Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

Africa is providing cheap liquidity to wealthy nations. In return it is paying huge interest rates to external institutional investors at the cost of its own development.

For instance, African central banks export their reserve funds for safekeeping. Sovereign wealth funds and pension fund managers invest only in investment-grade European and United States institutions. The most popular one is risk-free US treasuries, where they earn 3.5% annually on average. These are perceived as the safest instruments, easily convertible to cash without losing value.

The same European and US institutions then reinvest the same capital back to Africa at a high return for themselves. They purchase high-yielding bonds issued by African governments. Cumulatively, Africa has raised more than US$200 billion through sovereign Eurobonds since 2003. African countries are paying between 9% and 15% through Eurobond issuances.

Based on my expertise researching African financial markets, I argue that African countries can close their financing gap if they change regulations and investment policies.

Channelling a portion of Africa’s domestic funds to the continent’s development finance institutions would create a huge pool of domestic resources. This will make a significant impact on development. It would not jeopardise the central banks and asset managers’ need for safety of their funds. This would be a practical step towards a self-sustaining African financial ecosystem.

Africa’s capital strength

African central banks hold an estimated US$530 billion in reserves offshore. This is an international financial practice promoted by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and credit rating agencies. Central banks are required to maintain enough US dollar reserves to pay for four to six months of imports.

The sovereign wealth funds of 20 African countries now have approximately US$109.8 billion in total assets under management. Adding other assets of African origin, the amount climbs up to an estimated US$1.2 trillion.

The latest report by Africa Finance Corporation estimates Africa’s domestic capital base at US$4 trillion. These are funds owned by African institutions and individual citizens in the form of reserves, collected deposits, premiums and savings.

Other countries such as China, South Korea and Japan used domestic resources and state-directed finance to aggressively drive their own industrial transformation.

This hasn’t been the case for African countries. The continent’s financing gap is estimated at US$280 billion annually for infrastructure and trade. That’s the amount African countries need every year to build roads, electricity capacity, ports, railways, manufacturing industries and trade connections necessary for African economies to grow and compete globally.

In addition, despite a huge domestic capital stock, African countries pay high interest rates when they borrow abroad.

A system designed for capital flight

The reason for Africa’s capital flight is systemic. Africa’s financial institutions, including central banks, are required by national regulations and investment policies to invest in investment-grade rated instruments. The only investment-grade ratings recognised by the IMF and World Bank are those issued by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. This means the majority of African assets are excluded from the safe asset category.

The result is that African capital exits the continent. This has left African financial markets with fewer participants and investment instruments. Shallow financial markets make it difficult to finance industrialisation, infrastructure and job creation.

The absence of deep and liquid domestic financial markets becomes the justification for continuing to invest abroad. This is why African countries have remained heavily dependent on foreign capital and external debt despite growing domestic savings.

African central banks reserves

Three African leaders – the presidents of Ghana, Kenya and Zambia – have called for the continent’s foreign reserves invested overseas to be reinvested in African institutions.

At the 2025 Africa Financial Summit, central bankers agreed that it was time for African governments to place a portion of their foreign exchange reserves with domestic institutions.

Channelling a portion of these funds to African development institutions would be a practical step towards a self-sustaining African financial ecosystem. It would not compromise the effectiveness of central banks and other financial institutions. Instead, it would:

• deepen domestic financial markets

• bolster sovereignty

• reduce dependence on foreign financial centres

• strengthen local capital markets.

The Central Bank Deposit Programme by Afreximbank is a good example. Launched in September 2014, it invests in trade and development finance. The programme has mobilised over US$44 billion – about 9% of central bank reserves. Participating central banks have earned 6% to 6.5% – much higher than what investments in Europe and the US offer.

The programme’s performance demonstrates that African reserves can be safely and productively invested within the continent.

AU investment policy shift

It is for this reason that in February 2024 the African Union called on member states to redirect all their reserves back into the continent.

This was a landmark but long-overdue correction in the stewardship of Africa’s financial resources. It was more than an investment policy shift. It was a bold declaration of confidence in Africa’s own institutions and financial markets.

Since then, the AU’s own portfolio of resources has been fully reinvested in African-owned financial institutions. This declaration did not require ratification by AU member states.

What more needs to change

Building an African financing architecture demands a fundamental shift in how African assets are valued, regulated and invested. It means redefining risk for African markets. It also means developing regional investment-grade benchmarks and modernising prudential rules so that African capital can work and grow on the continent.

African capital markets remain shallow not because capital is scarce, but because risk perceptions are distorted. The rising discontent from African policymakers on the cost of capital makes the case even more compelling.

This is why a transformative project such as the Africa Credit Rating Agency has gained support in its pre-establishment phase.

African regulators and reserve managers must act decisively in the following ways:

• change reserve management frameworks to allow more investment in African assets and regional financial institutions

• formally recognise domestic credit ratings that offer contextually sensitive and empirically grounded assessments

• reform IMF-driven constraints that exclude reserves placed in African institutions from being accounted as official reserves

• allow rapid liquidity across borders when needed. This can be done while maintaining global standards to prevent illicit flows and regulatory breaches.

Africa cannot build credible domestic markets if its own capital is absent from the story. Investment is ultimately an act of confidence in the institutions behind the assets. The continent needs to invest in itself.

Misheck Mutize is affiliated with affiliated with the African Union as a Lead Expert on Credit Ratings

– ref. Africa’s capital must stay home to plug its financing gap: how it could be done – https://theconversation.com/africas-capital-must-stay-home-to-plug-its-financing-gap-how-it-could-be-done-281060

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Kyra Pazan, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, California State University, Stanislaus

When imagining our early human ancestors in prehistoric Africa hundreds of thousands of years ago, one might envision trekkers plodding across a savanna, baking under an equatorial sun.

Research, however, suggests that our species’ unique strengths – creativity, cooperation and adaptability – may have been honed in a very different environment. Our team of archaeologists has uncovered a story in which mountainous landscapes played a central role in making us human.

Today, those of us who like to explore mountains have technical gear and conveniences like GPS safety beacons, water filters and raincoats that pack down small. Without this, we’d be lucky to last one night in some places. How did early humans not only survive, but thrive in these landscapes?

This question inspires my archaeological research in Lesotho’s Maloti-Drakensberg Mountains. Since 2023, I have led an international team of excavators at Likonong, a collapsed rock shelter in a remote area of eastern Lesotho.

Our findings reveal that Likonong is the oldest known archaeological site in these mountains and an incredible case study in human adaptation.

Likonong was first discovered in 1995. I visited the site as a graduate student in 2015 and returned in 2023 with my PhD to begin excavations. I hoped that Likonong would be older than Melikane, which, at 83,000 years old, was Lesotho’s earliest known site at the time. When my team started finding stone tools that looked 100,000 years older, I realised this site was more important than I’d imagined.

