The Conversation – Africa – Page 38

July 22, 2025

Learning statistics through story: students get creative with numbers

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Johan Ferreira, Professor, University of the Witwatersrand

Statistics professor Johan Ferreira was feeling overwhelmed by the amount of “screen time” involved in online learning in 2021. He imagined students must be feeling the same way, and wondered what he could do to inspire them and make his subject matter more appealing.

One of the topics in statistics is time series analysis: statistical methods to understand trend behaviour in data which is measured over time. There are lots of examples in daily life, from rainfall records to changes in commodity prices, import or exports, or temperature.

Ferreira asked his students to write a short, fictional “bedtime” story using “characters” from time series analysis. The results were collected into a book that is freely available. He tells us more about it.

Why use storytelling to learn about statistics?

I’m fortunate to be something of a creative myself, being a professional oboe player with the Johannesburg Philharmonic Orchestra. It’s a valuable outlet for self-expression. I reflected on what other activity could inspire creativity without compromising the essence of statistical thinking that was required in this particular course I was teaching.

I invited my third-year science and commerce students at the University of Pretoria to take part in a voluntary storytelling exercise, using key concepts in time series analysis as characters. Students got some guidelines but were free to be creative. My colleague and co-editor, Dr Seite Makgai, and I then read, commented on and edited the stories and put them together into an anthology.

Students gave their consent that their stories could be used for research purposes and might be published. Out of a class of over 200 students, over 30 contributions were received; 23 students permitted their work to be included in this volume.

We curated submissions into two sections (Part I: Fables and Fairy Tales and Part II: Fantasy and Sci-Fi) based on the general style and gist of the work.

The project aimed to develop a new teaching resource, inspire students to take ownership of their learning in a creative way, and support them through informal, project-based peer learning.

This collection is written by students, for students. They used personal and cultural contexts relevant to their background and environment to create content that has a solid background in their direct academic interests. And the stories are available without a paywall!

What are some of the characters and stories?

Student Lebogang Malebati wrote Stationaryville and the Two Brothers, a tale about AR(1) and AR(2). In statistics, AR refers to processes in which numerical values are based on past values. The brothers “were both born with special powers, powers that could make them stationary…” and could trick an evil wizard.

David Dodkins wrote Zt and the Shadow-spawn. In this story, Zt (common notation in time series analysis) has a magic amulet that reveals his character growth through a sequence of models and shows the hero’s victory in the face of adversity. He is a function of those that came before him (through an AR process).

Then there’s Nelis Daniels’ story about a shepherd plagued by a wolf called Arma (autoregressive moving average) which kept making sheep disappear.

And Dikelede Rose Motseleng’s modern fable about the love-hate relationship between AR(1) (“more of a linear guy” with a bad habit of predicting the future based on the past) and MA(1), “the type of girl who would always provide you with stationarity (stability).”

What was the impact of the project?

It was a deeply enriching experience for us to see how students see statistics in a context beyond that of the classroom, especially in cases where students reformulated their stories within their own cultural identities or niche interests.

Three particular main impacts stand out for us:

students have a new additional reference and learning resource for the course content
new students can refer to the experiences and contextualisation of this content of former students, leading to informal peer learning
students engage in a cognitive skill (higher-order and creative thinking) that is not frequently considered and included in this field and at this level.

In 2024, shortly after the book was published, we asked students in the time series analysis course of that year to read any one of four stories (related to concepts that were already covered in the course material at that point in time). We asked them to complete a short and informal survey to gauge their experience and insights regarding the potential of this book as a learning resource for them.

The 53 responses we got indicated that most students saw the book as a useful contribution to their learning experience in time series analysis.

One positive comment from a student was:

I will always remember that the Random Walk is indeed not stationary but White Noise is. I already knew it, but now I won’t forget it.

Will you build on this in future?

It is definitely valuable to consider similar projects in other branches of statistics, but also, in other disciplines entirely, to develop content by students, for students.

At this stage, we’re having the stories and book translated into languages beyond English. In large classes that are essential to data science (such as statistics and mathematics), many different home languages may be spoken. Students often have to learn in their second, third, or even fourth language. So, this project is proving valuable in making advanced statistical concepts tactile and “at home” via translations.

Our publisher recently let us know that the Setswana translation is complete, with the Sepedi and Afrikaans translations following soon. To our knowledge, it’ll be the first such project not only in the discipline of statistics, but in four of the official languages in South Africa.

Johan Ferreira receives funding from the Centre of Excellence in Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, based at the University of the Witwatersrand, towards this Scholarship of Learning and Teaching project.

– ref. Learning statistics through story: students get creative with numbers – https://theconversation.com/learning-statistics-through-story-students-get-creative-with-numbers-261198

July 22, 2025

Livestock and lions make uneasy neighbours: how a fence upgrade helped protect domestic and wild animals in Tanzania

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jonathan Salerno, Associate Professor, Colorado State University, Colorado State University

Protecting livestock in areas where large carnivores (like lions) live is increasingly important as human land use expands, wildlife habitat shrinks, and climatic changes reshape the ways in which humans and wildlife interact. Protecting the carnivores from livestock owners is important too. Intact carnivore populations support more resilient food webs and the ecosystem services they provide.

It’s not easy for people, livestock, and carnivores to live together without conflict, though. One of the best ways to reduce conflict is to protect livestock like cattle and sheep from being attacked by predators.

There are various methods to do this, like guarding livestock or erecting fences. That’s all very well for the livestock inside the fences, but do predators simply turn to the nearest unprotected livestock for their meal instead? Are the neighbours’ cattle, sheep, and goats at greater risk? This question hasn’t been explored much by researchers.

We’re a group of conservation practitioners and scientists who have studied the interactions of carnivores, livestock, and people in Tanzania and elsewhere for decades to try and find solutions to conflict problems.

Our study area is next to a national park which protects important populations of lion, leopard, hyena, African wild dog, and cheetah. The people who live here have traditionally kept their livestock overnight in enclosures made of acacia-thorn branches. More recently, some of them have built pens, or corrals, from tall chain link fencing. We knew from years working with communities and from previous research that these fortified corrals were effective at keeping livestock safe from predators.

Our next step was to find out whether this made other nearby livestock less safe.

The results were intriguing. We found that the new enclosures made predation less likely in the nearby traditional enclosures too.

This type of beneficial spillover effect had yet to be documented in other systems where interventions aim to protect livestock from large carnivores.

