The Conversation – Africa – Page 5

April 23, 2026

Mozambique ‘sky island’ expeditions found 4 new species of chameleon – already at risk from forest loss

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Krystal Tolley, Principal Scientist, University of Johannesburg

Male sylvan chameleon (Nadzikambia goodallae) from Mount Ribáuè, Mozambique. Krystal Tolley, CC BY

Tropical rainforests are known for their unique biodiversity, with species found nowhere else on Earth. But nearly 30% of tropical rainforest has been destroyed or has become seriously degraded since 1990. Many of these forests have not been fully explored for their biodiversity. This means that the world may be losing species before they are even discovered by modern science.

In Africa, forest loss is rapid; about 25% of the continent’s tropical forest has been lost since 1990, against a backdrop of incomplete knowledge of where the biodiversity is located.

Greatly lagging in this respect are the “sky islands” of northern Mozambique: isolated granite mountains that rise sharply out of the savanna plains. They were left standing when softer rock around them gradually eroded, and can be as high as 3,000 metres elevation. Because they rise so steeply, the sky islands attract clouds and rainfall, feeding moisture to the tropical rainforests on their slopes within an otherwise arid terrain. Isolation has allowed unique species to evolve on each mountain, such as geckos, rodents, fishes, crabs, frogs, butterflies and bats.

Small patch of remaining pristine rainforest at Mount Inago.
Krystal Tolley, CC BY

From 2014 to 2018, a research team led by fellow herpetologist Werner Conradie and myself explored these sky island forests to catalogue the species of reptiles found there. We found that each sky island forest is home to a previously unknown species of chameleon within the genus Nadzikambia (forest-dwelling “sylvan chameleons”).

Unfortunately, these chameleons are already at risk of extinction due to the heavy slash-and-burn clearing of the forests, the only place they can call home.

We’ve described these new species, choosing four names to highlight pioneering women scientists whose work inspired us to strive towards new discoveries, but also to call attention to the losses of their forest habitat.

Hunting for chameleons

Over the course of several years, we explored four of Mozambique’s sky islands – Mount Namuli, Mount Inago, Mount Chiperone and Mount Ribáuè – with the aim of cataloguing all reptiles but also in the hopes of finding new species of chameleons. This was because a species of sylvan chameleon had been discovered on one of these mountains during the 1960s, but they were not known from any other mountains.

However, chameleons can be very difficult to find, given their ability to remain camouflaged against the background coupled with their slow movements. They are more easily spotted at night while they are sleeping, as they stand out against the vegetation when illuminated by a strong beam of light. Sylvan chameleons are even more difficult to spot than others, as they usually perch high in the thick forest canopy – tens of metres up.

The search meant dealing with some tough conditions: a long, arduous trek up the hot, arid slopes to reach the forest high up the mountain. Establishing a remote base camp was essential. All food, clothes and gear had to be packed into the camp, and we didn’t know how long it would take to find any animals.

At each of these mountains, we surveyed every night for chameleons – no trails to follow, no GPS signal to guide us, no cellphone signal to call for help.

Sometimes we were lucky and found chameleons on the first or second night. At other mountains we were not so lucky, with fruitless searches making it necessary to return another year.

Eventually these mountains revealed their secrets and we discovered four new species of sylvan chameleon, one on each of the four mountains.

Slash-and-burn clearing of rainforest at Mount Inago.
Krystal Tolley, CC BY

We don’t know how big their populations are, but we assume they are in decline. Most of their habitat has been destroyed by forest clearing to make way for agriculture, with increasingly rapid losses in the last decade. We estimate that in some cases, 80%-90% of their habitat has been destroyed.

When parts of an ecosystem are lost, the whole becomes unstable and is eventually lost.

Choosing names for the new species

To highlight their predicament, we have described and named these chameleons and have forecast that three of these species are at high risk of extinction.

In particular, we highlight Nadzikambia goodallae from Mount Ribáuè. This species has been named in honour of the distinguished scientist Jane Goodall, whose own study species, the chimpanzee, is under similar pressures from loss of its rainforest habitat.

Female sylvan chameleon (Nadzikambia goodallae) from Mount Ribáuè.
Krystal Tolley, CC BY

We also honour the renowned discoverer of the structure of DNA, Rosalind Franklin, by naming the species from Mount Namuli as Nadzikambia franklinae. The use of DNA data from these chameleons was essential to confirm them as new species.

Nadzikambia franklinae from Mount Namuli.
Werner Conradie, CC BY

We have dubbed the species from Mount Inago as Nadzikambia evanescens, meaning “vanishing” in Latin, acknowledging the state of the forest destruction.

Male sylvan chameleon (Nadzikambia evanescens) from Mount Inago.
Krystal Tolley, CC BY

The final species, Nadzikambia nubila, is named for the cloudy aspect of Mount Chiperone. This species has a lower risk of extinction given that the local community view the forest as sacred, and say it should be protected.

Female sylvan chameleon (Nadzikambia nubila) from Mount Chiperone.
Krystal Tolley, CC BY

This latter case is significant, as it demonstrates that wholesale destruction of these forests is not an essential trade-off for local people to thrive. If encouraged and supported, community support and buy-in can be a solution to protect biodiversity in these sensitive ecosystems.

Krystal Tolley receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa, the National Geographic Society and the Critical Ecosystems Partnership Fund.

– ref. Mozambique ‘sky island’ expeditions found 4 new species of chameleon – already at risk from forest loss – https://theconversation.com/mozambique-sky-island-expeditions-found-4-new-species-of-chameleon-already-at-risk-from-forest-loss-279908

April 23, 2026

Women in science – global study finds presence without power

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Marie-Francoise Roy, emerita professor in mathematics

Photo by Gustavo Fring via Pexels, CC BY

Academia isn’t strong on gender equality. Women are under-represented throughout, in the research workforce and even more so as leaders in scientific organisations. This is true for science academies (prestigious bodies within national science systems) and scientific unions (international organisations representing disciplinary communities).

Women today make up nearly a third of the global research workforce. According to Unesco, they accounted for 31.1% of researchers worldwide in 2022 – up from 29.4% in 2012. Women are particularly underrepresented in engineering and technology (one quarter or less), while gender balance is largely achieved in the social sciences and humanities.

But workforce representation does not automatically translate into senior or leadership positions. A recent global study shows that women remain underrepresented in organisations that influence scientific agendas and norms, recognise scientific excellence and advise governments.

This 2026 report is based on data from more than 130 scientific academies and international scientific unions, alongside a survey of nearly 600 scientists. It was produced by the International Science Council, the InterAcademy Partnership and the Standing Committee for Gender Equality in Science, and follows studies in 2015 and 2020. I was one of the authors of the 2026 report, with Léa Nacache and Catherine Jami.

National science academies illustrate the scale of the gender gap. In 2025, women represented on average 19% of members of these bodies. That is an improvement from the results of the two previous studies – 12% in 2015 and 16% in 2020. But it still falls well below their presence in the wider research community. And the global average masks sharp disparities: in some academies, women account for fewer than 5% of members; in others, they approach 40%.

The task of international scientific unions is to help develop and structure their discipline, organise global congresses and award prizes. These unions show a somewhat different pattern from academies. On average, women now hold 40% of leadership positions in the international unions that were surveyed. But here, too, progress is uneven. Long-standing disciplinary inequalities remain, particularly for the most prestigious scientific awards.

Our report looks at the reasons for these patterns, how institutions operate in practice, and how change could be achieved.

