The Conversation – Africa – Page 10

March 2, 2026

South Sudan has never had an election to hand over presidential power: so what are the rules of succession?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jan Pospisil, Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs

South Sudan has not held an election since it gained independence 15 years ago, and progress towards a new constitution has stalled. Election dates have been set and postponed at least three times. A new date has been set for December 2026 but it’s unclear the poll will take place. If it does, it will be the first electoral test for President Salva Kiir, who has been in power since 2011. It raises the question of what legal guardrails exist for a smooth transition to new leadership outside an election. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the country’s politics and power-sharing agreements, explains what’s in place.

What legal frameworks govern presidential succession in South Sudan?

Two legal frameworks operate side by side to regulate the succession question in South Sudan: the 2011 transitional constitution and the 2018 peace agreement, which has a quasi-constitutional quality.

Read together, the logic in the 2011 and 2018 frameworks is straightforward. Upon vacancy, the first vice-president acts as president, but only until the party in power nominates a successor. The president’s party then has 48 hours to nominate a replacement. If a nomination is made within that period, however, the nominee is sworn in and replaces the acting first vice-president.

The peace agreement overlays the constitutional acting mechanism with a time-limited party entitlement. But it does not replace the constitutional fallback.

A more granular breakdown looks like this.

The 2018 agreement is based on a power-sharing deal between five major political parties and blocs. It is the primary framework governing the country’s transitional period from conflict to democracy.

The peace agreement created a collective presidency composed of a president, one first vice-president and four vice-presidents. The four vice-presidents are considered equal in rank.

The key provision on succession is clause 1.6.5. It states that if the post of the president falls vacant during the transitional period, the replacement shall be nominated by the respective party as constituted at the signing of the agreement. The process of choosing a successor must also be done within 48 hours of the post falling vacant.

The clause establishes two principles.

First, the presidency remains allocated to the party that originally held the position under the power-sharing arrangement. In this case, it’s the mainstream SPLM, now called SPLM-IG, for “in government”. This is to differentiate it from the main opposition that formed in December 2013 in the course of civil war, SPLM-IO, for “in opposition”.

Second, the party’s right to nominate a successor is time-bound. The 48-hour window is designed to preserve the elite settlement and guarantee executive continuity with minimal friction.

What the agreement doesn’t do is spell out in detail what happens during those 48 hours. It does not foresee the creation of a separate interim authority for this short period.

Instead, continuity is ensured through the 2011 transitional constitution.

In the constitution, article 102 defines five ways the president’s office can become vacant. These are expiration of the term of office, resignation, impeachment, mental infirmity or physical incapacity and death. It lays out the respective succession rules.

If the presidency falls vacant, the vice-president assumes office temporarily,

pending the filling of this position, within fourteen days from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy, by a nominee of the political party on whose ticket he or she was elected.

Under the post-2018 structure, this provision applies to the first vice-president.

There has been precedent for such structured succession. In 2005, Salva Kiir assumed regional leadership following the death of John Garang under the constitutional framework that was then in force. At the time, South Sudan was a semi-autonomous region led by Garang, with Kiir as his deputy.

What happens if the 48-hour deadline is missed?

This raises difficulties. The 2018 agreement sets a time limit but does not contain a separate sanction clause.

If nomination occurs on hour 72 or 96 rather than hour 48, the text does not specify whether the party’s entitlement automatically lapses.

Different interpretations are possible. One reading treats the deadline as mandatory: once expired, the first vice-president’s acting role becomes substantive, and he or she becomes the president.

Another reading is that a delayed nomination could still be recognised if political actors agreed. This would be in line with the transitional constitution, which allows a 14-day window for nominations that need to be accepted by the vice-president acting as president.

In practice, such a scenario would likely be resolved through political bargaining rather than judicial enforcement.

What about the issue of someone being detained or being on trial?

This is a further complexity as the current first vice-president, Riek Machar, is in detention and on trial.

Detention or trial, however, do not automatically create a vacancy under either the 2011 constitution or the 2018 peace agreement. Unless the office holder resigns or is formally removed, the position remains legally intact.

If the presidency were to fall vacant while the first vice-president was detained but not removed, the legal text would still designate the latter as the acting authority.

The 2018 agreement does not rank the other vice-presidents for automatic succession. All are explicitly of equal rank.

Any attempt to bypass the first vice-president without formal removal would therefore be politically and legally contested.

Where are the biggest risks in the current system?

Behind these legal provisions lie political realities.

The 48-hour clause requires rapid consensus within the president’s party, the mainstream SPLM. The 2018 agreement does not specify which internal organ of the party must nominate the successor. Instead, this process is guided by internal party leadership structures, rules and regulations. In practice, this is likely to be handled by the SPLM Political Bureau.

However, the decision-making would be shaped by more than formal party ranks. Other factors, especially the support of the security sector, ethnopolitical balances and existing patronage networks, would come into play.

The presidency has historically been embedded in military and security structures, which gives succession an importance that extends beyond procedural law.

The 48-hour provision is clear on paper, but its operation depends entirely on political cohesion. If consensus fails, the text alone cannot prevent contestation.

How would elections help?

The picture could change once elections become a realistic possibility and a nomination process is held. South Sudan has postponed elections previously due to delayed preparations, political resistance and lack of funding. Polls are now slated for December 2026.

A post-transition order would revert to a presidency-vice presidency model as per the transition reflected in the country’s National Election Act, with a vice-president elected on a ticket as running mate, and thus positioned as the undisputed successor. Elections would force parties to clarify leadership hierarchies in advance.

In this sense, an electoral framework does not merely choose a president – it simplifies succession.

Jan Pospisil receives funding from the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep), funded by UK International Development from the UK government. However, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies. Any use of this work should acknowledge the authors and the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.

– ref. South Sudan has never had an election to hand over presidential power: so what are the rules of succession? – https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-has-never-had-an-election-to-hand-over-presidential-power-so-what-are-the-rules-of-succession-276640

March 2, 2026

South Africa’s move to greener energy is creating new jobs, but benefits aren’t evenly spread

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jessika Bohlmann, Research Specialist, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

South Africa’s green transition is creating jobs. But not for everyone.

The country’s economy has historically been heavily reliant on coal. Around 70% of its energy is generated from coal. This makes it one of the world’s most carbon-intensive economies.

To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and modernise the energy system, the government is advancing a transition towards renewable energy, improved energy efficiency, and the development of low-carbon industries. This shift forms part of South Africa’s commitment to a just energy transition, supported by international partners through the Just Energy Transition Partnership.

The transition is unfolding in a context of persistently high unemployment. The official rate is 30%. Youth unemployment is particularly severe. In response, policymakers and international organisations have promoted green industrial development and investment in renewable energy as potential drivers of job creation and inclusive growth.

But the extent to which these opportunities will be equitably distributed remains an open question.

South Africa’s move towards a greener economy is often presented by policymakers, international development institutions and energy transition strategies as achieving two objectives: lower carbon emissions and more jobs.

But does the data support this claim?

We are economists working on labour markets, structural change and the just energy transition. In a recent research paper we set about answering the question. In the study we combined South Africa’s labour force survey data with occupational information that identifies environmentally related work activities – green occupations. This allowed us to track green employment trends over time and examine which sectors and workers benefit most from the transition.