Our excavations have found evidence of people visiting Likonong beginning at 242,000 years ago, and making regular, longer visits by 144,000 years ago. Previously, archaeologists suspected that sustained occupation in highland Lesotho was unlikely before the climate warmed during the Last Interglacial, 130,000 years ago. Instead, our research shows that early humans thrived here during an ice age, possibly by relying on one another.

The setting

We’re no longer in an ice age, but living in Lesotho still requires teamwork. At Likonong, we’re hours away from the nearest paved road or medical clinic, excavating on a precarious, erosive slope above a ravine. We sleep in tents, filter water, and cook for ourselves. The sun sets at 5pm, giving way to unbearably cold and windy nights. Tinder is scarce on the barren, treeless landscape. At an elevation of 1,800 metres, an oncoming storm inevitably means snow.

Making the excavation work requires cooperation from each member of the team. While some of us dig, others sieve excavated sediment in search of artefacts. Someone heats up the tea kettle when the late afternoon chill sets in, and someone else knocks down the metre-long icicles that collect on the shelter roof.

It simply isn’t possible to survive in this environment without help, which might be why earlier hominins – members of the human lineage – didn’t stand a chance. While a few isolated hand axes suggest that a few brave individuals attempted to survive here, we haven’t discovered their bones or their campsites.

In contrast, 50km north-west of Johannesburg (about 600km from our site), an underground labyrinth of limestone caves known as the “Cradle of Humankind” traces human evolution back nearly 4 million years, to a time before the first stone tools or manmade fire. Hominins thrived in these lowlands and the equatorial highlands of east Africa, but the earliest occupations at Likonong didn’t occur until after the emergence of our species.

When were people there, and what were they doing?

In our excavations at Likonong we used several methods to get a clearer idea of how humans learned to adapt and survive at the site. One, called magnetic susceptibility, measures how easily sediment can be magnetised. We use it as an indirect measure of fire use, which we expect to have been frequent for anyone using Likonong as a home base. Fire is critical not only for warmth, but also for cooking, making tools, and advanced technologies like adhesives. The earliest occupations dating to around 242,000 and 214,000 years ago have relatively low magnetic susceptibility values, implying limited burning and that humans were not staying at the site for very long.

Evidence for human occupation between 214,000 and 144,000 years ago is minimal. But then something changed. Signs of human activity increased so much that we named this layer “Lower Crazy Town” because of the stone tools and charred bone gushing from its layers. We believe that this is the point at which humans started using Likonong as a more permanent home base. Families built hearths on top of hearths, cooked food, made tools, and slept in the shelter. Not long after, burning was so frequent that the earth itself turned red. Instead of building the occasional fire, humans structured their lives around this technology.

Crucially, surviving in the highlands at this time (144,000 years ago) would have been even more challenging than at 242,000 years ago. Between 190,000 and 130,000 years ago, a period of time known as the Penultimate Glacial Period, the world was plunged into an ice age. Temperatures dropped more than 6ºC, lush forests disintegrated into windswept grasslands, and glaciers capped the mountains’ highest peaks.

So why couldn’t Likonong’s first visitors figure out how to survive at the site for longer periods of time? We don’t believe they were any less intelligent than the later occupants.

We think they left because they didn’t share information, collaborate, or cooperate with one another. Innovations don’t happen in a vacuum. Cultural knowledge relies on mechanisms for both preserving and spreading information, such as far-ranging social networks and oral tradition. One small change – for example, more frequent fire use – could have led to profound technological advances by creating an environment for information sharing and group cohesion.

The humans who ventured into the highlands 144,000 years ago would have been under extreme environmental pressures. If they chose to rely on one another, sharing their skills and experiences around a fire, they may have jump-started a cascade of changes that shaped us into the adaptable species we are today.

During my first season as a principal investigator at Likonong, I was constantly texting my colleagues for help and advice. Which sieve should we use? What kind of stone was that? How do I resolve personal conflicts with team members? I’m lucky they picked up the phone. Without their help, I probably would have quickly left the site, too – just like the first humans to venture into the highlands, 242,000 years ago.

Kyra Pazan received funding from California State University, Stanislaus (Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activities awards) and a National Science Foundation Senior Investigator Grant (#1724435) and gear donations from Gossamer Gear.

Andrew Carr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Lesotho’s mountain life was harsh for early humans: fire made all the difference – https://theconversation.com/lesothos-mountain-life-was-harsh-for-early-humans-fire-made-all-the-difference-281168

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bomikazi Zeka, Associate Professor in Finance, University of Canberra

When interest rates rise, most people feel the financial pinch as repayments for home loans, car purchases or personal loans increase. This leads to less money for everyday spending and tightens the household budget.

Middle- and upper-income households tend to hold secured debt such as property, which builds wealth. Lower-income households are pushed into debt as they try to maintain their consumption levels. The result is that the impact of rising interest rates is even more significant for lower-income households. They may have to reduce spending on necessities to service interest payments. Even renters wanting to become home owners are indirectly influenced by rising interest rates, as home loans become less affordable.

Banks make money by charging consumers who borrow money while paying out little interest to those holding savings accounts. And most household debt is owed to the banking sector.

According to the World Bank, most African countries fall into the low- to middle-income bracket. In many of these economies, consumers tend to leave their cash sitting in transaction accounts because they are convenient, familiar and easy to access. While moving money out of transaction accounts and into savings products can offer a better return, most people tend to stick to what they know. And banks actually count on this “inertia”.

Whether it’s staying with the same bank out of habit or ignoring new investment products, that lack of movement is a huge win for the bank’s bottom line.

But there is an opportunity to gain from rising rates by moving excess funds into interest-earning financial products. Examples include:

• term deposits (a type of savings account that allows you to deposit a lump sum of money for a fixed period, with a guaranteed fixed interest rate)

• tax-free savings accounts

• bonds (a loan you make to the government or a company, giving you regular interest payments for a set period and your original investment in full at the end of the loan period).

Collectively these kinds of investments are known as fixed interest securities. They earn interest income in proportion to the amount you deposit. And the capital you deposit in them remains protected from fluctuations in the market.

If you access the funds, the amount of interest you earn will reduce proportionately.

As with any financial decision, it’s important to speak to a professional financial adviser to see which product best aligns with your needs and financial situation.

These kinds of financial instruments can earn you interest income. They won’t, however, outperform the returns you can get from more risky securities like shares. What they will do is allow your money to work for you in ways that money in a transaction account won’t.

And a guaranteed interest income from a fixed-interest investment is more attractive than zero return earned on a transactional account.

Making the most of rates rises in three steps

Firstly, get rid of the surplus in your transactional account.

There’s a common expression in the world of finance:

Idle cash doesn’t generate returns.

This implies that money that is dormant doesn’t grow. If you have excess money in your transactional account, consider how much you can comfortably afford to transfer into a term deposit, tax-free savings account or bonds.

