Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Humayun Kabir, Assistant Teaching Professor, Dept. of Environment, Culture, & Society, Thompson Rivers University
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has returned to power after winning a landslide victory in the country’s recent parliamentary elections last week.
The BNP, led by the new prime minister Tarique Rahman, declared victory in the elections after unofficial results showed the party winning two-thirds of the vote. Rahman is the son of former Bangladeshi prime minister and former BNP leader Khaleda Zia, who died in December 2025, and Ziaur Rahman, the sixth president of Bangladesh.
The election also sees the religious party, Jamaat-e-Islami, become the main opposition party for the first time after winning the second-highest vote share.
This election is the first following the 2024 July uprising that led to the ouster of the country’s longest-serving prime minister, Sheikh Hasina.
During a recent research trip to Bangladesh, two months before the recent election, I observed a palpable sense of uncertainty among people. Whether in roadside tea stalls — where people gather over tea, biscuits and betel leaf — or in upscale coffee shops, conversations consistently revolved around the country’s uncertain democratic future and the growing resurgence of religious political forces.
A prevailing sentiment was that the hope and dream for a new Bangladesh after the July uprising appeared to be fading.
Continuity and a rupture
There are valid reasons for such uncertainty. The present interim government, led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus and formed following Hasina’s ouster, is deeply tumultuous.
Incidents of mob violence, the killing of a prominent leader of the uprising, arson attacks on newspaper offices, violent persecution of Hindu minorities and attacks on Sufi shrines, among others, have left many Bangladeshis worried about the country’s future.
In the absence of Hasina’s Bangladesh Awami League, the party that ruled the country for more than 15 years, the landslide victory of the BNP-led alliance was predictable. The Awami League was banned by the interim government in May 2025.
What is surprising is the rise of the Jamaat-e-Islami, which secured 68 seats in parliament (77 with its alliance). Their success in the election moves them from the political margins to the forefront.
Now, the question is: What trajectory does this election set for Bangladesh’s democratic future? In many ways, the election represents both continuity and rupture — distinct in certain respects, yet familiar in others.
What makes this election different?
First, this election is significant because, for the first time in more than a decade, people were able to cast their ballots in a relatively free and fair environment. The elections held in 2014, 2018 and 2024 during the Awami League’s rule were widely seen as neither free nor fair, and marked by widespread irregularities and intimidation.
Both the BNP and opposition parties also claimed there were irregularities with the recent election.
The 2026 election was also significant because it was a referendum on the July National Charter. Aimed at incorporating the spirit of the July uprising, the charter adopted 84 proposals based on various reform commissions’ recommendations.
Despite concerns about the complexity of these proposals, and arguments that they might be difficult for ordinary citizens to fully comprehend, an overwhelming majority of voters supported the charter. Estimates suggest that more than 62 per cent voted in favour, compared to 29 per cent who voted against it.
The proposed reforms enshrined in the charter include introducing a bicameral parliamentary system, the establishment of a caretaker government to oversee free and fair elections, term-limits for the prime minister, expanding presidential powers and citizens’ fundamental rights, and measures to safeguard judicial independence, among others. As people voted in favour of the charter, the new government is required to implement the reform measures.
Second, the election empowers the Jamaat-e-Islami by expanding their base of supporters and representation in parliament. The political landscape of Islamic religious parties in Bangladesh is broadly streamed in three different fronts: the Jamaat-e-Islami, Sufi Islamic parties and Deobandi madrasa-centric Islamic parties, whose electoral success has never been significant.
For the first time in the country’s history, Jamaat-e-Islami — the dominant Islamic party whose support base largely consists of educated populations in both urban and rural areas — could assume the role of the main opposition.
Historically, however, Jamaat-e-Islami and other religious parties have often acted as kingmakers rather than dominant electoral forces and have struggled to secure significant vote shares independently. Now, as the main opposition party, Jamaat-e-Islami is likely to advocate more strongly for more religion-based policy making. The party may push for policies and institutional measures aimed at expanding the role of Islam in governance and public life.
Third, the July uprising gave rise to a new cohort of Gen Z and youth leaders who played a central role in orchestrating resistance against the authoritarian regime. Some of these leading figures later joined the interim government; however, they subsequently resigned from their positions when their newly formed political party, the National Citizen Party (NCP), chose to contest the election. However, their electoral success remained limited.
This was largely due to their alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami and internal divisions among the party’s leadership over this strategic decision. Consequently, NCP candidates secured only six seats under the broader Jamaat-e-Islami-led alliance.
While Jamaat-e-Islami succeeded in shifting from the political margins to a more prominent position, the NCP and its leadership experienced the opposite trajectory — moving from front-line political figures to the margins.
The road to democracy: Hopes & challenges
Notably, Tarique Rahman, who returned to Bangladesh after 17 years of self-exile in the United Kingdom, has long faced allegations related to corruption and involvement in a 2004 grenade attack on an Awami League rally that killed two dozen people and wounded about 300 others.
Although he was acquitted of these charges, it will be challenging for him to reform internal practices and distance the party from its legacy of corruption and extortion.
The political landscape in Bangladesh is often shaped by majoritarian ideological narratives, within which Islamic political forces have regained influence by resisting elements of secular-liberal ideals. The shift from secularism to pluralism has been interpreted by some observers as a way of appeasing religious political parties. For the new government, ensuring genuine pluralism and inclusivity will therefore be a significant challenge.
The 2026 election has helped to pacify some uncertainties surrounding the country’s political future. If the July Charter is implemented by the new BNP government, it could lay the foundations for a stable and functional democratic system.
However, the election has also reinstated an entrenched political leadership whose past governance record has been marked by cronyism, kleptocracy, corruption and extortion.
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Humayun Kabir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
– ref. Bangladesh’s election represents politics as usual, and some hope for change – https://theconversation.com/bangladeshs-election-represents-politics-as-usual-and-some-hope-for-change-276001
