those of us who are anxious, introverted, neurodivergent or dealing with chronic illness have all broken this down into agonising detailed steps – saying goodbye is a loaded cultural ritual. It’s a performance that demands a high degree of social skill, accuracy and nuance.

Goodbyes are high-demand situations and, sadly, by the end of a social occasion, many of us are already depleted and don’t have the energy to handle all the steps involved.

For many of us, socialising can mean feeling overwhelmed, constantly monitoring how we come across, trying to fit into other people’s expectations, comparing ourselves to others and worrying about rejection. It can be exhausting to feel like you’re constantly trying to act like your best version of normal.

When socialising means constantly adapting yourself to other people’s expectations, the healthy choice becomes using your last bit of energy to recharge and take care of yourself. Don’t leave the party completely drained with nothing left to recover with.

Sometimes we want to leave quietly because leaving loudly feels like shouting out: “I matter! Look at me, I’m leaving!” The fact is, many of us sit with the belief that we don’t really matter that much, so we don’t say goodbye because we don’t feel we are worth the performance.

Sometimes a silent exit is about self-respect, minding your energy reserves, even if you really enjoyed the evening. At other times, though, it’s an act of self-erasure. You leave without saying goodbye because you think no one will care, that you don’t matter enough to make a fuss when leaving.

Leaving quietly can become a way to protect yourself from the discomfort of saying goodbye. But the quiet exit cuts both ways. Ask yourself whether leaving without a word made your life bigger – you conserved enough energy to recover and you’re glad to go back next time – or whether it shrank it, adding another reason to avoid socialising altogether.

If you are going to pick apart your goodbye and negatively assess it, the next goodbye will feel even harder. Be careful to reality-test your post-event ruminations. It’s usually not as bad as you think, especially if you are assessing your performance through the distorting lens of anxiety.

The healthiest choice of all

There is always a tension between wanting to belong and wanting to be yourself. If saying goodbye starts to feel so pressured and so performed that you lose any sense of being authentic, then the connection is starting to cost more than it’s worth.

If you feel like you need to be a chameleon to survive the complexities of socialising, the healthiest choice is to find a way to be who you really are. Find a way to tell your friends and family that leaving quietly is something you need because of how your nervous system and psychology are made, and not a reflection of the relationship. Research shows that being your truest self and having the best social connections go hand in hand.

And if you are neurodivergent, being open about what you need can feel like a risk, but it can also be a way to find acceptance, support and understanding when you let people know what you need and like.

If you’re anxious, it’s worth letting your host know in advance that you might need to slip away quietly. Otherwise, there’s a risk that people will read it the wrong way, as coldness or indifference, say.

Get ahead of it by letting people know you’ll leave without saying goodbye, and that you’re grateful to have been invited. Anxious people aren’t bad at relationships. Relationships just work better when everyone understands the other person’s needs.

Less is more

There’s a growing idea that being choosy about your social life isn’t antisocial – some psychologists call it “selective sociality”. Picking your moments carefully means you have more to give when it counts. The goal isn’t to retreat, but to invest in deeper relationships and in real presence, rather than the hollow churn of online contact – unless it supports meaningful connection.

In a world where being seen to do the right thing has begun to outweigh doing the right thing, selective sociality offers a way forward. Knowing our limits and being open about them, when possible, doesn’t weaken connection – it helps create relationships that feel real and sustainable.

If sneaking out without a fuss makes it more likely you will go to the next party, then it’s a choice for more social connection and therefore your health.

Trudy Meehan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. From ‘French leave’ to ‘Irish goodbyes’: why you may be right to exit a party without saying goodbye – https://theconversation.com/from-french-leave-to-irish-goodbyes-why-you-may-be-right-to-exit-a-party-without-saying-goodbye-281994

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Basil Germond, Professor of International Security, School of Global Affairs, Lancaster University

The recent attack by Ukraine of a Russian missile-carrying corvette stationed in the Caspian Sea more than 1,500km away from Kyiv has put the spotlight on this large, often overlooked body of inland salt water.

The Caspian Sea hosts major offshore oil and gas fields and critical maritime infrastructure, including ports, pipelines and terminals that connect central Asia to global markets. It is a key node in the so-called middle corridor trading route from China to Europe via central Asia that avoid increasingly uncertain routes via Russia in the north and Iran in the south.

