The Conversation – Africa – Page 37

July 28, 2025

Armed banditry is becoming a crisis in Nigeria: why fixing the police is key

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Onyedikachi Madueke, PhD Candidate in Nigerian Security, University of Aberdeen

Armed banditry in Nigeria has escalated into a full-blown security crisis, particularly in the north-west and north-central regions. What began as sporadic attacks has now morphed into coordinated campaigns of terror affecting entire communities.

In March 2022, bandits attacked an Abuja-bound train with over 900 passengers, killing several and abducting an unknown number. Earlier, in January 2022, around 200 people were killed and 10,000 displaced in Zamfara after over 300 gunmen on motorcycles stormed eight villages, shooting indiscriminately and burning homes.

Between 2023 and May 2025, at least 10,217 were killed by armed groups, including bandits, in northern Nigeria. Most of the victims were women and children.

States like Zamfara, Sokoto and Katsina in the North-West and Niger, Kogi and Benue in the north-central region are especially hard hit. Farmers are abducted en route to their fields, travellers are kidnapped on major highways, and whole villages have been displaced. In many rural areas, residents are now forced to pay “taxes” to bandits before they can even harvest their crops.

Insecurity is now reshaping daily life in rural Nigeria. Families are abandoning their homes. Food supply chains are being disrupted. School attendance is falling. The rise in banditry is fuelling poverty, eroding trust in the state, and contributing to emigration in Nigeria.

While existing studies on armed banditry in Nigeria have largely focused on causes like ungoverned spaces, poverty and marginalisation, they often under-emphasise the fact that, since banditry is a law enforcement issue, the capacity of the police to address the crisis is paramount. Effective policing is the bedrock of internal security.

I’m a PhD researcher and have just completed my thesis on the link between institutional weakness and insecurity in Nigeria. A recent paper draws on my thesis.

This study examines how factors such as police manpower, funding, welfare conditions and structural organisation shape the ability of the Nigeria Police Force to respond effectively.

I found that the Nigeria Police Force has too few officers, is chronically underfunded, works under poor conditions, and is over-centralised, resulting in a lack of local ownership and initiative. These shortcomings aren’t just bureaucratic – they create an environment where organised violence thrives.

Tackling armed banditry in Nigeria requires addressing the institutional weaknesses of the police: expanding recruitment; improving salaries and welfare infrastructure; decentralising the force to enable state and community policing; and ensuring transparent, accountable use of security funds.

Four main challenges

Between 2022 and 2023, I conducted virtual interviews with 17 respondents including police and civil defence personnel serving in north-central Nigeria. I also conducted informal focus group discussions with police personnel and individuals affected by banditry in Abuja. Additionally, I analysed security reports and public documents from civil society organisations and media sources related to banditry and the Nigerian police.

What emerged was a troubling yet consistent story: the Nigerian Police Force wants to do more and has some dedicated officers, but is constrained by deep structural and institutional challenges. These challenges fall into four interlinked areas:

Manpower crisis: too few officers, spread too thin

Nigeria has over 220 million citizens but only about 370,000 police officers. The impact is most severe in regions where insecurity is rampant. In some local governments in northern Nigeria, only 32 officers are tasked with protecting hundreds of thousands of residents.

Worse still, up to 80% of officers are assigned to protect VIPs, politicians, traditional rulers and business elites, leaving about 20% available for regular policing. Officers are routinely deployed as drivers, bodyguards and domestic aides to VIPs.

Rural areas where banditry is most active remain dangerously under-policed, while safer cities in the south have a visible police presence. This imbalance has left vast regions vulnerable to bandit attacks.

Chronic under-funding and operational paralysis

Nigeria’s 2024 police budget stands at about US$808 million, a fraction of what countries like South Africa and Egypt spend. The result is that most police stations lack basic items like paper, computers, or internet access. Officers use personal mobile phones for official work. Some stations can’t even fuel their patrol vehicles without financial help from the public. Specialised equipment like bulletproof vests, tracking devices and functional armoured vehicles is either outdated or unavailable.

Even the Nigeria Police Trust Fund, established in 2019 to address these gaps, has been plagued by corruption and mismanagement. The result is a force that improvises its way through crises with minimal tools.

Poor welfare and working conditions

Morale within the police force is alarmingly low. Junior officers earn as little as US$44 per month – barely enough to live on in today’s Nigeria. Officers buy their own uniforms, pay for basic medical needs, and often live in rundown barracks that lack water, toilets, or electricity. In one barracks in Lagos, several families share a single bathroom.

Healthcare is patchy at best. Insurance schemes don’t cover critical conditions. Officers injured on duty have been abandoned in hospitals, while families of fallen officers sometimes wait years to receive death benefits. With no sense of protection or career dignity, many officers are demoralised and disengaged. This isn’t just a labour rights issue, it’s a national security issue.

Over-centralised structure and lack of local ownership

Nigeria’s police is centrally controlled from Abuja, leaving state governors, who are legally responsible for security, without real authority over officers in their states. This top-down structure causes delays, confusion and weak accountability.

In banditry-prone rural areas, officers often lack local knowledge, language skills and community trust. As a result, the response to attacks is slow, and the security presence feels distant. Bandits exploit this disconnect, operating freely in areas where the state appears absent or ineffective.

What to do

To stop armed banditry in Nigeria, the institutional challenges confronting the police must be dealt with. The country must:

increase police recruitment, especially in rural areas
raise police salaries and invest in welfare infrastructure
decentralise the police structure, allowing for state and community policing
ensure transparent use of security funds, particularly the Police Trust Fund.

Onyedikachi Madueke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Armed banditry is becoming a crisis in Nigeria: why fixing the police is key – https://theconversation.com/armed-banditry-is-becoming-a-crisis-in-nigeria-why-fixing-the-police-is-key-261302

July 27, 2025

3D printed food: yuck or yes? Researchers ask South African consumers

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Oluwafemi Adebo, Professor of Food Technology and Director of the Centre for Innovative Food Research (CIFR), University of Johannesburg

Would you eat food that was printed by a machine? 3D printed food is built up by equipment (a 3D food printer), layer after layer, using edible pastes, dough and food slurries in three-dimensional forms. These machines use digital models to produce precise, often personalised food items. Most 3D printed foods are made from nutrient-dense sources (plant and animal), which means they can offer health benefits.

The global market for 3D printed food is growing. It’s been estimated as worth US$437 million in 2024 and projected to reach US$7.1 billion in 2034. But the concept is still emerging in Africa.

