Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephanie Allais, Faculty member, Centre for Researching Education and Labour, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa’s 50 public technical and vocational education and training (TVET) colleges are, in the main, struggling institutions.

In many, throughput rates – how many students qualify in the expected time – are low. Some lecturers are under-qualified and under-resourced. Relationships with employers, which are crucial for the type of training that these colleges offer, are uneven.

Colleges are hard pressed to provide training to young people with weak schooling behind them and no clear path to employment ahead. The youth unemployment rate is almost 44%.

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Read more:
Life after school for young South Africans: six insights into what lies ahead

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The response to problems in the sector has been reform: rename the colleges, restructure them, give them new governance models, new qualification types, new funding arrangements. Over 30 years of democracy, South Africa has done all of these things, repeatedly. It has not worked.

And now there’s another round of changes being rolled out. There is little clearly documented explanation of what the new system is and how it will work in practice. But colleges have been instructed that most current qualification offerings will be phased out and replaced by new “occupational” qualifications.

In 2024 I wrote a paper tracing the history of the technical and vocational training sector, drawing on published literature, my research on skills development and my own involvement in South Africa’s education and training policy processes. The paper sets out why the sector is not working and what it needs to succeed.

In my view, based on the history of the sector, there is a serious risk that the latest reforms will make things worse.

Thirty years of the same mistake

South Africa’s policy vision and funding model for TVET colleges has, like that of many other countries, been to base funding on student enrolment for programmes that are linked to employer demand. It assumes colleges will respond to what employers want, and channel young people into jobs.

It has a long and largely unsuccessful track record, with problems in many countries – most extensively documented in Australia and the UK, the originators of the broad policy model.

The problem is structural. Funding institutions only through enrolments in specific programmes provides no institutional stability. It creates no incentive to invest in equipment, lecturers, or long-term relationships with employers. It treats colleges as if they were competing as private training providers.

When the programmes that attract funded enrolments change – as they do, repeatedly – colleges are left with stranded staff, obsolete equipment, and no financial buffer. And when new funding is made available, for new programmes, they don’t have lecturers who can teach them.

Private institutions tend not to offer manufacturing-related programmes – those are expensive. They focus on business-related programmes, which are cheaper.

Consider the National Technical Education Diploma (Nated) qualifications, the government-funded programmes that colleges have provided for decades. First, they were to be phased out. Then, when the National Development Plan created TVET enrolment targets, colleges were told to expand them. Colleges have built up staffing around them and enrolled students in them.

Now, the Department of Higher Education and Training has instructed colleges to phase them out. What replaces them are “occupational qualifications”.

The occupational qualifications problem

The department defines an occupation as

a set of jobs whose main tasks and duties are characterised by a high degree of similarity (skill specialisation).

The theory behind occupational qualifications is sound: link qualifications to specific occupations, make workplace experience part of the qualification, and graduates will have credentials that employers recognise and value.

The framework has thousands of occupations.

The problem – and here is where our new research (not yet published online) is indicating an uncomfortable finding – is that many of the “occupations” to which these new qualifications are linked do not really exist in workplaces and labour markets. And there is little publicly available information about them.

Some “occupations” have special skills that need special training, and others are really just jobs.

For example, in our research (not yet online) across 53 food and beverage manufacturing plants, we found that there are artisan trades like millwrighting, fitting and turning, and electrical work which fit the idea of an occupation. But machine operators don’t fit that description. Yet machine operators are among the new qualifications to be offered. The employers we visited don’t need those qualifications. They would rather hire someone they can train themselves, to use the equipment in their plant.

Training in a “knowledge module” like “personal mastery and interpersonal relationships” is not specific to the “occupation” of operating a machine.

You cannot create an occupation by developing a qualification for it. It works the other way: the occupation must exist before you create a qualification for it.

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Read more:
Jobs of the future: South Africa has major gaps in skills needed to shape the green economy

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This is not an abstract concern. Colleges are now being instructed to gain accreditation to offer these qualifications, to hire staff to teach them, to find workplace placements for students doing them – all on the assumption that there is a real occupational destination at the end.

For artisans, this assumption holds: there are real occupations that translate to opportunities in the workplace. But for the majority of new occupational qualifications being developed, far more analysis is needed.

What institutions actually need

Colleges cannot become strong institutions through enrolment-driven funding alone, any more than a school can become strong by being paid per pupil with no base funding for teachers or classrooms. And calling qualifications “occupational” does not mean that they will lead to work where there is no meaningful occupation in labour markets or workplaces.

Institutions need a stable core – employed lecturers, maintained equipment, administrative capacity – that allows them to function as institutions rather than as collections of projects cobbled together from different funding streams.

Some of them may be better off offering second-chance matric (secondary school leaving certificate) programmes instead of narrowly focused programmes where there are few real opportunities for employment in the surrounding areas, and no way colleges can find work placements for their learners.

Pockets of genuine excellence exist in the current system: colleges with good employer relationships and real employment outcomes for graduates. What they have in common is principled management, experienced staff, and enough stability to build relationships over time. The system should be trying to replicate those conditions.

In my view, what needs to happen is this:

• colleges should be funded with a core institutional grant, and enabled to provide a mix of training that reflects their local economic contexts

• occupational qualifications should be rolled out only where employers need them.

Otherwise the latest reforms risk repeating the errors of the past 30 years. Colleges and young people deserve better than that.

Stephanie Allais receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation. I have also recently worked on research funded by the Food and Beverage Manufacturing SETA.

– ref. Reforms to South Africa’s technical colleges keep failing students and employers: why? – https://theconversation.com/reforms-to-south-africas-technical-colleges-keep-failing-students-and-employers-why-278711

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ikechukwu (Ike) Nwaka, Assistant Lecturer, Business Economics, University of Alberta

Nigerian women of working age are mostly (90%) self-employed. By comparison, self-employment accounts for less than 16% of employment in high-income countries such as the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. It is far lower in middle-income countries like South Africa and Turkey too.

Official statistics show that self-employment in Nigeria is concentrated in the northern regions. And there’s a gender difference: women make up the majority of those working for themselves (Figure 1).

What these numbers do not explain is why women are far more likely than men to operate businesses from their homes, or whether those businesses generate meaningful economic returns.

As economists working on labour, gender, energy and development, we addressed these questions in a recent paper.

Using nationally representative household data from 2010 to 2019, the study examines why Nigerian women run enterprises from their homes. These kinds of operations include selling goods from a front room, preparing food at home, or offering haircuts, beauty services, laundry and dry cleaning, and shoe repair. They also make textiles, crafts, garments, shoes and cosmetics at home rather than in shops, kiosks or workshops.

The findings challenge the idea that home-based self-employment is mainly about personal preference or flexibility.

Childcare responsibilities, housing access, electricity and cultural norms strongly shape women’s work location. These insights reveal that supporting women in business must go beyond training or microfinance, and remove structural barriers.

Childcare limits women’s workplaces

We first identified factors associated with operating home-based businesses, using data (2010-2019) from national surveys that follow the same households over time.

We then examined how individual, household and contextual factors shape the likelihood of operating a business from home. We found that childcare was the strongest factor influencing women’s choice of work location.

The presence of young children doesn’t much affect where men work. For women, however, having young children makes it more likely they will run a business from home.