Our results show that in conservation, it’s important to look closely at complex local dynamics. The findings may help explain why there’s so much uncertainty about the effectiveness of various human–wildlife conflict mitigation strategies.

Beneficial spillover effects

People who keep livestock in east Africa have long had strategies to keep their animals safe from large carnivores. Sometimes acacia-thorn night enclosures (known locally as bomas), intensive herding practices, and guarding dogs work well.

Other times, and especially in communities within and adjacent to large, protected carnivore populations, traditional strategies fall short.

This is the case in Tanzania’s Ruaha-Rungwa Landscape. In our study area adjacent to Ruaha National Park, any pastoralist or agropastoralist (herding and crop farming) household has about a 30% chance of losing one or more animals to predation each year. This is a serious economic loss on top of important cultural and emotional costs.

Lion Landscapes, an organisation that some of us have been running for over a decade, works to support human-carnivore coexistence. Adjacent to Ruaha, we have been partnering with households to build 1.8-metre chain-link corrals. We subsidise them. Households contribute 25% of the cost and some of the labour for construction.

We analysed about 25,000 monthly reports of livestock predation in fenced and traditional enclosures, using statistical models. There were 846 predation events over nearly four years. Unexpectedly, while we did detect spillover effects, these appeared to be beneficial. Rather than displacing conflicts, fortified enclosures actually conferred protective effects on their traditional-enclosure neighbours.

For example, households within 50 metres (the minimum observed distance) of a fortified enclosure were half as likely to experience predation compared with distant households 2 kilometres away. And these beneficial effects increased with the number of fortified enclosures in a neighbourhood. Finally, the effects appeared to be durable over time.

The fortified enclosures were extremely effective. We showed that households could break even after paying for the fence in just a few years through avoided livestock losses. And we know that when domestic animals aren’t being killed, their owners are more tolerant of predators. We didn’t record carnivore killings in this study but it has happened fairly frequently in the area in the past.

In a few of the world’s human-wildlife conflict systems, where data exist to assess spillover effects, there is evidence that detrimental spillovers do occur. For instance, beehive deterrents may redirect elephants to nearby crop fields, or lethal removal of individual wolves may redirect the surviving pack to prey on adjacent ranches. Nevertheless, these are very under-studied interactions.

Livestock management and carnivore coexistence

In systems where humans, livestock, and wildlife overlap and sometimes come into conflict, management strategies too often focus on wildlife. Another option is to reduce whatever attracts wildlife. In the case of large carnivores, this means managing livestock.

Our results support this approach by demonstrating that management and protection of livestock is fundamental for reducing conflict, and can benefit not only livestock owners but landscape-level coexistence.

Conservationists and policy-makers need to encourage these practices that benefit people, carnivores, and livestock in shared landscapes.

Amy Dickman works for Lion Landscapes as the Joint CEO

Jonathan Salerno, Kevin Crooks, Rekha Warrier, and Stewart Breck do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Livestock and lions make uneasy neighbours: how a fence upgrade helped protect domestic and wild animals in Tanzania – https://theconversation.com/livestock-and-lions-make-uneasy-neighbours-how-a-fence-upgrade-helped-protect-domestic-and-wild-animals-in-tanzania-258113

July 22, 2025

Ghana’s security strategy has kept terror attacks at bay: what other countries can learn from its approach

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah, Postdoctoral Fellow, Dublin City University

Ghana stands out in west Africa as a nation that has not experienced terrorist attacks, even though it’s geographically close to countries that have. In Burkina Faso, Mali and Nigeria, extremist groups such as Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) have wreaked havoc.

This resilience is not accidental. It is the result of deliberate counter-terrorism strategies employed by Ghana’s security institutions.

Ghana’s counter-terrorism framework was set out in 2020. It has four pillars: prevent, pre-empt, protect, and respond. The idea is to coordinate multiple agencies, including the Ghana Police Service, Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana Armed Forces and the National Intelligence Bureau.

These pillars guide strategies to address both immediate threats and underlying vulnerabilities. Poverty, religious radicalism and porous borders are common drivers of terrorism in west Africa.

I am an international security and global governance researcher. My co-author is a government and international studies scholar.

Four years ago we wrote a paper examining Ghana’s resilience against terrorist attacks. Our findings are still relevant given the increasing activities of terror groups in the west African region.

We wanted to identify what works as a potential model for other countries.

Using a qualitative methodology, we interviewed stakeholders — including police officers, members of the armed forces, Muslim community leaders, and immigration officials. We also analysed the national framework for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism.

Our findings showed that Ghana’s success is traceable to an approach that integrates community engagement with advanced border technology, inter-agency training, media collaboration and intelligence operations. And it addresses both immediate and underlying threats.

We argue that Ghana’s ability to balance prevention with security offers solutions for stability in a geopolitically volatile region.

Community engagement

One of the standout strategies is community engagement. This serves multiple purposes, from guiding people away from extremism to gathering intelligence.

The Ghana Police Service, for instance, engages Muslim-dominated communities, known as “Zongos”, to counter radical Islamic ideologies that could be exploited by terrorist groups.

By collaborating with local religious leaders, police make communities aware of the dangers of radicalisation. They foster trust and encourage residents to report suspicious activities. This approach also works in tackling illegal arms circulation.

Ghana has an estimated 2.3 million small arms in circulation – 1.1 million of them illegally possessed. The availability of so many weapons fuels terrorist activities across west Africa.

Community based de-radicalisation aligns with global best practices. In Norway, for instance, it was used to disengage youth from extremist groups.

Technology at borders

Ghana’s border control management is another part of its counter-terrorism strategy. Ghana Immigration Service uses advanced security software and integrated systems like the “Immigration 360” system, designed to fully automate passenger processing and data management.

The system manages records of fingerprints and other data to improve reporting and intelligence sharing between Ghana Immigration and other security agencies.

The technology makes it possible to quickly identity individuals on terrorist watchlists and detects concealed goods. This helps prevent illegal cross-border movements.

There are gaps in Ghana’s defences, however. The influx of migrants fleeing extremist violence in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2024 highlights the urgency of scaling up investments in the technology.

Training for preparedness

Ghana combats new and varying forms of terrorism by uncovering trends and training personnel to deal with them.

A notable example was the six-day joint training in 2022 involving the Ghana Immigration Service, Police Service, Customs, Economic and Organised Crime Office, and the National Intelligence Bureau.

