The Conversation – Africa – Page 23

September 21, 2025

Ethiopia’s two bids at democracy have failed: what it will take to succeed

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Terefe Gebreyesus, Lecturer, Griffith University

Ethiopia has attempted to transition to democracy twice. First in 1991, when a new government overthrew a dictatorial military regime. Second in 2018, when Abiy Ahmed took over as prime minister after protests against a repressive government.

In both attempts, there was optimism and excitement. But both failed.

Can Ethiopia still get it right? In a recent article, I tried to answer this question. I examined four preconditions that scholars of democratic transition identify. These are:

economic growth over a considerable period
political elites committed to tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic rules and practices
independent political institutions
international organisations, such as the African Union and the UN, being willing to force the country’s political elites to uphold democratic values.

In my view, based on my research, Ethiopia does not meet any of the preconditions.

Instead, democratic governance is made almost impossible by its poverty, culture of solving political differences with conflict and violence, absence of strong political institutions, and polarisation.

A democratic government in Ethiopia would help ensure people live in a country that respects human rights and dignity. It would help unlock accountability, stability and economic growth.

Failed attempts

In 1991, the country had endured a 17-year civil war that began in 1974. The winners of the war, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, established control over the country by forming a coalition political party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.

The new government made radical reforms. It allowed political parties, radio and media communications to be free. It encouraged private publications and permitted public demonstrations.

But it didn’t take long for the new government to become authoritarian. It persecuted political competitors. Elections were held regularly, but they were not free and fair. Human rights and political freedoms were violated. Freedom of political communication was restricted.

As a result, protests started in 2015. They led to the appointment of Abiy as prime minister in 2018.

He began a second attempt at moving Ethiopia towards democracy. As The Guardian newspaper in the UK described it:

Something extraordinary is happening in Ethiopia … authoritarianism and state brutality appear to be giving way to something resembling democracy.

Again, this didn’t last. Instead, political order has worsened. The country went through a two-year civil war from 2020 to 2022 between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Another guerrilla war started between the federal government and an Amhara youth group named the Fano shortly afterwards.

What democratic transition takes

No country has become democratic without at least some of the four preconditions in place. And they are not equally important. For instance, Ghana may not have a strong economy, but it has political elites who play by the rules of democratic governance.

Economic growth: if a society is economically advanced, generally, the people want democracy. This is because an undemocratic and unstable government threatens their economic security. As a result, citizens won’t take part in activities that go against democratic consolidation.

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. While there is no magic number for this, one study found that a country with US$10,000 per capita income generally has a higher chance of adopting competitive elections. Ethiopia’s per capita income is US$1,011.

Economic growth is the foundation of strong political and civic institutions. These are important for transiting to and consolidating democracy.

But economic growth needs time. Ethiopia’s constant political instability has hurt its potential for economic development. In the two decades before 2018, its economy grew strongly, reducing the national poverty rate from 39% to 24%. Political instability and other factors since then had increased poverty rates to 32% by 2021.

Political elites: if political elites are committed to deliberating, compromising and cooperating, a country can successfully transit to democracy. One study found that when political elites are divided, the country will be authoritarian. The current civil war in Sudan offers an example of what can happen when political elites battle for power.

In Ethiopia, political disagreements often lead to violence or a government effort to silence and destroy the opposition. In 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front and other political groups couldn’t find common ground, the ruling elite eliminated dissenters. This allowed it to rule the country alone for 28 years. Similarly, when political elites couldn’t deliberate, compromise and cooperate in the second attempt, war broke out.

Political institutions: strong political institutions – such as an independent judiciary, police and electoral agency – support democratic transition. They also help sustain it. Political institutions prevent authoritarian leaders from persecuting political competition, and help solve any conflicts between competing elites.

External pressure: the best example of this was seen in 2022. The civil war between Tigray and the Ethiopian government ended when an African Union-led effort in South Africa forced the two sides to agree. It’s difficult, however, to transition to democracy by relying on external pressure, which would need to be constant and consistent. No country in Africa has been able to become and stay democratic based on external pressure.

What next

Democratic transition can only succeed in Ethiopia when at least one of three things occurs.

First, the country’s economy needs to grow for a substantial amount of time. Second, its diverse ethnic and religious identities must be integrated through policies that encourage the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. Third, society and, more specifically, the political elite need to commit to tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic principles.

All that will take a long time to achieve. Meanwhile, the country has two unfavourable choices: support a non-democratic government to consolidate political order and then gradually help it achieve democratic goals. Or attempt another transition, which may lead to anarchy and widespread inter-community violence. An untimely democratic transition would destroy political order.

With this in mind, Ethiopia’s political elites need to embrace discussion, debate and compromise. External forces can be a support by getting the political elite to move in this direction.