In Nigeria, women shoulder most of the unpaid domestic labour, including childcare, cooking and cleaning. Home-based businesses allow women to earn income while doing that labour.

For many women, home-based work may not be the most attractive option. Rather, the patterns we saw in the data suggest that it’s a way to reconcile income-earning with unpaid domestic responsibilities. Other research into women’s experiences has also shown that working from home may be a necessity rather than a choice.

Why home ownership doesn’t benefit women equally

Homeowners who operate home-based enterprises are better positioned to use property as collateral, access credit, expand workspace, or invest in equipment. They are able to turn housing into productive capital.

However, these advantages are not equally accessible to women.

Only 8.2% of women aged 20-49 are sole owners of land, compared with 34.2% of men, according to World Bank research into gender disparities in property ownership in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Nigerian constitution grants women equal rights to own, inherit and manage property. But many face legal, financial and social barriers that limit their actual control over assets.

Even in owner-occupied households, customary and patriarchal practices can mean that ownership doesn’t translate into decision-making power. Consequently, the same asset generates different economic returns for men and women. It confines women to lower-return home-based activities.

We found that 67% of female homeowners operate home-based enterprises compared with 33% of male owners. Most men who own homes work away from home.

Geography and social norms matter

We found that home-based enterprises are concentrated in poorer regions where returns are low, particularly in northern Nigeria, as shown in figure 2.

Even after accounting for income and education, women in northern Nigeria are far more likely to run businesses from home than women in the south. Cultural and religious norms that restrict women’s mobility and public participation probably play a central role.

This complicates global policy narratives that frame home-based work as inherently empowering. In Nigeria, it often reflects the need to juggle paid work with household obligations under restrictive conditions. These businesses tend to cluster in low-entry sectors, offer limited skill development, and have little growth potential.

Education helps, but only up to a point

Education and household income do expand women’s options, but their effects are limited. Our study shows that better-educated women are less likely than equally educated men to remain in home-based businesses when alternatives are available.

As household income rises, women are also less likely to operate enterprises from home. Importantly, observable characteristics do not explain the full gender gap. The study finds that less than half of the difference in home-based self-employment can be attributed to education, household size, marital status and housing. The rest likely reflects deeper structural forces that shape outcomes differently for men and women. These are forces like social norms, unequal access to finance, gendered returns to assets, and expectations around unpaid care work.

What this means for policy

Promoting home-based self-employment as a route to women’s economic empowerment can be misleading. When women are pushed into home-based enterprises because childcare is expensive, institutions and property rights are weak, or finance is inaccessible, entrepreneurship becomes a response to constraint, not opportunity.

Policies that reduce childcare costs, strengthen women’s property and inheritance rights, and improve access to credit are likely to do more to expand women’s choices than entrepreneurship programmes alone.

Digital infrastructure can help some home-based businesses reach wider markets, but only if deeper barriers are addressed. And because constraints vary across regions, one-size-fits-all solutions are unlikely to work.

More than flexibility

Home-based self-employment in Nigeria reflects deeply gendered expectations about work and care. Many women work from home not to assert independence, but because they have limited options.

Recognising this distinction matters. Celebrating women’s “flexibility” without addressing the constraints behind it risks turning resilience into a permanent requirement. A more equal future is one in which women can choose where and how they work, rather than adjusting their livelihoods around structural barriers.

Ikechukwu (Ike) Nwaka is affiliated with REACH Edmonton Council for Safe Communities as a Board Member

George Nwokike Ike does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Working from home in Nigeria: study finds women don’t have much choice – https://theconversation.com/working-from-home-in-nigeria-study-finds-women-dont-have-much-choice-274792

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Joshua Kumbani, Postdoctoral fellow, University of Tübingen

Rock paintings are found throughout Zimbabwe. They were made during the last 10,000 years by hunter gatherer groups and later by farming communities.

These came to the attention of the ERC Artsoundscapes project, based in Spain, in 2021. The project brings together experts in archaeology, ethnography, psychology and acoustic engineering to explore how humans understood sound in prehistoric times. Our team has studied some of the rock art of South Africa in which dance scenes are depicted, and we have begun work on documenting and analysing similar rock art in Zimbabwe.

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Read more:
Dance scenes in South African rock art: a closer look at ritual, music and movement

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Zimbabwe’s rock paintings are concentrated in the country’s eastern provinces, which is where we’ve focused so far. More can be found in the Matobo World Heritage Cultural Landscape in Matabeleland South, which will be the focus of future study.

We have published an article describing dance scenes in this rock art and comparing them with information from ethnographic sources to understand what kinds of dances they depict. The ethnographic research was done by anthropologists and focused on hunter gatherer groups in the broader southern African region (Botswana and Namibia).

We found that all the kinds of dances that have been described in living cultures – dances for ritual, entertainment or special circumstances – are depicted in Zimbabwe’s rock art. But ritual is a central theme.

This points to the need to refine our classification of rock art scenes. We’ve been using features like the body posture of depicted figures to classify a scene as a dance. But ritual dances often involve going into a trance state – and this alters a person’s ability to control their body, move in synchrony with other people and follow “rules” of a dance. Therefore, it may be necessary to reconsider whether some rock art scenes in Zimbabwe, and in the whole of southern Africa, depict dances or not.

Here we will discuss some examples of the rock art in Zimbabwe and explain how we categorised them.

Analytical method

We reviewed published works by archaeology researchers such as the late Peter Garlake and university professor Ancila Nhamo. We also used online resources, including the British Museum online collection by rock art photographer and author David Coulson, which features rock art from Zimbabwe and other southern African countries.

Our inquiry aimed to determine whether all dances that have been recognised ethnographically, in living people, in Zimbabwe as well as in other countries of southern Africa, are also represented in Zimbabwe’s rock art.

We analysed the scenes by applying six attributes that have proved useful in studies in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and the western Mediterranean. The attributes are divided into those related to the dancers themselves and those related to the type of dance. They are:

• dancers’ body posture (including bent figures, outstretched arms and flexed legs)

• items they hold, such as sticks, rattles, or headgear

• interaction between dancers

• evidence of synchrony

• direction of movement

• gender of the figures represented.

Dance scenes in Zimbabwe rock art

Using these attributes, we can say that a scene such as this one found at Lake Chivero is a dance because it has several men all wearing aprons, displaying the same body posture, and positioned in synchrony with outstretched arms.

Yet, in other scenes we encountered unexpected problems with the second group of attributes (type of dance). Those were designed to analyse dance scenes in other parts of the world with different belief systems. But they are not always valid when dancers engage in trance dances.

One example of this type of scene that does not follow the norm is found at a site called Chivhu. A series of therianthropes (figures with both human and animal features) were painted associated with a large snake bearing two animal heads. In the scene we analysed there, the interaction between dancers is irregular, their movements are not synchronised, and the direction of the dance is not homogeneous, as would be expected in a regular dance. But regular interaction, synchronisation and uniform direction are simply not possible when dancers are in an altered state of consciousness. So, this scene might not look like a dance but it probably is one, based on what we know from studies of living people in cultures associated with the makers of the rock art.