The country also works with regional neighbours like Burkina Faso, Togo and Benin, and partners such as the United States, through initiatives like “Operation Epic Guardian”.

Media as a strategic partner

Terrorists rely on media to amplify fear and publicise their causes. Ghana’s security agencies counter this tactic by actively engaging media houses to report accurately.

The Ghana Armed Forces, for instance, works with media to debunk false reports, which can cause public panic and inadvertently aid terrorists.

The Ghana Police Service emphasises regular dialogue with media to ensure sensitive information is verified before publication, reducing the risk of tipping off suspects. However, media competition for viewers poses a challenge.

Surveillance and intelligence gathering

Surveillance and intelligence gathering is critical. Plainclothes armed forces and immigration personnel blend into communities to monitor potential threats. The approach has worked but is constrained by resources.

It can also risk human rights violations, such as wrongful profiling, and is less effective against multiple targets compared to technological solutions like facial recognition or CCTV.

Challenges and regional implications

Despite its successes, Ghana’s counter-terrorism framework faces challenges that could undermine its long-term efficacy:

logistical and financial constraints
the influx of migrants fleeing regional violence
a lack of harmonised security cultures within the regional body, Ecowas.

In all, Ghana’s strategies offer lessons for west Africa, where terrorism is a growing threat.

Its community engagement model could be followed in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to counter radicalisation and arms proliferation, provided it avoids religious stereotyping.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ghana’s security strategy has kept terror attacks at bay: what other countries can learn from its approach – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-security-strategy-has-kept-terror-attacks-at-bay-what-other-countries-can-learn-from-its-approach-260333

July 22, 2025

South Africa’s police serve the ANC insiders, not the people: here’s how it happened

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Ivor Chipkin, Professional Professor, GIBS, University of Pretoria

After South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, there was significant optimism about police reform in the country. Impressive steps were taken to bring the South African Police Service under civilian control and to create a service responsive to calls for assistance from the public.

During the apartheid period, South Africa’s police worked to preserve the political order and pursue political opponents. It did not focus on dealing with crime. This is why the achievements of the 1990s are so important. For the first time, black South Africans could call upon officers to respond to personal emergencies. This period also saw a drop in crime levels.

However, this promising early transformation was interrupted. The appointment of Jackie Selebi as national police commissioner in 2000 heralded a new era. Selebi was an African National Congress (ANC) insider. The ANC originated as a liberation movement and has governed the country since 1994.

Selebi had served as the head of the ANC’s Youth League in the 1980s, when it was banned. In 1987 he was appointed to the organisation’s national executive committee, its highest decision-making organ.

His appointment as police commissioner was the start of significant change in the purpose of policing. It marked the end of the focus on civilian control of the police force and prosecuting authorities. As an ANC insider, Selebi led efforts to establish party control over the police.

This politicisation gained momentum over the next two decades. In the early years it was exemplified by the suspension of the head of the National Prosecuting Authority, Advocate Vusi Pikoli,, by then president Thabo Mbeki, amid corruption allegations against Selebi himself.

Other telling developments ensued. The Scorpions were disbanded in 2009 by acting president Kgalema Motlanthe. The unit’s job was to pursue high-profile cases against senior ANC politicians (among others).

The police became increasingly entangled in the ANC’s internal political conflicts. At the same time the office of the national police commissioner experienced high turnover due to intense political manoeuvring. Between 2009 and 2022, there were seven national commissioners.

Recent developments have once again brought the intermingling of police work and power battles in the ANC to the fore. In early July 2025, Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, the commissioner of police in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, made some startling claims. He called a press conference and, wearing camouflage uniform, he implicated the minister of police, Senzo Mchunu, together with the deputy national commissioner for crime detection, in a scheme to close down investigations into political assassinations in the province.

President Cyril Ramaphosa rushed back from a meeting of the Brics countries in Brazil to attend to the matter. He announced that the police minister had been placed on leave with immediate effect. He also announced a judicial inquiry into the allegations.

I have conducted research into South Africa’s security apparatus over the last decade. Based on this work, and new research forthcoming in the Journal of Southern African Studies done with Jelena Vidojevic, co-founder of the New South Institute, it is clear that elite contestation in the ANC is intensifying.

In other words, the ability of internal party structures to manage gatekeeping is declining. Many of the people involved are indifferent or even hostile to South Africa’s democratic and constitutional order.

As the ability of some political elites to access state resources through the party declines, some are linked with organised criminal networks. Organised crime has been on the edges of South African politics. It now risks taking a more central role.

In this environment, the police service will often be the thin (blue) line between multiparty contestation according to constitutional rules and the criminalisation of politics in South Africa.

The shift

Large organisational changes within the police vividly illustrate this shift away from its core function.

The Visible Policing programme was meant to meant to deter crime through patrols, checkpoints and roadblocks. But, instead, there was a steady decline in resource allocation. Employee numbers dropped between 2015 and 2021.

Detective services and crime intelligence also experienced such declines.

Conversely, employee numbers in the Protection and Security Services programme, responsible for providing bodyguards to politicians, increased sharply between 2014 and 2016.

Evidence heard by the commission of inquiry into state capture suggested that some officers and budgets in the service were even used to supply President Jacob Zuma and other politicians with what amounted to a private militia.

This reorientation of resources coincided with a rise in crime across the country, a decline in arrests by 24.5%, and a drop in the police’s efficacy in solving crimes.

Furthermore, a politicised police leadership effectively stopped policing various categories of crime. This was particularly true of offences like fraud, corruption, and certain types of theft, and particularly when politically connected persons were involved.

The state capture commission heard extensive evidence about the failure of the police to pursue politically sensitive investigations. Investigations into senior officials were frequently frustrated or impeded, and cases at state-owned enterprises were abandoned.

This shows how police resources were actively redirected as weapons of elite competition, pursuing political enemies and protecting allies within the ruling party.

Mkhwanazi’s claims, if substantiated, suggest that this political policing remains entrenched.

What now?

Ramaphosa has announced the appointment of Firoz Cachalia as the acting minister of police. Cachalia, a well regarded legal academic, served as ANC minister for community safety. Between 2019 and 2022 he was part of the ANC’s national executive committee.

His appointment raises serious questions.

If the core problem with the police is that it has become embroiled in ANC internal politics, having an ANC insider head the ministry of police (even if only on an acting basis) threatens only to compound the problem.

