The Conversation – Africa – Page 9

March 5, 2026

Ebo Taylor took highlife to the world and changed Ghanaian music forever

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Eric Sunu Doe, Senior lecturer, University of Ghana

The news of the passing of Ghanaian highlife star Ebo Taylor on 7 February 2026 felt less like the loss of a public musical figure and more like the closing of a living chapter of Ghanaian musical knowledge. To many, he was a legendary guitarist, composer, arranger, and ambassador of Ghanaian highlife music.

Highlife music is a homegrown Ghanaian popular dance-music, believed to have emerged along the west African coast in the late 19th century. It fuses indigenous musical elements with those of the west. Several styles that characterise it include brass and regimental influenced adaha and its konkoma variants, guitar influence and the “swing” dance bands which were popular with the then emerging local elite. These styles have become the bedrock of today’s popular musical styles.

Ebo Taylor was a custodian of Ghanaian popular musical thought, of ensemble ethics (playing music in a group), and of what it meant to live inside music as a craft and community. His mentorship shaped my musical life as an ethnomusicologist and as a musician in the palmwine genre.

I first encountered him as part of the pioneering guitar class at the University of Ghana in the early 2000s. For the next few years he shaped how I played guitar, how I listened, how I arranged, and how I understood the responsibilities of being in a band. Much of what I do today in my highlife ensemble traces directly back to those encounters.

Who was Ebo Taylor?

Deroy Ebo Taylor’s life in music was inevitable and self-fashioned. He was born on 7 January 1936 in the city of Cape Coast in southern Ghana into a musical environment shaped by church and community music-making. His formal education revolved around music as practice, as his father was a known choirmaster and church organist.

By his late teens in Cape Coast, he was already involved in the dance band culture that would become the backbone of modern Ghanaian popular music. This was the time when “swing” dance band highlife was popular with many Ghanaians. Bands like the Stargazers Dance Band, the Broadway Dance Band and Tempos Dance Band would provide the sounds that shaped Ghana’s fight for independence. These sounds deepened his resolve to be a musician. He often told stories of how he would break school rules to watch or, later, perform with some of the local bands in Cape Coast.

His early music was shaped by the formal instruction he received from his father and his music teacher at secondary school (St Augustine’s College), as well as his peers and eventually the various bands he played in.

Taylor later deepened his theoretical and arranging knowledge through formal studies in London at the Eric Gilder School of Music in the early 1960s. That period placed him within a broader Black Atlantic musical conversation. It connected him to Ghanaian musicians who would later shape African popular music globally. These included saxophonist Teddy Osei and drummer Sol Amarfio, who were members of what would become the globally remowned Osibisa, and contemporaries like Nigerian music star and activist Fela Kuti, who were similarly navigating jazz, highlife and emerging African popular forms.

Highlife pioneer

When he returned to Ghana, he worked with bands, recording studios, and particularly the pioneering Ghanaian label Essiebons Records. It was with Essiebons that his creative genius became widely recognised by Ghanaians, as he contributed in shaping the sound that has become known as highlife from the 1970s. He worked with great Ghanaian musicians like Pat Thomas, C.K. Mann and Gyedu-Blay Ambolley.

His fingerprint could be heard on the songs he worked on, especially in his trademark guitar phrasing and tone, and in his horn arrangements. These included My Love and Music, Love and Death and Atwer Abroba. Some of these songs have been introduced to contemporary global audiences by being sampled by artists including the Black Eyed Peas, Jidenna, Kelly Rowland and Vic Mensa.

Scholars of highlife, including John Collins and Mark Millas Fish, have emphasised the centrality of arranger-bandleaders such as Taylor in shaping modern Ghanaian dance band music. His compositional practice, as I observed it, was quite casual with a deeper sense of reflection.

Taylor’s achievements were honoured domestically and globally. In 2014 he received a Lifetime Achievement Award.

Reflections of a mentee

For those of us who had the privilege of being his students, his greatest legacy was how he imparted knowledge to us. In his classes, he embraced us as the next generation of musicians who would be responsible for carrying the highlife tradition forward. He gave us an understanding of palmwine guitar, how to play the intricate rhythms with relative ease, and how to leave spaces for the voice to tell the stories that were meant to be told.

Today, I model my ensemble pedagogy around some of these ideals Ebo Taylor instilled in us and, as much as possible, I collaborate with professional musicians who come in to engage with my students when their time permits.

His passing marks the closing of yet another library. But we will continue to hear his voice in the numerous songs he shared with us and in those of us who are building on the knowledge he passed down.

Eric Sunu Doe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ebo Taylor took highlife to the world and changed Ghanaian music forever – https://theconversation.com/ebo-taylor-took-highlife-to-the-world-and-changed-ghanaian-music-forever-276406

March 5, 2026

Iran war fallout: risks for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in March 2026 marks the end of a political era in the Middle Eastern country. Khamenei was killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s capital, Tehran. This has triggered a war drawing in numerous countries across the Middle East.

The Horn of Africa and Red Sea regions, which link Africa and the Middle East, share a dense web of military, political and economic interactions that enable crises on one shore to quickly affect the other. Here, Somalia, Eritrea, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti sit along one of the world’s most important trade and geopolitical corridors.

But the consequences of Khamenei’s death may be less dramatic than many expect. This is because power in Iran is dispersed across entrenched institutions and security elites who are capable of preserving regime continuity.

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea

Iran is no stranger to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. During the 1990s and 2000s, Tehran established security and economic ties with several countries, notably Sudan, to gain a foothold along the Red Sea.

Iran’s influence waned, however, during the 2010s as Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, increased their diplomatic, financial and military presence.

As a political scientist studying Middle Eastern and African security, I have followed Iran’s regional engagement for years. From my perspective, events in Iran and the Gulf matter to African countries because conflicts, arms flows and rivalries can easily spill across shores in a single strategic region.

Three intertwined dynamics shape how Khamenei’s death affects the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Firstly, Tehran’s influence here has declined over the past decade. This is with the exception of Yemen, where Iran supports the Houthi movement, which has previously attacked Israeli-linked vessels.

Secondly, the way this latest conflict was triggered and has escalated may be more important than a change in Iranian leadership. It could contribute to a broader erosion of moderation.

Thirdly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Iran’s powerful military force – is set to play a pivotal role in the post-Khamenei transition.

This is significant for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Iran’s engagement here has largely relied on unconventional methods. Naval manoeuvres are an example, such as the long-term deployment in the Red Sea of the Iranian vessel Saviz, which has served as a logistical and intelligence platform. The country has also deployed military advisers and established arms networks to transport Iranian weapons.

Any future leadership closely aligned with the IRGC is likely to keep using these low-cost tools.

In this sense, continuity will likely prevail over rupture. Iran’s ambitions are filtered through a sober assessment of constraints that the ongoing war may entrench.