Terefe Gebreyesus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ethiopia’s two bids at democracy have failed: what it will take to succeed – https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-two-bids-at-democracy-have-failed-what-it-will-take-to-succeed-263817

September 18, 2025

Uganda has signed a deal with the US to take asylum seekers – what’s behind it and what’s at stake

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Franzisca Zanker, Senior researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute

A new deal to deport asylum seekers from the US to Uganda was announced in August 2025. The full agreement, already signed by the ambassadors of the two countries at the end of July, set out the terms of the arrangements. Franzisca Zanker and Ronald Kalyango Sebba, who have studied refugee and migration policy in Uganda, unpack its significance.

What deal has Uganda signed with Washington on taking refugees?

Uganda has agreed to take on an unspecified number of third-country nationals who have a pending asylum claim in the US but cannot return home due to safety concerns. In other words, these are people who should likely be protected as refugees, but are no longer wanted in Donald Trump’s America.

Uganda is set to receive development funds in return. It also retains discretion on a case-by-case basis.

According to the official Ugandan statement, the deal, which entered into force with its signing on 29 July 2025, does not include people with a criminal background or unaccompanied minors. The written agreement, however, only mentions minors.

Once in Uganda, each person will go through individual refugee status determination processes.

How does this deal compare with others the US has reached on the continent?

It follows similar bilateral agreements with other African countries from recent weeks. For instance, eight people with a criminal background were deported in July to South Sudan. Five similar cases were deported to Eswatini. In mid-September, Ghana became the latest African country to crumble, taking in 14 deported migrants from the US.

A final example, Rwanda, has a long history of similar agreements. These agreements have usually been accompanied by much fanfare and followed by little in the way of receiving of actual refugees. Most recently Rwanda agreed to take in 250 people from the US. The first seven arrived in late August.

What are the issues with these arrangements?

The US is not alone in its attempts to send asylum seekers to countries in Africa.

Plans – with varying levels of concreteness – have been thrown around by politicians from the UK, Denmark and Germany.

Migration is being demonised by politicians all over the world. So externalising, which basically means moving the location of the problem, may seem like a solution.

But African countries have not always received such offers with open arms. While global asymmetries and aid dependencies mean that African officials may not overtly reject such deal attempts, countries are not keen to take on any deportees, let alone from third countries.

In fact, there is no international convention that provides a legal instrument for deporting people from another nationality to a different country. International agreements, most recently the Samoa Agreement between the European Union and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states, have removed the potential to deport third nationals.

Deporting nationals from other countries to African countries is, therefore, legally questionable – and diplomatically unpopular. The African Union has condemned such arrangements as “xenophobic and completely unacceptable”.

What’s in it for Uganda?

The deal provides the groundwork for much-needed improvements in bilateral US-Ugandan relationship.

In response to the globally condemned 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act, the Joe Biden administration terminated Uganda’s eligibility for US trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. This policy gave Uganda duty-free access to the American market for a variety of goods.

More recently under the Trump administration, Uganda has suffered the effect of US funding cuts. This includes the loss of an estimated 66% of funding following cuts to the USAID development assistance programme. Uganda also faces a higher tariff of 15%, up from the previously announced 10% that will affect the cost of its agricultural products in the US market. This could potentially lower its sales in a key export market.

While the details of the US-Uganda asylum deal are shrouded in secrecy, as is common with such agreements it could provide Uganda with much needed development funds and lead to better tariff conditions.

Domestically, opposition politicians have criticised the new bilateral deal. However, Museveni has not shown much concern for these misgivings. Uganda is one of the few countries where refugees have not become a major political issue.

However, this may change. Attitudes towards migrants are slowly changing at a societal and political level.

As refugee numbers rise, conflicts between them and host communities over land and environmental damage are increasing. There is growing public apprehension about the government’s open-door policy.

What is Uganda’s history when it comes to refugees?

Uganda has a long history of refugee protection. It currently hosts 1.8 million refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The country has a reputation as one of the most generous places towards refugees. Most people entering Uganda are given automatic refugee status. This was set up in the 1969 refugee convention from the then Organisation of African Unity.

The government provides refugees with a plot of land to farm. They have free access to schools and healthcare, and can work. As refugee numbers grow, however, the plots of land are getting smaller.

In practice, refugees are confined to dusty so-called refugee settlements, with few working and educational possibilities. Many refugees – just like the Ugandan host community – live under very high levels of poverty.

Some refugees have to go through individual refugee status determination processes where they face huge backlogs and access to justice issues.

Will the refugees from Washington get the same treatment?

We do not know at this stage. However, in August 2021, Uganda agreed to take on up to 2,000 refugees from Afghanistan on behalf of the US. While this was deemed only a temporary move before they were resettled elsewhere, many remain in Uganda to this day.

At the time, the Ugandan foreign minister wrote in an op-ed

our friend, partner and longstanding ally – the US – asked for our support …. when the US asks for our help and we are able to give it, we do.

In the same piece he also noted

Ugandans say refugees are our brothers and sisters. That is why our door will always be open to them.

What this means for the US deportees is unknown.

The agreement reveals no details about their temporary housing or refugee status determination process. Whether they will be sent to the remote settlements where most refugees in Uganda access free housing and humanitarian assistance, or stay in urban Kampala, remains to be determined.

