The Conversation – Africa – Page 28

September 17, 2025

Paul Biya at 92: will defections weaken his grip on absolute power in Cameroon?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of Nottingham

Cameroonians go to the polls in October 2025 in what some people hoped might be a break from the country’s troubled recent past. They thought that President Paul Biya (92) might stand aside to allow a transition.

Three years ago I was one of those who expressed optimism about the 2025 poll. But I was wrong.

Biya is set to run yet again for an 8th term. He is already one of Africa’s longest ruling presidents, behind only Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Nguema.

Biya is on the cusp of achieving lifetime presidency since taking office in 1982.

In July 2025, after months of speculation, he confirmed in a tweet that he would run again.

Having weathered coups, silenced dissent, defied death rumours, and outlasted generations of challengers, he reminded friend and foe alike that he remains at the centre of Cameroon’s political ecosystem.

I am a long time scholar of and commentator on African politics, regime transformation, democratic transition and broader governance. Given regional developments that have seen the military deposing long term leaders, one might expect Biya to superintend a managed transition. The intriguing question is: what is it about the situation in Cameroon that continues to defy logic?

There is evident restlessness and frustration among young Cameroonians as well as clear clamour for change. Yet, the incumbent remains the front-runner, supported by the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, and his near-total command of the state’s political machinery.

Simply, the system has been designed to serve Biya’s interests. With government control of the media, resources, and judicial and electoral institutions, it is unlikely that the opposition can bring about systemic change.

Some things have changed, however. Biya’s previous wins were landslides that left no room for debate. This time things could potentially be different on account of high-profile defections from his party. These men will be challenging him at the polls.

The field

The last electoral cycle, leading up to the 2018 poll, was characterised by subdued challenges and a co-opted or deeply divided opposition. This time Biya appears to face a relatively organised opposition.

Initially, 83 candidates signalled their interest. In July the electoral commission cleared 13 to run. The commission controversially disqualified Maurice Kamto, a renowned legal scholar who performed respectably in the 2018 electoral cycle with 14% of the vote.

Human Rights Watch warned that this would cast a shadow over the credibility of the electoral process.

Nevertheless, several credible figures across the political spectrum remain in the race and present alternatives.

Biya faces two other former allies turned political adversaries.

One is Issa Tchiroma Bakary, his minister of employment and vocational training. A longtime insider of the regime, he served in various ministerial roles and was long considered a loyalist. Yet in June 2025, he resigned from the government, delivering a searing critique of the system he once represented.

He then launched his campaign, running on the ticket of the Front for the National Salvation of Cameroon.

The minister of tourism and leisure, Bello Bouba Maigari, still formally holding office, declared his intention in July 2025 to run against his boss in the October elections.

This announcement was especially striking given the deep political history between the two men. Maigari is not just any cabinet member. He is a long-standing confidant of the president, having been appointed Biya’s prime minister in 1982 and hailing from the vote-rich northern region. The decision to enter the race marks a shift from loyal lieutenant to presidential challenger, revealing the growing fissures within the ruling elite.

Others in the race worth noting are:

Akere Muna, a former speaker who swore in Biya in 1982 and a tireless advocate for transparency and accountability. He ran for the top job in 2018 (but withdrew at the last minute).
Cabral Libii, from the Cameroon Party for National Reconciliation, a young and dynamic leader who also ran for president in 2018 and garnered 6% of the total vote.
Joshua Osih, a seasoned politician with a strong track record.

The issues

The nation’s pressing issues remain the same as they have been for a long while.

These include:

Endemic corruption. Cameroon is ranked 140 out of 180 countries by Transparency International. The reasons are systemic decay of state institutions and maladministration.
Economic stasis, including stubborn unemployment forecast at 7.34% by Statista; 23% live below the international poverty line and 3.3 million are food insecure.
The ongoing anglophone regional crisis pitting the English speaking regions against the dominant francophone centre.
Biya’s ability to govern and the succession question, given his very advanced age and the potential vacuum or infighting if he couldn’t complete his term.

The external dimension

Western actors have been consistent critics of Biya’s regime in the recent past. However, some have adopted a more cautious tone, balancing criticism with strategic interests.

The US, for instance, suspended some military assistance to Cameroon in 2019 over human rights abuses. But it continues counter-terrorism cooperation against Boko Haram.

The European Union, while pressing for peaceful resolution of the anglophone conflict, remains an important trade and aid partner.

China has become Cameroon’s largest bilateral creditor and a top trading partner. According to a report by Business in Cameroon, in 2024 Cameroon owed about 64.8% of its external bilateral debt to China. This is primarily for infrastructure loans that have funded projects like the Kribi Deep Sea Port, the Yaoundé-Douala highway, and hydropower stations.

For regime survival, Biya has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy. Beijing’s diplomatic stance of non-interference and respect for sovereignty resonates with Cameroonian political elites wary of western scrutiny and criticism over democratic backsliding and the anglophone conflict.

But Biya has not severed ties with the west. For example, the government maintains partnerships with France for security training, with Germany for decentralisation support, and with the US for counterinsurgency.

This balancing is not simply geopolitical. It is also deeply embedded in domestic patronage networks. Foreign aid, loans and investments serve as resources to consolidate elite power, strengthen the patronage system and suppress dissent.

The October polls are sure to reaffirm the status quo.

David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Paul Biya at 92: will defections weaken his grip on absolute power in Cameroon? – https://theconversation.com/paul-biya-at-92-will-defections-weaken-his-grip-on-absolute-power-in-cameroon-264915

September 16, 2025

Who’s got the power? Studies of male and female primates show it’s not simple

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Nikos Smit, Postdoc in evolutionary/behavioural ecology, University of Turku

Our understanding of female-male power relationships in animals has changed over time. Evolutionary biologists once thought that male mammals held clear-cut power over females. Later, species with pronounced female power over males were presented as exceptions in a landscape of strict male power. Spotted hyenas and certain primates, including bonobos and most lemurs, were examples of female dominance.

These views were reinforced by the assumption that males and females competed over different resources: males over females, and females over food.

But it’s not that simple, as the research of our colleagues and our own work on various primates has shown.

We reviewed studies of primate species and found that power relationships between the sexes varied significantly. In our sample, only 25 species exhibited clear male power, 16 exhibited clear female power, and the remaining species (about 70%) exhibited moderate or no sex biases in power. Most primate females can compete directly with males and often overpower them.

Size and strength differences between males and females

Males don’t always have all the power even when they are much larger and stronger than females.

