Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sibonokuhle Ndlovu, Lecturer, University of Johannesburg

“You speak good English for a Black person.”

“Why are the plates not washed when there is a woman in this house?”

“Can I touch your hair?”

These are some common microaggressions you might have heard before, especially if you’re a Black woman.

Microaggressions can be projected to Black people because they are expected to speak perfect English when it’s not even their language. Or because what’s natural hair to them seems exotic to someone from another culture. They can be projected because of sexism that says women in African cultures belong in the kitchen.

What are microaggressions?

Microaggressions are comments or actions that reveal prejudice against marginalised people or a group of people who are oppressed. They might be micro (small or everyday) and they might manifest unconsciously or without harmful intentions. But even so, microaggressions are hurtful and devalue the people they’re projected on to.

What is ableism?

So then, what are ableist microaggressions? Ableism is a worldview in which ability and being able-bodied is favoured over disability.

Saying to a wheelchair user, “Ah, I see you are going for a stroll.” Or speaking slowly to them as if they can’t grasp what you’re saying. Or owning an office without wheelchair access. Those can be seen as ableist microaggressions. Using terms related to disability out of context is ableist: “You must be blind.” Even if said to a sighted person, it’s insensitive to people who might actually have impaired vision.

---

Read more:
Here are some dos and don’ts to help tackle ableism

---

Ableist microaggressions are made by able-bodied people who don’t understand the realities of living with a disability. Sometimes they don’t mean to be harmful or they think they are helping by, for example, doing things for disabled people that the disabled person can actually do for themselves.

Even so, ableist microaggressions create a situation of unequal power dynamics because they make people with disabilities feel inferior, incapable or unintelligent.

Black women with a disability

As a scholar of inclusive education and disability in higher education, my research often focuses on disability and gender. I recently published a paper that reviewed studies of ableist microaggressions projected on to Black women with disabilities in southern Africa.

The paper explored how microaggressions affect these women in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Eswatini. The three countries share similar cultural values, identity and beliefs when it comes to gender, race and disability. And how these three things intersect.

In these cultures, women are generally honoured and might be called “izimbokodo” (grinding stones). It might be socially accepted that “a home cannot be a home without a woman” and, in the case of South Africa, issues of human rights might have improved over the years. Yet ableist microaggressions projected on women remain common, and even more so Black and disabled women.

---

Read more:
Sexual health is an extra struggle for women with disabilities: findings from 10 African countries

---

This has a negative effect on them particularly when it comes to making individual life choices, marriage and childbearing – as it does women without disabilities.

For example, in some parts of South Africa, when women who are disabled appear pregnant in public, many people assume they were raped. They don’t assume a woman with disability had sexual agency and she is shamed and treated as unusual. It makes it even harder for her to receive equal healthcare and social standing.

For Black African women with disabilities, the impact of ableist microaggressions is worse because they have an intersectional struggle – they experience several forms of discrimination. They face racism, sexism and ableism, often at the same time.

Why ubuntu matters

The question I ask in my study is what might help Black women with disabilities to be empowered to dismantle ableist microaggressions. The answer lies in the past. I argue that ubuntu is an important weapon against this form of discrimination.

Ubuntu is an African philosophy common to the region that is understood by different people in different ways. But it can best be explained through the isiZulu saying, “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (We are because of them). This means that a person is a person through other people.

In a worldview of care and cooperation like this, every human being in a community is valuable despite their gender, race or ability. Ubuntu helps people understand that they are dependent on each other. They need each other despite their differences.

---

Read more:
Ubuntu matters: rural South Africans believe community care should go hand-in-hand with development

---

In many precolonial African societies disability was positively conceived. Another isiZulu saying goes, “Akusilima sindlebende kwaso”. It means that disabled people are accepted and loved in their homes.

However, colonialism changed all that. Africans were reduced to being workers for European masters. Colonialism normalised able-bodied workers and regarded disabled bodies as inferior. This was further entrenched by colonial morality, which would shape social thinking in the region.

This mindset still plays out today in the modern African societies in these studies. Black women with disabilities are viewed as helpless, and so they are an easy target for ableist microaggression.

A system of thinking like ubuntu would give Black women with disabilities the opportunity for dignity and the agency to fight against the damaging effects of ableist microaggressions that they face in their daily lives.

Sibonokuhle Ndlovu receives funding from the University Research Council of the University of Johannesburg.

– ref. What is ableism? Words can hurt people but African culture offers an alternative – https://theconversation.com/what-is-ableism-words-can-hurt-people-but-african-culture-offers-an-alternative-263288

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Onyedikachi Madueke, Teaching Assistant, University of Aberdeen

Political activities heralding Nigeria’s 2027 general elections are beginning to pick up.

Politicians are limbering up, alliances are being whispered about, political war chests are being filled, and campaign narratives are being sharpened.

The country’s rapidly growing social mobilisation (online and offline) places great demands on the electoral system. Especially the referee – the Independent National Electoral Commission.

If it can’t deliver credible polls, the country risks sliding into political unrest.

In 2022, a new Electoral Act handed the commission new powers, legalised the use of election technology, and guaranteed its funding a year ahead of the polls.

But there were still reports of irregularities.

Flawed elections do more than produce disputed winners – they deepen cynicism, depress turnout, and risk violence.

Nigeria’s example matters. It’s Africa’s largest democracy. Its electoral standards influence the region. If 2027 repeats 2023’s failures, other west African leaders might feel they can treat election commissions as political tools.

My recently published research examined the factors constraining Nigeria’s electoral commission from conducting credible elections and safeguarding electoral integrity, using the 2023 polls as a case study.

The study identified four issues undermining the commission’s effectiveness: eroded autonomy, corruption, weak adherence to its own rules, and compromised personnel recruitment.

The commission needs legal reinforcement to shield it from state capture, improve its technological capacity, deepen civic engagement and accountability, and safeguard electoral integrity.

Why the commission struggles to deliver credible polls

For my study I interviewed senior electoral commission staff, representatives of political parties (the All Progressives Congress, People’s Democratic Party and Labour Party) and other political stakeholders. I also drew on materials from the commission’s website, relevant online sources, news reports, social media content, and official documents.