Our research findings show that green employment is indeed growing. However, the benefits are uneven. Some sectors and groups of workers are gaining ground. Others risk being left behind.

South Africa’s commitment to a just energy transition implies that workers and communities affected by structural change should not bear disproportionate costs.

But justice is not only about protecting workers in declining sectors. It is also about ensuring that new opportunities are broadly accessible.

Where jobs are being created, and where they’re not

What counts as a “green job”?

One of the first challenges is defining what a green job is. According to the International Labour Organisation, green jobs are decent jobs that contribute to preserve or restore the environment. They can be in traditional sectors such as manufacturing and construction. Or they can be in new emerging green sectors such as renewable energy and energy efficiency.

In our research, we developed a method to classify green employment in South Africa. We combined South Africa’s occupational classification system, which groups jobs according to tasks and skills, with international data linking specific work activities to environmental sustainability.

These jobs include work directly connected to renewable energy, energy efficiency, environmental management, waste reduction and sustainable finance.

This approach allowed us to move beyond broad assumptions and measure where green employment is actually happening in the labour market.

Our findings showed that the share of green jobs has increased gradually over time from 12.4% in 2022 to 14.8% in 2024. That suggests the transition to a greener economy is underway. But it’s not happening evenly across the economy.

Green jobs are concentrated in a handful of sectors:

utilities, particularly electricity and water
mining, including environmental rehabilitation and renewable energy components
construction, especially green buildings and energy-efficient infrastructure
finance. Here jobs are being created through sustainability reporting and environmental, social and governance investment activities.

These patterns reflect where regulation, investment and policy signals have been strongest. Government-led initiatives act as major catalysts. Examples include:

renewable energy procurement
environmental compliance requirements – including stricter environmental governance – force firms to invest in greener technologies and compliance measures. This creates a direct demand for environmental, technical, and engineering roles.
sustainable finance initiatives. These are shaping labour demand.

Other sectors show far less green penetration.

The demographic profile of green employment also reveals important patterns.
Green jobs are more likely to be:

held by younger workers
located in the formal sector; informal workers are underrepresented
associated with moderate levels of education (including post-secondary or technical qualifications rather than highly specialised professional degrees)
dominated by men. Gender disparities are noticeable.

This suggests that green growth does not automatically translate into inclusive growth.

Without deliberate policy intervention, existing inequalities may simply be reproduced within new sectors.

What needs to be done

Our findings highlight four policy implications.

Firstly, skills policy is central.

Many green jobs require specific technical or regulatory competencies. These range from renewable energy engineering and environmental auditing to sustainable finance and compliance expertise.

If the education and training system does not respond quickly enough, skill shortages could limit job creation. At the same time, workers without access to training may be excluded.

Active labour market policies, vocational training reforms and targeted upskilling programmes are therefore critical.

Secondly, the transition needs sectoral depth.

Green employment is concentrated in a few industries. Expanding the transition into manufacturing, services and small-scale enterprises could broaden employment effects.

This requires coordinated industrial, energy and trade policy. Localisation strategies in renewable energy value chains, for example, could deepen job creation beyond installation and maintenance.

Thirdly, informal workers must not be ignored. South Africa’s informal economy employs millions of people. Yet green employment, as currently structured, is largely formal.

Waste pickers, small-scale recyclers and informal repair services already contribute to environmental sustainability. Integrating and supporting these workers through policy and municipal systems could strengthen both environmental and social outcomes.

Fourthly, measurement matters.

Green transitions are often discussed in aspirational terms. But policy making requires evidence.

Developing robust methods to identify and track green employment allows government and stakeholders to monitor progress, assess distributional impacts and adjust policy accordingly. Without data, the idea of a just transition remains rhetorical.

A green economy can support employment – with the right choices.

South Africa’s statistical system could also improve measurement of green employment. Statistics South Africa could incorporate questions in the labour force survey that capture environmentally related work tasks, skills and training. It could also develop a national classification of green occupations and industries aligned with international standards. Better data would allow policymakers to monitor the employment effects of the transition more accurately.

Our findings do not undermine the case for green growth. On the contrary, they show that the transition is already reshaping South Africa’s labour market.
But the process is uneven and path-dependent. It reflects where incentives exist, where investment flows and where regulatory frameworks create demand.

If policymakers want the green transition to reduce unemployment and inequality, design matters. A greener economy will not automatically be a fairer one. Ensuring that it is requires deliberate, coordinated action.

Darlington Mushongera, manager for research and development at the South African Qualifications Authority, contributed to this article.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. South Africa’s move to greener energy is creating new jobs, but benefits aren’t evenly spread – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-move-to-greener-energy-is-creating-new-jobs-but-benefits-arent-evenly-spread-276495

March 1, 2026

Joseph Kony: how a Ugandan war criminal and his soldiers have evaded capture and endured for decades

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp

Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), remains at large two decades after the International Criminal Court issued its first arrest warrants against him and four of his commanders.

The LRA emerged nearly 40 years ago. Between 1987 and 2006, northern Uganda’s civilians were caught between LRA brutality – massacres and mass abductions – and a government counterinsurgency. This forced nearly two million people into camps for internally displaced people.

The LRA framed its struggle as resistance to President Yoweri Museveni and the sidelining of the Acholi, the dominant ethnic group in northern Uganda. However, over time violence ceased to be merely a strategy. It became the organising logic of the movement itself.

The YouTube video Kony 2012, produced by the American advocacy organisation Invisible Children, went viral in 2012. It turned a long war into a global cause célèbre. In 2013, Washington followed with a US$5 million bounty, which remains in place.

The International Criminal Court arrest warrants were for war crimes and crimes against humanity between 1 July 2002 (when the court’s jurisdiction took effect) and July 2005 (when the arrest warrants were issued).

Today, the LRA is no more than a small, mobile group (possibly 12 to 20 fighters) living off trade, agriculture and protection in one of Africa’s least governed border zones. It operates within the remote borderlands of the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The LRA may now be small, but its survival matters.

Kony’s continued evasion of arrest – despite two decades of warrants, bounties and military operations – exposes the limits of both regional security cooperation and international justice. Recent intelligence and defector accounts suggest he is still alive, operating in the Sudan-CAR borderlands.

As long as he remains at large, the International Criminal Court’s first arrest warrants risk becoming a symbol – not of global justice, but of its limits.

I have been researching the LRA for more than 20 years and in a recently published article, I answer the question: how has the group survived, even in extreme decline?

Drawing on interviews with former combatants, local actors and policymakers, my analysis looks as the LRA’s evolving strategies of endurance since 2011.

Two things have been crucial: borderlands and the lack of political priority.

Borderlands – particularly between Sudan and the CAR, and to a lesser extent with the DRC – have offered Kony and his LRA members a way to disappear, to trade and to buy protection.

At the same time, the shifting political priorities of the states tracking Kony have repeatedly undermined their own goals.

Why borderlands matter

Given their weak state presence, borderlands are often described as peripheral, marginal or forgotten. But in much of Africa, they are not empty spaces. They are active political and economic zones, shaped by cross-border networks of trade, migration, armed mobilisation and patronage.

For rebel groups, borderlands offer a particular set of advantages: access to sanctuaries across borders; rough terrain and low population density; cross-border trade routes; and opportunities to link into alternative centres of power.

This is precisely the kind of environment in which the LRA has been operating.