Iran’s shifting priorities

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has considered itself a middle power with legitimate claims to regional pre-eminence. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa gradually became part of Iran’s expanded strategic geography.

Following the consolidation of the regime promoted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei – who took over in 1989 after his predecessor’s death – progressively translated Iran’s ambition into strategic depth.

This aimed to extend Iran’s security perimeter beyond its borders through alliances, proxies and low-cost commitments.

In the 2000s, Iran cultivated close ties with Sudan and Eritrea.

It established naval access points in the two countries and used soft power tools, such as development aid and religious networks. It considered the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which is between Yemen and Djibouti, vital for countering Saudi and Israeli influence and maintaining alternative trade routes.

The limitations of this expansion became apparent, however.

Iran’s ambitions soon came up against reality. The country’s economy was weakened by sanctions linked to its nuclear programme and US withdrawal from a 2015 nuclear deal.

Meanwhile, political power remained fragmented across competing institutions. Domestic pressures, including economic hardship and periodic protest movements, were mounting. Instability in neighbouring states such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen made long-term regional power projection costly and uncertain.

After 2015, Saudi Arabia increased its engagement in the Horn of Africa through financial aid, diplomatic pressure and military cooperation linked to the war in Yemen.

Seeking logistical support along the Red Sea and aiming to counter Iran’s influence near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, Saudi Arabia strengthened its ties with regional governments. This prompted Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea to sever or scale back their relations with Tehran. They effectively aligned themselves with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Iran redirected resources to higher-priority theatres of war, such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

For a decade, therefore, Tehran’s presence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea has become more selective and opportunistic. Iran has relied on indirect leverage there, such as Houthi operations, rather than direct expansion.

Khamenei’s death is likely to reinforce rather than reverse the trend. In fact, the outcome of the current war and the start of a delicate succession process could prompt an even more cautious approach abroad.

Worsening fragility

Although a change in Iranian leadership may not alter the approach to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the dynamics that led to the recent conflict may have an impact on the region.

The scale and visibility of the Israeli-US attack – and Iran’s direct retaliation – signal something deeper: the erosion of thresholds in the use of force.

Iran is not buying time and avoiding direct confrontation while limiting the manoeuvre room of its rivals.

This could usher in a period of “anything goes”.

Regional actors, from Gulf states to local governments, are likely to feel increasingly justified in bypassing established security norms. The Red Sea has already become a crowded arena. External powers are projecting their strength. Local states are exploiting competition among them. The reshuffling of forces triggered by the war in Iran will have repercussions throughout the region.

In such a context, characterised by multiple hierarchies, even a reduction of Iranian capabilities could have knock-on effects.

The region’s fragility – as seen in civil war in Sudan, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, instability in Somalia and the heavy presence of military bases along maritime routes – amplifies these risks.

In other words, the question is not whether Iran will suddenly expand into east Africa. It is whether the regional climate will shift towards fewer restrictions and greater acceptance of coercive tools.

If escalation becomes normalised in the heart of the Middle East – the region’s most interconnected theatre – the fallout could be felt in places like the Horn of Africa.

Uncertainty in the short term

Khamenei’s death is likely to generate uncertainty in the short term at the regional level, but will lead to continuity in the long term.

Over time, Tehran has adopted what can be termed a “realist defence” doctrine – deterrence through a strong indirect presence, but at reduced cost and risk.

Iran’s view of international politics as a zero-sum game – where one actor’s gain is another’s loss – and its desire to reduce the influence of its rivals are not merely the result of personal legacies. Rather, they are deeply rooted in the country’s identity.

For the Horn of Africa, this means that Tehran is likely to remain a secondary but persistent player: active enough to hinder its rivals’ strategies, yet restrained enough to avoid major commitments.

Federico Donelli is affiliated with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), and the Orion Policy Institute (OPI).

– ref. Iran war fallout: risks for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa – https://theconversation.com/iran-war-fallout-risks-for-the-red-sea-and-the-horn-of-africa-277512

March 4, 2026

Colonialism in Africa: archaeology offers a deeper view

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Timothy Clack, Chingiz Gutseriev Fellow, University of Oxford

Map of Africa (1722). Original from The Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Digitally enhanced by rawpixel Wikipedia Commons, CC BY

Colonialism has been a central part of history around the world, differing only in form over time and space. After all, whenever people have moved from one place to another, they have colonised spaces and other people or forms of life.

In Africa, colonialism has mostly been studied as something imposed from outside, for example from Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. A recent special issue of the journal Azania sought to address this. Scholars looked at the topic from an angle that’s so far been neglected – the archaeology and history of colonialism from within Africa.

We introduced the journal issue with an essay revisiting basic ideas, reviewing literature and presenting new case studies.

We note, for example, that colonialism has a deep and complex history. There have been different kinds and degrees of colonialism. These range from expansion, trade, exchange and sharing cultural practices to settlement, domination, exploitation, control and imperialism.

These developments have taken place in a myriad of different settings. From Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, Phoenicia, Classical Greece and Rome, and China, to multiple locations in the Americas, including the Inka and the Aztecs, and Europeans, especially after 1492.

Global and local factors shape distinctive patterns of power, subjugation, consumption, extraction, exploitation and cultural exchange through time.

Important questions emerge when this is recognised. Examples include:

what historical justice looks like
which episodes get remembered and forgotten
which victims are ignored or compensated
which colonisers face consequence.

Colonialism from outside

In the 19th and 20th centuries, during the the so-called “Scramble for Africa”, seven European countries colonised almost the whole of the continent. The signatures left behind by Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain were wide and varied. They included:

drawing national boundaries
infrastructure geared towards extraction (like megaports, railways and roads)
administration (like bicameral governments, courts and churches)
defence (military structures and installations).

European colonialism even shaped the way most of us perceive the world via the instruments used to map time and space.

Earlier, large parts of Africa were colonised by Ottoman and Arab empires. Oman, for example, colonised the Swahili coast in the 18th and 19th centuries across a territory extending from areas of Somalia through to Madagascar.

Parts of Africa which had previously been under Islamic rule, in turn, experienced European colonialism differently. This had long-term implications for education, health and economic growth.

Taken together, these legacies, over time, developed into global organising principles for imagining Africa.

But this formulation ignores African agency and political processes. It is often forgotten, for example, that the Almoravids, a dynasty which rose to power in southern Morocco during the 11th century, exerted control over European soil. Africans have been colonisers too.

Colonialism from within

Africa has also experienced diverse colonial episodes from within. Examples include empires such as Egypt and Kush in north Africa, and Dahomey and Songhai in west Africa.

Rulers of these empires sought to annex territories, establish settlements, subjugate others, control resources and impose laws and customs. The archaeological indications of these can be seen in a number of ways. They include new settlement types, changes in material culture and the adoption of new languages and religions, particularly Islam and Christianity.