Some of the key issues identified include:

1.) Independence

On paper, the electoral commission is financially independent. But the real power lies in leadership appointments, which remain in the hands of the president, subject to Senate confirmation.

In practice, appointees are often politically connected, sometimes openly partisan. Civil society groups flagged these risks ahead of 2023, but partisan nominees still took up sensitive electoral posts.

This matters because leadership shapes decisions. The commission’s abandonment of real-time result uploads in the 2023 presidential poll – a core promise – fuelled suspicions of political influence.

2.) Corruption

Politicians and insiders alike admit that electoral officials, especially temporary staff, are routinely offered and often accept cash inducements. The euphemism is “sachet water” money. The impact is serious: turning a blind eye to vote buying, altering result sheets, or simply ensuring “friendly” polling officers are assigned to strategic locations.

The 2023 polls brought fresh allegations: from officials charging voters to collect their voter cards, to attempted bribes for changing the result figures.

3.) Technology

The biggest promise of 2023 was about technology. The biometric voter accreditation system and result viewing portal were designed to stop the familiar rigging playbook: stuffing ballot boxes, falsifying tallies, and “doctoring” results. The commission told voters that presidential results would be uploaded in real time. It didn’t happen.

On election day, the commission blamed “technical glitches” for the failure to upload presidential results. Oddly, the same system worked fine for National Assembly results cast the same day. Investigative journalists later uncovered glaring discrepancies between polling-unit figures and the results published on the portal.

Many believe abandoning the result viewing portal technology made it easier for the result of the 2023 presidential poll to be manipulated. This wasn’t just a technical hiccup; it was a breach of legal guidelines and public trust.

4.) Workforce

The electoral commission’s permanent staff is small; for a nationwide election, it leans on over a million ad hoc recruits. The recruitment process is vulnerable to political interference.

Training is inconsistent, with little formal induction for new permanent staff and ad hoc workers alike. As experienced staff retire without structured knowledge transfer, institutional memory weakens. Add in the temptation of bribes, and you have a workforce prone to both errors and manipulation.

Four reforms for a credible 2027 poll

If Nigeria is serious about credible polls, reform of the electoral commission must start now. Four priorities stand out:

1.) Merit-based leadership and staff recruitment: Remove the president’s sole power to appoint the commission’s top leadership. A multi-stakeholder panel should vet and nominate candidates. The commission must have a standing professional electoral service corps (career election officers) to replace the heavy reliance on temporary workers.

2.) Improve technology and enforce rule compliance: The commission needs a stronger ICT infrastructure, redundancy systems, and independent audits of its electoral technology. Publishing results promptly at the polling unit level (and protecting them from tampering) is critical. Update and integrate the voter register with biometric and national ID systems.

3.) Legal and dispute resolution: Pre-election litigation timelines should be tightened so that disputes over candidacy, party primaries and voter registration are settled well before election day. Post-election adjudication must also be concluded prior to inauguration.

Stricter penalties are necessary to end the culture of impunity surrounding electoral offences. Swift trials, stiff sanctions, and disqualification of political actors who benefit from malpractice should be enforced.

4.) Civic engagement and accountability: The commission must educate voters, particularly on issues such as vote buying, technology, and citizens’ rights.

Civil society observers, media and civic tech groups should get open access and be treated as partners.

Accountability reports before, during and after elections are essential to rebuild public trust and confidence in the electoral process.

Conclusion

The race for 2027 is already on, but the real contest isn’t between the parties or personalities. It’s between a compromised electoral institution and the reforms needed to make it worthy of public trust.

Nigeria needs to fix the electoral commission’s independence, root out its corruption, enforce its rules, and professionalise its workforce.

Onyedikachi Madueke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 2027 Nigerian poll could trigger unrest unless electoral commission is fixed – https://theconversation.com/2027-nigerian-poll-could-trigger-unrest-unless-electoral-commission-is-fixed-263974

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Michele Van Eck, Associate professor in the School of Law at University of the Witwatersrand, who specialises in the areas of contracts, legal ethics and education. , University of the Witwatersrand

Education is widely regarded as the road to a better life. Yet the rising cost of tertiary education means many students can only go to university if they get financial aid, bursaries or loans.

South Africa’s National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) offers students bursaries or loans which provide allowances for tuition and registration fees, books, travel and accommodation. But this type of funding applies only under specific and limited conditions. Many students fall outside its scope.

Students who are not enrolled for a qualification that is approved by the Department of Higher Education, or who wish to study for a second undergraduate qualification, or who are studying at private institutions, don’t qualify to get the funding.

The result is that many students can’t keep up with paying their university fees. In 2025 South African universities collectively held about R9.3 billion (US$528 million) in student debt that had remained unpaid since 2023.

Universities have been trying different methods to pressure students and graduates to pay outstanding student debts. This has included withholding of degree certificates, academic transcripts and marks.

Universities require funding to operate effectively, pay staff and maintain infrastructure. But withholding academic documents from indebted students may prevent them from securing employment – the very means by which they could repay their debts. These practices, while commercially defensible, often have the opposite effect. According to Unesco, “student loans generally have catastrophic effects for students and families across the world”.

It seems reasonable to conclude that student debt collection practices may entrench poverty and make it harder for graduates to get jobs.

From recent court cases, it appears that this issue is especially pronounced in the legal profession. Law graduates face additional scrutiny, as admission to the profession requires not only academic qualifications but also proof of moral character. The Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 mandates that candidates be “fit and proper” individuals, embodying values such as honesty, integrity and reliability. Outstanding debt may be seen as a contrast to the values of honesty and integrity.

Fulfilling financial obligations can indeed have a bearing on ethics (a field I study as a legal scholar). But as I argue in a recent paper, it’s necessary to distinguish between graduates who are unwilling to pay and those who are genuinely unable to.

I also propose a couple of ways this could be achieved so that universities get their money and graduates get their start in working life.

How universities collect debt

Unlike South Africa, some countries have taken steps to deal with the impact of student debt.

My paper highlights that, in the United States, several states don’t allow universities and colleges to withhold degree certificates and transcripts (records of academic activity) over unpaid fees. They recognise that those debt-collection practices hinder employment and make inequality worse. Instead, they promote other strategies, like repayment plans related to income, or policies for how to treat students who are experiencing hardship.

