Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Khalid Siddig, Senior Research Fellow and Program Leader for the Sudan Strategy Support Program, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. What began as a struggle for power has turned into a national catastrophe. More than 14 million people have been displaced. Health and education systems have collapsed and food insecurity threatens over half the population of about 50 million.

The war has disrupted key sectors, triggering severe economic contractions, and worsening poverty and unemployment levels.

Sudan’s finance minister reported in November 2023 that the war had resulted in economic losses exceeding US$26 billion – or more than half the value of the country’s economy a year earlier. The industrial sector, which includes manufacturing and oil refining, has lost over 50% of its value. Employment has fallen by 4.6 million jobs over the period of the conflict. More than 7 million more people have been pushed into poverty. The agrifood system alone has shrunk by 33.6%. These estimates exclude informal economy losses.

My research applies economy-wide models to understand how conflict affects national development. In a recent study, my colleagues and I used this approach to answer the question: what will happen to Sudan’s economy and poverty levels if the war continues through 2025?

To assess the economic impact of the conflict, we used a Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model. This is a tool that captures how shocks affect different sectors and other agents of the economy, such as firms, government and households.

Based on our modelling, the answer is devastating: the conflict could shrink the size of Sudan’s economy by over 40% from 2022 levels, plunging millions more into poverty.

We modelled two scenarios to capture the potential trajectories of Sudan’s economy.

The extreme scenario assumes a sharp initial collapse, with a 29.5% contraction in the size of the economy in 2023 and 12.2% in 2024, followed by a 7% decline in 2025, reflecting some stabilisation over time.

The moderate scenario, based on World Bank projections, applies a 20.1% contraction in 2023 and a 15.1% drop in 2024, also followed by a 7% reduction in 2025, indicating a slower but more prolonged deterioration.

We estimated the annual figures and report only the aggregate impacts through 2025 for clarity.

We found that if the conflict endures, the value of Sudan’s economy will contract by up to 42% from US$56.3 billion in 2022 (pre-conflict) to US$32.4 billion by the end of 2025. The backbone of livelihoods – agriculture – will be crippled. And the social fabric of the country will continue to fray.

How we did it

Our Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model used data from various national and international sources to show the impact of conflict on the value of the economy, its sectors and household welfare.

We connected this to government and World Bank data to reflect Sudan’s current conditions.

This allowed us to simulate how conflict-driven disruptions affect the value of the economy, its sectors and household welfare.

What we found

Under the extreme scenario, we found:

• Gross domestic product collapse: Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the total value of all goods and services produced in a country within a year. It’s a key indicator of economic health. We found that the value of Sudan’s economy could contract by up to 42%. This means the country would be producing less than 60% of what it did before the conflict. This would affect incomes, jobs, government revenues and public services. The industrial sector – heavily concentrated in Khartoum – would be hardest hit, with output shrinking by over 50%. The value of services like education, health, transport and trade would fall by 40%, and agriculture by more than 35%.

• Job losses: nearly 4.6 million jobs – about half of all employment – could disappear. Urban areas and non-farm sectors would be worst affected, with over 700,000 farming jobs at risk.

• Incomes plummet: household incomes would decline across all groups – rich and poor, rural and urban – by up to 42%. Rural and less-educated households suffer the most.

• Poverty spikes: up to 7.5 million more people could fall into poverty, adding to the 61.1% poverty level in 2022. In rural areas, the poverty rate could jump by 32.5 percentage points from the already high rural poverty rate pre-conflict (67.6% of the rural population). Women, especially in rural communities, are hit particularly hard. Urban poverty, which was at 48.8% pre-conflict, increases by 11.6 percentage points.

• The agrifood system – which includes farming, food processing, trade and food services – would lose a third of its value under the extreme scenario.

Why these findings matter

Sudan was already in a fragile state before the war. It was reeling from decades of underinvestment, international sanctions and institutional breakdown.

The war has reversed hard-won gains in poverty reduction. It is also dismantling key productive sectors – from agriculture to manufacturing – which will be essential for recovery once the conflict ends. Every month of continued fighting adds to the damage and raises the cost of rebuilding.

Our projections already show major economic collapse, yet they don’t include the full extent of the damage. This includes losses in the informal economy or the strain on household coping strategies. The real situation could be even worse than what the data suggests.

What needs to be done

First and foremost, peace is essential. Without an end to the fighting, recovery will be impossible.

Second, even as conflict continues, urgent action is needed to stabilise livelihoods. This means:

• supporting agriculture in areas that remain relatively safe. Food production must be sustained to prevent famine.

• restoring critical services where possible – particularly transport, trade and retail – to keep local economies functioning

• protecting the most vulnerable, such as women in rural areas and the elderly, through expanded social protection and targeted cash assistance.

Third, prepare for recovery. The international community – donors, development banks and NGOs – must begin laying the groundwork for post-conflict reconstruction now. This includes investment in public infrastructure, rebuilding institutions and re-integrating displaced populations.

The bottom line

Sudan’s war is more than a political crisis. It is an economic catastrophe unfolding in real time. One that is deepening poverty, destroying livelihoods and erasing years of progress.

Our research provides hard numbers to describe what Sudanese families are already experiencing every day.

The country’s economy is bleeding. Without a shift in the trajectory of the conflict, recovery could take decades – if it happens at all.

Khalid Siddig does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sudan’s war is an economic disaster: here’s how bad it could get – https://theconversation.com/sudans-war-is-an-economic-disaster-heres-how-bad-it-could-get-260609

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rehana Cassim, Professor in Company Law, University of South Africa

Bribery is one of the most common forms of corruption in South African companies and state institutions. This has a number of harmful outcomes.

Firstly, research shows that it weakens democracy and slows down economic growth. It also creates expensive barriers for honest businesses to succeed because it distorts fair competition. If bribery is not stopped or punished it has a demoralising effect, because it erodes trust and creates a culture where ethical conduct is undermined.

In 2024 a new law came into force in South Africa that puts a duty on companies to take proactive steps to prevent bribery. This law falls under a broader law dealing with corruption in South Africa.

The new provisions make it a crime for companies to fail to prevent bribery by an associated person. This is a major policy shift in South African anti-corruption law, and aligns with the United Kingdom’s anti-bribery legislation.

An associated person is anyone who performs services for the company. This can include suppliers, joint venture partners, distributors, consultants, and other professionals advising the company. It can even be other companies, like subsidiaries.

In my research I found that South Africa took inspiration from the United Kingdom (UK) Bribery Act 2010. The law makes it a criminal offence for commercial organisations to fail to prevent bribery by associated persons.