Resistance to colonialism is also visible in the historical record and expressed in many ways. This included insurgencies, protests and propaganda as well as myth, art, music, literature and non-cooperation.

In the 19th century, Shaka, for example, transformed a small Zulu chieftainship in southern Africa into an aggressive and successful state that absorbed neighbouring groups. The aftershock of the Zulu expansion was the Mfecane. This was a process that saw leaders establish their own polities. Soshangane, for instance, was a Ndwandwe general defeated by Shaka who established the Gaza state in contemporary Mozambique. It incorporated in it both Shona and Tsonga people.

Another example comes from the Mursi of south-western Ethiopia. They undertook several large-scale migrations over the past 200-300 years. This movement became part of their group identity. They displaced, assimilated and dominated other populations. The material traces they left have been explored by archaeological research. This has helped to interpret their activities, and also challenges their oral histories.

Cultural exchange and innovation

Colonialism is a generative process, with innovation emerging from cultural contact, relationships between colonisers and colonised, and material exchange.

Colonial processes have multi-directional influence. European colonialism, for example, shaped how Europeans dealt with the rest of the world. And, in turn, it contributed to how the western world was constructed. Ideas and materials flowed into the metropolitan centres of Europe as much as from them. In certain respects, Britain was colonised through contact with, for example, Africa, Australasia and North America, as much as those areas were colonial creations.

Colonialism often creates victims and oppressors. But it is also about consumption, innovation and exchange.

Archaeology offers a useful way to study colonialism because it leaves material and intangible indicators which the discipline has methods to interpret.

There is a need for more work on the processes and character of colonialism within Africa. This will enable comparisons and understanding, and correct a skewed picture of world history. A richer understanding of colonialism, including neocolonialism, may also inform debates about its legacy, and about decolonisation and restitution.

Timothy Clack receives research funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), British Academy, British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA), Christensen Fund, McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), Royal Anthropological Institute, and University of Oxford.

Shadreck Chirikure receives funding from the British Academy, UKRI, the University of Oxford, the University of Cape Town, the National Research Foundation of South Africa, and the Royal Society.

– ref. Colonialism in Africa: archaeology offers a deeper view – https://theconversation.com/colonialism-in-africa-archaeology-offers-a-deeper-view-275495

March 4, 2026

Teaching mathematical statistics: one lecturer’s way of testing what students understand

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Michael Johan von Maltitz, Associate Professor, Mathematical Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of the Free State

It’s getting tougher to assess how much university students have learnt. In his work as a Mathematical Statistics lecturer, Michael von Maltitz has tried a new way of getting students to learn, and of assessing what they’ve absorbed and retained. Students have to show and discuss how they arrived at their understanding of the subject. They can’t just rely on cramming, because he interviews them as if they were applying for a job.

What prompted you to try something new?

“We understand, but how will it be asked in the test?” This is the question that was posed to me time and again in 2019 when I started lecturing a module in mathematical statistics at second-year university level.

I knew I had to make a change. I already understood that students were stressed, prone to memorising content and cramming before tests and examinations, and using short cuts to attain a good grade, rather than to learn anything.

What did you then do differently?

The module was unfamiliar to me so I decided to allow the students to approach the course content in the same way as I was: gathering information from different sources and combining and collating it digitally, reflecting on how it helped to meet certain objectives or learning outcomes.

These portfolios of learning evidence would contain course and outcome information, content knowledge (including theorems and proofs), examples with solutions, showpiece assignments, links to and discussions on online tutorials or videos, and paragraphs of self-reflection. Readers might see these portfolios as “study notes on steroids”.

Assessing the portfolio would be an exercise in evaluating the learning process, rather than a memorised product.

The process was challenging but offered a reward for me and my students – that of discovery. Students seemed to be genuinely learning.

Besides checking their portfolios, I needed a way to assess progress that didn’t fall into the old habits of memorisation and “teaching to the test”. I needed to ensure that a student had created their own portfolio and could defend the content in it. And I needed an assessment method that would not take more time and effort than coming up with a unique written test or examination, formulating a typeset memorandum, and marking more than 100 answer scripts, giving feedback that the students might never look at.

I decided to test this form of deep learning using a workplace method – the interview. In a 30-minute online interview with each student, I asked questions about their understanding of the module content, as well as questions concerning their own portfolios. Each student had to defend the information collected and reflected upon.

The interview worked perfectly when paired with the portfolio. I assessed a set of portfolios in an evening, gave typed feedback, and then interviewed those portfolios’ creators the next day. Feedback was immediate, and the interview assessment became a learning experience, for me and the student.

They were able to defend their portfolios if I made any errors on the portfolio assessment, and I could give the correct answer immediately to any interview question they were stumped by.

Afterwards, the recording of the interview could be given to the student, and if they felt I was being unfair at all, they could compare their interview with another student’s. In doing so, the students themselves could moderate my assessment practice.

What results did you observe?

After a year or two of teaching and assessing like this, I noticed my students seemed to understand more of the content. They retained more into their final year, they were fluent in “statistics” communication and they had better time management and self-reflection skills.

Students told me that they were asked the same questions in their first job interviews as I had asked in my modules, and that they felt much more at ease in those first few job interviews.

How did you confirm these results?

To formally test the developments I had noticed in my students, I conducted research on the class in 2022, which was published in conference proceedings and an article.

This study showed that students experienced significant learning in every facet of an educational framework known as Fink’s taxonomy:

foundational knowledge
application and communication
integration of content into other areas
self-reflection
interest
learning how to learn.

Thus, the method of learning and assessment could formally be called a success within Statistics.

Can this approach be used in other courses?

Yes. One might argue that if this method can be employed for a mathematical module, it can be utilised anywhere. Mathematical modules contain theorems, proofs, definitions, theoretical and practical problem solving – items that might seem difficult to assess through verbal communication. But it is the understanding of the ideas behind the theorems, the stories of and the tricks used within the proofs, the application of the theoretical problems, that are so important in an age where your favourite AI can provide content knowledge.

Mathematical proofs and worked calculations, both of which take time in practice, can be assessed by looking at a portfolio containing these items with the student’s annotations and reflections. The understandings of these concepts are assessed in the interview.

Likewise, in other subjects, a portfolio could be used for assessing knowledge-based content, while the interview could be used to gauge a student’s understanding of what was put into the portfolio, why they chose that content, why the content is important, and how that content is used in practice.

Michael Johan von Maltitz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Teaching mathematical statistics: one lecturer’s way of testing what students understand – https://theconversation.com/teaching-mathematical-statistics-one-lecturers-way-of-testing-what-students-understand-275501

March 4, 2026

Iran war fallout for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: political analyst weighs up the risks

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea

Iran’s influence waned, however, during the 2010s as Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, increased their diplomatic, financial and military presence.