With elections in Uganda scheduled for January 2026, such a deal certainly helps President Yoweri Museveni preempt any US criticism regarding electoral freedom. But it also raises deeper questions about the long-term effects of open-door policies.

Franzisca Zanker receives funding from the European Research Council for the project “The Political Lives of Migrants: Perspectives from Africa” (Grant no: 101161856).

Ronald Kalyango Sebba is affiliated with Kyambogo University, Kampala Uganda.

– ref. Uganda has signed a deal with the US to take asylum seekers – what’s behind it and what’s at stake – https://theconversation.com/uganda-has-signed-a-deal-with-the-us-to-take-asylum-seekers-whats-behind-it-and-whats-at-stake-265545

September 18, 2025

Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera turns her prayers into paintings

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Assistant Professor, Harvard University

At the Boston waterfront sits the Institute of Contemporary Art, an architectural marvel that gleams against the harbour in a wealthy neighbourhood. My Uber driver, an African immigrant, remarks as I get out: “Be careful, this is an expensive area.” His comment hints at the subtle tensions of race and class in such affluent spaces, where one’s presence as an outsider is immediately registered. I assure him I’ve just come to see the art.

I’d come to see Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera’s first solo museum show in the US, Hidden Battles/Hondo Dzakavanzika. This exhibition is a landmark moment of recognition for one of southern Africa’s leading contemporary artists.

When most artists are grappling with history and archives, Zvavahera is focused on the dreams she has in her sleep, not as a retreat from the past or the urgency of the now, but as a parallel form of knowledge.

As a scholar of African literary histories and archives and how they intersect with visual culture, I find Zvavahera’s work particularly powerful. It uncovers layers of meaning that operate at the subconscious, where personal memory, cultural narratives, and the imagination intersect.

From an archival perspective, the exhibition is compelling because it frames these dreamscapes with materiality – paint, paper, canvas, brushstrokes – making each a document of emotional and cultural knowledge.

Zvavahera engages deeply with the traditional spirituality and African Pentecostal beliefs in which she was raised. She illuminates spirits and revelations. But she alters these dreams with emancipatory gestures: drawing in bodily features, concealing them as they morph into animal-like figures or plants. When looking closely, it’s as if the canvas was cut then sutured back with careful stitches, with each move a restoration of dignity. This is the delicacy of her brushstrokes.

The Boston gallery positions itself as a site for amplifying singular global voices in art, like Zvavahera’s. Her refusal to translate dreams into rational explanation is central to her practice. Boston audiences encounter Zimbabwean perspectives not as illustrative or ethnographic, but as intellectually and aesthetically complex. Zvavahera is placed within transnational conversations while her particular lived experiences are preserved.

The work on the show was made between 2021 and 2025, a time filled with mourning and melancholy, during and after the COVID pandemic. Zvavahera is a prophet who uses the canvas to transform dark dreams into vivid, colourful prayers. She says:

People say their prayers with words, and I’m saying my prayers with a painting.

Who is Portia Zvavahera?

Born in Harare in 1985, Zvavahera channels childhood experiences, ancestral presence, and mystical narratives into her paintings. The work blurs the line between the figurative and the abstract.

Growing up in Harare’s art scene, both modernist and indigenous art inspired her practice. She found mentorship and support from Gallery Delta and formal training from the National Gallery of Zimbabwe.

Her work has earned awards and international acclaim for its emotive force and poetic intensity.

The exhibition

Zvavahera’s canvases are layered with pigment and texture, incorporating printmaking techniques alongside stencilling, delicate lace, batik wax, and even palm fronds from her garden.

The dream paintings on show are all vast in scale, almost overwhelming in their presence. They appear as recurring visions, or fragments from a psyche as troubled as it is fertile.

The imagery conjures a world of vulnerability. Spectres in her dreams besiege her and try to snatch her children, harm her body, make her grandmother sick, unsettle her spirit. But she does not succumb. Instead, she renders them into haunting paintings and drawings, binding them into linen, oil and ink.

Their titles draw from Shona proverbs and folktales. Kurwira vana (fighting for the children). Tinosvetuka rusvingo (jumping over the wall). Hondo yakatarisana naambuya (the battle that grandmother is facing). They aren’t simply explanatory notes but portals, resisting simplification, pulling the viewer into the language of a cosmology not easily domesticated by English.

Zvavahera is an artist of scale, but also of duration. The canvases demand that viewers linger. To stand before the work is to enter a meditative space, one where line and colour pulse with life. In one caption she writes:

I know there’s going to be a battle in the future when I see a bull in my dreams.

The bull, like the angelic and demonic figures in her work, are not allegory but omen, a herald of struggle. This is the artist’s autobiography in colour.

What haunts is not only the possibility of harm, but also the persistence of love. Viewers witness the artist’s insistent refusal to let her children, her spirit, her imagination, be taken over. To dream is to fight; to paint is to protect. Her canvases stage encounters between the forces of good and evil, and transform them into visions of resilience.

Running through this series is a mystical or magical impulse that is especially vivid in her characters. Her paintings and drawings develop a kind of surrealist mystic experience.