Despite some successes, enforcement of the UK Bribery Act has been slow and the volume of prosecutions has been low.

Based on my research into company conduct, given the current challenges in law enforcement and the low conviction rates for crimes of corruption, the new law might not work as well as hoped.

But with improved enforcement, it has potential to reduce bribery in South Africa.

What’s behind the new law?

The new addition to the law was introduced after a commission of inquiry found evidence of widespread bribery and corruption under former president Jacob Zuma.

For example, Angelo Agrizzi, former chief operating officer of African Global Operations (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Bosasa), testified that Bosasa won about US$129 million in government tenders by paying about US$4 million in bribes to politicians and government officials. He said that every contract in which Bosasa was involved was linked to bribery and corruption.

The new law is designed to prevent this from happening.

If a person associated with a member of the private sector or an incorporated state-owned entity gives, agrees or offers to give a bribe (or gratification) to another person, the company could be held liable. This applies to companies as well as individuals, partnerships, trusts and other legal entities.

The bribe must be given by the associated person to get business for the company or to gain a business advantage for it. Importantly, a company can be found guilty even if it didn’t know about the bribe.

What counts as a bribe?

A bribe (or gratification) is not just money. It includes avoiding a loss or other disadvantage, releasing any obligation or liability, or giving any favour or advantage.

The bribe does not actually have to be given. It is enough if the associated person agrees or offers to give the bribe.

It is not clear yet if hospitality or promotional expenditures count as bribes.

Under the UK Bribery Act a hospitality payment is not regarded as a gratification unless it is disproportionate. In my view South Africa should follow the same approach.

For example, if paying for transport from the airport to a hotel for an on-site visit, taking clients to dinner, or giving them tickets to an event aligns with the norms for the industry, this probably will not be seen as a bribe.

Facilitation payments is another tricky area. These are small bribes made to minor officials to get routine administrative tasks done, such as applying for visas, clearing customs or getting licences.

The new law doesn’t say whether facilitation payments are regarded as bribes. In my view, they should be.

What companies need to do

Companies can avoid liability under the new law if they can prove that they had adequate procedures in place to prevent bribery by associated persons.

But the law doesn’t explain what “adequate procedures” are. Until the South African government provides guidance on this, it is useful to look at the guidance provided under the UK Bribery Act. It recommends the following:

• Companies should adopt procedures that are proportionate to the bribery risks they face and the nature, scale and complexity of their activities.

So a larger company operating in a high-risk market where bribery is known to be common must do more to prevent bribery than a smaller company in a low-risk market where bribery is less common.

• The company’s board of directors should foster a culture where bribery is never acceptable.

• Companies should periodically assess their exposure to potential bribery risks.

• Companies should carry out due diligence procedures on their associated persons.

• Companies should communicate their anti-bribery polices internally and externally. They should also provide training to ensure that everyone understands their anti-bribery position.

• Companies should monitor their procedures and improve them where necessary.

The way forward

The South African government should urgently publish official guidelines to help companies understand what they must do to comply with the new law.

The principles of South Africa’s corporate governance code, the King IV Report, can also be used to help companies comply with the new law. These principles promote ethical leadership, an ethical culture, risk management, accountability and transparency.

Guidelines are also important for small and medium enterprises. They also have a legal duty to put in place adequate procedures to prevent bribery.

Companies that have not already put in place anti-bribery procedures should act quickly. And they should check that their corporate hospitality policies are reasonable and proportionate to their businesses.

Companies should also evaluate their relationships with the people associated with them.

Setting up anti-bribery procedures may have cost implications. But not having them could cost far more. Having adequate procedures in place is the only defence under the new law.

Rehana Cassim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bribery in South Africa: law now puts a duty on companies to act – https://theconversation.com/bribery-in-south-africa-law-now-puts-a-duty-on-companies-to-act-260148

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Leila Demarest, Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

Lagos State, with an estimated population of 20 million, is Africa’s largest metropolis. Home to Nigeria’s commercial capital, it is a magnet for internal migration, drawing in a mix of the country’s ethnic groups. Nigeria is estimated to have between 150 and 500 distinct ethnic groups, many of which are represented in Lagos.

The original inhabitants of Lagos were Yoruba. As the colonial capital, the city experienced early migration from the Igbo group from the south-east. The Hausa-Fulani, from the north, are another important group to have been drawn to Lagos. More recent migration to the city has also been caused by insecurity in the north of Nigeria.

The social interactions between people from diverse backgrounds have been studied extensively as dynamics of exclusion are often pervasive in developed and developing societies alike. In multi-ethnic societies in Africa where there has been violent conflict, the question of peaceful coexistence is all the more important.

In Nigeria, past ethno-religious violence has led to massive casualties. The 1960s Biafra war and lethal riots in Kaduna and Jos in recent decades stand out. Lesser tensions are also present in Lagos state around competition for jobs and access to political power.

Intergroup tensions in Lagos may give rise to concerns about the risk of more serious threats.

But do we see this in adolescents, who haven’t yet started competing with each other for jobs and resources? In schools, young people generally have equal status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and potential for friendship. Could new generations overcome the adversarial past?

We have decades of research between us straddling group behaviour and identity formation, peace and conflict dynamics, and ethnicity and religion in sub-Saharan Africa. For our research we aimed to gain a picture of intergroup dynamics among Lagos adolescents.

We concluded from surveying young people that higher diversity levels encourage more friendships and cross-group political discussions, which lead to positive relations between ethnic groups. But waiting for this to happen naturally may not be the best approach. It may leave smaller minority groups exposed to discrimination in the meantime. Policy interventions may encourage a quicker development of positive relations.

Survey of Lagos adolescents

Nigeria has a large youth population. Half of the people who live in Lagos state are younger than 25. That could have an important impact on future developments in the city, including intergroup relations.

In 2019, we surveyed final year secondary school students in 36 schools across the state to find out how they viewed other societal groups and which factors affected their views. Most previous research on intergroup relations has focused on adults.

We aimed to obtain a sample of Lagos adolescents who experienced diversity in their daily lives. To achieve this, we drew from both urban and rural districts. Our final sample contained 70 % Yoruba, 16 % Igbo, 2 % Hausa-Fulani, and 12 % other minority group adolescents.

We found that:

• adolescents who reported more cross-group friendships had more positive attitudes, including higher trust, towards other groups

• those exposed to political discussions in diverse contexts were more likely to hold positive attitudes towards other ethnic and religious groups

• when youths experienced more diversity in their schools and neighbourhoods they were less likely to stereotype members of groups

• they were also less likely to report a preference for their own group when it comes to teachers, future bosses, marriage partners and electoral candidates.

