What the conflict in Iran means for Putin and Ukraine

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

As the war in the Middle East spreads and intensifies, the one in Ukraine continues. While geographically some 2,500km (1,600 miles) apart, the consequences of US president Donald Trump’s latest military adventure for the Russian war against Ukraine will be acutely felt across several areas. In the short term, the Kremlin will probably feel emboldened to double down on its aggression, but this is unlikely to shift the dial significantly towards Russian victory in the long term.

The targeted killing of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by a precision US strike would have reminded the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, of his reportedly “apoplectic” reaction to the killing of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011. Comments on social media from the likes of far-right Russian nationalist Alexander Dugin, who posted, that “one by one, our allies are being systematically destroyed”, and former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who alleged that the “talks with Iran were just a cover”, are unlikely to have steadied Putin’s nerves.

The Russian leader’s fears about being next after a string of US successes targeting foreign leaders may have been played up somewhat by the western media, but they are not completely unfounded. Putin continues to walk a fine line between paranoia and his outrage over the killing of supreme leader Ali Khamenei, which he condemned in a condolence letter to the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law” but did not mention Trump or the US as the culprits.

Concerns about his own longevity, however, will not be the only things weighing on Putin’s mind and compelling him to double down on his war against Ukraine. The escalation of violence in the Middle East offers Russia several opportunities – at least in the short term.

The sharp rise in oil prices throws Moscow a new lifeline for financing its ongoing war. Not only did prices spike, but the sudden – and probably lasting – inability of Iran to export oil will also have a major impact on China. China bought over 80% of all Iranian oil exports, equivalent to some 13% of China’s oil imports.

China has large stockpiles of oil that will allow it to ride out current inflation. But it is now likely to double down on its energy relationship with Russia.

This will serve both countries well. Russia will deepen its economic ties with China and rebalance the relationship, while China will tap into a reliable supply line that will not be as vulnerable to being choked off as maritime supply routes in a future confrontation with the US.

The closure of the strait of Hormuz and Iranian strikes against oil and gas facilities across the Gulf countries have destabilised global energy markets. This affects 30% of global seaborne oil trade and 20% of all trade in liquefied natural gas.

This offers a market opportunity for Russia and its shadow fleet of tankers, at least in the short term, given that Moscow retains sufficient refining and port capacity, despite a long Ukrainian air campaign against the country’s oil infrastructure.

US diverting arms to Middle East

Another likely benefit for the Kremlin will be disruptions to weapons supplies to Ukraine. While insisting that the US had “virtually unlimited supply” of weapons and munitions, Trump also conceded that there were areas “at the highest end, (where) we have a good supply, but are not where we want to be”.

This is a view echoed within the Pentagon. Defence officials are keen to discuss an acceleration of weapons production with key arms manufacturers.

With large parts of western military support for Ukraine consisting of US weapons paid for by Kyiv’s European allies, US shortages will immediately affect the flow of vital equipment to Ukraine. Even deliveries already agreed could be derailed. In June 2025, during the so-called 12-day war with Iran, the US diverted some 20,000 missiles from Ukraine to the Middle East.

Russia is unlikely to face any similar constraints. On the contrary, a Russian-Iranian deal in late 2022 enabled Moscow to acquire technology from Tehran that allowed the Kremlin to kick-start domestic drone production based on the Iranian Shahed design. Not only has Russia improved the drones, it now also produces them faster and cheaper than Iran ever did.

If western military supplies to Ukraine now dry up even temporarily as a result of an increased focus of the US on the Middle East, Russia’s air superiority and the devastating impact its relentless campaign of missile and drone strikes has had on Ukraine is likely to continue for some time.

At the same time this drives home the point that dependence on the US puts Ukraine and its European allies in an unacceptably precarious position. Ukraine’s own defence industry already meets half of the country’s needs, and the fallout from Iran war will probably further accelerate homegrown military production and innovation across Europe as the traditional US-European alliance frays.

Transatlantic relationships fraying

In the short term, transatlantic decoupling will serve Moscow’s interests more than Kyiv’s. European countries, including the UK, France, and Spain, have been critical of US and Israeli attacks on Iran, earning them the expected rebukes from Trump.

The White House might be too busy to follow through on threats “to cut off all trade” with Spain, but it will equally not put much effort into already fraught mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine. Given the dismal performance of Trump’s own efforts and those of his negotiation team, as well as the pressure that the US had put on Ukraine rather than Russia to cut a deal, this may not be much of a loss.

But US diplomatic disengagement from the Russian war against Ukraine still poses a problem. The US is the only country with the leverage to bring both sides together and – if Trump were to decide so – achieve a just and sustainable peace agreement.

Ukraine and its European partners may be able to prevent a Russian victory, but it will take some time for them to develop the military and political muscle to force Russia to make meaningful concessions that could pave the way towards a settlement.

If nothing else, Trump’s war of choice in the Middle East will be another factor in prolonging the war against Ukraine. Regardless of its short-term effects, it will not make a Russian victory more likely. But it has thrown the world into additional turmoil for no good reason, and it will delay the much-needed restoration of peace in Europe.

The Conversation

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

ref. What the conflict in Iran means for Putin and Ukraine – https://theconversation.com/what-the-conflict-in-iran-means-for-putin-and-ukraine-277298

Le télétravail peut-il vraiment réduire nos émissions de CO₂ liées à la mobilité ?

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Bérangère Legendre, Professor, Université Savoie Mont Blanc

En France, aujourd’hui, plus d’un salarié du secteur privé sur cinq télétravaille au moins une fois par mois.
Chris Montgomery/Unsplash, CC BY

Intuitivement, la généralisation du télétravail ne peut qu’avoir certainement un effet bénéfique sur nos émissions de gaz à effet de serre, mais, lorsqu’on examine les chiffres, cela se révèle moins probant.


Télétravailler pour réduire son empreinte carbone : l’idée semble évidente. Moins de trajets domicile-travail, moins de voitures sur les routes, donc moins d’émissions. Cette intuition a largement accompagné l’essor du télétravail depuis la crise sanitaire.

En France, plus d’un salarié du secteur privé sur cinq télétravaille aujourd’hui au moins une fois par mois. Ils n’étaient que 4 % avant la crise sanitaire. Or, les trajets entre le domicile et le travail représentent une part importante des émissions de gaz à effet de serre liées aux déplacements. Entre 1999 et 2019, la distance entre le domicile et le travail a augmenté en France, en particulier pour les habitants des zones rurales. Près du trois quarts de ces trajets se font en voiture, et cette part dépasse 90 % dans les zones peu denses. En moyenne, en 2019 un salarié émettait donc environ 700 kg de CO₂ par an pour ses seuls déplacements domicile-travail, et jusqu’à 1,3 tonne pour les personnes qui se déplacent le plus.

Dans ce contexte, le télétravail pourrait apparaître donc comme une solution évidente : en supprimant une partie de ces déplacements, les émissions devraient mécaniquement diminuer. Mais cette logique suppose que le télétravail n’affecte que les trajets entre le domicile et le travail, sans modifier les autres comportements de mobilité, ce qui est loin d’être évident.

Du côté des chiffres

Pour mieux comprendre ces dynamiques, nous avons mené une grande enquête entre décembre 2022 et février 2023 auprès de 3 530 actifs français, qui ne télétravaillaient pas avant la crise sanitaire. Une partie d’entre eux est passée au télétravail après 2020, ce qui permet de comparer leurs comportements de mobilité avant et après cette transition.

À première vue, les résultats semblent sans appel. Les télétravailleurs émettent moins d’équivalent CO₂ pour leurs déplacements entre le domicile et le travail : environ – 34 % pour les trajets directs et – 26 % lorsque l’on inclut les détours quotidiens (courses, accompagnement des enfants, etc.). À l’échelle de l’ensemble des mobilités (hors avion), leurs émissions annuelles apparaissent également plus faibles, de l’ordre de – 12 %.

Pris tels quels, ces chiffres pourraient suffire à conclure que le télétravail est bénéfique pour le climat. Pourtant, cette lecture est incomplète, et potentiellement trompeuse.

Pourquoi comparer télétravailleurs et non-télétravailleurs ne suffit pas

Déjà, il faut noter que les télétravailleurs ne sont pas des travailleurs « comme les autres ». Ils occupent plus souvent des emplois qualifiés, résident dans des zones spécifiques, ont des revenus plus élevés et des contraintes de mobilité différentes. Autrement dit ils n’auraient pas nécessairement eu les mêmes émissions que les non-télétravailleurs, même sans télétravail.

Comparer directement ces deux groupes revient donc à confondre potentiellement l’effet du télétravail avec des différences préexistantes. Pour isoler l’effet propre du télétravail, il faut raisonner en termes d’analyse d’impact : comparer ce qui s’est effectivement produit à un scénario de référence crédible, dans lequel les mêmes individus n’auraient pas télétravaillé.