Other dances recognised ethnographically as being of ritual character are initiation dances. An example of a dancing scene which may indicate a boys’ initiation dance can be found at a rocky outcrop in Glen Norah, Harare. American anthropologist Lorna Marshall, who undertook fieldwork among the !Kung people of the Kalahari Desert in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, described how the !Kung boys from Nyae Nyae in Namibia in the 1950s sometimes bent their upper bodies into an almost right-angle posture while dancing. The dancers in the painted scene are accompanied by other men who are not participating in the dance. These kinds of initiation dances are not documented or practised in Zimbabwe, however. So although the painted scene looks like an initiation dance, it probably isn’t one.

Rock art may also depict eland dances, the girls’ initiation dance. For example, dancing scenes depicting only women that may be interpreted as eland dances are found in Chipinge and Mudadi in Zimbabwe’s Chivi district.

The Makonde dance from Mashonaland West, which features more than 30 performers, is not easy to interpret. It is not clear whether this represents a large dance scene or if the dancers can be divided into different groups. Some individuals are clapping, while others are dancing, which may indicate the presence of trance dancers (group labelled b). Additionally, there are female dancers with tufts on their legs and wearing back aprons (group labelled a). These could be dancing for entertainment, because in reality for an eland dance (a ritual) they would probably remove the aprons.

Categorising certain dances can be challenging, and some may have been performed purely for entertainment purposes. For example, there is a dancing scene at Charewa that depicts women, men, and possibly children participating. We propose that this could represent an entertainment dance or a dance in some particular circumstance where everyone joined in.

Other elements emerging from the analysis of the dance scenes found in Zimbabwean rock art include the presence of musical instruments and a variety of artefacts associated with the dancers. Hand rattles frequently appear in dancing scenes and have been recognised as the most depicted musical instruments in Zimbabwean rock art, as we’ve discussed in an article about musical instrument representations.

Dancers are sometimes depicted with dancing sticks or other accessories, not only rattles. For instance, some figures appear to be holding round discs that are difficult to identify at Chikupu.

Moreover, dancers may be adorned with beads, as observed at Charewa Panel 2, and often wear distinctive headgear, typically resembling antennae, which may symbolise feathers as described in ethnographic accounts.

It’s important to accurately identify and describe these scenes. Our analysis highlights the valuable information that can be gleaned from close examination of the depictions, as well as from the use of ethnohistorical sources related to dance.

Margarita Díaz-Andreu received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme for the ERC Artsoundscapes project (Grant Agreement No. 787842) . Margarita Díaz-Andreu is affiliated with ICREA and the University of Barcelona.

Joshua Kumbani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Rock art, dance and ritual: what we learned from paintings in Zimbabwe – https://theconversation.com/rock-art-dance-and-ritual-what-we-learned-from-paintings-in-zimbabwe-279266

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Norman Sempijja, Associate professor, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique

Mali has been in a state of political turmoil since 2012. That year saw a military coup as well as armed groups taking over northern regions of the west African country. In the intervening years, efforts at establishing transitional governments have failed, culminating in the military junta dissolving and banning all political parties in May 2025.

In addition, the country has seen waves of military interventions by outside players like France, the US and most recently Russia. All have invested heavily in trying to contain the extremist threat in Mali.

But groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have continued to expand their influence. And in late April 2026 the military government found itself having to fend off coordinated attacks from separatists and jihadists across the country. The defence minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed.

Foreign interventions over the past decade have often misunderstood what was happening on the ground. Extremist groups have capitalised on issues such as land disputes, corruption, and resource competition to gain legitimacy, often aligning with the community’s tensions. The weakness of state institutions and security forces has allowed groups such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to consolidate power.

These groups have adapted by forming alliances and tailoring their narratives to local grievances, prioritising immediate issues over ideological objectives.

We are political scientists who have researched the security situation in Mali and the Sahel. Our recently published paper showed that non-state armed groups in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, have emerged as key power brokers, shaping local governance by filling gaps left by weak state institutions.

While external actors such as France, the US and Russia have prioritised counter-terrorism and state-building, they often overlook the governance functions of non-state armed groups. These groups often provide essential services and gain local legitimacy.

Recognising the role of armed groups as local power holders does not mean accepting or legitimising their actions. However, ignoring this reality has led to policies that miss the mark. When interventions focus only on military solutions, they risk misunderstanding why people interact with these groups in the first place.

Our findings challenge conventional interventions that focus solely on defeating non-state armed groups or reinstating centralised state control. We argue that security solutions alone are insufficient. We advocate for a more nuanced approach that integrates the potential for non-state armed groups when it comes to governance, legitimacy and local agency. Non-state armed groups have provided governance over territories in countries like Colombia, Syria and South Sudan, among others.

Armed groups as de facto authorities

Armed groups in Mali are not just fighting forces. In many parts of the country, they play a more complex role. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of groups operating within Mali. The largest and best known, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, is a coalition of five organisations and claims to have over 10,000 fighters in the country.

In central and northern Mali, bordering Algeria, the state is often distant, absent or mistrusted. Armed groups step into this vacuum. They settle disputes, enforce rules, collect taxes, and sometimes provide a basic sense of order.

For communities living with daily insecurity, these functions are not abstract; they shape everyday life.

Our study established that this does not necessarily mean the population agrees with these groups or supports their ideology. Many do not. However, when there are few alternatives, people adapt. They follow the rules because they need to survive, not because they believe in them.

This distinction is important. This helps explain why these groups are so difficult to dislodge. Their strength does not come only from weapons but also from how deeply they are embedded in local realities.

Why military strategies fall short

International efforts have largely focused on fighting these groups and rebuilding the authority of the Malian state. Although well intentioned, these kinds of interventions often overlook something essential: what happens to the spaces these groups leave behind?

An example is France’s 2013 intervention. The French army helped the Malian army to regain control of the northern part of the country from advancing Islamists during Operation Serval. The aim was to stop extremist forces from advancing to Bamako. This did not end the conflict. Many fighters moved to rural areas where the state had little presence and built ties with local communities.

In central Mali, where cattle farming is a key source of income, this dynamic contributed to the spread of violence between Fulani and Dogon communities, reinforcing grievances exploited by extremist groups.

Simultaneously, attempts to strengthen state institutions have struggled. In some places, security forces are seen as ineffective and even abusive.

Faced with this reality, people often turn to whoever can offer some level of predictability and protection, even if that actor is an armed group.

External involvement has also become increasingly fragmented. France’s withdrawal, rising anti-western sentiment, and the arrival of Russian-linked forces have created a crowded and sometimes conflicting intervention landscape.

Different actors bring different agendas, and their presence does not always translate into greater security. In some cases, it can even worsen things by reinforcing tensions or weakening trust in already fragile institutions.

Caught in the middle, civilians make difficult choices daily. Their decisions are rarely ideological but rather about survival.

Rethinking the response

We conclude from our findings that a more grounded approach would begin by listening to local realities. It would address the gaps that allow armed groups to take root. This means improving access to justice and security, supporting local institutions, and taking grievances seriously. It also means recognising that legitimacy is built from the ground up, not imposed from above.

Mali’s experience shows that there are clear limits to what military force can achieve on its own. As long as interventions overlook the everyday realities of governance and survival, they are unlikely to bring about lasting change. Until that shift happens, armed groups will remain hard to dislodge, not only because they can fight but also because, in many places, they have become part of how life is organised.

