The Conversation – Africa – Page 3

May 10, 2026

Cameroon’s sacred and royal animals: could literature and futures thinking help save them?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kenneth Nsah Mala, Expert in Environmental Humanities, Sustainability Science, Foresight and Futures Studies, University of Cologne

Certain animals, like the lion, carry deep cultural and spiritual significance. But they also face extinction. Library of Congress

In the grasslands and highlands of western Cameroon, some animals are believed to be sacred. Within the region’s indigenous kingdoms (fondoms), many of these animals are also considered to be royal. They include wild cats (like cheetahs, leopards, lions, tigers), buffaloes, elephants, porcupines, cowries (sea snails), and a brightly coloured bird called the Bannerman’s turaco.

These species carry deep cultural and spiritual significance. They are, for example, often used to decorate royals (kings, queens and queen mothers) or to award royal distinctions to deserving individuals. Their body parts can be used to make crowns, bedding, footstools, bangles or necklaces for royalty. Red feathers from the Bannerman’s turaco are used to distinguish warriors and hunters.

An ornate bird in a tree with a bright red head tuft, red wing tips and blue tail. — Bannermann’s turaco.
Henrik Grönvold

Here, indigenous cultural practices can both sustain and decimate biodiversity. The names of some of these animals, especially wild cats, are used as praise names for kings. But custom dictates that when these animals are found, they must be killed and taken to the palace as a tribute.

Most are either locally extinct or critically endangered. Except for cowries and porcupines, all these animals are included on the red list of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature.

Biodiversity loss caused by humans is accelerating at alarming rates around the world. This includes biodiversity hotspots like the Congo Basin in central Africa, which Cameroon is part of. Thousands of species have been identified in the basin, 30% of which are endemic (native).

I am a scholar who works across disciplines. These include the arts, literature and cultural studies; environmental humanities; sustainability science; anticipatory governance and future generations; strategic foresight and futures studies.

In a recent study, I explored how literary creativity combined with foresight workshops might help change how people view these animals. Could they offer more hopeful futures for these unique species?

The role of literature

Literary texts like plays, poems and novels offer insights into dealing with climate and ecological challenges in the Congo Basin. (Even in the case of less popular but highly important species such as insects.)

This is the case in many works by anglophone Cameroonian authors, like Athanasius Nsahlai, Kenjo Jumbam, J.K. Bannavti, and John Nkengasong.

Their stories have the potential to warn against the destruction of royal and sacred animals. They can also help shape new visions for the future of biodiversity conservation.

I draw on postcolonial ecocriticism (the relationship between literature, culture, the environment and history) and narrative foresight (what stories can reveal about the future) in my study. I analyse how these books engage with royal and sacred animals in ways that challenge environmentally unfriendly cultural practices, and how they propose new forms of relations between humans and other animals.

Jumbam’s novella, Lukong and the Leopard, for instance, tells the story of a young man called Lukong. The son of an outcast from the Nso kingdom, he helps capture a lion. Surprisingly the king demands it be brought to his palace alive. Just as Lukong is to be decorated by the king, his father sneaks in. Fearing for his son’s life, he sets the lion free.

In a sense, the story challenges the old cultural practice of killing royal animals. It invites readers to change how they see and relate with these animals in order to protect them.

Workshops

Stories like this can then be taken into foresight workshop sessions. Narrative foresight meets group participation to create what is called participatory foresight. Participants and stakeholders from diverse backgrounds are brought together to explore future scenarios, the challenges that shape them and what can drive change.

As part of my research, I organised a day of participatory foresight workshops on #CongoBasinFutures and #RoyalAnimalsFutures in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Over 30 participants across a range of ages, genders and interests were brought together. They included teachers, researchers, environmentalists, farmers, nurses, writers, filmmakers, musicians, journalists, students, civil society workers, policymakers, and indigenous kings (fons).

Using foresight tools, participants were asked to discuss motivations as well as historical barriers while envisioning more hopeful futures for royal and sacred animals. The workshops were designed to include literary narratives on the plight of these animals.

They drew on current trends and signals of change, like climate change, biodiversity loss and indigenous cultural practices. They imagined new futures and then collectively proposed several policy interventions that could be practical solutions.

Shaping better policies

Cameroon does have environmental laws aimed at protecting biodiversity, but they are not effectively implemented. My study – and our workshop – seeks to complement these laws and contribute to their effective use in practice. Ideas coming out of the workshop include:

Creative arts and education should be used to help raise awareness about protecting royal animals and biodiversity. This could include programmes like our workshop, creative competitions and updating educational curricula.
Instead of decorating those who kill, local hunters should be rewarded when they spot and report the presence of royal animals for monitoring and preservation. The use of artificial animal parts for traditional ceremonies should be encouraged.
Policy should encourage research into the controlled breeding of endangered royal and sacred animals and the promotion of ecotourism around these animals. Special parks and reserves could combine arts and royal animals to attract tourists. Revenue could improve livelihoods, sustain cultures, and promote environmental conservation.
Environmental regulation should be strengthened through collaboration with all stakeholders, including indigenous authorities and local communities. Hunting of certain animals could be regulated. Hunting seasons and quotas for certain species could be in place. Indigenous leaders and communities could be engaged to adapt and modernise cultural practices in an era of environmental collapse.

But we must move from recommendations into action. Otherwise, ideas from studies like this will remain good on paper only, like most environmental laws in Cameroon. If so, royal animals and other species will continue to be threatened by extinction.

Kenneth Nsah Mala receives funding from the University of Cologne (Germany), the British Council, and the School of International Futures (SOIF).

– ref. Cameroon’s sacred and royal animals: could literature and futures thinking help save them? – https://theconversation.com/cameroons-sacred-and-royal-animals-could-literature-and-futures-thinking-help-save-them-281160

May 8, 2026

Birds of prey in South Africa are in trouble – a study analyses data from 16 years of road counts

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Santiago Zuluaga Castañeda, JdlC Researcher, Departamento de Ecología Evolutiva, Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales (MNCN-CSIC)

Birds of prey and vultures (raptors) play a vital role in ecosystems, both as top predators and key scavengers. However, compared to many other bird species, raptor populations are declining faster. This is because they need large areas to live in, have low population densities, and reproduce slowly. For these reasons they are vulnerable to human impacts like farming with pesticides, electrocution, collision with wind turbines, or poaching.

In many cases, by the time scientists and conservationists fully understand how bad the declines are, it may be too late to act. Thus, having good population monitoring is vital to act as an early warning system of declines. Many countries in the global south host important populations of raptors but lack effective monitoring programmes.