In an earlier study, we showed that female mandrills in Gabon sometimes outrank males that are more than three times heavier than them.

Gorillas are an interesting case too. Apart from the big difference between males and females in body and canine tooth size, they are also typically presented (by scientists and non-scientists) as the species with the strictest male-biased power over females among great apes. They’ve become the “male power archetype” among animals.

We drew on 25 years of data about mountain gorillas in Uganda, to test if males strictly overpower females. Our findings suggest that females may leverage support from the most powerful males to gain power over other males. Or they may leverage access to themselves, and some males yield to females to acquire such access.

Our findings in mandrills and gorillas contribute a new perspective on the ecology and evolution of female-male power relationships in great apes and other primates that is not solely based on size and strength. They call for future work to investigate similar long-standing assumptions regarding the evolutionary origins of intersexual relationships across species.

Factors influencing power across primates

Our comparative analysis showed that intersexual power is influenced by different factors. Generally, females rely less than males on physical force and coercion in order to gain power. Female power is more likely to prevail in species that are monogamous, have little or no body size difference between adult females and males, and/or forage primarily in trees. These are conditions that give females greater control over reproduction.

By contrast, male power is more likely to prevail in species where males mate with multiple females, are primarily terrestrial, and have larger bodies or greater weapons than females.

Even when these conditions are met, however, there isn’t always a clear-cut bias in intersexual power of a social group or species.

Male mandrills and gorillas mate with multiple females and are terrestrial. In these species males generally have more power than females, and the highest ranking individual in a group’s social hierarchy is always a male. Yet power is not clear-cut and females can overpower other males.

What males and females compete for

Finally, our studies suggest that females and males often compete directly over access to resources.

In the comparative study across primates, we found that contests between females and males represented on average almost half of all contests in a social primate group.

In the study on mountain gorillas, we found that power relationships between females and males determined priority of access to a precious food resource, and when a female overpowered a male, she always had priority over him.

Altogether, these new findings suggest that:

most primate societies do not have clear-cut sex-biases in power
even in species with extreme male-biases in size and strength, females can overpower males
females and males compete directly over similar resources.

These findings refine our interpretation of intersexual relationships across animals. They caution against oversimplified views based solely on physical strength while neglecting the complexity of their social landscape.

Finally, this work shows that the human profile does not really resemble other primates where there is clear male dominance or clear female dominance. Instead, humans are closer to those “intermediate” species with moderate and flexible dominance relationships. This can inform attempts to reconstruct power relationships between men and women in early humans.

Elise Huchard receives funding from CNRS and the French Agence Nationale pour la Recherche (ANR).

Nikos Smit does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who’s got the power? Studies of male and female primates show it’s not simple – https://theconversation.com/whos-got-the-power-studies-of-male-and-female-primates-show-its-not-simple-263292

September 16, 2025

Refugee protection in Egypt: what’s behind the return train to Sudan

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Dina Wahba, Senior Researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, University of Freiburg

A special train left the Egyptian capital of Cairo for Aswan, a town close to the border with southern neighbour Sudan, in July 2025. The train, publicised by the Egyptian government as shiny, air-conditioned and free of charge, runs a weekly service. It is transporting Sudanese refugees who are willing to go back home. Sudan, however, has been in the midst of civil war since April 2023.

The train arrives in Aswan after around 12 hours. Travellers then continue via bus or ferry into Sudan. Little is known about what happens when travellers arrive in the country.

As at mid-2025, more than 190,000 Sudanese refugees had gone back home from Egypt. This is a five-fold increase in returns from 2024. Egypt hosts the largest number of Sudanese who have fled the war. More than 1.2 million Sudanese have crossed into Egypt since April 2023, making them the largest refugee community there.

The army-led Sudanese government – which regained control of Khartoum in March 2025 after losing the capital two years earlier – promotes return as part of its alleged efforts for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.

However, camouflaged behind Egypt’s voluntary return programme is a far more complex political reality, with refugees in the centre.

Initially, Egypt kept its borders relatively open, allowing women, children and older men to enter visa-free under a long-standing deal with Sudan.

As refugee numbers rose, however, new restrictions were imposed and brutally enforced from June 2023. These restrictions were codified in a new law adopted in 2024.

We have studied socio-political dynamics in Egypt and African refugee politics. In our view, while the voluntary return initiative is widely promoted by Egyptian and Sudanese authorities as a sign of solidarity and reconstruction, it masks a policy environment aimed at reducing the Sudanese population in Egypt.

Egypt has a contentious history of refugee protection. In recent years, refugees have faced hostile sentiments from host communities and rising xenophobia. Sudanese refugees in particular have been denied access to public spaces or rental property, and have faced physical violence.

The government’s response has focused on appeasing domestic audiences in the face of economic decline by providing external scapegoats. This does not bode well for the future of refugee protection in Egypt.

Countries often scapegoat refugees and other migrants to retain legitimacy with their own citizens, especially when there are pervasive inequalities that states cannot or will not bridge. This is the case in Egypt.

Egypt and Sudan’s shifting relations

Refugee hosting is never just a question of humanitarian or ethical protection measures. It is deeply embedded in domestic and external policy interests, as well as the global geopolitical context.

Egypt changed its open-border agreement with Sudan on 10 June 2023. It required all Sudanese to obtain visas before entry. Wait times stretched to two to three months, and an illicit market of visa “facilitators” sprang up, charging between US$1,500 and US$2,500 per person.

Egypt’s reception of displaced Sudanese took a more restrictive and controlling approach, including deportations. Its asylum law, passed in December 2024, formalises these harsh measures. Vague national security clauses enable status revocations and penalise the “illegal” entry of refugees.

Politically, Egypt has backed the Sudanese army as the cornerstone of stability. It backed Sudan’s October 2021 military coup and has aligned with the army in the ongoing civil war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

While the civil war continues to rage in many regions of Sudan, army-led forces have control of the centre and east of Sudan, supporting the push for the special train programme.

Additionally, Egypt has been a core beneficiary of European Union (EU) efforts to stop onward migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe. Though Egypt is no longer one of the most significant routes to Europe – this has shifted to Libya – Egyptians make up one of the largest national groups of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. With rising numbers of refugees in Egypt, the EU fears the situation could spiral.

To address this, Egypt signed a 7.4 billion euro (US$8.7 billion) deal with the EU in March 2024 to increase control of its (sea) borders and cooperate on returns from Europe. Thus, Egypt’s return of refugees to Sudan is in the EU’s interests.