Three intertwined dynamics shape how Khamenei’s death affects the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Secondly, the way this latest conflict was triggered and has escalated may be more important than a change in Iranian leadership. It could contribute to a broader erosion of moderation.

Thirdly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Iran’s powerful military force – is set to play a pivotal role in the post-Khamenei transition.

Any future leadership closely aligned with the IRGC is likely to keep using these low-cost tools.

In this sense, continuity will likely prevail over rupture. Iran’s ambitions are filtered through a sober assessment of constraints that the ongoing war may entrench.

Iran’s shifting priorities

This aimed to extend Iran’s security perimeter beyond its borders through alliances, proxies and low-cost commitments.

In the 2000s, Iran cultivated close ties with Sudan and Eritrea.

The limitations of this expansion became apparent, however.

Iran’s ambitions soon came up against reality. The country’s economy was weakened by sanctions linked to its nuclear programme and US withdrawal from a 2015 nuclear deal.

After 2015, Saudi Arabia increased its engagement in the Horn of Africa through financial aid, diplomatic pressure and military cooperation linked to the war in Yemen.

Worsening fragility

Although a change in Iranian leadership may not alter the approach to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the dynamics that led to the recent conflict may have an impact on the region.

The scale and visibility of the Israeli-US attack – and Iran’s direct retaliation – signal something deeper: the erosion of thresholds in the use of force.

Iran is not buying time and avoiding direct confrontation while limiting the manoeuvre room of its rivals.

This could usher in a period of “anything goes”.

In such a context, characterised by multiple hierarchies, even a reduction of Iranian capabilities could have knock-on effects.

If escalation becomes normalised in the heart of the Middle East – the region’s most interconnected theatre – the fallout could be felt in places like the Horn of Africa.

Uncertainty in the short term

Khamenei’s death is likely to generate uncertainty in the short term at the regional level, but will lead to continuity in the long term.

Over time, Tehran has adopted what can be termed a “realist defence” doctrine – deterrence through a strong indirect presence, but at reduced cost and risk.

Federico Donelli is affiliated with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), and the Orion Policy Institute (OPI).

– ref. Iran war fallout for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: political analyst weighs up the risks – https://theconversation.com/iran-war-fallout-for-the-red-sea-and-the-horn-of-africa-political-analyst-weighs-up-the-risks-277512

March 3, 2026

Warships as diplomats: how the South African Navy is tasked with building ties with other nations

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By André Wessels, Senior Professor (Emeritus) and Research Fellow, Department of History, University of the Free State

A naval exercise off the South African coast in January 2026, dubbed Will for Peace and involving the warships of South Africa, China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran, elicited international and domestic controversy. It also contributed to a further souring of relations between South Africa and the US.

Under pressure at home, South Africa’s defence ministry appointed a board of inquiry to investigate whether an instruction by President Cyril Ramaphosa not to involve Iran had been defied.

The exercise and its controversies have placed the spotlight on the South African Navy’s diplomatic role. André Wessels, who has extensively studied the history of the navy, unpacks this role.

What is the Will for Peace 2026 exercise and what is the controversy around it?

Navies traditionally take part in training exercises with other navies. This enhances interoperability and builds mutual trust.

Over time, many foreign warships have visited South African ports, including 23 in 1961, 50 in 1968 and 41 in 1973.

However, in reaction to South Africa’s domestic policy of apartheid, foreign warship visits almost dried up between 1977 and 1989. Once South Africa became a democracy in 1994, foreign warships poured back into the country’s ports, for example 35 from 15 countries in 1997.

New alliances allowed the country’s navy to take part in exercises with the navies of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, Germany, India and Brazil, and Russia and China.

The January 2026 exercise was branded as one of navies belonging to the expanded Brics intergovernmental organisation. But, strictly speaking, Brics+ is not a military alliance. It is significant that India, Brazil, Indonesia and Egypt, which are members, did not send ships to participate, probably so as not to offend the US. But it was the first-ever visit by a UAE warship to South Africa.

Iranian “grey diplomats” (a term used to describe navy warships) had previously visited South African ports in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, and in 2016-2017.

The current geopolitical situation is challenging. There are tensions between the US and Iran (for, among other reasons, the latter’s nuclear arms ambitions); the Russia-Ukraine war continues; and diplomatic relations between the US and South Africa are strained (partly because of the Trump administration’s unproven allegations of a white genocide in South Africa). Given this situation, the naval exercise should not have taken place.

South Africa should as far as possible stay neutral in international affairs to, among other things, safeguard its economic interests. Furthermore, its navy had very little to gain and can ill afford negative publicity, especially when it transpired that the government had apparently asked that Iran not participate. The facts in this regard, however, must still be determined by a government-appointed board of inquiry.

What role can and should a navy play in a country’s foreign policy?

The traditional exchange of diplomats between friendly countries, reciprocal visits by heads of states and cabinet ministers, and the holding of summit meetings are not the only means of strengthening relations between countries.

It has been, for example, the practice of seafaring countries to send warships to one another from time to time. The South African Navy is no exception.

Since 1922, South African warships have undertaken numerous flag-showing cruises (meaning diplomatic visits) to many countries. These visits have nothing to do with “gun-boat diplomacy”, which is diplomacy backed by the threat of military force.

Warships play a very important role in diplomacy. The presence of a warship can be the most tangible and visible sign of bilateral and multilateral friendships. When ships of a navy take part in combined exercises or international humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, those ships can generate mutual trust. The warships become diplomatic tools of the highest national value.

It is indeed one of the stated aims of the South African Navy: to conduct, among other things, assistance operations, including diplomatic support.

What phases can be identified in the navy’s diplomatic role?

In 1946, the South African Naval Forces were reconstituted as a permanent part of the Union Defence Force. In 1951, it became the South African Navy.

The period 1946 to 1973 was a phase of normal relations with most countries in the west. There were 37 flag-showing cruises. This included 16 visits to European colonial possessions in Africa, six transoceanic deployments (to South America, Europe and Australia), and visits to many ports during the delivery voyages of 26 new vessels for the navy.

Then followed a phase of growing isolation (1974-1979) because of the internal political situation in South Africa over apartheid. In these years the SA Navy only undertook four flag-showing cruises.

The 1980-1987 period was a phase of total isolation as far as foreign visits by South African warships were concerned. The navy was from time to time (since 1975) deployed in a supporting role for the other arms of the South African Defence Force during the Namibian War of Independence (1966-1989), a conflict that spilled over into Angola.

Then followed a transitional phase (1988-1993), with political negotiations taking place from 1990 onwards. Gradually, ports opened up and no fewer than 19 flag-showing cruises took place.

With the birth of a democratic South Africa in April 1994, the country was officially welcomed back as a respected member of the international community. Over a period of three years (1994-1996), South African warships visited at least 29 ports in at least 23 countries during eight flag-showing cruises.