Food science and technology researcher Oluwafemi Ayodeji Adebo and marketing academic Nicole Cunningham share what they learnt from a survey about South African consumers’ feelings on the subject.

How is food 3D printed and why?

In 3D food printing, edible food materials are formulated into printable materials (food ink). These inks can be made from pureed vegetables, doughs, or nutrient-rich mixes. The food ink is loaded into a 3D printer and extruded in layers until the selected shape is complete.

After printing, some products are ready to eat, while others need further processing such as baking or freeze-drying. The most common method is extrusion-based printing, valued for its simplicity and versatility.

The technique enables the customisation of food. Meals can be highly personalised in texture, appearance and nutritional content.

It can also transform food waste into food products. For example it can turn imperfect broccoli and carrots into healthy snacks and make noodles from potato peels.

It’s also useful in texture-modified diets for people with swallowing difficulties (dysphagia), especially the elderly. The products available for these patients tend to be bland and unappealing meals such as mashed potato, pumpkin and soft porridge. 3D food printing can produce nutritionally dense meals that are easier to eat and more appetising.

Food ink can combine various sources with different nutrients to boost the health benefits. Not having to process the product with heat can also result in higher nutritional content.

In South Africa, what sorts of foods might be 3D printed?

Virtually any edible material could be transformed into food inks, although some might require additives to make them printable. The abundance of nutrient-dense and health-promoting food crops in South Africa presents an excellent opportunity for 3D food printing to create novel food.

Sorghum, cowpea and quinoa have been used to make 3D printed biscuits, for example. They are more nutritious than wheat and don’t contain gluten.

Research at the Centre for Innovative Food Research at the University of Johannesburg has already demonstrated the feasibility of obtaining 3D printed products from different sources (for example whole-grain sourdough and malt biscuits, biscuits from wholegrain and multigrain flours and nutritious and appetising meals for dysphagia patients).

3D food printing is still in its infancy in South Africa, compared to developed countries such as China, Japan, the US and some European countries. The best-known companies that have adopted this technology include BluRhapsody, based in Italy, which makes 3D-printed pasta, and Open Meals based in Japan, which specialises in personalised sushi.

We carried out a study to understand South African consumers’ attitudes toward 3D-printed foods. Although the technology is not yet in wide use, we found some consumers were fairly knowledgeable about these foods and the associated benefits. These findings lay the foundation for business opportunities to commercialise and market 3D printed products in the region.

Who did you ask about it in your study?

The study surveyed South African consumers aged 18-65 who were familiar with the concept of 3D-printed food. We collected 355 responses, mostly females aged 24 to 44. They provided information and opinions on several aspects, including:

their awareness of 3D-printed food
their familiarity with 3D-printed food
their food neophobia (fear of new foods)
the convenience that 3D-printed food offers
their perspective on their health needs
the perceived benefits that 3D-printed food offers
attitudes towards 3D-printed food.

What did they say?

Positive attitudes were strongest among those who recognised the convenience and health-related benefits of this new technology. The potential to reduce waste, customise nutrition, and simplify meal preparation stood out as key motivators.

Interestingly, food familiarity didn’t play a significant role in people’s responses. This means they aren’t necessarily clinging to traditional or childhood meals when forming attitudes about 3D-printed food.

In short, novelty alone isn’t a deal-breaker, it’s more about perceived safety, usefulness, and understanding the benefits.

What does this tell us?

The findings highlight the crucial role of consumer education and awareness in shaping attitudes toward 3D-printed food. While unfamiliarity with the technology can create some hesitation, the research shows that consumers are not necessarily resistant to innovation. They just need to understand it better and be educated about the benefits it offers.

If food manufacturers and marketers invest in increasing public knowledge and offering hands-on experiences such as tastings, demonstrations, or transparent production processes, then consumer attitudes could shift positively.

This approach has shown promise in other markets. For example, educational campaigns in Europe and the US around lab-grown meat and plant-based proteins have improved public perception over time.

Marketers should talk about safety, health and sustainability, and demystify the technology through clear, engaging messaging. In countries where such strategies have been used, consumers have shown increased willingness to try novel food technologies. This is significant because of predicted growth in the industry.

If South African consumers see 3D-printed food more positively, this innovation could unlock opportunities to enhance food security, address malnutrition, and support personalised dietary solutions.

Oluwafemi Adebo received funding for this project from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa Support for Rated and Unrated Researchers (grant number: SRUG2204285188), the University of Johannesburg and Faculty of Science Research Committee Grant, and the South African Medica lResearch Council (SAMRC) Self-Initiated Research (SIR) Grant.

Nicole Cunningham receives funding from the DHET in order to conduct academic research.

– ref. 3D printed food: yuck or yes? Researchers ask South African consumers – https://theconversation.com/3d-printed-food-yuck-or-yes-researchers-ask-south-african-consumers-255887

July 27, 2025

Young Nigerians learn about democracy at school: how it’s shaping future voters

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Leila Demarest, Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

Democratic consolidation is a continuing struggle, in Africa as elsewhere. The turn to democracy gained momentum in Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s but has petered out since. Can new generations turn the tide?

The need to prepare young people to become democratically minded is well established. In western societies, school-based civic education has been considered the means to do it since as early as the 1960s. The assumption is that better knowledge about the democratic functioning of the state promotes stronger democratic values and norms. It is also thought to increase trust in institutions and a willingness to participate in politics in the future.

Research in western settings indeed shows that classroom instruction strengthens political attitudes and behaviour. Yet can we expect civic education to work in the same way in newer democracies? In weak democracies studies have found that civic education could actually lead young people away from political participation. Young people may become more aware of the flaws of their own system and turn away from politics.

Nigeria made the move from military rule to multiparty democracy in 1999 but remains a flawed democracy struggling with political corruption, vote buying and episodic violence. Individual liberties are only weakly protected.

As Africa’s most populous democracy, with a big young population, Nigeria needs young people to participate in democratic politics. And they have done so, as can be seen from events like the #EndSARS protests. Nevertheless many youths also show voter apathy. Or they engage in the country’s well-known cycles of election violence.

As scholars, we have conducted extensive research on how young people in African countries can overcome some dark legacies, like violent conflict, ethnic tensions and authoritarianism. In a recent study, we focused on democratic engagement among young Nigerians and how formal education could strengthen it.