For roughly two decades, between 1987 and 2006, the LRA was primarily fighting a Ugandan war. The conflict produced vast civilian suffering, including the displacement of nearly two million people into camps – what has been described as “social torture”.

From 1994 onwards, southern Sudan became crucial to the war, as Khartoum offered the LRA sanctuary and weapons. Further, before peace talks began in 2006 between Uganda and an LRA delegation, the rebel group crossed into the DRC and established itself in the dense and (at the time) mostly ungoverned Garamba National Park.

Following the collapse of negotiations, Uganda launched Operation Lightning Thunder in late 2008. The operation failed, and the LRA retaliated with massacres in north-eastern DRC in 2008-10.

These attacks were the LRA’s last moment of large-scale violence. Military pressure did not destroy the group, but fragmented it and pushed it out of the DRC.

Anticipating further offensives, the LRA began moving into the remote borderlands between the CAR, Sudan and South Sudan.

By 2010, it was operating around the contested Kafia Kingi enclave – a strip of territory that is, in principle, part of South Sudan but has long been controlled by Sudan.

From this point onward, Kony’s strategy shifted: the group reduced attacks, limited abductions and tried to become less visible.

It was no longer trying to win a war, but trying to avoid being found.

The borderland economy

As looting declined, the LRA needed income streams that attracted little attention. Trade and agriculture became central. In the Sudan-CAR borderlands, established routes for licit goods like bamboo intersect with trade in cannabis, gold, ivory and diamonds.

The LRA did not only participate in this economy, but also taxed it. It set up checkpoints along trading routes. It also cultivated a variety of crops on a large scale and was active in the trade of honey.

All of this allowed the group to survive quietly from around 2010 onwards, and become part of the border landscape. Its relationships included nomadic cattle herders, armed groups in the CAR and elements of the Sudanese military.

Kony also bought protection with the proceeds of illicit trade. Armed groups provided warnings about military threats and information about who was moving where. When necessary, Kony could move across borders quickly.

But borderlands are not only spaces of opportunity: they are also volatile.

Under military pressure, Kony divided his troops into smaller units to avoid detection. That made control harder. His violent internal rule – including the killing of commanders – pushed more people towards defection, leading to two splinter groups in 2014 and 2018.

They still operated under the LRA banner (in the CAR-DRC borderlands), but were no longer under Kony’s command. In 2023, through the work of the Dutch NGO PAX and Congolese NGO APRU, and amid growing insecurity, these groups demobilised in the largest LRA defection ever.

The outbreak of war in Sudan in 2023 disrupted the borderland economy. Trade slowed dramatically, increasing hardship and fuelling more defections.

The politics of the chase

The LRA has not been a security priority for Uganda, the CAR, the DRC, Sudan or South Sudan for decades.

The group operates far from capitals, poses little direct threat to state power and is expensive to pursue.

It has largely disappeared from the American political horizon. Advocacy networks that once kept the issue alive have faded.

Even when Kony’s location has been known by various intelligence services and analysts, it has not reliably triggered action. As my recent article shows, this was the case as recently as 2022-2023. In April 2024, reports surfaced that the Wagner group had attacked Kony’s trading camp in eastern CAR – but failed to capture him.

The end game that never arrives

The LRA’s survival reflects the sanctuary offered by borderlands, and uneven and inconsistent political will, shaped by shifting interests that often have little to do with justice for victims.

The ICC hearings in November 2025 that confirmed war crimes charges against Kony underline this paradox. While the court has built a legal case against him, the conditions that have kept him alive remain largely intact.

Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Joseph Kony: how a Ugandan war criminal and his soldiers have evaded capture and endured for decades – https://theconversation.com/joseph-kony-how-a-ugandan-war-criminal-and-his-soldiers-have-evaded-capture-and-endured-for-decades-276680

March 1, 2026

Trump’s tariffs have gutted Agoa’s duty‑free promise: our model shows how

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Vogel, Researcher, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) was introduced in 2000 as the cornerstone of US development-oriented trade policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. It was designed to grant eligible countries duty-free access to the US market.

In February 2026, President Donald Trump signed a one-year extension after the programme lapsed in September 2025.

Yet the programme’s core benefit has already been effectively eliminated.

Since April 2025, the US has imposed additional bilateral “reciprocal” tariffs ranging lately from 10% to 30% on countries eligible for the Agoa terms. Critically, Agoa only waives the standard tariff rate the US applies to all World Trade Organisation members (called the Most Favoured Nation tariff). This averaged just 3.3% in 2017.

The US Supreme Court struck down the much larger reciprocal surcharges on 20 February 2026. But the White House responded immediately, imposing a 15% surcharge on most imports, effective 24 February 2026 for 150 days.

Agoa technically lives on after a one-year extension. But its main advantage has largely disappeared since the US added tariffs on top of it.

As economists and trade modellers at the German Institute of Development and Sustainablity, we are interested in quantifying the effects of the changing US tariff regime. We ran a model that captures economy-wide adjustments across sectors and countries after a tariff shock via prices, production, consumption and trade diversion.

Our simulations show that new Trump-era tariffs drive large declines in US-bound exports from Africa. The steepest damage is in a few Agoa-dependent countries and sectors such as apparel. Our results remain valid after the latest shift to the 15% tariff surcharge.

African exporters face substantial duties. Agoa offers only a modest advantage over other developing countries still subject to Most Favoured Nation status tariffs.

Thus, the promise of duty-free access has been hollowed out.

When preferences vanish but ‘America First’ stays

Our simulations of the “Liberation Day” tariff package – the April 2025 “America First” tariffs applied on top of Agoa expiry – show that Agoa-eligible countries do lose out, but the aggregate effect on all countries at large is relatively small.

Agoa countries’ exports to the US fall sharply by 34.7%. But in context of their global exports the decline equates only to 1.1%. Real GDP of Agoa-eligible countries remains largely unchanged.

Behind this average, however, some countries and sectors are hit hard. Lesotho’s total exports could drop by about 5.9%, Madagascar’s by 3.3%, and those of both Chad and Botswana by 1.9%.

Wearing apparel is the most affected sector: bilateral Agoa exports to the US fall by nearly half. For Madagascar and Mauritius they are almost wiped out, with losses of roughly US$128.5 million and US$147 million respectively.

According to our latest simulation updates accounting for the lower November 2025 tariff rates, negotiating tariff cuts with Washington or accepting US concessions seem to change little. Agoa-eligible countries still face a 9.2 percentage point rise in their trade-weighted average US tariff (vs 14.8 percentage points in April), leading to a fall of Agoa exports to the US by 9.6%.

Total exports in our simulation decline only by 0.7% as trade diversion to other markets offsets over 40% of US losses.

The limits of preferences

Even before the “Liberation Day” tariffs, Agoa’s effectiveness was limited. Our simulations of a simple shift from Agoa preferences to standard Most Favoured Nation tariffs show only modest impacts on beneficiary countries. Bilateral exports to the US fall by 3.7%, but total exports for Agoa-eligible countries decline by just 0.1%.

This underscores how little Agoa mattered for African trade growth on a larger scale.

This limited effectiveness stems from three main factors.

First, for most sub-Saharan Africa economies, the US is no longer the primary export destination. EU and Chinese markets have become more important.