In contrast, youths exposed to political discussions in ethnic enclaves held negative views.

Diversity and contact

We used statistical analyses to investigate intergroup relations among our youth sample. We first asked whether there was a relationship between exposure to other groups and attitudes towards them. While urban areas, especially megacities like Lagos, are often characterised by diversity, many ethnic enclaves or homogeneous neighbourhoods exist.

We found that higher exposure to diversity had mixed effects. It was associated with less stereotyping and in-group preference, but also related to lower trust in others in general.

Mixed effects are not surprising, as scholars have long held that exposure to diversity does not really tell us how people actually relate to one another: what matters more is positive contact between individuals from different groups. Contact has been robustly associated with more positive intergroup attitudes in predominantly western-focused studies. In Africa-focused studies results have been mixed, with some finding positive and others no real impact of contact.

Our findings provide evidence for positive contact theory as adolescents with more cross-group friendships held more positive attitudes towards other groups and also had higher trust. This demonstrates actual positive contact is more important than mere exposure to diversity.

We also found that exposure to political narratives mattered. Youths who were exposed to political discussions in diverse contexts were more likely to hold positive attitudes towards other ethnic and religious groups.

Policy implications

Intergroup attitudes are formed at an early age. Once developed, prejudice or tolerance have a tendency to “stick” over time. Questions on the development of positive attitudes are in need of urgent attention in Africa because of the continent’s youthful populations and many African countries’ experiences with ethnic and religious conflict.

This brings us to the question of whether tolerance of others can be fast-tracked, especially at an early age, and when youth can be targeted through school interventions. Evidence from other (western) studies suggests that multicultural education, in which pupils are exposed to different cultures in the curriculum, cross-group class discussions on political themes, and cross-group school projects, may encourage positive intergroup relations.

These types of policies come with an important warning though. As we have seen during our field work, many schools, especially public schools, face large class sizes due to resource constraints and teacher training is minimal. Corporal punishment is still implemented. Group work and deliberation are difficult to manage with large numbers and a lack of training, and teachers also risk bringing their own prejudices to the classroom.

So it’s important to design interventions carefully and more research is needed to do this effectively in African contexts.

Leila Demarest received funding from the Leiden University Fund (grant reference W19304-5-01)

Arnim Langer receives funding from Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

– ref. Lagos is young and diverse, so what shapes ethnic and religious prejudice among teens? Our study tried to find out – https://theconversation.com/lagos-is-young-and-diverse-so-what-shapes-ethnic-and-religious-prejudice-among-teens-our-study-tried-to-find-out-260720

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Leanne N. Phelps, Associate research scientist, Columbia University

Imagine living in a place where a single drought, hurricane, or mudslide can wipe out your food supply. Across Africa, many communities do exactly that – navigate climate shocks like floods, heatwaves, and failed harvests.

What’s often overlooked in the development policies to tackle these threats is a powerful sources of insight: Africa’s own history.

Around 14,700 to 5,500 years ago, much of Africa experienced wetter conditions – a time referred to as the African Humid Period. As wet conditions declined around 5,500 years ago, major social, cultural, and environmental changes ensued across the continent.

We’re part of a multidisciplinary team of scientists who recently published a study about how diverse African communities adapted to climate variability over the past 10,000 years. This is the first study to explore thousands of years of change in people’s livelihoods across the continent using isotopic data.

This continent-wide approach offers novel insights into how livelihoods formed and evolved across space and time.

Prior theories often assumed that societies and their food systems evolved in a linear way. In other words they developed from simple hunting and gathering communities to politically and socially complex societies practising agriculture.

Instead, what we see is a complex mosaic of adaptable strategies that helped people survive. For 10,000 years, African communities adapted by mixing herding, farming, fishing and foraging. They blended different practices based on what worked at different times in their specific environment. That diversity across communities and regions was key to human survival.

That has real lessons for food systems today.

Our research suggests that rigid, top-down development plans, including ones that privilege intensifying agriculture over diversified economies, are unlikely to succeed. Many modern policies promote narrow approaches, like focusing only on cash crops. But history tells a different story. Resilience isn’t about choosing the “best” or most “intensive” method and sticking with it. Rather it’s about staying flexible and blending different strategies to align with local conditions.

The clues left behind

We were able to develop our insights by looking at the clues left behind by the food people ate and the environments they lived in. We did this by analysing the chemical traces (isotopes) in ancient human and domestic animal bones from 187 archaeological sites across the African continent.

We sorted the results into groups with similar features, or “isotopic niches”. Then we described the livelihood and ecological characteristics of these niches using archaeological and environmental information.

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Read more:
Tooth enamel provides clues on tsetse flies and the spread of herding in ancient Africa

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Our methods illustrated a wide range of livelihood systems. For example, in what are now Botswana and Zimbabwe, some groups combined small-scale farming with wild food gathering and livestock herding after the African Humid Period. In Egypt and Sudan, communities mixed crop farming – focused on wheat, barley, and legumes – with fishing, dairy, and beer brewing.

Herders, in particular, developed highly flexible strategies. They adapted to hot plains, dry highlands, and everything in between. Pastoral systems (farming with grazing animals) show up at more archaeological sites than any other food system. They also have the widest range of chemical signatures – evidence of their adaptability to shifting environments.

Our study also used isotopic data to build up a picture of how people were using livestock. Most animal management systems were reliant on grasses (plants such as millet and tropical pasture), and adapted to diverse ecological conditions. Some systems were highly specialised to semi-arid and mountainous environments. Others included mixed herds adapted to wetter or lower elevation regions. In other cases, animals were kept as stock in small numbers to supplement other livelihoods – providing milk, dung, and insurance against crop failure.

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Read more:
Pastoralists are an asset to the world – and we have a lot to learn from them

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This adaptability helps clarify why, over the past millennium, pastoral systems have remained so important, especially in areas with increasing aridity.

Mixed livelihood strategies

The study also provides strong evidence for interactions between food production and foraging, whether at community or regional level.

Dynamic, mixed livelihood strategies, including interactions like trade within and between communities near and far, were especially apparent during periods of climatic stress. One of these periods was the end of the African Humid Period (from about 5,500 years ago), when a drier climate created new challenges.

In south-eastern Africa, from 2,000 years ago, there was a rise of diverse livelihood systems blending herding, farming and foraging in complex ways. These systems likely emerged in response to complex environmental and social change. Complex changes in social networks – especially around sharing land, resources, and knowledge – likely underpinned the development of this resilience.