Our research among secondary school students in Lagos state shows promising results. A survey of over 3,000 final year students found that those with greater political knowledge and stronger democratic values were more likely to express intent to vote, contact officials, or protest in the future.

However, these same students rejected party membership and campaigning, which are commonly associated with corruption and violence in Nigeria. In contrast, students with lower levels of knowledge and democratic values remained inclined to participate in party activities. This might be to gain economic benefits.

These findings show that the core objectives of civic education are not likely to lead youth to abandon democratic politics. Fostering knowledge about how the system (ideally) works and strengthening democratic attitudes remains a valuable approach to achieving democracy.

Our findings

Ten years after the transition from military to democratic rule, the Nigerian government made civic education mandatory in primary and secondary schools. The curriculum covers issues such as Nigeria’s independence, the structures of the state, civic rights, political parties and national unity. It also covers corruption and clientelism (the exchange of political support for economic benefits).

After learning how the government works and gaining awareness of civic rights and responsibilities, would young Nigerians remain committed to political participation with all the country’s democratic flaws?

We conducted a survey among final year secondary school students in Lagos state in 2019. About 3,000 students across 36 randomly selected schools answered our questions. The results revealed three political participation profiles:

disengaged youth – those who do not wish to take part in any type of political activity
non-party activists – intent on voting, contacting politicians or officials and protesting, but they reject party membership and campaigning
party activists – interested in joining a political party and campaigning as well as voting, contacting politicians or officials and protesting.

Disengaged youths tended to come from richer socio-economic backgrounds. They showed low trust in institutions. Non-party activists were more informed and held stronger democratic values than party activists. This is likely because they saw political parties as corrupt or violent.

In a democracy where party politics are often tainted by corruption, the youths’ selective engagement may be a sign not of apathy but of a thoughtful and principled rejection of flawed party politics.

Despite a growing distrust in political parties, civic education does not appear to discourage pro-democratic political behaviour overall.

A ‘reverse’ participation gap

Schools are not the only shapers of youths’ political behaviour. Caregivers and peers play a role. In a large number of countries, youth from richer socio-economic backgrounds are more politically informed, more trusting of institutions, and active. This results in a so-called participation gap between richer and poorer citizens.

Where democracy is yet to take root, research shows that middle- and higher-middle class citizens also have higher levels of knowledge and stronger democratic norms. But they have lower levels of institutional trust and are less likely to participate in institutional politics. This presents a “reverse” participation gap, so to speak.

In our research, we found partial evidence of this “reverse participation gap”. Students from wealthier backgrounds were less likely to participate, but not necessarily because they had stronger democratic norms. One possible explanation is that these students were less economically dependent on the state. With no need to rely on public institutions for jobs or welfare, they might feel less of a need to engage with them.

Retreat from political participation

In non-established democracies, research shows that more educated citizens often are more critical of their governments. In Ghana and Zimbabwe, these citizens were less likely to participate in elections.

Concerning civic education programmes specifically, an intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo showed that these programmes might increase political knowledge and commitment to democratic values, but also decrease satisfaction with democracy in their country.

School-based research from the continent is lacking. But studies examining school-based civic education in electoral democracies elsewhere also show a retreat from institutionalised political participation. This spans voting, party membership, campaigning, and contacting politicians.

Our study finds more optimistic results for civic education programmes in Africa. Youths with high knowledge and values – the core objectives of civic education – remain committed to democratic political behaviour.

Leila Demarest receives funding from Leiden University Fund (grant reference W19304-5-01).

Line Kuppens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Young Nigerians learn about democracy at school: how it’s shaping future voters – https://theconversation.com/young-nigerians-learn-about-democracy-at-school-how-its-shaping-future-voters-261030

July 27, 2025

Uganda’s land eviction crisis: do populist state measures actually fix problems?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Rose Nakayi, Senior Lecturer of Law, Makerere University

Populism is rife in various African countries. This political ideology responds to and takes advantage of a situation where a large section of people feels exploited, marginalised or disempowered. It sets up “the people” against “the other”. It promises solidarity with the excluded by addressing their grievances. Populism targets broad social groups, operating across ethnicity and class.

But how does populism fare when it informs state interventions to address long-standing societal issues under capitalism? Do populist state measures – especially when launched by a politically powerful leader – deliver improvements for the stated beneficiaries?

As academics who have researched populism for years, we were interested in the implementation and outcomes of such policies and programmes. To answer these questions, we analysed a populist intervention by President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda to address rampant land conflicts. In 2013 he set out to halt land evictions.

What good came of this? Did it help the poor?

We analysed land laws, court cases, government statements and media reports and found that, for the most part, the intervention offered short-term relief. Some people returned to the land, but the underlying land conflict was unresolved.

This created problems that continue to be felt today, including land disputes and land tenure insecurity. The intervention also increased the involvement of the president and his agents personally in providing justice.

It didn’t make pro-poor structural changes to address the root of the problem.

Yet, the intervention had several political benefits:

it enhanced the political legitimacy of the president and state
it offered a politically useful response to a land-related crisis and conflict
it addressed broader criticisms over injustice and poverty by sections of the public and opposition leaders, some of whom (like Robert Kyagulanyi) also relied on populist rhetoric.

The promise to deal with land evictions “once and for all” has yet to be realised over a decade later. During Heroes Day celebrations on 9 June 2024, Museveni’s speech repeated his promise to stop evictions.

Such promises of getting a grip on and ending evictions via decisive state actions, including proposed new legal guidelines, were also made more recently, for example during Heroes Day 2025. This indicates that evictions – and state responses to them – remain a top issue on the political agenda ahead of Uganda’s 2026 election.

Persistent evictions

Evictions were rampant in the 2010s, especially in central Uganda’s Buganda region. They were driven by increased demand for land amid a growing population and legal reforms that seemed to protect tenants over landlords. Some landlords, desperate to free their land of tenants, were carrying out the evictions themselves.

The president condemned the evictions, but they continued. Soon, the number of evictees was in the thousands.

In response, Museveni set up a land committee within the presidency. He announced at a press conference in early 2013 that:

all evictions are halted. There will be no more evictions, especially in the rural areas. All evictions involving peasants are halted.

The dynamics of populism-in-practice

Museveni’s attempts to personally deal with evictions illustrate a continued power shift in Uganda, from institutions to the president’s executive units.

Despite its shortcomings, such as case backlogs, the judicial system offers an opportunity to present cases in a more neutral environment. It also allows parties to appeal decisions. This way, higher courts can correct errors where necessary.