Second, meeting Agoa’s rules of origin – if a product qualifies for the preferences based on location of value creation – is often costly. In contrast, the tariff advantage has been narrow due to already low US Most Favoured Nation rates.

Third, uncertainty over programme renewals and eligibility reviews has long discouraged firms from investing in Agoa compliance.

To make Agoa work for development again would require substantial reforms. These would need to include:

longer timelines and automatic continuation provisions
more predictable eligibility through transparent biennial reviews
updated rules of origin
broader coverage of increasingly important trade issues, such as digital trade, services, as well as non-tariff related trade barriers.

The bipartisan Agoa Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024 proposed some of these improvements, including a 16-year extension to 2041. But it stalled under the “America First” priorities.

Alternatives

In practice, deep reform looks unlikely amid volatile tariffs and short extensions, leaving Agoa increasingly irrelevant.

African policymakers must look elsewhere for new trade opportunities.

China’s new zero-tariff policy for 53 African countries beginning 1 May 2026 offers some relief from US protectionism.

Covering all tariff lines, it extends previous preferences for the continent’s 33 least developed countries to a much wider group of African partners. Middle-income exporters such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco stand to benefit. These countries previously faced Chinese tariffs of up to 25% on processed goods. They will now gain duty-free access on the same terms as the poorest African economies.

Such policies have boosted export diversification modestly for least developed countries in the past. But the benefits will depend on product fit and value-chain dynamics. Until now African exports to China have largely been dominated by low-value, primary products. African countries would need substantial investments to make use of preferential market access to China.

Beyond Chinese offers, the EU offers a stable partnership with substantial market scale. Its own unilateral tariff preferences through Generalised System of Preferences, Everything But Arms and reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements provide more predictable access than the US tariff rollercoaster.

On top of this, the EU actively tries to pursue strategic alignment around critical raw materials, green energy and sustainable investment. It does this via Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships and Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements.

Developing countries, however, often criticise the EU sustainability measures or costly compliance to EU standards which worsen their trade opportunities. Hence, the EU has to find a better balance of its sustainable trade and development playbook to build trust with the global south.

What needs to be done

African policymakers should seize this moment to build a foundation for a trade system that doesn’t depend on uncertain preferences and external policy shocks. Accelerating the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) serves as the most credible route to trade resilience, diversification and industrial upgrading.

The free trade area agreement can’t immediately replace US demand (different products, limited value-chain overlap). But it can reduce structural vulnerability to external shocks like US tariff volatility.

Tim Vogel receives funding from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Zoryana Olekseyuk receives funding from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). .

– ref. Trump’s tariffs have gutted Agoa’s duty‑free promise: our model shows how – https://theconversation.com/trumps-tariffs-have-gutted-agoas-duty-free-promise-our-model-shows-how-276641

February 26, 2026

Dance scenes in South African rock art: a closer look at ritual, music and movement

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Joshua Kumbani, Postdoctoral fellow, University of Tübingen

Rock art is widespread across southern Africa and includes a wide range of depictions such as human figures, animals, dots, handprints, and other painted or engraved imagery on rock surfaces. The rock art tradition of paintings was made by San hunter gatherers over thousands of years.

The first dance scenes in southern African rock art were documented 100 years ago. But there’s been some confusion as to whether certain scenes could indeed be interpreted as a dance.

Dance can be simply defined as intentional and organised bodily movement. It also functions as an expression of mood and a form of nonverbal communication. In southern African cultures, dance is also performed during moments of celebration and in ritual contexts. Sometimes dancers go into a trance.

Scholars in the past have interpreted the dances in San rock art as ritual dances, mainly trance dances. But ethnography (the study of living people) points to the fact that San communities also danced for leisure and entertainment. Hence the need to systematically examine and categorise dancing scenes in the rock art.

We are archaeologists with a special interest in sound and music in rock art. In a recent study, we examined selected dancing scenes in rock art from four of South Africa’s provinces: the Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape. The aim was to categorise the different types of dances depicted and to explore whether all dancing scenes represent ritual performances or whether some might reflect entertainment or leisure activities.

We concluded that some of the performances depicted were likely undertaken for leisure and enjoyment rather than ritual purposes.

We hope that our study provides a way to categorise dancing scenes in San rock art. This framework can be refined and expanded by future researchers working in music archaeology, the study of sound and its effects, or the iconographic analysis of musical instruments and dance imagery (working out what the images mean). This kind of research also helps people appreciate their music heritage from the past.

Sources and categories

Our article examined selected dancing scenes through a literature review and by consulting the African Rock Art Digital Archive database curated by the Rock Art Research Institute at the University of the Witwatersrand.

We consulted foundational works on rock art by pioneers George Stow and Dorothea Bleek (1930), and by more recent scholars such as Patricia Vinnicombe and David Lewis-Williams. Ethnographic accounts by Lorna Marshall (1969, 1976), Richard Katz (1982) and Megan Biesele (1993) of dance among San communities in the Kalahari (Botswana) and Nyae Nyae (Namibia) regions further informed our analysis.

We identified three broad categories of dances in the ethnographic records: ritual dances, circumstantial dances, and entertainment dances. Some circumstantial dances were performed to celebrate a successful hunt, while entertainment dances included those celebrating a newlywed couple, as well as dances done simply for fun and games by boys and girls.

We therefore argue that dancing scenes in the archaeological record should be examined critically: not all of them depict rituals.

Six points of identification

To systematically identify dancing scenes, we applied six analytical attributes:

body postures, including bent figures, outstretched arms and flexed legs
paraphernalia held by dancers, such as sticks, rattles or headgear
interaction between dancers
evidence of synchrony (moving in unison)
direction of movement
the gender of the figures represented.

In the following section, we provide examples of different kinds of dances in rock art and suggest how they may be interpreted on the basis of ethnographic information.

Ritual dances

Our study identified several ritual dances depicted in the rock art, including the trance or medicine dance. (An example is the Attakwas Kloof dance image above, from a site in the Klein Karoo in the Western Cape.) This is one of the most widespread dances among San communities. It is a communal healing practice in which medicine men, believed to possess healing powers, treat the sick through touch and dispel harmful spirits or misfortune.

During the trance dance, men dance while women sing and clap in accompaniment. Some of the male dancers serve as healers. The dancers move in a circular pattern, stamping their feet until a shallow furrow forms on the ground. Prolonged dancing induces an altered state of consciousness, during which healers may fall or collapse as they enter trance.

In South Africa, several forms of trance dance are depicted in the rock art. These scenes typically show clapping female figures accompanying male dancers, who are often shown bending forward. In some images, however, the clapping figures are absent, and only the dancers are represented.

Ethnographic accounts (for example, Wilhelm Bleek and Lucy Lloyd, 1911: 190) note that leg rattles are commonly used during trance dances to produce a sharp, rhythmic vibration, yet these rattles are not frequently depicted in the rock art. A notable exception comes from the Halstone site in the Eastern Cape (above), where several dancers are shown wearing leg rattles. Some figures balance on dancing sticks and appear to be in an altered state of consciousness, or in a trance.

Female initiation rituals that are accompanied by eland dances, performed during the first menstruation rite, also appear in the rock art.

The women mimic the moves of the female eland, a spiritually important animal. These dances are performed only by women, usually in a secluded space. The dancers move in a circle while bending forward, and the ceremony celebrates a girl’s first menstruation. This interpretation is supported by ethnographic research conducted among San communities in Botswana and Namibia by anthropologists such as Marshall and Biesele.