Un effet réel mais plus modeste qu’il n’y paraît

Une fois cette approche mise en œuvre, le diagnostic se nuance. Le passage au télétravail, tel qu’il s’est opéré en France entre 2020 et 2023, a entraîné une baisse des émissions liées aux déplacements domicile travail, de l’ordre de 400 kg de CO₂ par an pour les personnes télétravaillant au moins deux jours par semaine. Cet effet est robuste et s’explique directement par la réduction du nombre de trajets.

En revanche, cette baisse est en partie compensée par d’autres ajustements : légère hausse des déplacements privés, réorganisation des trajets dans la semaine, ou encore disparition de certains « détours » auparavant intégrés au trajet domicile-travail. Ces effets, appelés « effets rebond » ne suffisent pas à annuler totalement les gains, mais ils en réduisent l’ampleur.

Le télétravail, un levier utile pour réduire l’empreinte carbone liée à la mobilité, mais un levier limité

Au final, le télétravail a réduit les émissions liées à la mobilité, mais dans des proportions plus modestes que ce que l’intuition initiale laisse penser. Rapporté à l’empreinte carbone moyenne d’un Français, et sachant que tous les travailleurs ne télétravaillent pas, l’effet reste limité.

Par ailleurs, si l’enquête dont sont issus ces résultats permet de renseigner finement les habitudes hebdomadaires de mobilité et l’organisation du travail d’un échantillon représentatif de la population en emploi en France, elle n’intègre pas d’autres effets qui méritent tout autant l’attention des chercheurs : l’empreinte carbone de l’usage du numérique en situation de télétravail, ou encore les comportements de consommation d’énergie à domicile et au travail des salariés.

Faut-il en conclure que le télétravail est inutile pour le climat ? Pas nécessairement. Mais ces résultats invitent à dépasser une vision simpliste.

La question n’est pas seulement de savoir si le télétravail réduit les émissions, mais dans quelles conditions il peut réellement le faire. En effet, il est important de s’intéresser également aux mécanismes économiques de long terme qui sont à l’œuvre. C’est précisément ce que permet la modélisation théorique en économie : simuler l’ajustement de l’économie lorsque de profonds changements interviennent.

Télétravail et arbitrages sur le marché du travail

Sur le marché du travail, les individus arbitrent entre le salaire proposé et les coûts associés à l’emploi, au premier rang desquels figurent les coûts de mobilité. Plus un emploi est éloigné du domicile, plus les coûts de mobilité sont élevés, ce qui peut dissuader certains travailleurs d’accepter certaines offres d’emploi.

Le télétravail modifie donc profondément les arbitrages des travailleurs. En réduisant le nombre de jours de déplacement, il diminue le coût de mobilité associé à un emploi donné. Cela permet à certains travailleurs d’accepter des emplois plus éloignés, qu’ils n’auraient pas acceptés autrement, et améliore l’accès à l’emploi pour les personnes vivant loin des centres d’activité.

Du point de vue de l’emploi, cet effet est donc théoriquement positif. Du point de vue environnemental, il est ambigu : accepter des emplois plus éloignés peut conduire à des distances domicile-travail plus longues les jours de présence sur site.

Une segmentation spatiale des travailleurs

Le télétravail induit donc une segmentation géographique. Les travailleurs vivant loin des centres d’emploi sont plus enclins à accepter des postes offrant du télétravail, tandis que ceux vivant à proximité continuent plus souvent à travailler sur site.

Cette segmentation a un double effet. D’un côté, elle concentre le télétravail chez les travailleurs pour lesquels la réduction des déplacements est la plus importante en termes de kilomètres évités. De l’autre, elle modifie la répartition spatiale des travailleurs et influence les comportements de mobilité de l’ensemble de la population active.

Peu de travaux ont pour l’instant documenté les mobilités résidentielles liées au télétravail en France. En 2022, les économistes Marie‑Laure Breuillé, Julie Le Gallo et Alexandra Verlhiac ont cependant montré que le télétravail tendait à accentuer certaines tendances de migrations des villes vers les campagnes grâce à la flexibilité offerte par le télétravail.

Un effet rebond inattendu : le choix du véhicule

Un autre mécanisme, moins intuitif, concerne le choix du type de véhicule. Si les véhicules électriques coûtent cher à l’achat, leur utilisation au quotidien est moins onéreuse : charger son véhicule électrique coûte moins cher que faire le plein d’une voiture thermique. Les véhicules électriques deviennent donc rentables au-delà d’un certain nombre de kilomètres parcourus.

En réduisant la fréquence des déplacements domicile-travail, le télétravail peut faire passer certains travailleurs en dessous de ce seuil de rentabilité. Résultat : l’adoption des véhicules électriques peut ralentir chez certains télétravailleurs, ce qui constitue un effet rebond susceptible de réduire les gains environnementaux attendus.

Intensité du télétravail : un facteur clé

Les simulations issues des modèles montrent également que l’impact environnemental du télétravail dépend fortement de l’intensité à laquelle il est pratiqué. Un scénario dans lequel une grande proportion de travailleurs télétravaille un seul jour par semaine n’est pas nécessairement le plus favorable.

À l’inverse, une part plus réduite de travailleurs télétravaillant deux ou trois jours par semaine peut conduire à des réductions d’émissions plus importantes. Autrement dit il vaut parfois mieux peu de télétravailleurs faisant beaucoup de télétravail que beaucoup de télétravailleurs en faisant peu.

Télétravail et politiques climatiques : des interactions décisives

Enfin, le télétravail n’agit pas isolément. La modélisation théorique permet de simuler l’impact du télétravail dans un contexte où sont menées des politiques environnementales qui ne sont pas actuellement en place : que se passerait-il dans une économie avec une taxe carbone respectant la trajectoire du prix du carbone initialement prévue par le rapport Quinet ? Dirigé par l’économiste Alain Quinet pour France Stratégie, ce document de référence fixe une valeur de long terme au carbone afin d’aider l’État, les entreprises et les citoyens à orienter leurs choix vers des solutions compatibles avec la lutte contre le changement climatique.

Cette valeur donne donc une trajectoire de long terme, une référence scientifique sur laquelle s’appuyer pour fixer par exemple le niveau d’une taxe carbone compatible avec des objectifs de neutralité carbone. En France, la taxe carbone actuellement en vigueur n’a pas évolué depuis le mouvement des gilets jaunes (2018-2019), elle est donc inférieure à la trajectoire identifiée par le rapport Quinet.

Que se passerait-il en particulier si les recettes d’une telle taxe étaient reversées à la population sous forme de subvention à l’adoption du véhicule électrique ?

Dans ce contexte, une politique climatique ambitieuse peut réduire l’effet marginal du télétravail sur les émissions. Mais le télétravail peut aussi améliorer l’acceptabilité sociale de ces politiques, en réduisant la part du revenu consacrée aux coûts de transport, en particulier pour les travailleurs les plus éloignés des centres d’emploi.

Penser le télétravail comme un outil parmi d’autres

Le télétravail peut donc contribuer à la décarbonation des mobilités, mais seulement sous certaines conditions : intensité suffisante, articulation avec les politiques de mobilité et prise en compte des effets rebond.

La question n’est donc pas de savoir si le télétravail est bon ou mauvais pour le climat, mais comment l’intégrer intelligemment dans une stratégie plus large de transformation des mobilités et de l’organisation du travail.

The Conversation

Bérangère Legendre a reçu des financements de la chaire de l’économie environnementale (CLEE).

Sarah Le Duigou ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Le télétravail peut-il vraiment réduire nos émissions de CO₂ liées à la mobilité ? – https://theconversation.com/le-teletravail-peut-il-vraiment-reduire-nos-emissions-de-co-liees-a-la-mobilite-276989

À quelles conditions le télétravail peut-il bénéficier à l’environnement ?

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Erwann Fangeat, Coordinateur de pole, Ademe (Agence de la transition écologique)

Le télétravail s’est installé depuis quelques années dans nos habitudes professionnelles. Il peut contribuer à la décarbonation de l’économie… mais seulement à certaines conditions. Ses bénéfices restent par ailleurs marginaux au regard d’autres efforts à mener.


En 2024, 22 % des salariés du secteur privé télétravaillaient au moins une fois par mois, selon l’Insee. Le télétravail intensif, c’est-à-dire supérieur à trois jours hebdomadaires, qui avait connu un boom à la suite de la pandémie de Covid-19, est de son côté en diminution. Si elle n’est pas encore stabilisée, la pratique semble de toute façon appelée à s’inscrire dans le temps.