Zvavahera’s work matters because it demonstrates how art can navigate the intimate and the ancestral, the personal and the collective. It offers a worldview that’s too often marginalised in art world conversations. She brings to the fore the depth of the African imagination.

Her show is testament to the fact that African artists are not only present on the global art stage, they’re also helping shape the questions, forms and languages of art itself.

Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera turns her prayers into paintings – https://theconversation.com/zimbabwean-artist-portia-zvavahera-turns-her-prayers-into-paintings-265213

September 18, 2025

Travel as activism: 6 stories of Black women who refused to ‘stay put’ in apartheid South Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Janet Remmington, Research Associate, Humanities Research Centre (and African Literature Department, University of the Witwatersrand), University of York

For black people living in South Africa during apartheid, simply moving around the country was a fraught activity, let alone crossing its borders. This was especially the case for black women, who were “rock bottom of the racial pile”, as South African writer Lauretta Ngcobo expressed it.

Coming to power in 1948 and ruling for over 40 years before democracy in 1994, the white-minority apartheid government took various race-based policies to extremes. An emphasis was on trying to control movement, keeping the black majority “in their place”.

From the 1950s, the state extended pass laws, targeting black women. It also complicated overseas travel with extra bureaucratic and financial burdens.

Mobility restrictions caused an outcry, especially among the growing body of black working women in industrialising cities and towns. These women connected their everyday challenges with broader sociopolitical issues. They injected new energy and forms of activism into organisations involved in the liberation struggle, including the African National Congress (ANC).

In a recent study, I explore the stories of black women who refused to stay put in the face of apartheid’s controls. For these women, mobility was a powerful form of anti-apartheid resistance – and of self-assertion.

I highlight how in 1954, a number of these women, working across race lines, founded the Federation of South African Women (Fedsaw) and drafted the Women’s Charter. The pioneering document laid groundwork for the broader Freedom Charter, which enshrined ideas on freedoms of movement and thought:

All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to province, and from South Africa abroad.

Even though these ideals would only be realised much later, these activist women broke apartheid’s rules by travelling, exchanging ideas and making connections across borders.

The activist-traveller

These women’s high-risk journeys struck me as being characteristic of what journalist and scholar Mahvish Ahmad describes as a musāfir: an activist-traveller in a politically hostile environment who breaks new ground for others so they may be free.

The mobile black women workers I have been researching have not previously been brought into view as travellers with things to say about their journeys and movements. Their travel texts are diverse, many available only in archives. They include speeches, commentaries, handwritten accounts, interviews, letters and memoirs. Some memoirs were officially published, but outside the country.

Their outputs were not the products of high education or stylised writing, but produced in the intensity of the times by working women.

Elizabeth Mafekeng

When Elizabeth Mafekeng, president of the Food and Canning Workers’ Association, was denied a passport in 1955, she boarded a plane in disguise as a domestic helper. That’s how determined she was to get to the World Conference of Workers in Bulgaria. She also took in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and China, commenting in the press that she “saw the way people should live in the world” where race was not pronounced.

Returning to South Africa, she was punished for her transgressive travel. She became the first woman sentenced to political banishment by the apartheid state. Again she took mobility into her own hands, fleeing with her two-month-old baby to then Basotholand (today’s Lesotho).

Lilian Ngoyi and Dora Tamana

Lilian Ngoyi, leader of the Garment Workers Union and president of the ANC’s Women’s League, travelled to Switzerland, London, Berlin, the Soviet Union, China and Mongolia in 1955.

Ngoyi and Dora Tamana first tried to board a ship under “European names”, only to be arrested. On a second attempt, they succeeded by air using affidavits and a raft of explanations, eventually arriving in London after stopovers in Uganda, Italy and the Netherlands. Their destination was the World Congress of Mothers in Switzerland on behalf of Fedsaw. There they forged powerful solidarity networks.

Tamana reflected in a letter:

When I saw all these things, different nations together, my eyes were opened and I said, I have tasted the new world and won the confidence of our future.

On return, Ngoyi and Tamana played leading roles in the 20,000-strong 1956 women’s anti-pass march to parliament.

Frances Baard

Frances Baard was a domestic worker turned union organiser who presented the Women’s March petition to the apartheid state.

She travelled around South Africa extensively despite police harassment. Her organising work connected domestic workers, factory workers and other exploited labourers, for which she was imprisoned and banished. In her memoir, she spoke of the mind’s ability to travel:

Even though they ban me … my spirit is still there … free.

Florence Mophosho

My research includes those who travelled into exile like Florence Mophosho.

She was one of the few exiled women leaders of the ANC in the 1960s, based for years in Tanzania and travelling far and wide for the Women’s Secretariat. She stressed that travel was vital to advance the work of political freedom as well as global women’s emancipation. This wasn’t always appreciated by male colleagues.

Emma Mashinini

The apartheid government loosened some mobility restrictions in the 1980s. But this didn’t mean moving around was free or unencumbered. Emma Mashinini, who led the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union, undertook “a hundred and one travels” within and beyond South Africa to progress freedom for her people.

