The Conversation – Africa – Page 27

September 25, 2025

AI in Africa: 5 issues that must be tackled for digital equality

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rachel Adams, Honorary Research Fellow of The Ethics Lab, University of Cape Town

The AI revolution risks deepening inequality between the global north and south. Clarote & AI4Media/betterimagesofai.org, CC BY-SA

If it’s steered correctly, artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to accelerate development. It can drive breakthroughs in agriculture. It can expand access to healthcare and education. It can boost financial inclusion and strengthen democratic participation.

But without deliberate action, the AI “revolution” risks deepening inequality more than it will expand opportunity.

As a scholar of the history and future of AI, I’ve written about the dangers of AI widening global inequality. There’s an urgent need to develop governance mechanisms that will try to redistribute the benefits of this technology.

The scale of the AI gap is stark. Africa holds less than 1% of global data centre capacity. Data centres are the engines that drive AI. This means the continent has minimal infrastructure for hosting the computing power necessary to build and run AI models.

While only 32 countries worldwide host specialised AI data centres, the US and China account for over 90% of them.

And only about 5% of Africa’s AI talent (innovators with AI skills) have sufficient access to the resources needed for advanced research and innovation.

Leaders and policy-makers from around the world must grapple with an uncomfortable truth: AI is not equally distributed, and without deliberate action it will magnify global divides.

But they also still have the chance to set a new trajectory – one where Africa and the global majority shape the rules of the game. One that ensures AI becomes a force for shared prosperity rather than exclusion.

To achieve this, five critical policy areas most be addressed. These are data; computing capacity; AI for local languages; skills and AI literacy; and AI safety, ethics and governance. These are not just African priorities; they’re global imperatives.

1. Compute and infrastructure

Access to computational power has become the defining chokepoint in today’s AI ecosystem. African researchers and innovators will remain on the margins of the AI economy unless there is investment in regional data centres, GPU clusters (a group of computers working together on large-scale AI processing) and secure cloud infrastructure.

Europe, by contrast, has pooled over US$8 billion in establishing the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking to ensure the continent has computing capacity for local innovations.

African countries should press for funding and partnerships to expand local capacity. They will also need to insist on transparency from global providers about who controls access, and ensure regional cooperation to pool resources across borders.

2. Data governance

AI systems are only as good as the data they’re trained on. Much of the continent’s data is fragmented, poorly governed, or extracted without fairly compensating those it’s collected from. Large, diverse and machine-readable datasets are used to teach AI models about the contexts and realities the data reflect.

Where ethical stewardship frameworks exist, locally managed datasets have already driven innovation that has impact. For example, the Lacuna Fund has helped researchers across Africa build over 75 open-machine-learning datasets in areas like agriculture, health, climate and low-resource languages. These have filled critical data gaps, allowing for tools that better reflect African realities. Realities like high-accuracy crop yield datasets for farming. Or voice/text resources for under-served languages.

Robust national data protection and governance laws are needed. So are regional data commons, a shared resource where data is collected, stored, and made accessible to a community under common standards and governance. This would enable collaboration, reuse, and equitable benefits. Standards for quality, openness, interoperability and ethics developed by multilateral organisations must be designed with African priorities at their centre.

3. AI for local languages

Inclusive AI depends on the languages it speaks. Current large models overwhelmingly privilege English and other dominant languages. African languages are all but invisible in the digital sphere. This not only entrenches existing biases and inequalities, it also risks excluding millions from access to AI-enabled services.

Take the example of the Cape Town-based non-profit organisation Gender Rights in Tech. It has developed a trauma-informed chatbot called Zuzi that supports survivors of gender-based violence by providing anonymous, accessible guidance in diverse South African languages on their rights, available legal services, and sexual and reproductive health. It helps overcome stigma and bridge gaps in access. Zuzi demonstrates the power of AI technologies in local languages.

Dedicated investment in datasets, benchmarks, and models for African languages is urgently needed, as well as in tools for speech recognition, text-to-speech, and literacy.

4. AI skills and literacy

African infrastructure and data will mean little without human capacity to use them. At present, AI skills supply falls far short of demand, and public understanding of AI’s benefits and risks remains low.

To increase skills, AI and data science will need to be integrated into school and university curricula, and vocational training will need to be expanded. Supporting lifelong learning programmes is essential.

Public awareness campaigns can ensure citizens understand both the promise and perils of AI. This will support deeper public debate on these issues. It can also target support for women, rural communities, and African language speakers to help prevent new divides from forming.

5. Safety, ethics, and governance

Finally, stronger governance frameworks are urgently needed. African countries face unique risks from AI. Among them are electoral interference, disinformation, job disruption, and environmental costs. These risks are shaped by Africa’s structural realities: fragile information ecosystems, large informal labour markets, weak social safety nets, and resource-strained infrastructure. National strategies are emerging, but enforcement capacity and oversight remain limited.

African governments should push for the creation of an African AI safety institute. Safety and ethical audits must be mandated for high-risk systems. Regulations and AI governance instruments must be aligned with rights-based African principles that emphasise equity, justice, transparency, and accountability. Participation in global standard-setting bodies is also crucial to ensure that African perspectives help shape the rules being written elsewhere.

All eyes on the G20

Taken together, these priorities are not defensive measures but a blueprint for empowerment. If pursued, they would reduce the risk of inequality. They would position Africa and other regions across the majority world to shape AI in ways that serve their people and economies.

Digital and technology ministers from the world’s biggest economies will be attending the G20’s digital economy working group ministerial meeting at the end of September.

On paper, it’s a routine meeting. In practice, it may be the most consequential gathering on AI policy Africa has ever hosted.

This is the first time the G20’s digital ministers are meeting on African soil. It’s happening at the very moment AI is being hailed as the technology that will redefine the global economy.

This meeting will not stand alone. It will be followed by the AI for Africa conference, co-hosted by South Africa’s G20 presidency, Unesco and the African Union. Here the AI in Africa Initiative will be launched. It is designed as a practical mechanism to carry forward the G20’s commitments and advance implementation of the African Union’s Continental AI Strategy.

Cape Town could mark a turning point: the moment when African leadership, working in concert with the G20, starts to close the AI divide and harness this technology for shared prosperity.

Rachel Adams receives funding from the International Development Research Centre of Canada, under the AI4Development funding programme, co-led with the Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office of the UK.

– ref. AI in Africa: 5 issues that must be tackled for digital equality – https://theconversation.com/ai-in-africa-5-issues-that-must-be-tackled-for-digital-equality-265611

September 24, 2025

Graduated, now what? Survey of young Africans shows degrees don’t always land them a job

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrea Juan, Chief Research Specialist, Human Sciences Research Council

Graduates aren’t guaranteed a job. Nqobile Vundla/Unsplash

Study hard, get your degree, and then step confidently into a stable, well-paid job. That’s long been the assumption about how to secure a livelihood: in neat, predictable stages. But it is increasingly out of touch with reality. Secure jobs are no longer guaranteed after obtaining a tertiary qualification.