By moving these funds into an interest-earning account, you turn your stagnant balance into a defensive asset that grows with time, shielding your portfolio from negative shifts in the economy.

Secondly, accept that you’re playing the long game.

To make the most out of interest-bearing investments, you need to commit your funds for a year or longer. Longer investment terms typically offer higher interest rates, rewarding you for keeping your money invested. The power of compounding is also on your side as the money you earn from an investment is added back into your balance, and then that new, larger amount earns even more interest. Therefore, with a longer investment period, you aren’t just earning interest on the initial capital. You will begin to earn interest on the interest too. Longer durations can protect you from future interest rate drops by locking in today’s peak interest returns.

Thirdly, look beyond the big banks.

While it’s easy to keep track of your finances when all your funds are with the same bank, consider the investment products offered by alternative or smaller banks. Alternative banks can offer better interest rates to attract more customers. As more consumers explore different investment options, this challenges the “Big Banks” to be more competitive with their rates and product offerings.

By taking action and moving your money, you aren’t just helping your wallet, you are also forcing the banking sector to be more competitive.

When central banks raise interest rates, debt holders feel the impact instantly. But higher rates also create an opportunity that’s easily overlooked. If you can put your money to work in interest-earning investments, those same rate rises can start working for you instead of against you. What feels like bad news on one side can quietly become a source of passive income on the other. It just depends on where your money is sitting.

Bomikazi Zeka does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Higher interest rates: can I make them work for me? – https://theconversation.com/higher-interest-rates-can-i-make-them-work-for-me-282632

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Harith Omar Morgadinho Farooq, Lecturer, Lúrio University

Africa is one of the most biodiverse regions on Earth. But much of its biodiversity remains poorly studied. Research from the continent contributes to less than 1% to global scientific output.

This pattern is often explained by limited investment in research. Governments in sub-Saharan Africa allocate, on average, only about 0.4% of their gross domestic product (GDP) to research and development. By comparison, European countries invest on average more than 2% of GDP, while the global average is around 2.6%. India invests close to 0.7% of GDP, and the US nearly 3.5%. Additional constraints include the lack of infrastructure, and political instability.

But there is a more direct and often overlooked constraint: the salaries of the scientists.

Salary disparities are measurable, policy relevant and a direct economic constraint on researchers’ ability to conduct fieldwork. They play a role in shaping who is able to conduct scientific research, a disparity that becomes especially visible during fieldwork.

We are researchers who have been working on biodiversity conservation in Africa for more than a decade. Through collaboration with and experience in European research institutions, we have observed firsthand how financial limitations affect fieldwork, research continuity and scientific careers. We investigated whether differences in researchers’ incomes are associated with biodiversity research output across African countries.

Our study showed a clear pattern: countries where researchers earn less produce less scientific output and rely more heavily on studies led by foreign institutions. This has implications beyond output alone, because scientific leadership influences which questions are asked, which ecosystems are studied, and how conservation priorities are defined.

Strengthening local research capacity will require greater investment in science and higher education.

Salary disparaties

In our study, we compared salary differences between locally based and foreign-affiliated researchers using publicly available salary data. We linked these to biodiversity research output across 54 African countries using data from the Scopus database.

We found that researchers based at African institutions often earn only a fraction of what their collaborators from higher-income countries receive. This disparity was particularly prominent in Malawi, the Republic of the Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here, foreign-affiliated salaries were approximately 34, 32, and 25 times higher than local salaries, respectively.

Because of these low salaries, it can take years to save for basic research tools such as field clothing, cameras or computers. For researchers from higher-income countries, these costs can often be covered by a single monthly salary.

This financial constraint may help explain why much of the continent’s biodiversity research is conducted in collaboration with institutions based outside Africa, rather than being led by local organisations, which are few and often underfunded.

Although local researchers often possess critical knowledge of biodiversity, languages, logistics and environmental challenges, they may have limited opportunities to lead projects or secure senior authorship positions in international collaborations.

The hidden cost of doing fieldwork

Biodiversity research is inherently expensive. It requires travel, equipment, permits, and the support of local guides or assistants. Even short expeditions can cost hundreds or thousands of dollars. In many parts of the world, these costs are covered by research grants or institutional funding.

But in Africa, especially for exploratory research, funding is generally limited or unavailable. Consequently, scientists often have to rely on their own income to conduct fieldwork, a pattern also reported by researchers in other lower-income countries.

We found that across countries, foreign-affiliated researchers typically earned between four and 30 times more than locally based scientists conducting research in the same country. Researchers based outside the continent also retain substantially higher disposable income, even after accounting for travel costs, allowing them to contribute to or fully fund fieldwork. By contrast, in half of the African countries analysed, locally based researchers could not cover even a conservative fieldwork budget of US$1,000 using their entire monthly salary.

These differences create an uneven playing field. Success depends not only on the merit of ideas or quality of training, but also on who can afford to be in the field.

As a result, scientists with greater financial security may be better positioned to sustain fieldwork, revisit sites and maintain long-term research programmes.

For students, these realities become clear early on. Even those with a strong interest in biodiversity may decide not to pursue careers in biology, or reduce their involvement over time, once they understand the financial constraints. Consequently, fewer local specialists are trained.

The shortage of local specialists is part of a broader research capacity gap. Africa has approximately 236 researchers per million people. This is far below the global average of around 1,516, and substantially lower than Europe’s 4,240 researchers per million people or the more than 4,800 per million in the US.

Many African countries have few locally based scientists available to conduct biodiversity surveys, supervise students, lead long-term monitoring programmes, or build specialised expertise, particularly in poorly studied taxonomic groups.

When research becomes difficult to prioritise

Low salaries have broader consequences.

Scientists may rely on consultancies or teaching across multiple institutions. This leaves limited time for research. Over time it reduces both their development as researchers and the relevance of the knowledge they bring into the classroom.

Research capacity in African institutions remains limited. Most biodiversity studies are led by researchers from foreign institutions. Though international collaborations are essential, they can lead to local scientists being limited in their ability to lead projects or even participate.

In such cases, local knowledge and priorities can be overlooked. Large parts of these countries, and many taxonomic groups, may remain poorly studied.

In Mozambique, for example, some of the country’s most important areas for threatened and endemic plants and animals lie outside the current protected area network.

Conservation funding and research have historically concentrated in large protected areas known for charismatic megafauna such as elephants and lions.

Solutions are hard to come by

Increasing researchers’ salaries is not straightforward. In many countries, salaries at public universities are tied to national government salary scales and broader public sector budgets. This means there is no single institution that can solve the problem alone. Still, universities and funding agencies can create mechanisms to better support research activity.

