Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lilac Nachum, Visiting professor, Strathmore University

Africa is the world’s most endowed continent in agricultural potential, yet it remains a marginal player in global agribusiness. This paradox lies at the heart of Africa’s development challenge.

Africa’s land accounts for nearly half of the global total. Most of it can be used for growing crops. It is also largely unprotected, and not forested, with low population density. The continent’s climate supports the growth of 80% of the foods consumed globally. Economic theory would predict that these conditions would lead to strong export performance. Yet Africa’s share of global agricultural exports is the lowest worldwide. It fell from about 8% in 1960 to 4% in the early 2020s, according to World Bank data.

Policymakers have largely neglected agribusiness export performance, with a few exceptions, such as Kenya and Ghana. Agribusiness refers to the entire range of activities in producing, processing, distributing and marketing agricultural products.

Despite being the largest contributor to GDP and employment, agribusiness receives a disproportionately small share of government spending (on average 4%), far below its economic significance. There are variations across the continent, ranging from 8% and 7% respectively in Mali and South Sudan to less than 3% in Kenya and Ghana. Many governments have instead chosen manufacturing as the pathway to global integration.

Based on insights from over three decades of research, consulting and teaching on global markets and development, I argue that agriculture could lead Africa’s integration into the world economy. Four reforms would be necessary: improving access to capital; documenting land; designing targeted cross-border policies; and strategically employing trade policy.

In these ways, Africa could use its natural assets to secure broad-based economic growth and a stronger position in global value chains.

Four reforms to support agribusiness

1. Improve access to capital

Capital scarcity remains the most serious constraint on African agribusiness. Financial institutions are reluctant to lend due to high risk, long investment horizons, poor collateral, and profits being vulnerable to price shocks. The World Bank estimates that agriculture receives only about 1% of commercial lending despite contributing 25%-40% of GDP (up to 6% in Nigeria and Ethiopia). Lending rates are often double the economy-wide average, as UN Food and Agriculture Organization data show for Uganda.

Governments can help close this financing gap. In 2024, Kenya allocated US$7.7 million for developing its tea production. Domestic investment can generate savings by cutting food import bills. Nigeria’s Tomato Jos project, for instance, reduced annual tomato paste imports by US$360 million.

Governments should expand public lending while also enabling private sector participation through risk-sharing mechanisms. South Africa’s Khula Credit Guarantee Scheme illustrates how government-backed guarantees can unlock finance for collateral-poor farmers. This model has been reproduced in Kenya and Tanzania with EU and development bank support.

Private finance sources such as venture capital have also grown rapidly. In 2024, Nigeria and South Africa each attracted about US$500 million in venture funding. Funded African startups have grown six times faster than the global average. Micro-lending platforms now exceed US$8.5 billion in loans.

2. Document the land

Over 80% of Africa’s arable land is undocumented and governed by customary tenure systems poorly integrated into formal law. Weak land administration deters investment and limits land’s use as collateral. Transfers cost twice as much and take twice as long as in OECD countries (the world’s 38 most developed countries). That constrains access to credit and economies of scale needed for exports.

Several land tenure reforms introduced in the last decade demonstrate the benefits of formalisation. Ethiopia issued certificates to 20 million smallholders, boosting rental activity. Malawi’s redistribution of 15,000 hectares raised household incomes by 40%. In Mozambique, Uganda and Liberia, governments legally recognised customary institutions to facilitate formal land contracts. Rwanda’s comprehensive land mapping further improved transparency and investment incentives.

3. Design focused cross-border policies

Regional and global markets need different strategies for export success. Intra-African trade benefits from proximity and regulatory harmonisation. The East African Community’s trade facilitation measures increased intra-regional dairy exports 65-fold within a decade.

Most African agricultural exports, however, go to non-African markets, requiring infrastructure and logistics investments to ensure speed and quality. Senegal increased exports by 20% annually after investing in high-speed shipping, while Ethiopia’s flower growing boom owes much to its air transport and cold-chain systems.

Policies must also be crop specific. Kenya’s targeted avocado export strategy transformed it into Africa’s largest exporter, with double-digit annual growth. Mali’s mango export policy built a competitive value chain serving European markets.

4. Use trade policy as a tool for upgrading

African exporters primarily sell raw, low-value materials. Nigeria, a top tomato producer, exports nearly all production unprocessed – and imports paste. Less than 5% of Kenyan tea, the nation’s leading export, is branded. Trade policy can reverse this imbalance by encouraging domestic processing.

The East African Community’s differentiated tariff structure successfully encouraged value addition by lowering duties on intermediate goods while protecting local food processing. Governments could similarly tax or restrict unprocessed exports to motivate upgrading. At the same time, it’s necessary to invest in processing capacity. Several countries, including Botswana, Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire, have attempted raw export bans with limited success because the enabling conditions are missing.

A decisive shift

Africa’s agribusiness sector embodies the continent’s untapped potential for structural transformation. With abundant land, favourable climate and rapidly growing domestic demand, Africa possesses clear comparative advantages. Africa is also becoming more capable of addressing the challenges that have arrested the development of the agribusiness sector in the past. This article develops a policy agenda designed to reverse Africa’s declining share of world agricultural trade by amending institutional failures that have constrained competitiveness.

This agenda is based on enhancing access to finance, formalising land rights, implementing targeted cross-border initiatives, and using trade policy for upgrading. A decisive policy shift towards an agriculture-led development agenda is essential. Implementing this agenda will enable African countries to improve their economic position at home and in the world.

Lilac Nachum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Agricultural exports from Africa are not doing well. Four ways to change that – https://theconversation.com/agricultural-exports-from-africa-are-not-doing-well-four-ways-to-change-that-268780

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Amanda Gouws, Professor of Political Science and Chair of the South African Research Initiative in Gender Politics, Stellenbosch University

For democracies to function well, citizens have to trust their institutions. Every incidence of bad service delivery or corruption will influence how much citizens trust institutions.

The latest incident that will most likely shake confidence in South Africa’s political system, and specifically the police and the criminal justice system, is the accusation by General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, provincial commissioner of KwaZulu-Natal province, that members of these institutions are involved in organised crime. The accusations are being investigated by the Madlanga Commission and heard in parliament by an ad hoc committee.

General Mkhwanazi alleged that the police minister, other members of the South African Police Force and members of the judiciary interfered with the investigation he was leading into political assassinations. He alleged they attempted to close down the “political killings task team” because of their own links to organised crime.

Signs of corruption have, over time, eroded political trust among citizens in South Africa.

In this article we discuss the findings of the most recent survey by Afrobarometer, a pan-African research network, and two attitude surveys done by Citizen Surveys for the South African Research Chairs Initiative chair in Gender Politics. The data of the SARChI Chair will be made public once the research project is concluded.

Prof Gouws specialises in the construction of surveys and analysis of survey data and Dr Kupolusi is a statistician who is her post-doctoral fellow and did the statistical analysis for this article.

The reports show a decline of trust over a four-year period. The 2022 Afrobarometer data supports the findings of our two attitude surveys.

Citizens have to trust a political system if they are to accept its legitimacy and support it. When they see the system as legitimate, citizens are more willing to obey the laws of the country. They then support the rule of law.