Africa is an important continent for raptor diversity. Several studies across Africa have used road counts (counting birds from repeated transects across routes) to monitor how raptor populations have changed over time. A recent study went one step further, combining trends from these different surveys from across Africa to better understand these changes at a pan-African scale. Unfortunately, no data from South Africa were available to be incorporated into this analysis.

In our recent study we took advantage of data that was collected by one dedicated fieldworker, Ronelle Visagie, who drove nearly 400,000 km (the distance from Earth to the moon) across the central area of South Africa (see map) between 2009 and 2025, while she worked for the Birds of Prey Programme of the Endangered Wildlife Trust.

During these 16 years, Ronelle counted all the raptors and large birds that she saw on these work trips. Comparing how the rate of these observations (numbers of individuals per 100km driven) changed over time allowed us to explore species population trends. We had enough data to examine trends for 18 raptors and eight other large bird species over this period. Unfortunately, we did not find a good news story.

These road counts revealed that 50% of the species (13 out of 26) declined significantly, while only three species (12%) showed significant increases. The remaining ten species (38%) showed no significant trends (see Figure 2).

The declining trends raise serious concerns about the conservation status of several species in a region known to host important raptor populations. Thus, urgent conservation actions are needed, especially for species declining by more than 50%. Given that several of these species are not currently listed as threatened either globally or regionally, their conservation status may need to be reassessed.

Trends in raptor populations

According to our results, 42% of the assessed species declined by more than 50% in the last 16 years.

Notable declines included all of the three migratory species assessed (lesser kestrel, amur falcon and steppe buzzard). These trends match other studies from their breeding grounds in the northern hemisphere, which also suggested declines. Protecting migratory species is especially challenging because action may be needed in breeding areas, non-breeding areas, and along migration routes, where the threats they face may differ.

We also found declines of several resident raptors, including jackal buzzard, Verreaux’s eagle and secretarybird. Populations of these species declined by over 50% in our study region.

In contrast, populations of white-necked raven, greater kestrels, and white-backed vulture increased. The latter is a critically endangered species, but seems to be increasing within our study area.

Some of the trends we detected were similar to a recent study that explored raptor population trends from across Africa using similar approaches to our study. For example, our findings of large declines for secretarybird and lesser kestrel were very similar to those reported in Kenya and Botswana. Additionally, similar population changes for secretarybird were detected during winter (but not summer) using road counts in the Nama Karoo (a major part of our study area) during the period just before our study (a 61% decline between the late 1980s and early 2010s). This suggests that the decline detected earlier may have continued into the mid-2020s.

We compared the direction of trends (whether species numbers were going up or down) from our road counts and the Southern African Bird Atlas Project (SABAP2). But only about half of the trends agreed between the two methods (road counts and the bird atlas). Species with consistent trends between the methods included amur falcon and lesser kestrel – both showing declines – and greater kestrel and white-backed vulture – both showing increases. Species with inconsistent trends all showed decreases according to our road counts but increases according to the bird atlas project. These included Ludwig’s bustard, blue crane, secretarybird, black-winged kite, and southern pale chanting goshawk.

If we assume that our road counts trends are reliable, these findings suggest that although the bird atlas project data can provide valuable information on the changes in distribution of birds, atlas data may be less well suited to capture changes in abundance at large spatial scales and across multiple species.

Across Africa, declines in birds of prey are often linked to human population growth, agricultural expansion and climate change. In our study area, there have been no major recent changes in land use or population density, but more subtle or long-term human impacts may be driving these changes.

Conflicts between people and raptors, including illegal killings, could play a role. Climate change and infrastructure like power lines and wind farms are adding further pressure by fragmenting aerial habitat and affecting survival and reproduction.

Trends in human populations

Human populations in Africa are expected to grow significantly over the next three decades, which will increase pressure on biodiversity.

Given the projected human population growth in Africa (79%), and a corresponding rise in demand for resources and energy, threats to vulnerable bird species are likely to get worse.

It is therefore essential that we have reliable tools to monitor species trends and better understand the impacts of these pressures.

This is crucial for understanding the current biodiversity crisis and preventing severe wildlife loss.

Ronelle Visagie and Gareth Tate of the Endangered Wildlife Trust contributed to this research.

Santiago Zuluaga Castañeda received funding from The ABAX Foundation and a Juan de la Cierva postdoctoral contract from the Spanish government.

Arjun Amar receives funding from The ABAX Foundation.

Megan Murgatroyd does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Birds of prey in South Africa are in trouble – a study analyses data from 16 years of road counts – https://theconversation.com/birds-of-prey-in-south-africa-are-in-trouble-a-study-analyses-data-from-16-years-of-road-counts-281908

May 7, 2026

South Africans are far less tolerant of migrants than before – hotspots, drivers and solutions

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Steven Gordon, Chief Research Specialist., Human Sciences Research Council

Anti-immigrant marches in several major South African cities (such as Tshwane and Johannesburg) in early May 2026 once again led to questions being asked about xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa.

In the wake of the protests President Cyril Ramaphosa called on South Africans to embrace solidarity with their African neighbours. For their part, foreign governments lodged their protests while police sought to curtail violence.

The tension in the country was palpable.

Are the recent outbreaks of anti-immigrant activism a harbinger of a wider uptick in anti-migrant sentiment amongst South Africans? Recent public opinion data from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) suggests that this might be the case.

The HSRC’s South African Social Attitudes Survey is an important source of information on what ordinary South Africans think about international migration. The survey series consists of nationally representative, repeated cross-sectional surveys that have been conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003.

The latest data, from the 2025 survey, show that South Africans are more hostile towards immigrants than at any other time before since the survey began in 2003. An important dimension of the change has been an attitudinal shift and hardening of attitudes towards migrants among poorer and working-class adults. In addition, the recent growth of anti-immigrant sentiment has been geographically concentrated in four provinces: Mpumalanga, Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal.

The rise in anti-immigrant sentiment is particularly concerning given that the country is due to hold local government elections on 4 November 2026. Aspirant political parties, in an attempt to maintain or gain power, may seek to exploit anti-immigrant sentiment for their own ends. In this way elections can provide a potential accelerant for xenophobia.

Growing hostility may even provoke xenophobic violence in a country that has a long history of collective anti-immigrant hate crime. and is home to more than two million international migrants.

Declining Hospitality

South African Social Attitudes Survey has included the following in its questionnaire since 2003:

Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa… (i) All immigrants; (ii) Some immigrants; (iii) No immigrants; and (iv) Uncertain.