In the United Kingdom, universities are advised not to use academic sanctions to recover non-academic debts, such as accommodation fees. Consumer protection laws treat students as consumers, allowing them to challenge unfair contractual terms. If a university’s contract includes provisions to withhold degrees for unpaid fees, students may contest these clauses as unjust.

South Africa lacks similar legal safeguards. Each university sets its own rules. These range from students not being able to graduate unless all fees are paid, to the withholding of certificates from students not in good financial standing, and even preventing students from viewing their examination scripts if they owe money. Some examples may be found at the University of the Free State (page 27), University of Pretoria (page 16) and University of the Witwatersrand.

Law students face additional hurdles

In the legal profession, financial responsibility is often tied to ethical conduct. Lawyers manage trust accounts, client funds and sensitive legal matters. Integrity is non-negotiable.

However, the inability to pay student debts is not inherently dishonest. Some students fall into debt due to circumstances beyond their control, like family obligations, socio-economic conditions, unemployment or the sheer cost of education.

South African courts have grappled with outstanding student debts when it comes to admitting law graduates to the profession. The courts’ approach has been inconsistent.

In Ex Parte Tlotlego the court emphasised that poverty should not bar entry into the legal profession. It said courts should not require proof of debt repayment arrangements, which would be unfair to students from disadvantaged backgrounds.

But in Ex Parte Makamu the court found that a law graduate must still demonstrate how they intend to settle their debts to satisfy the ethical standards of honesty and integrity.

More recently, Ex Parte Galela reinforced this view. The court declined the application for admission because it wasn’t clear why the law graduate hadn’t paid off their debt. It suggested that financial irresponsibility could reflect poorly on the graduate’s character.

The courts’ approach and general student debt-collection practices often fail to differentiate between students who cannot pay and those who choose not to. This distinction is vital. A student who ignores their debt without justification may raise ethical concerns. But a student who is willing to pay yet lacks the financial means should not be penalised.

Solutions

The solution lies in balancing the financial interests of universities with the socio-economic realities of students. Student debts must be repaid, but repayment mechanisms must also be fair and sustainable.

There have been attempts to find a solution, such as the draft Student Relief Bill, which proposes setting up a Student Debt Relief Fund. But that might place unsustainable pressure on the economy.

I have another proposal: allowing graduates to receive their degree certificates regardless of outstanding debt, along with two legislative interventions. These are:

1. Automatic garnishee orders: upon graduation, an automatic garnishee order (a court order directing an employer to deduct a certain amount from an employee’s income) could be placed on future salaries of a graduate. This would ensure that student debt is repaid over time.

2. Amendment to the Prescription Act 68 of 1969: This could exclude student debt from prescribing (becoming too old to collect). Normally, such a debt would prescribe after three years. An amendment would allow universities to recover debts for the duration of graduates’ employment, not just within three years.

These measures would uphold the financial sustainability of universities while protecting the dignity and future employment prospects of graduates.

Michele Van Eck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. South Africa’s student debt trap: two options that could help resolve the problem – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-student-debt-trap-two-options-that-could-help-resolve-the-problem-262555

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Sallek Yaks Musa, Lecturer, University of Northampton

Nigerians have experienced what it means for their government to be controlled by the military.

From independence in 1960 until 1999, the country was under democratic rule for only about seven years. Since then, the military has taken a back seat in the affairs of the state. But in 2020, then president Muhammadu Buhari deployed the military to enforce restrictions imposed to manage the COVID pandemic.

This was not unusual. The armed forces have long been used in Nigeria for roles normally assigned to the police, from quelling protests to responding to floods.

In more than 30 states, troops were already involved in counter insurgency, anti-banditry, peacekeeping, and other security missions. COVID related orders extended this presence, making soldiers highly visible on patrols and roadblocks.

The military’s tasks included enforcing curfews, dispersing gatherings and closing markets – functions usually handled by the police. Two presidential regulations under the Quarantine Act expanded the powers of the security agencies.

Alongside enforcement, the military provided medical and logistical support. Military hospitals were used for treatment. The military assigned more than 220 personnel to the overstretched health sector. The Air Force moved medical supplies across the country, and military researchers joined regional vaccine collaborations.

Nigeria’s armed forces number about 223,000, with more than two thirds of this number in the army. Without a robust reserve force, Nigeria’s regular troops remain the main option for emergencies.

I am a security researcher, focusing on the evolving nature of civil-military relations and their implications for peace and security in Nigeria. In my contribution to the book Military Operations in Response to Domestic Emergencies and Global Pandemics, I wrote about treating a public health emergency as a security threat.

I described how the Nigerian military demonstrated adaptability and reach during the pandemic by providing logistics and health support. But reliance on soldiers for civilian enforcement revealed serious costs: human rights abuses, corruption, weak oversight and the diversion of resources from security operations.

In future emergencies, Nigeria needs a more balanced civil-military framework where soldiers act as partners in service rather than feared enforcers. Relying on soldiers for civilian tasks often has immense consequences.

The accountability gap

Nigeria has laws authorising military deployment in aid of civil authorities under presidential order with parliamentary oversight. Section 217(2) of Nigeria’s constitution and section 8(3) of the Armed Forces Act permit internal deployment to restore order and maintain public safety. Section 218 subjects presidential authority to legislative checks and control.

In practice, however, checks are weak. This was evident during the COVID deployment. Other issues evident from that time include:

Command and scope

Buhari’s March 2020 address announcing lockdowns referred vaguely to security agencies, without formal authorisation for the military. Yet the Defence Headquarters declared its readiness to act.

The ambiguity raised questions about authorisation of military deployments and constitutional compliance. With no clear rules of engagement, soldiers had wide discretion. Often, this translated into space for abuse and excessive use of force. Disproportionate punishment of curfew violators became the norm.

Checks and balances

Courts hold the authority to review military action. But during the lockdown judicial deference to the executive and weak legislative scrutiny meant abuses of civilians went unchecked.

Civilian leaders tolerated overreach for political expediency, giving the military more space in civilian matters than is acceptable in a democracy.