Norman Sempijja is affiliated with Mohammed VI polytechnic University and based at the Faculty of Governance Economics and Social Sciences.

Mouhammed Ndiaye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mali’s armed groups fill a government vacuum – addressing this is key to ending the violence – https://theconversation.com/malis-armed-groups-fill-a-government-vacuum-addressing-this-is-key-to-ending-the-violence-281648

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Narcisse Martial Yèdji, Sociologue politiste et enseignant-chercheur, University d’Abomey-Calavi de Bénin

Romuald Wadagni won the 2026 presidential election in Benin with over 94% of the vote. Wadagni, 50, is a technocrat who became an influential finance minister under Patrice Talon from 2016 until his election.

The Beninese political system is a pluralist democracy organised around a presidential system, with regular elections and political alternation. It is also characterised by a strict institutional framework governing electoral competition, particularly since recent reforms.

The outcome raises questions about the current dynamics of Benin’s political system. How should the 2026 presidential results be interpreted in a context marked by reforms to the party system and the electoral framework? Political sociologist Narcisse M. Yèdji offers some insights.

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How do you interpret the 94% result?

With the current national political climate, the landslide victory raises several questions. At first glance, the results suggest very strong support for the presidential majority. Statistically, this means a very low dispersion of votes between the two competing duos: the winning ticket formed by Romuald Wadagni and Mariam Chabi Talata, and the one formed by Paul Hounkpè and Rock Judicaël Hounwanou. More broadly, such a scenario is typical of electoral contexts where the opposition plays only a formal role and has no real chance of winning.

That said, the enormous margin between the two main candidates may also reflect strong support for the winning pair, giving the impression of a broad consensus in their favour.

Clearly, recent changes introduced to the country’s party system and the electoral code have tilted the balance in favour of the ruling party. Such a victory was predictable. The margin, however, was not.

A comparison with the 2021 presidential election places the 2026 result in a broader perspective. The 2021 election was won by Patrice Talon with 86% of the vote. The race was slightly more open. It involved a larger number of candidates: three pairs in total.

The statements are not contradictory. In a context where the political offer is restricted, voters have several options: either to stay at home, or to cast a default vote. Therefore, the 94% may reflect strong popular support. Or, given the limited set of choices, it may reflect the option of a default vote. The 2026 landslide victory can thus be read as a reflection of growing electoral support for the incumbent administration.

The latest complete overhaul of the rules of political competition left voters without meaningful and credible alternatives, thereby increasing the likelihood of people voting by default.

However, what might appear to be a gradual consolidation of electoral support for the ruling party could, in fact, be the effect of these reforms. The endorsement system, in particular, has played a key role in shaping how votes are distributed. It is a system that requires any presidential candidate to obtain the formal support of a certain number of elected officials (members of parliament or mayors) in order to be eligible to run. The threshold, initially set at 10% (16 endorsements), was raised to 15% in 2024 (28 endorsements), making it harder for the main opposition party to enter the race, as it was unable to secure the required number of endorsements.

It is therefore misleading to view the presidential ticket’s success as mere coincidence. A more realistic reading points to a long-matured political project, executed with cold calculation by those in power.

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Read more:
Présidentielle au Bénin : comment les réformes politiques sous Patrice Talon ont remodelé la compétition électorale

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There are two issues at stake. First, avoiding any risk of retaliation from a resentful successor. The long siege of more than 50 days imposed by security forces on former president Thomas Boni Yayi’s residence after the controversial 2019 legislative election lends weight to this argument. Second, to enable reforms and economic transformation projects to continue, while reducing political uncertainty.

In 2025, Talon had, in fact, hinted at his wish to pass the baton to a successor who would “not undo” his reform programme.

From this perspective, Wadagni’s success is no accident. It is the planned outcome of political system designed to ensure its own continuity.

How do you interpret the voter turnout?

A comparison with previous presidential elections highlights a mixed trend in voter turnout. The 2026 turnout was 63.57%. That is higher than 2021’s 50.17% turnout. However, civil society disputes that 2021 figure, claiming it was actually 26.47%. These turnout rates (for the 2021 and 2026 presidential runs) contrast sharply with recent legislative elections. Turnout was 27.12% in 2019; 38.66% in 2023; 36.74% in 2026.

This contrast reveals a hierarchy among elections. Presidental elections draw stronger turnout, even without real electoral options. For many citizens, electing the head of state is a central political moment.

However, the higher turnout for 2026 (63.57%) should not be interpreted as a revival of political interest. Voter participation has steadily declined since 2006. It averaged at 74.85% in 2006 and 84.82% in 2011.

There is another important reading from the 2026 presidential elections. The relatively high voter turnout of 63.57% happened at the same time as the electoral choices narrowed. In other words, turnout does not appear to be conditioned by the perception of effective pluralism in the electoral process.

Ultimately, these changes reflect how citizens relate to elections. Presidential votes still hold some appeal. Yet, the broader electoral trend remains one of growing abstention and mistrust.

This trend can clearly be linked to a limited belief in the effectiveness of the voting process. It may also stem from a narrower range of electoral choices. If a restricted political offer appears not to affect electoral participation, this does not imply that those who went to vote fully trust the electoral process.

It is entirely possible to be distrustful of the system while still voting, especially when abstention is not perceived as the best option.

Finally, it may be indicative of shifting social expectations regarding political representation.

What are the main challenges facing the new president?

Several challenges await the new president. The first is political legitimacy. Many see his term as a direct continuation of Talon’s rule. For them, Wadagni is his designated successor.

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Read more:
Au Bénin, le bilan de Patrice Talon à l’épreuve des élections législatives

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From this perspective, the new president appears to be both heir and hostage. He inherits the previous administration’s achievements. But he also inherits its liabilities. This raises a central question: can he build an independent authority of his own?

The central challenge of his term, therefore, is to distance himself from this divisive political legacy. He must build an image as an independent president. Wadagni has stated that his predecessor would “step aside” if he wins. But, doubts remain about whether this promised distance will become reality.

On the institutional front, the new president inherits a fragile executive branch. Parliament owes full allegiance to Talon. The Senate could also limit his room for action.

From the first challenge stems the second: restoring trust between politics and people. The outgoing president will sit in the Senate and is likely to remain, for years to come, one of the country’s most influential political figures. Meeting this challenge will undoubtedly depend on how the public will perceive Talon’s influence on government affairs from within the Senate.

Restoring trust between the political sphere and the people means winning back voters who have walked away from electoral processes. This will require credible actions that must prove renewed approach to governance.

The legitimacy of the new president’s policies may depend on this effort.

Beyond that, the deepest challenge might be national reconciliation. Recent political dynamics such as the electoral reforms appear to have contributed to deepening divisions among Beninese citizens. To ensure long term stability, the new president will need to take credible actions to ease tensions and rebuild social cohesion.

For this to happen, strong actions are expected quickly after his inauguration, especially on highly sensitive issues:

• security issues in the northern border regions exposed to terrorist threats

• economic and social issues, including the cost of living, improving purchasing power, youth employment, and reducing wage inequalities

• political and institutional issues, including “political prisoners”, exiles, and those in similar situations; easing the tax burden; and rebuilding public trust in institutions.