So, after years of isolation, the navy played a major role in establishing ties of friendship. It also established several new ties with African, Asian and South American countries.

Unfortunately, in the years 2018 to 2025, not a single tailor-made South African Navy flag-showing cruise took place, mainly because of budgetary constraints.

However, in February 2026, the warship SAS Amatola sailed to India for an international fleet review and to participate in Exercise Milan, involving the Indian and other visiting navies.

What does the future hold for the navy’s ‘grey diplomats’?

The primary role of the navy must always be to conduct operations in defence of South Africa. But in times of peace, it has an equally important role to play. This includes search and rescue, relief operations, assistance to state authorities, regional assistance operations and flag-showing cruises.

A warship is both a reflection and projection of the state it represents. It is, therefore, important that the ships are not undersized or under-equipped. A South African warship is South African territory afloat, and its presence in foreign waters sends a signal of support to the country’s allies.

Hopefully the navy will in future have at its disposal the necessary funds – and ships – to meet all the demands of its mission statement.

André Wessels in the past received funding from the National Research Foundation, but not since 2017.

– ref. Warships as diplomats: how the South African Navy is tasked with building ties with other nations – https://theconversation.com/warships-as-diplomats-how-the-south-african-navy-is-tasked-with-building-ties-with-other-nations-275830

March 3, 2026

What is happiness? A philosopher looks for answers

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anné H. Verhoef, Professor in Philosophy, North-West University

When we seek happiness, what exactly are we searching for? And when we wish happiness on someone else, what is it that we truly desire for them?

Can happiness even be defined or is it an illusion, an impossible desire to fulfil? So then why are there so many happiness self-help books? What do they promise and can they be attained? Is it possible to measure happiness? If so, how do ordinary people and scientists do that?

To answer these questions, I explored different definitions of happiness in my book Happiness, Unhappiness, and Chance. The book is based on my PhD study in philosophy.

Happiness today is narrowly defined by some positive psychologists as a joyous state of mind or well-being.

The happiness sciences see it as something you can calculate and quantify. They developed a Happiness Index and the World Happiness Report. These basically measure happiness as satisfaction, with criteria like gross domestic product per capita (money) and life expectancy (health) as some of the factors considered.

But happiness is also defined by our capitalist, consumer-driven society as certain aspirational products, brands and lifestyles. These consumerist definitions are often exaggerated by influencers on social media, but also through the manipulation of consumers by the online algorithms behind the digital tools we use. Increasingly, this also happens through artificial intelligence.

All these different definitions of happiness create their own problem for happiness. In fact they can lead to more unhappiness than happiness.

Joy and pleasure are often short-lived and unsustainable; well-being can quickly be ruined by illness and fate; owning certain brands, products and lifestyles exposes us to the trap of the “hedonistic treadmill,” which causes one “to rapidly and inevitably adapt to good things by taking them for granted”.

Happiness that’s reduced to a single and simple definition does not consider the complexity of being human, of the societies we live in, and the fragile relationship we have with the environment.

My book searches for a more inclusive and encompassing definition of happiness. A happiness that is more than just joy or well-being, more than an ethical or good life. More than just good and meaningful human relationships. More than just luck, the absence of pain or a by-product of consumption. More than just a meaningful, fulfilled and content life.

I wanted to find out if a better understanding of happiness can be formed and actually achieved. One that considers all cultures and also factors like justice and caring for each other and the environment.

Can this kind of understanding of happiness, I wondered, not be a powerful motivation to live and work for a better future for all?

Consumerism

To explore the potential of such a philosophical understanding of happiness, we first need to understand why the current dominant definitions of happiness don’t work anymore.

Today, consumerism and capitalism are the forces behind the digital technologies that manipulate our understanding of happiness. Consumerism, with its “you-must-have-this-or-that-to-be-happy” approach, became so powerfully enforced through today’s digital platforms that it became a question of whether we can still envision, hope, and live for something more than what the algorithmic ecologies we live in present to us.

Happiness sciences

Happiness sciences, as the power behind happiness within our contemporary global happiness culture, proclaim that happiness is something one must work for and must achieve. Happiness itself is becoming so all-consuming that it is like a new religion. US historian Darrin McMahon describes the situation thus:

At the dawn of the modern age, God was happiness; happiness has since become our God.

Consequently, happiness becomes and remains an exhausting and impossible task which paradoxically makes one more unhappy. In this process people give up on happiness and may even become cynical due to this impossible pressure to be happy in a certain way.

Religion

Globally, the strongest power behind certain forms of happiness, especially as “true and eternal” happiness, is religion.

The type of happiness some religions offer is one where the ideal is that unhappiness should be overcome or will be in an afterlife. Some religions teach that true happiness can only be achieved in the afterlife, in heaven or nirvana, for example. They proclaim it is impossible to find true happiness in this world, or in the here and now.

It is a happiness where this life is not fully affirmed because happiness can’t be attained. It is still to come. In effect it is not only giving up on the possibility of happiness, but on “true” goodness and beauty in daily life.

Philosophy

As alternative to these problematic understandings of happiness, and the different driving forces behind them, I used well-known French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s thinking to guide me. He argued that happiness should and could not be defined as the overcoming of unhappiness. Such an attempt will always be futile. It denies unhappiness as part of the fundamental reality and fullness of life, and leaves us with an impossible and unhappy task. Happiness and unhappiness are always in relation to each other, and the one does not mean the annihilation of the other.

Secondly, the relationship between happiness and unhappiness is situated within our fragile ability to work for happiness. Yet, at the same time, to be aware that receiving happiness is not just hard work but can be a result of chance. Unhappiness can be in the form of unexpected tragedy.

The tension between striving for happiness and receiving happiness unexpectedly should remain. We should continue to work at contributing to our own and others’ happiness. But if we try to always be in control we will become exhausted. So we should also keep on allowing space for chance – as luck and tragedy – in our lives.

Why this matters

The ability to think and dream again about a different kind of happiness, one that is connected to our lives (not the technological world of the present), our desires (not those manipulated by consumerism), and the needs of the world – which includes unhappiness and injustice – has become increasingly important today.

We need better definitions of happiness in a world where the term is constantly corrupted and used by consumerism, politicians, prosperity evangelicals, the self-help industry, and in algorithmic technologies.

Such happiness should be able to affirm our lives, here and now. Such affirmation will become more important as our lives are more manipulated and controlled by technology and consumerism.

I argue in my study that this affirmation of life allows for a happiness that can include and respond to unhappiness and chance. Life itself is one thing we should not give up on; otherwise, happiness will also become irrelevant.

Anné H. Verhoef does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What is happiness? A philosopher looks for answers – https://theconversation.com/what-is-happiness-a-philosopher-looks-for-answers-276091

March 3, 2026

South Africa’s economy is picking up, but hasn’t reached a turning point yet – economist

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrew Robert Donaldson, Senior Research Associate, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town

In presenting the 2026 national budget to South Africa’s parliament on 25 February, finance minister Enoch Godongwana characterised this as the turning point in South Africa’s public finances – heralding improved confidence, increased growth and rising infrastructure investment.