In 2003 about a third (34%) of the South African adult population said that they would welcome all immigrants. The remainder indicated that they would accept either none (32%) or some (35%).

The proportion of the public that would be prepared to welcome foreigners tended to fluctuate within a narrow band over the 2003-2017 period.

But around the time of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, the research data began to show an upswing in anti-immigrant sentiment.

About a quarter (26%) of those surveyed said that they would welcome all immigrants during the 2021 survey round. This was similar to figures in the mid-2010s.

But the share that held this hospitable attitude fell in subsequent survey rounds. In 2025 15% of adults said that they would welcome all foreigners.

Conversely, the proportion of the public adopting a hostile position (in other words ‘welcome no immigrants’) increased from 30% in 2021 to 42% in 2025.

Geography and class

The provinces with the highest growth in anti-immigrant sentiment – Mpumalanga, Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal – are ones through which most immigrants travel and often settle.

The situation has become particularly delicate in KwaZulu-Natal. The share of adults in the province who said that they would welcome no immigrants grew from 23% in 2021 to 45% in 2023 and then again to 60% in 2025.

The upsurge in hostility in KwaZulu-Natal could be linked to growing popular anger against the current economic and political status quo. A staggering 88% of provincial residents are unhappy with present economic conditions, and an equal proportion expect conditions to worsen over the next five years.

The notable attitudinal shift among poor people is also concerning.

South Africa is a highly unequal nation characterised by stark economic divisions. Most citizens can be found on the wrong side of these divides and could be classified as economically disadvantaged.

Historically, as research has shown, anti-immigrant sentiment in the country tended to cut across class divisions. But in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic, something changed.

Before the pandemic, South African Social Attitudes Survey data showed a linear relationship between economic disadvantage and anti-immigrant sentiment. In the years following the pandemic, however, a clear pattern emerged. As the lockdowns ended and the post-pandemic recovery began, most socioeconomic groups in South Africa became more and more hostile towards immigrants. But antipathy grew at a much more aggressive rate for the low and lower middle socioeconomic groups.

During the 2025 survey round, adults in these groups were much more hostile towards foreigners than those in the upper middle and high socio-economic groups.

The drivers

What could have caused the economically disadvantaged to become more antagonistic towards immigrants over the last five years or so?

It could be argued that the poor have become more likely to scapegoat foreigners for the failures and inequalities of the post-pandemic economic recovery. Poor people have been badly affected by a cost of living crisis and persistent deindustrialisation. They need someone to blame and foreigners have long provided a handy scapegoat.

The South African economy has struggled in the last few years, dealing with doggedly high unemployment. The country also has notoriously high crime rates. Such problems, as experts have argued again and again, cannot be directly laid at the feet of immigrants living in the country. But it would appear that they are getting blamed anyway.

What should be done?

The South African government has a National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.

Implemented in March 2019, one of its goals was to reduce public hostility towards migrants. Clearly, whether because of a lack of resources or government coordination, the plan has not succeeded.

The country needs to reinvigorate it and its associated processes. What’s needed is political, civic and community leaders to address legitimate socio-economic grievances without allowing immigrants to become scapegoats for deeper structural failures in society.

Efforts to strengthen social cohesion, improve economic inclusion, enhance public trust in governance and promote responsible political leadership are also crucial.

Well-provisioned and effective anti-xenophobia strategies are urgently required to address the worsening situation. The alternative is to allow hatred to flourish.

Steven Gordon has received funding from South Africa’s National Research Foundation. He is affiliated with the University of Johannesburg.

– ref. South Africans are far less tolerant of migrants than before – hotspots, drivers and solutions – https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-far-less-tolerant-of-migrants-than-before-hotspots-drivers-and-solutions-282389

May 6, 2026

The Conversation Africa: 11 years of impact

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jabulani Sikhakhane, Editor, The Conversation

Over the past 11 years, The Conversation Africa has published 12,961 articles by 8,257 authors, making the expertise of academics and researchers in Africa and other parts of the world accessible to the public, national and global policymakers, and other stakeholders. These articles are also republished by other media, making our work an important pillar of the media ecosystem.

It’s sometimes tough to gauge the true impact of the articles we publish. Replication by other news outlets – and readership on our site – help put numbers on their reach, but not how they might influence policy and opinion.

So it’s very gratifying when authors share stories that illustrate the ripple effect their articles have had. Here are some.

After the publication of her article on the pressures facing families that rely on social grants in South Africa, Nokukhanya Ndhlovu was invited by the country’s Public Protector to consult on hearings about child support and social assistance.

In Kenya, Joseph Ogutu’s analysis of a wildlife conservation policy fed directly into high-level discussions. The author was invited to make a presentation at an annual stakeholder meeting organised by the local governor’s office.

In west Africa, an article by Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Sayra van den Berg Bhagwandas on the central role women play in informal cross-border trade helped shift thinking among policymakers, helping gain broader recognition of women’s economic contributions. Following the article, the authors were invited to consult with policymakers at the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation.

Other stories demonstrate how impact can unfold through shifts in awareness and accountability. Coverage of issues ranging from social justice to agriculture have triggered consultations between researchers and policymakers, opening pathways for longer-term reform.

The impact of these articles, and thousands of others, is a reminder of why The Conversation Africa exists: to ensure that evidence informs debate, that African expertise shapes decisions, and that knowledge can help build better policy outcomes across the continent.

– ref. The Conversation Africa: 11 years of impact – https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-africa-11-years-of-impact-282317

May 5, 2026

Mozambique’s economy is failing: the tough policy choices that need to be made urgently

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sam Jones, Senior Research Fellow, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University

Mozambique is not in total crisis – but it is faltering. There has been no currency crash, no hyperinflation, no bank run. But over the past decade the main indicators of the country’s economic health have severely eroded.

An IMF assessment in early 2026 was remarkably blunt: public debt is unsustainably high, the external balance of payments is weak, and policy makers have limited options. Since then, tensions in the Middle East have further disrupted supply chains and dramatically raised global fuel prices. This is a major shock for small import-dependent economies, like Mozambique.

My analysis draws on over two decades of experience supporting economic research and policy analysis in the country. Currently, my work under the Inclusive Growth in Mozambique programme involves tracking the country’s economic performance through surveys of firms, students, and households.

The picture that emerges from this evidence is troubling. For ordinary Mozambicans, the deterioration in conditions over the past decade shows up in higher poverty, unreliable public services and a labour market that offers few decent opportunities – especially for the young.