Up-to-date and reliable data on graduate unemployment in Africa is hard to come by. A 2014 British Council study estimated that nearly one in four Nigerian graduates (23.1%) were unemployed. In Kenya, the study said, it took graduates an average of five years to secure their first job. In South Africa, graduate unemployment stood at just 5.8% in 2008. By 2023, this had more than doubled to 11.8%. When looking specifically at young graduates aged 20–29 – a useful proxy for those newly entering the job market – the figure is even starker: nearly one in three (30.3%) were unemployed in 2023.

These figures signal a crisis. The mismatch between graduates and opportunities makes it clear that it’s essential to find diverse ways of making a living.

So what do graduates do to generate livelihoods? We recently conducted research tracking more than 500 African tertiary graduates across 21 universities (nine in African countries and 12 in other countries) over five years to provide some answers.

The findings showed that graduates were piecing together livelihoods from multiple sources rather than walking the straight road of a career. Their paths were complex. Only 16% of the total sample moved smoothly from tertiary education into a job and remained in employment over the period of the survey.

Knowing this, universities can help provide graduates with the skills and resources they will need for the real world.

Graduates build portfolios of income

The study showed that African graduates are resourceful in generating livelihoods. From their responses we identified some trends.

First, they do more than one thing. Almost half of the respondents were engaged in more than one activity – for example, working while running a side business or pursuing further studies. A Ugandan graduate explained how he juggled salaried work, family farming projects and continued education.

Second, they make education itself a livelihood. Scholarships, postgraduate degrees and research opportunities provided both income and stability. Others use underemployment (jobs that don’t match their qualification, skills or ambitions) as stepping stones, gaining experience while waiting for better opportunities.

Third, entrepreneurship or self-employment has a role. While only a small minority relied solely on their own businesses, about a fifth of graduates supplemented their income in this way. Some sold goods, others started NGOs or social enterprises, and many saw entrepreneurship as a safety net in an unpredictable labour market.

But this isn’t just about necessity. Graduates are motivated by opportunity, passion projects, and the chance to build something of their own, often with family members. This challenges the common view that entrepreneurship in Africa is driven only by desperation. In reality, necessity and opportunity overlap, and both are part of how graduates make a living.

Beyond ‘waiting’ for an opportunity

The pathways described by graduates don’t fit the conventional picture of being “stuck” or “unemployed”. Instead, they are marked by movement, improvisation and continuous reinvention.

Even when underemployed, graduates often describe their jobs as dignified or at least as stepping stones. They are investing in their futures, sharpening skills and building networks.

This kind of agency (the capacity to navigate uncertainty and imagine alternative futures) is a crucial resource. It allows young Africans to find dignity and purpose in contexts where institutional support and job opportunities are limited.

What universities can do differently to prepare graduates

These findings raise tough questions for universities. If the education-to-employment pipeline is so complex, what role should higher education play in preparing graduates? Our research points to some answers:

First, universities must stop clinging to outdated concepts like “employability”. Degrees are not tickets to stable jobs. Instead, education should prepare students for diversified, non-linear livelihoods. This means teaching not just technical skills but also resilience, adaptability and entrepreneurial thinking.

Entrepreneurship education is one starting point. Courses on business planning, financial management and networking can help graduates who want to start or sustain ventures.

But skills alone are not enough. Without supportive ecosystems, such as incubators, access to finance and mentorship, many small businesses fail. Universities could act as hubs, linking students and graduates to government programmes, private sector partners and alumni networks. Partnerships between universities and government agencies, like South Africa’s National Youth Development Agency which funds business ventures, need to be forged.

Career services also need to evolve. Rather than focusing narrowly on job placements, universities should help students explore multiple career paths, build social capital and access opportunities for income diversification. Practical resources, like co-working spaces, short courses or “micro-credentials” that allow graduates to quickly pick up new skills, and seed funding could give graduates a head start.

Finally, alumni networks are a powerful but underused asset. Showcasing graduates who have successfully diversified their income can inspire others and change the prevailing narrative.

Education should no longer be seen simply as a bridge to wage employment, but as a platform for building flexible, multi-dimensional livelihoods.

A new story of graduate life

The African youth population is still growing, and the labour market will not suddenly expand to meet demand. That reality can sound daunting. But the stories of young graduates also show resilience, creativity and determination. They are not passively “waiting” for jobs – they are actively constructing futures, often against the odds.

Universities and other tertiary education institutions must catch up. By supporting entrepreneurship, fostering networks and recognising the reality of non-linear transitions, they can help graduates navigate uncertainty with confidence.

The future of work in Africa will not be defined by smooth transitions, but by complex entanglements. Recognising and supporting these entanglements may be one of the most important tasks of higher education in the decades ahead.

This article was produced in the context of The Imprint of Education study that was conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa between August 2019 and July 2025, in partnership with and funded by the Mastercard Foundation. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Mastercard Foundation, its staff, or its Board of Directors. Andrea Juan holds an honorary research fellowship at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Law.

This article was produced in the context of The Imprint of Education study that was conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa between August 2019 and July 2025, in partnership with and funded by the Mastercard Foundation. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Mastercard Foundation, its staff, or its Board of Directors. Adam Cooper holds an honorary research associateship at Nelson Mandela University, Chair in Youth Unemployment, Empowerment and Employability.

– ref. Graduated, now what? Survey of young Africans shows degrees don’t always land them a job – https://theconversation.com/graduated-now-what-survey-of-young-africans-shows-degrees-dont-always-land-them-a-job-264999

September 22, 2025

Economic sanctions need a rethink: evidence shows they raise food prices and hurt the poor most

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sylvanus Kwaku Afesorgbor, Associate Professor of Agri-Food Trade and Policy, University of Guelph

Economic sanctions are widely viewed by academics and policymakers as a better alternative to military interventions to pressure governments to change objectionable policies. The idea is simple: instead of using weapons, squeeze the ruling elite economically until they change their behaviour.

The use of economic sanctions has been rising steadily. According to recent data from the Global Sanctions Database, the number of active sanctions grew by 31% in 2021 compared to 2020, and this upward trend continued through 2022 and 2023.

In Africa, several countries are currently subject to sanctions imposed by the United States, the United Nations or the European Union. These African states include the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. It’s not mere coincidence that most of these countries are listed in the World Food Programme’s hunger hotspots.

Sanctions could have unintended consequences for citizens and they are usually the ones who pay the price. When sanctions hit food systems, the impact can be devastating.

I study economic sanctions and their unintended adverse effects on developing countries. In a recent study conducted with my colleagues, we looked at how economic sanctions affected food security across 90 developing countries between 2000 and 2022. We wanted to explore potential links between sanctions and starvation amid growing global concerns about food insecurity .

We focused on two key indicators: food prices and undernourishment (meaning the share of people who don’t get enough calories to live a healthy life).