China views it as a key corridor for energy supplies and its belt and road initiative that is an economic statecraft strategy that uses infrastructure connectivity to expand Beijing’s influence. The middle corridor links mainland China to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Turkey, meanwhile, uses Caspian links, especially fossil fuel transit projects, via Azerbaijan, to increase its influence across the Turkic world, becoming a regional energy hub.

The 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea sets out how the Caspian’s oil, gas, and fishing resources are divided among the bordering nations. Crucially, the agreement also prohibits the deployment of armed forces from third-party countries within the Caspian’s waters. This establishes a regional security order that excludes western military presence.

Russia’s back yard

For Russia, the Caspian Sea has a high value, both as a strategic back yard and a bridge to Iran. There, Moscow maintains the strongest navy and has used the Caspian as a platform for long‑range power projection. This has included missile strikes into other theatres, including against Islamic State targets in Syria in 2015.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Caspian Sea has also gained renewed importance as a rear maritime space for Moscow. Indeed, with the Black Sea Fleet increasingly under threat from Ukraine’s drones and missiles, elements of Russia’s naval forces have redeployed away from the contested Black Sea towards the Caspian Sea via inland waterways. That said, Ukraine’s recent attack demonstrates that the Caspian Sea’s role as a sanctuary for Russia’s naval forces is limited.

More importantly, the Caspian Sea plays a structurally important role in enabling strategic coordination between Russia and Iran. As a geographically enclosed maritime space with its own specially designed legal status, it provides a direct logistical and economic corridor between the two states that is largely shielded from western military presence and oversight.

The Russia-Iran connection

This corridor enables not only energy cooperation and trade flows but also the movement of technologies and materials relevant to sustaining both war economies under sanctions pressure. This includes sanctioned goods, drone components and dual-use technologies. The Iran war has accelerated this trading pattern.

In this sense, for the two allies, the Caspian Sea functions as a critical node in a broader resilience architecture. It reinforces bilateral alignment and reduces exposure to external coercion. Its role is therefore less tactical than systemic: it provides a stable logistical, economic and strategic framework that underpins long‑term convergence between Moscow and Tehran.

In late March 2026, Israeli airstrikes reportedly disabled dozens of Iranian Caspian naval assets, including missile boats, a corvette, a shipyard and a command centre.
The strikes are likely to have severely disrupted the Caspian logistics corridor that links Russian ports to Iran’s port at Bandar Anzali, the largest and oldest Iranian port on the Caspian Sea. It also degraded Tehran’s ability to receive supplies via this route. This could force both countries to rely more on riskier overland routes via Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan.

In other words, the Caspian’s attribute as a haven for the two allies is currently under threat. That might force Russia and Iran to spend more on multi-level air defence systems and drone monitoring. They might even need to redeploy troops and military equipment to the region. This would significantly raise the cost and complexity of using the Caspian as a safe space for mil,itary and naval assets and a bridge for trade.

The Caspian Sea has become an increasingly important strategic connector linking two conflicts that are usually thought of as separate. The war in Ukraine and the war in Iran are not isolated theatres but parts of an emerging Eurasian conflict system in which Russia and Iran are mutually dependent.

Iran’s provision of drones and other military support to Russia has directly affected the course of the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia’s diplomatic, military and economic backing is central to Iran’s capacity to withstand pressure and sustain its regional posture.

The Caspian Sea underpins this alignment by providing a relatively insulated corridor for coordination, logistics and economic exchange.

Recent events, such as Ukrainian and Israeli strikes, however, reveal the limits of this strategic function for both Moscow and Tehran. At the same time, other countries, notably China and Turkey, are investing in the middle corridor. This is raising the value of the Caspian Sea, both economically and in terms of its geographical connectivity.

The Caspian Sea faces an uncertain future. Its north–south Russia–Iran strategic and military axis is increasingly contested by their adversaries. Its east–west trade and energy role, meanwhile, holds the potential to rebalance regional power dynamics towards economic connectivity, rather than conflict. Or, to put it another way, this body of water could become either be a theatre of strategic confrontation or a corridor of trade and exchange. The latter, of course, would be better for all concerned.

Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why the Caspian Sea has become so important in both the Ukraine and Iran wars – https://theconversation.com/why-the-caspian-sea-has-become-so-important-in-both-the-ukraine-and-iran-wars-282781