Other ritual dances depicted in the rock art include boys’ initiation ceremonies, commonly known as the Tshoma. This dance marks the transition from boyhood to manhood and is performed exclusively by males. The ethnographic accounts mentioned above indicate that these ceremonies take place in secluded areas away from the main camp.

We identified some other dance scenes at G3 Site II (Vinnicombe 1976) (below) as possibly circumstantial or leisure dances and we suggested that this could have well been the case for the performance depicted at Witsieshoek (bottom).

It is likely that, because of their non-ritual nature, circumstantial or leisure dances – which ethnographic literature suggests were very common – were only rarely depicted in paintings.

This article is part of the ERC Artsoundscapes project (Grant Agreement No. 787842) that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. PI: Margarita Díaz-Andreu.

Joshua Kumbani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Dance scenes in South African rock art: a closer look at ritual, music and movement – https://theconversation.com/dance-scenes-in-south-african-rock-art-a-closer-look-at-ritual-music-and-movement-275489

February 26, 2026

Prophets and profits: the art of the sell in Shepherd Bushiri’s YouTube sermons

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ambrose Kolawole Dada, Research Assistant, Media and Communication, Nelson Mandela University

In a widely viewed YouTube sermon called 3 Types of Keys, a preacher, dressed in a sky blue Italian suit, holds a microphone and speaks with great assurance about spiritual matters. Prophet Shepherd Bushiri is telling his audience that their financial struggles are not accidental.

He warns that business, marriage or social standing can easily crumble if believers don’t pay their tithes to the church every month – 10% of their earnings. This message is not presented as advice, but as divine instruction.

Bushiri is one of the most influential and controversial Pentecostal prophets to emerge from southern Africa in the digital age. As journalist Pumza Fihlani writes:

This is a man who says he has cured people of HIV, made the blind see, changed the fortunes of the impoverished and, on at least one occasion, appeared to walk on air.

The growth of African evangelical movements has often been associated with self-styled pastors taking advantage of Africans who are already vulnerable. Their lives are characterised by socioeconomic failures of government, inadequate healthcare systems, beliefs in supernatural forces, and corruption-driven inequalities.

In recent years, Bushiri has been involved in a series of legal battles – including charges of financial crimes and sexual assault – leading to his exit from South Africa to Malawi, where he was born.

His sermons continue to reach masses of worshippers online, with 794,000 subscribers on YouTube alone at the time of writing. He says he has two million registered congregants today.

As media and communication scholars who are interested in religious communication, we analysed what his sermons can tell us about why his online presence is so successful.

We found that, like other rhetoric (persuasive language, for example by politicians or advertisers), his YouTube sermons are carefully framed narratives that promote ideas about faith, authority and prosperity. They strengthen the pastor’s personal influence over his audience and, at the same time, build his brand.

Who is Shepherd Bushiri?

Bushiri – called Major 1 by his followers – is the founder of the Enlightened Christian Gathering Church. He rose to prominence in the 2010s through TV broadcasts and social media (he has 5.8 million followers on Facebook alone), presenting himself as a prophet with supernatural insight.

His ministry expanded rapidly across Africa and among Africans living overseas. Reports claim that Bushiri is one of the richest pastors in Africa. His ministry reflects what has been described as “prophetpreneurship” – the strategic blending of prophecy, charisma and business.

These descriptions raise interesting questions. How are prophetic authority and prosperity communicated to followers? And what role does digital media play in sustaining this influence?

Sermons as communication

To answer these questions, we turned to Bushiri’s YouTube sermons. Video-sharing platforms play a central role in African Christianity today. YouTube has the capacity to boost religious audiences. Sermons are watched on mobile devices, replayed repeatedly and shared across borders, often outside formal church spaces.

Rather than evaluating Bushiri’s teachings as “true” or “false”, our study focused on how his sermons communicate meaning. Sermons function as public communication. Like political speeches or advertising, they’re designed to persuade, inspire and guide behaviour.

We used Critical Discourse Analysis, a research method that examines language to uncover underlying messages about power, authority and values. This was supported by framing theory, which explains how speakers present issues through storylines. A frame is simply the angle through which a message is communicated.

Four dominant themes

The analysis identified four recurring frames in a selection of 10 of Bushiri’s YouTube sermons.

1. Paying to pray

It’s a human aspiration to want to prosper. In Bushiri’s 3 Types of Keys sermon, human prosperity is closely tied to financial giving, emphasising that God requires the “whole tithe”.

South African theologian Mookgo Solomon Kgatle argues this emphasis resembles a money cult. While the Bible has references to tithing, interpretation and context are crucial. When money is a condition for divine favour, faith risks becoming about moneymaking rather than spirituality.

2. Self-positioning

In the sermon Exposure to the Spiritual World, Bushiri claims:

The spirit of God is in your nostrils; if I can breathe on you, you will see the power of God.

This teaching seems rather simplistic, and shifts focus to the self-positioning of Bushiri as a super prophet whose very breath has spiritual power.

Scholars have noted that such practices, common among new prophetic churches, can oversimplify or misrepresent spiritual truths. Despite their emotional appeal, these teachings risk misleading followers by elevating a prophet’s opinion over the scripture and established Christian tradition.

3. Building the brand

Self-branding is common in business, but in religious contexts it can be intensified. Bushiri repeatedly presents himself as a channel of divine blessings, with what he calls his “contract-winning touch”.

He recounts testimonies from international visitors who said, “Papa touched me and the contract came.” He claims that when he touches someone, he leaves a spiritual “substance” on them.

This framing encourages dependency on him. Personal contact is a drawcard for those seeking jobs or “healing” from illness.

4. Media strategy

Digital media has allowed more people to have access to more religious content, but it also raises ethical concerns. Scholars have argued that media-mediated spiritual encounters can blur the line between what’s real and what’s a performance.

In The Perfect Will of God, Bushiri claims that physical distance does not limit spiritual connection. He claims he can anoint people through the screen.

Televised images of new prophet church leaders are often carefully constructed to project success and extraordinary spiritual power, reinforcing their authority. Bushiri, for example, once made headlines for apparently raising a man from the dead.

The role of YouTube

Digital platforms intensify these frames. On YouTube, sermons can be consumed privately, without immediate discussion or challenge from a physical faith community. Emotional moments – prophecies, miracles and dramatic testimonies – are rewarded by likes and comments, and can be enhanced by controversies.

Followers affirm their faith and loyalty in a video’s comments. Over time, this creates a sense of a global spiritual community centred on a single individual.

Digital religion is not only about spreading faith. It is also about expanding influence and, in some cases, monetising belief.

Why this matters

Religion plays a vital role in African societies, offering hope, identity and belonging. But religion, like all forms of communication, is not neutral. It is designed to achieve particular aims. Recognising this does not mean dismissing faith; it means engaging with it critically and responsibly.

For audiences navigating online spaces, learning to recognise persuasive strategies, religious or otherwise, is increasingly important.

Understanding how religious messages are framed can help believers make informed choices and encourage healthier forms of accountability in religious leadership.