We measured food prices using the Food and Agriculture Organization’s food consumer price index. This index captures changes in the overall cost of food and non-alcoholic beverages typically purchased by households.

We also used the organisation’s prevalence of undernourishment computation. This is a key indicator under Sustainable Development Goal 2.1, which tracks progress toward ending hunger by 2030.

Our results are sobering. When sanctions are in place, food prices rise by about 1.2 percentage points compared to periods without sanctions. That might sound small, but in low-income countries where families spend half their income on food, even tiny increases make life harder. This is outside other external factors that may lead to price hikes, such as demand and supply patterns.

We also found that undernourishment goes up by 2 percentage points during sanction periods. For countries with millions already living on the edge of hunger, that’s a huge additional burden.

Why sanctions raise food insecurity

Sanctions ripple through economies in several ways, and food is often caught in the middle.

First, sanctions disrupt food imports. This is a critical concern for many developing countries that rely heavily on international markets to feed their populations. Between 2021 and 2023, Africa’s food imports totalled about US$97 billion. At the country level, for example, Ethiopia and Libya imported food worth US$3 billion, Sudan US$2.3 billion and the Democratic Republic of Congo US$1.2 billion. Sanctions can further restrict trade or increase transportation costs, making food both scarcer and more expensive.

Second, sanctions restrict access to essential agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers, pesticides and machinery. They also impede technology transfers. For instance, farmers in sub-Saharan Africa apply on average only 9kg of fertiliser per hectare of arable land, compared with 73kg in Latin America and 100kg in South Asia. These constraints reduce yields, increase production costs and make it harder for farmers to sustain output.

Third, sanctions shake financial systems, reduce people’s incomes and encourage hoarding. Households already on tight budgets are forced to cut back or switch to cheaper, less nutritious food.

Finally, sanctions often result in cuts to food assistance, as targeted countries lose access to international aid. For example, the recent suspension of US humanitarian assistance to Sudan forced the closure of 80% of the country’s emergency food kitchens. This impact is particularly severe given that some of the largest food donors, such as the United States and the European Union, are also among the most frequent users of sanctions.

The end result is simple: higher food prices, less food on the table and more hunger.

Not all sanctions are equal

We also found that the type of sanction matters.

Trade sanctions that block imports and exports push food prices up the most. Financial sanctions that freeze assets or cut off banking access also hurt because they disrupt agricultural trade indirectly.
When countries face trade, financial and travel sanctions together, the damage is severe: food prices jump by more than 3.5 percentage points and hunger rises sharply.
Who imposes the sanctions also makes a difference. Sanctions from the European Union raised food prices the most, while sanctions from the UN had the biggest effect on hunger – increasing undernourishment by nearly 6 percentage points.

Food as a weapon of warfare

The UN has warned for years against using food as a weapon. In 2018, Resolution 2417 explicitly condemned starvation as a tool of war or political pressure. Yet in practice, sanctions often restrict food, medicine and agricultural inputs even when “humanitarian exemptions” exist on paper.

Food insecurity in Africa is worsening. According to the World Health Organization, one in five people on the continent faces hunger, and the number of undernourished continues to grow. Sanctions add to this crisis.

And the moral dilemma is clear. The people most harmed – poor families, small farmers and children – are the ones least responsible for the behaviour that triggers sanctions.

While sanctions aim to punish regimes, they often punish ordinary people instead.

What needs to change

Sanctions are unlikely to disappear from global politics. But their design and humanitarian fallout need rethinking. There are three steps that could reduce the damage.

First, stronger humanitarian exemptions: make sure food, fertilisers and aid can move freely, without being blocked.
Second, track the impact of sanctions: international agencies like the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme should monitor how sanctions affect food systems and sound the alarm quickly.
Third, rethink the strategy: if sanctions end up fuelling hunger, instability and migration, they may do more harm than good in the long run.

If the world is serious about ending hunger by 2030, then the unintended consequences of sanctions cannot be ignored. Sanctions must be redesigned to protect the most vulnerable, otherwise they risk becoming not just a diplomatic tool, but a driver of food crises.

Sylvanus Kwaku Afesorgbor receives funding from the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agribusiness (OMAFA). Kwaku also consults occasionally for the African Development Bank and the African Economic Research Consortium. He is the Executive Founder of the international think tank, Centre for Trade Analysis and Development (CeTAD Africa), based in Accra, Ghana.

– ref. Economic sanctions need a rethink: evidence shows they raise food prices and hurt the poor most – https://theconversation.com/economic-sanctions-need-a-rethink-evidence-shows-they-raise-food-prices-and-hurt-the-poor-most-265296

September 21, 2025

Deepfakes and South African law: remedies on paper, gaps in practice

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Nomalanga Mashinini, Senior Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand

Deepfakes are forgeries of people’s faces, voices and likeness generated through artificial intelligence (AI). They create a serious digital deception. Deepfakes undermine constitutional rights, reduce trust in media and distort fairness in elections. While many countries have laws that address the risks caused by deepfakes, enforcement remains a challenge.

Deepfakes began to be widely created in 2017 after they’d first appeared on Reddit, a discussion website of forums where people exchange information. A Reddit user called Deepfakes shared an AI software tool that could superimpose celebrities’ faces on pornographic videos. AI-generated media became widely accessible through software apps that enable people to freely create deepfakes.

There are several types of deepfakes:

text deepfakes in the form of fake receipts and identification documents
photo deepfakes, often swapping faces and bodies using apps to create memes
audio deepfakes, where text-to-speech apps are used for voice cloning, often targeting politicians
video deepfakes, where face and movement are transferred onto someone else’s video, commonly used to create “revenge pornography”.

Deepfakes pose three main dangers:

They deceive audiences into believing fabricated media.
They enable cybercrimes, reputational harm and misrepresentation.
They can be published by anyone, including anonymous social media users.

The key issue is how law can protect people from the illegal use of their images, voices, and likenesses in deepfakes.

Since 2020, I have looked at laws that regulate deepfakes in South Africa and their implementation. My findings show that the biggest problem with deepfakes is law enforcement, rather than any lack of laws that prohibit the unlawful creation and distribution of deepfakes.

Deepfake threats

South Africa has seen notable cases that highlight the growing impact of deepfakes. In 2024, Leanne Manas, an award-winning South African broadcast anchor, was a victim when her image was used in fake endorsement of weight loss products and online trading on Facebook and TikTok.

South African-born businessman Elon Musk also appeared in a deepfake video that induced many South Africans to invest in a financial scam that promised high returns.

In 2025, Professor Salim Abdool Karim, the director of the Centre for the AIDS Programme of Research in South Africa, appeared in a deepfake video showing him making anti-vaccination statements while endorsing counterfeit heart medicine.

Legal protection in South Africa

South Africa has a mixed legal system that combines constitutional rights, legislation and common law rules to provide deepfake victims with remedies.