The findings matter because scientific academies and unions play a significant role in the governance of science. Persistent gender imbalances in these bodies, therefore, raise questions not only of fairness, but of legitimacy and effectiveness. The legitimacy of science depends in part on whether its institutions reflect the diversity of the scientific community. And legitimacy is important in a context of global challenges – from climate change to pandemics – where public trust in science is fragile.

Beyond pipeline effects

Gender disparities in scientific leadership are often explained as a lagging effect: if fewer women entered certain fields decades ago, fewer will now be in senior positions or eligible for nominations in academies or for scientific prizes. Pipeline dynamics do play a role, as do traditional disciplinary gaps. But they do not explain the full picture.

Most scientific organisations report formally open and merit-based nomination, election and awarding procedures. Yet, the data show that women are consistently underrepresented in nomination pools relative to their presence among eligible scientists.

Our analysis points to the importance of institutional processes. Who is eligible to nominate? How are suitable candidates identified? How transparent are the nomination criteria? How much weight is given to informal reputation and networks?

In 90% of the academies surveyed, nomination relies on existing members. In contexts where membership is already predominantly male, such procedures seem to perpetuate existing imbalances. Even in the absence of explicit discrimination, informal sponsorship networks and patterns of professional visibility influence who is put forward. Evaluation of who would make a good nominee is therefore shaped by social and institutional dynamics, and not solely by individual achievement and merit.

Our survey of the gender equality initiatives in place showed that encouragement and awareness-raising practices alone have had limited impact. They need to be accompanied by structural reforms. In most organisations, gender equality measures lack dedicated structures, formal mandates, budgets or monitoring mechanisms.

Participation without equal progression

The quantitative findings were complemented by survey responses from individual scientists active in scientific organisations. These provided insight into how the structural patterns operate in practice.

Women who join scientific organisations report participating at levels comparable to men. They serve on committees, attend meetings and contribute to activities. But we found that this engagement does not translate into equivalent progression or recognition.

Women are three times more likely than men to report barriers to advancement within their scientific organisation. Women are 4.5 times more likely than men to report missing important events due to care responsibilities. And when they are able to attend, they are six times more likely to report not feeling they can participate to the levels of men.

Women are 2.5 times more likely than men to report experiences of harassment or microaggressions in their activities within scientific organisations. They also express lower levels of trust in the transparency of selection processes and in mechanisms to report and address misconduct.

Qualitative interviews documented strategies that women develop to navigate these environments. They include building women-only networks, investing in international engagement to escape restrictive local cultures, or collectively advocating for change. These strategies appear to be effective and organisations should encourage them.

From diagnosis to change

The report does not argue for a single model or fixed targets applicable everywhere. Scientific organisations vary widely. However, the evidence and case studies featured in the report point to a set of key institutional levers that can make a difference.

To take an example, in academies where formal rules and structures have been revised, improvements in women’s representation have been more sustained. Such good practices need to be systematically identified and generalised.

The central conclusion is straightforward: the underrepresentation of women in scientific governance is not a question of insufficient talent. It reflects institutional practices based on cultures that developed within male-dominated scientific communities.

If science aims to serve society as a whole, the bodies that define and represent it must be willing to examine how they operate – and who they include.

Many colleagues made contributions that helped shape and improve the report on which this article, prepared with Peter McGrath (InterAcademy Partnership) and Léa Nacache (International Science Council), is based.

Marie-Francoise Roy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Women in science – global study finds presence without power – https://theconversation.com/women-in-science-global-study-finds-presence-without-power-279248

April 22, 2026

6 African thinkers who help us understand the world – new book

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christophe Premat, Professor, Canadian and Cultural Studies, Stockholm University

Who counts as an intellectual? In many traditions, the figure of the intellectual is tied to the search for truth, social critique and public engagement. From the Dreyfus Affair (a political scandal in 1894 in France that mobilised writers and thinkers to defend justice) to postcolonial debates, intellectuals are those who intervene in society, not just to interpret the world, but to challenge it.

In the African context, this role takes on particular urgency. Intellectuals on the continent and in the diaspora have long navigated a complex terrain shaped by colonial legacies, political constraints and global inequalities. They are not simply producers of knowledge. They are mediators between worlds, engaged in a struggle over meaning, identity and historical narrative.

As a scholar of cultural studies and postcolonial thought, I’ve sought, in a new French book, to analyse their paths not as isolated figures, but as part of a broader constellation of what we’ve called “African intellectual sensibilities”.

These are ways of thinking that are at once critical, situated and globally engaged. This approach highlights how African thinkers contribute not only to debates about Africa, but also to the redefinition of knowledge production itself.

So, identifying African thinkers is not just an exercise in recognition. It’s part of a broader effort to rebalance an intellectual history that has too often marginalised or misrepresented African contributions. As Congolese philosopher Valentin-Yves Mudimbe famously argued, Africa has often been constructed as an object of knowledge rather than a subject producing it.

From this perspective, here are six intellectuals whose work helps us rethink Africa and the world.

The famous

1. Valentin-Yves Mudimbe (1941-2025)

Mudimbe is one of the most influential African philosophers of the late 20th century. His seminal work The Invention of Africa dismantles what he calls the “colonial library”, the body of western knowledge that has historically defined Africa from the outside.

Rather than simply rejecting western thought, Mudimbe proposes a critical archaeology of knowledge. His work invites us to rethink how Africa can be known and, crucially, how it can speak for itself. He shifts the question from what Africa is to who has the power to define it.

His contribution goes further. By drawing on thinkers like Michel Foucault from France, he shows that knowledge is never neutral. It’s embedded in structures of power. This allows Mudimbe to expose how academic disciplines, from anthropology to history, have participated in constructing a distorted image of Africa.

His work opened the way for a generation of scholars who now seek to produce knowledge from within African perspectives rather than about Africa as an external object.

2. Achille Mbembe (born 1957)

A major voice in contemporary global theory, Cameroonian historian Mbembe explores how power operates in postcolonial societies. In works such as On the Postcolony and Critique of Black Reason, he analyses the afterlives of colonial violence and their impact on subjectivity.

A bald African man in horn-rimmed glasses smiles broadly as he suits in an audience. — Mbembe: thinking about power, violence and the postcolonial condition.
Wikimedia Commons/Heike Huslage-Koch, CC BY-SA

Mbembe also emphasises the need for Africa to produce its own narratives. For him, intellectual work is inseparable from historical trauma, but also from the possibility of reinvention.

One of his key contributions is the concept of “necropolitics”, which examines how modern forms of power determine who may live and who must die. This framework has been widely used to analyse conflicts, borders and inequalities far beyond the continent.

At the same time, Mbembe insists on moving beyond victimhood. His work points toward what he sees as an emerging African future, shaped by mobility, creativity and new forms of belonging in a globalised world.

The fascinating

3. George Ayittey (1945–2022)

Ghanaian economist and thinker Ayittey stands out for his uncompromising critique of postcolonial African elites. While acknowledging the impact of colonialism, he argues that many of Africa’s problems today stem from internal governance failures such as corruption, authoritarianism and institutional decay.

A balding African man in glasses sits in front of a microphone in a casual white shirt. — Ayittey: rethinking governance and postcolonial elites.
Wikimedia Commons/Gage Skidmore, CC BY-SA

One of his most influential ideas is the distinction between “cheetahs” and “hippos”. Cheetahs are a new generation of reform minded Africans, hippos are entrenched elites resistant to change. This captures a broader critique of political stagnation and elite capture.