Dans le cadre d’un travail mené à la demande de l’État sur le rôle que pourrait jouer le numérique dans la décarbonation de l’économie, l’Agence de la transition écologique (Ademe) a évalué quels effets sur l’environnement pourrait avoir une généralisation du télétravail et à quelles conditions ils sont les plus bénéfiques.

Pour cela, l’Ademe a mené une analyse de cycle de vie (ACV) dite conséquentielle, qui s’intéresse aux conséquences environnementales à long terme. Le principe était de mesurer les impacts environnementaux provoqués par une massification du télétravail par rapport à un scénario de référence représentatif des pratiques de télétravail en 2025. La différence permet d’estimer les effets directs et indirects positifs et négatifs ainsi que les effets rebond.

La comparaison a ainsi porté sur trois scénarios, comparés au même scénario de référence :

  • l’un sans télétravail,
  • l’un où il serait généralisé,
  • enfin, un dernier où il serait limité.

Le scénario de massification apparaît comme intéressant sur le plan environnemental, mais le bilan des effets est très contrasté et dépend de certains facteurs précis.

Une baisse des déplacements en voiture

Le principal effet positif de la massification du télétravail concerne les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et la consommation de ressources fossiles qu’il permettrait d’éviter. Cela tient, avant tout, à la réduction des déplacements en voiture.

L’étude a été menée sur trois types de territoire : les petites « aires d’attraction » (50 000 à 200 000 habitants), les moyennes (200 000 à 700 000 habitants) et les grandes (plus de 700 000 habitants).

Elle montre que ce bénéfice se vérifie surtout dans les petites aires d’attraction, où le nombre de télétravailleurs a le plus de probabilités d’augmenter par rapport au scénario de référence, et où la dépendance à la voiture individuelle est plus forte du fait de trajets plus longs et de transports en commun moins présents. Dans ces zones, le télétravail peut éviter jusqu’à 8 kg d’équivalent CO₂ par habitant et par an.

D’autres effets positifs pourraient être observés en cas de généralisation du télétravail, comme la fermeture temporaire de certains bureaux permettant d’en abaisser le chauffage, ou encore une moindre construction de nouvelles surfaces de bureau.

Des effets indirects à prendre en compte

Le bilan n’est toutefois pas entièrement rose. Travailler chez soi induit souvent une hausse du chauffage à domicile, surtout en hiver. Cela représente en moyenne 1,4 kilowattheure (kWh) supplémentaire par jour, soit entre 3,5 % et 7 % de la consommation journalière d’un foyer, selon une étude menée en 2023 par l’Ademe et l’Institut français pour la performance du bâtiment (IFPEB) sur l’impact énergétique du télétravail.

Un autre impact négatif est l’achat de mobilier (fauteuil) ou d’équipements informatiques (écran supplémentaire) ainsi que l’utilisation de la connexion Internet du domicile. Cela peut peser sur l’épuisement des ressources, quand on sait les coûts environnementaux et les dépendances générés par la numérisation de la société : un smartphone contient à lui seul une cinquantaine de métaux, par exemple.

Par ailleurs, le télétravail peut avoir des effets indirects sur les déplacements, en engendrant des trajets supplémentaires. Par exemple pour des courses, qui autrefois étaient réalisées sur le chemin du travail, ou bien en provoquant des déménagements vers des zones plus éloignées. Tous ces effets peuvent atténuer les gains évoqués précédemment.

Une pratique à organiser

Certaines pratiques organisationnelles pourraient limiter ces effets négatifs et maximiser l’impact positif du télétravail.

Sur la gestion des bâtiments, une fermeture totale de l’édifice pendant au moins 48 heures permettrait, selon une expérimentation menée par l’Ademe et l’IFPEB sur dix bâtiments administratifs, de diminuer leur consommation énergétique quotidienne de 25 % à 40 % grâce à l’arrêt du chauffage, de l’éclairage et de la ventilation dans les locaux vides. On peut maximiser cet effet en privilégiant un télétravail total et simultané de tous les travailleurs sur certains jours de la semaine.

En outre, favoriser le télétravail en été et encourager le recours des télétravailleurs à des tiers-lieux à proximité de leur logement peut limiter son effet rebond sur le chauffage à domicile.

L’autre dimension porte sur les pratiques numériques : une meilleure gestion des outils est indispensable pour contenir leurs effets néfastes. Il s’agit, par exemple, de couper la caméra lors d’une visioconférence pour réduire par dix la consommation de données ou de privilégier le Wi-Fi au réseau mobile.

Un bilan positif à relativiser

L’analyse multicritères utilisée ici s’est intéressée à une quinzaine d’indicateurs, dont les trois principaux sont les gaz à effet de serre, l’épuisement des ressources fossiles et l’épuisement des ressources métalliques. Dans chaque cas, l’étude fait le bilan net entre les gains et les pertes. Le résultat montre que la massification du télétravail est positive sur la plupart des indicateurs d’un point de vue environnemental.

Toutefois, elle révèle aussi que ces gains sont assez modestes, en particulier sur les gaz à effet de serre, au regard des objectifs de décarbonation des déplacements en voiture à l’échelle d’une collectivité. La massification du télétravail y contribuerait, selon le type d’agglomération, à hauteur seulement de 2 % à 4 %.

En outre, ces gains risquent de diminuer dans le temps, puisqu’ils sont principalement liés à la mobilité, appelée à s’électrifier. Une moindre utilisation de la voiture aura donc moins de bénéfices à l’avenir. Par conséquent, le télétravail, s’il participe à la décarbonation, ne doit pas se substituer à des efforts de décarbonation plus profonds : il fait partie de la solution, mais dans des proportions très modestes.

The Conversation

Erwann Fangeat ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. À quelles conditions le télétravail peut-il bénéficier à l’environnement ? – https://theconversation.com/a-quelles-conditions-le-teletravail-peut-il-beneficier-a-lenvironnement-275684

Congo-Brazzaville : face à une opposition divisée, Sassou Nguesso en route pour prolonger son règne

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Ngodi Etanislas, enseignant-chercheur, Université Marien Ngouabi

Les Congolais se rendront aux urnes le 15 mars 2026 pour élire leur président, dans un contexte marqué par une majorité présidentielle structurée et une opposition fragmentée, incapable de présenter un candidat unique. Le Parti congolais du travail (PCT), au pouvoir depuis la fin de la guerre civile de 1997, et ses alliés exercent un contrôle étendu sur l’appareil de l’État et les organes électoraux. La participation des citoyens, notamment celle des jeunes aspirant au changement, reste un enjeu crucial pour la légitimité du vote, mais l’apathie et le désintérêt réduisent son impact potentiel.

La crédibilité du processus électoral est également contestée, avec des inquiétudes sur l’accès des opposants aux médias publics, la fiabilité du fichier électoral et l’impartialité de la Commission nationale électorale indépendante. Etanislas Ngodi a étudié, entre autres, les systèmes politiques et les dynamiques partisanes au Congo-Brazzaville. Il s’est entretenu avec The Conversation Africa sur les enjeux du scrutin présidentiel.


Quels facteurs institutionnels ou politiques vous paraissent les plus décisifs pour l’issue du scrutin ?

Le scrutin présidentiel du 15 mars 2026 est marqué par une majorité structurée et organisée, une opposition fragilisée et en quête d’unité et un espace civique rétréci.

La mise en place par le Parti congolais du travail et ses alliés de conditions visant la conservation du pouvoir se traduit par un verrouillage du processus électoral. Celui-ci s’opère notamment à travers le contrôle de l’appareil d’État (administration, sécurité, médias publics) et des organes de gestion des élections (Commission nationale électorale indépendante, Direction générale des affaires électorales, Cour constitutionnelle, etc.).

Le président sortant Denis Sassou Nguesso s’appuie aussi sur le soutien de son parti et de ses alliés à travers la mobilisation politique de ses membres et l’ancrage institutionnel et administratif. Il mise également sur la création de réseaux clientélistes pour assurer une large victoire dès le premier tour.

Autour du candidat se greffent des dynamiques politiques et citoyennes de mobilisation incluant toutes les couches sociales. Parmi elles figure le Patriarche, mouvement de soutien politique centré sur Denis Sassou Nguesso, connu sous l’appellation « Vague bleue ». On note aussi le mouvement Timonier, incarné par le parti au pouvoir (PCT) comme dispositif politico-idéologique de mobilisation, ainsi que d’autres dynamiques telles que Pona Ekolo, dirigé par Hugues Ngouelondelé.