In 1981, Mashinini was thrown into solitary confinement for six months. In the eyes of the state, she had “overreached” as a black woman traveller-organiser. She insisted in her memoir that it was her country and she intended to come and go.

Moving to be free

Understanding this travel and writing history helps shine new light on (often unsung) black women trade unionists and organisational leaders as anti-apartheid movers and shakers.

Insisting on mobility came at great personal cost, but in a sense these women never went alone. They travelled to gain ground for the greater cause of freedom, while discovering new versions of themselves along the way.

Janet Remmington does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Travel as activism: 6 stories of Black women who refused to ‘stay put’ in apartheid South Africa – https://theconversation.com/travel-as-activism-6-stories-of-black-women-who-refused-to-stay-put-in-apartheid-south-africa-263854

September 18, 2025

Nigeria’s plastic waste could enrich the fashion industry: here’s how

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Solaja Mayowa Oludele, Lecturing, Olabisi Onabanjo University

On any street in Lagos, Abuja or Port Harcourt, you’ll find abandoned plastic bottles lying around. Each year, about 2.5 million tonnes of plastic waste are produced in Nigeria and much of it winds up in landfills or in the environment.

But plastic waste can be useful. In some places it’s converted to textiles and clothing. Adidas, a global shoe and apparel maker, uses ocean plastics to produce sneakers, and the clothing brands H&M and Patagonia have put their money into recycled polyester collection. They collect post-consumer plastic waste (like used plastic bottles), clean it, shred it into flakes, melt it down into pellets, and then spin these pellets into polyester yarn, which is used to make new sportswear and footwear.

We’re a team of sustainability researchers and social scientists with expertise in circular economy, ethics and plastic waste management. In a recent study, we reviewed the opportunities and challenges of using recycled polyethylene terephthalate (PET) plastics (the type of plastic used in beverage bottles) in Nigeria’s fashion industry.

Evidence from other regions, such as Europe and North America, shows that producing polyester fibres from recycled PET rather than unused materials can cut carbon emissions by over 45%. But little is known about its potential in Nigeria.

Our review mapped and analysed academic studies, industry reports and policy documents to identify technical, economic, environmental, social and regulatory factors shaping the adoption of recycled PET in Nigerian fashion.

We developed a theoretical model showing how knowledge from local crafts, industrial design, environmental science and policy frameworks interact to influence this emerging practice. And we made some proposals about how to foster a socially inclusive, ethically responsible and environmentally sustainable textile industry in Nigeria.

We believe that incorporating plastic waste into the Nigerian textile industry could reduce pollution, generate employment and cut a niche in the world of sustainable fashion.

Barriers beyond technology

Plastic bottles don’t have to be a social or environmental hassle. They can be a source of economic power. The concept of “waste to wealth” is more than a catchphrase – it has the potential to revive the textile industry.

But there are a number of obstacles.

Poor infrastructure: Nigerians do not have large recycling plants. Recycling tends to be small scale or informal. Recovered PET bottles are typically exported or down-cycled into low-grade products like mats or stuffing.

Consumer perceptions: In a recent survey conducted in Lagos only 18% of consumers had heard about recycled textiles. Nigerians think of recycled clothes as a sign of poverty or as second-hand goods, not as quality clothing.

Comfort: Recycled polyester is often uncomfortable to wear in hot, damp climates, as the fabric tends to retain moisture and heat. Nigeria’s average daily temperatures range from 25°C to 35°C with high humidity. The uptake among consumers will not improve until these technical problems are addressed.

Policy gaps: In Europe, companies must assume responsibility for the end of their products’ lives. In Nigeria there are no comparable regulations, incentives or infrastructure supporting sustainable textiles. This leaves local brands with little motivation to innovate.

Lessons from global and local experiments

Other countries and brands have shown what’s possible. Adidas has transformed thousands of tonnes of plastic taken from the oceans into sneakers and sportswear. H&M operates a take-back programme worldwide which gathered over 14,768 tonnes of worn garments in 2022. Patagonia has a programme called Worn Wear which invites customers to repair and reuse their clothes.

Nigeria can learn from these examples, but also has its own sources of innovation. Startup enterprises such as Chanja Datti in Abuja are testing community-based recycling and recovery. Circular fashion – where clothing is designed to be reused, repaired and recycled instead of discarded – can also be cultural fashion, as designers in Nigeria like Maki Oh are incorporating traditional textures and sustainable practices.

The way forward

At least four changes are essential to transform plastic waste into fashion in Nigeria:

1.) Take a stake in decentralised recycling centres

Regional centres with small but technologically prepared centres could generate, process and upcycle the PET waste into fibres. This would lower transport expenses, provide employment and feed directly into textile manufacturers.

2.) Assist small and medium textile enterprises

Nigeria has a fashion industry dominated by small businesses. They can be given access to finance, sustainable practice training and affordable technology to scale the use of recycled fabrics.

3.) Educate consumers

Recycled fashion needs to be perceived by Nigerians as stylish and of good quality rather than second-hand. Perceptions can be shifted through public education, collaboration with popular designers and influencers.