Ayittey also insists on the importance of indigenous African institutions as resources for political renewal. His work is therefore not only critical, it is also programmatic, calling for a reconstruction of governance.

4. Kwasi Wiredu (1931-2022)

Ghanaian philosopher Wiredu is one of the most important figures in African philosophy. His central project, conceptual decolonisation, aims to free African thought from uncritically adopting western philosophical categories.

For Wiredu, language plays a crucial role. Philosophical problems are often shaped by the language they’re formulated in. By returning to African languages, he shows that debates about truth, personhood or political organisation can be reframed in very different ways.

His work on consensus-based political systems, inspired by Akan traditions, is particularly influential. Rather than relying on majoritarian democracy, Wiredu explores forms of deliberation that include agreement and social cohesion. In the process, he does not reject universality. He redefines it from within African intellectual traditions.

5. Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí (born 1957)

Nigerian sociologist and gender scholar Oyěwùmí’s work offers a powerful critique of western ideas being applied to the rest of the world. In The Invention of Women, she argues that gender, as understood in western societies, was imposed on Yoruba social structures through colonialism.

An African woman with short hair sits smiling in a chair in front of African wood carvings. — Oyěwùmí: rethinking gender.
Wikimedia Commons/O Oyěwùmí, CC BY-SA

Her research demonstrates that social organisation in Yoruba society was not originally structured around gender in the same way.

Rather than gender serving as the main axis of social difference, other markers such as age and status played a more central role. This challenges the assumption that categories such as man and woman are universally foundational.

More broadly, her work invites us to question how knowledge travels and how it can distort the realities it claims to describe.

The rising

6. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (born 1967)

Zimbabwean historian Ndlovu-Gatsheni is a leading voice in decolonial theory. His work focuses on coloniality, understood as the persistence of colonial patterns of power long after formal independence.

He criticises the global division of intellectual labour, where African scholars are often confined to producing data while the theory is developed elsewhere. For him, the issue is about who has the authority to produce knowledge.

His work calls for African perspectives to be put in the centre of global debates and for a transformation of the structures that continue to marginalise them.

Beyond a list

African intellectuals are not a uniform group. They operate across disciplines such as philosophy, history, economics, sociology and literature, and across spaces around the world.

What unites them is a shared engagement with a central question. How can Africa be thought critically in a world still marked by unequal power relations?

There are, of course, many other prominent African thinkers whose work deserves attention. The figures here have been chosen because they are particularly representative of different ways of thinking from and about Africa.

Each of them opens a distinct intellectual pathway, whether through the critique of knowledge, the analysis of power, the rethinking of social categories or the transformation of political and philosophical frameworks.

Christophe Premat is a professor in Francophone cultural studies at the Department of Romance and Classical Studies at Stockholm University. He co-authored in 2025, with Buata B. Malela, the book Sensibilités intellectuelles africaines (Éditions Hermann).

– ref. 6 African thinkers who help us understand the world – new book – https://theconversation.com/6-african-thinkers-who-help-us-understand-the-world-new-book-280090

April 21, 2026

East African Community’s expansion has triggered financial troubles: why solutions come with risks

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicodemus Minde, Researcher, United States International University

The East African Community is one of Africa’s oldest regional economic organisations. Its birth in 1967 was the culmination of decades of economic ties forged in the colonial era between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It’s no surprise that the EAC is also the most deeply integrated regional entity.

In its heyday between 1967 and 1977, the bloc shared a common currency, jointly operated a development bank and administered its transport infrastructure as one. There was a common education policy with a single syllabus and examining body as well as the University of East Africa with specialised colleges in the three countries.

Political friction and conflicting priorities, among other factors, led to its collapse in 1977 but it was revived in 1999. Citizens within the bloc currently benefit from free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, along with the rights of establishment and residence. Unmet objectives include the return of a common currency and a political federation.

Meanwhile, the bloc has grown from three to eight – Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2007; South Sudan in 2016, the DR Congo in 2022 and Somalia in 2023. The territory covers stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic and brings together over 331 million people and a combined GDP of US$313 billion as of 2025.

However, this rapid expansion has triggered financial difficulties, putting the economic integration agenda at risk. While partner states are expected to contribute to fund the bloc’s operations, only Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda regularly meet their quota. The budget shortfall has led to massive staff layoffs and a freeze on new recruitment.

So serious is the crisis that it was top of the agenda at the annual summit of the heads of state in March 2026. The leaders stepped up to reform the funding model and signalled that the bloc was ready to sanction or sideline countries that compromise funding.

I have studied regionalism and integration in eastern Africa, conducted research on the EAC and published on Tanzanian citizens’ sovereignty, popular participation, and the EAC integration and democratisation.

It is my view that the radical proposals will compel non-paying partner states to either shape up or ship out. These reforms will salvage the East African Community but could potentially trigger mistrust and perception of unequal benefits in the long run.

The cost of rapid expansion

Each of the eight partner states is expected to contribute approximately US$7 million to fund the bloc’s operations. In addition, the bloc relies on development partners to fund some activities.

In recent years, six of the eight member states have missed their budget contributions. This resulted in a US$90 million budget shortfall. Regional institutions affected by these include:

the East African Legislative Assembly, the regional parliament
the East African Court of Justice, responsible for the interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty.

The two have failed to perform their core functions due to resource constraints. The regional assembly, on occasion, has been forced to skip sittings. This has an effect on critical debates and enactment of new laws to foster economic integration. The regional court grapples with case backlogs.

In November 2023, the EAC Summit adopted a new financing model. It shared 65% of the budget equally among partner states and the rest based on each country’s financial capacity. This capacity is assessed using the World Bank’s average nominal GDP per capita metric for the previous five years.

But only Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – and occasionally Rwanda – have remitted their contributions on time. Domestic conflicts in South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia may have played a role in the slow contributions of these newer EAC members. In the 2024-2025 financial year, Burundi paid only 19% of its expected contribution, the DRC paid 14%, Somalia paid around half, and South Sudan paid a mere 7%.

Overall compliance stood at roughly 58%, leaving the bloc with arrears exceeding US$55 million. In the 2025-2026 cycle, the picture was even bleaker: compliance slipped to just 36.6%, while outstanding obligations climbed to about US$90 million.

The pattern also hints at something deeper: political ambivalence among non-paying members, and uneasiness among some partner states about the benefits of belonging to the bloc. Despite the funding challenges, inter-regional trade in the EAC has been on the rise due to increased trade facilitation under the customs union and common markets protocols. The EAC has also made advances in peace and security. In 2022 for example, through the Nairobi Process, the EAC facilitated peace talks and deployed the East African Community Regional Force in DRC.

Beyond funding, personal and political differences between the DRC’s President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame have contributed to tensions within the bloc.

What did the leaders decide at the March summit?

Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, in a rather surprising but decisive move, pushed for a new financing formula, replacing the model adopted in 2023.

The highlights of the new financing formula include:

50% of the budget will be shared equally among all partner states, while the remaining 50% will be based on each country’s economic strength. The formula will take effect from 1 July 2026. By factoring in differences in economic capacity, the reform aims to reduce the burden on smaller economies and make the bloc’s funding more sustainable.
members of the legislative assembly should be paid by their respective national assemblies with effect from December 2027
the council of ministers should finalise the schedule of sanctions considering the new financing formula. The EAC aims to deal with mounting arrears and non-payment through a sanction regime.