Moreover, South Africans have already witnessed a long and expensive judicial inquiry into state capture. And despite extensive evidence of police failure to pursue politically sensitive investigations, nothing concrete has come of it.

How likely is it that this new initiative will be any different, especially if those investigating it and presiding over key institutions are themselves ANC insiders?

To depoliticise the police service and redirect its attention and activities towards crime and emergencies, a crucial first step is to reconsider the appointment processes for the national police commissioner and other top managers.

Under the current system the president has sole discretion. This bakes party-political considerations into the decision-making process.

Without structural changes, genuine democratic policing will remain an elusive ideal.

In 2024/25 the murder rate in South Africa stood at 42 per 100,000, among the highest in the world and close to levels not seen since the early 2000s.

At the very least, the minister of police must not be an ANC insider. Democratic renewal in South Africa requires bringing the police firmly under parliamentary control.

Ivor Chipkin teaches public policy at the Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) at the University of Pretoria. He is the director of the New South Institute.

– ref. South Africa’s police serve the ANC insiders, not the people: here’s how it happened – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-police-serve-the-anc-insiders-not-the-people-heres-how-it-happened-261301

July 21, 2025

Ghana has a rare treasure, a crater made when a meteor hit Earth: why it needs to be protected

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marian Selorm Sapah, Senior lecturer, University of Ghana

Impact craters are formed when an object from space such as a meteoroid, asteroid or comet strikes the Earth at a very high velocity. This leaves an excavated circular hole on the Earth’s surface.

It is a basic geological process that has shaped the planets from their formation to today. It creates landscapes and surface materials across our solar system. The moon is covered with them, as are planets like Mercury, Mars and Venus. On Earth, impacts have influenced the evolution of life and even provided valuable mineral and energy resources. However, very few of the impact craters on Earth are visible because of various processes that obscure or erase them.

Most of the recognised impact craters on Earth are buried under sediments or have been deeply eroded. That means they no longer preserve their initial forms.

The Bosumtwi impact crater in Ghana is different, however. It is well preserved (not deeply eroded or buried under sediments). Its well-defined, near-circular basin, filled by a lake, is surrounded by a prominent crater rim that rises above the surface of the lake and an outer circular plateau. This makes it a target for several research questions.

As an Earth scientist, I joined a research team from 2019 to better understand the morphology of the crater. We carried out a morphological analysis of the crater (a study of its form, structure and geological features).

This study concluded that the activities of illegal miners are a threat to the sustainability of the crater. We also discovered that the features of the Bosumtwi impact crater can be considered as a terrestrial representation for a special type of impact crater known as rampart craters. These are common on the planets Mars and Venus and are found on icy bodies of the outer solar system (like Ganymede, Europa, Dione, Tethys and Charon).

For future studies, the Bosumtwi impact crater can be used to help understand how rampart craters form on Mars and Venus. So the Bosumtwi impact crater should be protected and preserved.

The crater

The Bosumtwi impact crater is in Ghana’s mineral-rich Ashanti gold belt. It is the location of the only natural inland lake in Ghana. As one of the world’s best-preserved young meteorite impact craters it is designated as an International Union of Geological Sciences geoheritage site.

It is one of only 190 confirmed impact crater sites worldwide, one of only 20 on the African continent. Its lake is one of six meteoritic lakes in the world, recognised for their outstanding scientific value.

At almost 1.07 million years old, the crater offers unparalleled opportunities for studying impact processes, climate history and planetary evolution. It’s an irreplaceable natural laboratory for researchers and educators.

Beyond its scientific importance, the crater holds cultural significance for the Ashanti people of Ghana. The lake at its centre serves as a sacred site and spiritual landmark. The crater’s breathtaking landscape also supports eco-tourism and local livelihoods, contributing to Ghana’s economic development while maintaining exceptional aesthetic value.

The research

As part of further research work on the 2019 study, in 2025 we have discovered through field work and satellite data analysis that illegal artisanal mining is prevalent in the area and threatening the crater. This refers to informal, labour-intensive extraction of minerals, primarily gold. It is conducted by individuals or small groups using basic tools and rudimentary machinery. The use of toxic chemicals such as mercury and cyanide, and practices such as river dredging, cause severe environmental harm.

Illegal miners are encroaching on and around the crater rim, posing severe threats to its environment and sustainability. Their activities have become more prevalent over the course of less than 10 years, indicating a growing problem. If unchecked, it could lead to irreversible damage to the crater.

These mining operations risk contaminating the lake with toxic heavy metals. The consequences of these are grave. They include destroying critical geological evidence, accelerating deforestation, and degrading the land. All this damages the crater’s scientific, cultural and economic value.

The International Union of Geological Sciences geoheritage designation of the crater underscores the urgent need for protection measures. The loss of this rare geological wonder would represent not just a national tragedy for Ghana, but a blow to global scientific heritage.

Immediate action is required. This includes enhanced satellite monitoring (tracking illegal mining, deforestation and environmental changes) using optical imagery (such as Sentinel-2, Landsat, PlanetScope). These tools can detect forest loss, identify mining pits and sediment runoff, and analyse changes over time.

Stricter enforcement of mining bans, and community engagement programmes, will help preserve the Bosumtwi impact crater’s unique attributes for future generations of scientists, students, tourists and local communities who depend on its resources.

Marian Selorm Sapah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ghana has a rare treasure, a crater made when a meteor hit Earth: why it needs to be protected – https://theconversation.com/ghana-has-a-rare-treasure-a-crater-made-when-a-meteor-hit-earth-why-it-needs-to-be-protected-260600

July 21, 2025

Africa’s minerals are being bartered for security: why it’s a bad idea

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Hanri Mostert, SARChI Chair for Mineral Law in Africa, University of Cape Town

A US-brokered peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda binds the two African nations to a worrying arrangement: one where a country signs away its mineral resources to a superpower in return for opaque assurances of security.

The peace deal, signed in June 2025, aims to end three decades of conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.

A key part of the agreement binds both nations to developing a regional economic integration framework. This arrangement would expand cooperation between the two states, the US government and American investors on “transparent, formalized end-to-end mineral chains”.

Despite its immense mineral wealth, the DRC is among the five poorest countries in the world. It has been seeking US investment in its mineral sector.

The US has in turn touted a potential multi-billion-dollar investment programme to anchor its mineral supply chains in the traumatised and poor territory.