Par ailleurs, l’opposition congolaise aborde le scrutin en rangs dispersés. Elle a été incapable de trouver un consensus pour une candidature unique, réduisant fortement les chances d’une alternance démocratique dans le pays. Six candidats d’opposition sans véritable base politique sont officiellement en lice. Il s’agit de Joseph Kignoumbi Kia Mboungou, Nganguia Engambe-Anguios, Dave Uphreim Mafoula, Destin Melaine Gavet Elengo, Vivien Romain Manangou et Mabio Mavoungou Zinga.

Certaines figures historiques de l’opposition ayant marqué la scène politique au cours des dix dernières années (Mathias Dzon, Clément Miérassa, Claudine Munari, etc.) n’ont pas réussi à former une coalition solide susceptible de concurrencer efficacement le pouvoir en place.

L’opposition parlementaire, incarnée par l’Union panafricaine pour la démocratie sociale (UPADS) de l’ancien président Pascal Lissouba et l’Union des démocrates et humanistes-Yuki (UDH-YUKI) de Guy Brice Parfait Kolélas, décédé en mars 2021, a brillé par son boycott. Elle évoque des problèmes de gouvernance électorale (biométrie, fiabilité du fichier électoral, impartialité des organes de gestion des élections, etc).

L’impact d’actions pré-électorales a été manifeste à travers les opérations de répression, les intimidations et pressions politiques mises en place par le pouvoir à la veille du scrutin. L’opération de lutte contre criminalité urbaine et la délinquance juvéniles lancée en novembre 2025 par la Direction générale de la sécurité présidentielle (DGST) en est une. Il y a également les attaques des 11 et 13 janvier 2026 dans le département du Pool (sud-ouest du pays) ont visé à créer un climat de peur et de terreur parmi les opposants et activistes. Cette situation remet en question les conditions de concurrence libre et équitable du scrutin.




Read more:
Cameroun, Guinée équatoriale, Congo : les guerres de succession menacent la stabilité régionale


Quel impact la participation électorale pourrait-elle avoir sur l’équilibre des forces en présence ?

Les enquêtes Afrobarometer (rounds 9 et 10) réalisées dans le pays en 2023 et 2024 montrent que près de 53,4 % des répondants avaient déclaré avoir voté lors des dernières élections. Quelque 41,6 % des répondants affirmaient ne pas avoir voté pour diverses raisons. Parmi celles-ci figurent la non-inscription sur les listes électorales (13,1 %).

Il y a également le désintérêt pour la politique et l’apathie au vote (12,1 %), le manque de temps (4,3 %) et l’absence de candidats ou de partis politiques proches du peuple (4,7 %). D’autres motifs évoqués concernaient le manque de confiance dans le processus électoral, notamment envers les organes de gestion des élections.

Les expériences électorales passées ont montré comment la participation électorale demeurait un déterminant de légitimité et de crédibilité. L’un des enjeux de ce scrutin demeure le taux de participation, signe de légitimité populaire pour l’élection et le vainqueur.

A ce sujet, l’absence de candidats de taille face au président sortant, les appels au boycott lancés par l’opposition radicale et l’apathie des citoyens aux processus électoraux pourraient entraîner une faible participation.

Comment la participation électorale peut-elle influencer l’équilibre politique du scrutin présidentiel ?

Les débats autour des processus électoraux dans le pays se concentrent généralement sur l’écart entre les chiffres officiels annoncés par le ministère de l’Intérieur et les observations sur le terrain, faites par les organisations de la société civile et les partisans de l’opposition. Ils portent également sur l’impact du désengagement citoyen. Toutefois, le niveau de participation ne pourrait pas changer l’équilibre politique à l’issue de cette élection.

Pour lutter contre l’abstention élevée, le pouvoir en place pourrait s’appuyer sur les stratégies clientélistes pour susciter une forte participation citoyenne. De son côté, l’opposition radicale pourrait mettre en avant l’intrigue selon laquelle, l’élection en cours n’a pas d’enjeu majeur, faute de challenger crédible face au président sortant, comparablement à l’élection présidentielle du 20 mars 2016.




Read more:
En Afrique centrale et orientale, le sacre des « démocraties puissantes et durables »


Lors de ce scrutin, Denis Sassou Nguesso faisait face à des opposants de taille (Jean‑Marie Michel Mokoko, André Okombi Salissa, Guy Brice Parfait Kolelas …). Cette stratégie pourrait susciter une faible participation des électeurs au vote et renforcerait le désintérêt ou le découragement des jeunes et/ou nouveaux électeurs aspirant au renouvellement de la classe politique.

Dans quelle mesure la crédibilité du processus électoral pèsera-t-elle sur les résultats finaux ?

La question de la crédibilité du scrutin constitue l’un des enjeux les plus sensibles de cette élection. Elle ne détermine pas seulement qui gagne, mais aussi comment le résultat est accepté, interprété et comment il assure la stabilité politique post-électorale. Au regard des lacunes susmentionnées en ce qui concerne la gouvernance électorale, il est évident que le manque de transparence, de caractère inclusif et d’équité dans le cadre du scrutin de mars 2026 suscite des contestations, même par les perdants.

Les élections organisées régulièrement depuis 2002 ont souvent été considérées comme peu compétitives et peu transparentes par des observateurs. Parmi eux figurent notamment les missions d’observation électorale internationales, les organisations de la société civile congolaise et certains analystes politiques. Ces derniers soulignent notamment des dysfonctionnements majeurs concernant l’accès équitable aux médias, comme le déséquilibre de couverture dans les médias publics et les restrictions ou intimidations envers certains candidats.

Des inquiétudes persistent aussi quant à la fiabilité du fichier électoral (audit indépendant du fichier, radiation des doublons et des personnes décédées, inscription des nouveaux majeurs et transparence dans l’affichage des listes, etc.).

La confiance accordée à la Commission nationale électorale indépendante (CNEI) fait également l’objet de débats récurrents sur son impartialité. Ces critiques portent notamment sur le mode de désignation des membres, l’équilibre entre majorité, opposition et société civile, ainsi que sur la capacité logistique (distribution du matériel, formation des agents, remontée des résultats).

L’opposition radicale, pour avoir opté pour le boycott, n’aura moins de légitimité pour mobiliser des recours ou des contestations. Elle facilite ainsi l’acceptation des décisions des institutions électorales par les différentes parties prenantes.

Comment la longévité politique de Denis Sassou Nguesso influence-t-elle la compétition électorale actuelle ?

Le président sortant, Denis Sassou Nguesso au pouvoir depuis 1979, constitue l’un des facteurs structurants majeurs de la compétition électorale du 15 mars 2026 en République du Congo. Son ancienneté ne joue pas seulement sur son image, mais sur l’architecture même du champ politique. Son parti, le PCT, contrôle largement l’appareil d’État, y compris les moyens de communication, les ressources publiques locales et une grande part de l’administration mobilisée dans le cadre de sa campagne électorale.

Après quatre décennies au sommet de l’État, le président Denis Sassou Nguesso a façonné les équilibres institutionnels. Il continue d’influencer les nominations dans l’administration, les forces de sécurité et les institutions clés (parlement, commission électorale, conseils consultatifs, etc.).

La longévité est présentée par les partisans du pouvoir comme un gage d’expérience politique, notamment à travers la maîtrise des équilibres internes et le bilan des différents projets de société (communication centrée sur les infrastructures, les projets publics et la paix, etc.). Elle est également perçue comme un facteur de stabilité politique et sécuritaire, constituant une garantie de continuité institutionnelle.

Pour l’opposition, elle contribue à la restructuration du paysage partisan, la marginalisation de certaines figures historiques et l’émergence des oppositions divisées ou personnalisées par le pouvoir. Dans ce contexte, émergent des discours sur le renouvellement qui deviennent plus audibles, la nécessité pour les jeunes de solliciter le changement de système politique et les aspirations à une alternance générationnelle.

The Conversation

Ngodi Etanislas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Congo-Brazzaville : face à une opposition divisée, Sassou Nguesso en route pour prolonger son règne – https://theconversation.com/congo-brazzaville-face-a-une-opposition-divisee-sassou-nguesso-en-route-pour-prolonger-son-regne-277442

Iran war fallout: risks for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in March 2026 marks the end of a political era in the Middle Eastern country. Khamenei was killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s capital, Tehran. This has triggered a war drawing in numerous countries across the Middle East.

The Horn of Africa and Red Sea regions, which link Africa and the Middle East, share a dense web of military, political and economic interactions that enable crises on one shore to quickly affect the other. Here, Somalia, Eritrea, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti sit along one of the world’s most important trade and geopolitical corridors.

But the consequences of Khamenei’s death may be less dramatic than many expect. This is because power in Iran is dispersed across entrenched institutions and security elites who are capable of preserving regime continuity.

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea

Iran is no stranger to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. During the 1990s and 2000s, Tehran established security and economic ties with several countries, notably Sudan, to gain a foothold along the Red Sea.