Under such complicated settings, refugees become pawns. Egypt’s train, therefore, serves domestic policy interests of reducing Sudanese refugees, addresses the general hostile environment these refugees face and supports Cairo’s external policy interests.

What about the refugees?

When it comes to Sudan, the big question is whether states are violating a core tenet of refugee protection: the principle of non-refoulement. This states that countries cannot return refugees to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

Many Sudanese may choose to return not because they’re hopeful but as a result of economic hardship in Egypt, uncertainty with regard to their legal status, and fear.

The UN Refugee Agency advances three “durable solutions” for the return of refugees:

local integration, which is difficult in Egypt
resettlement to a third country, which has become increasingly difficult in the current global environment. The US, for instance, suspended all its resettlement programmes in January 2025.
returning voluntarily to the country of origin.

Where possible, states aim to return people – both refugees and other migrants – voluntarily. This is often done with the assistance of the International Organisation for Migration. However noble this process may be, migrants may still feel coerced.

Though army-controlled areas in Sudan like Khartoum, Sennar and El Gezira have seen relative calm, key conflict zones like Darfur and Kordofan are still actively contested. Humanitarian agencies caution that the ongoing violence undermines the voluntary nature of return.

What can be done

Usually after a conflict ends, the UN Refugee Agency draws up tripartite agreements with the countries of origin and asylum, and itself. This establishes the conditions for refugees to return and establishes proper reintegration programmes.

In the Egypt and Sudan case, however, it’s not clear who is financing the return train. Where is the tripartite agreement between Sudan, Egypt and the UN Refugee Agency? Is this even on the table given the continuing conflict in Sudan?

The trickiest part is what happens in the long run for those returning to conflict. This can amount to what scholars call “slow deportation”, where return, even when allegedly voluntary, undermines a serious commitment to refugee protection.

What Sudanese refugees need is not air-conditioned trains. Rather, they need protection of their full political, social and legal rights, as the world promised in the aftermath of the atrocities of the second world war in 1951.

Franzisca Zanker receives funding from the European Research Council for the project “The Political Lives of Migrants: Perspectives from Africa” (Grant no: 101161856).

Dina Wahba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Refugee protection in Egypt: what’s behind the return train to Sudan – https://theconversation.com/refugee-protection-in-egypt-whats-behind-the-return-train-to-sudan-264917

September 15, 2025

Inequality in Africa: what drives it, how to end it and what some countries are getting right

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

The relationship between inequality and economic growth is a complex one, especially in Africa. Inequality is the result of a host of factors, including policy choices, institutional legacies and power structures that favour elites. Professor Imraan Valodia, director of the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies spoke to Ernest Aryeetey, emeritus professor of Development Economics at the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana about the issues.

What policy choices have African governments made that have worsened inequality?

Firstly, structural adjustment policies. Many African countries undertook these during the late 20th century, often encouraged by international financial institutions. These policies included public sector retrenchments, the removal of subsidies, and reduced social services. They disproportionately affected the poor by weakening the state’s role in redistributing public goods, and limiting access to essential services.

The programmes also increased income inequality by choosing free markets over social protection. Later efforts to address the consequences were often “too little, too late.”

Secondly, taxation and fiscal policies. Most tax systems in Africa have relied on indirect taxes (such as VAT or consumption taxes) rather than progressive, direct taxes on income and wealth. As a result, poorer households often bear a heavier relative tax burden while the wealthiest benefit from exemptions or evasion.

Early post-independence taxation rarely did much to redistribute wealth, and efforts to tax the informal sector have been minimal or poorly designed. They have failed to capture significant resources for social spending.

Thirdly, education and healthcare investment. Policy choices have often perpetuated access gaps between urban and rural populations and among socioeconomic classes. Investments tended to favour cities and privileged groups, so that not everyone had the same opportunities. This “urban bias” in public spending reinforced existing inequalities. Rural people’s needs remained unmet.

Fourthly, weak social protection. Until the expansion of more comprehensive schemes in the 2000s, many Africans were left poor and vulnerable, without adequate safety nets.

Fifth, economic structures favour elites. African governments have often maintained or even reinforced economic structures that concentrate wealth and opportunity for just a few. Examples include policies favouring extractive industries or resource sectors controlled by politically connected groups. Land tenure, trade policies and access to state contracts and licences have frequently favoured the powerful.

Sixth, limited regional and gender inclusion. Early public policies rarely met the needs of women, youth, rural areas, or marginalised regions. Exclusion from land ownership or financial services, and limited emphasis on affirmative action, reinforced systemic inequalities. Only in recent decades have some governments begun to address these gaps, but progress remains uneven.

Are these choices linked to the capture of public policy by elites?

Yes. Privileged groups have often shaped or manipulated state policies in ways that protect their interests and reinforce inequality.

Colonial and postcolonial legacy. Policies and institutions established during and after colonialism often allocated resources and power to a narrow elite, either colonial settlers, expatriates or local collaborators. Today’s elites inherited and sustained many of these structures. They still control wealth, land, and market opportunities.

Economic structure and resource control. Many African economies remain oriented around extractive industries and primary commodities such as oil and minerals. Policies around resource extraction, trade and land tenure have often favoured elites through preferential access, tax exemptions and regulatory loopholes.

Policy design and fiscal choices. The design of tax systems has typically favoured indirect taxes (like VAT). These do not affect elite wealth. Efforts to tax high incomes, property or capital gains are underdeveloped or easily evaded.

Social protection and service delivery. Safety nets and public goods (like quality education, healthcare, or infrastructure) often target formal sector workers or urban residents (where elites reside). They neglect the informal sector, rural poor and marginalised groups.

Political patronage and governance. State resources, positions and contracts go to loyalists, family members, or ethnic/regional networks.

What have been the 3 biggest inequality drivers?

Firstly, regressive fiscal policies. These include broad based taxes such as transaction levies and VAT. They take a larger share of low income earners’ cash flows. Wealthier groups benefit from exemptions or low tax rates.

Secondly, rapid, elite led privatisation and market liberalisation. Selling state assets or opening key sectors (energy, telecoms and transport) to politically connected investors concentrates profits and market power. Informal workers and small firms are left with reduced earnings.

Patronage, corruption and political capture keep things that way.

Thirdly, under-investment in universal social services. Cuts to health, education and social safety nets limit upward mobility for the poor and maintain regional and gender gaps.

Lastly, resource dependence and economic structure. Many African economies focus on industries like oil, minerals and cash crops. These benefit political and business elites but don’t diversify industries or create jobs. The benefits of growth go mostly to the already privileged. Most citizens and entire regions are excluded.