My central argument is that muddling through is not a safe option. Without careful adjustments now and a deliberate shift toward growth and job creation outside extractives – the part of the economy that actually employs most Mozambicans – today’s pressures will keep building until a large economic correction becomes unavoidable and under far worse conditions.

A slow squeeze

The country’s present condition is one of vulnerable stagnation. Since the hidden debt crisis of 2016, real GDP growth outside the extractive sector has hovered around 2%, barely matching population growth. In per capita terms, the non-extractive economy has flatlined for a decade. Average real incomes outside mining and gas (or the public sector) have gone essentially nowhere.

Fiscal deficits of 4%-6% of GDP have been financed increasingly by domestic banks. But as both the IMF and World Bank have warned, that model is now reaching a breaking point. Banks can only absorb so much government debt before they run out of willingness – or capacity – to lend. When that happens, the government faces a choice between defaulting, printing money, or slashing spending abruptly. None is painless.

Evidence of these pressures is plain to see. Over a year ago, the global rating agency S&P classified local-currency debt as “selective default”. This is a formal determination that the government had failed to meet its obligations to domestic creditors on the original terms, even if it continued paying.

By late 2025, arrears had extended to short-term treasury bills – government IOUs that mature within months and are supposed to be the safest instruments in the domestic financial system. When a government struggles to repay even these, it signals serious fiscal distress.

On top of this, a decade of crisis management has displaced any serious thinking about growth. The government’s wage bill and debt service dominate spending, leaving chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, education, and agriculture. Schools and health facilities lack supplies, roads deteriorate, and social protection has weakened sharply.

Payments under the basic social subsidy programme have become highly irregular. Many elderly beneficiaries receive only a fraction of what they are owed. Poverty has increased, with around two thirds of the population now below the poverty line.

Demographic pressures are intensifying. Mozambique needs to absorb roughly 500,000 new labour market entrants annually by 2030, yet the formal sector generates a small fraction of new jobs. Informal work dominates and without a step-change in growth, it will only expand. Each year of stagnation adds another youth cohort to an already strained labour market. Delay does not preserve stability – it makes eventual adjustment larger and more costly.

The exchange rate question

The metical has been held stable against the US dollar since 2021, but in real terms it has appreciated by over 20%, eroding export competitiveness. Foreign exchange shortages are now pervasive. The parallel market premium reached around 14% by late 2025. Firms report severe and lengthening delays in accessing foreign exchange through formal channels.

The policy response has been administrative: raising exporter surrender requirements, tightening banks’ foreign exchange position limits, restricting overseas card usage. These measures treat symptoms, but the underlying misalignment only deepens.

The overvalued exchange rate functions as a tax on the non-resource economy. Recent fuel shortages and panic buying – driven in part by importers’ inability to secure foreign exchange and price uncertainty – provide a visible demonstration of the mounting costs.

The politics of adjustment

In practice, public sector employment has come to serve as a form of social protection for the urban middle class. Our research shows roughly half of all university graduates find employment in the public sector, and having a public sector job is one of the best predictors of not being poor.

The public sector wage bill underpins political legitimacy, which is why attempts to cut discretionary 13th-month salary payments were quickly reversed once key workers threatened to strike.

Exchange rate adjustment poses a parallel dilemma. A depreciation would raise the cost of imported food and fuel, hitting urban households directly, and any price increase would spark calls to hike minimum wages. With the memory of popular violence from the 2024 elections still fresh, there is a strong bias toward the status quo.

But as pressures mount, there is a growing risk of compounding distortions. So far the temptation has been to respond with new administrative controls, including import restrictions, tighter capital controls, and preferential credit allocation.

The ongoing handling of the fuel price shock illustrates the pattern. Rather than adjust pump prices promptly, the government has held prices fixed, leaving distributors to manage a mounting shortfall through supply rationing.

Each temporary fix may ease immediate pressures, but tends to deepen the underlying misalignment, push activity into informal channels, and narrow future options.

Feasible pathways

Path 1: Muddle through and wait for the gas. This is the current trajectory. Fiscal adjustment occurs passively, driven by financing constraints rather than strategy. The hope is that LNG revenues could materialise from the early 2030s. Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin holds an estimated 100 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas – among the largest discoveries globally in the past two decades. But only one offshore platform (Coral South) is currently producing. Even if the 2030 timeline holds, continued stagnation would further erode public services, weaken institutions, and deepen social frustration – and another general election must be managed. By the time resource revenues arrive, the state may lack the capacity and public trust to deploy them effectively.

Path 2: Gradual, growth-first adjustment. The most economically coherent path, though politically demanding. The central premise: restoring non-extractive growth must take priority, even at the cost of short-term macroeconomic discomfort. Key elements would include:

a phased depreciation of the metical to restore competitiveness, supported by clear communication and strengthened social protection
acceptance of temporarily higher inflation, with policy focused on preventing second-round effects rather than suppressing the initial price shift
a fiscal framework centred on spending quality and revenue efficiency
wage bill containment through hiring restraint, attrition, and systematic payroll audits to eliminate ghost workers and improper payments
re-engagement with external partners under a credible IMF programme framework; and
an evidence-based and financially viable medium-term growth strategy targeting agricultural productivity, labour-intensive exports and a predictable regulatory and macroeconomic environment.

Path 3: Forced correction. If external shocks bite deeper, a large adjustment may be imposed suddenly – involving disorderly exchange rate movement, abrupt fiscal contraction, and potential banking sector stress. The longer gradual adjustment is postponed, the higher this probability.

The narrow path

There is no easy option. Every adjustment has visible losers, while the benefits remain uncertain, delayed, and diffuse.

But one priority stands out: boosting growth beyond extractive sectors. Without it, fiscal consolidation is self-defeating, job creation will remain grossly inadequate, and social pressures will only intensify. Stabilisation pursued in isolation, or at the expense of growth, could be bad medicine.

This growth strategy must be grounded in data, evidence and honest debate. Mozambique has not lacked for projects or initiatives, but it has lacked consistent use of rigorous data to identify what drives productivity and job creation.

The window for a controlled, policy-driven adjustment is narrowing fast. The alternative is not stability. It is adjustment under far worse conditions, at higher cost.

Sam Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mozambique’s economy is failing: the tough policy choices that need to be made urgently – https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-economy-is-failing-the-tough-policy-choices-that-need-to-be-made-urgently-281679

May 5, 2026

What Ghana’s foreign-built landmarks tell us about its global relationships

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Irene Appeaning Addo, Associate Professor of African Architecture, University of Ghana

The call to prayer echoes across the neighbourhood as people congregate under the sweeping domes and tall minarets of Ghana’s National Mosque in Accra. For many, it is a place of faith, community and national pride. Yet, few pause to consider that this landmark – now firmly part of Accra’s skyline – was funded and built by Turkey.