Iran’s influence waned, however, during the 2010s as Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, increased their diplomatic, financial and military presence.

As a political scientist studying Middle Eastern and African security, I have followed Iran’s regional engagement for years. From my perspective, events in Iran and the Gulf matter to African countries because conflicts, arms flows and rivalries can easily spill across shores in a single strategic region.

Three intertwined dynamics shape how Khamenei’s death affects the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Firstly, Tehran’s influence here has declined over the past decade. This is with the exception of Yemen, where Iran supports the Houthi movement, which has previously attacked Israeli-linked vessels.




Read more:
Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing


Secondly, the way this latest conflict was triggered and has escalated may be more important than a change in Iranian leadership. It could contribute to a broader erosion of moderation.

Thirdly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Iran’s powerful military force – is set to play a pivotal role in the post-Khamenei transition.

This is significant for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Iran’s engagement here has largely relied on unconventional methods. Naval manoeuvres are an example, such as the long-term deployment in the Red Sea of the Iranian vessel Saviz, which has served as a logistical and intelligence platform. The country has also deployed military advisers and established arms networks to transport Iranian weapons.

Any future leadership closely aligned with the IRGC is likely to keep using these low-cost tools.

In this sense, continuity will likely prevail over rupture. Iran’s ambitions are filtered through a sober assessment of constraints that the ongoing war may entrench.

Iran’s shifting priorities

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has considered itself a middle power with legitimate claims to regional pre-eminence. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa gradually became part of Iran’s expanded strategic geography.

Following the consolidation of the regime promoted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei – who took over in 1989 after his predecessor’s death – progressively translated Iran’s ambition into strategic depth.

This aimed to extend Iran’s security perimeter beyond its borders through alliances, proxies and low-cost commitments.

In the 2000s, Iran cultivated close ties with Sudan and Eritrea.

It established naval access points in the two countries and used soft power tools, such as development aid and religious networks. It considered the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which is between Yemen and Djibouti, vital for countering Saudi and Israeli influence and maintaining alternative trade routes.

The limitations of this expansion became apparent, however.

Iran’s ambitions soon came up against reality. The country’s economy was weakened by sanctions linked to its nuclear programme and US withdrawal from a 2015 nuclear deal.




Read more:
Iran will respond to US-Israeli strikes as existential threats to the regime – because they are


Meanwhile, political power remained fragmented across competing institutions. Domestic pressures, including economic hardship and periodic protest movements, were mounting. Instability in neighbouring states such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen made long-term regional power projection costly and uncertain.

After 2015, Saudi Arabia increased its engagement in the Horn of Africa through financial aid, diplomatic pressure and military cooperation linked to the war in Yemen.

Seeking logistical support along the Red Sea and aiming to counter Iran’s influence near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, Saudi Arabia strengthened its ties with regional governments. This prompted Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea to sever or scale back their relations with Tehran. They effectively aligned themselves with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Iran redirected resources to higher-priority theatres of war, such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

For a decade, therefore, Tehran’s presence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea has become more selective and opportunistic. Iran has relied on indirect leverage there, such as Houthi operations, rather than direct expansion.

Khamenei’s death is likely to reinforce rather than reverse the trend. In fact, the outcome of the current war and the start of a delicate succession process could prompt an even more cautious approach abroad.

Worsening fragility

Although a change in Iranian leadership may not alter the approach to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the dynamics that led to the recent conflict may have an impact on the region.

The scale and visibility of the Israeli-US attack – and Iran’s direct retaliation – signal something deeper: the erosion of thresholds in the use of force.

Iran is not buying time and avoiding direct confrontation while limiting the manoeuvre room of its rivals.

This could usher in a period of “anything goes”.

Regional actors, from Gulf states to local governments, are likely to feel increasingly justified in bypassing established security norms. The Red Sea has already become a crowded arena. External powers are projecting their strength. Local states are exploiting competition among them. The reshuffling of forces triggered by the war in Iran will have repercussions throughout the region.

In such a context, characterised by multiple hierarchies, even a reduction of Iranian capabilities could have knock-on effects.

The region’s fragility – as seen in civil war in Sudan, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, instability in Somalia and the heavy presence of military bases along maritime routes – amplifies these risks.

In other words, the question is not whether Iran will suddenly expand into east Africa. It is whether the regional climate will shift towards fewer restrictions and greater acceptance of coercive tools.

If escalation becomes normalised in the heart of the Middle East – the region’s most interconnected theatre – the fallout could be felt in places like the Horn of Africa.

Uncertainty in the short term

Khamenei’s death is likely to generate uncertainty in the short term at the regional level, but will lead to continuity in the long term.

Over time, Tehran has adopted what can be termed a “realist defence” doctrine – deterrence through a strong indirect presence, but at reduced cost and risk.

Iran’s view of international politics as a zero-sum game – where one actor’s gain is another’s loss – and its desire to reduce the influence of its rivals are not merely the result of personal legacies. Rather, they are deeply rooted in the country’s identity.

For the Horn of Africa, this means that Tehran is likely to remain a secondary but persistent player: active enough to hinder its rivals’ strategies, yet restrained enough to avoid major commitments.

The Conversation

Federico Donelli is affiliated with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), and the Orion Policy Institute (OPI).

ref. Iran war fallout: risks for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa – https://theconversation.com/iran-war-fallout-risks-for-the-red-sea-and-the-horn-of-africa-277512

The world’s largest climate finance deal was built to flounder: why funding fails to reach the front-line

Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Nikita Sud, Professor of the Politics of Development, University of Oxford

Adopted in December 2015, the Paris Agreement commits countries to keeping global temperature rise below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

All 195 signatories set their own plans to meet this shared goal. However, UN climate negotiations acknowledge that wealthy nations bear the greatest responsibility for climate change.

Because of their wealth and historically higher emissions, developed countries made a nonbinding commitment in Paris to raise at least US$100 billion a year by 2025 to help developing nations shift to renewable energy and adapt to climate change.

But for developing countries such as Indonesia, meeting these targets is not just a matter of political will. It requires massive financial mobilisation, and current funding levels may not be enough to bridge the gap.

The trillion-dollar gap

The OECD says the US$100 billion target was met for the first time in 2022. Still, many countries in the Global South — across Asia, Africa and Latin America — argue the funds are far from enough.

At every UN climate summit since Paris, countries in the Global South have called for more funding to meet tougher climate targets.

At the second-to-last summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, developed countries agreed to “help channel” at least US$300 billion a year to developing countries by 2035. But the Global South countries pushed for more.

In 2025, COP30 held in Belem in Brazil called for mobilising at least US$1.3 trillion a year by 2035 for climate action.

Where does the money promised by the industrialised, developed Global North to the South for historical overuse of the global carbon budget actually go, and what does it fund? And does it really help countries on the front-line of climate change to cut emissions and adapt to its effects?

To find out, I examined the largest climate finance deal signed between several developed countries and a Global South country, Indonesia.

Not a partnership

Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country and the 17th largest economy. It is also the largest exporter of coal, and an archipelago of more than 17,500 islands that are highly vulnerable to rising seas and intensifying storms.

A coal power plant.
Indonesia must wean its power sector off coal to decarbonise.
Cpaulfell/Shutterstock

To meet the Paris climate goals, Indonesia pledged to source 29% of its energy from renewables by 2030 — or 41% with international support. In 2022, that support seemed to arrive through a US$20 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP).

JETPs are designed to help fast-growing, coal-reliant emerging economies speed up their shift to clean energy. The funding blends public and private money, including grants, concessional loans, and commercial debt and equity investments.

Despite the size of this supposed transfer of wealth, my research indicates that Indonesia’s JETP has delivered very little so far.

One reason is governance. The JETP secretariat — meant to serve as the agreement’s planning hub — had to get its policy and investment plans approved by developed-country partners. Although it was chaired by an Indonesian appointed by the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry, there was no dedicated funding to hire a proper JETP team.

Once touted as Indonesia-led, the JETP was soon beholden to the interests of developed countries. Its working groups for technical planning, policy, finance and justice were funded respectively by the OECD-led International Energy Agency, the Washington-headquartered World Bank, the multilateral Asian Development Bank (whose largest shareholders are the US and Japan) and the UN Development Programme.

Companies from the donor countries also dominated discussions about JETP funding. One of the first proposed projects was the early closure of the Cirebon-1 coal power plant in Java, the largest stake of which is owned by Japan’s Marubeni Corp (32.5%). Recent reports indicate the plans to retire the plant early have now been shelved.




Baca juga:
Global tensions demand a faster energy transition — why does Indonesia still rely on fossil fuel imports?


‘An instrument of control’

“Justice” is a common tagline in climate finance initiatives, including JETPs.