Which countries have managed best to change this?

Rwanda has a progressive income tax structure. Low value mobile money transactions are exempt from tax. Key utilities such as electricity and water remain largely public, which has reduced the impact of taxes on the poor.

Rwanda has also made efforts towards inclusive governance. Examples include quotas for women, investments in health and education, and a focus on rural inclusion.

Botswana has pursued a cautious privatisation agenda. The state retains majority ownership in diamonds, telecoms and banking. Revenues were channelled into universal primary education and health.

Despite its dependence on diamonds, it does well at channelling resource wealth into national savings, infrastructure and public services. This while maintaining relatively high institutional quality and political stability.

Ethiopia, pre 2020 reforms which saw the role of the private sector being broadened.

Before then, the country had focused on massive public investment in primary education, health extension services and rural road networks. At the same time it avoided large scale privatisation of basic utilities. This limited the social service gap.

In addition, it has invested in manufacturing and export-led growth. This has generated jobs and gradually shifted the economy away from depending on primary commodities. Inequality has reduced compared to resource-dependent peers.

Have technology advances affected inequality differently on the continent?

Yes.

Technology has the potential to reduce inequality by expanding access to markets, services, information and financial inclusion. But gaps in digital infrastructure, affordability and skills have caused technology to sometimes reinforce, rather than alleviate, disparities in African countries.

Digital divide and urban-rural gaps. Access to digital technologies is highly uneven. Rural areas, the poor, women and less-educated groups are less likely to use the internet or benefit from digital services. This divide is much starker in Africa than in advanced economies, where technology adoption is nearly universal. As a result, new technologies can benefit urban, educated and higher-income groups the most. This widens inequalities if not accompanied by robust, inclusive policies.
Mobile leapfrogging, but patchy inclusion. Africa’s rapid leap to mobile phone use has often skipped fixed-line infrastructure. This has brought financial inclusion and new markets to millions, such as M-Pesa in Kenya. Still, large parts of the continent remain excluded due to affordability, lack of electricity, limited digital skills and language barriers.
Economic structure and global value chains. Limited integration into global value chains and a small high-tech sector mean most jobs on the continent remain in low-productivity informal work.

Why do the effects differ?

Firstly, late, unequal adoption. The industrial revolution and subsequent technological advances arrived late and unevenly. Colonial and postcolonial legacies left Africa behind in both education and infrastructure. This made it harder for broad segments of the population to benefit from new technologies.

Infrastructure scarcity forces societies to adopt mobile solutions directly, bypassing legacy banking but also making them vulnerable to policy shocks.

Secondly, policy and market failures. Inadequate regulation, weak competition and high costs of devices and data are brakes on digital transformation. Digital public goods, such as e-government and online education, reach only connected groups. And digital skills gaps further entrench the social digital divide.

Imraan Valodia receives funding from a number of foundations and institutions that support independent academic research.

– ref. Inequality in Africa: what drives it, how to end it and what some countries are getting right – https://theconversation.com/inequality-in-africa-what-drives-it-how-to-end-it-and-what-some-countries-are-getting-right-265265

September 15, 2025

Ansaru terror leaders’ arrest is a strategic change for Nigeria: what could happen next

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

Attacks by non-state armed groups are a security challenge in the Sahel, including Nigeria.

In northern Nigeria, the activities of Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (also known as Boko Haram), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) contribute to the instability of the Nigerian state.

On 16 August 2025, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s national security adviser, announced the arrest of two leaders of Ansaru: Mahmud Muhammad Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri.

They appeared before the Federal High Court in Abuja on 11 September. Usman pleaded guilty to the charge of illegal mining activities and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. They are currently facing a 32-count charge including engagement in acts of terrorism, and other violent crimes.

As a scholar of security studies, I can offer some thoughts about the importance of the arrest, possible responses from Ansaru and how Nigeria should respond.

Who are the two men arrested?

Mahmud Muhammed Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri are two key leaders of Ansaru, a terrorist organisation that formed as a breakaway faction of Boko Haram in 2012 in Kano state. Boko Haram is a Salafi Jihadist militant group operating in north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. It’s known for its efforts since 2010 to establish an Islamic state governed by Islamic law.

Ansaru functioned until 2013 before it appeared to fizzle out. Its operations included a prison break in November 2012, an attack on a Nigerian military convoy heading to Mali in January 2013 and the kidnapping of seven expatriates working with Setraco Construction Company in Bauchi in February 2013.

Since 2013, not much has been heard about the group. Some linked its silence to the death of its leader Abubakar Adam Kambar in 2012. Others said it had been forced back into mainstream Boko Haram by that group’s then leader Abubakar Shekau.

But Ansaru revived between 2018 and 2020 and has been recruiting and involved in rising banditry and kidnapping in North West and North Central.

The arrested leaders are prominent figures in Ansaru. An official statement revealed that Mahmud Muhammad Usman is the amir (leader) and Mahmud al-Nigeri serves as the deputy and chief of staff.

Both have undergone extensive training from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb region. Al-Qaeda is a pan-Islamic militant group leading a global Islamist revolution aimed at uniting the Muslim world. It was established by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 and he remained its leader until 2011, when he was killed.

Strategic significance of the arrest

Arresting leaders is known in counterterrorism as “leadership decapitation” or “snakehead strategy”. This involves capturing or killing the leaders or high-ranking commanders of terrorist organisations.

Not all policymakers and academics agree about the effectiveness of that tactic. States facing terrorism challenges, such as Israel, the United States and Russia, often use it, but most research shows it is not that effective.

It may temporarily incapacitate the group, but the group may bounce back even more brutally.

The targeted killing of Osama Bin Laden decimated al-Qaeda but paved the way for the rise of the Islamic State as a global caliphate. Islamic State has been lethal in its operations, particularly in the Sahel.

And the 2009 killing of Muhammed Yusuf, the former leader of Boko Haram, led to the emergence of Abubakar Shekau. Under him, Boko Haram became more formidable until he died in 2021.

The case of the Ansaru leaders is different, however. It is target arrest and incarceration.

This strategy has advantages for Nigeria and the broader Sahel region.

Incarceration of the two leaders means Ansaru won’t be able to take key decisions for some time. And it will deny the group some key technical know-how. Terrorist organisations seldom get new leaders while others are still alive.

Al-Nigeri is not only deputy and chief of staff, he is an expert in planning and implementing attacks and kidnapping in Nigeria and Niger. He underwent training in the Maghreb in handling weapons and making explosive devices.