The opportunity costs

The deployment of troops placed heavy strain on already stretched forces. Personnel and resources were diverted from counter insurgency and anti banditry campaigns.

Armed groups, especially Boko Haram, shifted from targeting civilians to attacking the military, achieving initial successes despite countermeasures. They also intensified recruitment among people impoverished by lockdown job losses and spread misinformation to weaken public health messaging. More than 100 lives were lost and over 50 attacks by bandits were recorded in the north-west states of Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina and Kaduna between April and July 2020.

The closure of military schools and training centres and restrictions on gatherings had an impact on timely completion of training and readiness for missions.

Lockdowns also coincided with a rise in armed robbery.

Corruption

Soldiers at checkpoints extorted money from truck drivers and travellers, often ignoring official permits.

COVID measures undermined

The military approach undermined public health goals. Fear of troops discouraged cooperation with contact tracers, while corruption and unlawful violence deepened public distrust and resistance to preventive measures.

In some areas, civilians refused to cooperate with health officials, obstructed patrols or withheld information about rule-breakers.

Abuses

The military’s reputation in domestic operations was already mixed, with critics citing unprofessionalism and human rights abuses in previous deployments. As the National Human Rights Commission report on COVID-19 enforcement observed, heavy handed enforcement of pandemic restrictions reinforced these perceptions.

Abuses were widespread: curfew violators were beaten; health workers were harassed.

In the first two weeks of enforcement, personnel killed 18 civilians, more than the virus had at that stage. Few of these cases were prosecuted and military trials lacked transparency.

Lessons learnt

The COVID-19 deployment illustrated persistent gaps in Nigeria’s civil-military relations. For future public health or disaster responses, Nigeria’s government could draw five main lessons:

Clear authorisation: Internal military roles should be grounded in explicit presidential orders, endorsed and bounded by parliamentary legislation, with the scope and duration defined.

Rules of engagement: Domestic missions need clear guidelines that stress minimal force, rights protection, and coordination with civil agencies.

Stronger police capacity: Building police capability in equipment, training and community relations would reduce reliance on soldiers for enforcement. The military should focus on logistics and medical support.

Effective oversight: Legislative committees and independent rights bodies must monitor deployments, investigate abuses promptly and refer all over-reach for immediate action.

Rebuild public trust: Training on civilian engagement, human rights and inter-agency coordination would improve professionalism of personnel and restore the public legitimacy of the institution.

Sallek Yaks Musa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s use of soldiers for civilian tasks comes with serious costs – how to prevent this – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-use-of-soldiers-for-civilian-tasks-comes-with-serious-costs-how-to-prevent-this-263984

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Amanuel Tesfaye, Doctoral Researcher, University of Helsinki

The UK is moving to lower its voting age from 18 to 16. The new legislation takes effect ahead of the country’s next general election in 2029, and is aimed at boosting its democracy. The move has ignited global debate: should 16-year-olds be trusted with the ballot?

For African countries, where young people make up the majority of the population but often feel shut out of politics, the question is especially pressing. We spoke to political researchers from Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria for their views.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Should African countries lower the voting age to 16? Views from Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria – https://theconversation.com/should-african-countries-lower-the-voting-age-to-16-views-from-ethiopia-ghana-kenya-and-nigeria-263396

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Roula Inglesi-Lotz, Professor of Economics, University of Pretoria

It will take an estimated 131 years for the world to achieve gender parity, defined as equal access, opportunities and outcomes for women and men across economic, political, educational and health dimensions. That’s according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2023.

Most of us alive today will never see it happen.

Gender parity matters because women make up more than half of the world’s population, and excluding them from full participation has economic and social costs. Closing the gap is not only a matter of fairness. It’s a condition for sustained growth, innovation and societal wellbeing.

The slow pace of progress raises a question about what more needs to be done. Are countries pursuing the right kind of policies? It’s tempting to look for “best practices” and replicate them. But a closer look at how different nations approach gender equality shows there is no universal path.

Our research team of economists examined how different countries design gender equality policies. In our paper, we set out to compare South Africa and Australia to understand how context shapes approaches.

The two countries have very different histories, economies and institutions. Nevertheless, both aspire to gender equality.

We found that South Africa represents an equity-based approach, rooted in redress after apartheid. Australia has an equality-focused strategy that emphasises workplace reforms, reporting and institutional mechanisms. Equality can be defined as access to the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities for each citizens. Equity refers to providing social justice by assisting the most disadvantaged members of society. Equality implies treating all individuals similarly while equity involves differentiated treatment.

Our analysis shows why context matters more than copying models. What works in one place may not translate elsewhere. Importing Australia’s corporate gender strategies into South Africa without tackling issues that matter most in the country would miss the core issue.

Similarly, Australia does not need South Africa’s equity-based affirmative action framework in the same way. Instead, Australia aims to dismantle persistent gender inequalities in pay, workforce participation and leadership representation.

The better approach is to share lessons rather than adapt strategies. South Africa can learn from Australia’s corporate and fiscal gender mainstreaming. Australia can take note of South Africa’s insistence that equity requires actively putting things right when past discrimination lingers.

South Africa’s equity-based path

South Africa’s gender policies are deeply connected to its post-apartheid transformation. This sought to dismantle the structures of racial segregation and inequality.

Apartheid not only excluded the majority population from political, social and economic participation, it also compounded gender inequalities. Black women in particular faced a “double exclusion,” denied rights and opportunities both as Black citizens and as women.

After the first democratic elections in 1994 gender measures were therefore framed as part of the broader project of redress, seeking to dismantle these intersecting structures of racial and gender disadvantage.

With this history of exclusion and structural injustice, the country had to focus on equity and redress.

South Africa has prioritised laws and frameworks addressing gender-based violence and reproductive rights. It has also introduced employment equity legislation, gender-sensitive budgeting initiatives, and affirmative action measures to improve women’s representation in the workplace and politics.

The approach recognises that simply treating everyone “equally” on paper is not enough in a society historically hurt by systemic discrimination.

Yet progress across these areas – from reproductive rights and workplace participation to tackling gender-based violence – has been uneven.