A quorum for the meeting of all organs and institutions of the community will be two-thirds of all partner states. Previously, all states had to participate in passing crucial resolutions, and this was frustrated by absenteeism, especially by non-paying countries.

Nominations for the key institutional positions will depend on the sponsor state’s ratification of all community legal instruments, domestication of the treaty, and full implementation of the roadmap for the partner state’s integration.

What’s next

These are radical proposals, with consequences. Take the example of the decision to appoint Stephen Mbundi of Tanzania as the new secretary general. Based on the rotational principles of the EAC, South Sudan was poised to take over the position from Kenya’s Veronica Nduva. But South Sudan is a defaulter.

This decision signalled the bloc’s commitment to financial compliance and commitment to the spirit of regional integration. Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, also took over the chairman’s position, bypassing Somalia and the DRC, which were poised to lead the community for a year. Somalia and the DRC have been behind in their annual payments.

The proposals, which appear to have been orchestrated by the founding members, suggest a pragmatic move to salvage the EAC.

Nicodemus Minde does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. East African Community’s expansion has triggered financial troubles: why solutions come with risks – https://theconversation.com/east-african-communitys-expansion-has-triggered-financial-troubles-why-solutions-come-with-risks-280632

April 21, 2026

Ghana’s mining law aims to stop speculation but leaves communities in limbo – insights from a lithium case study

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Clement Sefa-Nyarko, Lecturer in Security, Development and Leadership in Africa, King’s College London

Ghana’s parliament ratified the country’s first lithium mining agreement in March 2026. This came three years after lithium mining was confirmed as commercially viable in September 2023.

The Ewoyaa Lithium Project, in the Central Region of Ghana, covers an area where farming communities have lived for generations. It spans several communities.

The agreement is between the government and Barari DV Ghana Limited, the local subsidiary of Australia-based Atlantic Lithium. Lithium is a mineral used in batteries that power electric vehicles, renewable energy storage systems and everyday electronics. It’s at the heart of global minerals supply chains to decarbonise energy and transport.

With the deal in place, formal discussions will begin with mining communities about relocation, compensation and restoring livelihoods. Compensation could include payment for land, crops, construction work and other assets that will be affected by mining operations, as required under Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act.

The ratification of the deal also marks the end of a legal moratorium set out in Ghanaian law. This comes into force once minerals of commercial value are discovered.

The moratorium, which lasted three years in the case of the Ewoyaa Lithium Project, was designed to protect both the state and mining firms from complications such as speculative construction, sudden land claims, and inflated compensation demands that may arise from new developments.

Under Ghana’s mining law, once minerals of commercial value are confirmed, temporary restrictions are placed on new permanent structures, farm expansion and other major land use changes in the affected area. It lasts until there is a mineral agreement and compensation arrangements are clear. The intention is to stabilise land use and ensure fair valuation.

It has profound social consequences.

For people already living in these areas, the moratorium can mean extended periods of uncertainty. During this time, everyday decisions about livelihoods, housing and the future are placed on hold.

Its practical impact is that residents living on or near the mining area can’t build, expand their farms, or make other major decisions about land use.

The affected communities live in a state of suspended time during the moratorium. Farmers are unable to plan their next season confidently. Families delay home improvements. Young people postpone major life decisions because their future access to land remains unclear.

The mining agreement doesn’t end the waiting. Instead, it opens a new phase of negotiations, compensation assessments and administrative back and forth. It could stretch on for months or even years.

This prolonged uncertainty causes real social and economic harm. Yet its effects are often overlooked.

My academic work examines governance, natural resources, politics, and energy transitions. In a recent paper, based on extensive fieldwork in the lithium-rich communities of Ewoyaa, Krampa Krom and Krofu, I investigated how these delays and uncertainty shaped everyday life. I gathered firsthand accounts of how people navigated this period of waiting. All are affected by the project.

The effects were unmistakable. People described the moratorium as a form of “frozen time”, when life could not move forward.

The economic setbacks and emotional strain from long periods of uncertainty often go unrecognised in public policy discussions.

Time on hold

My research identified a number of negative effects of the delays in getting mining operations off the ground.

Firstly, households described how it eroded local opportunities and contributed to young people leaving the area. Young people expressed frustration as their job prospects remained frozen, and they lacked clarity on whether future employment at the mine would be accessible or meaningful.

Many young adults, already frustrated by years of stalled prospects, had left in search of work elsewhere.

The few lower-paid jobs associated with early stage mining activities were not yet available.

Secondly, farmers reported clear losses: they could not expand or invest.

Thirdly, women traders, many of whom sell farm produce and foodstuffs, reported disruptions in household income patterns because farming activities were stalled.

Fourth, community elders, reflecting on years of limited communication, described a growing distrust towards government institutions and the processes governing the mineral agreement.

Across these accounts, what united residents was the feeling that their lives had been interrupted by forces far beyond their control. The moratorium did more than pause development, it suspended decision making, aspirations and the ability to plan even the simplest aspects of the future.

“Time on hold” shaped economic choices, social relationships and the very rhythm of community life.

In my study, I argue that these prolonged delays are a form of “temporal injustice”. This concept emerged directly from listening to residents describe how their aspirations, livelihoods and sense of security were reshaped by bureaucratic time.

Temporal injustice occurs when certain groups bear unfair burdens of waiting, uncertainty and delayed decision-making. These disruptions may seem minor when viewed from the outside. But they have broader implications. They affect project timelines, investor confidence, and the long-term reliability of the supply chains that power the global clean energy transition.

Looking forward

As Ghana and the mining company move into the compensation and community engagement phase, they have an opportunity to address not only material losses but the temporal burdens that communities have endured.

First, compensation frameworks should recognise that the moratorium itself caused harm. Beyond land, crops and structures, policymakers must account for the economic and social costs of years spent waiting.

Second, community engagement must be timely, transparent and genuinely participatory.

Information should flow consistently, especially when people’s livelihoods depend on it.

Third, Ghana should incorporate temporal justice principles into mining governance, including clearer timelines, regular updates and support for communities facing prolonged delays.

Finally, as Ghana deepens its role in the global critical minerals supply chains, local communities should share the benefits rather than being left to carry hidden costs. A just energy transition demands fair distribution not only of mineral wealth, but of time, certainty and opportunity.

Clement Sefa-Nyarko receives funding from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) for a Future Leaders Fellowship that is researching justice in critical minerals governance and energy transitions. Clement also does occasional consultancy for Participatory Development Associates for research and evaluation in Africa, but not directly related to mining.

– ref. Ghana’s mining law aims to stop speculation but leaves communities in limbo – insights from a lithium case study – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-mining-law-aims-to-stop-speculation-but-leaves-communities-in-limbo-insights-from-a-lithium-case-study-279594

April 20, 2026

Women working in Uganda’s pig sector: how challenging prejudices can unlock opportunities – research

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Esther Leah Achandi, Post Doctoral Fellow- Gender, International Livestock Research Institute

In some communities in Uganda, women aren’t supposed to work with pigs. This stems from restrictive social and gender norms, some of which are rooted in culture and religious beliefs.

Until recently, eating pork was associated with drunkards because the meat was typically served alongside home-brewed alcohol in local bars. That’s changing, as “pork joints” become popular everyday eating places. What’s more, pigs are unfairly thought of as dirty and therefore some people think the people who work with them must be dirty too. Women, in particular, according to prevailing social norms, are meant to keep themselves clean.