The peace that the June 2025 deal promises, therefore, hinges on chaining mineral supply to the US in exchange for Washington’s powerful – but vaguely formulated – military oversight.

The peace agreement further establishes a joint oversight committee – with representatives from the African Union, Qatar and the US – to receive complaints and resolve disputes between the DRC and Rwanda.

But beyond the joint oversight committee, the peace deal creates no specific security obligations for the US.

The relationship between the DRC and Rwanda has been marred by war and tension since the bloody First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo wars. At the heart of much of this conflict is the DRC’s mineral wealth. It has fuelled competition, exploitation and armed violence.

This latest peace deal introduces a resources-for-security arrangement. Such deals aren’t new in Africa. They first emerged in the early 2000s as resources-for-infrastructure transactions. Here, a foreign state would agree to build economic and social infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, hospitals) in an African state. In exchange, it would get a major stake in a government-owned mining company. Or gain preferential access to the host country’s minerals.

We have studied mineral law and governance in Africa for more than 20 years. The question that emerges now is whether a US-brokered resources-for-security agreement will help the DRC benefit from its resources.

Based on our research on mining, development and sustainability, we believe this is unlikely.

This is because resources-for-security is the latest version of a resource-bartering approach that China and Russia pioneered in countries such as Angola, the Central African Republic and the DRC.

Resource bartering in Africa has eroded the sovereignty and bargaining power of mineral-rich nations such as the DRC and Angola.

Further, resources-for-security deals are less transparent and more complicated than prior resource bartering agreements.

DRC’s security gaps

The DRC is endowed with major deposits of critical minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese and tantalum. These are the building blocks for 21st century technologies: artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, wind energy and military security hardware. Rwanda has less mineral wealth than its neighbour, but is the world’s third-largest producer of tantalum, used in electronics, aerospace and medical devices.

For almost 30 years, minerals have fuelled conflict and severe violence, especially in eastern DRC. Tungsten, tantalum and gold (referred to as 3TG) finance and drive conflict as government forces and an estimated 130 armed groups vie for control over lucrative mining sites. Several reports and studies have implicated the DRC’s neighbours – Rwanda and Uganda – in supporting the illegal extraction of 3TG in this region.

The DRC government has failed to extend security over its vast (2.3 million square kilometres) and diverse territory (109 million people, representing 250 ethnic groups). Limited resources, logistical challenges and corruption have weakened its armed forces.

This context makes the United States’ military backing enormously attractive. But our research shows there are traps.

What states risk losing

Resources-for-infrastructure and resources-for-security deals generally offer African nations short-term stability, financing or global goodwill. However, the costs are often long-term because of an erosion of sovereign control.

Here’s how this happens:

certain clauses in such contracts can freeze future regulatory reforms, limiting legislative autonomy
other clauses may lock in low prices for years, leaving resource-selling states unable to benefit when commodity prices surge
arbitration clauses often shift disputes to international forums, bypassing local courts
infrastructure loans are often secured via resource revenues used as loan security. This effectively ringfences exports and undermines sovereign fiscal control.

Examples of loss or near-loss of sovereignty from these sorts of deals abound in Africa.

For instance, Angola’s US$2 billion oil-backed loan from China Eximbank in 2004. This was repayable in monthly deliveries of oil, with revenues directed to Chinese-controlled accounts. The loan’s design deprived Angolan authorities of decision-making power over that income stream even before the oil was extracted.

These deals also fragment accountability. They often span multiple ministries (such as defence, mining and trade), avoiding robust oversight or accountability. Fragmentation makes resource sectors vulnerable to elite capture. Powerful insiders can manipulate agreements for private gain.

In the DRC, this has created a violent kleptocracy, where resource wealth is systematically diverted away from popular benefit.

Finally, there is the risk of re-entrenching extractive trauma. Communities displaced for mining and environmental degradation in many countries across Africa illustrate the long-standing harm to livelihoods, health and social cohesion.

These are not new problems. But where extraction is tied to security or infrastructure, such damage risks becoming permanent features, not temporary costs.

What needs to change

Critical minerals are “critical” because they’re hard to mine or substitute. Additionally, their supply chains are strategically vulnerable and politically exposed. Whoever controls these minerals controls the future. Africa must make sure it doesn’t trade that future away.

In a world being reshaped by global interests in critical minerals, African states must not underestimate the strategic value of their mineral resources. They hold considerable leverage.

But leverage only works if it is wielded strategically. This means:

investing in institutional strength and legal capacity to negotiate better deals
demanding local value creation and addition
requiring transparency and parliamentary oversight for minerals-related agreements
refusing deals that bypass human rights, environmental or sovereignty standards.

Africa has the resources. It must hold on to the power they wield.

Hanri Mostert receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa. She is a member of the Expropriation Expert Group and a steering committee member of the International Bar Association’s (IBA) Academic Advisory Group (AAG) in the Sector for Energy, Environmental, Resources and Infrastructure Law (SEERIL).

Tracy-Lynn Field receives funding from the Claude Leon Foundation. She is a non-executive director of the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa.

– ref. Africa’s minerals are being bartered for security: why it’s a bad idea – https://theconversation.com/africas-minerals-are-being-bartered-for-security-why-its-a-bad-idea-260594

July 21, 2025

Johannesburg’s creative hubs are booming: how artists are rejuvenating a failing inner city

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mariapaola McGurk, Lecturer in Innovation & Entrepreneurship, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

Johannesburg is weathering a storm of crises. Nowhere is its complex tangle of challenges more visible than in the inner city, where crime, overcrowding, and infrastructure collapse – such as roads literally exploding – paint a grim picture. Cultural institutions haven’t been spared either, with long-standing landmarks like the Johannesburg Art Gallery caught in cycles of neglect and crisis.

Yet, while many avoid the inner city or speak only of its decline, the creative and cultural practitioners of Johannesburg never left. In fact, artists, architects, fashion designers, animators, musicians and the like have been hard at work. They’re building, dreaming and shaping a new urban reality that could become the beacon of hope this city needs.

As a researcher and visual artist, I recently completed a PhD study that focused on Johannesburg’s cultural and creative industries. My research revealed that a clear understanding of the existing structures and dynamics within this industry is essential for developing effective strategies to strengthen its role in local economic development.

Here I explore one such opportunity: creative hubs. I argue that they represent a low-hanging fruit for the inner city’s growth and revitalisation.