The presidential land committee, we found, tended to be biased in favour of tenants, paying less attention to the landlords’ cases.

The president’s intervention wasn’t adequate to address the immediate causes and effects of the evictions, nor the root causes.

Those included land tenure insecurities. Due to legal reforms, land-rich landlords were unable to get rent at market value from tenants. Neither could they evict them lawfully where rent was in arrears.

In some cases, legal options such as land sales between landlords and tenants were applied. This was often to the detriment of tenants, especially where there was no neutral actor to oversee negotiations.

Land reforms need to be institutionalised and funded to deliver the intended outcomes. Otherwise, unlawful sales and evictions become a quick option for landlords.

Museveni’s populist initiative also unleashed new problems for beneficiaries. Some secured land occupancy in the interim but lived in fear of a relapse of conflict. Mistrust and scarred interpersonal relationships hampered cohesion in some communities. Disputes over land put political actors who would ideally be working together to restore calm at loggerheads.

Populism as power

The creation of populist presidential units has become routine in Uganda. More recently, Museveni created a unit to protect investors, which has resolved some investment-related land disputes. Another one was established to fight corruption. Both units remain very active.

Our research finds that the government needs these units and interventions for a number of reasons. It uses them to govern the country’s conflict-ridden economy and society. They allow the government to assemble a politically useful response to crises and to address some on-the-ground problems. They make the state look concerned and responsive to people’s needs. And they allow ruling party political actors to increase their popularity locally.

Museveni and his ruling party, the National Resistance Movement, therefore, benefit from a key aspect of populism. It allows the merging of disparate, competing and contradictory views, interests and demands of members of various societal classes and groups into a significantly simplified and uniform narrative that (potentially) speaks to all. This could mean: end corruption, end evictions, wealth for all, and so on.

A general election is due in early 2026. The steps Museveni has taken on evictions, and the units set up to fight corruption or protect investors, need to be seen with this political context in mind.

Museveni has put protecting people from evictions high on his government’s agenda. Speaking to party members in August 2024, he emphasised

the importance of adhering to the mass line, which prioritises the needs and rights of the masses over those of the elite.

In our view, this pre-election narrative signifies the continued political and social relevance of populism in today’s Uganda. This could result in heightened populist state activity in the run-up to and after the election.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Uganda’s land eviction crisis: do populist state measures actually fix problems? – https://theconversation.com/ugandas-land-eviction-crisis-do-populist-state-measures-actually-fix-problems-260512

July 27, 2025

Long-COVID, viruses and ‘zombie’ cells: new research looks for links to chronic fatigue and brain fog

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Burtram C. Fielding, Dean Faculty of Sciences and Professor in the Department of Microbiology, Stellenbosch University

Millions of people who recover from infections like COVID-19, influenza and glandular fever are affected by long-lasting symptoms. These include chronic fatigue, brain fog, exercise intolerance, dizziness, muscle or joint pain and gut problems. And many of these symptoms worsen after exercise, a phenomenon known as post-exertional malaise.

Medically the symptoms are known as myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS). The World Health Organization classifies this as a post viral fatigue syndrome, and it is recognised by both the WHO and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as a brain disorder.

Experiencing illness long after contracting an infection is not new, as patients have reported these symptoms for decades. But COVID-19 has amplified the problem worldwide. Nearly half of people with ongoing post-COVID symptoms – a condition known as long-COVID – now meet the criteria for ME/CFS. Since the start of the pandemic in 2020, it is estimated that more than 400 million people have developed long-COVID.

To date, no widely accepted and testable mechanism has fully explained the biological processes underlying long-COVID and ME/CFS. Our work offers a new perspective that may help close this gap.

Our research group studies blood and the cardiovascular system in inflammatory diseases, as well as post-viral conditions. We focus on coagulation, inflammation and endothelial cells. Endothelial cells make up the inner layer of blood vessels and serve many important functions, like regulating blood clotting, blood vessel dilation and constriction, and inflammation.

Our latest review aims to explain how ME/CFS and long-COVID start and progress, and how symptoms show up in the body and its systems. By pinpointing and explaining the underlying disease mechanisms, we can pave the way for better clinical tools to diagnose and treat people living with ME/CFS and long-COVID.

What is endothelial senescence?

In our review, our international team proposes that certain viruses drive endothelial cells into a half-alive, “zombie-like” state called cellular senescence. Senescent endothelial cells stop dividing, but continue to release molecules that awaken and confuse the immune system. This prompts the blood to form clots and, at the same time, prevent clot breakdown, which could lead to the constriction of blood vessels and limited blood flow.

By placing “zombie” blood-vessel cells at the centre of these post-viral diseases, our hypothesis weaves together microclots, oxygen debt (the extra oxygen your body needs after strenuous exercise to restore balance), brain-fog, dizziness, gut leakiness (a digestive condition where the intestinal lining allows toxins into the bloodstream) and immune dysfunction into a single, testable narrative.

From acute viral infection to ‘zombie’ vessels

Viruses like SARS-CoV-2, Epstein–Barr virus, HHV-6, influenza A, and enteroviruses (a group of viruses that cause a number of infectious illnesses which are usually mild) can all infect endothelial cells. They enable a direct attack on the cells that line the inside of blood vessels. Some of these viruses have been shown to trigger endothelial senescence.

Multiple studies show that SARS-CoV-2 (the virus which causes COVID-19 disease) has the ability to induce senescence in a variety of cell types, including endothelial cells. Viral proteins from SARS-CoV-2, for example, sabotage DNA-repair pathways and push the host cell towards a senescent state, while senescent cells in turn become even more susceptible to viral entry. This reciprocity helps explain why different pathogens can result in the same chronic illness. Influenza A, too, has shown the ability to drive endothelial cells into a senescent, zombie-like state.

What we think is happening

We propose that when blood-vessel cells turn into “zombies”, they pump out substances that make blood thicker and prone to forming tiny clots. These clots slow down circulation, so less oxygen reaches muscles and organs. This is one reason people feel drained.

During exercise, the problem worsens. Instead of the vessels relaxing to allow adequate bloodflow, they tighten further. This means that muscles are starved of oxygen and patients experience a crash the day after exercise. In the brain, the same faulty cells let blood flow drop and leak, bringing on brain fog and dizziness.