Political trust and legitimacy

We understand “political trust” as it was conceptualised by David Easton, an American political scientist, in 1975. It is the perceived likelihood that the political system will deliver public goods without having to be closely scrutinised by citizens. Political trust is closely linked to the concepts of political support and legitimacy.

These three concepts relate to each other in the following way. Support for the political authorities or a regime will typically express itself in two forms: trust or confidence in them, and belief in their legitimacy.

Trust is present when citizens feel that their own interests would be attended to even if the authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny. Legitimacy is present when people believe it is right and proper to accept and obey the authorities, and abide by the requirements of the political system.

Trust and legitimacy are therefore distinct concepts. Trust is measured through political support for the regime and its authorities. Easton distinguishes between two types of support.

Diffuse support is a reservoir of positive attitudes and goodwill towards the regime as a whole, its underlying principles, and the larger political community. Diffuse support is more durable than specific support, which is trust in the incumbents of the political system.

Research
has shown that levels of trust in institutions like parliament, parties and courts far outweigh judgements on national and personal economic well-being. Economic performance is more important in high income countries, but trust in institutions, coupled with free and fair elections, is more important in newer democracies.

Declining levels of trust

In this article, through the use of different surveys conducted at different points in time (2018 and two different surveys in 2022), we show how institutional trust has declined over time in South Africa, to the detriment of the political system.

We also show that there’s a gender gap – that men and women differ in their attitudes towards the rule of law.

The most recent Afrobarometer survey (Round 9, 2022) had a national sample of 1,582 respondents. It found “no trust” at 66% for the police, 73% for parliament, 75% for the ruling party and 72% for opposition parties. It is only for the courts where “no trust” is below 50%.

Afrobarometer’s findings corroborate those of our own surveys, done in 2018 and 2022 by Citizen Surveys, a survey company in Cape Town. The survey was conducted with a national stratified sample of 1,300 respondents in all nine provinces and translated into seven languages. The interviews were done face to face by the fieldworkers of Citizen Surveys.

What our surveys show are declining levels of trust over time in the most important institutions of the police, parliament and political parties, with “no trust” in all of them over 50%.

When it comes to the rule of law our 2022 data showed that 45.8% of respondents said it was “not necessary to obey the laws of a corrupt government”, 69% indicated that it was fine to “get around the law as long as you don’t break it”, 62% agreed that it was fine if “the law is suspended in times of emergency” and 50.4% thought it was “better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately than wait for a legal solution” (vigilante justice).

What surprised us was the difference between the attitudes of men and women for the rule of law in our 2022 data. For “it is not necessary to obey the laws of a corrupt government” 44% of men agreed vs 47% of women. For “it is all right to get around the law as long as you don’t actually break it” 65.6% of men agreed vs 71.4% of women. For “suspending the law in times of emergency” 61.2% of men agreed vs 63.5% of women. And for “sometimes it is better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately” 46.2% of men vs 53.4% of women agreed.

What this shows is that women are more militant in their attitudes towards (breaking) the rule of law – findings that were quite unexpected. It seems that women, who are often at the receiving end of crime, have had enough.

What needs to happen

Declining trust and support for the rule of law undermines the legitimacy of government. The courts have been a beacon of legitimacy but even for courts the level of “no trust” is close to 50%.

A serious problem is that citizens do not distinguish between institutions (diffuse support) and incumbents (specific support). This means that corrupt officials undermine trust in institutions (such as the police, parliament and political parties).

A decline in specific support affects diffuse support – that reservoir of goodwill toward institutions. When corruption is not dealt with, erosion of trust in institutions is a consequence of the behaviour of incumbents.

Political trust and support for the rule of law are important in democracies to sustain stability, and so that citizens will not start to look for alternative ways such as protest or political violence to make their demands known to those who govern them.

Amanda Gouws receives funding from the National Research Foundation through her SARChI Chair in Gender Politics.

Joseph Ayodele Kupolusi receives funding from the National Research Foundation through Amanda Gouws SARChI Chair in Gender Politics

– ref. South Africans have lost trust in the police, in parliament and in political parties – what that means – https://theconversation.com/south-africans-have-lost-trust-in-the-police-in-parliament-and-in-political-parties-what-that-means-268804

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Lamine Doumbia, Research Associate – Dep. African History /Institute for Asian and African Studies, Humboldt University of Berlin

Mali has been struggling for over a decade to defeat “jihadists” around Gao, Kidal and Ségou. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), linked to al-Qaida, is believed to be the most vicious of the terrorist groups operating there, based on the scale of its attacks.

The group’s aims include an imposition of its strict interpretation of Islam and sharia. Recently it raised the ante with attacks in certain zones in Mali. This has put strain on trade routes and the supply of essential commodities, including fuel.

Consequently, there have been media reports raising concerns about the deepening security crisis in the country. Yet, as Malian researchers, we think some of these claims are exaggerated. We work in African studies, social anthropology, history, economics and development studies, and have been conducting fieldwork in Bamako over the past six months. Our view also draws on our broader research on urban market dynamics and social resilience in west Africa.

We argue that what is being reported is more like guesses based on certain conditions than solid conclusions backed by evidence.

For instance, the fuel crisis in Bamako has been interpreted as the direct consequence of terrorist activity. A contributing factor may be the limited institutional and governmental capacity to effectively coordinate fuel and energy procurement and storage of the country.

Indeed, since September 2025, Mali has a fuel shortage and a sharp rise in prices. Government efforts have not yet brought the crisis under lasting control. But this does not necessarily mean the capital city is under siege.

Our field observations suggest a different picture. Bamako is indeed under immense pressure and activities have been disrupted. But markets continue to function, and people display remarkable solidarity and adaptability in their daily lives.

The distinction matters, not to minimise the crisis, but to capture it with the nuance, complexity and empirical sensitivity that local realities demand.

Beyond the narrative of collapse

Framing Bamako as “blockaded” risks obscuring these complex social realities. While insecurity on key transport corridors is real, the city remains functional.

Markets continue to operate, albeit under difficult conditions. Schools, though intermittently closed, have reopened after a shutdown of two weeks, and many urban communities are mobilising local forms of resilience. External analyses too often overlook these.

To call this situation a “blockade” is to conflate logistical disruption with military encirclement. A blockade would imply that no movement of people or goods is possible, which is not the case. What we are witnessing is a progressive suffocation of the city’s economic arteries, not a total siege.

Everyday realities: markets and hardship

To understand the present crisis around Bamako, one must trace its history. As the emeritus social anthropologist Georg Klute explains, conflict in the Sahara-Sahel region has long taken the form of asymmetric, nomadic “small wars”.

These were not total wars but mobile and negotiated confrontations, rooted in strategies of autonomy and survival in marginal environments. What we see today is a continuation of this tradition of localised contestation.

The asymmetric “small war” has evolved into hybrid insurgencies blending historical modes of resistance, political grievances from the 1990s onwards, and transnational terrorists’ ideology.

This trajectory was already visible more than a decade ago, when the 2012 coup was followed by the occupation of northern Mali by Tuareg separatists and terrorists Islamist groups.