There are laws that provide remedies in both civil and criminal cases. For example:

Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020: criminalises electronic publication of intimate private images without consent.
Electoral Act 73 of 1998: bans publishing false information to influence elections.
Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996: prohibits online distribution of private sexual photographs and films to cause harm.
Protection of Personal Information Act: prohibits misuse of personal information that infringes privacy.

Common law remedies

Anyone can claim violation of privacy if their private images are used without permission. They can also enforce their right to identity if a deepfake misrepresents them or gives a perpetrator commercial advantage.

I investigated these principles in an article about the impact of deepfakes on the right to identity in South Africa. Using South African cases, I found that the unauthorised use of a person’s identity attributes in a deepfake deserves protection.

The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed, in Grütter v Lombard, that South African law protects a person’s identity from being exploited without permission. And this protection is supported by the constitutional guarantee of human dignity. Grütter and Lombard once practised on the same premises under the name “Grütter and Lombard”, but Grütter later left. Lombard kept using Grütter’s name without consent. The court ordered him to stop as it falsely implied an ongoing professional association and infringed Grütter’s right to identity.

In another case, a surfer’s magazine called ZigZag published a photo of a 12-year-old girl as a pin-up cover image. The court stressed that the key issue was whether an image was exploited for another’s benefit without consent. The defendants were ordered to pay compensation and costs.

Another case is that of South African television personality, beauty pageant titleholder, businesswoman and philanthropist Basetsana Kumalo. She sued a business that took photos of her while she was shopping in their store and used those images in an advertisement for their products without her permission. The court ruled that using someone’s likeness for false endorsements infringes identity and privacy, because it creates the misleading impression of support for the product, service or business.

These cases fit squarely into the deepfakes misuses, showing that false endorsement, election disinformation and non-consensual pornography on social media can trigger liability.

Enforcement challenges

While South African law provides remedies against deepfakes, four hurdles frustrate enforcement:

South African courts have capacity constraints and struggle to resolve backlogs.
Litigation remains a “rich man’s” option. The poor struggle to access justice or wait too long for pro bono help.
While South African courts can assert jurisdiction over global platforms like Meta and TikTok, serving court orders abroad and compelling compliance is still costly, and takedown notices are often enforced too late.
Perpetrators hide behind fake profiles and are hard to trace through the South African Police Service. Social media companies delay revealing the perpetrators’ true identities upon request.

These enforcement challenges can be addressed through capacity building and legal reform. AI research centres should work with law enforcement to train personnel and provide practical skills and tools for tracing and authenticating deepfakes. Parliament must update social media laws so that platforms are directly accountable for fast and fair action when people’s identities are misused in deepfakes.

Legal rules should set minimum standards that deepfake apps and platforms must follow. Rather than relying on age restrictions or consent alone, the law should require these tools to embed watermarking to signal that content is a deepfake, enable tracing of where it comes from, and make sure takedown systems actually work.

Justice on paper

South African law clearly prohibits the misuse of identity through deepfakes, but enforcement gaps leave victims exposed. Without affordable legal access, faster platform accountability, and effective international cooperation, illegal deepfakes will continue to increase.

Nomalanga Mashinini receives funding from the National Research Foundation Thuthuka Grant.

– ref. Deepfakes and South African law: remedies on paper, gaps in practice – https://theconversation.com/deepfakes-and-south-african-law-remedies-on-paper-gaps-in-practice-263850

September 21, 2025

Ethiopia’s two bids at democracy have failed: what it will take to succeed

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Terefe Gebreyesus, Lecturer, Griffith University

Ethiopia has attempted to transition to democracy twice. First in 1991, when a new government overthrew a dictatorial military regime. Second in 2018, when Abiy Ahmed took over as prime minister after protests against a repressive government.

In both attempts, there was optimism and excitement. But both failed.

Can Ethiopia still get it right? In a recent article, I tried to answer this question. I examined four preconditions that scholars of democratic transition identify. These are:

economic growth over a considerable period
political elites committed to tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic rules and practices
independent political institutions
international organisations, such as the African Union and the UN, being willing to force the country’s political elites to uphold democratic values.

In my view, based on my research, Ethiopia does not meet any of the preconditions.

Instead, democratic governance is made almost impossible by its poverty, culture of solving political differences with conflict and violence, absence of strong political institutions, and polarisation.

A democratic government in Ethiopia would help ensure people live in a country that respects human rights and dignity. It would help unlock accountability, stability and economic growth.

Failed attempts

In 1991, the country had endured a 17-year civil war that began in 1974. The winners of the war, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, established control over the country by forming a coalition political party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.

The new government made radical reforms. It allowed political parties, radio and media communications to be free. It encouraged private publications and permitted public demonstrations.

But it didn’t take long for the new government to become authoritarian. It persecuted political competitors. Elections were held regularly, but they were not free and fair. Human rights and political freedoms were violated. Freedom of political communication was restricted.

As a result, protests started in 2015. They led to the appointment of Abiy as prime minister in 2018.

He began a second attempt at moving Ethiopia towards democracy. As The Guardian newspaper in the UK described it:

Something extraordinary is happening in Ethiopia … authoritarianism and state brutality appear to be giving way to something resembling democracy.

Again, this didn’t last. Instead, political order has worsened. The country went through a two-year civil war from 2020 to 2022 between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Another guerrilla war started between the federal government and an Amhara youth group named the Fano shortly afterwards.

What democratic transition takes

No country has become democratic without at least some of the four preconditions in place. And they are not equally important. For instance, Ghana may not have a strong economy, but it has political elites who play by the rules of democratic governance.

Economic growth: if a society is economically advanced, generally, the people want democracy. This is because an undemocratic and unstable government threatens their economic security. As a result, citizens won’t take part in activities that go against democratic consolidation.

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. While there is no magic number for this, one study found that a country with US$10,000 per capita income generally has a higher chance of adopting competitive elections. Ethiopia’s per capita income is US$1,011.

Economic growth is the foundation of strong political and civic institutions. These are important for transiting to and consolidating democracy.

But economic growth needs time. Ethiopia’s constant political instability has hurt its potential for economic development. In the two decades before 2018, its economy grew strongly, reducing the national poverty rate from 39% to 24%. Political instability and other factors since then had increased poverty rates to 32% by 2021.

Political elites: if political elites are committed to deliberating, compromising and cooperating, a country can successfully transit to democracy. One study found that when political elites are divided, the country will be authoritarian. The current civil war in Sudan offers an example of what can happen when political elites battle for power.

In Ethiopia, political disagreements often lead to violence or a government effort to silence and destroy the opposition. In 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front and other political groups couldn’t find common ground, the ruling elite eliminated dissenters. This allowed it to rule the country alone for 28 years. Similarly, when political elites couldn’t deliberate, compromise and cooperate in the second attempt, war broke out.