In the gut, they weaken the lining, allowing bits of bacteria to slip into the bloodstream and trigger more inflammation. Because blood vessels reach every corner of the body, even scattered patches of these “zombie” cells found in the blood vessels can create the mix of symptoms seen in long-COVID and ME/CFS.

Immune exhaustion locks in the damage

Some parts of the immune system kill senescent cells. They are natural-killer cells, macrophages and complement proteins, which are immune molecules capable of tagging and killing pathogens. But long-COVID and ME/CFS frequently have impaired natural-killer cell function, sluggish macrophages and complement dysfunction.

Senescent endothelial cells may also send out a chemical signal to repel immune attack. So the “zombie cells” actively evade the immune system. This creates a self-sustaining loop of vascular and immune dysfunction, where senescent endothelial cells persist.

In a healthy person with an optimally functioning immune system, these senescent endothelial cells will normally be cleared. But there is significant immune dysfunction in ME/CFS and long-COVID, and this may enable the “zombie cells” to survive and the disease to progress.

Where the research goes next

There is a registered clinical trial in the US that is investigating senescence in long-COVID. Our consortium is testing new ways to spot signs of ageing in the cells that line our blood vessels. First, we expose healthy endothelial cells in the lab to blood from patients to see whether it pushes the cells into a senescent, or “zombie,” state.

At the same time, we are trialling non‑invasive imaging and fluorescent probes that could one day reveal these ageing cells inside the body. In selected cases, tissue biopsies may later confirm what the scans show. Together, these approaches aim to pinpoint how substances circulating in the blood drive cellular ageing and how that, in turn, fuels disease.

Our aim is simple: find these ageing endothelial cells in real patients. Pinpointing them will inform the next round of clinical trials and open the door to therapies that target senescent cells directly, offering a route to healthier blood vessels and, ultimately, lighter disease loads.

Burtram C. Fielding works for Stellenbosch University. He has received funding from the National Research Foundation, South Africa and the Technology Innovation Agency.

Resia Pretorius is a Distinguished Research Professor at Stellenbosch University and receives funding from Balvi Research Foundation and Kanro Research Foundation. She is also affiliated with University of Liverpool as a Honorary Professor. Resia is a founding director of the Stellenbosch University start-up company, Biocode Technologies and has various patents related to microclot formation in Long COVID.

Massimo Nunes receives funding from Kanro Research Foundation.

– ref. Long-COVID, viruses and ‘zombie’ cells: new research looks for links to chronic fatigue and brain fog – https://theconversation.com/long-covid-viruses-and-zombie-cells-new-research-looks-for-links-to-chronic-fatigue-and-brain-fog-261108

July 24, 2025

What makes a person cool? Global study has some answers

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Todd Pezzuti, Associate Professor, Business School, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez

From Lagos to Cape Town, Santiago to Seoul, people want to be cool. “Cool” is a word we hear everywhere – in music, in fashion, on social media. We use it to describe certain types of people.

But what exactly makes someone cool? Is it just about being popular or trendy? Or is there something deeper going on?

In a recent study I conducted with other marketing professors, we set out to answer a simple but surprisingly unexplored question. What are the personality traits and values that make someone seem cool – and do they differ across cultures?

We asked nearly 6,000 people from 12 countries to think of someone they personally knew who was “cool”, “not cool”, “good”, or “not good”. Then we asked them to describe that person’s traits and values using validated psychological measures. We used this data to examine how coolness differs from general likeability or morality.

The countries ranged from Australia to Turkey, the US to Germany, India to China, Nigeria to South Africa.

Our data showed that coolness is uniquely associated with the same six traits around the world: cool people tend to be extroverted, hedonistic, adventurous, open, powerful, and autonomous.

These findings help settle a long debate about what it means to be cool today.

A brief history of cool

Early writing on coolness described it as emotional restraint: being calm, composed and unbothered. This view, rooted in the metaphor of temperature and emotion, saw coolness as a sign of self-control and mastery.

Some of these scholars trace this form of cool to slavery and segregation, where emotional restraint was a survival strategy among enslaved Africans and their descendants, symbolising autonomy and dignity in the face of oppression. Others propose “cool” restraint existed long before slavery.

Regardless, jazz musicians in the 1940s first helped popularise this cool persona – relaxed, emotionally contained, and stylish – an image later embraced by youth and various countercultures. Corporations like Nike, Apple and MTV commercialised cool, turning a countercultural attitude into a more commercially friendly global aesthetic.

This is what makes someone cool

Our findings suggest that the meaning of cool has changed. It’s a way to identify and label people with a specific psychological profile.

Cool people are outgoing and social (extroverted). They seek pleasure and enjoyment (hedonistic). They take risks and try new things (adventurous). They are curious and open to new experiences (open). They have influence or charisma (powerful). And perhaps most of all, they do things their own way (autonomous).

This finding held remarkably steady across countries. Whether you’re in the US, South Korea, Spain or South Africa, people tend to think that cool individuals have this same “cool profile”.

We also found that even though coolness overlaps with being good or favourable, being cool and being good are not the same. Being kind, calm, traditional, secure and conscientious were more associated with being good than cool. Some “cool” traits were not necessarily good at all, like extroversion and hedonism.

What about South Africa and Nigeria?

One of the most fascinating aspects of our study was seeing how consistent the meaning of coolness was across cultures – even in countries with very different traditions and values.

In South Africa, participants viewed cool people as extroverted, hedonistic, powerful, adventurous, open and autonomous – just like participants from Europe to Asia. In South Africa, however, coolness is especially distinct from being good. South Africa is one of the countries in which being hedonistic, powerful, adventurous and autonomous was much more cool than good.

Nigeria was the only country in which cool and uncool people were equally autonomous. So basically, individuality wasn’t seen as cool. That difference might reflect cultural values that place a greater emphasis on community, respect for elders, or collective identity. In places where tradition and hierarchy matter, doing your own thing might not be cool.

Social sciences, like all science, however, are not perfect. So, it’s reasonable to speculate that autonomy might still be cool in Nigeria, with the discrepancy resulting from methodological issues such as how the Nigerian participants interpreted and responded to the survey.

Nigeria was also unique because the distinction between cool and good wasn’t as notable as in other countries. So coolness was seen more as goodness than in the other countries.

Why does this matter?

The fact that so many cultures agree on what makes someone cool suggests that “coolness” may serve a shared social function. The traits that make people cool may make them more likely to try new things, innovate new styles and fashions, and influence others. These individuals often push boundaries and introduce new ideas – in fashion, art, politics, or technology. They inspire others and help shape what’s seen as modern, desirable, or forward-thinking.