For over a decade, the size of the deficit and the rise in public debt have been central themes in the annual budget.

This year, analysts have welcomed the apparent turnaround in the budgetary outlook. Debt has peaked at just under 80% of GDP. And for the first time in a decade, the Treasury projects that interest on debt will increase more slowly than spending on education or health.

This is a transition that goes back to May 2025, when the rand began to strengthen against the US dollar in the turbulence that followed US president Donald Trump’s April tariff announcements. The South African Reserve Bank’s commitment to lower inflation and Parliament’s opposition to value added tax increases reinforced market sentiment that inflation would be kept in check. Around this time, the 10-year government bond yield began an extraordinary decline from its 11% peak to around 8% today.

These are the financial trends that account for the national treasury’s projected decline in debt service costs as a percentage of GDP. It expects these to fall from 5.4% this year to 5.2% in 2028/29.

But for the economic outlook to improve decisively, growth must rise. It is projected to increase, but not by much: 1.4% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026, and then 2% by 2028. The recovery is still very fragile – gross fixed-capital formation, which should be upwards of 25% of GDP, is just 14%. Unemployment is still above 30% of the labour force. And the budget deficit for the year ahead (the difference between expenditure and revenue) is still uncomfortably high at 4% of GDP.

As an economist, I would argue that, if growth is the metric that counts, this is not yet the turning point that will deliver rising living standards and jobs for all.

Growth depends, in the Treasury’s analysis, on continued implementation of structural reforms, several of which form part of the Presidency’s Operation Vulindlela programme, launched in 2020. These include:

electricity sector restructuring
modernisation of state transport utility Transnet and logistics networks
investment in digital infrastructure and an e-visa system
boosting export competitiveness.

The Budget Review presents a summary of progress: 62% implementation of electricity reforms, 33% in transport, 11% in the water sector, 67% in telecommunications, 75% in reform of the visa system.

These initiatives will take time to shift the economic growth outlook.

What still needs to be done

Operation Vulindlela recognises that improvements in state capability are priorities of phase 2 of the presidency’s programme. There is a renewed focus on local government. This includes a proposed shift to a “utility model” for water and electricity services in which these functions will be run “like businesses”, to ensure proper infrastructure maintenance and accountability to the public.

Deterioration in local infrastructure is increasingly evident in water supply, roads and local services in many municipalities.

The Treasury also hopes that the implementation of the Public Service Amendment Bill will lead to improvements in professional standards in government, and particularly in municipalities.

Is state capability perhaps the key turnaround needed for an improved growth outlook?

The 2026 Budget Review signals a more robust, interventionist approach of the National Treasury to dysfunctional provincial departments and municipalities.

This will include centralised control of payroll and headcounts, enforcement of financial recovery plans, and stricter conditions attached to financial flows to provinces and municipalities.

It also includes technological reforms, such as the “smart meters grant programme”. Its aim is to improve billing accuracy and address leaks and illegal electricity connections.

But substantial improvements in state capability will not be achieved by top-down interventions and technology projects alone. Substantial reallocations of state resources are also needed. Simply put, resources must be redirected from unproductive to productive activities.

This is where the Treasury’s “targeted and responsible savings” initiative comes into play. Expenditure reviews have been under discussion for several years; in the 2025 medium term budget policy statement the savings programme was introduced to give this practical effect. The 2026 budget includes R4 billion (US$250 million) a year in identified savings.

That is not enough. It is less than 0.1% of GDP, and just 1.1% of the gap between government expenditure and revenue.

It’s not just that savings must be found if tax increases are to be avoided while lowering the budget deficit. The targeted and responsible savings initiative is also about shifting resources towards the investment, infrastructure maintenance, housing, police and court services that need to be strengthened. A bolder approach is needed. The goal should be R100 billion (US$6.3 billion) a year.

This means a targeted reconsideration of the “architecture” of the state.

What needs to be fixed

Here are some of the dysfunctionalities that must be addressed:

Two-tier local government: District municipalities serve no discernible democratic purpose. Where they provide cross-boundary services, these can be organised as utilities owned by and accountable to their component local municipalities.

Sector Education and Training Authorities (Setas) and the National Skills Fund: Once again, the Treasury has signalled its intent to “review” the skills funding system. Setas should be liquidated and the levy paid to them by employers abandoned. They are costly and inefficient intermediaries. The levy relief would be a benefit to businesses, allowing them to finance training as needed, not subject to one-size-fits-all rules and bureaucratic processes.

The Road Accident Fund: It is more than 20 years since reform proposals were set out for the Road Accident Fund. It has an unfunded liability of around R400 billion (US$25 billion) arising from road accident compensation claims that have yet to be settled. It should be restructured as a capped benefit scheme, with the balance of cover left to insurance providers.

Unemployment Insurance Fund expansion of mandate: The fund is planning to expand its administrative staff from 3,424 in 2024/25 to 11,424 next year. It also intends to expand its activities from payment of unemployment benefits to provision of skills audits, employment subsidies, and enterprise support. Its reported expenditure increased from R26.0 billion in 2024/25 to R48.8 billion in 2025/26. The Treasury should simply say No. It is absurd that public health and education programmes are subject to strict spending controls while a fund administered by the Department of Employment and Labour is allowed free rein.

Southern African Customs Union transfers: Review of the customs union agreement is long overdue. Its formula-based distribution of over R78 billion (US$4.9 billion) to neighbouring countries next year no longer rests on a defensible rationale from either a trade or regional development perspective.

More broadly, the budget reform that is needed is to extend Treasury’s expenditure planning and control systems to cover the 196 public entities that perform statutory functions and rely on fiscal revenue but fall outside the expenditure control limits of the budget process. Public entity boards and executive staff are often paid more than senior departmental officials, their programmes are not subject to Treasury review, and in many cases they hold funds that should properly be controlled by the Treasury.

Tighter expenditure control can in part be done through existing provisions of the Public Finance Management Act. More complete implementation might require fiscal responsibility legislation.

The Treasury’s plan for fiscal sustainability is to introduce a principles-based “fiscal anchor” that will require each new administration to table a medium-term plan to ensure that debt service costs do not erode service delivery capability. If the expenditure planning system is not extended to include public entities, this will be a toothless tiger.

A version of this article first appeared on the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (Saldru) website.

Andrew Robert Donaldson is a former National Treasury official.