Political institutions: strong political institutions – such as an independent judiciary, police and electoral agency – support democratic transition. They also help sustain it. Political institutions prevent authoritarian leaders from persecuting political competition, and help solve any conflicts between competing elites.

External pressure: the best example of this was seen in 2022. The civil war between Tigray and the Ethiopian government ended when an African Union-led effort in South Africa forced the two sides to agree. It’s difficult, however, to transition to democracy by relying on external pressure, which would need to be constant and consistent. No country in Africa has been able to become and stay democratic based on external pressure.

What next

Democratic transition can only succeed in Ethiopia when at least one of three things occurs.

First, the country’s economy needs to grow for a substantial amount of time. Second, its diverse ethnic and religious identities must be integrated through policies that encourage the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. Third, society and, more specifically, the political elite need to commit to tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic principles.

All that will take a long time to achieve. Meanwhile, the country has two unfavourable choices: support a non-democratic government to consolidate political order and then gradually help it achieve democratic goals. Or attempt another transition, which may lead to anarchy and widespread inter-community violence. An untimely democratic transition would destroy political order.

With this in mind, Ethiopia’s political elites need to embrace discussion, debate and compromise. External forces can be a support by getting the political elite to move in this direction.

Terefe Gebreyesus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ethiopia’s two bids at democracy have failed: what it will take to succeed – https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-two-bids-at-democracy-have-failed-what-it-will-take-to-succeed-263817

September 18, 2025

Uganda has signed a deal with the US to take asylum seekers – what’s behind it and what’s at stake

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Franzisca Zanker, Senior researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute

A new deal to deport asylum seekers from the US to Uganda was announced in August 2025. The full agreement, already signed by the ambassadors of the two countries at the end of July, set out the terms of the arrangements. Franzisca Zanker and Ronald Kalyango Sebba, who have studied refugee and migration policy in Uganda, unpack its significance.

What deal has Uganda signed with Washington on taking refugees?

Uganda has agreed to take on an unspecified number of third-country nationals who have a pending asylum claim in the US but cannot return home due to safety concerns. In other words, these are people who should likely be protected as refugees, but are no longer wanted in Donald Trump’s America.

Uganda is set to receive development funds in return. It also retains discretion on a case-by-case basis.

According to the official Ugandan statement, the deal, which entered into force with its signing on 29 July 2025, does not include people with a criminal background or unaccompanied minors. The written agreement, however, only mentions minors.

Once in Uganda, each person will go through individual refugee status determination processes.

How does this deal compare with others the US has reached on the continent?

It follows similar bilateral agreements with other African countries from recent weeks. For instance, eight people with a criminal background were deported in July to South Sudan. Five similar cases were deported to Eswatini. In mid-September, Ghana became the latest African country to crumble, taking in 14 deported migrants from the US.

A final example, Rwanda, has a long history of similar agreements. These agreements have usually been accompanied by much fanfare and followed by little in the way of receiving of actual refugees. Most recently Rwanda agreed to take in 250 people from the US. The first seven arrived in late August.

What are the issues with these arrangements?

The US is not alone in its attempts to send asylum seekers to countries in Africa.

Plans – with varying levels of concreteness – have been thrown around by politicians from the UK, Denmark and Germany.

Migration is being demonised by politicians all over the world. So externalising, which basically means moving the location of the problem, may seem like a solution.

But African countries have not always received such offers with open arms. While global asymmetries and aid dependencies mean that African officials may not overtly reject such deal attempts, countries are not keen to take on any deportees, let alone from third countries.

In fact, there is no international convention that provides a legal instrument for deporting people from another nationality to a different country. International agreements, most recently the Samoa Agreement between the European Union and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states, have removed the potential to deport third nationals.

Deporting nationals from other countries to African countries is, therefore, legally questionable – and diplomatically unpopular. The African Union has condemned such arrangements as “xenophobic and completely unacceptable”.

What’s in it for Uganda?

The deal provides the groundwork for much-needed improvements in bilateral US-Ugandan relationship.

In response to the globally condemned 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act, the Joe Biden administration terminated Uganda’s eligibility for US trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. This policy gave Uganda duty-free access to the American market for a variety of goods.

More recently under the Trump administration, Uganda has suffered the effect of US funding cuts. This includes the loss of an estimated 66% of funding following cuts to the USAID development assistance programme. Uganda also faces a higher tariff of 15%, up from the previously announced 10% that will affect the cost of its agricultural products in the US market. This could potentially lower its sales in a key export market.

While the details of the US-Uganda asylum deal are shrouded in secrecy, as is common with such agreements it could provide Uganda with much needed development funds and lead to better tariff conditions.

Domestically, opposition politicians have criticised the new bilateral deal. However, Museveni has not shown much concern for these misgivings. Uganda is one of the few countries where refugees have not become a major political issue.

However, this may change. Attitudes towards migrants are slowly changing at a societal and political level.

As refugee numbers rise, conflicts between them and host communities over land and environmental damage are increasing. There is growing public apprehension about the government’s open-door policy.

What is Uganda’s history when it comes to refugees?

Uganda has a long history of refugee protection. It currently hosts 1.8 million refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The country has a reputation as one of the most generous places towards refugees. Most people entering Uganda are given automatic refugee status. This was set up in the 1969 refugee convention from the then Organisation of African Unity.

The government provides refugees with a plot of land to farm. They have free access to schools and healthcare, and can work. As refugee numbers grow, however, the plots of land are getting smaller.

In practice, refugees are confined to dusty so-called refugee settlements, with few working and educational possibilities. Many refugees – just like the Ugandan host community – live under very high levels of poverty.

Some refugees have to go through individual refugee status determination processes where they face huge backlogs and access to justice issues.

Will the refugees from Washington get the same treatment?

We do not know at this stage. However, in August 2021, Uganda agreed to take on up to 2,000 refugees from Afghanistan on behalf of the US. While this was deemed only a temporary move before they were resettled elsewhere, many remain in Uganda to this day.

At the time, the Ugandan foreign minister wrote in an op-ed

our friend, partner and longstanding ally – the US – asked for our support …. when the US asks for our help and we are able to give it, we do.

In the same piece he also noted

Ugandans say refugees are our brothers and sisters. That is why our door will always be open to them.

What this means for the US deportees is unknown.

The agreement reveals no details about their temporary housing or refugee status determination process. Whether they will be sent to the remote settlements where most refugees in Uganda access free housing and humanitarian assistance, or stay in urban Kampala, remains to be determined.

With elections in Uganda scheduled for January 2026, such a deal certainly helps President Yoweri Museveni preempt any US criticism regarding electoral freedom. But it also raises deeper questions about the long-term effects of open-door policies.

Franzisca Zanker receives funding from the European Research Council for the project “The Political Lives of Migrants: Perspectives from Africa” (Grant no: 101161856).

Ronald Kalyango Sebba is affiliated with Kyambogo University, Kampala Uganda.