– ref. Prophets and profits: the art of the sell in Shepherd Bushiri’s YouTube sermons – https://theconversation.com/prophets-and-profits-the-art-of-the-sell-in-shepherd-bushiris-youtube-sermons-276277

February 26, 2026

Morocco: ancient fossils shed light on a key period in human evolution

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Mohib Abderrahim, Chercheur en Préhistoire et conservateur principal des Monuments et Sites, Institut national des Sciences de l’Archéologie et du Patrimoine in Rabat

Could a Moroccan cave hold a crucial piece of the puzzle of human origins? Hominin fossils dating back 773,000 years discovered in the country are bringing new evidence to the debate about the last common ancestor of present-day humans (Homo sapiens), Neanderthals and Denisovans. The discovery points to a long evolutionary history in north Africa, much earlier than modern Homo sapiens. It also supports Africa’s central role in the major stages that shaped the human species.

Abderrahim Mohib is a prehistoric archaeologist, heritage curator, and associate professor and researcher at the National Institute of Archaeological Sciences and Heritage in Rabat. He’s one of the authors of a recent study that explains the significance of the discovery.

What did you discover and why does it matter?

Excavations have been underway since 1994 in the Hominid Cave at the Thomas Quarry I, south-west of the city of Casablanca in Morocco. A research programme called Prehistory of Casablanca working at the site is led by Morocco’s National Institute of Archaeological Sciences and Heritage and the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs.

The team has unearthed hominin fossils along with thousands of animal remains and around 300 artefacts made of quartzite and flint. The site looks like it was a den for large carnivores. This is supported by a hominin femur showing bite marks from a large carnivore, likely a hyena.

In addition to the femur, the set of hominin remains includes a nearly complete adult jaw, half of another adult jaw, a young child’s jawbone, cervical and thoracic vertebrae, and several teeth.

This discovery is significant. It sheds new light on a key period in human evolution. Fossils from this period are very scarce in Africa, Europe and Asia. These remains help document little-known populations between early Homo species and the more recent lineages. They are the oldest hominin fossils ever found in Morocco with a clear and reliable date.

All known human fossils at the Moroccan sites. Author provided (no reuse)
Fourni par l’auteur

In addition, the site is adjacent to another, older, site named Unit L in the same quarry. This site covers more than 1,000 square metres and dates back to 1.3 million years ago. It documents the oldest human occupation in Morocco. It is linked to the Acheulean material culture in north-west Africa.

How old are these early humans and how did you date them so accurately?

These fossils found in Casablanca were dated to around 773,000 years, using palaeomagnetism, the study of the Earth’s ancient magnetic field.

The sediments in Grottes à Hominidés have recorded changes in the Earth’s magnetic field. With very high-resolution sampling (every 2cm) we were able to identify the last geomagnetic reversal from a reverse polarity (Matuyama) to a normal polarity (Brunhes). This means that we have identified a period when the Earth’s magnetic field flipped. And that is a natural event that serves as a marker for dating geological and archaeological layers.

This reversal is a very solid and widely accepted chronological marker. What is extraordinary is that our fossil remains date precisely to the time of the reversal. This offers one of the most reliable datings of hominin fossils from the Pleistocene era (starting about 2.58 million years ago and often called the “Ice Age”). These data are consistent with the geological setting and palaeontological remains.

How does this change our understanding of modern human evolution?

The Casablanca fossils come from a time when Homo erectus spread out of Africa. It was also a time when older groups of hominins like the Australopithecus and Paranthropus died out.

In terms of shapes and features, the fossils show a mix of archaic traits typical of Homo erectus and more advanced traits closely related to Homo sapiens. They also fill an important gap in the African fossil record. Palaeogenetic data suggest a split between the African lineage to Homo sapiens and the Eurasian lineages that later produced the Neanderthals and the Denisovans.

The unique combination of primitive and more evolved features suggests that these individuals were in a population that lived close in time to this split.

This Moroccan population can be described as having advanced traits of Homo erectus. It has more evolved traits than older Homo erectus fossils found in Africa and Asia. But it lacks the full modern features seen in Neanderthals or anatomically modern Homo sapiens.

Until now, the fossils of Homo antecessor unearthed at the Gran Dolina site in Atapuerca, Spain were the only ones to show Homo sapiens-like traits. The fossils from the Grotte à Hominidés offer a new perspective.

They open up the possibility of an evolutionary link with the oldest known Homo sapiens fossils – those from Jebel Irhoud in Morocco, dated to around 315,000 years ago. These discoveries help clarify the emergence of the Homo sapiens lineage while reinforcing the idea that its deep roots are African.

So, based on their mix of archaic and derived traits, these finds support the deep African roots of Homo sapiens but also point to an African population close to the split between Eurasian and African lineages in the Middle Pleistocene.

Why is north Africa, and Morocco in particular, so important?

North-west Africa, along with east and southern Africa, represents one of the key regions where we currently have a new window into the evolution of Pleistocene hominins. The Mediterranean Sea likely acted as a major biogeographical barrier. It contributed to the divergence between African and Eurasian populations.

The Sahara desert’s size changed over time. It probably shaped how African populations were structured. The Moroccan fossils confirm how ancient and deep our species’ roots are in Africa. They highlight the key role of north-west Africa in the major stages of human evolution.

Mohib Abderrahim is Researcher in Prehistory and Chief Curator of Monuments and Sites, National Institute of Archaeological Sciences and Heritage in Rabat.

– ref. Morocco: ancient fossils shed light on a key period in human evolution – https://theconversation.com/morocco-ancient-fossils-shed-light-on-a-key-period-in-human-evolution-275099

February 25, 2026

Disability and access to justice in four African countries: strong laws, weak in practice

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Azwihangwisi Judith Mphidi, Adjunct Academic, University of South Africa

South Africa has a reputation as one of the most progressive countries on the African continent when it comes to disability rights.

It has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and adopted laws aimed at protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.

But is it truly a disability-friendly country, especially within its criminal justice system?

This question forms the core of recent research. In it I examined South Africa’s disability-friendliness in the justice system, drawing comparative insights from Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana.

I am a researcher with a focus on policing, criminal justice and social justice.

A pattern emerged across all four countries: solid legislative frameworks exist, but implementation lags badly. There are structural barriers, such as inaccessible infrastructure and lack of transport options. And there are institutional factors, like weak enforcement and inadequate sensitivity training.

Societal stigma also plays a part. This is particularly true for people with invisible disabilities, who are largely overlooked in policy and practice.

I argue that in this technological era, it is not impossible to allocate resources to improve services.

I found that South Africa’s legal framework is more comprehensive and advanced than the other three countries. But all four face similar challenges in practice.

South Africa’s legal framework: progressive yet incomplete

South Africa’s constitution explicitly prohibits discrimination based on disability. It guarantees access to healthcare, education and employment.

Laws such as the Employment Equity Act and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act insist on reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. The White Paper on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2015) outlines a strategy to eliminate barriers.

Despite these progressive laws, the criminal justice system faces practical challenges.

Firstly, many courtrooms, police stations and legal procedures remain physically inaccessible to those with mobility impairments.

Secondly, communication support services such as sign language interpreters and materials in Braille or simplified legal language are not always available. It’s often left to individual officials to arrange help.

Thirdly, there’s still societal stigma and discrimination in the justice system. Some law enforcement, prosecution and judiciary personnel have negative attitudes to disability – especially invisible disabilities such as intellectual, psycho-social, or communication impairments.