Urban renewal

Numerous articles have explored strategies for the city’s economic development and urban renewal. One group of scholars recently outlined four critical focus areas: coordinated efforts across government levels; an active civil society; a shift in political culture; and restored leadership in a revitalised administration.

These are vital interventions, but they still beg a deeper question. What is the new “gold” of the “City of Gold”, the mining town founded in 1886 and on track to become a megacity by 2030?

What is it that truly sets Johannesburg apart, nationally and globally? What strengths already exist that, if nurtured, could help address the city’s challenges? The answer may not lie in building something entirely new, but in recognising and investing in what already thrives. The city’s people, its culture, and its extraordinary creativity.

In 2004, Unesco launched the Creative Cities Network. Today it comprises 246 cities in 80 member states. South Africa has three cities in the network: Cape Town (design), Durban (literature) and Overstrand (gastronomy). Johannesburg has never applied to belong.

Cities are acknowledging the economic and social value of the cultural and creative industries, particularly in addressing challenges such as youth unemployment, micro-enterprise growth, equity and community development.

Yet cities globally are grappling with how to retain creative professionals. This is the case in cities like Toronto, Sydney, Los Angeles, Cologne or Barcelona. Rising property prices, the redevelopment of industrial areas into commercial or luxury spaces, and short-term rental agreements are displacing these professionals from the urban cores they help energise. Cities are coming up with incentives and programmes to correct this.

A recent World Cities Cultural Forum report offers a solution in the form of Creative Land Trusts. These permanently hold land and assets at affordable rates for creatives. They take property out of speculative real estate markets. They’re designed to support not galleries or theatres, but the studios and workspaces where creative production actually happens.

Similar initiatives are happening in London, Helsinki and San Francisco.

Mapping Johannesburg’s creative hubs

Unlike cities that are trying to reverse the exodus of creatives, Johannesburg’s inner city has seen a recent surge in creative hub development.

A creative hub is a physical or digital space (in this case physical) designed to bring together cultural and creative professionals for studio space, collaboration, networking and the exchange of ideas.

Over the last year, 21 creative hubs have been mapped in the city, the majority newly established. Notable examples include Transwerke Studios, Asisebenze Art Atelier, Victoria Yards and Oovookoo. Remarkably, 19 of the 21 hubs identified in my open-source mapping process are in the inner city. Only two are government run – Transwerke and Downtown Music Hub.

Across Johannesburg, creative hubs buzz with independent activity, yet share a common commitment to cultivating talent, business support and community impact. They are evidence of innovative partnerships between creatives and property developers.

Inside these spaces, artists and creatives get opportunities through gallerist and investor visits (access to markets). They build practical and entrepreneurial skills through tailored workshops. And they collaborate on projects that place social upliftment at their heart.

Some hubs focus on offering studio spaces, while others extend their reach beyond their walls, blending artistic expression with community development and public engagement.

By actively building community and opportunity, creative hubs are becoming

lighthouses for the new urban economy.

They are small business incubators, urban beautification engines and potential cultural tourism hotspots. An event like Contra Fair opens the doors of art studio hubs once a year. Entrepreneur and social activist Tebogo Moalusi has now taken the lead in the establishment of Creative20. This will become a platform for revitalising Johannesburg’s creative cities campaign.

Neglected by the city

And yet the cultural and creative industries remain almost entirely absent from the city’s strategic planning. The Johannesburg 2040: Growth and Development Strategy fails even to mention the sector.

This is despite Gauteng, the province that houses Johannesburg, being the epicentre of South Africa’s creative economy. It contributes 46.3% of the industry’s gross domestic product and generates the highest employment impact. Johannesburg hosts the majority of creative businesses in the province.

The Gauteng 2030 Strategy highlights three high-growth sectors: agro-processing, cultural and creative industries, and high-tech/knowledge sectors, including digital and gaming. Two of these directly involve the creative economy. Yet there’s been little effort to integrate them into Johannesburg’s urban development agenda.

If Johannesburg is serious about inclusive economic development and sustainable urban growth, it must recognise and invest in the cultural and creative industries which are already thriving within its borders.

Mariapaola McGurk consults to Creative20 Organisation

– ref. Johannesburg’s creative hubs are booming: how artists are rejuvenating a failing inner city – https://theconversation.com/johannesburgs-creative-hubs-are-booming-how-artists-are-rejuvenating-a-failing-inner-city-260224

July 21, 2025

African media are threatened by governments and big tech – book tracks the latest trends

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hayes Mabweazara, Senior Lecturer in Sociological & Cultural Studies (Media, Culture & Society), University of Glasgow

Media capture happens when media outlets lose their independence and fall under the influence of political or financial interests. This often leads to news content that favours power instead of public accountability.

Media Capture in Africa and Latin America: Power and Resistance is a new book edited by news media scholars Hayes Mawindi Mabweazara and Bethia Pearson. It explores how this dynamic plays out in the global south and how journalists and citizens are resisting it. We asked them four questions.

What is media capture and how has it reshaped itself in recent times?

Media capture describes how media outlets are influenced, manipulated or controlled by powerful actors – often governments or large corporations – to serve their interests. It’s an idea that helps us understand how powerful groups in society can have a negative influence on news media. While this idea isn’t new, what has changed is how subtly and pervasively it now operates.

These groups include big technology organisations that own digital media platforms – such as X, owned by xAI (Elon Musk), and Instagram and Facebook, owned by Meta. But it’s also important to consider Google as a large search engine that shapes the news content and audience of many other platforms.

This matters because the media are important for the functioning of democratic societies. Ideally, they provide information, represent different groups and issues in society, and hold powerful actors to account.

For example, one of the key roles of the media is to provide accurate information for citizens to be able to decide how to vote in elections. Or to decide what they think about important issues. One big concern, then, is the effect of inaccurate or biased information on democracy.

Or it might be that accurate information is harder to access because algorithms and platforms make it easier to access inaccurate or biased information. These can be intended and unintended consequences of the technology itself, but algorithms can amplify misinformation and fake news – especially if this content has the potential to go viral.

So, what’s particular about media capture in the global south?

This is a really interesting question that is still being investigated, but we have some ideas.

First of all, it’s useful to know that media capture scholarship from the global north emerged around the time of the 2008 financial crisis. The influence of financial institutions on business journalists was one of the first areas of study. Since then, research in the US has focused on the capture of government-funded media organisations like Voice of America. And on how digital platforms like Google and Facebook can lead to capture.