– ref. South Africa’s economy is picking up, but hasn’t reached a turning point yet – economist – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-economy-is-picking-up-but-hasnt-reached-a-turning-point-yet-economist-277263

March 2, 2026

South Africa’s minibus taxi industry runs on social bonds – reform must accept this

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Siyabulela Christopher Fobosi, Senior Researcher, UNESCO ‘Oliver Tambo’ Chair of Human Rights, University of Fort Hare, University of Fort Hare

South Africa’s minibus taxi industry is the backbone of the country’s public transport system. Every day, millions of commuters rely on it. In many low-income and peri-urban communities, there is no real alternative. They account for roughly 70% of daily public transport trips in the country.

Yet despite its scale and significance, the industry remains largely informal. It is governed less by formal contracts and clear regulatory systems than by relationships, trust and unwritten rules.

This makes the sector an important subject for industrial and economic sociology scholars like myself, who are concerned with how regulation, labour and economic life unfold in practice rather than merely on paper. Particularly in contexts marked by informality, inequality and contested regulatory environments.

In a recent study, my co-author and I explore how “social capital” – the networks, shared norms and trust that connect people – shapes the governance, labour relations and everyday functioning of the minibus taxi sector.

We conducted a structured search of academic databases and South African institutional repositories, and analysed 62 peer-reviewed articles, theses and policy reports to identify themes.

Our central finding is that social capital within South Africa’s minibus taxi industry operates as a double-edged sword. The same dense networks of trust, shared norms and reciprocal obligations that enable the industry to function also entrench inequality, exclusion and, at times, violence. Social capital is a source of both resilience and instability.

This matters because policy debates have too often treated the industry’s informality either as a problem to be eradicated or as a reality to be tolerated. Our research suggests that sustainable reform requires a hybrid approach: one that works with social capital rather than against it. Efforts to formalise or regulate the sector are unlikely to succeed if they ignore the networks and authority structures that already govern it.

It is therefore essential to engage with taxi associations, drivers and commuters, recognising their lived realities and institutional knowledge. It is possible to make the industry safer, fairer and more efficient without undermining the social foundations on which it depends.

An industry born of exclusion

The modern minibus taxi industry took shape during apartheid (1948-1990), when black South Africans were systematically excluded from formal urban planning and public transport provision. Commuters faced long journeys between racially segregated townships and economic centres, so entrepreneurs began operating minibuses to meet demand. The sector grew rapidly because it was responsive, decentralised and embedded in communities.

In the new democratic era after 1994, the industry continued to expand – but without being fully integrated into formal transport planning. Today, it comprises hundreds of thousands of vehicles organised into roughly 1,500 taxi associations nationwide. These associations regulate routes, manage disputes and coordinate operations. Alongside them are individual taxi owners, who own vehicles and lease them out, and drivers.

Part of the reason for this limited integration is that the state has lacked the institutional capacity and the political leverage to impose coherent oversight on the sector.

In the absence of consistent and effective state oversight, informal systems of governance have developed. These systems are rooted in social relationships.

Understanding social capital

The concept of social capital is often associated with political scientist Robert Putnam, who defined it as the networks and norms that enable collective action. According to this view, trust and civic engagement help communities solve shared problems.

But sociologist Pierre Bourdieu offered a more critical perspective. For him, social capital was not simply about cooperation. It was also a resource that groups could use to consolidate power and exclude others.

Drawing on these traditions, we distinguish between three forms of social capital in the taxi industry:

bonding: tight-knit networks within taxi associations and owner groups
bridging: connections across different associations or stakeholder groups
linking: vertical ties between the industry and formal institutions such as government departments, banks and law enforcement agencies.

All three forms are present in the minibus taxi sector. But they operate unevenly, and their effects are not always positive.

The strengths of dense networks

Bonding social capital is particularly strong within taxi associations. These organisations function as powerful, if informal, regulatory bodies. They control routes, set fare guidelines and enforce industry norms. Membership provides access to shared resources and a measure of protection in a competitive market.

These dense networks allow for rapid coordination. If disputes arise, they can often be resolved internally without recourse to the courts. If demand shifts or new residential areas develop, associations can adjust routes quickly. In communities where formal institutions are perceived as distant or ineffective, such embedded systems can appear more responsive and legitimate.

Trust is also central to financial arrangements. Many taxi owners rely on rotating credit schemes and informal savings groups to finance vehicle purchases and maintenance. Formal financial institutions frequently regard the sector as high risk, making credit expensive or out of reach. Social networks therefore take the place of formal banking relationships.

The driver-owner relationship also depends heavily on trust. In many cases, drivers lease vehicles for a fixed daily fee, with no written contracts. Instead, expectations are governed by personal relationships and informal understandings.

In short, social capital fills gaps left by weak or uneven formal regulation enabling coordination, resilience and continuity.

When networks entrench power

However, the same bonding social capital that enables coordination can also reinforce hierarchy and exclusion.

Taxi associations control access to routes, which are the primary source of income. Because associations regulate who may operate on which routes, they wield considerable power. Dense networks of members can create barriers to entry for outsiders.

Disputes over routes are a feature of the industry. In some cases, they escalate into violence. Such conflicts arise in a system where economic survival depends on territorial control and where formal mediation mechanisms are weak.

Social capital here functions as a resource of dominance. Associations mobilise networks to maintain authority and legitimacy. Their links to communities can confer symbolic power, even in the absence of formal legal recognition.

Most drivers, by contrast, occupy a precarious position. Many are not members of associations in their own right. They lease vehicles from owners and have to meet fixed daily payment targets. To do so, they frequently work shifts exceeding 12 hours. If they fall short, they may absorb the loss themselves.

Without formal employment contracts, drivers typically lack access to medical benefits, unemployment insurance or retirement savings. Trust-based arrangements limit recourse in cases of exploitation or unfair treatment.

In this context, social capital benefits some actors more than others.

The missing links to formal institutions

While bonding social capital within associations is strong, linking social capital between the industry and formal institutions remains comparatively weak.

Government has attempted to formalise and regulate the sector, most notably through the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme. The aim was to replace older vehicles, improve safety and integrate the industry more fully into national transport policy. Yet implementation has been uneven, and many reforms have met resistance.

One reason is that policy interventions don’t “talk to” existing informal governance structures. Top-down regulation can be perceived as a threat to association autonomy. Where there is limited trust between the state and industry actors, compliance is likely to be partial.

Towards hybrid governance

The research suggests that industry reforms would have to recognise and work with social capital.

Formalisation should not simply impose external control. It should build on existing structures while introducing safeguards.

Legal recognition of taxi associations as cooperatives is one potential pathway. This could enhance access to subsidies, training and financial services. It could also clarify governance and accountability.

Standardised employment contracts for drivers are another step. They could provide greater security, define working hours and clarify dispute resolution processes.

Digital technologies may also help. Mobile payment systems could reduce reliance on cash, improve transparency and minimise disputes over fares. Digital platforms for route management could support fairer allocation processes and clearer record-keeping.

Drivers and commuters would have to take part in creating these solutions.