South Africa continues to face very high unemployment, deep income inequality and persistent workplace discrimination on both racial and gender grounds.

The Gender Social Norms Index (2023) found that 97.3% of South Africans hold at least one gender bias. For example, many respondents agreed with statements such as “men make better political leaders than women” or “men have more right to jobs when jobs are scarce”.

This is among the highest rates globally. It shows how policy targets often are not in synch with cultural and social norms.

Australia’s equality-oriented path

Australia pursued a more institutional and corporate-focused route. Its stable liberal democracy and high-income economy provided the foundation for a series of workplace equality reforms. Beginning in the 1980s it introduced successive laws, including the Sex Discrimination Act and, later, the Workplace Gender Equality Act.

This focus stemmed from long-standing advocacy for women’s workplace rights and recognition that gender gaps in pay and leadership positions persisted despite overall prosperity.

Such workplace reforms are not absent in South Africa. But in Australia they have been at the centre of the strategy, supported by strong corporate governance structures and economic stability.

Australia has also used fiscal tools. It reintroduced the Women’s Budget Statement in 2013 after it was discontinued in the mid-1990s. It requires government budgets to assess how spending and tax measures affect women differently. This ensures that economic policy is evaluated through a gender lens.

A Women’s Economic Equality Taskforce was also set up in 2022 to advise the government. This approach prioritises equality in participation and opportunity, ensuring women have the same access to jobs, pay and leadership roles.

The results show measurable progress. Australia improved its position in the Global Gender Gap Index, ranking 13th in 2025.

But challenges remain, particularly in narrowing the wage gap and achieving parity in leadership positions.

Cultural change has proven slower than institutional reform.

What the comparison shows

On paper, both countries are relatively high performers in terms of gender parity. In the Global Gender Gap Index 2025, South Africa ranked 33rd and Australia 13th out of 146 countries. Yet their policy emphases and challenges differ sharply.

Using indicators such as the Global Gender Gap Index, Gender Inequality Index, and employment-to-population ratios, our study shows that while both South Africa and Australia rank relatively high in global comparisons, their challenges diverge sharply.

In South Africa, women’s labour force participation – defined as the share of women aged 15 and older who are either employed or actively seeking work – remains low at 35.4% in 2022 compared to 59.1% in Australia. By contrast, men’s participation rates were 55.5% in South Africa and 69.5% in Australia.

This means the gap between men and women is much larger in South Africa.

Australia performs better on participation and pay gap reforms, but progress is slower in shifting underlying cultural attitudes.

Closing the gap

Our findings confirm that gender equality advances through different pathways, shaped by each country’s social, historical and institutional context. And that no universal model can address such diverse realities.

Gender equality is not just about ticking boxes in international rankings. It is about recognising that different societies need different tools – and that tailored, evidence-based policies are our best hope to close the gap in less than 131 years.

Roula Inglesi-Lotz receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF).

Anna Maria Oosthuizen receives funding from the University of Pretoria. Relevant affiliations: SA-TIED UNU-WIDER

Nguyen Tuan Khuong Truong receives funding from the Australia Africa Universities Network (AAUN).

Getrude Njokwe, Heinrich Bohlmann, Helen Cabalu, Hiroaki Suenaga, Jessika Bohlmann, Julian Inchauspe, and Margaret Chitiga-Mabugu do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Gender equality is the goal, but how to get there? Case study of South Africa and Australia shows that context matters – https://theconversation.com/gender-equality-is-the-goal-but-how-to-get-there-case-study-of-south-africa-and-australia-shows-that-context-matters-264202

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Diane Le Gouvello, Postdoctoral fellow, Nelson Mandela University

All sea turtle species are threatened worldwide. They migrate long distances in the oceans – often thousands of kilometres – and so fall under multiple countries’ laws and conservation targets. They also have a complex life cycle with changes in habitats and diet at different life stages. These things make it difficult to protect them from threats like illegal harvesting, fisheries bycatch, coastal development, diseases and pollution.

Although they predictably return to the same nesting grounds on beaches where they were born, and the movements of adults have been well studied (mostly using satellite tracking), very little is known about their early life. Once newly hatched turtles enter the sea and disperse, they are gone for several years, also known as the “lost years”.

It’s hard to track hatchlings because they are small (just a few centimetres long), many die, and the survivors grow fast (so tracking devices don’t stay on). But knowing more about where they go during these “lost years” would help conservation scientists to improve their chances of survival and thus ensure recruitment and population viability.

Computer models are valuable tools for predicting the distribution of organisms in the oceans. The Sea Turtle Active Movement Model, for example, has been used to suggest how young turtles might disperse in the North Pacific and North Atlantic oceans – not only drifting in currents but actively swimming to their preferred habitats. The two most important factors are water temperature and food availability.

---

Read more:
Seychelles: floating baby corals can help save damaged reefs – new study

---

I was part of a team of scientists in South Africa who worked with the creators of that model to set up a similar one for the western Indian Ocean turtles. These are the species that nest on the eastern coast of the African continent and offshore islands.

We knew something about the surface currents in the Indian Ocean, the sea temperatures, the tiny hatchlings’ swimming speed, their starting points, what food they might need to find, and their growth rate. All this could be combined in the model to calculate where they might be at different points in time. The model produced maps predicting the distribution of dispersal for each species of sea turtle in the western Indian Ocean.

We found that ocean currents were the most important driver of dispersal, as hatchlings’ swimming abilities are limited during the first year. Swimming becomes more important as the young turtles grow.

This was similar to the findings of other studies.

Young turtles don’t stay inside marine protected areas all the time. The maps we created can be used to show where and when they might be most vulnerable and which areas of the ocean are most important to protect.

Indian Ocean turtles

We chose to model the sea turtles of the western Indian Ocean for a few reasons. There are five species that nest here; all the countries on this coastline and offshore islands have turtle conservation and monitoring programmes; and the ocean currents are complex.

The five species are green turtles (Chelonia mydas); hawksbills (Eretmochelys imbricata); loggerheads (Caretta caretta); leatherbacks (Dermochelys coriacea); and olive ridleys (Lepidochelys olivacea, which nest in smaller numbers and have not been included in our model). We had already studied their hatchling fitness, including their different swimming speeds, which was information the model would need.