Amid the profound political and institutional changes underway, Wadagni’s ability to meet all these expectations will shape his legitimacy. It will also determine the overall success of his seven-year term.

Narcisse Martial Yèdji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Benin election: Wadagni’s landslide win raises questions about his legitimacy – https://theconversation.com/benin-election-wadagnis-landslide-win-raises-questions-about-his-legitimacy-281005

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Andrew McKechnie, Professor of Zoology and South African Research Chair-holder, University of Pretoria

Humans are not the only species negatively affected by increasingly hot and humid conditions. Intense heatwaves sometimes kill large numbers of wild animals. Eastern Australia’s giant fruit bats, known as flying-foxes, provide possibly the most dramatic illustration. In late 2018, two days of extreme heat in the far north of Queensland wiped out one third of Australia’s population of spectacled flying-foxes. The species is now red-listed as endangered.

Bat biologists have identified high humidity as a major risk factor for these mass mortality events.

In late 2020, South Africa saw its first documented heat-related mass mortality event involving wild birds. Air temperatures in the typically humid Phongolo Nature Reserve in northern KwaZulu-Natal exceeded 45°C, about 10°C higher than average conditions. Staff in the reserve started seeing dead and dying birds. Most of the victims were songbirds, which are known to be more sensitive to extreme heat than many other groups of birds.

Of these, the worst-affected species was the blue waxbill, a charming little finch with a powder-blue face and belly that spends most of its time foraging for grass seeds in small flocks.

Blue waxbills made up nearly half the carcasses found by field rangers when they searched part of the reserve after the heat had passed.

The Phongolo mortality event added to the urgency of our research programme on the effects of climate change on Africa’s birds. The blue waxbills’ prominence among the victims identified them as a bellwether of the impacts of extreme heat on birds in the wetter south-eastern parts of the continent.

Since 2009, we have been leading a research team spanning the universities of Cape Town, Pretoria and several other local and overseas institutions. The over-arching goal of our research is understanding how climate change is affecting birds and other wildlife and developing methods to predict future effects.

Our expertise is mainly in behavioural ecology (Susie Cunningham) and evolutionary physiology (Andrew McKechnie). This combination has proven ideal for investigating how rising temperatures affect animals’ survival and reproduction.

Why humidity can be a killer

During hot weather, humans and other animals depend on evaporation to offload heat. Evaporation may take place by sweating (the major cooling mechanism for humans), through panting (your dog on a hot day) or other pathways. The process of changing liquid water (sweat or saliva) into water vapour uses heat, so it cools the source of the water (the body). But the air is like a sponge: when it’s already humid (wet), the air can’t hold much more water vapour.

These conditions impede evaporation and thus heat loss. On a 40°C day in a desert like the Kalahari or Sahara, evaporative cooling is efficient because the air is dry and sweat can evaporate as soon as it reaches the skin’s surface. At the same temperature on a humid day in the coastal tropics, however, sweat cannot evaporate and forms drops on the skin. This severely reduces rates of heat loss.

If body temperature increases more than a few degrees above normal levels, nervous system function is compromised, organ damage starts to occur and proteins begin denaturing. This breakdown of physiological functioning can rapidly lead to death.

The journey

In early 2022, just over a year after the waxbill event, our Masters student Nazley Liddle set out to examine the role high humidity had played in the deaths of the waxbills. She also aimed to predict areas where risks of mortality will increase in future.

Nazley investigated the waxbills’ capacity to regulate their body temperature over a range of air temperatures and humidity levels. Her results confirmed that high humidity severely compromises the birds’ ability to avoid dangerous hyperthermia (getting too hot).

For example, she found that blue waxbills can tolerate air temperature up to 48°C under dry conditions, whereas under humid conditions similar to those on the day of the Phongolo mortality event they are unable to maintain a safe body temperature if air temperature exceeds 45.7°C.

Nazley then modelled how the waxbills will fare under hotter, more humid future conditions. The modelling showed that likelihood of mass mortality events for waxbills (and other birds with similar physiology) will increase greatly in coming decades. This ranged across much of Kruger National Park, south-eastern Zimbabwe and large parts of southern and central Mozambique, including the ferociously hot Zambezi Valley.

Predicted risk of mortality becomes three to seven times higher when humidity is taken into account, compared to increasing temperature alone. Many of these areas will simply become too hot and humid during the wet season for the species to persist.

The blue waxbill study should set alarm bells ringing. Most of Earth’s 11,000 bird species occur in the tropics, many experiencing hot, humid conditions for at least part of the year.

Another recent paper from our team reveals similar increases in projected future risks of lethal hyperthermia for trumpeter hornbills. This large, fruit-eating forest species found in southern Africa plays a critical role in seed dispersal. Although biologists have often viewed tropical lowlands as safe habitats for birds from the point of view of their physiological functioning, our work is showing that increasing humidity coupled with rising temperatures poses a serious threat to birds, bats and other animals of the tropics.

There are worrying signs that climate change has already caused widespread declines in tropical birds. During 2025, several teams of researchers reported substantial declines in bird abundance, even in intact rainforests that have not been affected directly by human activities such as slash-and-burn agriculture.

Most recently, population declines of 25%-38% since 1950 among tropical birds have been attributed to increasingly extreme heat events. Tellingly, these declines have been more pronounced in songbirds compared to other groups. Rising temperature and humidity is a global-scale problem. The only long-term solution is halting human-driven climate warming.

Andrew McKechnie receives funding from the National Research Foundation and University of Pretoria.

Susan Cunningham receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the University of Cape Town.

– ref. Humidity and heat are killers for tropical birds – waxbill and hornbill studies highlight the dangers – https://theconversation.com/humidity-and-heat-are-killers-for-tropical-birds-waxbill-and-hornbill-studies-highlight-the-dangers-271634

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Simon D. Angus, Professor, Department of Economics & SoDa Laboratories, Monash Business School, Monash University

Well, well. Kenyan marathon runner Sabastian Sawe has officially broken through the fabled “sub-2-hour” marathon barrier.

On a reportedly perfect Sunday, 26 April 2026 in London, the 31-year-old Sawe ran through the finish gate on the Mall in front of Buckingham Palace’s gilded architectural flourishes in an official marathon time of 1 hour 59 minutes and 30 seconds.

This betters the marathon world record by a whopping 65 seconds, the largest single improvement since 2018. The previous world record was held by the late Kelvin Kiptum, also of Kenya. Kiptum’s 2 hours and 35 seconds, set in Chicago in 2023, now somehow seems an entire era away.

In fact, saying Sawe broke 2 hours is something of an understatement. Such was the brilliance of the moment, that Sawe pushed the second-placed Yomif Kejelcha of Ethiopia below the sub-2-hour mark as well, just 11 seconds behind Sawe.

But as we absorb all of this, it’s hard not to wonder, “What next?”

My interest as a data scientist and economist (and fellow runner) lies in analysing the historical progression of the men’s and women’s world marathon records.

If sub-2 was the driving force behind the marathon in the last decade, what’s left to aim for?

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Read more:
Marathon under 2 hours is closer than ever – scientist shows how Kenya’s Kiptum tests human limits

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Humanity seems obsessed with the limits of human creativity, ingenuity and performance. We award extravagant prizes for world firsts and remember the greatest achievements through bronze statues in prominent squares the world over.