These may include productivity-based incentives, research stipends, fieldwork allowances, reduced teaching loads for active researchers, and grant schemes that directly fund local scientists. Governments can also invest in research as part of long-term national development strategies.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Poor pay is holding back Africa’s biodiversity research and reducing its contribution to global science – https://theconversation.com/poor-pay-is-holding-back-africas-biodiversity-research-and-reducing-its-contribution-to-global-science-282447

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Thulani P. Makhalanyane, Professor of Microbiology, Stellenbosch University

South Africa has a paradox when it comes to food availability. Its supermarkets are overflowing. But it continues to record high levels of stunted growth.

This seems to be a global problem. Data suggest that the world has produced more food in the last two decades and more wealth. Yet, roughly 150 million children under five remain stunted (too short for their age).

Stunted growth and poor cognitive development often stem from the same early-life problems, like poor nutrition, illness and unhealthy environments. These impediments to a child’s learning ability and physical growth have been shown to have serious long-term consequences for health and future economic prospects.

More concerning is that it appears that putting calories into mouths is not enough to prevent stunting. The science points to the role played by our intestinal microbiome – the trillions of microscopic organisms, including bacteria, viruses and fungi, that live in and on us – and the inability to digest nutrients.

We – a microbiologist and a health economist – recently published a paper in which we outline emerging evidence demonstrating that poverty affects children’s physiology – the way their bodies work – not merely their access to resources. Addressing childhood stunting therefore requires moving beyond single interventions such as providing food. What’s needed are integrated approaches that simultaneously tackle sanitation, infection control, nutrition quality and early childhood stimulation.

Our findings support the growing scientific evidence that both physiological and environmental factors must be addressed together to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty and developmental impairment. Nutrition is not the full story. The gut microbiome plays a complementary role by breaking down complex carbohydrates that our bodies cannot digest on their own, converting them into forms that may be absorbed and used for growth and development.

Diet provides the essential raw materials, while the microbiome helps unlock their nutritional value, thereby contributing to growth and development. There is also strong evidence that the environment shapes the microbiome’s ability to carry out these functions.

Gut microbes, poverty and stunting

Children’s growth is affected not only by what they eat, but also by how well their bodies can process and absorb nutrients.

Children living in informal settlements, where sanitation is generally poor, are exposed to microorganisms through dirt, toxic dust and sewage. This exposure may lead to a condition called environmental enteric dysfunction. This is when an inflamed intestine impairs the absorption of nutrients, including fats, proteins and vitamins.

The result is stunting. This may remain undiagnosed but can affect health negatively across a lifetime.

The prevalence of environmental enteric dysfunction in South Africa remains unclear. One reason is that there are no easily administered diagnostic tests. The other is the lack of large scale coordinated national studies.

Evidence from studies in Asia supports the potential role of the microbiome as a central contributor to stunting. These studies suggest that gut microbial communities of healthy children tend to follow predictable developmental milestones during the first two years of life. Failure to achieve these milestones may compromise the microbiome’s capacity to process food efficiently, with important implications for child growth and development.

In contrast, children with severe acute malnutrition often carry an immature gut community that does not mature in response to food or interventions focused on water, sanitation and hygiene services alone.

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Read more:
South African policy isn’t connecting child nutrition and sanitation

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In a study done in Malawi, scientists transplanted gut bacteria from malnourished children into young animals and showed that the animals developed growth deficits. Conversely, microbes from healthy children could restore growth.

These studies show that an unhealthy gut community may be a cause – not just a consequence – of poor growth. Although the concept of a “healthy” microbiome has been the subject of extensive debate, there is increasing consensus that healthy microbiomes are typically characterised by high microbial diversity, the absence of dominance by a single organism, the capacity to remain stable, resilience and the ability to maintain essential functions even when community composition changes or is subject to environmental disturbance.

Studies that look directly at the small intestine have found that many stunted children have bacteria from the mouth growing in the wrong part of the gut. These bacteria may interfere with how the body absorbs fat, creating a direct link between the makeup of gut microbes and poor growth.

Other studies show that what really matters is what the microbes do – their ability to make vitamins and other building blocks – not just which species are present.

Put simply, the microbiome can help determine whether the food a child eats is used to grow body tissue or is wasted.

Knowledge gaps

Progress in tackling stunting has been slow for a number of reasons.

Firstly, traditional interventions focused on food provision and sanitation without understanding the underlying biological damage that impairs how nutrients are absorbed.

Secondly, the evidence base relies on studies from high-income contexts where nutrition alone may be the primary constraint. In lower and middle income countries the biological mechanisms driving stunting involve multiple interacting pathways.

Part of the answer is geography of research. Many of the early groundbreaking studies come from Asia and south Asia and from a few sites in east Africa and Malawi. Large multicountry cohorts such as the MAL-ED project and several studies in Bangladesh have provided strong evidence about enteric pathogens and their links to growth.

But sub-Saharan Africa remains under represented in longitudinal microbiome studies despite carrying a large burden of stunting. That gap has real world consequences. We know that the gut microbiome varies considerably and is influenced by several factors including diet and geography.

Children in different places have different diets, different exposures and different baseline microbes. Interventions that work in one region may fail in another.

The answers

What’s needed is African led research that samples African children across geography to understand what will work on the continent.

This requires a change in approaches to policy and research.

First, policy makers must stop treating food availability as synonymous with nutritional success. Food security matters but it is not sufficient.

Secondly, routine growth must be monitored better at primary healthcare level so stunting is not missed in communities where short stature looks normal to the eye.

Third, studies must measure gut function – not only weight and height. This will show who is failing to extract the benefit of food.

Fourth, water, sanitation and hygiene must be integrated.

Finally, build African capacity for this work, and fund African research.

Where the science could lead

Research into the microbiome can shift strategies from treating hunger to restoring lifelong health.

For example, it may be possible to identify new microbes that block fat absorption or those that degrade essential vitamins. We may begin to map how early disruptions in gut function influence metabolism and increase the risk of non-communicable diseases later in life.

We may also learn to use simple stool or blood markers to identify children who, despite having enough food, will not grow without gut-directed therapy.

Thulani P. Makhalanyane receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation, The European Union Horizon 2020 Program, and the Human Frontier Science Program.

Ronelle Burger receives funding from the South African Research Foundation, the DG Murray Trust, the South African Medical Research Council, and the Department of Science, Technology and Innovation for research on child stunting and housing.

– ref. Gut health: why food alone won’t fix childhood stunting – https://theconversation.com/gut-health-why-food-alone-wont-fix-childhood-stunting-273395

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Salah Ben Hammou, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Rice University

Malian officials announced on 4 May 2026 that junta leader General Assimi Goïta would take on the post of defence minister after the killing of General Sadio Camara a week earlier.

Camara’s death occurred amid an offensive by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which launched attacks across Mali. Insecurity persists in Mali despite years of military rule, which was justified on promises of restoring order and defeating insurgent violence.

On the surface, Goïta’s decision to absorb the defence portfolio appears to be a pragmatic wartime measure, aimed at ensuring continuity within the armed forces during a period of instability.