Coolness, in this sense, might function as a kind of cultural status marker – a reward for being bold, open-minded and innovative. It’s not just about surface style. It’s about signalling that you’re ahead of the curve, and that others should pay attention.

So what can we learn from this?

For one, young people in South Africa, Nigeria, and around the world may have more in common than we often think. Despite vast cultural differences, they tend to admire the same traits. That opens up interesting possibilities for cross-cultural communication, collaboration and influence.

Second, if we want to connect with or inspire others – whether through education, branding, or leadership – it helps to understand what people see as cool. Coolness may not be a universal virtue, but it is a universal currency.

And finally, there’s something reassuring in all this: coolness is not about being famous or rich. It’s about how you live. Are you curious? Courageous? True to yourself? If so, chances are someone out there thinks you’re cool – no matter where you’re from.

Todd Pezzuti received funding from ANID Chile to conduct this research.

– ref. What makes a person cool? Global study has some answers – https://theconversation.com/what-makes-a-person-cool-global-study-has-some-answers-261266

July 24, 2025

Who Will Bury You? Short stories from Zimbabwe about women who refuse to be easily defined

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gibson Ncube, Senior Lecturer, Stellenbosch University

Zimbabwe-born, Canada-based Chido Muchemwa’s debut short story collection, Who Will Bury You?, was published late in 2024 and immediately attracted the right kind of attention.

Here was an unexpected range of themes: queer identity, dislocation in the diaspora, the lingering complexities of family and cultural belonging. The 12 stories, set between Zimbabwe and Canada, trace moments of rupture and reconnection across time and geography. And they’re mostly about women. Women, selfhood, loss and love.

Gibson Ncube, who researches queer African fiction, unpacks why it’s such a good read.

What are some of the stories about?

The recurring questions in Who Will Bury You? are: who will remain when we are gone – who will understand us, who will grieve for us, and who will honour the truths we live by? These questions are animated through emotionally layered stories that centre the lives of Zimbabwean women and queer characters.

Written with subtlety and care, some of the stories draw on Zimbabwean folklore, allowing Muchemwa to bridge the mythical and the present-day. She demonstrates how ancestral narratives continue to shape how people experience love, loss and belonging.

The title story introduces a Zimbabwean “church going woman” and her daughter, who is living in Canada and has embraced a lesbian identity. In Zimbabwe, same-sex relationships remain criminalised under laws inherited from colonial rule and reinforced by state-sponsored homophobia. Political leaders often frame queerness as un-African or morally deviant.

The story is told through alternating perspectives and offers a portrait of intergenerational estrangement, cultural friction, and love strained by silence. What one of the characters calls “things that might never feel sayable”. The theme of queerness recurs in several other stories like This Will Break My Mother’s Heart and If It Wasn’t for the Nights.

Muchemwa allows these stories to gather meaning through multiple vantage points. She seems to resist resolution in favour of complexity. The collection is a significant contribution to the small but growing body of Zimbabwean literature that openly addresses queerness.

What’s Muchemwa saying about queer African life?

One of Muchemwa’s most powerful acts in the book is to treat queer life not as peripheral, but as central to the cultural, emotional and political worlds her characters inhabit. Queer desire, intimacy and estrangement are not exceptional disruptions. They are ordinary realities that are woven into everyday life. In these stories, queerness is at once a site of tenderness, conflict and hope. The effects of religion and colonial morality continue to shape how love is expressed and denied.

The stories challenge the erasure of queer voices by positioning them at the heart of families and communities. Queer characters are neither idealised nor victimised. They are allowed to simply be joyful, ambivalent, flawed, and resilient.

Aside from identity, what are some of the other themes?

The book also grapples with questions of memory, history and myth. In Finding Mermaids, Muchemwa blends contemporary reportage with folklore. A journalist and her grieving mother investigate the disappearance of young girls in a rural Zimbabwean town who are suspected to have been captured by njuzu, water spirits.

Other stories, like Kariba Heights and The Captive River, explore the legacies of colonialism and the spiritual power of the Zambezi River. In these stories, Muchemwa is attentive to how land, history and belief have an impact on personal experiences.

Living away from home, in the diaspora, is also a theme. Zimbabwe’s collapsing economy and ongoing political instability have driven many to seek better lives abroad, looking for jobs or educational opportunities.

Characters in Toronto grapple with cultural dislocation. They long for home as they tackle the challenges of forging new forms of kinship abroad. The Toronto that Muchemwa renders is richly textured. It’s far from a generic western backdrop. It is portrayed as a space of possibility and tension in which characters remake themselves in the face of displacement.

Why is it a special book to you as a scholar?

Muchemwa’s prose is precise, controlled, and emotionally resonant. She writes with confidence, trusting the power of implication and delicate shifts in tone. The plots of the stories are simple. They are not driven by dramatic revelations. Rather, by accumulative emotional insight. Her characters often seem to border on the edge of decision or reconciliation. In fact, their silences are as revealing as their speech.

Throughout the collection, there’s a sense of hushed intensity. The question of who will be there – at the end, in crisis, in love – lingers and ties the stories together. Even as her characters move between countries, generations and identities, they remain tied by their desire for recognition and care.

Muchemwa’s debut contributes to a growing body of contemporary African writing that focuses on intimacy, friendship and queerness as legitimate and urgent narrative concerns. Who Will Bury You? offers a fresh take that avoids the clichés and stereotypes often associated with African literature – what Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has famously called the single story.

Rather than dwelling on recurrent tropes of suffering or political crisis, Muchemwa’s stories place a spotlight on private lives and emotional entanglements. They compel us to be attentive to the quiet yet consequential turmoil that takes place within families and intimate relationships.

The collection does not avoid the cultural and religious violences that have an impact on everyday life. But Muchemwa faces them through the perspective of those who survive, and remake, these constraints on their own terms.

Who Will Bury You? is a carefully crafted collection that demands close attention. It’s a book about women who refuse to be easily defined. With this collection, Muchemwa asserts herself as a compelling new voice in Zimbabwean and African literature. Her debut represents new African storytelling which continues to expand the narratives of African writers. It dares to centre the personal, the queer, and the emotionally complex.

Gibson Ncube receives funding from the National Research Foundation.