The protected areas include South Africa’s iSimangaliso Wetland Park, a Unesco World Heritage Site. The turtle rookery there is about 200km long and has been monitored since 1963.

Our model also incorporated a high resolution ocean model of the Mozambique Channel, a very turbulent and dynamic oceanic region. It mostly flows southward, but eddies also send surface water in all directions. At the western end of the channel’s Agulhas Current, the Agulhas Rings also transport water into the South Atlantic Ocean, connecting the two ocean basins and a potential route for young turtles.

Water temperature matters too. Sea turtles do not regulate their own body temperature and the newly hatched turtles are less tolerant of temperature changes than adults are, but vary depending on the species. Temperature is more important for their survival than food is (their food requirements are easily met during the first year, as they are so small).

The model uses data on surface ocean currents and primary productivity (as a proxy for food availability). For each nesting site and species, we “released” 5,000 “virtual hatchlings” over a one-month period of peak hatching. The daily location of each virtual hatchling was recorded over one year. The model simulated young turtle dispersal and thereby estimated their potential distribution at an individual level. We then analysed this to predict their dispersal corridors at the population level.

Where young turtles go

The study revealed that the young turtles mostly go from their hatching site to a particular developmental area (the place where they develop for the first years) even though these are sometimes very far apart. Dispersal is mostly driven by ocean currents (during the first year) but differs among species. When they are older, currents are less important in their dispersal, and they start to actively swim towards favourable ocean areas.

There were three distinct dispersal corridors: among equatorial Indian Ocean islands (hawksbills); along east Africa (green turtles); and around southern Africa (loggerheads and leatherbacks).

The study allowed us to predict and map where critical dispersal habitats might be for four species nesting in this ocean region. It’s the first study to provide a regional-scale estimate of the dispersal pathways and corridors used by young turtles (individually and as populations), which are usually lacking in conservation assessments.

The results can also assist to develop more targeted management measures for conservation managers and policy makers, which will enhance the protection afforded to each of these threatened migratory species. The UN’s new high seas treaty will be instrumental in extending these actions into areas beyond national jurisdiction.

Diane Le Gouvello does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Baby turtles vanish into the Indian Ocean for years: now a model shows where they might go – https://theconversation.com/baby-turtles-vanish-into-the-indian-ocean-for-years-now-a-model-shows-where-they-might-go-261576

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

In April 2011, Ethiopia began construction of Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), on the Blue Nile river. The dam is expected to generate more than 6,000 megawatts of electricity, effectively transforming Ethiopia into the continent’s largest power exporter.

The dam affects 11 countries, two downstream and nine upstream.

Addis Ababa completed construction of the US$4 billion-plus project in July 2025, mainly with funds sourced from Ethiopians at home and in the diaspora, with an official launch on 9 September 2025. John Mukum Mbaku, who has researched the governance of the Nile’s waters, explains the dam’s potential for Ethiopia – and the controversies that have dogged it.

What are the simmering tensions around the official launch of the dam?

The dispute over the allocation and use of the Nile waters has been going on for many years. This has been exacerbated by climate change, and increased demand for food and water from growing populations.

The 11 countries that share the waters of the Nile have competing development priorities too. These states include Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya.

Egypt and Sudan lie downstream. They receive the river’s waters only after it has passed through the nine upstream states.

Initially, the downstream states, particularly Egypt, opposed the construction of the dam, arguing that it was a threat to their water rights.

However, Ethiopia powered ahead with construction. Egypt and Sudan then shifted negotiations to securing an agreement for filling and operating the dam.

The two downstream states had suggested that filling the dam should take about 12 to 21 years in order to protect their water supply. For domestic and political reasons, Addis Ababa prefered a shorter filling period. In addition, Egypt and Sudan argued that filling the reservoir without a legally binding agreement would disregard their interests and rights.

But with the dam now fully filled and due to be officially inaugurated on 9 September 2025, the issue of a binding agreement for filling the dam’s reservoir is moot.

Egypt and Sudan’s political and diplomatic efforts highlight what they say is the illegality of unilaterally operating the dam without a binding agreement. Despite the intervention of the African Union and the US government, as well as appeals by Egypt to the UN Security Council, the three countries haven’t been able to secure a deal.

Part of the reason is that Egypt has insisted that any negotiations on water allocation begin with the rights granted to it under its 1959 Nile Waters Treaty with Sudan.

Under this agreement, Egypt was granted 66% of the Nile’s estimated average annual water flow of 84 billion cubic metres. Sudan got 22%. The treaty ignores upstream countries’ legal claims to Nile waters, since 10 billion cubic metres were reserved for seepage and evaporation. Ethiopia’s highlands, for instance, supply more than 86% of the water that flows into the Nile River.

Egypt continues to argue that Ethiopia’s dam is a threat to its water security and that, if necessary, it will take measures to protect what it refers to as its “historical rights” to Nile waters.

Egypt relies on the Nile for more than 90% of its fresh water supplies. The country’s water needs have risen as its population has grown and its economy has expanded significantly.

However, Egypt and Sudan’s insistence on keeping their historical water shares cannot be considered equitable and reasonable. Additionally, Cairo doesn’t appear to be prioritising a water-use approach that acknowledges the legal claims of upstream states to the Nile’s waters.

Instead of improving and updating its water infrastructure, minimising wasteful irrigation practices and generally improving water use, Egypt has focused on grandiose mega projects that are putting significant stress on the region’s scarce water resources.

Sudan, which has been battling a devastating civil war since 2023, has raised concerns about Ethiopia’s dam affecting the operations of its own dams. This would make it more difficult to manage Khartoum’s development plans.

What makes agreement on the Nile so elusive?

The legal framework regulating the allocation of the Nile’s waters has been dominated by colonial-era agreements. These have been embraced by the two downstream states, Sudan and Egypt, but contested by the nine upstream ones.

Two of the most important of these agreements are the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Egypt-Sudan treaty.

The 1959 treaty augmented the water allocations granted to Egypt and Sudan by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. These treaties also granted Egypt veto power over any construction projects on the Nile or its tributaries.