Once celebrated as a model democracy, Mali entered a prolonged cycle of fragility, marked by military coups, fragmented authority and the erosion of public trust.

While Bamako faces shortages and rising prices, the epicentre of economic suffering lies further north and east, in the Mopti, Kayes and Ségou regions. Recent studies show how armed groups have inserted themselves into everyday economic life, controlling markets, taxing trade routes and regulating mobility.

In Mopti, “jihadist” factions have established parallel systems of governance, collecting “zakat” taxes, enforcing their own codes of justice, and offering minimal security in exchange for compliance.

In Ségou, transport networks are heavily monitored; farmers and traders are often forced to pay informal levies to move goods between villages. These measures have distorted local economies, redirected value chains and imposed new hierarchies of control.

What began as localised insurgency in nomadic peripheries has now reached the urban heart of Mali’s political and economic life.

Yet, as we observed during our recent fieldwork in Bamako’s Grand Marché, this is not a war fought solely with weapons, it is also a struggle for survival, dignity and sovereignty.

Resilience and solidarity

During our recent field research on urban market dynamics and contestations in west Africa, we witnessed how the current crisis has reshaped everyday life in Bamako.

In the Grand Marché, the city’s commercial heart, traders and consumers alike are facing hardship. The shortage of fuel has disrupted the circulation of goods and people, making transport scarce and expensive.

This shortage has set off a chain reaction. Prices of basic commodities have soared and electricity cuts have multiplied, undermining cold storage, small-scale industries, and household livelihoods. Although we don’t have official data, we have observed “unregistered” workers – the majority of Bamako’s labour force – seeing their income sources collapse.

Yet resilience and solidarity remain striking. Many traders continue to walk long distances to reach the market, often uncertain whether customers will come at all. On Saturdays, when fuel becomes slightly more available, market areas come alive with crowds of vendors and buyers.

Across the city, long queues form at petrol stations, and people wait patiently, sharing water, information and small acts of support.

What emerges from these scenes is a remarkable atmosphere of mutuality, a collective will to endure and to adapt. In the face of scarcity, Bamako’s residents are reinventing everyday life through cooperation, perseverance, and a sense of community.

In this context, the lesson is that military escalation cannot resolve what began as an asymmetric, socially embedded crisis. As both our field observations and long-term research suggest, negotiation (rooted in local realities and historical understanding) offers the only sustainable path forward.

Negotiation, not militarisation

From the vantage point of the Grand Marché, Bamako’s current crisis is not one of imminent collapse, but of cumulative exhaustion. The people’s resilience cannot indefinitely compensate for the paralysis of governance.

The Malian crisis has demonstrated, time and again, the limits of a purely military response. The social and economic despair we are witnessing today reinforces the urgency of a social political dialogue, not as a sign of weakness, but as a pragmatic acknowledgment of reality.

Negotiation must go beyond the binary of “state versus armed groups”. It must include religious leaders, market actors, civil society groups, university scholars and local communities.

Such a process will be difficult, especially given the commitment to laïcité (secularism) in Mali’s constitutional framework. Yet, refusing dialogue only deepens isolation (political, social, and humanitarian).

Rather than framing Mali’s capital as a city under siege, we should recognise it as a city struggling under immense strain; one that still breathes, resists and adapts. Negotiation, not militarisation, remains the only credible route to sustainable peace in Bamako.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bamako is under pressure, not under siege: the difference and why it matters – https://theconversation.com/bamako-is-under-pressure-not-under-siege-the-difference-and-why-it-matters-269447

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

The decision by the rating agency Moody’s to downgrade Senegal’s sovereign credit rating in late October 2025 triggered an immediate week-long sell-off in Senegal’s Eurobonds. This was the third downgrade in one year. It left the country’s 16-year bond trading at a 40% discount to its face value. Meaning, for every one dollar denominated bond, it was being sold for 60c on the market.

Moody’s decision once again raised questions about the accuracy of decisions taken by the world’s three biggest rating agencies – Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and the Fitch – when it comes to African countries.

One of the main reasons for Moody’s downgrade was Senegal’s decision to turn to regional markets to raise capital. Since the start of 2025, the government has raised over US$5 billion through the West African Economic and Monetary Union regional bond market. This is approximately 12% of Senegal’s US$42 billion public debt.

Moody’s interpreted Senegal’s actions as weakness, warning that dependence on regional investors could expose Senegal to ‘reversals in investor sentiment’. In other words, the rating agency treated the fact that Senegal had mobilised domestic and regional capital as a new source of risk. On the contrary, S&P recognise this strength.

I have been researching Africa’s capital markets and the institutions that govern them for decades. Drawing in this, I argue here that Moody’s interpretation is both unfair and analytically flawed. Tapping into local and regional capital markets isn’t a liability. It’s a model of the fiscal sovereignty African countries have been encouraged by economists and African leaders to pursue for decades. This enhances self-reliance and reduces vulnerability to external shocks.

At the heart of the problem lies a narrow definition of risk. Rating models for emerging markets still prioritise narrow macroeconomic indicators – per-capita GDP, foreign-exchange reserves, current-account balances and IMF programme status. They don’t capture qualitative factors like domestic investor participation, fiscal adaptability and the development of regional markets.

Regional markets versus global

Countries worldwide are increasingly relying on local and regional markets to raise capital. In Africa, South Africa, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire have been mirroring patterns seen in Mexico, Brazil and Indonesia, prioritising domestic and regional borrowing.

Regional and local-market financing has a number of benefits for countries.

First, it reduces foreign exchange exposure by reducing the needs for huge foreign currency reserves for debt servicing.

Second, it strengthens domestic market liquidity by expanding the number of local investors on the bond market.

Third, it keeps debt-service payments within Africa’s financial ecosystem. Retaining capital on the continent and reducing dependence on volatile external financing.

Lastly, it minimises market swings. Domestic bondholders are largely local institutional investors — a more stable and less speculative pool of capital that understands local market dynamics far better than external rating agencies.

Senegal’s regional bond issues have been performing extremely well because investors want to buy more than the government is even offering — a sign of strong demand. The interest rate it paid, averaging 7%, was also much lower than the much higher (double-digit) interest rates it would have been charged if it had borrowed from international markets through Eurobonds. In simple terms, borrowing locally was cheaper, safer and more attractive for Senegal than borrowing globally.

Investors from across the region – pension funds, banks and insurance companies – have been lining up to purchase the bonds on all the five issuance in 2025.

Senegal’s success boosts confidence among local investors and encourage other African governments to tap their own capital markets. A powerful incentive to mobilise more African capital for the continent’s development.

When ratings become a source of risk

Moody’s downgrade triggered immediate selling of Senegal’s Eurobonds due in 2048, driving their price down to about 72 cents on the dollar. That slump was not because the country’s economic fundamentals were deteriorating, it was sentiment triggered by the downgrade.

This dynamic creates a damaging feedback loop. Negative ratings lead to investor flight, which raises borrowing costs and validates the pessimism. In effect, the perception of risk becomes the cause of risk.

This cycle undermines the policy credibility of African governments. It disincentivises reform and discourages innovation.