It’s possible that lack of access to their expertise and authority will drastically reduce the activities of Ansaru.

Shortly after their arrest, Abduraham Yusuf, son of the Boko Haram founder, who is also a leader of one of ISWAP cells in the region, was arrested in Chad. Similarly, Boko Haram leader Ibrahim Mahamadu, also known as Bakura, was reportedly killed in Niger Republic on 20 August.

I believe these two incidents may be related to intelligence obtained following the arrest of the two Ansaru leaders.

Likely responses from the group

Considering the importance of the two leaders to Ansaru, there are two likely responses from the group.

breaking them out of prison – the group carried out prison breaks in 2012 and 2022
high-profile kidnapping and hostage taking, a trademark of Ansaru.

The March 28 2022 Abuja-Kaduna train bombing incident was believed to have been carried out by Ansaru with the support of some bandits as a retaliation for the Nigerian Police raid of Ansaru Camp in Kaduna State in which two commanders of the group were killed.

Even the parent group, Boko Haram, possibly executed the Chibok kidnapping in 2014 in retaliation for some of its commanders under incarceration of Nigerian government. Given these antecedents, the arrest of their prize leaders may trigger retaliation from the group.

Although the group’s ability to retaliate largely depends on whether it can still function effectively without the inputs of its two leaders in incarceration, the current cordial relationship between Ansaru and some bandits operating in the North West may make this possible.

Responses from the state

The Nigerian government and security forces must brace for likely retaliation from Ansaru. I expect that these two leaders should not be kept together in the same prison facility, and there is a need to adequately fortify prison facilities where they are kept to fend off any possible attack.

Furthermore, security needs to be provided for key places, especially schools, communities, and other vulnerable people that Ansaru may attack in the North West and North Central regions.

Saheed Babajide Owonikoko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ansaru terror leaders’ arrest is a strategic change for Nigeria: what could happen next – https://theconversation.com/ansaru-terror-leaders-arrest-is-a-strategic-change-for-nigeria-what-could-happen-next-264921

September 14, 2025

Hunger among South African students: study shows those studying remotely need financial aid for food

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Angelo Fynn, Specialist Researcher, University of South Africa

Food insecurity is associated with worse academic outcomes. PxHere

The spectre of food insecurity unfortunately haunts many households in South Africa.

Food security is commonly understood as having sufficient and nutritious food to live a healthy, active life. Access to sufficient food is a basic human right and is enshrined in the South African constitution.

Estimates from Statistics South Africa show that the proportion of households experiencing some form of food insecurity rose between 2019 and 2023 from 15.8% to 19.7%. Many households still seem to be feeling the pressure of slow economic growth and consumer price inflation. And a third of South Africans are unemployed.

These pressures affect students too.

The South African higher education sector has made great strides in making tertiary education more accessible. While the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) was established to broaden access to post-school education, by providing for fees, accommodation and a stipend, levels of food insecurity among university students remain high.

It’s hard to say just how high. Sometimes students seek assistance discreetly due to stigma. What we do know is that while the 2025 NSFAS research report talks about a 5% increase in funding, Statistics South Africa figures show inflation rates higher than that for basic food items.

Education researchers are interested in this because food insecurity is associated with worse academic outcomes among university students. It’s linked to lower class attendance and lower academic performance, among other indicators, which then affects their psychological wellbeing.

However, most of this research is based on traditional (full-time) university students. Students in open, distance and e-learning institutions are under-researched when it comes to food insecurity. Distance learning students form a third of all tertiary education students enrolled in South African universities: 371,592 students, according to 2023 audited figures.

My research interests are in how students learn, cope and succeed. My aim is to help university management and academics understand the issues that students face. One of these is food insecurity.

In a study conducted on 7,494 students from a South African distance learning institution, I found that only 27.9% of those surveyed were food secure and 71.7% (5,380 individuals) were moderately to severely food insecure.

The finding is worrying when considered along with the negative impact that food insecurity has on academic outcomes, physical and psychological well-being.

Food insecurity among this group of students cannot be ignored. I recommend that a system of food grants should be considered.

Which students were the most food insecure

The sample of students was drawn from a South African public open, distance and e-learning institution with approximately 370,000 students. These students were from all walks of life. The majority of respondents (5,670) were female; 23% were male (1,705). The institution as a whole has a 70:30 female-to-male ratio.

About 61% (4,573) of respondents were the first in their immediate family to attend tertiary education. About 12% (896) were members of the LGBTI+ community. It was important to consider this group as some research shows they are disproportionately affected by food insecurity.

Only one in five of respondents were working full time and 14% were studying full time. The biggest group (26%) were unemployed and looking for work; 21% were not looking for work. The remainder were engaged in various forms of employment and study.

The majority (43%) indicated that they were dependent on some form of government grant as their main income, followed by 26% who relied on salaries or wages, 10% who were reliant on their parents and 12% who had no form of income. In terms of household income, 40% earned up to R1,200 (about US$68) per month.

When this data was broken down further, stark patterns of food access emerged.

those who identified as Black Africans reported the highest levels of food insecurity (42%)
43.8% of first generation students reported severe food insecurity (compared with 27% of other students who were not first generation students)
members of the LGBTQ+ community were also found to be more at risk of severe food insecurity than the total response population.

Impact of food insecurity on students

Food insecurity has a negative impact on academic outcomes and on physical and psychological wellbeing.

Students may repurpose funds intended for study purposes to buy food, leaving them without the necessary materials to participate effectively in their education.

Psychological impacts of food insecurity can include increased rates of depression and anxiety associated with concerns around obtaining sufficient food.

Students may consume poor, more affordable food, higher in energy density but lower in nutrients.

Food pantries and grants

Open, distance and e-learning institutions face a challenge when it comes to addressing food insecurity. Students are geographically dispersed and may be enrolled in large numbers. The food pantry programmes found in contact institutions are simply not viable as the infrastructure required is large and costly.

Food pantry programmes are one of the most widely used interventions to combat food insecurity at universities globally. Common barriers to use are the stigma associated with using them, high rate of volunteer staff turnover, location of the programmes and complexity of eligibility criteria, among others.

Given the findings, I suggest that food grants for distance education students are necessary. Public-private partnerships could be explored, too, to address the issue of distance education student hunger.