People with these disabilities are often misunderstood, denied the help they need, or even excluded from legal proceedings.

Fourth, there is inadequate training for criminal justice personnel on disability rights and needs. As a result many do harm without realising it, undermining trust in the justice system.

Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana

Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana also have legal frameworks that affirm the rights of people with disabilities.

All have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and have disability laws aimed at fostering inclusion.

Nigeria ratified the convention in 2007 (and the optional protocol in 2010) and passed the Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (Prohibition) Act in 2018. The act prohibits discrimination, mandates accessibility, and establishes a national commission for enforcement.

Kenya ratified the UN convention in 2008, integrating it via Article 2(6) of its 2010 constitution. It has the Persons with Disabilities Act (2003, amended) focusing on inclusion in education, employment and public services.

Ghana ratified the convention and optional protocol in 2012, after signing in 2007. The Persons with Disability Act (Act 715 of 2006) promotes rights to education, health, employment and accessibility.

However, like South Africa, there are gaps in enforcement, accessibility and practical steps to accommodate people with disabilities.

In Nigeria, courthouses and police facilities are often inaccessible. And people with intellectual or mental health disabilities often struggle to understand and communicate within the legal process.

Reports of mistreatment and wrongful detention, especially those with psychosocial disabilities, are not uncommon. A notable case highlighted the denial of proper accommodations for a visually impaired person accused of theft.

Kenya’s Persons with Disabilities Act mandates accessible public buildings, including police stations and courts. Yet many facilities remain inaccessible.

There aren’t enough trained personnel who understand the needs of people with disabilities. And public transport – critical for accessing justice – is not always equipped to carry people with mobility impairments.

Ghana’s Disability Act (2006) provides a strong legal foundation, complemented by ratification of the UN convention.

But many public facilities remain inaccessible after the legislated compliance period.

Police misconduct towards people with disabilities, especially those with mental health conditions, has been documented.

Detention conditions are sometimes inhumane. Many people, particularly with psychosocial disabilities, face wrongful imprisonment without fair legal representation.

In all four countries the justice systems do more to accommodate visible disabilities, including mobility or sensory impairments. They neglect intellectual, psychosocial and communication disabilities. This neglect results in misunderstanding, exclusion and discriminatory outcomes.

Cases such as the tragic deaths in South Africa’s Life Esidimeni mental health crisis and incidents of sexual violence against women with disabilities in Kenya and Nigeria highlight the grave consequences of systemic neglect.

They also underscore the urgent need for reforms not only in legal provisions but also in attitudes, resources and operational practices.

Moving forward: key recommendations for South Africa

South Africa’s strengths in disability rights legislation provide a foundation to build a more inclusive criminal justice system. However, closing the gap between law and lived experience requires focused action:

Enforcement and oversight: Regular audits of courts, police stations and correctional facilities for accessibility compliance must be mandated and resourced. Disability-specific expertise within oversight bodies can improve accountability.

Disability training: Ongoing, mandatory training on disability rights is essential. Collaborating with organisations for disabled people ensures training reflects lived realities.

Standard accommodations: Provision of sign language interpreters, accessible legal documents, and trauma-informed procedures must be codified and resourced. This must include invisible disabilities.

Inclusive policy development: Persons with disabilities and their representative organisations must be part of making and monitoring policy.

Public awareness and anti-stigma campaigns: Changing societal attitudes is key to fostering a culture of respect and inclusion.

Regional collaboration: Sharing best practices and harmonising standards can accelerate progress across the continent.

Next steps

Comparing South Africa to Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana reveals common challenges and highlights the need for systemic, coordinated change.

Disability justice is not solely a matter of legal texts. It’s a complex interplay of attitudes, institutional practices and social inclusion. The approach must address physical, psychological, and social barriers to deliver justice for all citizens.

Azwihangwisi Judith Mphidi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Disability and access to justice in four African countries: strong laws, weak in practice – https://theconversation.com/disability-and-access-to-justice-in-four-african-countries-strong-laws-weak-in-practice-263987

February 24, 2026

Africa’s militaries have always relied on imported weapons: why a shift to homegrown defence is now under way

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Nate Allen, Associate Professor of Security Studies, National Defense University

Africa’s militaries are built on imported power. Foreign countries such as China, Russia, the United States, Turkey and France dominate Africa’s weapons market. Between them they supply everything from small arms to attack helicopters, unmanned systems and communications equipment.

The results are often quite poor. From the Sahel to Somalia, weapons and equipment supplied from abroad breaks down quickly, sits idle for lack of maintenance, or requires expertise that local forces are not trained to sustain.

At the same time, insurgents on motorbikes equipped with AK-47s and improvised explosives gain the upper hand. These issues are quite often due to corruption or mismanagement by African militaries, a problem that has been extensively documented by scholars.

Now, a quiet revolution is underway. Having spent collectively decades researching and working with African militaries, we have noticed a growing trend of discontent with reliance on external actors to build their security forces. As a result, African governments are becoming more determined to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers and build capabilities they can control, maintain and adapt.

Numerous African countries, from Nigeria to Kenya to Morocco, are embracing a combination of disruptive new technologies and partnerships to localise defence supply chains and build local military capabilities. Morocco, the country which has pursued this strategy most successfully, has managed to triple its arms exports over the last few years, and is on its way to becoming a defence manufacturing hub.

Lowered barriers to innovation are offering African countries an opportunity to shift from being security consumers to being producers and even exporters of military equipment and technology. This shift could enable African militaries to more sustainably project and maintain force and capture value from a growing global arms market.

Dependency’s challenges

On paper, imported military equipment promises cutting-edge capabilities. In practice, it often delivers frustration.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Mali. Beginning in 2021, Russia supplied Bamako with a “small air force” of dozens of attack helicopters, transport planes and other combat aircraft as part of its expanding security role in the Sahel. This air force no longer exists. The two Sukhoi-25 fighter jets Mali received were lost within months. Of eight Mi-35M and Mi-171 attack helicopters, only one remained serviceable within a year of delivery. Mali’s army was unable to maintain them. Meanwhile, rebel groups using stolen rifles, lightweight anti-aircraft guns and homemade artillery overran military outposts and encircled Bamako.

Even Africa’s better-resourced militaries struggle. South Africa operates one of the continent’s most advanced fleets of fighter aircraft, yet only half of its Swedish-built JAS Gripen aircraft and seven of its 39 Oryx helicopters were serviceable as of mid‑2024 because of parts shortages and maintenance gaps. South Africa’s state-owned arms manufacturer Denel, once a world-class defence and aerospace producer, has declined over the past decade amid financial distress, governance failures and state capture, leading to liquidity shortages, unpaid suppliers and a loss of skilled personnel.

Ghana has one of the region’s most capable fleets. But many of its ships remain unserviceable. Ambitious plans to expand the fleet have been delayed owing to prohibitive costs: one modern corvette costs US$200 million, or half of Ghana’s 2024 military budget.

Homegrown solutions

The growing appeal of homegrown solutions was on display in August 2025, when Nigeria convened 37 African defence chiefs to discuss how to develop local security solutions. Nigeria’s chief of defence at the time, General Christopher Musa, urged his counterparts to innovate on their own terms by investing in “cyber defence, artificial intelligence and indigenous military technology.”