4.) Create enabling policies

Tax incentives to sustainable producers, recycling start-up grants and procurement policies that focus on recycled textiles would encourage industry players. Laws must not promote waste and excessive dependence on imports.

Why this matters globally

Sustainable fashion is not only a western issue. Nigeria boasts one of the largest young populations in the world, a dynamic fashion industry and a huge plastic waste crisis. Should Nigeria be able to incorporate the use of recycled plastics in its textile industry, it may serve as an example to other poor economies facing similar circumstances.

Solaja Mayowa Oludele does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s plastic waste could enrich the fashion industry: here’s how – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-plastic-waste-could-enrich-the-fashion-industry-heres-how-264919

September 18, 2025

Soil erosion is tearing DRC cities apart: what’s causing urban gullies, and how to prevent them

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Matthias Vanmaercke, Associate professor BOF Faculty of Science, KU Leuven

In fast-growing cities like some in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), heavy rains are carving huge scars into the land. Known as urban gullies, these deep erosion channels can swallow homes, destroy roads and displace entire communities.

They can grow to hundreds of metres long and dozens of metres wide, splitting neighbourhoods in two. Once established, they keep expanding with each major downpour.

The consequences are devastating. In Kinshasa, the DRC’s capital, heavy rainfall in December 2022 triggered rapid gully expansion, destroying homes and claiming dozens of lives.

Urban gullies form when rainwater runoff cuts deep channels into fragile soils. The erosive force of concentrated water exceeds the strength of these soils. The gullies usually form after intense rain on steep slopes. Urbanisation makes the situation worse as vegetation is removed to build houses, greatly increasing the likelihood that heavy rainfalls will simply run off the top soil. Roads also play a critical part as they can change how water flows across the landscape, forming direct pathways along which runoff can accumulate.

Our new study reveals the staggering scale of the problem in the DRC. Our research team of Congolese and Belgian earth scientists and geographers identified 2,922 urban gullies in 26 DRC cities.

We used satellite imagery and population data to identify the gullies. Our detailed, nationwide mapping effort – the first to map gully erosion across an entire country – shows that this is not a series of isolated incidents but a widespread and fast-growing hazard.

But urban gullies can be avoided by adequate urban planning and infrastructure. This includes adapted zoning plans and measures such as better road drainage, rainwater retention and infiltration systems, increased vegetation cover and targeted engineering works to divert runoff safely.

The crisis in numbers

Many of the urban gullies in the DRC are huge. A typical example is easily 250 metres long and 30 metres wide. Together, they stretch nearly 740 kilometres.

Kinshasa alone has 868 mapped gullies (221km in total). With about 17 million inhabitants, it is the DRC’s largest city and one of Africa’s megacities, where rapid, unplanned growth (around 6.6% per year) makes gully erosion a major urban hazard. Kinshasa is also tropical with annual rainfall typically above 1,000 millimetres.

By reconstructing how these features expanded between 2004 and 2023, we calculated that 118,600 people in the DRC were forced from their homes. Displacement has accelerated sharply: before 2020, about 4,600 people were displaced annually; today, the figure is more than 12,000.

The study also looked ahead. In 2023, some 3.2 million Congolese lived in areas considered at risk of future gully expansion. Of these, more than half a million are in zones where the chance of losing their homes within a decade is very high.

Several factors make Congo’s cities especially prone to gully erosion. Many are built on steep slopes with sandy soils that are highly erodible. Rapid, unplanned urban growth strips vegetation and increases impermeable surfaces such as rooftops and roads, which funnel runoff into concentrated flows.

The link with roads is particularly striking: 98% of all mapped gullies were connected to the road network, either forming along unpaved streets or fed by runoff from poorly drained roads.

The problem is set to worsen. Congo’s urban population is booming, driven by both natural growth and migration. Informal neighbourhoods often lack basic infrastructure, leaving rainfall to carve its own destructive paths.

Climate change adds another layer of risk. Rainfall intensity in tropical Africa is projected to rise by 10%-15% in the coming decades. Since heavy downpours are a trigger for gully formation, expansion rates could double if no action is taken.

Prevention over cure

Once formed, gullies are extremely hard and costly to stabilise. Local communities often try to slow their advance, but without proper engineering solutions, most efforts fail. Stabilising a single large gully can cost the DRC more than US$1 million, an impossible burden for most municipalities.

The study shows that prevention is the only viable long-term strategy. That means paying careful attention to how cities are planned and built. Measures such as better road drainage, rainwater retention systems and strategic vegetation cover can reduce the risks.

Above all, improved spatial planning is crucial to stop new neighbourhoods from being built in vulnerable areas. The effectiveness of specific urban gully control measures remains largely unknown and poorly documented, apart from an earlier case study in the DRC that showed that many measures fail. But such measures should not be confused with better spatial planning. This means avoid constructing houses and roads in areas that are sensitive to urban gully formation, or at least making sure that rainwater is safely stored or evacuated.

We argue that the best strategy for limiting the impacts of urban gullies is preventing them.