– ref. Who Will Bury You? Short stories from Zimbabwe about women who refuse to be easily defined – https://theconversation.com/who-will-bury-you-short-stories-from-zimbabwe-about-women-who-refuse-to-be-easily-defined-261291

July 24, 2025

Togo’s ‘Nana-Benz’: how cheap Chinese imports of African fabrics have hurt the famous women traders

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Fidele B. Ebia, Postdoctoral fellow, Duke Africa Initiative, Duke University

The manufacturing of African print textiles has shifted to China in the 21st century. While they are widely consumed in African countries – and symbolic of the continent – the rise of “made in China” has undermined the African women traders who have long shaped the retail and distribution of this cloth.

For many decades Vlisco, the Dutch textile group which traces its origins to 1846 and whose products had been supplied to west Africa by European trading houses since the late 19th century, dominated manufacture of the cloth. But in the last 25 years dozens of factories in China have begun to supply African print textiles to west African markets. Qingdao Phoenix Hitarget Ltd, Sanhe Linqing Textile Group and Waxhaux Ltd are among the best known.

We conducted research to establish how the rise of Chinese-made cloth has affected the African print textiles trade. We focused on Togo. Though it’s a tiny country with a population of only 9.7 million, the capital city, Lomé, is the trading hub in west Africa for the textiles.

We conducted over 100 interviews with traders, street sellers, port agents or brokers, government officials and representatives of manufacturing companies to learn about how their activities have changed.

“Made in China” African print textiles are substantially cheaper and more accessible to a wider population than Vlisco fabric. Our market observations in Lomé’s famous Assigamé market found that Chinese African print textiles cost about 9,000 CFA (US$16) for six yards – one complete outfit. Wax Hollandais (50,000 CFA or US$87) cost over five times more.

Data is hard to come by, but our estimates suggest that 90% of imports of these textiles to Lomé port in 2019 came from China.

One Togolese trader summed up the attraction:

Who could resist a cloth that looked similar, but that cost much less than real Vlisco?

Our research shows how the rise of China manufactured cloth has undermined Vlisco’s once dominant market share as well as the monopoly on the trade of Dutch African print textiles that Togolese traders once enjoyed.

The traders, known as Nana-Benz because of the expensive cars they drove, once enjoyed an economic and political significance disproportionate to their small numbers. Their political influence was such that they were key backers of Togo’s first president, Sylvanus Olympio – himself a former director of the United Africa Company, which distributed Dutch cloth.

In turn, Olympio and long-term leader General Gnassingbé Eyadéma provided policy favours – such as low taxes – to support trading activity. In the 1970s, African print textile trade was considered as significant as the phosphate industry – the country’s primary export.

Nana-Benz have since been displaced – their numbers falling from 50 to about 20. Newer Togolese traders – known as Nanettes or “little Nanas” – have taken their place. While they have carved out a niche in mediating the textiles trade with China, they have lower economic and political stature. In turn, they too are increasingly threatened by Chinese competition, more recently within trading and distribution as well.

China displaces the Dutch

Dating back to the colonial period, African women traders have played essential roles in the wholesale and distribution of Dutch cloth in west African markets. As many countries in the region attained independence from the 1950s onwards, Grand Marché – or Assigamé – in Lomé became the hub for African print textile trade.

While neighbouring countries such as Ghana limited imports as part of efforts to promote domestic industrialisation, Togolese traders secured favourable conditions. These included low taxes and use of the port.

Togolese women traders knew the taste of predominantly female, west African customers better than their mostly male, Dutch designers. The Nana-Benz were brought into the African print textile production and design process, selecting patterns and giving names to designs they knew would sell.

They acquired such wealth from this trade that they earned the Nana-Benz nickname from the cars they purchased and which they used to collect and move merchandise.

Nana-Benz exclusivity of trading and retailing of African print textiles cloth in west African markets has been disrupted. As Vlisco has responded to falling revenues – over 30% in the first five years of the 21st century – due to its Chinese competition, Togolese traders’ role in the supply chain of Dutch cloth has been downgraded.

In response to the flood of Chinese imports, the Dutch manufacturer re-positioned itself as a luxury fashion brand and placed greater focus on the marketing and distribution of the textiles.

Vlisco has opened several boutique stores in west and central Africa, starting with Cotonou (2008), Lomé (2008) and Abidjan (2009). The surviving Nana-Benz – an estimated 20 of the original 50 – operate under contract as retailers rather than traders and must follow strict rules of sale and pricing.

While newer Togolese traders known as Nanettes are involved in the sourcing of textiles from China, they have lower economic and political stature. Up to 60 are involved in the trade.

Former street sellers of textiles and other petty commodities, Nanettes began travelling to China in the early to mid-2000s to source African print textiles. They are involved in commissioning and advising on the manufacturing of African print textiles in China and the distribution in Africa.

While many Nanettes order the common Chinese brands, some own and market their own. These include what are now well-known designs in Lomé and west Africa such as “Femme de Caractère”, “Binta”, “Prestige”, “Rebecca Wax”, “GMG” and “Homeland”.

Compared to their Nana-Benz predecessors, the Nanettes carve out their business from the smaller pie available from the sale of cheaper Chinese cloth. Though the volumes traded are large, the margins are smaller due to the much lower final retail price compared to Dutch cloth.

After procuring African print textiles from China, Nanettes sell wholesale to independent local traders or “sellers” as well as traders from neighbouring countries. These sellers in turn break down the bulk they have purchased and sell it in smaller quantities to independent street vendors.

All African print textiles from China arrive in west Africa as an incomplete product – as six-yard or 12-yard segments of cloth, not as finished garments. Local tailors and seamstresses then make clothes according to consumer taste. Some fashion designers have also opened shops where they sell prêt-à-porter (ready-to-wear) garments made from bolts of African print and tailored to local taste. Thus, even though the monopoly of the Nana-Benz has been eroded, value is still added and captured locally.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese actors have become more involved in trading activity – and not just manufacturing. The further evolution of Chinese presence risks an even greater marginalisation of locals, already excluded from manufacturing, from the trading and distribution end of the value chain. Maintaining their role – tailoring products to local culture and trends and linking the formal and informal economy – is vital not just for Togolese traders, but also the wider economy.

Rory Horner receives funding from the British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship. He is also a Research Associate at the Department of Geography, Environmental Management and Energy Studies at the University of Johannesburg.