Angelo Fynn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Hunger among South African students: study shows those studying remotely need financial aid for food – https://theconversation.com/hunger-among-south-african-students-study-shows-those-studying-remotely-need-financial-aid-for-food-264542

September 14, 2025

We created a support programme for schools in Nairobi’s informal settlements: what we learned

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Benta A. Abuya, Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

School room in Kibagare, Nairobi, Kenya. Ninara, via Flickr, CC BY

Access to school is considered to be better for children who live in urban areas than in rural areas in countries such as Kenya. But research shows that this access doesn’t translate into children doing better at school if the setting is an informal settlement. Despite being able to attend school, some children don’t fully enjoy their right to education, because the urban advantage seems to have dwindled in these contexts in recent years.

Some years ago, our team of researchers at the African Population & Health Research Center in Kenya examined the enrolment patterns in slums and non-slum communities in Nairobi. Our study found that pupils living in non-slum areas had higher rates of primary school completion (92%) than their counterparts in urban informal settlements (76%). And the pupils outside slums were more likely (76%) to go on to secondary school than the pupils in slums were (46%).

This motivated us to design and carry out an intervention, called Advancing Learning Outcomes and Transformational Change (ALOT Change). It was a nine-year after-school support programme that ran in three phases:

phase 1 from 2013 to 2015
phase 2 from 2016 to 2018
phase 3 from 2019 to 2022.

The programme consisted of homework support, mentoring in life skills (including relationship skills and responsible decision making), parental counselling and transition subsidies. In phase 2, we added a leadership component and boys into the programme. In phase 3 we added motivational talks, service learning and digital literacy.

Parents were encouraged to support their children and peers to learn from each other. Children were encouraged to think about careers.

ALOT Change aimed to contribute to a better future for boys and girls aged 12-19 in informal settlements. We implemented this intervention in two Nairobi settlements, Korogocho and Viwandani. Korogocho is reported to be more stable but to have worse health and socio-economic outcomes, while Viwandani is more transient, with a youthful, migrant population.

Once the intervention had run its course, we wanted to know whether it had made a positive impact on pupils’ literacy and numeracy scores. We analysed data from 577 pupils at baseline and 392 at endline during phase 3.

Our endline report showed modest improvements in literacy and numeracy, better self-confidence and aspirations, stronger parental involvement, and reduced delinquent behaviour among participants.

We found that the programme was particularly useful for follow-up cohorts who had been engaged in earlier phases.

Generally, the intervention had more impact among boys than girls, for pupils aged 12-13, and among pupils from least poor households. Numeracy improved more in Korogocho than in Viwandani.

These findings point to some adjustments that could be made to future interventions.

Evaluation of impact on numeracy and literacy achievement

Our evaluation compared two cohorts of boys and girls. The “follow-up cohort” were followed from primary school (2016-2018) into secondary schools. The “new cohort” started the programme in 2019 and were followed for three years.

The research questions were:

Did the intervention improve literacy and numeracy scores?
How did those scores vary?
Were there any differences between boys and girls?

In our analysis we chose to look at five groups, defined by their performance in literacy and numeracy tests. We explored the relationships between their performance and the students’ characteristics (age and gender) and household factors (like household head age, availability of reading materials at home, and household size).

Some of the highlights of our findings were that:

the intervention had a strong impact on numeracy among higher achievers
reading at home had a notable benefit for lower and middle achievers
girls tended to perform better than boys in literacy
boys scored better in numeracy than girls
the effects of the intervention on literacy and numeracy were sustained one year into secondary school
numeracy and literacy scores reduced in older age groups, as in other studies.

The follow-up cohort had been exposed to the intervention for three years (in phase 2) by the time we started assessing their performance. They performed better than the new cohort.

Gender differences in performance were evident at both lower and higher achievement levels. This finding mirrors those of other studies that speak to the need to encourage boys to enjoy reading to improve their reading abilities. But some studies explain this lag in reading by boys to the likelihood that boys are more inclined towards science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, which takes them away from the focus of reading competency.

Recommendations

The study points to the need to pay more attention to boys during the literacy sessions and to girls in the numeracy sessions during the implementation of the intervention programmes.

The reduction in scores at older ages suggests a need to adjust the programme to suit younger and older adolescents.

Programmes may need to further adapt interventions for older adolescents. Continuing with the same components of the intervention may not be feasible for older adolescents.

Benta A. Abuya works for APHRC. She does not receive funding from any organisation

– ref. We created a support programme for schools in Nairobi’s informal settlements: what we learned – https://theconversation.com/we-created-a-support-programme-for-schools-in-nairobis-informal-settlements-what-we-learned-264594

September 14, 2025

Angolans are fed up with broken promises: why the ruling MPLA keeps stalling local elections

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Daniel Tjarks, Resarch Associate in Human Geography, Saarland University

Weeks of protests in July 2025 in Angola left 30 dead and hundreds imprisoned. Sparked by a hike in fuel prices, the outcome of a governmental effort to reduce subsidies, the unrest quickly spread across the country.

This escalation, along with the government’s uncompromising reaction, is symptomatic of two things: the country’s dire economic conditions, and mounting discontent over disappointed expectations of change in President João Lourenço’s Angola.

After 38 years of rule by José Eduardo dos Santos, Lourenço’s 2017 inauguration briefly had “many Angolans dreaming again”. Those dreams, however, have since been shattered.

One repeatedly broken promise recently slipped by almost unnoticed when, two weeks after the protests, Angola’s parliament quietly wrapped up the legislative year. While Angola’s MPs have begun to pave the way for the 2027 national elections through adjustments to electoral statutes, there was nothing on the agenda about the country’s long-promised local elections.

Over the past 15 years, Angolans have grown accustomed to delays and postponements of what was once hailed as a building block for a more democratic country. Back in 2010, the ruling MPLA had prominently recommitted to the election of local governments – the autarquias – in the country’s constitution.

This promise of decentralisation initially captured the imagination of civil society and international organisations. But it has given way to disillusionment after delays and lukewarm excuses. Justifications alternate between insufficient infrastructure, unresolved legislative issues, or the COVID-19 pandemic.

I am an interdisciplinary social scientist, and for my PhD I studied Angola’s cities and the country’s highly centralised system of local governance.

My research leads me to conclude that Angola’s government has no real interest in establishing the autarquias – at least not anymore. What’s got in the way of the ruling power’s decentralisation strategy has been an astoundingly rapid transformation of Angola’s traditional political geography.

This transformation of demography and party affiliation has increasingly deprived the ruling party, the MPLA, of the urban electorate that it once believed to be its core support group. This helps explain why hopes for systematic change in post-war Angola have mostly faltered.

The reversal of Angola’s political geography

In 2002, Angola emerged from decades of civil war as an autocratic one-party state. In the following years, the MPLA government under Dos Santos cautiously introduced reforms. These included the first peacetime multi-party elections in 2008 and the easing of repression. And with the 2010 constitution, the government recommitted to decentralisation.