Above all, urban gullies must be recognised as a disaster risk on par with floods and landslides. Only then can policies and investments be developed that are needed to protect vulnerable populations.

A problem in the rest of Africa too

Although the DRC is at the epicentre of the crisis, similar problems are emerging elsewhere in Africa, including Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi and Madagascar.

With urban populations across the global south expected to nearly triple by 2050, gully erosion could become one of the defining urban hazards of the century.

The deep scars running through Congo’s cities are not just features of the landscape, they are reminders of the urgent need to rethink how urban growth is managed in vulnerable regions.

Matthias Vanmaercke receives funding from the University of Leuven. The research behind this article was funded through the Belgian ARES research collaboration project PREMITURG (Prevention and Mitigation of Urban Gullies: lessons learned from failures and successes, D.R. Congo)

– ref. Soil erosion is tearing DRC cities apart: what’s causing urban gullies, and how to prevent them – https://theconversation.com/soil-erosion-is-tearing-drc-cities-apart-whats-causing-urban-gullies-and-how-to-prevent-them-264497

September 17, 2025

Paul Biya at 92: will defections weaken his grip on absolute power in Cameroon?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of Nottingham

Cameroonians go to the polls in October 2025 in what some people hoped might be a break from the country’s troubled recent past. They thought that President Paul Biya (92) might stand aside to allow a transition.

Three years ago I was one of those who expressed optimism about the 2025 poll. But I was wrong.

Biya is set to run yet again for an 8th term. He is already one of Africa’s longest ruling presidents, behind only Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Nguema.

Biya is on the cusp of achieving lifetime presidency since taking office in 1982.

In July 2025, after months of speculation, he confirmed in a tweet that he would run again.

Having weathered coups, silenced dissent, defied death rumours, and outlasted generations of challengers, he reminded friend and foe alike that he remains at the centre of Cameroon’s political ecosystem.

I am a long time scholar of and commentator on African politics, regime transformation, democratic transition and broader governance. Given regional developments that have seen the military deposing long term leaders, one might expect Biya to superintend a managed transition. The intriguing question is: what is it about the situation in Cameroon that continues to defy logic?

There is evident restlessness and frustration among young Cameroonians as well as clear clamour for change. Yet, the incumbent remains the front-runner, supported by the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, and his near-total command of the state’s political machinery.

Simply, the system has been designed to serve Biya’s interests. With government control of the media, resources, and judicial and electoral institutions, it is unlikely that the opposition can bring about systemic change.

Some things have changed, however. Biya’s previous wins were landslides that left no room for debate. This time things could potentially be different on account of high-profile defections from his party. These men will be challenging him at the polls.

The field

The last electoral cycle, leading up to the 2018 poll, was characterised by subdued challenges and a co-opted or deeply divided opposition. This time Biya appears to face a relatively organised opposition.

Initially, 83 candidates signalled their interest. In July the electoral commission cleared 13 to run. The commission controversially disqualified Maurice Kamto, a renowned legal scholar who performed respectably in the 2018 electoral cycle with 14% of the vote.

Human Rights Watch warned that this would cast a shadow over the credibility of the electoral process.

Nevertheless, several credible figures across the political spectrum remain in the race and present alternatives.

Biya faces two other former allies turned political adversaries.

One is Issa Tchiroma Bakary, his minister of employment and vocational training. A longtime insider of the regime, he served in various ministerial roles and was long considered a loyalist. Yet in June 2025, he resigned from the government, delivering a searing critique of the system he once represented.

He then launched his campaign, running on the ticket of the Front for the National Salvation of Cameroon.

The minister of tourism and leisure, Bello Bouba Maigari, still formally holding office, declared his intention in July 2025 to run against his boss in the October elections.

This announcement was especially striking given the deep political history between the two men. Maigari is not just any cabinet member. He is a long-standing confidant of the president, having been appointed Biya’s prime minister in 1982 and hailing from the vote-rich northern region. The decision to enter the race marks a shift from loyal lieutenant to presidential challenger, revealing the growing fissures within the ruling elite.

Others in the race worth noting are:

Akere Muna, a former speaker who swore in Biya in 1982 and a tireless advocate for transparency and accountability. He ran for the top job in 2018 (but withdrew at the last minute).
Cabral Libii, from the Cameroon Party for National Reconciliation, a young and dynamic leader who also ran for president in 2018 and garnered 6% of the total vote.
Joshua Osih, a seasoned politician with a strong track record.

The issues

The nation’s pressing issues remain the same as they have been for a long while.

These include:

Endemic corruption. Cameroon is ranked 140 out of 180 countries by Transparency International. The reasons are systemic decay of state institutions and maladministration.
Economic stasis, including stubborn unemployment forecast at 7.34% by Statista; 23% live below the international poverty line and 3.3 million are food insecure.
The ongoing anglophone regional crisis pitting the English speaking regions against the dominant francophone centre.
Biya’s ability to govern and the succession question, given his very advanced age and the potential vacuum or infighting if he couldn’t complete his term.