Fidele B. Ebia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Togo’s ‘Nana-Benz’: how cheap Chinese imports of African fabrics have hurt the famous women traders – https://theconversation.com/togos-nana-benz-how-cheap-chinese-imports-of-african-fabrics-have-hurt-the-famous-women-traders-260924

July 23, 2025

Togo’s ‘Nana-Benz’: how cheap Chinese imports of African fabrics has hurt the famous women traders

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Fidele B. Ebia, Postdoctoral fellow, Duke Africa Initiative, Duke University

Data is hard to come by, but our estimates suggest that 90% of imports of these textiles to Lomé port in 2019 came from China.

One Togolese trader summed up the attraction:

Who could resist a cloth that looked similar, but that cost much less than real Vlisco?

China displaces the Dutch

They acquired such wealth from this trade that they earned the Nana-Benz nickname from the cars they purchased and which they used to collect and move merchandise.

In response to the flood of Chinese imports, the Dutch manufacturer re-positioned itself as a luxury fashion brand and placed greater focus on the marketing and distribution of the textiles.

While newer Togolese traders known as Nanettes are involved in the sourcing of textiles from China, they have lower economic and political stature. Up to 60 are involved in the trade.

– ref. Togo’s ‘Nana-Benz’: how cheap Chinese imports of African fabrics has hurt the famous women traders – https://theconversation.com/togos-nana-benz-how-cheap-chinese-imports-of-african-fabrics-has-hurt-the-famous-women-traders-260924

July 23, 2025

AI chatbots can boost public health in Africa – why language inclusion matters

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Songbo Hu, PhD Candidate, University of Cambridge

Language technologies like generative artificial intelligence (AI) hold significant potential for public health. From outbreak detection systems that scan global news in real time, to chatbots providing mental health support and conversational diagnostic tools improving access to primary care, these innovations are helping address health challenges.

At the heart of these developments is natural language processing, an interdisciplinary field within AI research. It enables computers to interpret, understand and generate human language, bridging the gap between humans and machines. Natural language processing can process and analyse enormous volumes of health data, far more than humans could ever handle manually. This is especially valuable in regions with a stretched healthcare workforce or limited public health surveillance infrastructure, because it enables faster, data-driven responses to public health needs.

Recently, our interdisciplinary team, combining expertise from computer science, human geography and health sciences, conducted a review of studies on how language AI is being used for public health in African countries. Almost a decade’s worth of academic research was analysed, to understand how this powerful technology is being applied to pressing human needs.

Out of 54 research publications, we found that evidence of real-world effects of the technology was still rare. Only 4% of these studies (two out of 54) showed measurable improvements in public health, such as boosting people’s mood or increasing vaccine intentions.

Most projects stop at technology development and publication. Very few advance to real-world use or impact. Opportunities to improve health and well-being across the continent could be missed as a result.

Current limitations

In recent years, AI language technologies for public health have increased rapidly. This wave of technology development really took off as the COVID-19 pandemic renewed attention to public health. Health chatbots and sentiment analysis tools were developed in Africa and beyond.

Health chatbots “talk” to people and provide reliable health information in a friendly, conversational way. Sentiment analysis tools scan social media posts to understand what people are feeling and talking about. Together they can identify misinformation or changes in public opinion and then provide accurate information.

Of course, new technologies come with imperfections. We found that most technologies for public health in Africa exist in just a few languages whose dominance can be traced to colonial times, namely English and French.

The consequences are clear: key health messages fail to reach many communities, leaving millions unable to access or act on essential information.

We also found that few projects have gone beyond the laboratory development stage. Our study found only one system in operation that had a measurable public health effect.

A successful model

This standout example comes from a team at the Center for Global Development and the University of Chicago, in partnership with the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics. Their chatbot, deployed on Facebook Messenger, was designed for people in Kenya and Nigeria who were hesitant about COVID-19 vaccines. It was only available in English.

More than 22,000 social media users used this app, sharing vaccine-related questions and concerns. The chatbot provided tailored, evidence-based responses to topics ranging from vaccine effectiveness and safety to misinformation. Its effect was notable. The intervention boosted users’ intention and willingness to get vaccinated by 4%-5%. The strongest effects were seen among those most hesitant to begin with.

Behind this success was the researchers’ commitment to understanding the local context. Before launching the chatbot, in-depth discussions were held with focus groups and social media users in Kenya and Nigeria. The aim was to learn about the specific worries and cultural factors shaping attitudes toward vaccination.

The chatbot was designed to address these concerns. This user-centred, locally adapted approach enabled the chatbot’s messages to address real barriers. As this example demonstrates, language technologies for public health are most effective when responding to the concerns and needs of the intended users.

From lab to life

These technologies take time and money to be put into practice. The COVID-19 pandemic jump-started development but public health language AI technologies are very new. It could be that a future survey would find a very different situation.

At the same time, advances in large language models such as GPT-4 are rapidly lowering the technical barriers to developing language technologies. These models can often be adapted to new applications with far less data and effort than previous methods. Recent advances could enable small teams of researchers or even individual developers to build tools tailored to the specific needs of their own communities. The path from lab to real-world effects may become much shorter and easier.

Investors, accelerators and state support could help make this transition from lab to life happen.

Technology developers can also contribute by rooting their work in community-driven, multi-disciplinary and cross-sector collaboration. Social science and public health research knowledge and skills can inform the design and development of new technologies.

To maximise the potential of language technologies for public health, the following needs to happen:

involving communities and health workers in natural language processing design
expanding provision in indigenous African languages
integrating language technologies into existing health systems.

Future research and development must move beyond technical prototypes and laboratory tests to rigorous real-world evaluations that measure health outcomes.

The other co-authors behind this research are: Abigail Oppong, Ebele Mogo, Charlotte Collins, and Giulia Occhini.

Songbo Hu currently receives funding from the Cambridge Trust.

Anna Barford currently receives funding from UKRI and the Mastercard Foundation. She has previously received funding from the the British Aacdemy, ESRC, Leverhulme Trust, CPEST, the University of Cambridge, Unilever (via a philanthropic donation to the University) and the Asian Development Bank. Anna is the Co-Director of the Business Fights Poverty Institute and a consultant to the International Labour Organization.

Anna Korhonen receives funding from UKRI, and has previously received funding from MRC, EPSRC, NERC, Royal Society, ERC, and philantrophic donations to the University of Cambridge.

– ref. AI chatbots can boost public health in Africa – why language inclusion matters – https://theconversation.com/ai-chatbots-can-boost-public-health-in-africa-why-language-inclusion-matters-260861