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Read more:
Hunter-gatherer diets weren’t always heavy on meat: Morocco study reveals a plant-based diet

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How the past can inform the future

Ancient livelihood strategies offer a playbook for surviving climate change today.

Our analysis suggests that over thousands of years, communities that combined herding, farming, fishing and gathering were making context-specific choices that helped them weather unpredictable conditions. They built food systems that worked with the land and sea, not against them. And they leaned on strong social networks, sharing resources, knowledge and labour.

Past responses to climate shifts can inform current and future strategies for building resilience in regions facing socio-environmental pressures.

Leanne N. Phelps is affiliated with Columbia Climate School at Columbia University; Royal Botanic Garden Edinburgh, UK; and NGO Vaevae based in Andavadoake, Toliara, Madagascar

Kristina Guild Douglass receives funding from The US National Science Foundation. She is affiliated with the NGO Vae Vae.

– ref. Africans survived 10,000 years of climate changes by adapting food systems – study offers lessons for modern times – https://theconversation.com/africans-survived-10-000-years-of-climate-changes-by-adapting-food-systems-study-offers-lessons-for-modern-times-260240

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Kayla Kolff, Postdoctoral researcher, Osnabrück University

When we think about what sets humans apart from other animals, language often comes to mind. Language is more than words – it also relies on the ability to build shared understanding through conversation.

At the heart of conversation is turn-taking: the ability to coordinate interaction in time. This means alternating speaking roles, where one person speaks and the other listens, and responding in ways that keep the exchange moving forward.

But is this uniquely human? Increasingly, scientists are finding signs of turn-taking beyond our species – in visual cues in Siamese fish, in meerkat calls, and, as our recent study suggests, also in the grooming behaviour of chimpanzees.

As primatologists and biologists, we are interested in the evolutionary origins and driving forces behind human communication and cognition.

One animal behaviour that’s been said to involve features resembling human communication is grooming – combing through or licking each other’s fur. It’s one of the ways that some animals connect and bond with one another.

Grooming is a central part of the daily lives of chimpanzees, a species that together with bonobos represent humans’ closest living relatives. Chimpanzees engage in grooming to build relationships, reduce stress, and strengthen their friendships. While we know why they groom, and whom they prefer to groom, we do not know much about how it is organised. Does grooming happen randomly, or do chimpanzees take turns? And might things like age, their position in the group, family ties, or friendships influence the interaction? There may be another layer to grooming, shaped by social decisions made in the moment.

To answer this, we looked at whether grooming interactions involve turn-taking. We found that chimpanzees living in their natural environments do take turns, using a range of signals and movements to engage each other within the interaction. We then went on to check whether age, social standing, family ties and friendships affected the exchange of turns.

We found that especially age and social standing shaped how individuals accommodated their partners. This is in line with Communication Accommodation Theory, which is the idea that individuals adapt their communication according to the characteristics of recipients. Our findings open a new window on chimpanzee social cognition and provide perspectives on the evolutionary foundations of human communication.

Grooming coordination in the wild

To investigate how chimpanzees coordinate their grooming interactions, we studied male eastern chimpanzees at the Ngogo field site, in Uganda’s Kibale National Park. Over the course of ten months, we observed and filmed grooming interactions among 42 males in their natural environment using a digital camera.

As chimpanzee grooming is not just a simple back-and-forth where one chimpanzee grooms and then gets groomed in return, we paid close attention to gestures and additional actions. Gestures are bodily movements used to get another chimpanzee’s attention or to ask for something, such as raising an arm to invite more grooming. Actions, on the other hand, are things one chimpanzee does to another, such as grooming, approaching or leaving.

Based on these, we identified four types of turn exchanges:

• action–action

• action–gesture

• gesture–action

• gesture–gesture.

We observed that chimpanzees actively managed the interaction, using actions and gestures to start, invite, or respond to their partner’s participation.

What shapes participation in these exchanges?

Some chimpanzees were more likely than others to take turns during grooming. A closer look revealed that age and social status played a key role. Older males, who in chimpanzee societies tend to hold more dominant positions, were more likely to get responses from others. Younger males, especially adolescents, were more likely to take a turn in response to others than to have others take a turn in response to them – suggesting they were more often responding than being responded to.

That makes a lot of sense when you think about chimpanzee social life. Younger individuals are still figuring out their place in the group, and grooming can be a way to build and nurture relationships and to learn the social ropes and finesses. Older males already have stable and strong friendships; they often receive grooming from others and tend to give less in return.

Surprisingly, friendships and family ties did not influence the chances of turn-taking, although these are important aspects of chimpanzee lives. What mattered more were age and social standing. Think of it like choosing a lunch seat at school: you might choose to sit near an older student or someone popular, even if it meant not sitting with your friends or family.

When we looked more closely at different types of turn-taking, one stood out: gesture–gesture exchanges. These looked a lot like social negotiations, where both chimpanzees gestured to each other before any grooming happened. These kinds of exchanges were more common when a chimpanzee interacted with an older individual, who may be more experienced in handling social situations and better at getting what they want, whether that means “groom me” or “keep going in grooming me”.

This study suggests that chimpanzees take turns as a strategic social tool to achieve goals like being groomed instead of doing the grooming themselves. Who you are, who you are interacting with, and what you might stand to gain from the exchange all shape how things unfold.

What this tells us

Our findings reveal that chimpanzee grooming is a complex behaviour, organised through structured exchanges of gestures and actions, shaped by strategies for engaging with others. It’s about more than the grooming itself.

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Read more:
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This ability to coordinate action and respond to others suggests a basic foundation that may have helped lay the groundwork for the evolution of human communication.

Kayla Kolff received funding from the DFG, German Research Foundation.

This project is part of a project that was funded by an EUConsolidator
grant (772000, TurnTaking) to SP of the European
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme.

– ref. Whose turn is it? The question is at the heart of language and chimpanzees ask it too – https://theconversation.com/whose-turn-is-it-the-question-is-at-the-heart-of-language-and-chimpanzees-ask-it-too-258736

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Arnim Langer, Professor, KU Leuven

Almost 70 years after independence was gained across the continent, many African countries continue to face the complex task of managing ethnic diversity and building national cohesion. National cohesion is a broad and often abstract concept. It refers to the extent to which people within a country share a sense of common purpose and belonging. It is often reflected in the strength of national identities and the degree of pride individuals feel in being part of the nation.

The fact that borders in colonial Africa were drawn in the late 19th century to the early 20th century by European powers without regard for ethnic and cultural realities and histories meant that post-colonial African governments had to develop a sense of national consciousness and belonging.