The pig sector is growing rapidly in east Africa on the back of rising demand. Uganda is one of three top pork producers in Africa, after Nigeria and Malawi. The country also has the highest per capita consumption of pork in the region, estimated at 3.4 kilograms per person per year. This has led to job opportunities in pig farming, trading, butcheries, food stalls, artificial insemination, and feed and veterinary supply shops.

Across Africa, social and gender norms determine whether a woman can work, what kind of work she can do, where she can work, with which animals, and how much she gets paid. This is the case in Uganda. In some parts of central Uganda, while the management – and cleanliness – of piggeries have improved, resulting in better perceptions about pig hygiene, lingering prejudices have meant women working in the pig industry have little bargaining power and lower incomes, and may feel pressured to work covertly. All this results in missed opportunity for women to develop professional skills and support their families, and reduced food safety for everyone.

In 2022/2023 we conducted a study in two districts to understand how local gender norms affected women in the pig farming sector. The findings revealed that women faced restrictions in conducting artificial insemination, castrating animals, taking sows to boars for mating, and transporting pigs on motorcycles. Additionally, certain activities – including slaughtering, trading livestock, producing feed, and owning large farms – were deemed inappropriate for women.

We also found systemic barriers such as lower wages, lack of control over income, restricted physical mobility, and exclusion from influential networks blocked them from fully reaping the benefits of the sector.

These findings led us to launch a range of interventions in the districts. Working with the international NGO Ripple Effect, my team at the International Livestock Research Institute and I trialled a range of interventions in Uganda’s Masaka and Mukono districts.

The results, evaluated a year later in December 2025, showed that social norms can be both accommodated and transformed for the benefit of all. For example, radio shows and conversations challenged widely held sentiments and sought to normalise roles that were taboo for women – such as providing pig insemination services to other farmers and contributing to a growing pig sector.

Our findings have lessons that are of value across many industries and in many places.

Doing things differently

We worked with pig farmers, business people, regulators and community members in five different communities to address the restrictive norms that prevented women from engaging in pig businesses. The work was carried out in Masaka district (south-west of Kampala) and Mukono district (east of the capital).

The interventions we put in place included:

providing women farmers with weigh-bands to estimate live pig weights and make sure they weren’t being cheated
offering training for women farmers to help them negotiate better prices and animal services
providing branded lab coats and badges to certified professionals to help combat the lack of respect for women in technical roles like artificial insemination
providing aprons, head wraps and boots to women working in slaughterhouses and butcher shops, so they would not be seen wearing dirty clothes.

These interventions provided solutions to accommodate existing norms without directly challenging them.

We also trialled some interventions aimed at transforming gender norms. We organised broadcasts on local radio talk shows, featuring a panel discussion between gender officers from Ripple Effect, community leaders and local men who explained why they supported their wives and daughters to work in the pig industry.

For instance, in one broadcast, one local leader shared his family’s story:

My wife rears pigs in large numbers, and I help her look for markets. When I travel, I bring her feeds for them. A home without money is unhappy. Piggery projects are family enterprises … When a woman earns an income, her husband is relieved financially; an empowered woman is a responsible woman.

We also held large community meetings, and used recordings from these shows to spark dialogue about these issues.

The changes

Over a year we observed changes.

Women butchers, farmers and artificial insemination agents felt more confident and accepted, and their services were sought after, especially by other women.

They were able to negotiate higher prices for their pigs. They invested their savings in their piggeries; some were able to use the profits to buy their own land and build houses.

There has been movement towards policy changes, too. Traditionally, pigs have had to be killed in official slaughterhouses – male-dominated spaces. Women did not feel welcome there, and men felt women would not be able to cope with the practical act of slaughter.

After our work in the sector, including inspection officials, authorities are now allowing some women to slaughter their pigs at home.

Lessons

Norms are powerful. Any efforts to improve livelihoods, boost community health, or grow a particular industry will be shaped by these norms. Ignoring them is a recipe for failure, while understanding them – and, where appropriate, moving beyond them – can benefit a whole community.

To transform restrictive norms, both men and women must be included in dialogues that encourage critical curiosity about their impacts. Religious, political and community leaders – people who often enforce these unwritten rules – must also be part of the conversations and solutions.

Radio talk shows and social media can showcase women successfully performing traditionally masculine tasks and supportive men, to normalise new behaviours and reduce shaming. And something as simple as professional clothing can send a signal that women are competent – and clean.

Gender norms can change, and these social changes can have practical and economic effects. Livestock development, as we have seen in Uganda’s pig industry, can be an entry point to promote gender equality.

At the same time, removing barriers to women’s participation can boost families’ incomes, bolster rural industries and alleviate poverty.

Challenge norms, empower women, and everyone benefits.

Esther Leah Achandi received funding from the CGIAR Sustainable Animal and Aquatic Foods (SAAF) Science Program, with funding from CGIAR Trust Fund donors. We would like to thank all funders who support this research through their contributions to the CGIAR Trust Fund:
www.cgiar.org/funders.

– ref. Women working in Uganda’s pig sector: how challenging prejudices can unlock opportunities – research – https://theconversation.com/women-working-in-ugandas-pig-sector-how-challenging-prejudices-can-unlock-opportunities-research-277751

April 20, 2026

Political violence in South Africa is driven by a power elite trying to establish dominance – new research

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Ivor Chipkin, Associate lecturer, University of Pretoria

For much of the past two decades, South Africa’s recurring waves of protest have been interpreted through a dominant lens: the failure of the post-apartheid state to deliver services to its poorest citizens. Rising unemployment, corroding infrastructure and inadequate housing are the familiar explanations offered.

We are political scientists who have been analysing protests and protest data for years. In a recent article we propose that the overall pattern of protest activity in South Africa cannot be explained by socio-economic conditions alone. It tracks the internal power struggles of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC).

This has led us to a new reading of state capture.

As we set out in a paper in 2025, state capture in South Africa is often reduced to a phenomenon of large-scale corruption. The focus has been on the way that private businesses, working with politicians, repurposed legislative and administrative processes to serve their interests and disable the criminal justice system to avoid consequences.

The conventional understanding casts state capture as looting: the opportunistic and organised theft of public resources by politically connected networks and enabled by a compromised presidency.

We do not contest the reality of this pillaging. But we argue that it was also something more structurally purposeful. State capture, in our account, was the mechanism by which former president Jacob Zuma sought to forge a “power elite” in the ANC.

This is a term we borrow from the sociological tradition of C. Wright Mills to refer to a small cohesive group that is able to make decisions with national consequences in political, military and economic institutions. In contrast a politically connected network may have influence but is too diffuse to exercise power as such.

The power elite matters because it explains who really makes the biggest decisions in society and why democratic institutions do not always fully control those decisions.

The argument we’re presenting has consequences for how the country understands what state capture is, and the trajectory of South African democracy itself.

Protests as a barometer

Drawing on data from the South African Police Service, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, and the Institute for Security Studies, we identify a striking pattern. Protest events rose sharply from around 2006, reaching what some researchers called “insurrectionary proportions” by 2011.

Then they stabilised and began to decline between roughly 2013 and 2017. This period coincided with the consolidation of Zuma’s hold on power and the height of state capture.

After 2018, protests surged again to unprecedented levels. In 2021, the country
experienced its worst civil revolt since the end of apartheid.