My research shows that JETP documents include justice “standards”, such as preserving cultural heritage or respecting labour rights. But these remain guidelines that are not legally binding.

According to the JETP secretariat, by mid-2024, 19 programmes totalling US$144.6 million had been launched, or were in the final phase of discussions. Yet, Eco-Business reported in October 2024 that none of the pledged transition finance had “translated into new clean energy projects or the early retirement of coal-fired power plants”.

Instead, the initial funding from the US, Germany and Canada was reportedly going towards paying consultants for feasibility studies or technical assistance.

Follow-on funding to build renewable projects is not guaranteed after feasibility studies have concluded. In fact, some programmes credited to JETP assistance, like Germany’s energy transition mechanism partnership fund, were already sanctioned under other schemes, like the Asian Development Bank’s flagship Energy Transition Mechanism. This is not JETP-specific cash that will add to an Indonesia-led energy transition.

A worker attends a solar panel.
Under threat: funding for solar power production in Indonesia.
Kemarrravv13/Shutterstock

Indonesian policymakers I have spoken to are candid about the politics of climate finance. They see it as driven less by justice than by self-interest. One policymaker in the energy sector described the JETP as “an instrument of control” used by G7 countries to counter China’s influence in Southeast Asia.

At the onset of Trump’s second presidency, with a US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement — and from Indonesia’s JETP — looming, Indonesian policymakers began calling JETP a failure. Others took a more pragmatic view, suggesting the process had accelerated discussion around energy transition in Indonesia.

Today, as developed economies face fiscal pressures and rethink their aid budgets, climate finance — often drawn from aid commitments — looks increasingly uncertain.

As climate funding tightens, justice for historical emissions and support for those disadvantaged by the renewable transition risk slipping further down the agenda. The same fate might await substantive partnerships between developed and developing countries to meet climate goals.




Baca juga:
If Australia and Indonesia agreed to end new thermal coal mines, it could drive the green transition.



The Conversation

Nikita Sud menerima dana dari Oxford University’s John Fell OUP Research Fund (Number 0012658) and a Leverhulme Research Fellowship (RF-2024-551).

ref. The world’s largest climate finance deal was built to flounder: why funding fails to reach the front-line – https://theconversation.com/the-worlds-largest-climate-finance-deal-was-built-to-flounder-why-funding-fails-to-reach-the-front-line-273805

GLP-1 drugs may fight addiction across every major substance, according to a study of 600,000 people

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Ziyad Al-Aly, Clinical Epidemiologist, Washington University in St. Louis

With GLP-1 drugs becoming more accessible and affordable, they could also be within reach for substance use treatment. Michael Siluk/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

A patient of mine, a veteran who had tried to quit smoking for over a decade, told me that after he started a GLP-1 drug for his diabetes, he lost interest in cigarettes. He didn’t use a patch. He didn’t set a quit date. He simply lost interest. It happened without effort.

Another patient on one of these drugs for weight loss told me that alcohol had lost its pull – after years of failed attempts to quit.

People struggling with many addictions, ranging from opioids to gambling, are reporting similar experiences in clinics, on social media and around dinner tables. None of them started these drugs to quit. This pattern of people losing their cravings across a broad range of addictive substances has no precedent in medicine.

But my patients were giving me an important clue. People taking GLP-1 drugs often talk about “food noise” vanishing: the constant mental chatter about food that dominated their days simply goes quiet. But my patients were reporting that it wasn’t just food: They were noticing that the preoccupation with smoking, drinking and using drugs that drives people back despite their best intentions to stop was going quiet too.

As a physician whose patients are often on GLP-1 drugs, and as a scientist who works on answering pressing public health questionsfrom long COVID to medication safety – I saw a problem hiding in plain sight: Many addictions have no approved treatment. The few medications that exist are massively underutilized, and none works across all substances. The idea that a drug already taken by millions might do what no addiction treatment has done before was too important to ignore.

My team and I set out to test whether GLP-1 drugs – medications like semaglutide (Ozempic and Wegovy) and tirzepatide (Mounjaro and Zepbound), originally developed for diabetes and then approved for obesity – could do what no existing addiction treatment does: curb craving itself.

Our evidence strongly suggests they can.

Researchers believe that GLP-1 drugs act on reward areas of the brain that are responsible for food cravings.

Biological basis of cravings

The hormone that these drugs mimic – GLP-1 – is not only produced in the gut. It is also active in the brain, where the receptors it binds to cluster in regions governing reward, motivation and stress – the same circuitry that gets hijacked by addiction. At therapeutic doses, GLP-1 drugs cross the blood-brain barrier and dampen dopamine signaling in the brain’s core reward center, making addictive substances less rewarding.

GLP-1 drugs seem to inhibit cravings for several different substances in multiple animal models. For instance, rodents given GLP-1 drugs drink less alcohol, self-administer less cocaine and show less interest in nicotine. When researchers gave semaglutide to green vervet monkeys – primates that voluntarily drink alcohol much like humans do – the animals drank less without showing signs of nausea or changes in water intake. This suggests the drug lowered the reward value of alcohol rather than making the animals feel sick.

From animals to people

To find out whether these drugs have a similar effect on people, we turned to the electronic health records of more than 600,000 patients with Type 2 diabetes at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs – one of the largest health care databases in the world.

We designed a study that applied the rigor of randomized controlled trials – the gold standard in medicine – to real-world data. We compared people who started GLP-1 drugs to people who did not, adjusting for differences in health history, demographics and other factors, and followed both groups for three years.

My team and I asked two questions: For people already struggling with addiction, did the drugs reduce overdoses, drug-related hospitalizations and deaths? And for people with no prior substance use disorder, did GLP-1 drugs reduce their risk of developing one across all major addictive substances: alcohol, opioids, cocaine, cannabis and nicotine?

What we found was striking. In the group already struggling with addiction, there were 50% fewer deaths due to substance use among those taking GLP-1 drugs compared with those who were not. We also found 39% fewer overdoses, 26% fewer drug-related hospitalizations and 25% fewer suicide attempts. Over three years, this translated to roughly 12 fewer serious events in total per 1,000 people using GLP-1 drugs – including two fewer deaths.

Reductions of this magnitude are rare in addiction medicine – and what’s remarkable is that the finding came from drugs initially designed for diabetes, later repurposed for obesity and never intended to treat addiction.

The drugs also appeared to prevent addiction from developing in the first place. Among people with no prior substance use disorder, those taking GLP-1 drugs had an 18% lower risk of developing alcohol use disorder, a 25% lower risk of opioid use disorder and an approximately 20% lower risk of cocaine and nicotine dependence. Over three years, this translated to roughly six to seven fewer new diagnoses per 1,000 GLP-1 users.

With tens of millions of people already using GLP-1 drugs, the reductions in deaths, overdoses, hospitalizations and new diagnoses could translate into thousands of prevented serious events each year.

Converging evidence

Our findings align with a growing body of evidence.

A Swedish nationwide study of 227,000 people with alcohol use disorder found that those taking GLP-1 drugs had 36% lower risk of alcohol-related hospitalizations. This is more than double the 14% reduction that the same study found with naltrexone, which was the best-performing medication approved for treatment of alcohol use disorder in that analysis. Other observational studies have linked GLP-1 drugs to lower rates of new and recurring alcohol use disorder, reduced diagnoses and relapse in cannabis use disorder, fewer health care visits for nicotine dependence and lower risk of opioid overdose.

Meanwhile, randomized controlled trials that directly test whether these drugs help people with addiction also show promise. In one trial, semaglutide reduced both craving and alcohol consumption in people with alcohol use disorder. In another, dulaglutide reduced drinking. More than a dozen additional trials are already underway or actively enrolling, and several more are planned.

The future of addiction treatment

GLP-1 drugs are the first type of medication to show potential benefit across multiple substance types simultaneously. And unlike existing addiction medications, which are prescribed by specialists and remain vastly underused, GLP-1 drugs are already prescribed at enormous scale by primary care doctors. The delivery system to reach millions of patients already exists.

The consistency of GLP-1 effectiveness across alcohol, opioids, cocaine, nicotine and cannabis suggests these drugs may act on a shared vulnerability underlying addiction – not on any single substance pathway. If confirmed, that would represent a fundamental shift in how society understands addiction and how doctors treat it.

Some unanswered questions remain, though, about how these drugs would affect addiction. Many people who take GLP-1 drugs to treat obesity or diabetes discontinue them; afterward, their appetite typically returns and they regain the weight they lost. Whether the same rebound would occur with addiction, and what it would mean for someone in recovery to face the roar of craving again, is unknown. Nor is it clear whether the benefits persist over years of continuous use, or whether the brain adapts in ways that dampen those effects.