To address this task, many African countries have made efforts to promote a shared national identity which could bridge ethnic and regional divides. Governments have experimented with a diverse range of policies: promoting national languages, establishing civic education, celebrating national holidays, and reforming state institutions. Other measures have included abolishing traditional kingdoms, redistributing land, renaming capital cities, compulsory military service, and national youth service programmes.

Research into the effectiveness of these African initiatives has been limited and inconclusive. In recently published research, researchers at the Centre for Research on Peace and Development at KU Leuven addressed this gap by analysing the impact of Ghana’s National Service Scheme. Our research shows that, under certain conditions, participation in this programme can meaningfully enhance feelings of national belonging.

Ghana’s experience with national service

Established in 1973, Ghana’s National Service Scheme requires university graduates to spend one year serving in diverse roles throughout the country. This sometimes takes them to regions far from their homes.

While Ghana is widely regarded as a model for the peaceful management of ethnic diversity, the establishment of the National Service Scheme in 1973 was necessary. It was partly a response to the deep regional and ethnic divisions that marked the country’s early postcolonial period. Notably, in the years leading up to the scheme’s introduction, political rivalry between Ashanti and Ewe elites played a significant role in the country’s political instability.

Initially designed to counteract such ethnic divisions, the scheme continues to engage very large numbers of graduates each year. Over 100,000 were deployed in 2025. The programme aims not only to strengthen national cohesion, but also to promote manpower development and address key social challenges. These include unemployment, illiteracy and poverty.

Participants are deployed across a range of sectors, including education, healthcare, agriculture and public administration. While the vast majority of participants are assigned to teaching roles in primary or secondary schools or to positions in healthcare institutions, others take on administrative roles within government agencies or the private sector. These deployments are meant to expose them to different communities and foster intergroup contact under conditions that promote social bonding and reduce prejudice.

But can national service also contribute towards fostering stronger feelings of national belonging?

To answer this question, we conducted a large-scale panel survey among almost 3,000 service personnel. They had participated in the scheme between August 2014 and September 2016. The participants were surveyed three times: before their deployment and again within weeks after completing their national service.

The survey was aimed at examining their feelings of national pride before, during, and after their year of national service. Our study provides compelling evidence that national service significantly boosts participants’ feelings of national pride and belonging.

We found that the mechanism behind this impact lies in intergroup contact. This is described as positive, meaningful interactions between individuals from diverse ethnic and regional backgrounds. Participants who reported frequent and meaningful interactions, including developing new friendships and gaining deeper knowledge of other cultural groups, showed the most significant increases in their sense of national pride.

Importantly, the greatest improvements were observed among participants who initially identified less strongly with the nation.

We further found that the positive effects of participation were not short-lived. It persisted well beyond the year of service.

Key takeaways for policymakers

Governments aiming to strengthen national identity through youth service programmes should consider four key lessons from Ghana’s experience.

Mandatory participation is crucial. Voluntary schemes tend to attract individuals who are already inclined towards inter-ethnic harmony. This limits their broader societal impact. Ghana’s mandatory approach ensures that a wide and diverse range of participants are included. This enhances the programme’s reach and effectiveness.

Structured interactions must be actively promoted. Simply placing people from different backgrounds together is not enough. Successful programmes, such as Ghana’s, intentionally create opportunities for meaningful engagement. These structured interactions help participants develop lasting relationships and deepen their understanding of other cultures.

Youth should be engaged during formative years. Recent graduates are at a stage in life when attitudes and identities are still forming. National service programmes that target this age group can have a lasting influence. Especially on how young people perceive national unity and their role within it.

Diverse placements are essential. National service programmes should deploy participants in settings that are diverse. The geographical location is of secondary importance. Exposure to diverse settings will challenge assumptions and broaden perspectives. It will also foster stronger national bonds across ethnic and regional lines.

Why national service pays off in the long run

National youth service programmes, when well-designed and properly managed, are a promising yet underused tool for promoting national unity in Africa’s ethnically diverse societies. These initiatives can create meaningful opportunities for young people to engage across regional and ethnic lines. This helps to build trust, civic responsibility, and a shared sense of national identity.

Yet, in recent decades, many of these programmes have been scaled back or discontinued across the continent. Examples are Botswana, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia. The main reason? Cost. Governments have often viewed the logistical and financial demands of deploying tens of thousands of graduates each year as unsustainable. But this short-term budget logic misses the bigger picture.

Ghana’s scheme shows what’s possible. In recent years, the scheme’s deployment figures have reached record highs. It is now common for around 100,000 national service personnel to be mobilised in a single service year. The positive outcomes observed in Ghana offer clear, evidence-based lessons for policymakers across the continent. Investing in national service is not just a cost – it’s a commitment to a more united future.

Arnim Langer receives funding from Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

Bart Meuleman receives funding from Research Foundation Flanders (FWO)

Lucas Leopold receives funding from Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

– ref. University graduates in Ghana must serve society for a year – study suggests it’s good for national unity – https://theconversation.com/university-graduates-in-ghana-must-serve-society-for-a-year-study-suggests-its-good-for-national-unity-258743

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julie Shantone Rubbi Nunan, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Early Childhood Education and Development, University of South Africa

South African primary schools are facing a crisis. Every day, learners fight, bully, destroy property, and intimidate other learners and teachers, turning what should be safe spaces into places of fear and mistrust.

Research shows that learner behaviour frequently involves violence, bullying and vandalism (damage to school property) that threatens the safety of both learners and staff.

The media usually report only serious cases of violence, but schools and teachers face challenging and dangerous behaviour every day that often goes unreported. This underreporting is not unique to South Africa; it’s a challenge seen in other countries too.

Research shows that this kind of behaviour disrupts teaching and learning, leading to poor learner performance and school dropouts.

Teachers frequently face aggression and intimidation from learners, which undermines their ability to teach effectively. They feel unsafe and frustrated when learners act aggressively, and this problem worsens when parents protect their children’s bad behaviour instead of addressing it.

Violence, bullying, and damage to school property don’t just cause harm to learners and teachers. They also cost schools money to repair the damage and cause emotional trauma and suffering for victims and their families.

Given these realities, it is important to carefully explore the lived experiences of teachers, school leaders and caretakers to fully understand the severity and complexity of challenging learner behaviour. This understanding is essential for developing effective policies and interventions aimed at restoring safety and improving learning environments in South African primary schools.