But the move also follows a broader political path that has become visible in Mali since the junta seized power in 2020. Rather than institutionalising military rule, Goïta has concentrated authority around the presidency, tightened control over the state’s coercive apparatus, and relied on a small circle of military elites.

As political scientists who have extensively published and written on military coups and regime trajectories in west Africa, we observe this behaviour is not unique to Mali. It is the third country in the region to see military leaders consolidate their authority around individual leaders rather than the armed forces.

Across the post-coup Sahel, military regimes have shifted from presenting themselves as temporary “corrective” interventions to becoming personalised systems of rule. The other two examples are Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who took power in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in July 2023.

The distinction matters because military regimes governed collectively by officer coalitions retain some internal balance and institutional constraint. As power becomes concentrated around a single ruler, however, decision-making revolves around personal loyalty rather than broader military or state interests.

Military rule and personalisation in Mali

Goïta (then a colonel) and his companions in Mali toppled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020. The coup architects initially presented themselves as reluctant interveners. At the time, observers expected a short transition. Within months the regional body Ecowas had lifted its financial embargo.

Goïta pledged elections within 18 months, then 24.

A constitutional revision passed in 2025 removed the provision that had previously barred him from standing in any future presidential election. Political parties were banned. The transitional legislative body was filled by presidential decree. And civilian oversight institutions, including the electoral observation body, were dissolved.

The armed forces were restructured along lines scholars recognise as counterbalancing. This is best described as a coup-proofing mechanism. Regimes create parallel armed structures with distinct reporting lines to make it more difficult for any group to move against them.

In Mali, three specialised military units were created with overlapping counter-terrorism mandates that report to the executive. The police were also placed under military discipline.

Goïta assumed the defence portfolio, appointed the former chief of staff of the armed forces, Major General Oumar Diarra, as delegate minister, and named a new chief of staff to replace him.

The defence portfolio controls the largest share of the state budget, grown from 11.5% to 14.5% of GDP since 2020. It is where Mali’s relationship with Africa Corps, which since 2023 has replaced French forces in counter-terrorism operations, is managed daily.

As defence minister since the coup, Camara had been the primary link with Africa Corps.

The appointment of Diarra is consistent with what scholars describe as the rotation of commanders to limit the accumulation of loyalty around any single figure. Diarra had served as chief of staff since 2020.

Burkina Faso and Niger

In Burkina Faso and Niger, too, there have been signs that military regimes are concentrating power around individual military leaders rather than a collective of officers.

Traoré is perhaps the clearest example of this trend. Since seizing power in 2022, he has cultivated an image of himself as a revolutionary anti-colonial figure, drawing comparisons to the iconic Burkinabè leader Thomas Sankara.

Coordinated social media campaigns glorified Traoré while attacking critics. This was combined with nationalist rhetoric and highly publicised economic reforms. All helped elevate his image as the symbolic saviour of Burkinabè society.

Allegations of assassination attempts and coup conspiracies helped rally public support around Traoré as a besieged national leader. They also served as valuable pretexts for targeting political opponents and rivals in the military.

Traoré has appointed family members and trusted allies to strategic positions. Individuals like his brother, Inoussa Traoré, hold senior positions and help curate the regime’s digital message while maintaining links with sympathetic civil society.

Elections are repeatedly delayed and Burkinabes are urged to “forget about democracy”. Traoré is slated to remain in power until 2029.

In Niger, Tiani, the former commander of Mohamed Bazoum’s Presidential Guard, has extended his rule until at least 2030.

Much like Goïta, he has made the timeline conditional on the state of the country’s security.

Tiani dissolved political parties, promoted himself to army general, a first in Niger, and was cast as a national hero. He has reportedly retreated almost entirely from public life and conducts government from within the presidential guard compound.

From there, Tiani has militarised the civilian administration and placed trusted figures around him. General Salifou Mody at defence serves as his principal relay with Russian partners and with the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Moussa Salaou Barmou.

The regime also moved to repress political opponents through civilian-facing institutions, such as the Commission de lutte contre la délinquance économique, financière et fiscale.

The perils of personalism

For decades, political scientists have highlighted the dangers and weaknesses of personalist political systems. Concentrating power around a single ruler often weakens the institutions needed for effective governance and long-term stability.

In military-ruled countries like those in the Sahel, the consequences can be especially severe. Armed forces may be reorganised less around operational effectiveness than around protecting the ruler from rivals and internal threats.

Promotions and command positions become tied to loyalty, parallel security structures proliferate, and mistrust within the officer corps deepens. On the battlefield, these dynamics can undermine coordination and reduce the military’s ability to respond effectively to insurgent violence.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mali’s military leader is consolidating power. Why this is dangerous – https://theconversation.com/malis-military-leader-is-consolidating-power-why-this-is-dangerous-282923

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Kevin J.A. Thomas, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, Rice University

During the Ebola epidemic of 2014 to 2016, Musu, a resident of Monrovia, Liberia contracted the Ebola virus along with her husband, five sons and daughter.

A few weeks later, six members of her family died. Musu and her youngest son survived. Since then, their lives have not been the same. Her husband was the family’s sole breadwinner. Now a widow and a single parent, Musu struggles to make ends meet. As she put it, “There is no one here to help besides God. No boyfriend. No father. I am the father, the mother, the uncle, and the brother. At the place we are renting, we can’t even find food to eat.”

Musu is one of the many survivors who recovered from the world’s largest Ebola epidemic. The epidemic started as a localised disease outbreak in the village of Meliandou in Guinea but spread to neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Over the course of three years, the disease infected 28,600 people. Approximately 11,000 of them died while 17,000 survived.

On 9 June 2016, the World Health Organization announced the official end of the Ebola epidemic in Liberia.

Compared to the widespread media coverage of the epidemic when it started, news reports on its aftermath have been limited. As a result, very few people know that Ebola survivors have struggled to continue with their lives since the end of the epidemic.

These survivors include widows like Musu, orphans who are now homeless, and thousands of people who are now blind or have permanent vision problems.

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Read more:
Ebola survivors can lose their eyesight. What we’re doing to prevent it

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I am a social demographer who studies health and population trends. My recent book Life After Epidemics: Ebola Survivors and the Social Dimensions of Recovery documents many of these experiences. Based on interviews with 250 Ebola survivors in Liberia and Sierra Leone, I set about trying to understand why many survivors live in worse conditions than before the epidemic, and what’s preventing them from returning to their normal lives.

Understanding these issues is a first step towards developing solutions to the problems currently faced by Ebola survivors. Learning about their experiences can prevent these problems from occurring among survivors of future epidemics.

Medical versus social responses to epidemics

The process of determining what went wrong begins by understanding the contrast between two types of responses to epidemics.

The first is the medical response, which emphasises the use of clinical medicine to save lives and care for infected patients.