But can we actually calculate these limits? Is there a “maths” of human endeavour?

Historical world record progression

Back in 2018, the legendary Eliud Kipchoge of Kenya ran 2 hours 1 minute and 9 seconds in the official Berlin Marathon. At the time, many dared to dream Kipchoge could be the one to take the men’s marathon below 2 hours.

In fact, a year later, Kipchoge appeared to do just that – running a phenomenal 1 hour 59 minutes and 40 seconds in a tightly orchestrated “breaking 2” display in Vienna.

However awe-inspiring, the Vienna effort would never make it into the official marathon books. The run was contrived in a number of ways, fully understood and acknowledged by Kipchoge and the organisation around him. This was never about the record, but instead, it was, he said, about proving that limits are there to be broken.

Around the same time, I had been working on a statistical approach to modelling the progression of marathon world records over the last few decades. I was intrigued to apply learnings from technological change in economics to the question of human performance.

There are all kinds of factors that feed into a world-record marathon performance. These range from training methods, nutrition, supplementation and biometrics, to performance analysis, and of course, clothing and shoe technology.

However, my approach, drawn from the economics of innovation, is founded on the idea that while performance gains can be made in any of these areas at any time – providing innovation rates stay steady over time – then the next world record marathon performance should be somewhat predictable.

Back then, I estimated that the official men’s marathon would break the sub-2 barrier around May 2032. That is, assuming a pretty rare 1-in-10 chance on any given marathon day of it happening.

Since then, we’ve had Kipchoge himself break his own record at Berlin in 2022, then Kiptum in Chicago in 2023, and now Sawe in London.

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Read more:
Eliud Kipchoge broke the men’s marathon record by 30 seconds. How close is the official sub-2 hour barrier now?

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At each point, I’ve adjusted my predictions, since the model can use the new world record marks to improve its accuracy.

My most recent prediction, made in October 2023 for a runner similar to Kiptum, would be that the official sub-2 would go down in March 2027. From the perspective of a prediction exercise starting with data from the 1960s, Sawe was just a touch early!

How likely was Sawe’s run?

Using my original modelling framework, if we include data only up to Kiptum’s Chicago run in Oct 2023, the likelihood of a sub-2 on 26 April 2026 is estimated to be 1 in 4.29 (just less likely than 1 in 4 odds). In other words, pretty likely!

However, this is the likelihood of a run of just under 2 hours – 1 hour 59 minutes 59 seconds to be precise.

But Sawe went well under 2 hours, so what were the odds of his actual run?

If I use my framework to calculate the odds of Sawe’s actual time on that day, given the sweep of historical world records since 1960, I find the likelihood of 1 hour 59 minutes, 30 seconds on 26 April 2026 to be 1 in 7.4 (around 2 in 15) – that’s pretty rare.

Clearly, a lot of things had to click for the performance that played out in London. And indeed, the backstory already includes:

• the timing of Sawe’s fitness meshing perfectly with the London event;

• the importance of getting fuelling and shoe technology right;

• the “just so” conditions in London on Sunday (something that was absent in Berlin during Sawe’s previous attempt on the record); and, of course,

• the competitive environment that saw Sawe pushed by the second-best-of-all-time Kejelcha until the final few hundred metres.

So then what’s next?

My statistical framework uses an assumption that, over time, performance gains get harder and harder to achieve. Any of us who have aimed to improve on our local park run time will know all too well how hard it becomes to eke out more performance gains after the initial euphoria of the first week or two’s improvements is over.

In my model, if we follow the improvement process out for very long time periods, we can estimate the eventual limits of human performance. That is, an estimate of the best possible human marathon time ever. I call it the “limiting” time.

In 2019 when my findings were first published, based on men’s world record times up to and including Kipchoge’s world record of 2 hours 1 minute and 39 seconds set in 2018 in Berlin, the limiting men’s marathon time came out to be 1 hour 58 minutes and 5 seconds.

In 2023 I updated this forecast to include Kipchoge’s next world-record time of 2 hours 1 minute and 9 seconds (also set in Berlin, 2022) and Kiptum’s astonishing Chicago run of 2 hours 35 seconds (2023). At that time, and following the “Kiptum line” – a runner like him closer to the 1 in 4 odds line – the new limiting marathon time dropped to 1 hour 55 minutes 40 seconds.

As I remarked then, Kiptum had given the limits of human performance a real bump.

After Sawe obliterated the men’s 2-hour barrier, rerunning my model sees the limiting time once more drop, but this time, not by quite so much.

The new limit comes out to 1 hour 54 minutes – a full 5 minutes 30 seconds faster than Sawe produced in London. In performance gap terms, there is still around four and a half percent of performance gains to be made.

Naturally, there are a lot of inherent assumptions. And such is the exercise that new data points (new world records) tend to have a significant impact on forecasts. Furthermore, we are talking here about the limits of human endeavour – potentially hundreds of years into the future.

The tiniest deviations in a line of forecast today can have outsize impact on a point thousands of days into the future.

Which is a long way of saying, when Sawe’s Italian coach, Claudio Berardelli, hinted that Sabastian might go faster on a better suited course like Chicago or Berlin, I for one, will not be surprised.

The statistical arc of human endeavour in the marathon keeps bending upwards. There is still much to be inspired by.

Simon D Angus has received funding from the Paul Ramsay Foundation, the Judith Neilson Institute, the Scanlon Foundation, and the Public Interest Journalism Initiative and the Defence, Science & Technology Group (Department of Defence). He is a co-founder of SoDa Laboratories, Monash Business School, and co-founder and the Director of the Monash IP Observatory, Monash University, and co-founder and director of KASPR Datahaus Pty Ltd.

– ref. Kenya’s Sawe breaks the 2-hour barrier: what’s next for the men’s marathon world record? – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-sawe-breaks-the-2-hour-barrier-whats-next-for-the-mens-marathon-world-record-281568

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Dylan O’Driscoll, Professor in Peace and Conflict, Coventry University

Climate change and its associated impacts can worsen security challenges, including those associated with violent extremism.

This is particularly the case in areas that are both vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and characterised by social and political instability.

In north-eastern Kenya, for instance, droughts, flooding and livelihood destruction are unfolding alongside, and worsening, activity by al-Shabaab, a terrorist network headquartered in Somalia. The terror group has evolved from carrying out large-scale attacks in Kenya, such as the Westgate Mall attack (in 2013) and the Garissa University attack (2015), to persistent, low-intensity attacks and broader community engagement in the border region.

Despite these overlapping crises, the understanding of how climate change and violent extremism interact remains limited.

As a multidisciplinary team, we set out to address this gap through workshops with policymakers and practitioners working across relevant policy areas in Nairobi and north-eastern Kenya, as well as focus groups and interviews with community members and leaders in the region.

Our findings highlight how in vulnerable environments, climate change acts as a threat multiplier. It intensifies:

• economic instability, by damaging and destroying livelihoods

• social fragmentation, by increasing the strain on social networks

• psychological strain, through the scale of destruction caused by cumulative climate events

• institutional weaknesses, by increasing pressure on public services and government access.