This detail points to a bigger story. Some of Ghana’s most important public buildings are shaped by global relationships as much as local needs. And those relationships are not just economic; they are deeply political.

Therefore buildings are not just functional. They are powerful expressions of political power, used to describe and project ideas about hierarchy, state authority, solidarity and modernity.

As a result, architecture can be used to explore the identity and ideology of African states and international partners who choose to finance or donate new buildings to Africa featuring western architectural aesthetics.

I am a scholar of African architecture. I collaborated with scholars from different areas of expertise, including political scientists, on a project that studied the connection between architecture and power in Africa. From Ghana, two projects were used to illustrate international relations in architecture, highlighting the interplay of power and agency. One was the National Mosque and the other was the seat of Ghana’s government, Jubilee House, an edifice funded by the government of India.

Ghana and India’s ties can be traced to their co-founding of the Non-Aligned Movement. These were a group of states not formally aligned with major power blocs during the cold war. Ghana and Turkey’s relationship goes as far back as 1957. Turkey is one of the leading investors in Ghana’s economy.

Our work established that when a country finances and constructs a major building abroad, it leaves a visible and lasting imprint on another nation’s landscape. The building becomes part of everyday life while reflecting the influence of its external sponsor. These buildings normalise the presence of the sponsoring nation and are a constant reminder of its political interests.

History written in buildings

Foreigners have been shaping Ghana’s built environment for centuries, from colonial forts along the coast to post-independence modernist projects designed by international architects.

Ghana’s architecture tells a layered story of power and exchange. During the colonial era, Europeans constructed forts and castles that dominated coastal landscapes. These were not just military structures; they were symbols of control and gateways to global trade networks, including the transatlantic slave trade. Sections of these buildings were later repurposed as schools, embedding education within spaces marked by violence and coercion.

This dual legacy highlights how architecture can carry multiple, often conflicting meanings over time.

After independence, Ghana sought to project a new national identity through modern architecture.

Foreign architects were commissioned to design housing, universities and civic buildings that would signal progress and global relevance. This moment reflected both aspiration and dependence: a desire to appear modern on the world stage, combined with reliance on external expertise and resources.

‘Soft power’

Today, Ghana continues to engage with global partners through architecture and infrastructure development. The National Mosque is one example. Backed by Turkey with the active involvement of Ghanaian Muslims, it represents both religious solidarity and diplomatic outreach underpinned by local agency.

Its scale, design and prominence make it a visible marker of Turkey’s presence in Ghana. The National Mosque Complex is modelled after the Ottoman-era Sultan Ahmed Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey. The national mosque in Accra features domes, semi-domes and arcaded porticos. These are the characteristics of Ottoman architecture, a predominant classical style for mosques in Turkey and the Islamic world.

Another example of political “gift” is Jubilee House, the seat of government. While financed and constructed with support from India, it incorporates the form of the Akan stool, a deeply significant symbol of authority in Ghanaian culture. This blending of external funding with local agency and symbolism shows that these projects are not simply imposed. They are shaped through negotiation.

Across the continent, similar patterns can be seen. China has funded major government buildings, including the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa and the Zimbabwe parliamentary complex. These projects are often described as “gifts”, but they also reflect strategic relationships and long-term influence. Political scientist Innocent Batsani-Ncube has illustrated how China’s large-scale investment in the Zimbabwe parliament is used as a proxy for its sustained activities in and around African parliamentary institutions.

Ghana’s case

It is easy to view foreign-funded infrastructure as purely beneficial, especially given Ghana’s development needs. But architecture is never neutral. Buildings embody power relationships in terms of the scale, materiality, the architectural features and the location in urban areas.

They reflect who has the resources to design, finance and construct, and whose ideas are ultimately realised in physical form. A mosque, a parliament or a presidential palace is not just a functional space; it is a statement about identity, legitimacy and global belonging of both the sponsor and the recipient country. In this sense, architecture becomes part of diplomacy. It is a way of making relationships visible – and durable.

Describing these projects simply as soft power, however, does not capture the full picture. Soft power theory often assumes that influence flows smoothly from powerful countries to less powerful ones.

Ghana’s experience suggests something more complex. Buildings cannot simply be “exported” like films or fashion. They are rooted in specific places, histories and communities. This creates friction.

For example, Ghana’s engagement with foreign-built projects often involves negotiation over design, symbolism and use. Local government officials, religious leaders and communities play a role in shaping outcomes.

In the case of the National Mosque, Ghanaian Muslim communities were not passive recipients. Their advocacy and social influence were crucial to the project’s realisation. Similarly, the incorporation of the Akan stool in Jubilee House reflects an effort to assert cultural identity. These examples show that foreign influence is most often mediated by local contexts.

Ghanaian actors’ agency in these processes has limits, however. Many decisions about large-scale projects are made by political elites. As a result, the interests reflected in these buildings may not represent the broader population.

These examples point to broader questions. Do foreign-funded buildings contribute to long-term development, or are they primarily symbolic? How can Ghana ensure that such projects reflect local priorities and needs? And what does it mean to build a national identity in a world shaped by global partnerships?

The links among soft power, public and cultural diplomacy, and development across the continent will continue to be subjects of research.

International relations scholars Joanne Tomkinson and Julia Gallagher contributed to the research that this article is derived from.

Julia Gallagher received funding from European Research Council

Lloyd G. Adu Amoah and Mjiba Frehiwot do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What Ghana’s foreign-built landmarks tell us about its global relationships – https://theconversation.com/what-ghanas-foreign-built-landmarks-tell-us-about-its-global-relationships-279603

May 5, 2026

Mali attacks: Tuareg grievances hold the key to peace

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

The precarious security situation in Mali took a turn for the worse in late April 2026. Well coordinated attacks targeted several cities and claimed the lives of the defence minister, Sadio Camara, and several Malian soldiers.

The events are a culmination of increased attacks over the past few years on the military and state institutions in Mali.

We have been researching insecurity and politics in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. We believe the recent attacks trace back to grievances expressed by Tuaregs that the current military regime has not addressed. The Tuaregs are nomadic Berber communities in northern Mali.

First is the inability or unwillingness to address Tuareg discontent. Their grievances centre on political autonomy, marginalisation, cultural recognition, resource control, security and perceived state neglect.