The socio-economic conditions typically cited to explain protest – unemployment, inequality, poor service delivery – do not follow this same pattern. They did not improve during the 2013-2017 lull. If anything, they worsened. As our paper records, municipal audit outcomes deteriorated sharply by the end of the period.

Inequality, measured by Gini coefficients across South Africa’s major
cities, remained essentially unchanged. The exception was Cape Town, where inequality seems to have declined.

The stabilisation of protest activity, we conclude, cannot be attributed to improvements in the living conditions of poor South Africans.

Something else was suppressing the mobilisation of discontent.

Our answer draws on political sociology and on comparative work on elite formation in Africa and beyond. We conclude that protests are instruments of elite competition. This includes the tactical deployments of professional agitators by local politicians and their networks contesting for control of resources, positions and patronage within the ANC.

When these competitions are acute and unresolved, they spill outward as protests. When they are contained, protest subsides.

The how

By repurposing state-owned enterprises away from their public mandates, the Zuma network generated enormous rents that were then used for private enrichment and to finance factional political activity. This included paying for party rallies, sustaining provincial and regional networks, creating sympathetic media infrastructure, and distributing cash and contracts to potential opponents in exchange for loyalty or silence.

The result was a temporary stabilisation of what had been a fractured and contested elite terrain.

Between roughly 2013 and 2017, a group of politically aligned operators was able to discipline internal competition, in part by allocating positions in government, state-owned enterprises and the party apparatus.

Those who would not be bought were expelled, marginalised, or subjected to violence. We note that political assassinations rose sharply during Zuma’s second term. Evidence before the Zondo Commission into state capture pointed to the deployment of armed units under presidential operational control.

The relative “stability” observable in protest data between 2013 and 2017 was the successful suppression of elite competition through corruption, patronage and coercion. The modest improvement in municipal spending was the result of elite power exercised over administrative systems.

The unravelling under Ramaphosa

If Zuma’s presidency saw the construction of a power elite, Cyril Ramaphosa’s has seen its unravelling.

The consequences have been severe.

At the ANC’s 54th national conference in December 2017, Ramaphosa narrowly defeated Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma for the party presidency. Zuma’s internal compact then began to fracture. The spike in protest activity that followed was almost immediate.

Ramaphosa was not prepared to deploy corruption and violence as political solutions. But without an alternative basis for managing elite competition, the ANC’s internal fissures deepened.

There were symptoms of this disintegration in 2023:

the establishment of the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party by Zuma
its performance in the May 2024 general election – it emerged as the third-largest party nationally.

Gatekeeping became decentralised and unregulated. Elite contestation began migrating out of the party system altogether.

A sobering conclusion, and hint of hope

We conclude that some of it will be pushed towards organised crime. Mafia-type networks, we suggest, should be expected to grow.

There is, however, a more hopeful possibility. The reason the ANC has functioned as the primary arena for elite competition is that it has controlled access to the “gate” – the allocation of positions in the state, the civil service and state-owned enterprises.

Remove that control, and the character of elite competition changes. This is precisely what is at stake in the amendments to the Public Service Act of 1994. Signed into law by Ramaphosa on 26 March 2026, it was gazetted on 1 April 2026.

The legislation aims to:

reduce executive discretion over appointments in the public service
insulate civil service recruitment and operations from party-political interference.

If implemented, political parties will be compelled to compete for support through policy and performance rather than patronage. Elite competition will shift to the public administration system itself. Ideally, this will be governed by merit, transparency and professional standards.

We are cautious about the prospects for this reform. History is not encouraging and the political conditions are challenging.

But if it can end gatekeeping, new legislation like the Public Service Amendment Act will change the elite social terrain in South Africa.

Ivor Chipkin and Jelena Vidojević are affiliated with New South Institute

Jelena Vidojević does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Political violence in South Africa is driven by a power elite trying to establish dominance – new research – https://theconversation.com/political-violence-in-south-africa-is-driven-by-a-power-elite-trying-to-establish-dominance-new-research-280504

April 17, 2026

The IMF enjoys preferred creditor status: why it shouldn’t be the judge when it comes to other lenders

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) should not be an arbiter of discussions about which other multilateral financial institutions should qualify for preferred creditor status. This is because the IMF is a direct beneficiary of the creditor hierarchy policy.

A preferred creditor status gives multilateral development institutions priority for the repayment of their loans should a borrower run into financial difficulties. This means preferred creditors have no non-performing loans on their balance sheets. This preserves their low-cost funding channels. Non-preferred creditors have high risk exposure and borrowing costs.

The events leading to Fitch Ratings’ downgrade in January 2026 of the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the rating agency’s subsequent withdrawal of the bank’s ratings illustrate this IMF conflict.

Fitch acted on a statement by the IMF declaring that Afreximbank was not treated as a preferred creditor in the finalisation of Ghana’s debt restructuring.

The effect of the IMF’s statement was to throw into doubt Afreximbank’s preferred creditor status, which it qualifies for by convention and through its member shareholders.

The IMF’s interpretation was that the agreement between Ghana and Afreximbank was consistent with the comparability of treatment under the official creditors’ committee framework. Official creditors are governments, government agencies, or international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Comparability of treatment is the principle that debtor countries must restructure all external debt on broadly equivalent terms. This is aimed at ensuring fairness and equal sharing of losses when a country defaults.

The official creditors committee was formed in terms of the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments. The framework was created by the G20 to enable low-income countries that have hit financial trouble to restructure their debts, working with creditors.

Based on my work on rating agencies and African countries, I argue that the IMF’s statement on Afreximbank should not have been treated as a fact. In addition, no attempt was made to verify the specific terms with Ghana or Afreximbank. Fitch admitted in its rating report that it did not have details of the loan terms.

And based on the same agreement between Ghana and Afreximbank, GCR, a subsidiary of Moody’s, took a different view, affirming Afreximbank’s globally comparable ratings. Most importantly, GCR revised the bank’s rating from “rating watch evolving” to stable, arguing that Afreximbank’s preferred creditor status was strong.

Despite the differences in interpretation of the agreement between Afreximbank and Ghana, the IMF statement triggered a chain reaction. Fitch Ratings first downgraded the bank’s rating and later completely withdrew its rating of the bank.

But beyond the technical jargon of debt restructuring lies a deeper, more troubling reality. The IMF is not a neutral arbiter on any discussions relating to preferred creditor status. It is itself a direct beneficiary of the very creditor hierarchy it is pushing to maintain as policy.

Ghana and Afreximbank agreement

In December 2025, Afreximbank and Ghana announced that they had reached an agreement on a US$750 million facility.

The details of the agreement were not disclosed. But both Ghana and Afreximbank said they were happy with it.

Afreximbank’s preferred creditor status is not just a matter of convention. It is granted to the bank by its member shareholders.

If Ghana had treated Afreximbank’s loan facility as commercial, it would have bundled it together with other commercial lenders in the restructuring. Eurobond holders, for example, took a nominal 37% reduction in the value of what they had lent Ghana.

The ‘baby multilateral’ prejudice

The Ghana-Afreximbank case is one example of how conflicted the Bretton Woods institutions – the IMF and the World Bank Group – are when they are engaging on matters of global financing. This conflict of interest is at the heart of key challenges bedevilling global financial governance.

The IMF, together with the Paris Club (an informal group of official creditors), has long treated African multilateral financial institutions such as Afreximbank as second-class entities.

Their associate economists have dismissively referred to African multilateral financial institutions as complicating debt restructuring by claiming to be preferred creditors. Analysts also prejudicially referenced African multilateral banks as “baby multilaterals” relative to the size of IMF and the World Bank.