– ref. Uganda has signed a deal with the US to take asylum seekers – what’s behind it and what’s at stake – https://theconversation.com/uganda-has-signed-a-deal-with-the-us-to-take-asylum-seekers-whats-behind-it-and-whats-at-stake-265545

September 18, 2025

Nigeria’s plastic waste could enrich the fashion industry: here’s how

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Solaja Mayowa Oludele, Lecturing, Olabisi Onabanjo University

On any street in Lagos, Abuja or Port Harcourt, you’ll find abandoned plastic bottles lying around. Each year, about 2.5 million tonnes of plastic waste are produced in Nigeria and much of it winds up in landfills or in the environment.

But plastic waste can be useful. In some places it’s converted to textiles and clothing. Adidas, a global shoe and apparel maker, uses ocean plastics to produce sneakers, and the clothing brands H&M and Patagonia have put their money into recycled polyester collection. They collect post-consumer plastic waste (like used plastic bottles), clean it, shred it into flakes, melt it down into pellets, and then spin these pellets into polyester yarn, which is used to make new sportswear and footwear.

We’re a team of sustainability researchers and social scientists with expertise in circular economy, ethics and plastic waste management. In a recent study, we reviewed the opportunities and challenges of using recycled polyethylene terephthalate (PET) plastics (the type of plastic used in beverage bottles) in Nigeria’s fashion industry.

Evidence from other regions, such as Europe and North America, shows that producing polyester fibres from recycled PET rather than unused materials can cut carbon emissions by over 45%. But little is known about its potential in Nigeria.

Our review mapped and analysed academic studies, industry reports and policy documents to identify technical, economic, environmental, social and regulatory factors shaping the adoption of recycled PET in Nigerian fashion.

We developed a theoretical model showing how knowledge from local crafts, industrial design, environmental science and policy frameworks interact to influence this emerging practice. And we made some proposals about how to foster a socially inclusive, ethically responsible and environmentally sustainable textile industry in Nigeria.

We believe that incorporating plastic waste into the Nigerian textile industry could reduce pollution, generate employment and cut a niche in the world of sustainable fashion.

Barriers beyond technology

Plastic bottles don’t have to be a social or environmental hassle. They can be a source of economic power. The concept of “waste to wealth” is more than a catchphrase – it has the potential to revive the textile industry.

But there are a number of obstacles.

Poor infrastructure: Nigerians do not have large recycling plants. Recycling tends to be small scale or informal. Recovered PET bottles are typically exported or down-cycled into low-grade products like mats or stuffing.

Consumer perceptions: In a recent survey conducted in Lagos only 18% of consumers had heard about recycled textiles. Nigerians think of recycled clothes as a sign of poverty or as second-hand goods, not as quality clothing.

Comfort: Recycled polyester is often uncomfortable to wear in hot, damp climates, as the fabric tends to retain moisture and heat. Nigeria’s average daily temperatures range from 25°C to 35°C with high humidity. The uptake among consumers will not improve until these technical problems are addressed.

Policy gaps: In Europe, companies must assume responsibility for the end of their products’ lives. In Nigeria there are no comparable regulations, incentives or infrastructure supporting sustainable textiles. This leaves local brands with little motivation to innovate.

Lessons from global and local experiments

Other countries and brands have shown what’s possible. Adidas has transformed thousands of tonnes of plastic taken from the oceans into sneakers and sportswear. H&M operates a take-back programme worldwide which gathered over 14,768 tonnes of worn garments in 2022. Patagonia has a programme called Worn Wear which invites customers to repair and reuse their clothes.

Nigeria can learn from these examples, but also has its own sources of innovation. Startup enterprises such as Chanja Datti in Abuja are testing community-based recycling and recovery. Circular fashion – where clothing is designed to be reused, repaired and recycled instead of discarded – can also be cultural fashion, as designers in Nigeria like Maki Oh are incorporating traditional textures and sustainable practices.

The way forward

At least four changes are essential to transform plastic waste into fashion in Nigeria:

1.) Take a stake in decentralised recycling centres

Regional centres with small but technologically prepared centres could generate, process and upcycle the PET waste into fibres. This would lower transport expenses, provide employment and feed directly into textile manufacturers.

2.) Assist small and medium textile enterprises

Nigeria has a fashion industry dominated by small businesses. They can be given access to finance, sustainable practice training and affordable technology to scale the use of recycled fabrics.

3.) Educate consumers

Recycled fashion needs to be perceived by Nigerians as stylish and of good quality rather than second-hand. Perceptions can be shifted through public education, collaboration with popular designers and influencers.

4.) Create enabling policies

Tax incentives to sustainable producers, recycling start-up grants and procurement policies that focus on recycled textiles would encourage industry players. Laws must not promote waste and excessive dependence on imports.

Why this matters globally

Sustainable fashion is not only a western issue. Nigeria boasts one of the largest young populations in the world, a dynamic fashion industry and a huge plastic waste crisis. Should Nigeria be able to incorporate the use of recycled plastics in its textile industry, it may serve as an example to other poor economies facing similar circumstances.

Solaja Mayowa Oludele does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s plastic waste could enrich the fashion industry: here’s how – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-plastic-waste-could-enrich-the-fashion-industry-heres-how-264919

September 18, 2025

Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera turns her prayers into paintings

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Assistant Professor, Harvard University

At the Boston waterfront sits the Institute of Contemporary Art, an architectural marvel that gleams against the harbour in a wealthy neighbourhood. My Uber driver, an African immigrant, remarks as I get out: “Be careful, this is an expensive area.” His comment hints at the subtle tensions of race and class in such affluent spaces, where one’s presence as an outsider is immediately registered. I assure him I’ve just come to see the art.

I’d come to see Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera’s first solo museum show in the US, Hidden Battles/Hondo Dzakavanzika. This exhibition is a landmark moment of recognition for one of southern Africa’s leading contemporary artists.

When most artists are grappling with history and archives, Zvavahera is focused on the dreams she has in her sleep, not as a retreat from the past or the urgency of the now, but as a parallel form of knowledge.

As a scholar of African literary histories and archives and how they intersect with visual culture, I find Zvavahera’s work particularly powerful. It uncovers layers of meaning that operate at the subconscious, where personal memory, cultural narratives, and the imagination intersect.

From an archival perspective, the exhibition is compelling because it frames these dreamscapes with materiality – paint, paper, canvas, brushstrokes – making each a document of emotional and cultural knowledge.

Zvavahera engages deeply with the traditional spirituality and African Pentecostal beliefs in which she was raised. She illuminates spirits and revelations. But she alters these dreams with emancipatory gestures: drawing in bodily features, concealing them as they morph into animal-like figures or plants. When looking closely, it’s as if the canvas was cut then sutured back with careful stitches, with each move a restoration of dignity. This is the delicacy of her brushstrokes.