Second, the continuous use of force by the military against rebels in the northern regions without regard for the collateral damage. The Tuaregs have long contested the militarisation policies of successive Malian governments.

Third, the uneven distribution of resources, which keeps the northern region marginalised. These include northern Mali’s resources such as gold deposits, salt mines, grazing lands, and strategic trade corridors. Revenues from these sources remain controlled by the state’s centre based in the south.

Addressing resource marginalisation could have a number of benefits. It could temper Tuareg grievances, restore trust in the Malian state, and shift conflict incentives away from rebellion towards political inclusion, stability, and sustainable peace in northern Mali.

The breakdown

In April 2026 the jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) joined forces with ethnic Tuareg rebels from the northern Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) to attack several cities in the country recently.

This mirrors a similar attack in 2012 when the Tuareg and al-Qaeda-affiliated militants launched an offensive against the state. The Tuareg-dominated National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) attempted to secede and initiated a rebellion.

The MNLA is a Tuareg‑dominated separatist movement. Founded in 2011, it is mainly composed of ex-Libyan war returnees and northern Malian Tuaregs. The organisation had about 10,000 fighters at its peak in 2012.

Despite their numbers, they lacked the military power to hold the territory. As a result they aligned with Islamists Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Shortly after pushing back Malian forces in late 2012, the alliance disintegrated.

The Islamist groups were better armed and funded. They forced the secular separatists out of major towns like Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The intervention of French forces in 2013 helped the Malian government regain most of the lost territories.

AQIM and its allies then moved into the mountains and surrounding desert areas. They shifted to guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings and landmines.

The withdrawal of French forces in 2022 seems to have emboldened the Islamist militants. It removed counter‑terrorism pressure, disrupted intelligence and logistics and created a security vacuum amid weak Malian state capacity. This allowed Islamist groups to expand operations, recruit locally and regain territorial influence.

Lessons unlearnt

The largely popular military regime of Assimi Goita has failed to address the demands of Tuareg separatists. The Tuaregs have historically complained about exclusion from power by the southern dominated Malian state. Since the country’s independence in 1960, Tuareg leaders have argued that the structure of the Malian state does not reflect their political identity, economic interests and governance traditions. The demand for self-rule or autonomy has been suppressed, often by force.

More recently, increased drought, desertification and climate variability has devastated Tuareg pastoral livelihoods. These grievances pre-date Islamic insurgency and are fundamental in understanding the approach of the group.

The second unaddressed issue is that counterterrorism operations use force which creates collateral damage. Recent analysis shows that counterterrorism operations in northern and central Mali have resulted in large scale civilian harm, displacement and collective punishments. These have included arbitrary arrests and mass killings.

These factors have created conditions which Islamist groups have exploited for recruitment, territorial control and legitimacy.

The blame for this has been put on successive Malian regimes and previous French operations. This has been a key reason for France’s interventions being labelled as failures.

The third major driver of violence in Mali relates to the uneven distribution of resources. Since independence, public investment, infrastructure, social services and political attention have been heavily concentrated in the southern parts of the country.

Previous peace agreements have promised decentralisation, funding and integration of northern elites and ex-combatants. But implementation have been slow or nonexistent.

Is there a way forward?

The Tuareg question must be answered to reduce the tension between the regions of the country. It can be argued that Tuareg actors have twice miscalculated by entering arrangements with jihadist groups. But this does not diminish the need to address the structural inequalities and long-standing grievances underpinning Tuareg demands.

To achieve this, the Malian regime can copy the blueprint of former president Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger. Prior to his presidency, the Nigerien Tuaregs were similarly aggrieved. When he became president in 2011, he:

integrated Tuareg elites and former rebels into state institutions
decentralised state authority by allowing administrative and budgetary control at the regional level
introduced disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Issoufou also invested in infrastructural development in the areas that directly affected the Tuaregs. This included pastoralism, education and livelihood support. Water access in arid pastoral areas was improved. And connectivity and road safety was expanded.

Addressing the Tuareg agitations would reduce tensions in Mali.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mali attacks: Tuareg grievances hold the key to peace – https://theconversation.com/mali-attacks-tuareg-grievances-hold-the-key-to-peace-281832

May 4, 2026

What’s stopping kids from learning useful skills? Short answer: exams

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Frank Quansah, Senior Lecturer, Educational Assessment, Measurement and Evaluation, University of Education, Winneba

Across Africa and beyond, education systems are shifting to curricula designed to build critical thinking and problem-solving skills.

Competency-based curricula put learners at the centre. They are meant to prepare students for a rapidly changing world, where success depends on the ability to adapt, think critically and solve complex problems.

Unlike traditional curricula, which often emphasise covering content and memorising facts, competency-based curricula focus on how students apply what they learn in real-world situations. For example, instead of simply recalling scientific definitions, students might be asked to use a concept to explain how diseases spread.

Much of the discussion around this shift in education has focused on familiar challenges, including teacher preparedness, availability of learning materials, and how faithfully the curriculum is implemented.

While these factors are important, they do not fully explain why reforms often fall short of their intended goals, particularly in improving how students learn and develop competencies.

In a recent study I co-authored, published in Discover Education, we reviewed evidence from different countries, including Ghana, Kenya and Vietnam, about what is undermining learner-centred education. We found that the main constraint to reforms in teaching is assessment systems. Teaching and testing systems are mismatched. While curricula promote skills like critical thinking and problem-solving, national exams want learners to memorise facts and follow routine procedures. So that’s what teachers concentrate on.

The misalignment is holding students back from success: being able to apply what they learn in real-world situations. This ability is essential for further education, employment and everyday decision-making.

Exams shape what counts

In our study, we set out to understand why learner-centred reforms, which are central to competency-based education, often fail to produce meaningful changes in classroom practice. We reviewed research and policy evidence from multiple countries across Africa, Asia and beyond, focusing on how national assessment systems interact with curriculum reforms.

We found a pattern: high-stakes exams do more than assess learning; they shape what teachers teach and what students focus on.

Our analysis shows that this creates a “double bind” for teachers. They are expected to promote critical thinking and problem-solving, while also preparing students for exams that reward recall and procedural accuracy. In practice, this often leads to surface-level reforms. New methods are introduced but teaching remains focused on memorisation.

In many African countries, examinations such as the West African Senior School Certificate Examination and Kenya’s National Secondary School Exams exert strong pressure on teachers.

As a result, learning narrows to what can be tested. This limits the impact of reform.

In effect, exams become the real curriculum, regardless of what official documents say.