It’s not the first time that rating agencies have cautioned risks that have a near zero chance of materialising and in the process, shaken investor confidence and caused capital fight. These include:

• During the COVID crisis S&P warned of imminent food shortages and foreign-exchange depletion in Egypt despite stable remittance inflows and active central-bank management.

• In 2023 the Kenyan government announced plans to repurchase part of its maturing Eurobond. This was a prudent debt-management step, but Moody’s warned it would be interpreted as a sign of distress. This never happened. In fact, Moody’s later upgraded Kenya’s outlook, largely based on the success of same bond restructuring which it warned against 10 months earlier.

What needs to change

Credit ratings are supposed to guide investors, not govern economies through certain policy inclinations. But in Africa’s case, they often do both. Because many institutional investors are required to hold investment-grade securities, a single downgrade can abruptly cut a country off from international capital markets.

The consequences are immediate and severe – higher interest rates, reduced access to credit, weaker currencies and a perception of crisis. This sequence can unfold even when a country’s underlying fundamentals are still strong. Overly cautious rating assessments not only reflect negative market sentiment, they create it.

Africa does not need special treatment, it needs balanced and context-sensitive rating evaluation.

Accurate risk assessment would recognise the strategic logic of financing through domestic and regional markets. It would acknowledge that by financing through domestic and regional markets, African governments are building alternatives that are better suited to current realities.

Global agencies must therefore recalibrate their analysis to account for domestic and regional market depth, fiscal adaptability, strength and stability of Africa’s internal markets. Ignoring these and focusing solely on perceived weaknesses is to tell an incomplete story to investors.

Without such adjustments, rating agencies will continue to lag behind economic reality and risk becoming instruments of distortion rather than insight.

Misheck Mutize is affiliated with the African Union – African Peer Review Mechanism as a Lead Expert on credit ratings

– ref. Senegal’s credit rating: Moody’s latest downgrade was questionable – here’s why – https://theconversation.com/senegals-credit-rating-moodys-latest-downgrade-was-questionable-heres-why-269473

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Ekta Patel, Scientist, International Livestock Research Institute

Aquaculture – the farming of fish and other aquatic organisms – is the world’s fastest-growing food production system.

The sharpest growth in aquaculture is happening in Africa. Average annual growth rates have exceeded 10% in recent years measured by production value.

Over the past 10 years in Lake Victoria, shared between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, aquaculture has transformed from a small-scale enterprise into a vast and diverse commercial industry.

Lake Victoria is the world’s second-largest freshwater lake. Cage aquaculture, the farming of fish within cages, has expanded rapidly in the lake. The cages are made of nets in frames, and are mostly stocked with Nile tilapia. The number of fish in a cage farm varies from tens to hundreds of thousands. The sector accounts for about 25% of the fish Kenya produces.

These cage farms support the nutrition and livelihoods of more than 40 million people in the lake’s basin.

We are environmental scientists who study biological threats to public health. From our research, we have found that this industry faces two interconnected challenges: large-scale fish deaths; and resistance to the drugs used to treat diseased fish.

Repeated, large-scale die-offs are known as fish kills. They involve the rapid death of hundreds of thousands, or sometimes millions, of fish within a few days. Many farmers who find dead fish in their cages simply toss them into the lake, where they can easily wash up against another cage and transmit disease.

Farmers and fish health professionals often use antimicrobials, which are drugs like antibiotics, to manage and treat infectious diseases. But antimicrobial resistance is a rising threat. A misuse of these drugs is fuelling the emergence of resistant bacteria, making treatments ineffective.

Because of the scale of these problems, we set out to systematically examine both the causes of mass fish deaths and the spread of antimicrobial resistance in Lake Victoria’s cage aquaculture industry.

Our study was conducted in Kenya. We found that fish deaths in Lake Victoria’s tilapia industry are likely driven by water quality problems. These include low oxygen levels, pollution and harmful algal blooms. Algal blooms refer to the rapid growth and subsequent decomposition of algae. This can lead to the release of toxins and rapid drops in dissolved oxygen levels.

These water quality problems create openings for infectious bacteria to thrive.

To address this, we suggest:

• stronger disease reporting systems to enable a prompt response from industry authorities

• improved diagnostics to determine the cause of fish mortalities

• clear guidelines for antimicrobial use among farmers.

Without these interventions, the sustainability of a rapidly growing industry – and the food security of millions in east Africa – remains at risk.

Our findings

Our study surveyed 172 cage farm operations. These were across the five Kenyan counties in Lake Victoria (Kisumu, Siaya, Busia, Homa Bay and Migori).

We surveyed cage farmers’ perceptions and responses to fish kills. We also carried out a rapid-response investigation of a mass tilapia mortality event, and disease surveillance. Finally, we tested the antimicrobial resistance of identified bacterial pathogens.

Between 2020 and 2023, the farmers in our study reported 82 large-scale fish kill events in Lake Victoria, with more than 1.8 million tilapia dying.

These events had major economic consequences, but reporting and treatment were limited.

We found that only 39% of farmers informed the relevant Kenyan authorities. These include the Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute, Kenya Fisheries Service and county fisheries offices.

Just 17% attempted treatment. This usually included applying salt to the water without obtaining a diagnosis. This points to gaps in reporting systems and access to fish health services.

Farmers mostly attributed fish deaths to poor water quality. Nearly 90% perceived links to changes in water colour and smell, high temperatures or algal blooms.

Harmful algal blooms happen when phytoplankton (tiny organisms in the water) quickly multiply and then decompose. These blooms produce dangerous toxins and can rapidly lower the levels of dissolved oxygen in the water. They can lead to fish deaths, and can affect human health if people eat contaminated fish or drink the water.

Harmful algal blooms in Lake Victoria are driven by the runoff from industries and the excessive use of fertilisers.

A smaller number of farmers cited human activities like stocking, handling or pollution.

Very few directly associated mortalities with disease. This probably reflects limited training to recognise clinical signs of infection.

Our rapid-response investigation of a major fish kill in Busia County supported these observations. On arrival, we found discoloured, foul-smelling water. There were floating dead molluscs and low dissolved oxygen levels, conditions typical of harmful algal blooms.

From freshly deceased tilapia, we isolated three bacterial pathogens: Aeromonas jandaei, Enterobacter hormaechei and Staphylococcus epidermidis. These opportunistic pathogens often cause disease secondary to a primary stressor, such as poor water quality or rough handling.

This was the first time bacterial pathogens were successfully identified from a fish kill in Lake Victoria.

We found that bacterial tilapia pathogens were more commonly found within cage farms with clogged cage nets, likely because the nets reduce water circulation and worsen cage water quality.

Finally, antimicrobial resistance testing revealed resistant strains among the bacterial samples.

These results can guide veterinarians and policymakers in making decisions about antimicrobial use in aquaculture.

What next

Our findings point to a central conclusion: opportunistic pathogens are widespread in Lake Victoria. And fish disease outbreaks are often driven by poor water quality.

Action is needed at multiple levels.

At the landscape scale, nutrient runoff into the lake must be reduced. This requires improving sanitation infrastructure and promoting more efficient fertiliser use in agriculture. This will help prevent harmful algal blooms.