In the global south, scholars have drawn attention to the importance of large media corporations in understanding media capture. For example, in Latin America, there’s a high level of what’s called “media concentration”. This is when many media outlets are owned by a few companies. These companies often own companies in other sectors, which means that critical reporting on business interests presents a conflict of interest.

But to focus on Africa, scholars have drawn attention to governments as a source of pressure on journalists and editors. This can be through direct pressure or what we might call “covert” pressure. Withholding advertising that helps to fund media outlets is an example, or offering financial incentives to stop investigating certain topics.

Researchers are also concerned about the influence of big tech in Africa. Digital platforms like Google and Facebook can shape the news and information that citizens have access to.

Can you share some of the studies from the book?

Our book includes many interesting studies – from Colombia, Brazil and Mexico in Latin America to Ethiopia and Morocco in Africa. We’ll share a few African cases here to give an overview of the issues.

The book’s contribution on Ghana warns us that although more overt “old” types of media capture may have subsided, transitional democracies can feature messier, more nuanced forms of media control. This can be evident in government pressures and through capture of regulators.

In the Morocco chapter, we see the threat to media freedom presented by digital platforms owned by global tech giants. This is known as “infrastructural capture”. It means news organisations become dependent on tech giants to set the rules of the game for democratic communication.

Another compelling case is Nigeria, where researchers explore ties between media ownership and political patronage. The authors argue that the Nigerian press is failing in its democratic duty because of its reliance on advertising and sponsorship income from the state. Added to this are ineffective regulatory mechanisms and close relationships with some big businesses that own newspapers and printing presses.

How can media capture be resisted in the global south?

The studies in the book show some ways forward and we do think it’s important to be optimistic! Resistance takes many forms. Sometimes it comes through legal and policy reform aimed at increasing transparency and media diversity. In other cases, it’s driven by social movements, investigative journalists and independent media who continue to operate under pressure.

The chapter on Uganda shows that journalist groups working with media advocacy organisations can strategically act to resist government media capture and harmful regulations. For example, to push back against one legislative change, several groups formed a temporary network called Article 29 (named after the article in the Ugandan constitution protecting free speech) and the African Centre for Media Excellence produced a report criticising the proposed changes.

One of the chapters on Ghana also shows how networks such as journalists, media associations, human rights groups and legal organisations can mobilise to push back against government influence. Organisations including the Ghana Journalists Association and Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association have played key roles in, for example, taking the media regulator to court to overturn laws that would have led to censorship. These findings are echoed in Latin America, where research on Mexico and Colombia also found professional journalism to be a strong source of resistance.

The conversation must also include rethinking how we define capture itself. If we frame it only as total control, we risk missing the everyday ways influence operates – and the spaces where it can be resisted. We would also say it’s really important that citizens are aware and alert to the issues when they think about how they access news media and what platforms they use. This is sometimes called “media literacy” and is about people being more knowledgeable about where trustworthy news comes from.

You can listen to a podcast about the book over here.

– ref. African media are threatened by governments and big tech – book tracks the latest trends – https://theconversation.com/african-media-are-threatened-by-governments-and-big-tech-book-tracks-the-latest-trends-258017

July 20, 2025

South African university programmes to support black students aren’t working. What needs to be done

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anthea Adams, Lecturer: Academic Staff Development, Rhodes University

Most universities and colleges have formal and informal programmes and initiatives to support student and staff development. Their goal is to create learning experiences that help students succeed academically. Typically, academic development practitioners design and run these programmes. They are usually academics themselves. To help students, they use tools like data analytics to design tutoring and mentoring programmes. For staff, development might include formal courses, webinars, workshops and seminars. Education researchers Anthea Adams, Sandra Williams, Patricia Muhuro and Charlene Van Wyk-Geduld reflect on their recent paper on academic development in South African higher education.

What is the role of academic development in South African higher education?

It started in the early 1980s when black students were first allowed to register at universities that had previously been reserved for white students.

After 1994 when South Africa became a democracy, the main aim of academic development was to help transform society by giving black students better opportunities to succeed at university.

Research on whether these efforts were making a difference in improving student learning, and our reflections, show a mismatch between what academic development is supposed to achieve and how it is being carried out in practice.

What is the mismatch between goals and practices?

Academic development has come a long way, mainly thanks to government support and funding. There is evidence of this in research and annual progress reports submitted to the Department of Higher Education and Training. This evidence clearly shows the positive impact of academic development efforts over the years.

But even with these strides, we can’t ignore a major concern: many black students drop out of university or do not progress with their studies as expected. This tells us that there’s a serious disconnect between what academic development aims to achieve and its actual practices.

One of the biggest red flags is the ongoing gap in graduation rates across different population groups. For example, the Council on Higher Education’s 2022 review of higher education highlighted that in 2018, white students were six percentage points more likely to complete their studies than black students.

What’s also worrying is that South African curricula and learning approaches are not yet relevant to diverse learning contexts. Students, academic staff and professional organisations like the Higher Education Learning and Teaching Association of Southern Africa have all said that academic development practices may not sufficiently address the academic realities of the majority of students.

What lessons can we learn?

We propose that academic development work should be based on research that can genuinely support all students’ success.

A number of scholars have argued that the quality of current research on academic development work contributes to the mismatch between its goals and actual practices. The research is not yet as theoretical, scholarly and critical as it needs to be to help us fully understand and improve academic development work.

This critique helps us understand why academic development research often feels limited to one specific context. This is particularly true of research that looks into why some students are dropping out or struggling to complete their studies.
This kind of research doesn’t offer insights that help practitioners and academics think more broadly about how to apply the findings in different learning contexts.

Valuable work is being done by both veteran and less experienced academic development practitioners. Their efforts have influenced academic development work as we know it today. But we should respond to the observation that most academic development work is still, in practice, limited to one context.

What is the way forward?

Less experienced academic development practitioners and scholars may find it daunting to produce research rich in theory. Therefore, we propose working together in communities of practice to build networks and benefit from reciprocal mentorship opportunities.

Mentors can be peers or seasoned academic development practitioners and researchers. They can help each other unpack what it means to produce rigorous research based on real-life teaching and learning contexts.