As part of a wider study of challenging learner behaviour, I interviewed 21 participants from three primary schools in Durban, South Africa. It was a qualitative case study, in which the small sample size was well-suited and provided relevant and credible information on challenging learner behaviour. Thematic analysis was appropriate for identifying patterns and themes for further exploration.

The aim was to probe the participants’ perspectives to understand how learners’ challenging behaviour is experienced in primary schools. I wanted to know more about how behaviour stemming from children’s homes and environments, playing out at school, was affecting teachers and the overall school climate.

The interviews indicated that teachers were unhappy and wanting to quit the profession, learner victims faced constant fear and distress, and caretakers felt degraded. If this is a sign of how teachers, children and caretakers are feeling around South Africa, it points to the need for ways to reduce their stress.

Voices from schools

The schools in my study are located in semi-urban areas within the same district and serve learners from grade R (about age 5) to grade 7 (about age 12). The surrounding communities face high levels of unemployment, domestic violence, and various social challenges.

Fifteen teachers, three governors, and three caretakers shared their experiences through interviews, enabling open discussion and deeper insights. Consistency across school sites supported the trustworthiness of the findings. Ethical guidelines were followed throughout.

Across the three schools, participants described an environment where serious learner misconduct was a common, everyday problem.

Teachers, governors, and caretakers reported daily disruptions that affected teaching, learning and emotional wellbeing. Aggression and violence were constant. Learners engaged in physical fights – punching, kicking, and using sharp objects like pencils and knives. These were not minor scuffles but incidents that caused serious injuries. Teachers were also threatened, shouted at, and occasionally physically harmed.

Bullying was widespread, both verbal and physical. Learners harassed peers through name-calling, exclusion, extortion and intimidation, often in unsupervised spaces like toilets and tuckshops. Victims lived in fear, while teachers struggled to maintain discipline and protect vulnerable learners.

Vandalism and property damage were routine. Learners tore up textbooks, damaged desks and windows, defaced walls with vulgar graffiti, and clogged toilets with rubbish. Caretakers faced degrading tasks like cleaning and scrubbing faeces and graffiti off the walls. The costs of repairing damage strained already limited school budgets.

Adding to the tension, gang-like behaviour emerged. Small groups banded together to provoke fights, intimidate others, and sometimes fuel unrest rooted in xenophobia or local politics, creating fear, uncertainty and division among learners.

Some incidents had gendered and criminal implications, including the reporting of boys violating the privacy and rights of other boys in the school toilets, and girls being inappropriately touched and harassed. This contributed to emotional trauma and, in some cases, learner dropout – especially among girls. The United Nations Children’s Fund posits that school violence contributes to girls dropping out of school. The dropout rate is a concern in South Africa.

Stealing and lying were common. Learners stole from classmates, teachers, and school offices, often without remorse, and frequently lied or blamed others when confronted, further eroding trust and accountability.

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Read more:
Dealing with unruly behaviour among schoolchildren in a tumultuous world

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Many participants believed learners expressed unspoken pain or mirrored violence and instability seen at home and in their communities. According to social cognitive theory, such behaviours are learned. Children exposed to violence, neglect, or chaos often replicate these actions in school. Without consistent guidance, role models, or consequences, the cycle intensifies.

Moving forward

In short, these schools are no longer safe havens for learning – they are in crisis. Without urgent and effective intervention, the very mission of basic education – and the wellbeing of children – is at risk.

Primary schools depend on governing authorities and communities for their safety and success. Stakeholders must take collective action to reclaim schools as safe learning spaces.

Governing authorities should address the issues raised by reviewing policies and implementing support programmes, including counselling, family-school partnerships, and teacher training to handle challenging behaviour in positive and sustainable ways.

Julie Shantone Rubbi Nunan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bullying, violence and vandalism in primary school: study explores a growing crisis in South Africa – https://theconversation.com/bullying-violence-and-vandalism-in-primary-school-study-explores-a-growing-crisis-in-south-africa-260111

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Philipp Kastner, Senior Lecturer in International Law, The University of Western Australia

The governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda concluded a peace treaty in June 2025, aimed at ending a decades-long war in eastern DRC. The United Nations welcomed the agreement as “a significant step towards de-escalation, peace and stability” in the region.

I have analysed several different peace negotiations and agreements. It’s important to distinguish between what’s needed to get warring parties to the table, and what’s eventually agreed on. In this article, I examine whether the DRC-Rwanda deal has got the four essential components that usually signal that an agreement will hold.

Two broad points about peace agreements, first – and one particular complication in the DRC-Rwanda case.

Firstly, one agreement is rarely enough to resolve a complex conflict. Most deals are part of a series of agreements, sometimes between different actors. They often mention previously concluded ones, and will be referred to by subsequent ones.

Secondly, peace is a process, and requires broad and sustained commitment. It is essential that other actors, like armed groups, are brought on board. Importantly, this also includes civil society actors. An agreement will be more legitimate and effective if different voices are heard during negotiations.

One major complication in relation to the DRC-Rwanda deal is that the United States has been the prime broker. But rather than acting as a neutral mediator trying to bring about peace, Washington seems to be pursuing its own economic interests. This does not bode well.

There is no simple recipe for a good peace agreement, but research shows that four elements are important: a serious commitment from the parties, precise wording, clear timelines and strong implementation provisions.

What underpins a good agreement

First, the parties need to be serious about the agreement and able to commit to its terms. It must not be used as a cover to buy time, re-arm or pursue fighting. Moreover, lasting peace cannot be made exclusively at the highest political level. Agreements that are the result of more inclusive processes, with input by and support from the communities concerned, have a higher success rate.

Second, the agreement must address the issues it aims to resolve, and its provisions must be drafted carefully and unambiguously. When agreements are vague or silent on key aspects, they are often short-lived. Previous experiences can guide peace negotiators and mediators in the drafting process. Peace agreement databases established by the United Nations and academic institutions are a useful tool for this.

Third, clear and realistic timelines are essential. These can concern the withdrawal of armed forces from specified territories, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the establishment of mechanisms providing reparations or other forms of transitional justice.

Fourth, an agreement should include provisions on its implementation. External support is usually helpful here. Third states or international organisations, liked the United Nations and the African Union, can be mandated to oversee this phase. They can also provide security guarantees or even deploy a peacekeeping operation. What is crucial is that these actors are committed to the process and don’t pursue their own interests.

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Read more:
DRC and Rwanda sign a US-brokered peace deal: what are the chances of its success?

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To know what to realistically expect from a specific peace agreement, it’s important to understand that such agreements can take very different forms. These range from pre-negotiation arrangements and ceasefires to comprehensive peace accords and implementation agreements.