These conditions provide increased opportunities for extremists to influence or coerce the local population.

When we spoke with local herders and community leaders in north-eastern Kenya, we found that the impact of climate change left local communities more vulnerable to recruitment by extremists. At the same time, al-Shabaab activities in the area made it harder for communities to adapt to a changing environment. This reinforces a cycle of fragility.

Climate impacts and insecurity are interwoven dynamics that shape everyday life, governance and prospects for stability in north-eastern Kenya.

Our findings challenge the idea that climate change and security can be addressed separately. Effective responses must combine environmental, social and security strategies to build long-term resilience.

Livelihood destruction

For pastoralists in the north-eastern Kenyan counties of Garissa and Wajir, keeping livestock is not just a job. It is their identity, their food security and their children’s future.

However, as droughts and flash floods become more frequent, herds are being decimated. In times of desperation, al-Shabaab positions itself as a provider.

As one community member told us:

When the land dries up, animals die, farms fail, and people go hungry, especially the youth, they become desperate. Al-Shabaab knows this and exploits it. They offer food, money, and what seems like ‘purpose’ to young boys who feel abandoned by their own government.

What we had not anticipated before undertaking this research was the profound emotional toll of climate change and how this is creating ideal conditions for al-Shabaab recruitment. The loss of livestock causes a deep sense of shame among men who can no longer fulfil their role as providers.

A local herder told us:

We are men, supposed to provide, but we found ourselves helpless.

In a culture where “a man without animals is seen as a child, no matter his age”, as one respondent put it, this loss of status leads to depression and hopelessness.

Extremist groups exploit this emotional emptiness. They offer a sense of status to men who feel they have lost everything else.

Increased migration

As water and pasture vanish, herders are forced to travel much further from home, often entering remote, insecure areas where the state has limited presence.

This increased mobility is a necessary survival strategy. But it increases the likelihood of encountering al-Shabaab.

Individuals arriving in new areas with depleted resources and no social contacts are vulnerable to recruitment. In these remote areas, al-Shabaab often steps in to provide assistance, such as protection.

The lack of veterinary services and schooling creates several further vulnerabilities. When children drop out of school to follow herds, they become soft targets for recruiters.

Social breakdown

Beyond individual loss, violent extremism is unravelling social bonds.

In the past, neighbours could count on each other. Now, they are drifting apart because nobody has anything left to give, leading to a profound loss of community dignity.

As one community member put it:

When your neighbour comes asking for milk or sugar, you have nothing to offer. Our economy is not just about money; it is about sharing. When livestock die, that sharing disappears, and we become poorer not only in wealth but also in spirit.

Even the authority of community elders is under pressure. They are losing influence because their traditional wisdom about the seasons is no longer effective. Their status diminishes, creating a leadership vacuum.

Al-Shabaab is quick to attempt to fill this void, offering a new sense of order.

Governance challenges

The reach of the Kenyan state is limited in the remote and arid northern region.

When aid is delayed or distributed unevenly, it fuels grievances about neglect. Al-Shabaab is highly effective at using religious and political language to channel these frustrations against the state. It presents its own ideology as a path to justice.

Furthermore, insecurity prevents the delivery of the services needed for climate adaptation, leaving the most vulnerable populations dependent on anyone who will help. This gives al-Shabaab a clear entry point.

The way forward

Breaking this cycle of vulnerability requires a policy shift that integrates environmental and security strategies. It is necessary to formally recognise climate change as a critical security issue, to trigger the multi-agency coordination necessary for mitigation.

In practice, this means aligning national and county-level plans to prevent and counter violent extremism with climate adaptation strategies. This would enable agencies to share knowledge and pool funding.

Climate adaptation plans must incorporate conflict analyses to ensure aid does not inadvertently fuel grievances.

Most importantly, future interventions must look beyond technical solutions to address the emotional weight of lost dignity and the breakdown of social structures. This will foster resilience in the local economy and the community.

Dylan O’Driscoll receives funding from the British Academy for this research. He is an Associate Senior Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen receives funding from the British Academy.

Joel Busher received funding from the British Academy for this research.

Wilson Ndenyele receives funding from the British Academy.

Sheila Ronoh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Climate change is worsening violent extremism in Kenya – what can be done – https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-worsening-violent-extremism-in-kenya-what-can-be-done-279604

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ishmael Tingbani, Associate Professor in Accounting, University of Southampton

Ghana introduced a new payment arrangement for petroleum imports in 2023, using gold instead of scarce US dollars. The policy was designed to ease pressure on the cedi by reducing the need for upfront dollar purchases to settle fuel import bills.

In an import-dependent economy, rising demand for US dollars usually weakens the domestic currency. Importers must exchange local currency for dollars. As the local currency loses value, the local cost of imports rises, driving inflation.

Ghana’s petroleum-for-gold strategy delivered short-term benefits. It reduced immediate demand for foreign exchange, supported relative stability in the cedi and contributed to moderating fuel price pressures and inflation.

The country is still vulnerable to global oil price shocks, however. That has become evident with the latest surge in oil prices triggered by instability in the Middle East. For oil-importing economies such as Ghana, geopolitical risks like this translate directly into higher fuel import costs and greater pressure on foreign-exchange reserves.

I am a scholar who has served as a technical adviser to Ghana’s Ministry of Energy and major oil firms. This article argues that Ghana’s current stabilisation measures are helping to manage short-term pressure, but they have not removed the country’s exposure to oil shocks. That matters because temporary relief should not be mistaken for structural reform.

The structural gaps are limited refining capacity, weak storage infrastructure and an underdeveloped downstream petroleum sector.

As long as these constraints remain, oil shocks will continue to transmit quickly into the exchange rate, inflation and the broader economy.

What’s working

Ghana is one of Africa’s largest gold producers, with output exceeding 120 tonnes annually.

The creation of the Ghana Gold Board, under the Ghana Gold Board Act, 2025 Act 1140, improves the state’s ability to mobilise gold through official channels. This is not a solution to Ghana’s energy problem. But it is a more credible stabilisation strategy than relying on politically driven fuel price interventions and implicit subsidies. Those strategies, seen in earlier periods, contributed to fiscal losses and market distortions.

Inflation has eased significantly over the past year, falling from peak levels in 2023 to around 3%-4% in early 2026. Fuel prices have moderated, with pump prices declining by over 20% year-on-year in Febuary 2026. This indicates that short term pressures are being managed.

But relief is not reform. Policies such as gold-for-oil cannot eliminate Ghana’s dependence on imported refined fuels.

The gaps

Ghana’s vulnerability to global oil shocks stems from the structure of its energy system. Despite producing crude from offshore fields such as Jubilee, TEN and Sankofa-Gye Nyame, the country remains heavily dependent on imported refined fuels priced and settled in US dollars. That mismatch ties the domestic economy directly to global oil markets.

In practice, this dependence is substantial. Domestic refining meets only a small share of demand, with roughly 72% of refined petroleum products supplied through imports in recent years. In other words, most of the fuel actually consumed in the economy is sourced from international markets rather than processed locally, reinforcing the country’s reliance on foreign currency.