The Boston gallery positions itself as a site for amplifying singular global voices in art, like Zvavahera’s. Her refusal to translate dreams into rational explanation is central to her practice. Boston audiences encounter Zimbabwean perspectives not as illustrative or ethnographic, but as intellectually and aesthetically complex. Zvavahera is placed within transnational conversations while her particular lived experiences are preserved.

The work on the show was made between 2021 and 2025, a time filled with mourning and melancholy, during and after the COVID pandemic. Zvavahera is a prophet who uses the canvas to transform dark dreams into vivid, colourful prayers. She says:

People say their prayers with words, and I’m saying my prayers with a painting.

Who is Portia Zvavahera?

Born in Harare in 1985, Zvavahera channels childhood experiences, ancestral presence, and mystical narratives into her paintings. The work blurs the line between the figurative and the abstract.

Growing up in Harare’s art scene, both modernist and indigenous art inspired her practice. She found mentorship and support from Gallery Delta and formal training from the National Gallery of Zimbabwe.

Her work has earned awards and international acclaim for its emotive force and poetic intensity.

The exhibition

Zvavahera’s canvases are layered with pigment and texture, incorporating printmaking techniques alongside stencilling, delicate lace, batik wax, and even palm fronds from her garden.

The dream paintings on show are all vast in scale, almost overwhelming in their presence. They appear as recurring visions, or fragments from a psyche as troubled as it is fertile.

The imagery conjures a world of vulnerability. Spectres in her dreams besiege her and try to snatch her children, harm her body, make her grandmother sick, unsettle her spirit. But she does not succumb. Instead, she renders them into haunting paintings and drawings, binding them into linen, oil and ink.

Their titles draw from Shona proverbs and folktales. Kurwira vana (fighting for the children). Tinosvetuka rusvingo (jumping over the wall). Hondo yakatarisana naambuya (the battle that grandmother is facing). They aren’t simply explanatory notes but portals, resisting simplification, pulling the viewer into the language of a cosmology not easily domesticated by English.

Zvavahera is an artist of scale, but also of duration. The canvases demand that viewers linger. To stand before the work is to enter a meditative space, one where line and colour pulse with life. In one caption she writes:

I know there’s going to be a battle in the future when I see a bull in my dreams.

The bull, like the angelic and demonic figures in her work, are not allegory but omen, a herald of struggle. This is the artist’s autobiography in colour.

What haunts is not only the possibility of harm, but also the persistence of love. Viewers witness the artist’s insistent refusal to let her children, her spirit, her imagination, be taken over. To dream is to fight; to paint is to protect. Her canvases stage encounters between the forces of good and evil, and transform them into visions of resilience.

Running through this series is a mystical or magical impulse that is especially vivid in her characters. Her paintings and drawings develop a kind of surrealist mystic experience.

Zvavahera’s work matters because it demonstrates how art can navigate the intimate and the ancestral, the personal and the collective. It offers a worldview that’s too often marginalised in art world conversations. She brings to the fore the depth of the African imagination.

Her show is testament to the fact that African artists are not only present on the global art stage, they’re also helping shape the questions, forms and languages of art itself.

Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera turns her prayers into paintings – https://theconversation.com/zimbabwean-artist-portia-zvavahera-turns-her-prayers-into-paintings-265213

September 18, 2025

Travel as activism: 6 stories of Black women who refused to ‘stay put’ in apartheid South Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Janet Remmington, Research Associate, Humanities Research Centre (and African Literature Department, University of the Witwatersrand), University of York

For black people living in South Africa during apartheid, simply moving around the country was a fraught activity, let alone crossing its borders. This was especially the case for black women, who were “rock bottom of the racial pile”, as South African writer Lauretta Ngcobo expressed it.

Coming to power in 1948 and ruling for over 40 years before democracy in 1994, the white-minority apartheid government took various race-based policies to extremes. An emphasis was on trying to control movement, keeping the black majority “in their place”.

From the 1950s, the state extended pass laws, targeting black women. It also complicated overseas travel with extra bureaucratic and financial burdens.

Mobility restrictions caused an outcry, especially among the growing body of black working women in industrialising cities and towns. These women connected their everyday challenges with broader sociopolitical issues. They injected new energy and forms of activism into organisations involved in the liberation struggle, including the African National Congress (ANC).

In a recent study, I explore the stories of black women who refused to stay put in the face of apartheid’s controls. For these women, mobility was a powerful form of anti-apartheid resistance – and of self-assertion.

I highlight how in 1954, a number of these women, working across race lines, founded the Federation of South African Women (Fedsaw) and drafted the Women’s Charter. The pioneering document laid groundwork for the broader Freedom Charter, which enshrined ideas on freedoms of movement and thought:

All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to province, and from South Africa abroad.

Even though these ideals would only be realised much later, these activist women broke apartheid’s rules by travelling, exchanging ideas and making connections across borders.

The activist-traveller

These women’s high-risk journeys struck me as being characteristic of what journalist and scholar Mahvish Ahmad describes as a musāfir: an activist-traveller in a politically hostile environment who breaks new ground for others so they may be free.

The mobile black women workers I have been researching have not previously been brought into view as travellers with things to say about their journeys and movements. Their travel texts are diverse, many available only in archives. They include speeches, commentaries, handwritten accounts, interviews, letters and memoirs. Some memoirs were officially published, but outside the country.

Their outputs were not the products of high education or stylised writing, but produced in the intensity of the times by working women.

Elizabeth Mafekeng

When Elizabeth Mafekeng, president of the Food and Canning Workers’ Association, was denied a passport in 1955, she boarded a plane in disguise as a domestic helper. That’s how determined she was to get to the World Conference of Workers in Bulgaria. She also took in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and China, commenting in the press that she “saw the way people should live in the world” where race was not pronounced.

Returning to South Africa, she was punished for her transgressive travel. She became the first woman sentenced to political banishment by the apartheid state. Again she took mobility into her own hands, fleeing with her two-month-old baby to then Basotholand (today’s Lesotho).

Lilian Ngoyi and Dora Tamana

Lilian Ngoyi, leader of the Garment Workers Union and president of the ANC’s Women’s League, travelled to Switzerland, London, Berlin, the Soviet Union, China and Mongolia in 1955.

Ngoyi and Dora Tamana first tried to board a ship under “European names”, only to be arrested. On a second attempt, they succeeded by air using affidavits and a raft of explanations, eventually arriving in London after stopovers in Uganda, Italy and the Netherlands. Their destination was the World Congress of Mothers in Switzerland on behalf of Fedsaw. There they forged powerful solidarity networks.

Tamana reflected in a letter:

When I saw all these things, different nations together, my eyes were opened and I said, I have tasted the new world and won the confidence of our future.

On return, Ngoyi and Tamana played leading roles in the 20,000-strong 1956 women’s anti-pass march to parliament.

Frances Baard

Frances Baard was a domestic worker turned union organiser who presented the Women’s March petition to the apartheid state.