Fish farmers can:

• set up cages in deeper waters with better circulation

• keep cage nets clean to allow water flow

• dispose of dead fish by composting or burning rather than throwing them back into the lake

• rapidly report mortality events so authorities can investigate

• improve feeding practices, such as using high-quality feed and avoiding overfeeding, to reduce nutrient loading into the lake.

A One Health approach, which recognises the interconnectedness of human, animal and environmental health, is important for the sustainability of Lake Victoria’s aquaculture.

This means monitoring water quality and pollution, and establishing cross-sectoral collaborations for rapid disease response. Farmers also need training.

Improved production practices can decrease the need for antibiotics in the first place. Coordinated monitoring systems and cross-sectoral collaboration can help promote their responsible use.

Eric Teplitz was funded by an NIH T32 postdoctoral training grant and a Cornell Atkinson Center Graduate Student Research Grant.

This study received funding from the USAID Feed the Future Fish Innovation Lab, US National Science Foundation, Cornell Atkinson Center Academic Venture Fund, and the Department of Public and Ecosystem Health Impact Awards (to KJF).

Ekta Patel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Fish farming is booming in Lake Victoria, but pollution and disease are wiping out millions. How to reduce losses – https://theconversation.com/fish-farming-is-booming-in-lake-victoria-but-pollution-and-disease-are-wiping-out-millions-how-to-reduce-losses-266073

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

The end of South Africa’s G20 presidency does not mean the end of its ability or responsibility to promote the issues it prioritised during 2025. It can still advocate for action on some of these issues through its further participation in the G20 and in other international and regional forums.

In this article, I argue that going forward South Africa should prioritise the financial challenges confronting Africa that it championed in 2025.

South Africa established four overarching priorities for its G20 presidency. Two of them dealt with finance. One sought to “ensure debt sustainability for low-income countries”. The other was to mobilise finance for a just energy transition.

The importance of debt, development finance and climate to Africa’s future is clear. Over half of African countries are either in debt distress or at risk of being in distress. More than half of Africa’s population live in countries that are spending more on servicing their debt than on health and/or education.

In addition, 17 African countries experienced net debt outflows in 2023. This means that they were using more foreign exchange to pay their external creditors than they received in new debts that could be used to finance their development. The continent is also experiencing extreme weather events that are adversely affecting food security and human wellbeing.

In short, African countries are caught in a vicious cycle. The impacts of climate and their struggle to meet their debt obligations are interacting in ways that undermine their ability to meet their sustainable development goals.

South Africa’s priorities

South Africa’s priorities for its G20 presidency were ambitious. Success required meaningful action at three levels:

Awareness. South Africa would need to bring the international community to a better understanding of the nature of the debt and development finance challenges confronting African countries and of the consequences of failing to address them.

Process. South Africa would need to convince the G20 to correct the shortcomings in the Common Framework it had devised to deal with low-income countries seeking debt relief.

The examples of Zambia and Ghana showed that the Common Framework was cumbersome, slow and unduly favourable to creditors. For example the framework requires the debtor to engage separately with each group of its creditors in a sequential process. This means that it should not negotiate with its commercial creditors until it has successfully negotiated with its official creditors.

Commercial creditors can’t give debt relief until the official creditors are satisfied with their deal and are confident that the commercial creditors will not receive more favourable treatment from the debtor than they have received.

Another complication is the IMF’s multiple roles in debt restructurings as an advisor to and a creditor of the debtor countries. In addition, it does the debt sustainability analysis that determines the amount of debt relief that all other creditors are expected to provide to the debtor country in order for it to regain debt sustainability. The more optimistic its assessment, the smaller the contributions the various creditors, including the IMF, are expected to provide. These contributions can either be in the form of new funding or new debt terms.

Substance. The current debt restructuring process treats debt as a technical financial and legal problem rather than as the complex multifaceted problem that is experienced by debtor countries. The former perspective limits the scope of debtor-creditor negotiations to the terms of the financial contracts.

The negotiations focus on the adjustments that must be made to these terms because the debtor cannot comply with its originally accepted obligations. They treat as largely outside the scope of the discussions the adverse impact the debt situation has on the sovereign debtor’s other legal obligations and on the social, political, environmental and cultural situation in the debtor country.

This approach in effect leaves the debtor to deal with these other issues on its own. This artificial distinction between the debtors’ other legal obligations and those it owes to its creditors makes it very difficult for the debtor to escape the vicious debt, development and climate cycle in which it is trapped. It forces it to choose between its commitments to its creditors and its development obligations.

Over the course of 2025, South Africa has been very effective in raising awareness of the African debt crisis and its dire impact on African countries. South Africa persuaded the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors to issue a declaration on debt sustainability at the end of their October meeting.

The declaration is the G20’s eloquent acknowledgement of the problem and of the need for more discussion of how these debt issues are managed by both debtors and creditors. Unfortunately, it does not contain any firm G20 commitments on what it will do to remedy the situation.

There has not been substantial progress at the process and substance levels. This is unlikely to change in the remaining weeks of South Africa’s G20 presidency.

But there are three actions that South Africa can take beyond the end of its term to ensure that the African debt crisis continues receiving attention.

Three actions

First, it should ask a group like the African Expert Panel that it established to advise the president to prepare a technical report that identifies and analyses all the barriers to Africa accessing affordable, sustainable and predictable flows of external development finance.

This report should be submitted to the South African president in the first half of 2026. Next year, South Africa will still be a member of the G20 Troika, which consists of the current, immediate past and the incoming G20 presidents. Consequently, next year, it will still be able to table the report at the G20. South Africa can also use the report to promote action in other appropriate regional and global forums.

Second, South Africa and the African Union should create an African Borrower’s Club that is independent of the G20. This club should be a forum in which African sovereign debtors can share information and lessons learned about negotiating sovereign debt transactions and about responsible debt management. When appropriate, the club can work with regional African financial institutions.

The club, working with regional organisations like the African Legal Support Facility, can also sponsor workshops in which interested African sovereign debtors can share information and more critically assess their financing options. They can also work to improve their bargaining capacity in sovereign debt transactions.

The African Borrower’s Club should also be mandated to establish an African Sovereign Debt Roundtable that is modelled on the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. This entity should be an informal forum, based on the Chatham House Rule in which the various categories of stakeholders in African debt can meet to discuss the design of a sovereign debt restructuring process that is effective, efficient and fair and that adopts an holistic approach to a sovereign debt crisis.

Third, South Africa should capitalise on the fact that the impacts of climate, inequality, unemployment and poverty on Africa’s development prospects are now acknowledged to be macro-critical, and so within the IMF’s macro-economic and financial mandate. South Africa should call for a review of the IMF’s operating principles and practices and its governance arrangements.

This call should note that the multilateral development banks have been the object of G20 review for a number of years and that this has resulted in important enhancements in their capital frameworks and operating practices. On the other hand the IMF has not been subject to a similar review despite the fact that its operations have had to undergo possibility even more extensive revisions.

Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at the University of Pretoria is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University; Senior G20 Advisor, South African Institute of International Affairs and a Compliance Officer, Social and Environmental Compliance Unit, UNDP.