Working alongside each other and sharing knowledge and expertise can be fulfilling. It can also be the catalyst for building theory that will advance an understanding of academic development work. Opportunities to form peer networks help academics develop confidence and competence as teachers and scholars.

This kind of work can happen naturally as long as the context is supportive. However, we recognise opportunities for both formal and informal reciprocal mentoring relationships. This is based on our reflections on our teaching experiences and engagements in postgraduate diplomas in higher education.

Several scholars support the proposal for national directives to develop academics as university teachers and scholars. Professional development initiatives, such as postgraduate diplomas, can be conducive learning spaces where academics can engage in the scholarship of teaching and learning.

In other words, supported by experienced facilitators, academics can use research and evidence to interrogate how they teach and how students learn.

Professional development initiatives are not a panacea for the mismatch between academic development goals and actual practices. However, they can be a place where academics help each other to build theory in academic development. Only then, by working together, can academics respond to challenges casting a shadow on academic development work.

– ref. South African university programmes to support black students aren’t working. What needs to be done – https://theconversation.com/south-african-university-programmes-to-support-black-students-arent-working-what-needs-to-be-done-251954

July 17, 2025

East African countries and open borders: great strides, but still a long way to go

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Senior Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

It’s not uncommon to find a Ugandan taxi driver in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, just as one regularly meets Zimbabwean Uber drivers in South Africa. But there is a big difference. A Ugandan working in Rwanda most likely has a secure legal right to be there, whereas Zimbabweans working in South Africa are often uncertain of their current or future legality.

East Africa has made greater strides towards the free flow of people crossing borders and seeking work than most of Africa. Only the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) is in the same league.

While the African Union’s Free Movement of Persons protocol has faltered at a continental level, some of the regional economic communities have made progress. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) allows visa-free travel across almost all its borders.

Ecowas and the East African Community (EAC) have driven ambitiously towards regional common markets including the freeing up of job-seeking, residential settlement and business development across the borders of member states.

The New South Institute, a think-tank focused on governance reforms in the global south, is nearing the end of a research programme on migration governance reform in Africa. Our new report is on East Africa.

We have found that unlike much of the global north, the African continent is moving towards more open borders for people. In some of the global south the promise of economic growth outweighs political fears. Yet progress is slow, and not coordinated. Mostly migration reform happens in regions and between neighbours.

The progress in the East African Community is particularly notable compared with other African regional communities. We identify a number of reasons for this, including strong leadership and co-operation between state and non-state actors.

The commitment to free movement

The East African Community adopted its Common Market Protocol in 2010. The bloc is made up of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia.

The regional body’s common market pact includes the movement of goods, services, capital and people. It gives people the right – on paper at least – to find employment across borders, the right to reside and the right to establish a business. There is also a commitment to the harmonisation and mutual recognition of academic and professional qualifications and labour policies to ease mobility.

Even before the common market protocol, the regional bloc began to establish one-stop border posts on many of its internal borders to facilitate the flow of goods and people. Though they don’t all operate the same way or equally well, they have been successful at easing movement.

Uneven outcomes

The common market’s impact on the movement of people has been uneven within the region. Most integrated are Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda, which allow the cross-border movement of citizens with standardised identity documents – they do not need passports.

It is also relatively easy to get jobs across these borders.

Tanzania and Burundi are close to the inner circle but still require passports, though no visas. The three states which joined more recently, South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia, are all fragile states with governance systems that do not always meet the standards needed for acceptance into all the privileges of the regional bloc.

In practice there is differential treatment. Generally, it is more difficult for citizens of the three latecomers to get regular access and jobs in their regional partners.

Another limitation when it comes to the mobility of people is that little progress has been made in the formal harmonisation of education, health and social welfare systems between member states. This inhibits job seeking across borders.

In addition, national labour laws, which tend to require permits for foreigners, still apply to varying degrees in the region. Some countries are more permissive. For example, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have a reciprocal no-fee work permit agreement.

Another shortcoming has been that the outcomes of court processes in enforcing the freedom of movement have been disappointing. This is so even though the regional bloc has an active East African Court of Justice. Its legal mandate includes the enforcement of the bloc’s treaty and its protocols.

In some cases the court has found that national actions inhibiting the movement of persons were trumped by the regional protocol. It has instructed the errant governments to comply. But its ability to enforce the decisions is minimal.

Reasons for success

Leadership has been important. The fact that the strongest economy in the region, Kenya, has been part of the leading echelon is significant.

Rwanda and Uganda have led by example too. Rwanda was one of the first countries on the continent to offer visa-free entry to all other African countries. For its part, Uganda is widely admired for its refugee inclusion programmes.

Another factor outlined in our report has been the opportunity for collaboration fostered by relationships between formal institutions, such as governments, and non-state actors such as the International Organisation for Migration. Interactions between these various players have created opportunities for officials and policymakers from states of the region to meet, discuss issues of concern, and develop relationships of trust and understanding.

Another non-state donor-funded actor, TradeMark Africa, which was established in 2010 to support in the implementation of the common market in east Africa, provided considerable support. For example it supported the implementation of the regional One-Stop Border Post programme..

Way forward

Based on our report we identified changes that could make a positive difference.

Firstly, the development of reliable, harmonised systems in the region to collect and manage data on population mobility and employment. This would build confidence that policy was being made on the basis of reliable information.

Secondly, reducing friction in cross-border monetary transactions, including migrants’ remittances. This would make it easier for migrants to send some of their income to their countries of origin.

Thirdly, improvements to population registers, identity documents, passports and cross-border migration management systems. Improvements would build mutual trust in the integrity of systems and pave the way for further commitments to lowering migration barriers.

Fourth, cooperation on cross-border access to social services such as health and education. This is one of the most important intermediate steps towards freeing up mobility for the citizens of the region.

Fifth, reconsidering some of the amendments made to weaken the East African Court of Justice in 2007. This would strengthen the de jure powers of the court, adding considerably to the entrenchment of cross-border rights in the region.

Ultimately, the key constraint in the region is political and security instability, which holds back social and economic development. Nevertheless, incremental progress on mobility is possible despite issues in the fragile states, even though it may result in asymmetric progress within the East African Community.

Alan Hirsch’s work on migration governance is part of his responsibilities while employed as a Senior Research Fellow at the New South Institute.

– ref. East African countries and open borders: great strides, but still a long way to go – https://theconversation.com/east-african-countries-and-open-borders-great-strides-but-still-a-long-way-to-go-261021