The second is the social response, which addresses issues such as the provision of sustainable livelihoods, supporting orphans, and integrating survivors into their communities.

Policy makers placed a greater priority on short-term medical responses to the consequences of the Ebola epidemic than on long-term social responses.

The main objective of my research is to examine how Ebola survivors have been affected by that emphasis. I used information from interviews and other sources to assess how their health, sources of livelihood, and family lives have changed since the end of the epidemic.

The research provides evidence on the ways in which the limited investment in social responses continues to negatively affect the lives of survivors.

For example, there are no programmes that provide them with comprehensive access to healthcare, even though many of them are either blind, suffer from musculoskeletal conditions, have neurological conditions, or live with other long-term side effects of the virus.

It also describes the experiences of farmers in poor health, who can no longer till their land, and hunters who can no longer see. They are among the many survivors who were previously self-employed but have lost their sources of livelihood.

With the limited investment in social responses, the stigma of Ebola continues to thrive in local communities. As a result, the social interactions of Ebola survivors are often plagued by the fears of people who believe they are still infected. These fears caused business owners to lose clients and contributed to the end of marriages.

Many survivors no longer receive invitations to attend social events such as weddings and child naming ceremonies. In some cases, their children have also lost playmates after neighbours banned their children from playing with the children of Ebola survivors.

Humanitarian organisations played a major role in containing the spread of the disease during the epidemic. Some of their policies had unintended consequences, however, that have added to the problems of patients who survived. For example, the practice of burning the belongings of infected patients to prevent further transmission of the virus has increased economic hardship among many survivors.

The burning process led to financial losses among survivors who kept their savings under their mattresses, lost farming tools, and had to pay for equipment borrowed from neighbours that was also destroyed.

Some of the messages employed in public health campaigns used to contain the spread of the virus during the epidemic have also had unintended consequences. These campaigns warned the public to avoid touching infected people as a way of stopping transmission of the disease, because there was no cure for Ebola. Since the end of the epidemic, many people in local communities have continued to avoid touching survivors. They question how survivors can claim to be Ebola-free when the public was told that the disease had no cure.

Why Ebola survivors feel abandoned

Hearing the stories of the survivors made it clear that many of them felt abandoned. The visits from community leaders have stopped. The specialised care they received from hospitals has been discontinued. Many of the promises of political leaders who claimed they would provide resources to support their recovery remain unfulfilled. Some of the resources provided by donors were lost to fraud.

Meanwhile, Ebola survivors continue to be affected by the irreversible losses they experienced a decade ago. These experiences and the lack of attention to their social circumstances still define their lives.

Policy makers will need to give equal attention to medical and social issues when responding to future epidemics. This will require sustained investments to improve the lives of survivors long after we celebrate the end of epidemics.

Kevin J.A. Thomas received funding from the Andrew Carnegie Fellows Program while conducting the study described in this article.

– ref. Ebola survivors struggle to return to normal lives: what I found out in Sierra Leone and Liberia – https://theconversation.com/ebola-survivors-struggle-to-return-to-normal-lives-what-i-found-out-in-sierra-leone-and-liberia-281678

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nyashadzashe Chiwawa, AIA Research Co-ordinator in the College of Law and Management Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal

Across many cities and towns in South Africa, turning on a tap no longer guarantees water. Instead, trucks – known as water tankers – arrive to deliver water to communities facing shortages.

Water tankers have shifted from being an emergency stopgap to a routine feature of water provision by municipalities. In many communities, especially informal settlements and areas affected by repeated outages, residents now depend on trucks to deliver water for months at a time.

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Access to water has a long racial history in Durban: I followed the story in the city’s archives

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This reliance has grown over more than 10 years as ageing pipes, leaking networks, failed pumps, power cuts and poor maintenance have made supply increasingly unreliable.

Water tankering has also become a lucrative municipal business. Johannesburg Water, an entity owned by the City of Johannesburg, reportedly spent R130.5 million (US$8 million) on tankers in the 2024/25 financial year. Although this is only about 0.16% of Johannesburg’s combined R83.1 billion operating and capital budget for 2024/25, it is a large recurring outlay for what is meant to be an emergency service. It is also about 1.8% of the city’s R7.4 billion capital budget, money that could otherwise support longer-term infrastructure investment.

In Johannesburg, the tankers are largely supplied through private contractors appointed by Johannesburg Water. They deliver water from Johannesburg Water’s own supply.

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Read more:
The lack of water in South Africa is the result of a long history of injustice – and legislation should start there

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The water tanker contracts have also attracted controversy: a R263 million (about US$16 million) Johannesburg Water contract for 70 water tankers was declared invalid and set aside by the Gauteng High Court in December 2025 because of irregularities in the tender process.

South Africa’s growing reliance on water tankers reflects a deepening collapse in municipal water systems. A 2023 government report found that 46% of water supply systems in the country had poor or bad microbiological water quality, compared with only 5% in 2014.

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Read more:
Community dialogue can show the way to meeting water needs: a South African case

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Water lost through leaks, faulty meters, illegal connections, poor billing or uncollected revenue rose from 37% in 2014 to 47% in 2023. This is far above the international average of about 30%.

By 2025, 47% of audited wastewater treatment systems were in a critical state, up from 39% in the previous assessment. Water systems rated excellent or good fell from 14% to 8%.

Together, these reports point to a long-running deterioration in municipal capacity: infrastructure is ageing, maintenance budgets are inadequate, skilled staff are in short supply, and many municipalities are losing treated water faster than they can reliably deliver it.

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Read more:
Water in the dams, but South Africa’s taps are dry: essential reads on a history of bad management

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As a researcher working in public governance and service delivery, I conducted a study aimed at understanding what happens when a temporary water solution becomes permanent. I wanted to find out how this shapes the lives of people forced to collect their only water supply in buckets from tankers over long periods.

My research explored how tanker-based water provision affects fairness, environmental sustainability, and trust in government in the eThekwini Municipality (formerly known as Durban), a coastal city in South Africa.

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Sewage leaks put South Africa’s freshwater at risk: how citizen scientists are helping clean up

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The findings reveal a troubling pattern. Marginalised communities, particularly those in informal settlements or peri-urban areas, receive irregular and unreliable water deliveries. Some wait hours or even days for water, while others have more consistent access.

The key findings of my research are that water tankering:

• delays real solutions to water shortages

• is the result of top-down decisions that communities haven’t been part of

• has a negative impact on the environment

• makes inequality much worse.

The challenges seen in eThekwini are not unique. Cities around the world are facing similar pressures from climate change, urbanisation and ageing infrastructure. Relying on short-term fixes like tankering is becoming more common. But understanding its consequences is critical for avoiding larger crises in the future.

On the ground

I spoke directly to people affected by water shortages and those responsible for managing supply: municipal officials, engineers, community leaders, activists and residents living in water-scarce areas. My aim was to record real life stories about how people receive water, how they perceive the system and what challenges they face.