She travelled around South Africa extensively despite police harassment. Her organising work connected domestic workers, factory workers and other exploited labourers, for which she was imprisoned and banished. In her memoir, she spoke of the mind’s ability to travel:

Even though they ban me … my spirit is still there … free.

Florence Mophosho

My research includes those who travelled into exile like Florence Mophosho.

She was one of the few exiled women leaders of the ANC in the 1960s, based for years in Tanzania and travelling far and wide for the Women’s Secretariat. She stressed that travel was vital to advance the work of political freedom as well as global women’s emancipation. This wasn’t always appreciated by male colleagues.

Emma Mashinini

The apartheid government loosened some mobility restrictions in the 1980s. But this didn’t mean moving around was free or unencumbered. Emma Mashinini, who led the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union, undertook “a hundred and one travels” within and beyond South Africa to progress freedom for her people.

In 1981, Mashinini was thrown into solitary confinement for six months. In the eyes of the state, she had “overreached” as a black woman traveller-organiser. She insisted in her memoir that it was her country and she intended to come and go.

Moving to be free

Understanding this travel and writing history helps shine new light on (often unsung) black women trade unionists and organisational leaders as anti-apartheid movers and shakers.

Insisting on mobility came at great personal cost, but in a sense these women never went alone. They travelled to gain ground for the greater cause of freedom, while discovering new versions of themselves along the way.

Janet Remmington does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Travel as activism: 6 stories of Black women who refused to ‘stay put’ in apartheid South Africa – https://theconversation.com/travel-as-activism-6-stories-of-black-women-who-refused-to-stay-put-in-apartheid-south-africa-263854

September 18, 2025

Soil erosion is tearing DRC cities apart: what’s causing urban gullies, and how to prevent them

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Matthias Vanmaercke, Associate professor BOF Faculty of Science, KU Leuven

In fast-growing cities like some in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), heavy rains are carving huge scars into the land. Known as urban gullies, these deep erosion channels can swallow homes, destroy roads and displace entire communities.

They can grow to hundreds of metres long and dozens of metres wide, splitting neighbourhoods in two. Once established, they keep expanding with each major downpour.

The consequences are devastating. In Kinshasa, the DRC’s capital, heavy rainfall in December 2022 triggered rapid gully expansion, destroying homes and claiming dozens of lives.

Urban gullies form when rainwater runoff cuts deep channels into fragile soils. The erosive force of concentrated water exceeds the strength of these soils. The gullies usually form after intense rain on steep slopes. Urbanisation makes the situation worse as vegetation is removed to build houses, greatly increasing the likelihood that heavy rainfalls will simply run off the top soil. Roads also play a critical part as they can change how water flows across the landscape, forming direct pathways along which runoff can accumulate.

Our new study reveals the staggering scale of the problem in the DRC. Our research team of Congolese and Belgian earth scientists and geographers identified 2,922 urban gullies in 26 DRC cities.

We used satellite imagery and population data to identify the gullies. Our detailed, nationwide mapping effort – the first to map gully erosion across an entire country – shows that this is not a series of isolated incidents but a widespread and fast-growing hazard.

But urban gullies can be avoided by adequate urban planning and infrastructure. This includes adapted zoning plans and measures such as better road drainage, rainwater retention and infiltration systems, increased vegetation cover and targeted engineering works to divert runoff safely.

The crisis in numbers

Many of the urban gullies in the DRC are huge. A typical example is easily 250 metres long and 30 metres wide. Together, they stretch nearly 740 kilometres.

Kinshasa alone has 868 mapped gullies (221km in total). With about 17 million inhabitants, it is the DRC’s largest city and one of Africa’s megacities, where rapid, unplanned growth (around 6.6% per year) makes gully erosion a major urban hazard. Kinshasa is also tropical with annual rainfall typically above 1,000 millimetres.

By reconstructing how these features expanded between 2004 and 2023, we calculated that 118,600 people in the DRC were forced from their homes. Displacement has accelerated sharply: before 2020, about 4,600 people were displaced annually; today, the figure is more than 12,000.

The study also looked ahead. In 2023, some 3.2 million Congolese lived in areas considered at risk of future gully expansion. Of these, more than half a million are in zones where the chance of losing their homes within a decade is very high.

Several factors make Congo’s cities especially prone to gully erosion. Many are built on steep slopes with sandy soils that are highly erodible. Rapid, unplanned urban growth strips vegetation and increases impermeable surfaces such as rooftops and roads, which funnel runoff into concentrated flows.

The link with roads is particularly striking: 98% of all mapped gullies were connected to the road network, either forming along unpaved streets or fed by runoff from poorly drained roads.

The problem is set to worsen. Congo’s urban population is booming, driven by both natural growth and migration. Informal neighbourhoods often lack basic infrastructure, leaving rainfall to carve its own destructive paths.

Climate change adds another layer of risk. Rainfall intensity in tropical Africa is projected to rise by 10%-15% in the coming decades. Since heavy downpours are a trigger for gully formation, expansion rates could double if no action is taken.

Prevention over cure

Once formed, gullies are extremely hard and costly to stabilise. Local communities often try to slow their advance, but without proper engineering solutions, most efforts fail. Stabilising a single large gully can cost the DRC more than US$1 million, an impossible burden for most municipalities.

The study shows that prevention is the only viable long-term strategy. That means paying careful attention to how cities are planned and built. Measures such as better road drainage, rainwater retention systems and strategic vegetation cover can reduce the risks.

Above all, improved spatial planning is crucial to stop new neighbourhoods from being built in vulnerable areas. The effectiveness of specific urban gully control measures remains largely unknown and poorly documented, apart from an earlier case study in the DRC that showed that many measures fail. But such measures should not be confused with better spatial planning. This means avoid constructing houses and roads in areas that are sensitive to urban gully formation, or at least making sure that rainwater is safely stored or evacuated.

We argue that the best strategy for limiting the impacts of urban gullies is preventing them.

Above all, urban gullies must be recognised as a disaster risk on par with floods and landslides. Only then can policies and investments be developed that are needed to protect vulnerable populations.

A problem in the rest of Africa too

Although the DRC is at the epicentre of the crisis, similar problems are emerging elsewhere in Africa, including Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi and Madagascar.

With urban populations across the global south expected to nearly triple by 2050, gully erosion could become one of the defining urban hazards of the century.

The deep scars running through Congo’s cities are not just features of the landscape, they are reminders of the urgent need to rethink how urban growth is managed in vulnerable regions.

Matthias Vanmaercke receives funding from the University of Leuven. The research behind this article was funded through the Belgian ARES research collaboration project PREMITURG (Prevention and Mitigation of Urban Gullies: lessons learned from failures and successes, D.R. Congo)

– ref. Soil erosion is tearing DRC cities apart: what’s causing urban gullies, and how to prevent them – https://theconversation.com/soil-erosion-is-tearing-drc-cities-apart-whats-causing-urban-gullies-and-how-to-prevent-them-264497