Also, because GLP-1 drugs engage the brain’s reward circuitry – the same system that governs not just craving but everyday motivation – prolonged use could, in theory, dampen motivational drive in some people. Whether that might affect real-world outcomes, such as initiative, competitive drive or performance at work, remains an open question.

Mounting research – as well as real-life success stories – paints a bright future for the use of GLP-1 drugs in addiction treatment.

What comes next

GLP-1 drugs have not been approved for addiction, and there is not yet enough evidence to prescribe them solely for that purpose. But for millions of people already weighing whether to start a GLP-1 drug for diabetes, obesity or another approved indication, it is one more factor worth considering.

A patient living with diabetes who is also trying to quit smoking might reasonably choose a GLP-1 drug over another glucose-lowering medication, not because it is approved for smoking cessation, but because it may help them quit, a benefit that other diabetes drugs do not offer. Similarly, for people living with obesity who also struggle with alcohol, the potential for benefit beyond weight loss could be one more reason to consider a GLP-1 drug.

If additional trials confirm that they effectively curb cravings across addictive substances, these drugs could begin to close one of the most consequential treatment gaps in medicine. And the most promising lead in addiction in decades will have come not from a deliberate search but from patients reporting a benefit no one anticipated. Like my patient who quit smoking after a lifetime of trying, it happened without effort.

The Conversation

Ziyad Al-Aly receives funding from U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.

ref. GLP-1 drugs may fight addiction across every major substance, according to a study of 600,000 people – https://theconversation.com/glp-1-drugs-may-fight-addiction-across-every-major-substance-according-to-a-study-of-600-000-people-275233

As International Women’s Day approaches, why is Mark Carney rejecting gender equity efforts?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jeanette Ashe, Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Women’s Leadership, King’s College London

The past year marked the 30th anniversary of the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the world’s most comprehensive plan to achieve the equal rights of women and girls.

Adopted in 1995, it called on governments to fight for gender equality, to protect women’s rights and to rebalance power structures so that everyone has an equitable chance in the world.

Thirty years later, Canada is still falling short. One of Beijing’s core commitments was for governments to create permanent, well-resourced institutions dedicated to advancing gender equality. Yet across Canada, some provinces still lack full, stand-alone ministries of Women and Gender Equality (WAGE), and the federal ministry of WAGE has been deprioritized.

A fragile federal commitment

Prime Minister Mark Carney initially dropped the Women and Gender Equality (WAGE) portfolio from his first cabinet, reinstating it only after pushback from women’s and social justice organizations.

More recently, reports of deep budget cuts to WAGE have renewed concern that gender equality remains politically expendable. Without sustained funding, programs vital to women’s safety and economic security could be decimated at a time when a number of urgent issues demand gender expertise.

As a recent UN Women media advisory reports, “the spread of digital misogyny poses a direct and urgent threat to progress on gender equality.” While much of this activity results in various forms of cyberbullying and harassment, the impact of these networks goes far beyond the digital world and shows up in real life spaces like our public schools.




Read more:
‘Quiet, piggy’ and other slurs: Powerful men fuel online abuse against women in politics and media


Wavering commitment

Yet, Canadian governments have done little to respond, as exemplified by AI Minister Evan Solomon’s decision against banning Elon Musk’s X or his AI chatbot Grok despite the growing problems of “nudification” and personalized pornography .

This wavering commitment echoes global patterns of institutional gender rollback, with the UN warning of a “post-feminist retrenchment.”

These trends are part of an international shift against equity and inclusion exemplified by recent court cases and policy changes in the United States — a shift glaringly evident as the Donald Trump administration blames gangs of “wine moms” for ICE protests and violence, including the killing of 37-year-old Renee Good in Minneapolis. Good’s death was described by Vice President JD Vance as a “tragedy of her own making.”

While this anti-equity rhetoric is circulating in Canada, a recent report reveals that “most Canadians view EDI measures in the workplace positively, with strong support among equity deserving groups, younger workers and those with positive job experiences.”




Read more:
Blaming ‘wine moms’ for ICE protest violence is another baseless, misogynist myth


A provincial patchwork

Six provinces currently maintain full, stand-alone ministries dedicated to women and gender equality:

By contrast, four provinces still lack a dedicated ministry:

Opaque and easily cut

When gender equality has a ministry of its own, citizens can see its budget, monitor its priorities and hold governments accountable. Where it does not, gender programs are buried inside larger departments; invisible in financial statements and easily cut.

Even federally, where WAGE exists, proposed cuts and decreased funding show how vulnerable these portfolios remain.

Carney’s mandate letter to cabinet clearly indicated a shift from his predecessor’s feminist brand. There is no reference at all to feminism or gender equality. In fact, Carney’s cuts to WAGE seem to reflect a larger rejection of feminist policies, including foreign policy.

But while governments stall, the public is ahead. Recent Abacus Data polling found that 86 per cent of Canadians support equal numbers of women and men in politics and 58 per cent support requiring political parties to nominate a minimum number of women candidates — up four points from last year.

This data shows Canadians are ready for legislated gender quotas and for the institutions needed to help deliver them. Fully funded ministries for Women and Gender Equality are one such institution.

Why now matters

The Beijing anniversary arrived amid a global gender backlash, from the rollback of reproductive rights in the U.S. to rising online abuse of women in politics. At precisely this moment, governments should be strengthening equality initiatives rather than weakening them.




Read more:
Growing threats faced by women candidates undermine our democracy


If gender equality is a priority, it’s simply not enough to celebrate the growing number of women in our legislatures. Real progress demands institutional power and stable funding of gender equality mandates. As UN Women recently reported, “achieving gender parity could cumulatively add US$342 trillion to the global economy by 2050.”

Repositioning Canada in the global hierarchy does not mean leaving 50 per cent of the population behind. Now, more than ever before, it’s critical to double down on the commitment to equity. In troubled times, leaders need to embrace equity wholesale, and taking leadership on equity must be a cornerstone of Carney’s supposed “values-based” pragmatism.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. As International Women’s Day approaches, why is Mark Carney rejecting gender equity efforts? – https://theconversation.com/as-international-womens-day-approaches-why-is-mark-carney-rejecting-gender-equity-efforts-273677

How would the Iran crisis play out in a world powered by renewables not fossil fuels?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katie Marie Manning, Lecturer in Climate Change, Business and Society, King’s College London

Imagine the escalating conflict between the US, Israel and Iran unfolding in a world powered mostly by wind, solar and batteries rather than oil and gas.

In today’s fossil-fuelled economy, markets react to Iran’s attacks on oil and gas facilities in the Gulf and the threat to close the strait of Hormuz. Oil prices jump. Governments brace for inflation. Around a fifth of the world’s traded oil passes through the narrow corridor, linking the Gulf states to the wider world. When tensions rise there, energy markets react instantly.

But in a world where most energy is generated domestically from renewables, would the same threat trigger the same global shock? Would instability in the Gulf still lead to more expensive food and fuel across the world? Or would the economic aftershocks look very different?

To understand what’s at stake, we need to first look at how today’s energy system is structured.

A system built on chokepoints

For about a century, the global economy has depended on fossil fuels produced by a few producers in the Middle East. Chokepoints like the strait of Hormuz carry enormous strategic weight.

That is why the current conflict between the US, Israel and Iran reverberates so quickly through global markets. Even before any sustained disruption to supply, oil and gas prices have surged on the possibility that a major proportion of global flows could be blocked. Because oil underpins transport, agriculture and manufacturing, price spikes ripple rapidly through commodity exchanges, supply chains and into household budgets. Regional conflict can magnify into global economic turmoil within days.

Now run the same crisis in a renewable world

Return to our thought experiment. Now, imagine the same crisis unfolding in a world where energy systems were powered by renewables and electricity rather than oil and gas.

It is the same week. Same military escalation. The same rhetoric about closing the strait of Hormuz. But this time the global energy system has already largely been decarbonised.

In this alternative world, most electricity globally would be produced within national borders from wind, solar and other low-carbon sources. Road transport would be predominantly electric. Heating would rely on locally available renewable sources, such as heat pumps, domestic biomass, geothermal systems or green hydrogen. These are all tried and tested solutions. They are not a thing of the future, and yet today our global economy still gets roughly 80% of its primary energy from fossil fuels.

In the alternative scenario, what changes?

The immediate macroeconomic shock would be weaker. A disruption at the strait would still matter. Oil would still be traded in some sectors, but it wouldn’t be as central to everyday energy use. Prices would be lower because demand was falling. The automatic link between Gulf instability and global inflation would loosen.

Electricity generation would continue, largely insulated from disruption of gas supply. People with electric cars would be less directly affected by a petrol price spike. Household bills would remain unchanged as energy price rates stay stable. Governments would be less exposed to sudden demands to subsidise fuels and an inflationary shock.