– ref. Africa has a debt crisis: momentum from G20 in South Africa can help find solutions – https://theconversation.com/africa-has-a-debt-crisis-momentum-from-g20-in-south-africa-can-help-find-solutions-269004

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

For the second time in five years, Nigeria has been designated a “country of particular concern” by the US government, in both cases by President Donald Trump. The first time was in 2020 but the designation was removed in 2021.

The November 2025 redesignation can be traced to, among other things, a campaign by US congressman Riley Moore, who alleged that there was an “alarming and ongoing persecution of Christians” in Nigeria.

Nigeria refuted this claim. President Bola Tinubu, in a statement, argued that the US characterisation of Nigeria did not reflect the country’s reality or values.

But what does the designation mean for Nigeria? And what should Nigeria’s response be? As a scholar who has studied Nigeria’s insecurity and identity crises, I have some suggestions.

Nigeria must prevent the diplomatic row with the US from progressing further, and act decisively against insecurity for all Nigerians.

To achieve this, the Nigerian government should look beyond military capability. The country needs governance and administrative restructuring that empowers sub-national and local authorities to address local issues. This bottom-up approach will address insecurity better than the current top-down approach.

What ‘country of particular concern’ means

The classification of a country as being of particular concern is outlined in the United States International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998. Under section 402 of the act, “country of particular concern” is a designation given to a foreign country whose government has engaged in or tolerated especially severe violations of the religious freedom of its citizens.

By this definition, a country may not be directly involved in violating its citizens’ religious freedom, but culpable for not acting decisively against those who do.

For a country to be classified as such, it is first placed on a special watch list. This allows for an assessment of whether there is a serious violation of religious freedom.

The designation is part of US foreign policy for promoting human rights globally.

Why Nigeria was given this status

Nigeria was designated a country of particular concern because of allegations of “genocide” against Christians there. Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, identity conflicts have become a common occurrence. But there’s a new dimension with the emergence of terror groups and intensifying farmer-herder disputes.

A study I conducted in early 2025 revealed that between 2010 and 2022, a total of 230 attacks specifically targeted Christians, 82 of which were between 2019 and 2022.

Several other attacks, such as the Runji killing in Kaduna State in April 2023, the Apata and Yelwata massacres in Benue State in March and June 2025, respectively, and the Mangu killings in Plateau State, have also taken place.

This shows that there are targeted attacks against Christians in parts of Nigeria. But they are a fraction of the attacks and killings carried out by non-state armed groups in the country.

As one study argued, Christians make up roughly half of Nigeria’s population, but attacks explicitly directed against them account for about 5% of total reported violent incidents.

Therefore, framing Nigeria’s insecurity in terms of anti-Christian violence alone oversimplifies the broader dynamics of the country’s national insecurity.

How this will affect Nigeria

The International Religious Freedom Act stipulates 15 required sanctions under section 405(a). Section 407 allows the president of the US to waive these sanctions based on national interest or to further the purpose of the act. For this reason, in most cases, the designation is seldom followed by sanctions.

Several countries have been exempted from sanctions even when designated as countries of particular concern. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been repeatedly designated but the US has never sanctioned them.

Even Nigeria’s designation in 2020 was not followed by sanctions. The US continued to provide security assistance, military cooperation and development aid to Nigeria. The US only used the period of designation to call for improved protection of religious communities and accountability for perpetrators.

For the recent designation, however, Trump has threatened to cut aid to Nigeria and take military action against terrorists in Nigeria.

The US, through the US Agency for International Development, provided development assistance worth US$7.89 billion between 2015 and 2024 to support health, education, economic and humanitarian development. But all of that has reduced since the scrapping of the agency and a drop in foreign aid.

US security aid to Nigeria remains significant. It approved sales of sophisticated precision military weapons worth US$346 million to Nigeria and has offered training support for Nigerian soldiers.

The US could end that deal, but that would undermine Nigeria’s ability to address terrorism and general security challenges. It would counter the purpose of the International Religious Freedom Act. Therefore, I believe the US may waive this.

Direct military intervention in Nigeria is becoming a possibility and Trump is most likely going to do it without respect for Nigeria’s sovereignty. He has ordered the US Department of War to draw up plans, and they have come up with options. But I do not see this solving the problem of insecurity in Nigeria. It may instead lead to the dispersal of terrorists, complicating Nigeria’s insecurity. Or terrorists might increase mass kidnappings and hostage-taking for shields.

How Nigeria should respond

Nigeria must prevent diplomatic rows with the US because they are partners in the fight against terrorism. A discussion about how the US can improve Nigeria’s capacity to address its security challenges would be a good step.

Furthermore, Nigeria’s limited capacity to safeguard lives and property points to deeper structural and governance challenges. The country’s security architecture is too centralised and works top-down. This makes it harder for sub-national and local authorities to provide security and address the drivers of violence at the local level.

Nigeria should go beyond improving its military response. To enhance security, it also needs to reform its governance and administrative structures.

Saheed Babajide Owonikoko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. US-Nigeria relations: what it means to be a ‘country of particular concern’ and why it matters – https://theconversation.com/us-nigeria-relations-what-it-means-to-be-a-country-of-particular-concern-and-why-it-matters-269044

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jonathan Powell, Visiting assistant professor, University of Kentucky

Guinea-Bissau heads into its November elections against the backdrop of a deepening crisis of electoral legitimacy across Africa. In recent months, a string of elections has reinforced the perception that incumbency, not competition, remains the standard.

In Cameroon, 92-year-old Paul Biya claimed an eighth consecutive term after officially winning 53.7% of a vote widely denounced as fraudulent and met with protests.

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Read more:
Paul Biya’s life presidency in Cameroon enters a fragile final phase

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In Tanzania, President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the victor with an implausible 98% of ballots cast in her favour following a poll marred by numerous irregularities and followed by protests and a crackdown unprecedented in the country’s history.

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Read more:
Tanzania: President Samia Hassan’s grip on power has been shaken by unprecedented protests

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And in Côte d’Ivoire, President Alassane Ouattara comfortably secured a fourth term with nearly 90% of the vote, extending his hold on power despite the constitution’s two-term limit.

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Read more:
Côte d’Ivoire’s elections have already been decided: Ouattara will win and democracy will lose

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Across the continent, including west Africa, these outcomes have fuelled public cynicism and highlighted a worrying erosion of democratic norms, as leaders manipulate constitutions, neutralise opponents, and hollow out institutions meant to safeguard accountability.

It is within this climate of regional disillusionment that Bissau-Guineans will head to the polls on 23 November.

The west African country’s upcoming election once offered the potential to demonstrate a growing electoral resilience, a deepening of institutional strength that would help the country break from past legacies of instability. Instead, the process has been repeatedly undermined by President Umar Sissoco Embaló.

As social scientists who have written extensively on political instability in Africa, we believe that such dynamics all but guarantee another entry to the roster of failed elections across the region.

At stake is more than Guinea-Bissau’s democratic credibility. Its unravelling speaks to a wider regional crisis in which incumbents erode legitimacy not by abolishing elections, but by emptying them of real competition.

A legacy of instability

In contrast to long-tenured leaders like Biya or Ouattara, or enduring parties such as Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Guinea-Bissau’s voters navigate an electoral system defined by unpredictability and instability, especially during election season.