A lasting resolution of the conflict should not be expected when only a few conflict parties have concluded a temporary ceasefire.

The DRC-Rwanda agreement: an important step with lots of shortcomings

It’s difficult to tell at this point how serious the DRC and Rwanda are about peace, and if their commitment will be enough.

Their assertion that they will respect each other’s territory and refrain from acts of aggression is certainly important.

But Rwanda has a history of direct military activities in the DRC since the 1990s. And the treaty only includes rather vague references to the “disengagement of forces/lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda”. It doesn’t specifically mention the withdrawal of the reportedly thousands of Rwandan troops deployed to eastern DRC.

The Paul Kagame-led Rwandan government has also supported Tutsi-dominated armed groups in the DRC since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) is the current primary military actor in eastern DRC. But the agreement between the governments of DRC and Rwanda didn’t include the M23 or other groups. The two governments only commit themselves to supporting the ongoing negotiations between the DRC and the M23 facilitated by Qatar.

The agreement also foresees the “neutralisation” of another armed group, the Hutu-dominated Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). This group claims to protect Rwandan Hutu refugees in the DRC, but is considered “genocidal” by the Rwandan government. The group has reacted to this plan by calling for a political solution and a more inclusive peace process.

What’s needed

The DRC-Rwanda agreement includes provisions that are vital to the people most affected by the conflict, such as the return of the millions of people displaced because of the fighting in eastern DRC. But it does not address other key issues.

For instance, aside from a general commitment to promote human rights and international humanitarian law, there is no reference to the widespread violations of human rights and war crimes reportedly committed by all sides. These include summary executions, and sexual and gender-based violence, including violence against children.

Some form of justice and reconciliation mechanism to deal with such large-scale violence should be considered in this situation, as for instance in the fairly successful 2016 agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC). This could contribute to preventing further violations as it sends a clear signal that committing crimes will not be rewarded. It also helps the population heal and gives peace a better chance.

There is no single model for this, and so-called transitional justice (defined as the “range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”) remains highly controversial. For instance, insisting on war crimes trials can be seen as endangering a fragile peace process.

But peace agreements across the world, from Libya to the Central African Republic, have over past decades moved away from blanket amnesties. They have increasingly included provisions to ensure accountability, especially for serious crimes. The DRC-Rwanda deal is silent on these questions.

A twist in the tale

The DRC-Rwanda deal is complicated by Washington’s role and pursuit of economic interests.

The two states agreed to establish a joint oversight committee, with members of the African Union, Qatar and the United States. It foresees a “regional economic integration framework”, which has been criticised as opening the door for foreign influence in the DRC’s rich mineral resources. The country is the world’s largest producer of cobalt, for instance, which is essential for the renewable energy sector.

Such a neocolonial “peace for exploitation bargain” does not send a positive signal. And it will probably not contribute to ending an armed conflict that has been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources.

Philipp Kastner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 4 things every peace agreement needs – and how the DRC-Rwanda deal measures up – https://theconversation.com/4-things-every-peace-agreement-needs-and-how-the-drc-rwanda-deal-measures-up-260944

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Johann van Niekerk, Doctor, Department of Environmental Sciences, University of South Africa

Have you ever wondered how wild birds cope with baking hot afternoons and freezing cold mornings? Our new study has taken a close look at one of Africa’s most familiar birds – the helmeted guineafowl – and uncovered surprising answers about how they deal with extreme temperatures.

The helmeted guineafowl (Numida meleagris) is a common sight across sub-Saharan Africa’s savannas and semi-arid regions. They are instantly recognisable with their spotted plumage, bony helmet, bare blue head, and loud cackling calls. These birds are famously social, often seen roaming in noisy flocks.

Helmeted guineafowl can endure air temperatures from -4°C up to 40°C in South Africa.

The idea that animals huddle to stay warm – known as social thermoregulation – is well documented in mammals and birds like penguins. This theory proposes that animals huddle together to conserve heat in cold conditions, but is this what guineafowl are doing?

Together with colleagues in Spain, we set out to find the answer because understanding whether birds group to keep warm or for other reasons helps ecologists uncover the true drivers of social behaviour. This can also inform how species will respond to changing climates and help guide conservation strategies.

We studied a wild population of guineafowl in South Africa’s Madikwe Game Reserve, a protected area near the Botswana border. It’s known for its sharp daily temperature fluctuations during winter, with cold, frosty mornings dropping to 0°C and sweltering afternoons reaching up to 40°C.

To spy on the birds without disturbing them, we set up a live-streaming webcam at a busy waterhole, recording their behaviour over an entire year. We watched how group size, body posture and daily routines shifted with the seasons and weather.

What we found was striking.

Our study challenges some common assumptions about how animals survive in extreme climates. Guineafowl don’t rely on cuddling for warmth like some penguins and some species of monkeys. Rather, they use behaviour – adjusting posture, timing their activity and changing group sizes according to food and safety needs – to navigate life’s temperature extremes.

This strategy may help them cope with the growing unpredictability of climate.

When they get together, it’s to exploit a food patch and nurture their offspring within close-knit social groups while foraging, or to fend off predators during coordinated mobbing behaviour.

What we found

The evidence we gathered shows that the guineafowl did not form bigger groups when temperatures dropped. There was no evidence they huddled together to stay warm. Even at night, when they roosted in trees, they perched in small family units – just two or three birds per branch.

Our findings suggest that the reason guineafowl form groups has more to do with food and safety.

During the dry winter months, when seeds and vegetation are scarce, the birds form large foraging flocks to help find food and stay safe from predators. More eyes mean better chances of spotting danger. This supports the widely recognised “many eyes” hypothesis, which shows that individuals in larger groups benefit from improved predator detection. But once the rains return and food becomes more plentiful and spread out, the guineafowl split into pairs or small groups to focus on breeding.

While group size wasn’t tied to temperature, the birds used clever body postures to handle both heat and cold. On chilly mornings below 17°C, they puffed out their collar feathers and tucked their bare necks deep into their bodies, creating a rounded, fluffy ball that trapped heat.

On warmer days, they stood tall with their necks fully extended, legs exposed, and feathers sleek to release excess heat. When temperatures soared above 30°C, they opened their beaks to pant, spread their wings slightly away from their bodies, and exposed bare skin to cool off, much as a dog pants on a hot day.

One of the most delightful behaviours observed was “sunning”. On frosty winter mornings, guineafowl would fly down from their roosts and stand facing the rising sun, fluffing their feathers and soaking up warmth before starting their day. It’s a simple, effective way to heat up after a cold night.