They have strongly resisted any suggestion that African multilaterals should be accorded status equal to the World Bank or the IMF, or even that they should be allowed to use the term “multilateral” development banks.

But the opposite could be true. Small multilaterals need the preferred creditor status more than Bretton Woods institutions. This is because the status is a strategic advantage.

Concessional lending argument is flawed

The IMF’s justification for why African multilateral banks should be denied preferred creditor status often sounds reasonable on the surface. It suggests that this status should be reserved for institutions that lend on highly concessional terms, with long maturities and low interest rates.

By this logic, African multilaterals do not quality for the same protection because they lend at slightly higher interest rates relative to bigger institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. But this argument is fundamentally flawed for two reasons.

First, preferred creditor status is not a reward for concessionality, it is a functional necessity for any multilateral lender that must recycle funds across multiple countries. The function of a multilateral development bank is to take wholesale risk so that its members do not have to. Size and concessionality – more favourable terms compared to commercial lenders – are not the criteria. Credibility and a developmental role are.

Second, if the IMF genuinely wanted African multilaterals to grow and lend at more concessional rates, it would have supported their access to resources. For example, through its quota system, the IMF constrained the 2021 reallocation of unused Special Drawing Rights that had been proposed for rechannelling to African multilateral financial institutions.

The Special Drawing Right is not a currency and derives its value based on a basket of currencies comprising the US dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese yen, and the British pound sterling.

Of the US$650 billion in available Special Drawing Rights, it imposed a limit of just US$15 billion for allocation across all multilateral development banks. The African Development Bank was the only African multilateral financial institution that accessed the Special Drawing Rights fund.

The argument was technical. But the effect was political – keep African institutions small and dependent, and then point to their small size as a reason to deny them equal status. That is not neutrality but gatekeeping.

What needs to change

The IMF demands that African multilaterals prove their creditworthiness without preferred creditor status, while the IMF itself would likely see its own credit rating downgraded if it were treated as a common creditor. The IMF enjoys preferred creditor status not because it is the largest or most concessional, but because the system has been designed to protect it. It can thus not credibly adjudicate on whether others deserve it.

This needs to change in the following ways.

First, the global financial architecture must confront legitimate issues affecting developing countries and their institutions with neutrality. Creditors should establish clear, transparent and consistent criteria for preferred creditor status that apply equally to all multilateral lenders across the globe.

Second, rating agencies must stop treating IMF statements as presumptively correct, especially when the IMF has a direct stake in the outcome.

Lastly, African governments and their multilateral banks must collectively challenge the “baby multilateral” narrative, not by begging for recognition but by building alternative mechanisms.

If this does not change, the global financial architecture will remain a a two-tier system with the World Bank, IMF and their associates at the top and African-led institutions holding the bottom.

Misheck Mutize is affiliated with the African Union – African Peer Review Mechanism as a Lead Expert on credit ratings

– ref. The IMF enjoys preferred creditor status: why it shouldn’t be the judge when it comes to other lenders – https://theconversation.com/the-imf-enjoys-preferred-creditor-status-why-it-shouldnt-be-the-judge-when-it-comes-to-other-lenders-280509

April 16, 2026

Congo-Brazzaville election: boycotts, blackouts and growing dissent but Denis Sassou Nguesso held on to power

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Ngodi Etanislas, enseignant-chercheur, Université Marien Ngouabi

The 2026 presidential election in Congo-Brazzaville (the Republic of the Congo) returned Denis Sassou Nguesso for a fifth consecutive term, with a definitive 94.90% of the vote.

We asked Ngodi Etanislas, a political scientist who focuses on the central African country, to sum up what happened and why it matters, now that the dust has settled.

What political factors shaped the result?

Denis Sassou Nguesso’s huge victory is not the result of an open electoral race. It is, rather, the culmination of a political system built on decades of power consolidation since the end of the 1997 civil war. It was a “Soviet-style” outcome (overwhelming and predetermined) that can be explained by a few key political factors.

First, there is the political longevity of Nguesso, in power since 1979 (with an interruption from 1992 to 1997). This four-decade dominance gives him total control over the country’s political, institutional, and security apparatus. It makes political change not only difficult but structurally unlikely.

Furthermore, the rigged electoral process – especially through control of the state apparatus and election management bodies – contributed to this victory.

Electoral campaigning was also deeply unequal. Nguesso’s campaign looked like a “national tour”. It was built on a show of strength designed to project the image of a leader close to the people.

Did a divided opposition influence the result?

The fragmentation of the political opposition was arguably the most decisive factor behind the landslide. The opposition entered the election divided. They could not agree on a single candidate, which significantly reduced the chances of a democratic transition.

The election was marked by the absence of certain figures in Congolese politics. Some remain imprisoned (Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko and André Okombi Salissa). Others chose to boycott the poll, believing the conditions for a free and transparent election were not met. This stripped the contest of any real stakes. It helped secure a first-round victory for Nguesso. In 2016, he won 60.4% of the vote against a strong opposition.

For many observers, the six candidates in the race were largely unknown or lacked any real political base. Some appeared to be using the election to gain some visibility, or better yet, political legitimacy ahead of future contests. They were no match for Nguesso. They lacked the financial resources to campaign nationwide and build local support to defend their platforms.

Finally, the digital blackout – including a countrywide shutdown of phone networks and internet on election day – added another layer of opacity of the process. It created an unprecedented information blackout.

This reduced the opposition’s ability to organise collectively and deploy its delegates. It also aimed to limit the spread, on social media, of rumours about ballot stuffing, vote buying, and other politically sensitive content. The president was clearly worried about low turnout figures leaking out.

What was the mood among voters?

Voting was marked by deep disaffection, fuelled by the opposition’s boycott and a sense among many young people that voting was pointless. It also took place in a climate of fear perpetuated by the repressive environment. This included operations carried out early in the year by the General Directorate of Presidential Security, as well as intimidation and crackdowns targeting activists and political opponents.

The issue of voter turnout lies at the heart of the controversy surrounding this election.

Two scenarios can be considered.

The first is turnout orchestrated by the government through political and patronage networks. The goal is to boost participation in order to legitimise the electoral process and bolster the credibility of the results.

The second scenario involves a boycott of the election encouraged by the opposition, aimed at achieving low turnout, which could spark challenges over the election’s legitimacy.

Reports highlight a clear gap between official figures and field observations, suggesting a more complex picture of voter turnout than is apparent. The official turnout rate reportedly jumped by nearly 17% – from about 67.57% in 2016, when there were more opposition figures, to 84.65% in 2026, despite a widespread boycott. Yet polling stations across 6,620 booths in 4,011 centres appeared largely empty.

What challenges lie ahead?

To escape political and social stagnation, several democratic reforms are urgent:

Restoring electoral credibility and the independence of institutions is one of the most sensitive issues. The election exposed serious shortcomings in electoral governance – lack of transparency, inclusiveness and fairness.
The reliability of voter rolls, the impartiality of the Independent National Electoral Commission and unequal access to the media pose ongoing problems. All this happened without effective independent oversight. Without sweeping reforms of the electoral system, abstention and disengagement will continue to grow, particularly among young people.
Building a pluralistic political space and a viable opposition is essential for reshaping the Congolese political landscape. Releasing political prisoners and guaranteeing an effective right to opposition would be essential prerequisites for any national reconciliation.
Protecting fundamental freedoms and civic space. Human rights violations have been on the rise and there is no political dialogue between the government, the opposition, and civil society.
Succession and transition. The questions of what comes after Nguessou, whether power remains within the presidential majority, or ensuring continuity for a new term in 2031. This may include scenarios of dynastic succession within the presidential family.
Turning oil wealth into human development. Nearly half the population lives below the poverty line. The challenge is to convert oil revenues into public services (health, education) and opportunities for young people.
Reconnecting citizen participation, particularly young people, to politics. Young Congolese and civil society need to be brought back into the political process. Citizen participation remains crucial to the legitimacy of the electoral process.