Nigeria has already begun to do so. It is one of the few but growing number of African countries with a cyber warfare command. The country is expanding local production of small arms and ammunition. For example, it is developing rocket systems, and designing AI-enabled wearable devices for a future “smart soldier”.

Nigeria has also become a continental leader in the production of unmanned aerial systems (UAVs). These include lightweight FPV drones, one-way kamikaze drones, and long endurance combat drones. A drone factory in Abuja is now capable of churning out 10,000 drones annually.

Nigeria is not alone. Nine African countries now produce drones, supplying an increasing share of the African market. Twenty-one have launched and own satellites. South Africa, Kenya and Senegal are experimenting with 3D printing (making 3D objects from a digital file by adding successive layers of material) for critical spare parts, drone swarms for border security, and satellite-based communications to reduce dependency on external signals intelligence.

These affordable, adaptable and dual-use technologies allow African armed forces to respond to asymmetric threats from terrorist organisations and criminal networks without bloating defence budgets or waiting for international suppliers.

When domestic production is not immediately possible, African governments are pursuing opportunities for technology transfer and co-production. Sudan’s locally manufactured Zajil-3 multi-role attack drone is a copy of the Ababil-3 drone made by Iran, one of the country’s top external drone suppliers. Morocco is positioning itself as a defence manufacturing hub by partnering with India’s Tata Motors to locally manufacture armoured vehicles. It is also partnering Israel’s Bluebird Aero systems to produce military drones, and is attempting to woo US firms such as Lockheed Martin to invest in local production and maintenance lines.

Next steps

These trends reflect a broader realisation: in an era of intensifying great-power competition and shifting global alliances, the capacity to make independent defence and security decisions, free from external influence, is a core national security concern.

The cultivation of local supply chains is necessary but not sufficient for Africa’s militaries to overcome the challenges of relying on externally supplied military equipment and technology. Institutional capacity, regulatory frameworks and human capital must be developed in tandem to translate innovation into meaningful outcomes. Cybersecurity, data governance and ethics must also be taken into consideration, ensuring that technological sovereignty does not become a liability. The embrace of technology will do little to make African citizens safer if it is used to entrench corrupt elites or abuse human rights.

Finally, while greater independence in the production of defence platforms and technology is a worthy goal, total autonomy is a fantasy. For higher-end military systems such as advanced missiles, frontier AI, manned combat aircraft, and key components such as chips and semiconductors, African governments will maintain some degree of dependency on external actors for a long time to come.

The next phase of Africa’s defence transformation needs to move beyond acquiring advanced technology and equipment. It needs to ensure they are suited to the continent’s unique threats, and that they are locally managed and maintained.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University or the Department of Defense.

– ref. Africa’s militaries have always relied on imported weapons: why a shift to homegrown defence is now under way – https://theconversation.com/africas-militaries-have-always-relied-on-imported-weapons-why-a-shift-to-homegrown-defence-is-now-under-way-274802

February 23, 2026

Forgiveness isn’t always easy, but studies show it can help you flourish

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Richard G. Cowden, Research Scientist, Harvard University

The Global Flourishing Study suggests that forgiveness is shaped by cultural and local influences. Raphael Brasileiro/Pexels, CC BY-SA

Being hurt by others is common and can be deeply painful. How we respond can affect our individual and collective well-being. Which raises the question of forgiveness.

In the last few decades, researchers have helped us better understand how people experience forgiveness and how it influences our lives. The Global Flourishing Study seeks to enrich this knowledge from a more global perspective. Launched in 2021, the study follows people over time to understand what a good life looks like in different parts of the world – including health, happiness, meaning, relationships, character, and financial security. It’s the first study to measure forgiveness in national samples from many different cultures and contexts.

A large part of my work as a psychology scholar looks at human flourishing, including data from the Global Flourishing Study. In the first wave of data from more than 200,000 participants across 22 countries, my colleagues and I found that about 75% of individuals reported they had “often” or “always” forgiven those who had hurt them. Percentages varied across countries, ranging from 41% in Turkey to 92% in Nigeria.

All five African countries included in the study – Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania – were ranked in the top six. This shouldn’t be interpreted as implying that one region “does forgiveness better” than another, but it does point to the central role of forgiveness as a human strength on the African continent.

The variation across countries around the world suggests that forgiveness is shaped by cultural and contextual influences, including norms for preserving social harmony and religious teachings about responding to wrongdoing.

In a new longitudinal analysis using two waves of Global Flourishing Study data collected about one year apart, we looked at whether people who reported being more forgiving tended to report better well-being about a year later. We found that forgiveness predicted somewhat higher well-being on many of the 56 outcomes, including mental health, purpose in life, relationship satisfaction and hope.

Decades of research have pointed to similar links. But this new analysis is unique. Because of its cross-national scale and breadth of outcomes, it provides one of the most comprehensive tests of the connection between forgiveness and flourishing.

Forgiveness can be strengthened

We’re often drawn to stories of extraordinary forgiveness, such as when we read in the news about people forgiving perpetrators of extreme violence. But dramatic experiences of forgiveness aren’t part of everyone’s story. The reality is that forgiveness can be difficult for many people.

The hopeful news is that forgiveness isn’t a rare quality that some of us have and others lack. Studies have shown that forgiveness is like a muscle we can strengthen.

Our large multisite, randomised trial with more than 4,500 individuals across Colombia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, South Africa and Ukraine used a three-hour forgiveness workbook (reflective exercises, writing activities, educational material and the like) that participants completed to help them forgive a specific hurt.

We found the workbook improved forgiveness, anxiety, depression and overall well-being. Although some situations may call for more support than a workbook can offer, these results indicate that even a brief do-it-yourself forgiveness workbook can be helpful to many people with unresolved hurts.

The workbook is based on the widely studied REACH Forgiveness model and is free to download and use. It’s also available in several languages, making it easier for many people to use in the language they’re most comfortable with.

Forgiveness is a process

People sometimes resist forgiveness because it can seem as though one is being asked to excuse the wrongdoing, abandon justice, or reopen the door to an unsafe relationship. But that’s not what forgiveness means.

Forgiveness is a process that involves choosing not to seek payback, working to release resentment, and moving towards greater compassion for the person who hurt us.

While many people in the first wave of the Global Flourishing Study endorsed a tendency to forgive others, about 25% of individuals across the countries reported that they had “rarely” or “never” forgiven those who had hurt them.

These results suggest there may be value in making resources available for those who want to forgive but find it difficult. This could empower people to pursue forgiveness on their own terms when it’s safe and appropriate.

Initiatives like the Global Forgiveness Movement have been established with this in mind. However, scaling the reach and uptake of forgiveness resources requires partnerships and ongoing engagement across health systems, workplaces, schools, religious communities and civic organisations. This may be especially important in settings where mental health services are less available or accessible.

If we can expand opportunities for people to consider, access and engage with forgiveness tools in ways that preserve autonomy, safety and justice, the benefits to individual well-being may ripple outward into a more flourishing humanity.

That possibility invites each of us to consider how we can participate in making the world a more forgiving place.

Richard G. Cowden works for the Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University, which coordinates the Global Forgiveness Movement.

– ref. Forgiveness isn’t always easy, but studies show it can help you flourish – https://theconversation.com/forgiveness-isnt-always-easy-but-studies-show-it-can-help-you-flourish-275868