Rethinking what assessment does

The stakes are high.

If competency-based education is to succeed, assessment systems need to be rethought, not just adjusted at the margins.

This does not mean abandoning national exams. Rather, it means redefining what they are designed to measure.

Assessment should focus less on what students can recall and more on what they can do with what they know. This could include tasks that require analysis, problem-solving and application in real-world contexts.

It also means moving beyond a single high-stakes test. Combining national examinations with school-based assessments (such as projects or portfolios) can provide a more complete picture of learning.

The challenge is to do this in ways that remain fair, reliable and scalable across entire education systems.

A practical way forward

In our study, we propose a practical way to address this misalignment. We call it the LEARN model (Learner-centred assessment design; Evidence of competence; Adaptive to context; Reflective and feedback oriented; Nationally relevant and scalable). It offers a system-level framework for policymakers and education systems to redesign assessment so that it supports curriculum reforms.

The model is built around five ideas:

designing assessments that reflect how students learn, using tasks that require applying knowledge rather than simple recall
focusing on evidence of competence rather than recall, emphasising what students can do with what they know
allowing flexibility to adapt to different classroom and national contexts
integrating feedback into assessment so that it supports learning, instead of just measuring it
ensuring that systems remain nationally relevant while still being practical to implement at scale.

The model shifts the focus from standardising test formats to aligning what is assessed with what matters.

Our model shows it is possible to balance two goals that are often seen as competing: maintaining national standards while supporting meaningful learning.

Frank Quansah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What’s stopping kids from learning useful skills? Short answer: exams – https://theconversation.com/whats-stopping-kids-from-learning-useful-skills-short-answer-exams-281652

May 4, 2026

Nigeria’s budget is treated like a government secret: how an online public monitoring system could fight corruption

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tolu Olarewaju, Economist and Postgraduate Supervisor, University of Lancashire; Keele University

Nigerians have no reliable way of scrutinising the national budget. The citizen’s portal of the Nigerian Budget Office of the Federation is often offline, and when it is online, it is highly technical and difficult for ordinary citizens to understand.

Data on the Nigerian budget sourced elsewhere online is also frequently hard to find and incomplete. As a result, the Nigerian budget is treated like a government secret and Nigerian citizens are unable to effectively scrutinise the government’s income and expenditure decisions.

My research shows that this disrupts the social contract between the citizens and the government of Nigeria and creates an opportunity for corruption.

The World Justice Project estimates that corruption has cost the Nigerian economy more than US$550 billion since 1960. And a report by the accounting firm PwC shows that corruption in Nigeria could cost up to 37% of the nation’s GDP by 2030 if it’s not dealt with immediately.

I am an economist whose research focuses on poverty and corruption reduction. In a recent paper, I show how secrecy fuels corruption in the management of Nigeria’s finances. I set out how citizen monitoring and digital engagement can enhance transparency and accountability.

I also identify some obstacles to making this a reality in Nigeria. These include technical capacity limitations, weak enforcement mechanisms, and political resistance.

To overcome these challenges, the government must invest in digital infrastructure. Fostering civic engagement and independent oversight, too, can ensure sustained accountability and effective implementation.

Budgetary secrecy and corruption in Nigeria

The Open Budget Survey is produced by the International Budget Partnership. It provides the main global assessment of budget accountability in the world and evaluates:

public participation: formal and meaningful opportunities for the public to engage in the national budget process
oversight: institutions such as the legislature, national audit office and independent bodies
transparency: comprehensive budget information, made available to the public in a timely and accessible manner.

Nigeria performed poorly in the 2023 survey. It scored 19/100 in public participation, 61/100 in oversight, and 31/100 in transparency. It ranked 92 out of 125 countries. This was below several African peers and the global average of 45.

This marks a decline from 2021. Nigeria scored higher then in public participation (26) and transparency (45), while oversight has remained unchanged.

The drop is largely due to the government’s failure to publish key fiscal reports on time. These include in-year reports and mid-year reviews.

The source of the problem

My research found that government budgetary secrecy and corruption in Nigeria have historical roots. They stem from the era of colonial taxation, when colonialists collected taxes but didn’t invest in the people’s wellbeing.

But these bad practices have intensified since independence. About 47% of Nigeria’s 232.68 million people live in multidimensional poverty. This is a clear sign that Nigeria is not spending its resources wisely. Development, job creation and service delivery are all lacking.

My research found that even when funds are budgeted, secrecy facilitates fraud in a number of ways.

The first way is through vaguely specified budgeted projects. Many projects are listed without quantity or location. They use terms like “empowerment and sensitisation” or “provision of infrastructure”.

Secondly, through the budgeting of non-beneficial initiatives. Nigeria’s approved federal budget for 2025 included US$1.5 billion for health, US$2.5 billion for education and US$1.7 billion for agriculture. However, a whopping US$17 billion was allocated for the presidency.

Thirdly, through inflated figures for budgeted items. For example, the purchase of a car for ₦375 million (US$278,000).

Fourth, through the under-delivery and abandonment of projects.

Nigeria’s budgetary corruption is reinforced by a complex three-tier system of budgeting at the federal, state, and local government levels.

At the federal level, the budget is prepared by the executive (president and ministries). It is coordinated by the Budget Office, approved by the National Assembly, and enacted as the “Appropriation Act”. However, limited and delayed fiscal disclosures enable budget padding, vague allocations, and weak expenditure tracking.
At the state level, budgets are prepared by governors and state ministries. They are approved by the State Houses of Assembly, focusing on state needs. However, inconsistent publication of budgets and reports at this level makes it difficult to monitor spending and creates room for misallocation.
At the local level, budgets are prepared by local government officials. However, they are heavily influenced by state governments and approved by local councils. Here, a lack of financial autonomy and state control over funds leads to diversion, ghost projects, and minimal accountability to citizens.

The solution

The Nigerian government says it also has an Open Treasury Portal that provides transparency in its budgeting system. My research shows that this platform also suffers from technical glitches, incomplete data, and low enforcement.

BudgIT, a Nigerian civic technology organisation, uses data visualisation and storytelling to try to make the government budget more accessible to citizens, but its impact is also limited by insufficient data availability.

Advances in information technology make it possible for Nigeria to build a real-time online government budget system that the public can access and monitor. This would cover financial statements and reports across federal, state and local governments. Nigerians could also use a system like this to vote on projects the government should focus on.

South Korea has a similar model. Known as the Digital Budget and Accounting System (dBrain), it is a fully integrated system for budget planning, execution and monitoring of government finances across agencies in real time.