After a sweeping 2008 victory, the MPLA stood at the height of its power. It had secured more than 80% of the national vote (the vast majority in all provinces) and Unita, its former war adversary, was weak and discredited. Flush with abundant oil revenues and Chinese credit lines, Angola’s government could feel fairly confident in its grip on power.

It also opted for the idea of “gradualism”. This meant restricting local elections to the party’s traditional city strongholds where it felt most secure in its electoral support.

However, the rise of Unita as the opposition party soon upended the government’s power calculus. Rooted in the Ovimbundu communities of the Angolan highlands, Unita had, during the years of war, often been described and framed as the rural counterpart to the supposedly more modern and urban MPLA. But soon after the war’s end in 2002, the party turned into a serious contender and managed to expand its support base.

It has also emerged as a viable alternative for a young and politically alienated urban electorate in Angola’s cities. For them, Unita offers a potential break with a political system in which they have lost faith.

The electoral results are unambiguous evidence of that. In each national election since 2008, the MPLA lost around 10% of the vote. This dynamic was most pronounced in the capital, Luanda, which Unita officially won for the first time in 2022.

This power shift in Luanda strikes at the very foundation of the MPLA system.

The imperative to control Luanda

Angola is dominated by its capital city – a system that I have elsewhere analysed as “metropolitan bias”. Around 40% of Angolan city dwellers live in the capital. It also generates and absorbs the vast majority of economic and financial resources in the country.

These riches underpin what other researchers have described as a type of urban “political settlement”. This means that the patronage structures and corruption characteristic of post-war Angola fundamentally depend on the financial capital attracted to the oil-fuelled real estate and construction sectors of Luanda.

An oppositional capital would be all but unacceptable to the ruling MPLA.

Over the years the kleptocratic dynamics of Angola’s elite-controlled system have been laid bare by research on Angola’s political economy and the type of investigative journalism that produced the infamous Luanda Leaks. These have shown how the intertwining of the party-state with the petro-economy has facilitated the blatant self-enrichment of Angola’s ruling class.

In contrast, almost every second Angolan lives on less than US$3.65 a day. For their part, those close to the inner circle of power have largely distributed the country’s oil wealth among themselves.

From promises to manipulation

Judged against its own promises of decentralisation and faced with the emergence of a decidedly urban Unita electorate, the MPLA has a dilemma. For the last 15 years its solution has been to opt for a permanent delay.

Oppositional and civil society groups like the “Jovens pelas autarquias” (Youth for Local Government) have long denounced what’s occurred.

The latest chapter in the Angolan decentralisation saga came in 2025 with a new administrative structure. The number of local government units has been more than doubled and the capital splintered into 16 units.

This reform will allow the MPLA to blame delays on insufficient infrastructure for the foreseeable future. It will also ensure that, should autarquias be established at some point, local governments will remain relatively weak.

This is a well-worn anti-democratic strategy of manipulating decentralisation – tried and tested in countries such as Ethiopia, Malawi and Uganda.

There can be little doubt that the early enthusiasm that greeted Lourenço’s inauguration in 2017 has faded and that the current outlook for local democracy in Angola does not appear much brighter than under his predecessor.

One may therefore reasonably doubt that Angolans will see local elections taking place any time soon.

The most important question ahead is how the MPLA will respond to the type of escalating grievances that have recently erupted in the streets of Luanda. And to what extent it will allow these popular sentiments to find free and fair expression in the 2027 national elections.

Daniel Tjarks has received funding from ‘Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia’ (FCT) under scholarship 2022.12544.BD.

– ref. Angolans are fed up with broken promises: why the ruling MPLA keeps stalling local elections – https://theconversation.com/angolans-are-fed-up-with-broken-promises-why-the-ruling-mpla-keeps-stalling-local-elections-264294

September 11, 2025

Chalk and talk vs. active learning: what’s holding South African teachers back from using proven methods?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lizélle Pretorius, Lecturer in Education, Cape Peninsula University of Technology

Learning experiences have to include opportunities to develop thinking, skills and values. PickPic

As a full-time teacher completing a PhD part-time, I made a decision early on: do research that speaks to the daily realities of teachers and teaching. And so, the idea came from a lived experience – the day I asked one of my grade 11 learners (an A student) about the interpretation of a poem. His response?

Ma’am, please just write the answer on the board so we can study it for the exam.

I am sure that many teachers can relate to that request, which is typical of education framed by a “chalk and talk” approach.

“Chalk and talk” refers to a classroom environment where the teacher does most of the talking. There’s an over-reliance on textbooks and a focus on recall and rote learning. This is your typical “one size fits all” approach to teaching. Learners are mostly motivated to learn to pass their final year exams.

In South Africa, where I work, that’s contrary to what the national curriculum states. The critical outcomes of the Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement say learning has to be active, focus on critical thinking and reasoning, and go beyond memorising.

But that’s the exception rather than the rule in South African classrooms. There is a mismatch between policy and practice.

A US study weighed the pros and cons of active learning vs direct instruction. Ultimately, active learning is essential to promote curiosity, take ownership of one’s learning journey, and develop important social skills.

The goal of my research was simple: to help teachers include active learning activities in their regular classroom routines. I called my intervention the “altered flipped classroom”. The idea originates from the “flipped classroom”, an active learning approach to make the best use of face-to-face time with learners.

Altering the flipped classroom

The flipped classroom makes use of pre-recorded lessons that learners view before coming to class. In class, teachers support them to do their “homework”.

The flipped classroom has been researched in depth and the advantages to learning are impressive. These include improved learning performance and the development of skills such as critical analysis, problem-solving and collaboration. One study discovered that the flipped classroom helped low performers to keep up with their peers.

In South Africa, only 21.48% of public schools have access to the internet for teaching and learning. Because of this limitation, I had to “alter” the flipped classroom by excluding the technology component.

For example, instead of relying on online resources, learners can be given a visual representation of a poem along with a few guiding questions to prepare at home for the next day’s lesson. In class, they could then share their responses with a peer or the whole group.

This simple adjustment can enable meaningful contributions and include participation from all learners in a class.

Teachers take on the challenge

I invited Grade 8-11 teachers in public and private schools in the Western Cape province to participate. Thirty-one teachers attended the online training, and nine took part in the study. Their teaching experience ranged from first-year to over 30 years. They also received a teacher manual which included the background of the flipped classroom, its underlying theories, and practical examples of how to start. Teachers were asked to flip their classroom for three consecutive lessons and to keep a research diary to capture their experiences. These were also discussed during online interviews.