The terms of these treaties, however, are only possible if the nine upstream riparian states don’t access or utilise any water from the Nile and its tributaries.

Most importantly, they make the water rights of the other Nile countries dependent on Egypt and Sudan’s goodwill.

Ethiopia and other upstream states have long argued that they were not parties to the colonial-era treaties and are, therefore, not bound by them.

What international principles guide water use across borders?

The pillars of international transboundary water law are:

(i) equitable and reasonable use

(ii) the obligation not to cause significant harm

(iii) the duty to cooperate.

International legal scholars have noted that the 1959 Nile Treaty stands in sharp contrast to these principles. It disregards the sovereign rights of other riparian countries to their fair share of the Nile, and interferes with their development.

What does the dam promise for Ethiopians?

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is a symbol of national unity and pride. It is significant that construction was undertaken without reliance on financing from external actors, such as international financial institutions or major industrial countries.

The dam’s electricity output could potentially transform Ethiopia’s development.

First, the electricity would provide a reliable source of energy for rural industrialisation, reducing deforestation by eliminating the need for households to cut down trees for firewood.

Second, it would reduce the pollution associated with burning wood, dung and other forms of biomass for cooking and other activities.

Third, it would improve access to education, effectively providing light that enhances the ability of pupils to complete homework assignments and study at night. During hot seasons, the electricity generated could be used to cool classrooms, improving learning outcomes.

Finally, higher electricity output would boost internet connectivity in rural areas in Ethiopia, effectively boosting access to the outside world.

The dam could also help with flood control in Sudan and drought protection in Egypt – but only if the three countries work together.

John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ethiopia’s mega dam has taken 14 years to build: what it means for the Nile’s 11 river states and why it’s so controversial – https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-mega-dam-has-taken-14-years-to-build-what-it-means-for-the-niles-11-river-states-and-why-its-so-controversial-264665

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Richard Atimniraye Nyelade, Lecturer, Sociological and Anthropological Studies, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

Fatima, a fisherwoman on Lake Chad, sets out at dawn not just to make a living from the shrinking waters, but to pay a “tax”. Before casting her net, she must hand over part of her meagre earnings to armed men claiming allegiance to Boko Haram. If she refuses, her catch, her boat, even her life, could be taken.

Boko Haram is an insurgent network that began in north-east Nigeria in 2002 and later fractured into two main factions: JAS (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, the original Boko Haram faction) and ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province, the Islamic State affiliate in the region). Both operate across Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Economic shakedowns like this are happening every day throughout the Lake Chad Basin. This is a vast, drought-stricken region spanning the borderlands around Lake Chad in north-eastern Nigeria, south-eastern Niger, western Chad and northern Cameroon. It is home to more than 30 million people whose livelihoods depend on fishing, farming and herding.

I am a researcher of climate-related insecurity and conflict. In a recent paper, I looked at how environmental degradation, regional instability and external geopolitical interests are exacerbating the conflict in the region. The study drew on qualitative analysis of security reports and academic literature. These include the United Nations Development Programme’s 2022 conflict analysis of the Lake Chad Basin and the World Food Programme’s 2024 climate and food-security report.

The paper sets out how Boko Haram has come to operate like a parallel government, imposing taxes on trade, farming and fishing. It offers harsh order in exchange for revenue.

I conclude from my findings that war is no longer driven only by belief. It’s driven by a collapsing economy, ecological ruin and the absence of viable alternatives.

Understanding these factors is crucial for developing comprehensive security strategies. Based on the findings I recommend five interventions: investment in the ecological recovery of the region; the strengthening of cross-border intelligence to choke the illicit trade in fish, cattle, arms and people; transparency from foreign players about their motives; the rebuilding of local economies and support for displaced communities; and lastly the rebuilding of trust with local communities.

Environmental degradation

Lake Chad’s open-water area fell from about 25,000 km² in the early 1960s to lows of a few hundred km² in the 1980s, and has generally remained under one-tenth of its 1960s extent with strong variability. This is documented in satellite analyses by Nasa and the United States Geological Survey.

This isn’t just an ecological crisis. As water recedes and fertile land disappears, fishing, farming and herding collapse. The basin hosts about 30 million people across 10 subnational regions or states.

In 2024, Niger’s floods affected about 1.5 million people nationwide, with Diffa recording around 50,000 affected and authorities on alert along the Komadougou Yobe river. The Red Cross also flagged basin-wide flood emergencies that month.

The basin’s ecological collapse has turned Lake Chad into a recruitment ground. The World Food Programme shows how droughts and erratic rainfall have crushed agricultural yields. The UN Development Programme links these environmental shocks to rising displacement, hunger and extremism.

Across the shared basin, Boko Haram has built a brutal, extractive shadow economy. In Nigeria, the group at one point controlled up to half of the fish trade around Baga. Fishermen were taxed at every stage, from lake to market. Refusal brought violence.

In Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, Boko Haram factions have orchestrated cattle rustling that has decimated pastoralist communities. My research details how armed raids strip herders of their livelihoods overnight. The stolen animals are sold through cross-border smuggling networks, feeding the insurgency. The group also taxes livestock traders at makeshift checkpoints, turning rustling and market levies into steady revenue.

Across the basin, kidnapping has become an industry. The UN reports that kidnapping for ransom remains a key revenue source for Boko Haram/ISWAP, and that a “large ransom” was paid in the 2018 Dapchi schoolgirls case. What began as ideological acts, like the abduction of schoolgirls, has turned into a ruthless business model. Ransoms pay for weapons, logistics and recruitment.

Regional instability

Ecological and economic desperation fuels regional instability. As communities fracture and compete over dwindling resources, the borders of the four Chad Basin countries become highways for insurgents, smugglers and arms.

Since 2014 Boko Haram has spilled from Nigeria into Cameroon, Chad and Niger, where security forces are stretched and coordination is uneven. Arms flow through the Sahel and abuses by security actors erode public trust, which in turn eases recruitment.

The paper details how national armies, often under-equipped and struggling with coordination, have been unable to secure this vast terrain. The Multinational Joint Task Force, a regional military coalition, has had successes but is hampered by these same challenges.