The country’s modern electoral turbulence can be traced back decades. João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira returned to power in 2005 for a second stint, nearly a quarter-century after first seizing control via a 1980 coup.

His rule was marred by conflict, including an 11-month civil war triggered by a rebellion from former army chief of staff Ansumane Mané. Vieira’s long first tenure ended in a second coup in May 1999, and his second term was cut short in 2009 when he was murdered by members of the armed forces.

Malam Bacai Sanhá emerged as Vieira’s elected successor but passed away in January 2012, leaving Raimundo Pereira as interim president. Within months, Pereira would be removed in yet another military coup.

The 2012 upheaval halted a runoff election between Carlos Domingos Gomes Júnior and Kumba Ialá.

The 2014 election brought José Mário Vaz to the presidency, defeating a candidate with close ties to the military. When Vaz completed his term in 2020, he became Guinea-Bissau’s first president to finish a constitutionally defined tenure.

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Read more:
Guinea-Bissau’s political crisis: a nation on the brink of authoritarianism

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Undermining the process

Questions arose even before Vaz’s exit. After Umar Sissoco Embaló was declared the winner over Pereira in the 29 December runoff, Pereira challenged the results. Ignoring the ongoing legal process, Embaló arranged an inauguration ceremony for himself in February 2020.

The African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) accused Embaló of orchestrating a coup and appointed Cipriano Cassamá as an interim president.

Embaló then ordered the deployment of the military to state institutions, including the National Assembly. Cassamá stepped down on his second day, citing death threats.

The supreme court ultimately declined to rule on the dispute after its chief judge fled the country, also citing death threats. The crisis was effectively resolved by the Economic Community of West African States’ (Ecowas) recognition of the Embaló government. Uncertainty, however, would continue to plague the new government.

In May 2022, three months after an attempted coup, Embaló dissolved and suspended parliament.

The main opposition party, the PAIGC, formally regained parliamentary control in the June 2023 elections, setting the stage for continued confrontation between the presidency and the legislative majority. Embaló again pursued the dissolution of parliament in December 2023.

Although Embaló’s term officially expired in February 2025, the supreme court later ruled he could remain in office until 4 September.

Even after that date, Embaló remained in office. These manoeuvres have heightened concerns about the erosion of constitutional norms.

Concerns over the broader electoral environment have also come to the fore. Legislative elections initially scheduled for late November 2024 were indefinitely postponed due to alleged funding and logistical challenges. Earlier, Embaló had declared he would not seek reelection, only to reverse course in March 2025.

A mediation team deployed by the Economic Community of West African States, tasked with helping the sides agree to and honour an election timeline, abruptly withdrew following threats of expulsion from the Embaló government.

More recently, the PAIGC’s chosen presidential candidate, Domingos Simões Pereira, was barred from contesting the November election after the supreme court rejected his candidacy over the late submission of documents.

For the first time in Guinea-Bissau’s history, the country’s oldest and most influential party will be excluded from the presidential race.

The country has fallen in the Electoral Democracy Index, provided by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). As shown in the graph below, the decline even outpaces the drop witnessed after military coups in 2003, 2012, and the assassination of Vieira in 2009.

The V-Dem data end in 2024, and thus do not yet capture the 2025 election cycle.

Performative elections, entrenched power

What is unfolding in Guinea-Bissau is not an isolated crisis. It is part of a wider regional pattern in which leaders recognise that elections can be held, even celebrated, while hollowing out nearly everything that once made them meaningful. Critically, the recent coups in the region have been linked, in part, to popular frustration with flawed electoral processes.

Embaló has not entrenched himself with the personal longevity of Cameroon’s Biya or the institutional dominance of Tanzania’s CCM, but the mechanisms he has used to tilt the field look strikingly similar.

The removal of viable opponents, the manipulation of constitutional timelines, the coercive use of the security sector, and the corrosion of judicial independence all signal a shift away from accountability.

Guinea-Bissau was for the first time in decades poised to demonstrate that democratic resilience could be strengthened. Instead, the 2025 election cycle risks becoming another example of how fragile gains can be reversed with impunity.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Guinea-Bissau’s presidential poll has already failed the credibility test – https://theconversation.com/guinea-bissaus-presidential-poll-has-already-failed-the-credibility-test-269461

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Kirsten A Donald, Professor of Paediatric Neurology and Development, University of Cape Town

Children in many countries are growing up surrounded by violence. It may happen at home, in their neighbourhoods, or both. Some children are directly harmed, while others witness violence between caregivers or in their communities. Either way, the impact can be profound.

Evidence shows that the relationship between violence exposure and poor mental health can be seen even before a child is old enough to go to school. Researchers are learning that early adversities can have lifelong consequences.

We are researchers in paediatric neuroscience and psychology who set out to understand how early experiences of violence are shaping young children’s cognitive and emotional health in low- and middle-income countries. Here we discuss our findings from a review of studies from 20 countries and new data from a large cohort of children in South Africa.

We found that violence exposure is extremely common in all the countries we looked at and that its effects on mental health are already visible in childhood.

The response will require action at all levels – families, communities, health systems and governments.

Gaps in the research

Early childhood (birth to 8 years) is a critical period for emotional, social and cognitive development. Mental health or cognitive difficulties that begin in the preschool years can shape children’s relationships, learning and wellbeing well into adolescence and adulthood. Yet, little is known about how violence affects children in the early years in low – and middle-income countries, where violence rates can be high. Most research focuses on school-age children or adolescents, missing the window when prevention may be most effective, in early childhood.

We aimed to fill that gap by collating existing knowledge and generating new evidence from South African children. This formed the basis of co-author Lucinda’s PhD thesis.

First, we reviewed 17 published studies from 20 low- and middle-income countries, examining how violence exposure affects children’s cognitive functioning. Second, we used data from almost 1,000 children in the Drakenstein Child Health Study, a long-running birth cohort in a peri-urban community outside Cape Town. We examined these children’s exposure to different types of violence by age four-and-a-half and assessed their mental health at age five.

What we found

Sadly, our findings revealed that violence exposure is extremely common.

The review found that over 70% of the studies drawing from 27,643 children from 20 countries, aged up to 11, across four continents, reported poor cognitive outcomes associated with experiencing maltreatment, intimate partner violence and war.

In our South African cohort, by age 4.5 years, 83% of children were exposed to some form of violence. This included witnessing community violence (74%), witnessing domestic violence (32%), and being direct victims in the community (13%) or at home (31%). Nearly half (45%) experienced more than one type of violence.

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Read more:
Why South Africa’s children are vulnerable to violence and injuries

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In many countries, early exposure to violence is not exceptional. It is a normal part of growing up for many children.

Regarding how violence affects mental health in early childhood, the South African data showed that preschool children exposed to more violence displayed more internalising symptoms, such as anxiety, fear, or sadness, and externalising symptoms, such as aggression, hyperactivity, and rule-breaking. Experiencing violence at home and witnessing violence in the community were particularly linked with these difficulties.