The problems identified included:

• delays in real solutions to water shortages. Instead of investing in infrastructure like pipes, reservoirs and treatment plants, municipalities are relying on tankers as a stopgap. Over time, this delays tackling the root causes. As one participant described, tankering becomes a “Band-Aid” rather than a cure.

• a lack of community involvement. Decisions about water distribution are often made without input from those most affected, leading to mistrust, frustration and a sense of exclusion. When people feel they have no voice in how water is managed, it undermines both governance and social cohesion, as one person I interviewed told me:

I advocate for community-driven solutions such as rainwater harvesting systems or decentralised water treatment facilities. These approaches empower communities to manage their water resources sustainably and reduce dependence on external interventions like water tankering.

• environmental impact. The tankers use diesel, which causes carbon emissions and pollution. Extracting and transporting water at scale can strain natural resources, especially in already water-stressed regions. As another person I interviewed said:

It’s not a sustainable solution for ensuring water security. It’s costly, energy-intensive, and can have negative environmental impacts.

• inequality. Water is essential to life, health and dignity. When access to water is unequal, it affects everything from education and employment to public health. Children in water-scarce households may miss school. Families may spend hours collecting water instead of working. Poor water quality can lead to disease. These are not isolated issues. A community member told me that getting water from tankers instead of from the tap is frustrating and demoralising:

We feel like second-class citizens, constantly at the mercy of erratic delivery schedules and uncertain water quality. Ethically, we deserve access to reliable, clean water just like any other community. The current situation undermines our dignity and perpetuates a cycle of poverty and dependence.

What needs to happen next?

First, governments must shift from reactive to proactive solutions. This means investing in long-term water infrastructure rather than relying on emergency measures. Pipes, treatment plants and storage systems may require large upfront costs, but they provide sustainable and equitable access to water over time.

Second, governance must improve. Transparency, accountability and anti-corruption measures are essential to ensure that resources are used effectively. Public funds spent on repeated tanker contracts could often be better invested in permanent systems.

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Stormwater harvesting could help South Africa manage its water shortages

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Third, communities must be included in decision-making. Local knowledge and participation can lead to more effective and context-specific solutions, such as rainwater harvesting or decentralised water systems. When people are involved, they are more likely to trust and support water management strategies.

Finally, policymakers need to treat water access as a matter of justice, not just logistics. This means recognising water as a basic human right and ensuring that policies prioritise the most vulnerable populations.

Nyashadzashe Chiwawa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Water tank delivery in South Africa has stopped pipes getting fixed and opened the door to corruption – research – https://theconversation.com/water-tank-delivery-in-south-africa-has-stopped-pipes-getting-fixed-and-opened-the-door-to-corruption-research-281752

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

The World Bank made history in 1994 by creating the Inspection Panel, the first independent accountability mechanism at any international organisation. Its function is to investigate complaints from communities who allege they were harmed because the bank failed to comply with its own policies and procedures.

By establishing the three-member Inspection Panel, the World Bank showed support for a democratic vision of international governance based on the rule of law and the rights of individuals to take part in development decisions that affect their lives.

To date, the panel has received 186 complaints. Fifty-two have been from Africa. They involved projects in 56 countries, including 26 African countries. The complaints have raised issues such as the World Bank’s failure to comply with its own policies regarding public consultations, environmental and social impact assessments and involuntary resettlement in the projects that it funds.

The board has expanded the bank’s accountability process to include both compliance reviews and dispute resolution processes. Today, the World Bank Group has three independent accountability mechanisms:

• the Inspection Panel, which focuses on compliance reviews in public sector projects

• a separate dispute resolution mechanism for public sector projects

• the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, which offers both compliance reviews and dispute resolution services for private sector projects, primarily funded by the International Finance Corporation.

These accountability mechanisms have operated with mixed success. There have been some wins, for example in a case in Uganda involving risks for women and children associated with the building of a road. And some failures. An example is the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman finding against the International Finance Corporation for noncompliance in a coal fired power plant in India that was ignored.

We were involved, as legal academics and working with civil society organisations, in the establishment of the Inspection Panel. We have been following the activities of these independent accountability mechanisms for over 30 years. We are concerned about their future.

The World Bank Group is seeking to become a “bigger and better” bank. This involves promoting more collaboration between the five entities that make up the group. It is doing so under the banner of “One WBG”. This is an important development because the World Bank is the only global multilateral development bank. It offers developing countries both financial and advisory services. For example, it is the biggest funder of development projects in Africa.

The increasing collaboration between the different institutions in the bank raises concerns about which of their policies are applicable to a particular project. It also raises the issue of whether the bank should integrate the group’s independent accountability mechanisms so that there is no question about which mechanism is applicable to the project.

We believe that resolving this issue offers the bank’s board an opportunity to improve the structure of its independent accountability mechanisms and their contribution to the bank’s operations.

The dangers

The board appointed a two-person task force in September 2025 to advise it on the feasibility of integrating the three organisations in a way that does not reduce their independence, accessibility and effectiveness. The task force prepared a thorough and well-reasoned draft report.

The report was finalised after public consultations and is being considered by the board. It shows that integration of the mechanisms is a feasible, but complex exercise. The existing mechanisms have different operating cultures, policies and practices and human resource needs. The report describes various models for integrating the existing mechanisms.

The report also demonstrates that if mishandled, the exercise could result in a less independent and less effective accountability mechanism. To avoid this risk, we propose that the board adopt a model consisting of two separate independent accountability mechanisms. One to cover compliance reviews across the entire group. The other to cover dispute resolution across the group. This will enable both functions to operate independently and efficiently.

Our proposal raises four issues.

First, it is important that each mechanism is independent of the bank’s management. Each mechanism must have sufficient resources to undertake effective compliance reviews or dispute resolutions. Their processes must also be robust enough to result in meaningful outcomes for the complainants.

Second, the new compliance mechanism must retain a three-member panel appointed by and reporting to the bank’s board. The panel should have a permanent chair serving a six-year term. The chair must have the authority to decide which cases need the panel’s attention. The other two panel members should also serve staggered six-year terms.

A three-person panel allows for some geographic, technical and experiential diversity. Gaining a consensus among the panel members improves the quality and increases the credibility of the panel reports. A three-member panel is better able to withstand pressure from the bank’s management and other stakeholders than is a mechanism headed by one person.

Third, the dispute resolution mechanism should be headed by an experienced dispute resolution professional at the vice-president level. This official should report to the president of the bank. Our view is that this arrangement could encourage the institution to play a more proactive role in resolving disputes.

To ensure that the unit has some independence it should also have regularly scheduled meetings with the board. The head of the unit should also be able to request a meeting with the board whenever they deem it necessary and without requiring the prior approval of the bank’s president.