Energy security would become less about controlling distant shipping lanes, and more about building a distributed and resilient domestic electricity grid, more storage capacity and diversified supply chains.

Maritime chokepoints to mineral supply chains

This does not mean energy geopolitics would disappear. It would mutate.

Renewable systems depend on critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt and so-called rare earth elements, and involve advanced manufacturing supply chains to make solar panels, wind turbines and batteries. New chokepoints could emerge in mineral processing hubs or semiconductor plants. Already there is geopolitical competition over access to rare earths.

But there are important differences. Fossil fuel reserves are geographically concentrated, which is why global trade converges on a handful of maritime routes: Hormuz, Suez, Malacca (between the Indian and Pacific Oceans) and more. Markets for oil and gas are volatile.

Renewable resources such as sunlight and wind are more widely distributed. While mineral supply chains remain uneven, and still rely heavily on a handful of producers such as China for rare earths, the Democratic Republic of the Congo for cobalt and Indonesia for nickel, they do not converge on a single chokepoint. Price changes propagate through markets for technologies much more slowly. It is easier to built strategic reserves.

In our imagined Iran crisis, power would be more diffuse, with no single state able to threaten such disruption.

Minerals being more dispersed than oil and gas, and less concentrated in a few places, reduces the kind of centralisation and “resource capture” that has historically characterised the oil industry. Global standards on community consent, transparency and environmental protections are now much stronger in mineral supply chains than they ever were for fossil fuels.

This gives local actors more leverage in a renewable-powered world. Mineral-rich regions in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia would gain new some power – not simply as resource suppliers, but through mechanisms of community consent social licence to operate and they are better able to influence whether projects proceed.

This marks a shift from the petroleum age, where power has largely been concentrated between states and multinational oil companies operating at a distance from affected communities.

The geopolitical dividend of decarbonisation

Decarbonisation is often framed as a climate necessity. It will also lead to a redistribution of geopolitical power, probably towards greater stability.

In today’s fossil fuelled system, the strait of Hormuz sits at the heart of a global economic system that ties global economic stability to the uninterrupted flow of oil – and to the military power that guards it. The current crisis exposes the fragility of that arrangement.

Running this thought experiment does not suggest that renewable energy dissolves geopolitics. In a post-oil world, the strait would still matter and resource conflicts would not vanish. But it does suggest that our fossil energy system is fragile and conflict can reverberate quickly around the world.

The Conversation

Katie Manning receives funding from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) for a Maximising Adaptation for Climate Change research project that is looking at the adaptive capacity of Nature-based solutions in the UK. Katie also works as a consultant on the current Defra Research, Development and Evidence Framework.

Clement Sefa-Nyarko receives funding from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) for a Future Leaders Fellowship that is researching justice in critical minerals governance and energy transitions. Clement also does occasional consultancy for Participatory Development Associates for research and evaluation in Africa, but not directly related to mining.

Frans Berkhout does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How would the Iran crisis play out in a world powered by renewables not fossil fuels? – https://theconversation.com/how-would-the-iran-crisis-play-out-in-a-world-powered-by-renewables-not-fossil-fuels-277537

Hyrox is booming worldwide – here’s how to train for this race safely and effectively

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Athalie Redwood-Brown, Senior Lecturer in Performance Analysis of Sport, Nottingham Trent University

Hyrox combines cardio and strength exercise. Sandra Sev Jarocka/ Shutterstock

Once a niche challenge for hardcore athletes, Hyrox has become one of the fastest-growing fitness trends worldwide. It blends elements of endurance running with functional strength work in a way that appeals to both strength and cardio enthusiasts.

Hyrox is a fitness race designed around eight 1km runs – each paired with a strength or conditioning station. After every run, competitors complete a set number of reps or a set distance of exercises before their next 1km run. Typical exercises include sled pushes, lunges, wall balls and burpees.

This means that over the course of the event, you’ll run 8km and complete multiple high-effort strength challenges that test your stamina, strength and mental resilience.




Read more:
Hyrox: this challenging race could improve your strength, endurance and fitness – here’s the evidence


The combination of cardio and strength training that Hyrox demands may have many benefits for your heart health, muscular endurance and overall fitness. But for people new to Hyrox, it’s important to train with a plan. Rushing into hard workouts can lead to pain, injury or burnout. With smart training, you can build fitness and confidence without setbacks.

Warm-ups matter

Before every Hyrox workout, it’s extremely important you warm-up properly.

A warm-up is more than stretching. It prepares your heart, lungs, nerves and muscles to work together. Research even shows warm-ups can improve performance and reduce injury risk. Simple warm-ups also help your body move better and faster, making high-effort training safer.

There are three elements to a good warm-up:

1. Start with light exercise

Aim to do 5-8 minutes of light exercise that gets your heart pumping and increases blood flow. This can include light jogging, cycling, rowing or skipping.

This will warm the muscles, improve flexibility and help move oxygen to your cells, which fuels energy production and delays fatigue.

2. Dynamic mobility and activation

Next, spend around six to ten minutes doing dynamic mobility movements. This is a form of stretching done while moving your joints, taking them through their full range of motion.

Dynamic stretches activate your muscles and improve joint motion. Studies show this boosts performance and reduces injury risk more than static stretching alone. Some good dynamic stretches to do before your Hyrox workout or race include leg swings and walking lunges.

3. Practice specific movements

Once you’re warmed up and stretched, do some easy versions of the exercises you’re about to train. This could include a short jog, a lightweight sled push or lunges.

This helps your nervous system and muscles “talk” to each other so they coordinate movement. Better coordination improves performance and reduces the risk of awkward or unstable movement patterns as the exercise becomes more intense.

Ease into training

New Hyrox athletes often feel they need to push hard every workout. But injuries can happen when you do too much too soon. This is why it’s important to progress gradually, upping the intensity a little bit each workout.

Although you might want to run the 1km as fast as you can, your initial runs should actually feel easy. A good rule of thumb is that you should be able to talk while running.

This helps build an aerobic base, which improves your heart’s ability to deliver oxygen to the working muscles during intense workouts. Ultimately, a good aerobic base will ensure you can train more intensely over time.

A woman goes for a jog in a park.
Keep your runs easy at first.
MilanMarkovic78/ Shutterstock

It’s also important to focus on technique and performing the strength and resistance movements with good form before ramping up the weights or repetitions. Good form reduces stress on joints, therefore reducing injury risk.

Another tip is to mix your training up carefully. In the first few weeks after starting Hyrox, try alternating easy runs on strength days – or do separate hard runs and strength days. This helps your body adapt.

You’ll know you’re ready to up the intensity of your workouts when your performance stays consistent, you’re able to recover well from workouts within 24-48 hours (meaning you have no lingering muscle soreness) and you’re able to maintain good technique during workouts – even when tired.

But it’s important that when you do up your workout intensity, you only increase one part of training at a time (such as the distance of your runs, the number of reps you do or the amount of weight you’re lifting). This strategy is known as periodised training, and research shows it helps performance and reduces injury risk.

Beginners should aim to train three to four days per week, focusing on a balance between running, strength and Hyrox-specific practice.

Cool-downs for recovery

Cool-downs help your body move from high effort back to rest. Research suggests gentle cool-downs may help blood flow and relaxation.

A simple cool-down should include:

  • five to ten minutes of slow walking or cycling
  • flexibility work such as functional stretches for tight areas
  • deep, slow breathing.

Although these cool-down essentials may not eliminate muscle soreness completely after a workout, it will set you up better for your next session.

Avoiding Hyrox injuries

No sport is injury-free. But given Hyrox’s intensity, it could place even more stress on the body if you’re not prepared.

Some of the most common Hyrox injuries may include calves and achilles tendon strain (from running and sled pushes), knee pain (from lunges and wall balls), lower back strain (from poor technique on sleds, burpees and farmers carries) and shoulder injuries from long carries and overhead movements.

The best ways to reduce in injury risk include:

  • gradually increasing training intensity
  • practising good form when lifting
  • getting enough sleep and proper nutrition
  • including mobility exercises and recovery days into your training plan.

Pain that lasts more than two to three days or changes how you move should be taken seriously. It’s your body telling you to slow down.

Hyrox challenges both your strength and endurance. But training doesn’t need to be confusing or risky. Smart preparation doesn’t just prevent injury it makes you stronger, faster and more confident on race day. With the right approach, your first Hyrox race can feel tough but totally achievable.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Hyrox is booming worldwide – here’s how to train for this race safely and effectively – https://theconversation.com/hyrox-is-booming-worldwide-heres-how-to-train-for-this-race-safely-and-effectively-275477