This security vacuum is the space in which Boko Haram’s parallel governance and illicit economy thrive, making the crisis a truly regional one that no single country can solve alone. The result is a conflict system that crosses borders, mixes ideology with profit, and outlasts purely military responses.

Bombs not the answer

Military force alone cannot fix this. It’s necessary to address the root causes, ecological collapse, broken livelihoods, and the economic lifelines that keep the insurgency going.

The Lake Chad Basin Commission is the intergovernmental body that manages the lake’s resources. Created in 1964 by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, and later joined by the Central African Republic and Libya, the commission and national governments must lead with urgency and courage. They must:

• invest in climate resilience, large-scale water management, drought-resistant crops, restored wetlands and sustainable fishing

• disrupt illicit trade and go after the money, not just the militants

• demand transparency from foreign actors about their agendas in the region

• rebuild local economies and trust.

Fatima’s daily struggle on Lake Chad is not just about fish. It is about the future of the region. The shrinking lake, the abandoned villages, the armed taxmen – these are not side effects. They are the story.

Richard Atimniraye Nyelade does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Military force isn’t the solution for Lake Chad Basin conflict: the key is rebuilding local economies – https://theconversation.com/military-force-isnt-the-solution-for-lake-chad-basin-conflict-the-key-is-rebuilding-local-economies-262640

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

The Congolese military court has accused former president Joseph Kabila of treason, corruption, war crimes and supporting the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group. During court proceedings that began in July 2025, arguments were made for utilising the death penalty against Kabila, who was in power from 2001 to 2019. The trial is going on in Kabila’s absence as the threat of arrest led him into exile. The former president had fought against the M23’s first iteration in 2012-2013, as well as its predecessor, the National Congress for the Defence of the People, which fought the DRC government between 2006 and 2009. Jonathan R. Beloff, who has studied the regional and internal political dynamics in the DRC for over a decade, examines the implications of the case.

What is Joseph Kabila’s political history?

Joseph Kabila took over as president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 26 January 2001 after the assassination of his father, Laurent-Désiré. He was 29.

Before this, during the First Congo War (1996-1997), he served in the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, which aimed to overthrow the Zairean dictator Joseph Mobutu. This war has been labelled “Africa’s World War” by historians like Gérard Prunier because of the large number of foreign actors it involved. These include Angola, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda.

A significant number of soldiers and commanders in the alliance were Rwandan. Much of the war was conducted by Rwandan General James Kabarebe, who became a de facto father figure for Kabila, training him in military strategy, tactics and politics.

A breakdown in Rwanda’s relationship with the DRC in 1998 led to the bloody Second Congo War (1998-2003). It was between Uganda, Rwanda and to a lesser extent Burundi, who fought against the DRC and its allies like Angola and Zimbabwe. The war was mostly fought by rebels from these nations who had varying interests. During this period, Kabila became the deputy chief of staff for the Congolese military.

After he became president, he successfully applied pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to negotiate peace agreements in 2002.

Overall, his presidential term was marred by the persecution of political rivals, corruption and multiple active rebel forces in the volatile eastern region.

Further, despite the DRC’s constitution forbidding it, Kabila extended his presidency from two five-year terms, only stepping down in 2019. A political deal was struck that saw him relinquish power and hand over to Felix Tshisekedi.

What has happened to Kabila since then?

Kabila and his successor have not seen eye to eye.

Since departing from power, the former president has faced increased accusations of corruption during his presidency. Further, by 2021, many of Kabila’s supporters within the government and military had been removed.

The relationship between the two further soured in 2023 when Kabila spoke out against Tshisekedi’s handling of the M23’s violent campaign in eastern DRC. Kabila has also criticised Tshisekedi’s use of uncontrolled militias, Wazalendo, who have been unsuccessful in combating the M23.

Kabila went into self-exile, reportedly in South Africa and other African nations, that year. He returned to eastern DRC’s regional hub Goma in May 2025, when he met with M23 leaders.

The Congolese government used Kabila’s visit to M23-controlled Goma to justify the charges brought against him. Further, the government suspended Kabila’s political party, Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie. The party represented Kabila’s interest in Congo’s legislative branch.

Soon after the party’s suspension, the senate stripped Kabila of his immunity, allowing charges to be filed against the former president.

Why is the case against Kabila before a military court?

While Kabila doesn’t hold any political or military post – he last served as president and major-general in January 2019 – his past experience in the army led to a military rather than civilian process.

Additionally, the case is before a military court as Kabila is accused of committing treason by meeting with an opposing military force, the M23. The government seized his assets after he met and engaged with leaders of the rebel group.

While it’s not the most significant charge, Kabila also faces accusations of massive corruption during his 18-year presidency. Further, he’s being held accountable for past military decisions that led to war crimes, murder and rape during and after the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

What are the implications of the court case for DRC’s peace process?

In June 2025, Rwanda and the DRC signed a peace agreement following negotiations led by Qatar and the United States.

On the surface, the agreement could lead to regional stability and growth. However, for Tshisekedi, it is a landmine of political risks.

Since the M23’s resurgence in November 2021, Tshisekedi has blamed Rwanda, as well as the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, who are historically Rwandan populations resident in eastern DRC, for the return of the rebel group.

The new peace deal significantly complicates Tshisekedi’s relationship with his key political allies and ministers. If they begin to believe he is caving in to Rwanda, Tshisekedi could lose the presidency ahead of next year’s election.

Thus, in my view, based on my research on Congolese instability, Tshisekedi needed to find a political distraction that his supporters could rally behind.

Kabila’s return to Goma and relationship with the M23 provided that opportunity. The court case allows Tshisekedi to highlight his fight against the rebel group and its allies. The Congolese military has been unable to significantly halt the M23’s advances.

The case also allows the president to demonstrate his tough stance on opposition figures.

However, Tshisekedi will need to be careful of the potential implications of the case for himself. Kabila’s remaining loyalists could become even more daring in standing up against Tshisekedi. While a majority were removed, there are still some left.

Jonathan Beloff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Joseph Kabila is on trial for treason in the DRC. What the case against the former president is all about – https://theconversation.com/joseph-kabila-is-on-trial-for-treason-in-the-drc-what-the-case-against-the-former-president-is-all-about-264412