What implications could the election have on political stability?

Stability rests on fragile foundations. A large part of the population sees the government as lacking legitimacy. Distrust in the electoral system runs deep.

Youth frustration is a particularly worrying indicator.
A 2024 survey indicates that young people have little confidence in the political system. Many feel that voting is pointless. Chronic unemployment and lack of economic prospects deepen their frustrations.

The internal struggle within the ruling party over who comes after Sassou Nguessou could become the main source of instability. The risk grows if no clear widely accepted successor emerges. Internal divisions seen during the party’s congress in 2025 show how central succession is. They also show ongoing shifts in power and elite positioning.

The March 2026 presidential election did not resolve any key issues.

Ngodi Etanislas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Congo-Brazzaville election: boycotts, blackouts and growing dissent but Denis Sassou Nguesso held on to power – https://theconversation.com/congo-brazzaville-election-boycotts-blackouts-and-growing-dissent-but-denis-sassou-nguesso-held-on-to-power-279539

April 16, 2026

Bird and tortoise fossil tracks on South Africa’s coast – latest findings are world firsts

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Charles Helm, Research Associate, African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience, Nelson Mandela University

The south coast of South Africa’s Western Cape province is a rich source of fossil tracks and traces – clues suggesting what this environment may have been like many thousands of years ago.

We’re a research group from the African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience who have been finding and documenting these tracks since 2007. So far we have identified more than 400 tracksites left by vertebrates, including pangolins, giraffe, snakes, rock hyraxes, crocodiles and elephants. They include a variety of marks, from footprints to butt-drag impressions and even traces of sound vibrations. Some of these animals have never been found in the vicinity through the body fossil record, only from their tracks.

Most have been dated to the Pleistocene era, between 130,000 and 90,000 years in age, using a technique that measures how long ago grains of sand were exposed to light. Some of the fossil tracks and traces are the first of their kind ever found anywhere.

Our research has recently yielded two more world firsts in the fossil record:

the only known giant tortoise tracks, and tramline tortoise trackways
the only known tracks of a bird called the hamerkop (“hammerhead”).

Hamerkop, with webbed feet.
By Bernard Dupont, Wikimedia, CC BY

These sites are in danger of being destroyed in rockfalls, but our work ensures that the traces they preserve are not lost and we can continue to build a picture of the environment back when this area – now a coastline – was a giant plain full of creatures, like today’s Serengeti.

First known fossil tracks of the hamerkop bird

The bird trackway we’ve recently found was definitely made by a hamerkop (family Scopidae). These are the first fossil tracks of this bird found anywhere in the world.

The foot of a hamerkop track is roughly similar to that of a heron or egret, except that it has substantial webbing between the toes. Members of the heron family (Ardeidae) have three forward-pointing toes, and one backward-pointing toe that is slightly offset to the side. No or minimal webbing is evident. A well-preserved hamerkop track, however, will show a similar orientation of digits, but will also have webbing.

That is exactly what we found at a tracksite on the ceiling of an overhang on a remote stretch of coastline.

We don’t know why hamerkops have webbing. Perhaps more ancient members of the lineage needed it to aid in swimming.

A couple of bones of a Pliocene hamerkop, probably about 4-5 million years old, have been identified at the South African west coast fossil site of Langebaanweg, and have been assigned to the species Scopus xenopus.

While we cannot determine if the tracks we have identified were made by the extant hamerkop (Scopus umbretta) or the extinct Scopus xenopus, a hamerkop origin is clear.

It is unusual to be able to identify a trackmaker to genus level based on just a few tracks, but a hamerkop provides a welcome exception to the rule.

The hamerkop track adds to 48 other fossil bird tracksites identified on the Cape coastline, including tracks of ostriches, storks, cranes, egrets, flamingos, guineafowl, spurfowl, oystercatchers and other shorebirds, terns, doves, and possibly cormorants, ducks and pelicans.

Bird body fossils are not common in southern Africa from this time period (from 194,000 to 57,000 years ago), but of those that have been found, most were in this coastal area.

A recurring theme in our work has been the identification of larger-than-expected bird tracks, hinting at the possibility either of extinct species or larger Pleistocene versions of extant trackmakers.

Tramlines and giant tortoise tracks

Our team found the world’s first fossilised giant tortoise trackway in 2022 on a rugged, remote stretch of the same coast. From the size of the tracks and trackway, we estimated that its maker was 106cm long, making it 50% longer than the largest tortoise that currently inhabits South Africa, the leopard tortoise (Stigmochelys pardalis).

Tragically, within a couple of months of being found, the loose rock slab bearing the trackway of the giant tortoise had slumped down the sandy slope and disappeared into the ocean.

So we were excited to find a second set of giant tortoise tracks.

In the Walker Bay Nature Reserve we found typical “toe-tip traces” of a tortoise, and were able to estimate that the trackmaker was 98cm in length. This is, therefore, the second set of trace-fossil evidence of giant tortoises found in the world.

But first, we found three tortoise trackways showing the typical tramline pattern of smaller versions of these reptiles, with a wide “straddle” and closely spaced tracks in each line of the tramline. These fossilised tramline trackways are the first of their kind to be found in the world, and fill a notable gap in the fossil record.

One is located in the De Hoop Nature Reserve, and was probably made by a leopard tortoise. It is only rarely exposed, usually being covered by a thick layer of beach sand.

The other two are located in the Walker Bay Nature Reserve, and were probably made by the angulate tortoise, Chersina angulata.

Significance of these finds

There aren’t any body fossils of giant tortoises in southern Africa from the Pleistocene, but here we have track fossils.

Why the mismatch?

The answer may lie in the fact that the Pleistocene body fossils (of various animals) that have been uncovered in the region are mainly from caves our human ancestors inhabited. If our ancestors ate giant tortoises, it might have made more sense to butcher, cook and eat them on the spot, rather than carry a creature weighing 100kg all the way back to “home base”, which might have been as much as 10km away.

This is therefore an example of the trace fossil record delivering unanticipated findings and evidence that could not have been suspected from the traditional body fossil record.

The hamerkop site is now threatened. An enormous rockfall from the cliffs above has obliterated a couple of tracksites just a few metres to the east, rendering the entire band of cliffs unstable and dangerous.

Our photogrammetry work (making three-dimensional models from two-dimensional images) at all the sites, however, will digitally preserve the tracks and trackways. It will also allow for the production of exact replicas which can be exhibited.

Given that these are the only known fossilised hamerkop tracks and the only remaining fossil tracks of a giant tortoise and of tramline tortoise trackways, it is reassuring to know that they will not be lost forever.

Charles Helm does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bird and tortoise fossil tracks on South Africa’s coast – latest findings are world firsts – https://theconversation.com/bird-and-tortoise-fossil-tracks-on-south-africas-coast-latest-findings-are-world-firsts-278123