These imports are concentrated in a few critical products that underpin everyday economic activity. Diesel accounts for the largest share, used extensively in transport, logistics, construction and backup power generation. Petrol (gasoline) supports road transport, while liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is widely used for household cooking and some commercial purposes. In effect, Ghana’s import bill is not abstract. It underwrites the economy’s core energy needs, from moving goods and people to powering businesses and households.

This dependency on imports is driven by three factors.

• Limited refining capacity. Ghana’s ability to process crude oil domestically is constrained by the limited and unreliable operation of its main refining asset, the Tema Oil Refinery. Although installed capacity exists, it has operated intermittently for years due to financial constraints, maintenance challenges and operational inefficiencies.

But expanding domestic refining capacity on its own won’t insulate Ghana from price dynamics. Domestic fuel prices remain linked to international benchmarks, meaning global oil shocks would continue to pass through to inflation.

Where refining could make a difference is on the financing side. It would lower demand for US dollars.

• Weak storage infrastructure. Ghana has limited strategic storage capacity for petroleum products, reducing its ability to build reserves and manage supply over time. The country must rely on frequent imports to meet demand, increasing exposure to external supply and financing shocks.

• An underdeveloped downstream petroleum sector. Beyond refining and storage, inefficiencies in the movement and sale of petroleum products constrain how effectively supply is managed within the domestic market. Distribution remains fragmented across importers, bulk distributors and retail outlets, with limited coordination and logistical bottlenecks in transportation and depot infrastructure. Regulatory rigidities in pricing and market participation further reduce flexibility. As a result, even when supply is available, it is not always efficiently allocated, and global price shocks are transmitted quickly and with limited buffering through the domestic economy.

What needs to be done

Four priorities now stand out.

First, recent gains must be consolidated through continued macroeconomic discipline and a firm avoidance of policy reversals.

Second, foreign-exchange buffers should be strengthened to better absorb future oil-price shocks and contain exchange-rate pressures.

Third, gold and foreign exchange strategies need to be integrated so that gold mobilisation directly reinforces external liquidity.

Finally, dependence on downstream imports must be reduced through credible investment in refining, storage and broader energy infrastructure.

The real test of Ghana’s fuel strategy is not whether it can withstand a single episode of oil-market volatility, but whether today’s stabilisation measures can be converted into a more resilient energy system.

Ishmael Tingbani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ghana’s fuel payment strategy works for now: how to fix longer term problems – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-fuel-payment-strategy-works-for-now-how-to-fix-longer-term-problems-281076

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ndidzulafhi Innocent Sinthumule, Associate Professor, University of Johannesburg

South Africa’s Limpopo province borders Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique. It is one of the poorest provinces in the country. This is due to a combination of historical underdevelopment, a high unemployment rate, heavy reliance on government grants and a rural-based economy with limited industrial diversification.

It’s an interesting place for a geographer like me. My work brings together the themes of traditional ecological knowledge, environmental geography, conservation and society. My research looks at sustainable environmental outcomes by recognising the role of local culture, sacred sites and community practices in managing natural resources in southern Africa.

In two recent studies I explored how local communities in Limpopo are commercialising the harvesting of local insects to manage extreme poverty.

In one I explored the process involved in the commercialisation of mopane worms. Mopane worms (Gonimbrasia belina) are a nutritious, high-protein seasonal delicacy for many communities in Limpopo.

In a similar study, I turned to the harvesting and commercialisation of termite alates in Limpopo.

These resources are important for food security and poverty relief. Mopane worms and alate termites offer both high-quality nutrition and substantial income-generating opportunities for rural households. Both foods are traded in local and regional, formal and informal markets.

This enterprise is largely driven by unemployment, economic hardship, and the need for cash income in rural areas.

My research shows clearly that these resources play an important part in rural households and it’s important to manage them sustainably. One way of ensuring this happens is to tap into local knowledge.

As a separate study I did shows, traditional knowledge can help manage scarce resources by integrating customary rules, taboos and seasonal monitoring to prevent over-exploitation.

Mopane harvesting and trade

The mopane worm study took place in June and July 2023 in Muyexe and Nsavulani villages, Mopani District, Limpopo. The area is dominated by mopane woodlands, trees which are the main food of mopane worms (caterpillars). These villages have not benefited from development in the past and people depend heavily on natural resources for survival.

The processing of mopane worms (from harvesting to a marketable commodity) involves a series of traditional, manual steps to ensure quality. They are degutted (squeezing the caterpillar to remove stomach contents or frass), washed, boiled and dried to allow them to be stored for long periods. They are then graded and sold at home or in towns.

I chose 161 households in Muyexe village and 82 households in Nsavulani village as respondents, and interviewed villagers using a questionnaire. The questions covered:

• the socio-economic profile of respondents

• the availability and procurement, processing, marketing, trading and livelihood benefits of mopane worms.

The study found that most of the harvesters in Muyexe (69%) and Nsavulani (59%) villages were women. Almost all processed the worms at home. They collected the worms for both household consumption and trade. Those who traded worms reported making between R1,000 (US$54) and R3,000 (US$163) per season. There are two mopane seasons in Limpopo: November to January and April to May.

The study found that 55% of households in Muyexe village and 70% in Nsavulani village derived income only from mopane worm sales. (Individuals were under 60 and didn’t qualify for a social grant, or administered grants for children, nor for themselves.) Although the income earned from the sale of mopane worms is seasonal, communities appreciate it. Commercialising mopane worms contributed significantly to rural livelihoods. It is a crucial source of food security and cash income. This helps alleviate poverty and improves the lives and livelihoods of those involved in the business.

Termite harvesting and trade

In a similar study, I turned to the harvesting and commercialisation of termite alates in Limpopo. I interviewed 71 respondents in Thohoyandou and Sibasa towns (who came mainly from villages), as well as Mukula and Tshidzivhe villages, and found that these insects were harvested to eat at home and to sell.

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Read more:
My formula for a tasty and nutritious Nigerian soup – with termites

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Women of all ages were more involved than men in this enterprise, making up 75% of the respondents. Almost half had secondary education and 23% had tertiary education; 63% were self-employed. The majority lived below the upper bound poverty line of R1,558 (about US$95) per person per month. About 31% of the traders indicated that over the selling season (October to December), alates contributed up to 100% of the income in their households.

Management for the future

While commercialisation puts pressure on resources, traditional rules and local management protect the trees. In the study on traditional ecological knowledge, I found that the communities imposed rules that:

• prohibited cutting of green branches

• restricted harvesting during specific seasons to allow for maturity

• prohibited tree damage during the mopane worm harvest.

Traditional ecological knowledge regulated the timing of harvest, protected host tree health, and ensured long-term livelihood security for local communities.

This shows that integrating local traditional ecological knowledge into harvesting practices is crucial for managing these resources sustainably.

Management strategies should be integrated into local and regional planning efforts. Efforts should also be made to communicate these strategies to relevant authorities to foster cooperation and raise awareness about the importance of mopane trees for all user groups.

To ensure the sustainable future of this woodland species, I recommend that the government work with traditional leaders and communities to support and enforce existing traditional practices.

Ndidzulafhi Innocent Sinthumule does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mopane worm and termite sales relieve poverty in rural South Africa – studies explore the impact – https://theconversation.com/mopane-worm-and-termite-sales-relieve-poverty-in-rural-south-africa-studies-explore-the-impact-280926