A delicate balance

The future of South Africa’s minibus taxi industry depends on striking a careful balance. Reform must recognise that the sector’s social capital is both its foundation and its fault line.

Strengthening bridging and linking social capital – across associations and between the industry and the state – can reduce conflict and foster shared accountability.

The challenge is not to dismantle the social fabric of the minibus taxi industry, but to reshape it, so that trust, cooperation and collective action serve all who depend on it.

Although our study focuses on South Africa, its implications extend more broadly. Across the global south, informal transport systems play a central role in urban mobility. They are often more adaptable than formal systems but also more vulnerable to conflict and labour exploitation.

Siyabulela Christopher Fobosi previously received funding from the National Research Foundation for his Master of Arts in Industrial and Economic Sociology Degree at Rhodes University and PhD in Industrial Sociology at the University of Johannesburg.

– ref. South Africa’s minibus taxi industry runs on social bonds – reform must accept this – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-minibus-taxi-industry-runs-on-social-bonds-reform-must-accept-this-276771

March 2, 2026

Biometric IDs are being rolled out in Africa. Study reveals the risks and pitfalls

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Tony Roberts, Digital Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

Across Africa, governments are introducing digital systems that use individuals’ unique physical measurements to identify them. These systems collect citizens’ biometric and personal data and use it to give people access to essential public services like voting, healthcare, education and social protection. Biometric digital identification systems are often promoted as tools to improve efficiency, inclusion and service delivery.

But a new report by the African Digital Rights Network, published by the Institute of Development Studies, highlights serious concerns about exclusion, rights violations, data protection and accountability. Drawing on evidence from ten African countries, the report shows how millions of people are struggling to enrol in or safely use these systems, or are choosing not to participate due to fear and mistrust.

The report draws on the expertise of researchers based in each of the ten countries studied. Tony Roberts, co-editor of the report, takes us through what they found.

What are biometric digital IDs and why are they both useful and problematic?

Digital-ID is a form of identification that can hold large amounts of sensitive personal data. This includes biographic data like name, date of birth and address, as well as biometric data such as fingerprints and facial recognition. What makes digital-ID distinct from paper-based IDs is that it is machine readable. And, when it’s connected to the internet, millions of people can be identified and verified, instantly and remotely.

Biometric digital-ID includes facial recognition, fingerprints, iris scans and voice patterns that are unique to individuals. It can verify that an individual is who they claim to be.

Increasingly, biometric digital-ID systems are being imposed across Africa and used to determine who gets services or entitlements. For example, fingerprint or iris scans are used during elections to confirm that a person is entitled to vote. In Botswana and in Malawi there are examples of ID chaos threatening voter registration.

But these systems are leaving millions of citizens in Africa unable to obtain essential services. Some people struggle to register for biometric digital-ID due to disability or illiteracy. There are costs to use online systems, including phone access, mobile data, or electric power for phone charging. This is deepening existing inequalities.

How is uptake happening in Africa?

Our report includes ten country studies. The research was coordinated by the African Digital Rights Network, bringing together 75 digital rights researchers from 30 African countries, in collaboration with Paradigm Initiative, a non-profit organisation.

We found that pressure to adopt biometric systems often comes from foreign funders and creates dependencies on foreign technology providers.

The World Bank claims that the motivation for spending billions of dollars on digital-ID is to meet the Sustainable Development Goal of “identity for all”. But the role of private vendors, international funders and even state actors may also reflect interests in profit generation, data control, or surveillance of populations.

The introduction of biometric digital IDs varies between countries. Between 2017 and 2025, Ghana registered 19 million people (around 95% of the adult population) to a system called GhanaCard. In Ethiopia, 28 million people (around 35%) have enrolled in the Fayda-ID scheme. In the Democratic Republic of Congo there is still no digital-ID system despite repeated announcements and legislation introduced to enable it since 2011.

In Senegal, biometric digital-ID, with fingerprint data, was introduced in law in 2016. Citizens need it to obtain a phone number, bank account and public services, such as electricity and water. Based on 2025 data, it’s estimated that around 10 million citizens hold a biometric national ID card, just over 90% of the population aged 15 and over.

But this suggests that around 10% of the population over 15 – over 1 million people – lack ID and therefore lack access to essential services and entitlements.

What are the challenges of rolling them out?

One of the challenges is that universal human rights which should be unconditional become conditional on enrolment in a biometric digital-ID scheme. These include access to education, healthcare, social security and voting. Withholding access is a violation of fundamental human rights.

The report includes the case of Ethiopia, where registration in the Fayda digital-ID system is a condition of access to government services, banking and mobile telecoms.

Millions of citizens cannot enrol, particularly those with disabilities. For example, some people don’t have fingerprints due to amputation, diseases including leprosy, years of hard manual labour or old age. Some people cannot provide iris scans due to vision problems.

Millions of Africans are also denied legal ID because government officials dispute their citizenship. The project of digital-ID is sold as a solution. But research shows that it reproduces this form of discrimination and injustice.

For example, in Kenya, members of the Somali, Nubian and Pemba communities who have lived in the country for five or six generations and inter-married are discriminated against and rendered stateless. They are denied digital-ID and so cannot access education, healthcare, voting and social protection.

Some do not want to enrol for a biometric digital-ID because they have good reason not to trust their governments with their personal information. In countries like Sudan and Ethiopia the state is targeting people based on their ethnic group or on other identifiers such as surname, address or religion which are used as proxies for ethnicity.

Are there any dangers?

The use of biometric digital-ID introduces new challenges and risks. These include risks to privacy caused by data leakage or sharing and risks of exclusion due to poor data quality or mismatches.

There are also privacy risks involved because biometrics are permanent. People need to be aware and give informed consent. Data protection principles should be followed.

There is a lack of adequate legal frameworks and robust digital security to prevent unauthorised access to sensitive data. Countries also lack accountability mechanisms for when data entry errors, breaches or system failures occur.

The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Initiative has a framework of 18 core principles to ensure that digital-ID is secure, inclusive and rights-based.

Eight out of ten countries studied in the report have no law specifically governing digital-ID, and none include special protection. In some cases, where legal provisions exist, enforcement is weak or symbolic.

Independent oversight bodies are rare, as are judicial mechanisms to contain function creep – where ID systems expand beyond their original scope. Governments could secure consent by saying that digital-ID will only be used for a single purpose, such as voting. But then they could make it mandatory for accessing education, healthcare, employment and banking.

Without stronger legislation, clearer accountability and harmonised regional standards, digital-ID projects risk entrenching inequality and mistrust rather than delivering inclusion or security.

Tony Roberts receives funding from the Open Society Foundation.

– ref. Biometric IDs are being rolled out in Africa. Study reveals the risks and pitfalls – https://theconversation.com/biometric-ids-are-being-rolled-out-in-africa-study-reveals-the-risks-and-pitfalls-273510