The aim was to explore what had been holding them back from active learning methods. It turned out that they experienced internal and external pressures. Teachers had to overcome possible judgement for “teaching differently” and faced uncertainty regarding the changing of roles. They also experienced fear of having less control, and noted their old habits and mindsets of teaching.

Voices from the classroom

The teachers in my study were concerned about what colleagues or management might think:

If someone walked into my class, it would have seemed like … the kids were playing around, not working, but they were. It just … looked different.

Teachers had to face their own deep-rooted habits and mindsets, which mostly centred on control. This appeared to come from their well-established teacher identities, shaped by their beliefs, assumptions and experiences with regard to their own teaching and how they were taught.

One teacher emphasised the need to move from “a conservative in a box kind of teacher”. One said “my classroom is my stage”; another “felt territorial about {her} space”.

Some teachers recognised the need for change. One said, “I feel like we can break that habit” and another, “We cannot do it the way we have always done it”. They started to become aware of old habits that influenced their practice:

It’s so like hammered into me that you have to be in the front, you have to teach.

From passive learning to purposeful growth

Ideally, teachers will challenge themselves to question the chalk and talk comfort zone and the system that reinforces it.

If nothing changes, learners are being set up to be dependent on their teachers.

The teachers reported many advantages for active learning, such as increased motivation and learners taking responsibility for their learning.

Teachers should be encouraged to go beyond the boundaries of traditional teaching. Learning experiences have to include opportunities to develop thinking, skills and values. Apart from knowledge, these are essential when entering the workforce or when studying a post-school qualification.

Change is not always easy, but it is necessary.

Lizélle Pretorius received funding from UNISA as part of a bursary when completing her PhD.

She is currently a member of ISATT (International Study Association of Teachers and Teaching) and the Junior coordinator of EARLI’s Special Interest Group 22 (Neuroscience and Education)

– ref. Chalk and talk vs. active learning: what’s holding South African teachers back from using proven methods? – https://theconversation.com/chalk-and-talk-vs-active-learning-whats-holding-south-african-teachers-back-from-using-proven-methods-263216

September 11, 2025

What is ableism? Words can hurt people but African culture offers an alternative

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sibonokuhle Ndlovu, Lecturer, University of Johannesburg

“You speak good English for a Black person.”

“Why are the plates not washed when there is a woman in this house?”

“Can I touch your hair?”

These are some common microaggressions you might have heard before, especially if you’re a Black woman.

Microaggressions can be projected to Black people because they are expected to speak perfect English when it’s not even their language. Or because what’s natural hair to them seems exotic to someone from another culture. They can be projected because of sexism that says women in African cultures belong in the kitchen.

What are microaggressions?

Microaggressions are comments or actions that reveal prejudice against marginalised people or a group of people who are oppressed. They might be micro (small or everyday) and they might manifest unconsciously or without harmful intentions. But even so, microaggressions are hurtful and devalue the people they’re projected on to.

What is ableism?

So then, what are ableist microaggressions? Ableism is a worldview in which ability and being able-bodied is favoured over disability.

Saying to a wheelchair user, “Ah, I see you are going for a stroll.” Or speaking slowly to them as if they can’t grasp what you’re saying. Or owning an office without wheelchair access. Those can be seen as ableist microaggressions. Using terms related to disability out of context is ableist: “You must be blind.” Even if said to a sighted person, it’s insensitive to people who might actually have impaired vision.

Ableist microaggressions are made by able-bodied people who don’t understand the realities of living with a disability. Sometimes they don’t mean to be harmful or they think they are helping by, for example, doing things for disabled people that the disabled person can actually do for themselves.

Even so, ableist microaggressions create a situation of unequal power dynamics because they make people with disabilities feel inferior, incapable or unintelligent.

Black women with a disability

As a scholar of inclusive education and disability in higher education, my research often focuses on disability and gender. I recently published a paper that reviewed studies of ableist microaggressions projected on to Black women with disabilities in southern Africa.

The paper explored how microaggressions affect these women in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Eswatini. The three countries share similar cultural values, identity and beliefs when it comes to gender, race and disability. And how these three things intersect.

In these cultures, women are generally honoured and might be called “izimbokodo” (grinding stones). It might be socially accepted that “a home cannot be a home without a woman” and, in the case of South Africa, issues of human rights might have improved over the years. Yet ableist microaggressions projected on women remain common, and even more so Black and disabled women.

This has a negative effect on them particularly when it comes to making individual life choices, marriage and childbearing – as it does women without disabilities.

For example, in some parts of South Africa, when women who are disabled appear pregnant in public, many people assume they were raped. They don’t assume a woman with disability had sexual agency and she is shamed and treated as unusual. It makes it even harder for her to receive equal healthcare and social standing.

For Black African women with disabilities, the impact of ableist microaggressions is worse because they have an intersectional struggle – they experience several forms of discrimination. They face racism, sexism and ableism, often at the same time.

Why ubuntu matters

The question I ask in my study is what might help Black women with disabilities to be empowered to dismantle ableist microaggressions. The answer lies in the past. I argue that ubuntu is an important weapon against this form of discrimination.

Ubuntu is an African philosophy common to the region that is understood by different people in different ways. But it can best be explained through the isiZulu saying, “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (We are because of them). This means that a person is a person through other people.

In a worldview of care and cooperation like this, every human being in a community is valuable despite their gender, race or ability. Ubuntu helps people understand that they are dependent on each other. They need each other despite their differences.

In many precolonial African societies disability was positively conceived. Another isiZulu saying goes, “Akusilima sindlebende kwaso”. It means that disabled people are accepted and loved in their homes.

However, colonialism changed all that. Africans were reduced to being workers for European masters. Colonialism normalised able-bodied workers and regarded disabled bodies as inferior. This was further entrenched by colonial morality, which would shape social thinking in the region.

This mindset still plays out today in the modern African societies in these studies. Black women with disabilities are viewed as helpless, and so they are an easy target for ableist microaggression.

A system of thinking like ubuntu would give Black women with disabilities the opportunity for dignity and the agency to fight against the damaging effects of ableist microaggressions that they face in their daily lives.

Sibonokuhle Ndlovu receives funding from the University Research Council of the University of Johannesburg.

– ref. What is ableism? Words can hurt people but African culture offers an alternative – https://theconversation.com/what-is-ableism-words-can-hurt-people-but-african-culture-offers-an-alternative-263288