Another surprise was how rarely the birds drank water. Despite living in a dry environment, only about 2% of observed guineafowl visits were to the waterhole. In wet seasons, they likely get most of their moisture from eating green plants and insects. In the cold, dry season, when food is drier, drinking increased slightly, but still far less than expected.

They drank even less when it was both hot and windy, possibly because the noise of the wind makes it harder to detect predators when standing out in the open. Avoiding water during hot periods is usual among helmeted guineafowl, which typically avoid exposing themselves during peak heat due to increased predation risk and the physiological stress of extreme temperatures. Most galliforms (gamebirds) and terrestrial species favour early morning or late afternoon activity patterns, limiting mid-day exposure.

Every evening, the flock gathered at the same familiar “launching pad” near the waterhole and flew into nearby trees to roost. But once again, warmth wasn’t the reason for this behaviour. They roosted to avoid ground predators, not to share body heat. I have seen them for many years going into trees when predators or dogs chase them, unlike spurfowl and francolin just flying further on.

Why insights are useful

This research carries important lessons for understanding animal adaptation. Rather than relying on group warmth, guineafowl show how behavioural flexibility, adjusting posture, timing and habitat use, can buffer them against harsh conditions. It highlights how survival depends not just on temperature or water availability, but on having access to diverse habitat types: open grasslands for foraging and trees or dense bush for roosting and safety.

As climates shift and ecosystems change, understanding how animals like guineafowl cope with extremes will be crucial for conservation planning.

Johann van Niekerk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Guineafowl can outsmart extreme temperatures: we spent a year finding out how – https://theconversation.com/guineafowl-can-outsmart-extreme-temperatures-we-spent-a-year-finding-out-how-260439

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sheldon Strydom, Senior Lecturer & Head of Department, Department of Geography, Rhodes University

Winter in some parts of South Africa is a time of low (or no) rainfall and high fire danger. Sheldon Strydom studies the relationship between weather and fire, in particular how Berg winds, also known as mountain flow events, are linked to periods of enhanced fire danger. Mid-July is typically a high risk period. He shares what he has learnt during his research in the midlands of KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa, close to the country’s largest mountain range, the Drakensberg.

What are Berg winds and how do they form?

It’s long been known that mountain winds (“foëhn winds”, “chinook winds” and the like) increase fire danger. There’s case study evidence from around the globe.

In South Africa, these mountain winds are known as Berg winds. They are generally experienced as warm and dry.

A mountain wind starts when a mass of air is forced to rise along a windward slope (the side of the mountain that wind is blowing towards). As the mass of air rises it cools. When it reaches the peak of the slope or mountain it descends on the leeward (sheltered) side. As it gets lower, the air gets warmer.

Berg winds commonly occur in South African winters when high atmospheric pressure systems are situated over the interior of the country and low pressure systems are situated off the coast. (Atmospheric pressure is the pressure of air over the land, and affects the movement of air.)

Usually, a coastal low pressure system happens a day or two before a cold front. The pressure gradient (difference in pressure that drives wind) between the interior high pressure cell and coastal low pressure cell results in air flowing towards the coast from the interior of the country, down the mountain escarpment. The air reaches coastal areas as a warm, dry wind.

Why study the relationship between Berg winds and fires?

Winds can spread fires in the landscape.

Our study, using data from four sites in the midlands of KwaZulu-Natal, quantified the effect of Berg winds on the microclimate (local weather conditions) and emphasised how these changes influence fire danger.

The sources of fires in South Africa, as elsewhere, vary. For example, wildfires can be started when prescribed burning, or the planned use of fire, becomes uncontrolled due to changes in weather conditions. Accidental fires and arson are the most common causes of wildfires. Research shows that wildfires and fire disasters are common in areas where prescribed burning is used.

Prescribed burning, or the planned use of fire, is an important aspect of agricultural management. It promotes the dispersal and germination of seeds from a number of species and also removes ground litter. Prescribed burning is used to manage grasslands and has been linked to decreasing the number of disease-borne vectors such as ticks.

But if they get out of control, fires pose a threat to farmland and plantations.

It’s therefore vital to have weather forecasts and monitoring systems that warn of conditions conducive to the development and spread of fires.

Internationally, fire danger indices or meters are used to monitor conditions. In South Africa, the South African Weather Service and other interested and affected parties currently use the Lowveld fire danger index. The index is calculated using records of air temperature, relative humidity and wind speed and rainfall. These are measured once a day. Daily forecasts are available from the Weather Service and disseminated to local fire protection associations.

Much research in South Africa has focused on pyrogeography (understanding when and where fires occur) and fire ecology. Little research has been done to quantify the effects of Berg winds on fire danger using available historical hourly meteorological data.

The midlands of KwaZulu-Natal province serve as a perfect environment to study the effects of Berg winds on the microclimate and fire danger. The area is close to the Drakensberg mountains and experiences frequent fires. It’s also a largely agricultural area.

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Read more:
Southern Africa’s rangelands do many jobs, from feeding cattle to storing carbon: a review of 60 years of research

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What did you discover?

The study developed a fuzzy logic system (a mathematical method for handling uncertainty) to identify periods of Berg wind conditions using historical hourly meteorological data in four sites.

We analysed variables like the air temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, and fire danger at different times of the day and night, before and during Berg winds.

The analysis revealed the significance of change experienced in the local weather conditions (within 2km) during periods of Berg winds, and how these changes influence fire danger.

It found that:

• Berg winds were more common during daytime hours and affected the microclimate most during the day

• during daytime Berg wind events, air temperatures rose by an average of 5.5°C; humidity fell by an average of 16%; and wind speed increased by an average of 5.2 metres per second

• daytime Berg wind events significantly elevated fire danger

• night-time Berg winds, while less common, did still result in significant change in the microclimate

• at night, fire danger increases when a combination of variables change significantly.

The fuzzy logic system can be useful in two ways: to quantify the effects of Berg winds on the microclimate and to complement any fire danger monitoring system. It can measure conditions at a higher temporal resolution, such as every 10 minutes, or hour – making it more useful for monitoring near real-time changes in fire danger.

The system could be valuable for operational use by agencies like the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Disaster Management Centre, and could be applied in other regions vulnerable to fire risk.

Sheldon Strydom receives funding from Rhodes University, and the National Research Foundation.

Michael John Savage has received funding from the NRF.

– ref. Berg winds in South Africa: the winter weather pattern that increases wildfire risks – https://theconversation.com/berg-winds-in-south-africa-the-winter-weather-pattern-that-increases-wildfire-risks-260612