Fourth, the process of consolidating accountability mechanisms will be complex. Consequently, the board should first decide on the basic structure: a compliance review unit headed by a three-member panel and a separate dispute resolution unit headed by a senior professional.

It should delay any decisions on the policies, principles and practices of the mechanisms until it receives advice from a multi-stakeholder working group that includes external stakeholders and management and is co-chaired by one person from each of the units being merged.

An opportunity to fix things

The bank has the opportunity to strengthen its development mission. The changes it makes should be designed to:

• help make the bank a better institution that supports higher quality projects

• make the bank a learning institution that openly accepts criticism and looks to implement solutions

• ensure it becomes an institution that recognises that people affected by bank-funded projects are stakeholders in its operations who may be forced to risk their well-being for the greater good.

Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at the University of Pretoria, is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Development Policy Center, Boston University.

David Hunter has previously received grants of up to $100,000 per year from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, an independent US foundation that supports groups that work on sustainable finance). He serves on the Board of Directors of Accountability Counsel, a non-profit advocacy group in the United States that supports affected communities in bringing claims to accountability mechanisms, like the World Bank Groups’ Inspection Panel and CAO.

– ref. The World Bank wants to change the way it manages complaints: the fixes that could make it better – https://theconversation.com/the-world-bank-wants-to-change-the-way-it-manages-complaints-the-fixes-that-could-make-it-better-282695

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Ongama Mtimka, Lecturer, Nelson Mandela University

Julius Malema, the leader of South Africa’s fourth-largest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), is a divisive figure: loved by some, hated by others.

Malema made headlines in April 2026 after a lower court found him guilty of illegal possession and discharging of a firearm and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. He is appealing the conviction and sentence.

Within a few weeks he made headlines again when the country’s Constitutional Court ruled in a case the EFF had brought before it. The case was about the alleged theft of a large sum of foreign currency from President Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa’s private game farm, Phala Phala. The court found in favour of the EFF and the other party to the case, the African Transformation Movement.

Malema hails from Seshego, a small village in Limpopo, which is one of South Africa’s poorer provinces. Born in 1981, he has become something of a generational peculiarity in the body politic of the country.

The old guard of liberation fighters who were active from the 1960s and 1970s onwards continue to dominate South Africa’s political landscape. They include leaders of parties in parliament like the African National Congress (ANC), Bantu Holomisa of the United Democratic Movement, and Patricia De Lille of the Good party, among others. But Malema broke that mould.

Few South African politicians have achieved what he has.

In 2013 Malema, together with Floyd Shivambu, announced the founding of the Economic Freedom Fighters as the main host for radical youth politics in South Africa. This was after they were fired from the ANC while serving as leaders of its youth wing.

The EFF went on to poll numbers that put it in third place in four successive elections between 2014 to 2021. In the most recent national poll in 2024, however, the party lost this spot to the former president Jacob Zuma’s new uMkhonto weSizwe Party.

Malema is a career politician who has used the political liberties bequeathed to democratic South Africa to his personal and political advantage. Yet, he continues to agitate against the emerging order, as if he himself were the victim of it, not a beneficiary high up in the distribution chain.

As a political analyst and senior lecturer, I have studied the rise of Malema and his party as part of South Africa’s ongoing leftist, worker-driven political wing. Tracking the gains and failings of the EFF, I believe there are several factors that contribute to Malema’s successes and shortcomings.

His skills at building a party and running a tight ship have been bolstered by his charisma and speech-making capability. But there have been controversies over showmanship and the use of divisive and incendiary speech. This has produced a complex and ambiguous public figure. And a party in flux.

The rise of a firebrand politician

Malema shot to national prominence in 2007 in the build-up to the major political upheaval of the democratic period, the 52nd conference of the ANC in the city of Polokwane. The league had assumed a kingmaker role in ANC succession battles in various times in the history of the liberation movement, helping remove president AB Xuma in 1949 and then president Thabo Mbeki through its active campaigning.

Events at the conference would change the trajectory of South Africa. Mbeki was president of the country as well as the party and was seeking a third term to run the party. His deputy in the party, Jacob Zuma, whom he had suspended as deputy president of the country, defeated Mbeki and delegates to the conference elected him to lead it.

After Zuma had come to power, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and the ANC Youth League became critical of him.

Youth league members, including Malema, were hauled before the disciplinary structures of the ANC. According to his biographer, Fiona Forde, this was an attempt to curtail his rising influence in the party and the potential to disrupt succession.

Nonetheless, Malema’s EFF avoided the fate of quickly disintegrating, unlike other breakaway parties such as the Congress of the People.

He did this by building his party with the leaders who followed him from the Youth League. He used strong control of the party platform as its chief communicator, building a militant persona.

Malema’s wider public success can be attributed to his rhetoric, chants and tactics that have bordered at times on anarchy, war mongering and glorification of violence.

He has fashioned himself into a warrior figure who exploits black rage to gain popularity. The party stands for a more radical path to economic transformation in South Africa, particularly expropriation of land without compensation and nationalisation of mines.

But, as my research shows, his purpose appears less about waging a true revolutionary war and more about drawing political value from the perception that he could.

This creates a stark contradiction. Malema performs the role of a fearless revolutionary within a stable democracy that offers him all the securities and legal protections he needs to sustain this performance. Unlike those who rise against authoritarian regimes, he faces no mortal risks.

He appears to care deeply for the plight of the poor, yet his lifestyle suggests he is high up the distribution chain, with a taste for the finer things in life.

Many revolutionaries throughout history came from better backgrounds than the people they spoke for. Karl Marx, Frans Fanon, and Martin Luther King Jnr are but some of the examples. Yet few have balanced so overtly the “militant” brand with such personal comfort.

The primary mechanism for this warrior persona is a calculated mix of word, appearance and branding.

Malema uses the media and public events as a platform for his politicking. He has received significant media coverage as a result of his activities. But this hasn’t stopped him from frequently attacking the fourth estate.

In Parliament he has used disruptive tactics to draw attention to the party, even though it now only has 47 seats out of a total of 400.

An ambiguous future

Now that Malema has been convicted and sentenced to an effective five-year term in prison, he faces a turning point. He may be disqualified from serving as an MP and could even go to prison. This places the EFF into the realm of the ambiguous and uncertain.

Because the party has been held together by his firm grip, which clamped down on ambition, the EFF is not yet prepared for a succession. The potential loss of its leader leaves the “Red Berets”, and the rage they channel, in a state of flux.

The South African Communist Party has resolved to contest elections independently of the ANC. It remains to be seen how this will reconfigure left politics in terms of control over municipal councils in 2026. South Africa is scheduled to go to the polls in November 2026.

Ongama Mtimka is affiliated with the South African Association of Political Studies as the current sitting president.

– ref. Julius Malema: South Africa’s performative revolutionary is facing his biggest battle – https://theconversation.com/julius-malema-south-africas-performative-revolutionary-is-facing-his-biggest-battle-281750