Another country, Georgia, has an e-budget transparency system. It provides real-time budget execution data and is integrated with the goverment’s e-procurement and treasury systems.

The US also has the USAspending.gov service, which tracks federal spending in real time and provides publicly accessible and searchable data on what the federal government spends.

Importantly, real-time online budget monitoring enables quick detection of corruption, but its effectiveness depends on clear and consistently enforced penalties.

What needs to be done

An online government budget system which the public could monitor would improve transparency and accountability in Nigeria. Technologies such as Enterprise Resource Planning systems and Integrated Financial Management Information systems enable real-time budget tracking and integrated financial management. Blockchain can further strengthen transparency through secure records. Also, cloud computing can improve accessibility and data security.

Data analytics and AI can enhance forecasting, automate monitoring, and improve decision-making. This would make budgeting more efficient, transparent and responsive.

The Nigeria Tax Administration Act has introduced a digital tax system requiring Nigerian taxpayers to keep accurate transaction records.

The Nigerian government aims to use this to improve efficiency, accuracy and transparency in its tax system. The government should implement a similar system for all its own financial transactions.

Tolu Olarewaju does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s budget is treated like a government secret: how an online public monitoring system could fight corruption – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-budget-is-treated-like-a-government-secret-how-an-online-public-monitoring-system-could-fight-corruption-280503

May 3, 2026

India’s Horn of Africa strategy has shifted: what it’s trying to do and how it could work

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

India’s engagement in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea basin was, until recently, largely limited to UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy patrols.

Since the second half of the 1990s, India has participated in nearly all peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Anti-piracy efforts emerged between 2008 and 2014 as piracy off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden spread across a vast maritime space. This spanned east Africa and the wider Indian Ocean, bringing threats close to India’s shores.

Indian trade routes were exposed to new security risks, so a more sustained maritime posture was needed.

From the mid-2010s, therefore, India expanded its engagement in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin to secure shipping lanes linking it to global markets. At the same time, it sought to counter China’s growing naval presence along the western Indian Ocean coast, protect its diaspora and investments, and position itself as a regional security provider.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014, this shift accelerated. India placed greater emphasis on proactive diplomacy, expanding high-level engagement, and trade and infrastructure links. It also pursued strategic coordination through bilateral agreements and naval exercises across west Asia and the adjoining African coastline.

India, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin

This evolution reflects India’s transition from a post-colonial, non-aligned actor to a more assertive power with ambitions outside the region. It is now Africa’s third-largest trading partner. Economic interdependence is growing alongside geostrategic interests.

Drawing on our work on international security in the western Indian Ocean and sub-Saharan Africa, we argue that over the past decade New Delhi has redefined the Indian Ocean as a protective buffer and a primary theatre of influence linking the Indo-Pacific to the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa lies at the heart of this connective space.

In 2023, India declared itself the Indian Ocean’s “net security provider”. It introduced a framework to strengthen regional security, deepen economic cooperation and address shared maritime challenges.

Today, with shipping routes being recalculated and governments reconsidering their strategic partnerships, India’s position is being put to an operational test.

The Horn is a space where legitimacy, delivery and endurance determine who remains relevant after the headlines fade. For the first time, India’s quiet advance is visible. Next, it will have to solidify its presence.

Why the Horn of Africa is important for India

An initiative called the 2025 Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement, co-hosted with Tanzania, positions India as a security partner for African nations, particularly those along the Indian Ocean rim.

India is also involved in development and investment projects in the region. These include agricultural efforts to improve food security, infrastructure projects, and technical assistance in education and health. It also provides humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti.

What distinguishes the past decade is the effort to align these activities within a broader strategic narrative – one that presents India as a partner offering technology and development without debt concerns or political conditions.

This narrative is attractive to local governments in the Horn. But it also creates a test: India must show that it can deliver consistently.

Ethiopia has an important role for India. It hosts the African Union, functions as a diplomatic centre and offers an entry point into African multilateral politics.

Somalia also matters. It sits close to critical sea lanes and is central to the security of the Gulf of Aden. External actors there can convert security assistance into political access.

India’s interest in Somalia and Somaliland has taken on a geo-economic dimension. Indian firms are focusing on gold and mineral resources, particularly in eastern Somaliland.

Although still limited in scale, this shift signals that India’s footprint in the Horn is no longer confined to security and development assistance. It is intersecting with resource access and supply chain strategies.

The competition

The corridor of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean has become a crowded arena for external powers over the past two decades.

Great powers have seen countries in the region as a platform for counterterrorism and naval reach. Small and middle powers (like Turkey, Iran and Gulf states) have sought to secure influence through ports, training missions, arms transfers, commercial access and selective mediation.

The result is a dense environment. Almost every external actor offers a package of security, finance, technology and diplomacy. Fragile local governments hedge among them.

India’s challenge is to deliver consistently through:

creating defence and security training pipelines
project delivery
stable financing instruments
sustained bureaucratic attention.

If India’s Africa policy is maritime-led, then things like naval exercises, information-sharing, coast guard cooperation and institutional training must become regular and visible.

If the strategy is also developmental and technological, then India must deliver flagship projects in digital infrastructure, health and agriculture.

From quiet influence to lasting power

India faces three constraints in growing its influence in the Horn of Africa.

1. Limited military capacity

India’s naval capabilities do not match the scale of China’s fleet or America’s technological edge and operational depth. This gap is not fatal if India’s aim is durable influence through partnership. It does mean that India’s leverage will depend on institutional cooperation and coalition-building.

2. Competitive density

The Horn’s architecture is made of foreign bases, port diplomacy and overlapping rivalries. India’s advantage is that it’s not overwhelmingly intrusive. But it could become just one more actor among many.

3. Institutionalisation

If India’s engagement depends too heavily on leader-level attention, it will remain vulnerable to distraction. Durable influence requires bureaucratic routines and financing mechanisms. It must survive political cycles and shifting crises. Ethiopia is a test case. High-level roadmaps will have to turn into visible digital infrastructure, health systems and agricultural support.

The broader point is that the Horn is not an empty theatre waiting for India to arrive.

Federico Donelli is affiliated with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), and the Orion Policy Institute (OPI).

Riccardo Gasco is affiliated with IstanPol Institute.

Chiara Boldrini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. India’s Horn of Africa strategy has shifted: what it’s trying to do and how it could work – https://theconversation.com/indias-horn-of-africa-strategy-has-shifted-what-its-trying-to-do-and-how-it-could-work-281252