One of the clearest findings was that multiple exposures compounded the risk. Children who experienced both domestic and community violence were at particularly high risk of mental health difficulties, especially experiencing externalising symptoms.

Public health challenge

These results highlight a major public health challenge, which starts early. These patterns appear before school entry, suggesting that violence exposure can alter developmental pathways well before formal education begins.

Since the risks from mental health difficulties linked to violence were visible by age five, waiting to intervene until school-age misses a crucial opportunity.

Impacts to wellbeing in early childhood can cause some children to internalise distress and others to act out, but both can disrupt learning, relationships and future mental health.

It is a stark reality that in some communities, most children are affected by violence. Individual therapy alone cannot fix a problem this widespread. It is a population-level issue. Broader community and policy responses are needed, such as the INSPIRE strategies developed by the World Health Organization.

Where to from here

The reality is grim and calls for quick and informed action at all levels: families, communities, health systems, and governments. A successful response will include:

1. Early identification: Health and community services should routinely ask about violence exposure, including witnessing violence, during early childhood visits.

2. Support for families: Interventions that reduce domestic violence, strengthen parenting skills, and provide mental health and social support can protect both children and adults.

3. Addressing community violence: Safer neighbourhoods, violence prevention efforts and policing reforms should be implemented and also clearly linked with child mental health strategies in policy wording.

4. Policy that prioritises early childhood: Governments and NGOs should embed early violence prevention and child mental health promotion into national health and education strategies.

5. Monitoring and revising strategies: Improving data collection and data quality will help track progress and inform improvements to further interventions.

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Read more:
Violence against children carries a huge cost for Africa: governments need to act urgently

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Violence exposure in early childhood is widespread in low- and middle-income countries and has clear impacts on young children’s mental health. These effects emerge early, grow with multiple exposures, and require early intervention at every level. Protection and support are essential to build healthier and safer communities for the future.

There is hope as some organisations in South Africa are working to prevent violence against women and children, and intervening for those affected.

Lucinda Tsunga received funding from the University of Bristol’s (i) Pro Vice-Chancellor (PVC)-Research and Enterprise Strategic Research Fund and (ii) The Quality-related Research Global Challenges Research Fund (QRGCRF) Strategy funded by Research England during the course of her Dctoral studies.

Kirsten A Donald does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Violence is a normal part of life for many young children: study traces the mental health impacts – https://theconversation.com/violence-is-a-normal-part-of-life-for-many-young-children-study-traces-the-mental-health-impacts-268512

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Folahanmi Aina, Lecturer in Political Economy of Violence, Conflict and Development, SOAS, University of London

The Sahel region, south of the Sahara, is notorious for being the global epicentre of terrorism. With a combined population of 75 million people, the region has accounted for more fatalities than any other on the African continent since 2021.

In 2024, deaths from terrorism across the region stood at 11,200: more than half of Africa’s toll that year.

The situation has deteriorated following the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The three countries are among the most affected in the troubled region. As of June 2025, these countries contributed to the more than 2.9 million people who have been displaced across the region, more than half of them being children.

As a political scientist with over 10 years of expertise on terrorism, insurgencies and extremism in west Africa, I have closely monitored the emergence, evolution and endurance of armed non-state actors.

Violent extremist groups operating across the region, affiliated to the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaida, have used tactics like kidnappings for ransom, ambushes, cattle rustling, and attacks on military formations.

Recent attacks have reflected the changing character of this hybrid warfare. Low-cost commercial drones have been weaponised and artificial intelligence has been adopted as part of a broader propaganda strategy. There have been forays into the world of cryptocurrency to diversify revenue sources.

These violent extremist groups have leveraged local grievances which have their roots in worsening socio-economic conditions, poor governance, weak institutions, and environmental degradation.

I have been tracking the rapid spread of one of the most powerful extremist groups in Africa: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). JNIM seeks to expand beyond kidnappings for ransom, cattle rustling, human trafficking and taxes on local communities. It has its eyes set on gaining access to gold fields. Control of artisanal gold mines in parts of the Sahel region is a central part of its financial and strategic operations.

Given JNIM’s strength and capabilities, the group now poses an existential threat to Nigeria, which already faces multiple security threats. But the group can be quickly repelled with the right measures in place.

Who is JNIM?

JNIM was formed in 2017 and has up to 6,000 fighters. It is an al-Qaida affiliated group representing a coalition of armed groups driven by similar political ideologies. Al-Qaida is a terrorist organisation formed in the 1980s with the goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate governed by sharia law.

The Islamic State (IS), though also inspired by Al-Qaeda, has become a rival. It is a Sunni jihadist organisation that also seeks the establishment of a self-governing Islamic caliphate under strict sharia law.

JNIM continues to expand. The group has previously been mostly active in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. In May 2025, the group launched an attack in the town of Djibo, in Burkina Faso, which resulted in the deaths of 200 soldiers. In more recent times, it has carried out attacks in Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire.

On 29 October 2025, JNIM recorded its first attack on Nigerian soil, which resulted in one fatality. The attack was on soldiers who were on patrol, in the north central state of Kwara, near the border with Benin, in the early hours of the day.

JNIM had indicated in June that it intended to set up a Katiba (a brigade) in Nigeria, thereby signalling an interest in establishing a presence in west Africa’s largest country.

Why Kwara State?

The choice of Kwara is significant and strategic, given its location at the centre of Nigeria and its proximity to the Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria’s seat of power.

Nigeria’s porous borders have been a major issue of national security concern which violent extremist groups like JNIM are keen to exploit. By establishing a footprint in Kwara State, the group could expand across other neighbouring states, including Niger State, close to the Federal Capital Territory. Another al-Qaida linked Boko Haram cell has already established a presence there, in Shiroro, in recent times.

This leaves other states, particularly Osun, vulnerable, given its proximity to Kwara.

In January this year, Nigeria’s Department of State Services dismantled an Islamic State cell in Osun state. The state has significant gold deposits.

Over the past two months, JNIM has enforced a fuel blockade in Mali’s Kayes region, which accounts for over 70% of Mali’s gold production.

With the recent rise in gold prices, the terror group has a greater incentive to tighten its grip on the region.

Nigeria’s response

Nigeria has made gains in its counterterrorism efforts, which have included military and non-military approaches. But a lot still needs to be done to avert threats such as those from terror groups.

A first step would be to strengthen border security and management by using advanced technologies, including facial recognition technology and unmanned aerial vehicles, to complement human intelligence on the ground.

The establishment of temporary military positions across Nigeria’s north central region for rapid deployment would provide useful offensive bulwarks against the advancement and expansion of armed groups into the north central region.

The sub-national states within the region must also get and use tactical early warning mechanisms.

Implications for the region

Insecurity in the Sahel region is worsening. Violent extremist groups are entering new territories such as Nigeria and parts of coastal west African states, including Benin, Togo, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

The implications for regional peace, security and stability are dire. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, despite the juntas’ promises to bring an end to insecurity, a more realistic solution to the problem entails the restoration of democratic rule. That would pave the way to strengthening institutions that could address the root causes of the crisis.

Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s new terror threat: JNIM is spreading but it’s not too late to act – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-new-terror-threat-jnim-is-spreading-but-its-not-too-late-to-act-269562