The external dimension

Western actors have been consistent critics of Biya’s regime in the recent past. However, some have adopted a more cautious tone, balancing criticism with strategic interests.

The US, for instance, suspended some military assistance to Cameroon in 2019 over human rights abuses. But it continues counter-terrorism cooperation against Boko Haram.

The European Union, while pressing for peaceful resolution of the anglophone conflict, remains an important trade and aid partner.

China has become Cameroon’s largest bilateral creditor and a top trading partner. According to a report by Business in Cameroon, in 2024 Cameroon owed about 64.8% of its external bilateral debt to China. This is primarily for infrastructure loans that have funded projects like the Kribi Deep Sea Port, the Yaoundé-Douala highway, and hydropower stations.

For regime survival, Biya has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy. Beijing’s diplomatic stance of non-interference and respect for sovereignty resonates with Cameroonian political elites wary of western scrutiny and criticism over democratic backsliding and the anglophone conflict.

But Biya has not severed ties with the west. For example, the government maintains partnerships with France for security training, with Germany for decentralisation support, and with the US for counterinsurgency.

This balancing is not simply geopolitical. It is also deeply embedded in domestic patronage networks. Foreign aid, loans and investments serve as resources to consolidate elite power, strengthen the patronage system and suppress dissent.

The October polls are sure to reaffirm the status quo.

David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Paul Biya at 92: will defections weaken his grip on absolute power in Cameroon? – https://theconversation.com/paul-biya-at-92-will-defections-weaken-his-grip-on-absolute-power-in-cameroon-264915

September 16, 2025

Who’s got the power? Studies of male and female primates show it’s not simple

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Nikos Smit, Postdoc in evolutionary/behavioural ecology, University of Turku

Our understanding of female-male power relationships in animals has changed over time. Evolutionary biologists once thought that male mammals held clear-cut power over females. Later, species with pronounced female power over males were presented as exceptions in a landscape of strict male power. Spotted hyenas and certain primates, including bonobos and most lemurs, were examples of female dominance.

These views were reinforced by the assumption that males and females competed over different resources: males over females, and females over food.

But it’s not that simple, as the research of our colleagues and our own work on various primates has shown.

We reviewed studies of primate species and found that power relationships between the sexes varied significantly. In our sample, only 25 species exhibited clear male power, 16 exhibited clear female power, and the remaining species (about 70%) exhibited moderate or no sex biases in power. Most primate females can compete directly with males and often overpower them.

Size and strength differences between males and females

Males don’t always have all the power even when they are much larger and stronger than females.

In an earlier study, we showed that female mandrills in Gabon sometimes outrank males that are more than three times heavier than them.

Gorillas are an interesting case too. Apart from the big difference between males and females in body and canine tooth size, they are also typically presented (by scientists and non-scientists) as the species with the strictest male-biased power over females among great apes. They’ve become the “male power archetype” among animals.

We drew on 25 years of data about mountain gorillas in Uganda, to test if males strictly overpower females. Our findings suggest that females may leverage support from the most powerful males to gain power over other males. Or they may leverage access to themselves, and some males yield to females to acquire such access.

Our findings in mandrills and gorillas contribute a new perspective on the ecology and evolution of female-male power relationships in great apes and other primates that is not solely based on size and strength. They call for future work to investigate similar long-standing assumptions regarding the evolutionary origins of intersexual relationships across species.

Factors influencing power across primates

Our comparative analysis showed that intersexual power is influenced by different factors. Generally, females rely less than males on physical force and coercion in order to gain power. Female power is more likely to prevail in species that are monogamous, have little or no body size difference between adult females and males, and/or forage primarily in trees. These are conditions that give females greater control over reproduction.

By contrast, male power is more likely to prevail in species where males mate with multiple females, are primarily terrestrial, and have larger bodies or greater weapons than females.

Even when these conditions are met, however, there isn’t always a clear-cut bias in intersexual power of a social group or species.

Male mandrills and gorillas mate with multiple females and are terrestrial. In these species males generally have more power than females, and the highest ranking individual in a group’s social hierarchy is always a male. Yet power is not clear-cut and females can overpower other males.

What males and females compete for

Finally, our studies suggest that females and males often compete directly over access to resources.

In the comparative study across primates, we found that contests between females and males represented on average almost half of all contests in a social primate group.

In the study on mountain gorillas, we found that power relationships between females and males determined priority of access to a precious food resource, and when a female overpowered a male, she always had priority over him.

Altogether, these new findings suggest that:

most primate societies do not have clear-cut sex-biases in power
even in species with extreme male-biases in size and strength, females can overpower males
females and males compete directly over similar resources.

These findings refine our interpretation of intersexual relationships across animals. They caution against oversimplified views based solely on physical strength while neglecting the complexity of their social landscape.

Finally, this work shows that the human profile does not really resemble other primates where there is clear male dominance or clear female dominance. Instead, humans are closer to those “intermediate” species with moderate and flexible dominance relationships. This can inform attempts to reconstruct power relationships between men and women in early humans.

Elise Huchard receives funding from CNRS and the French Agence Nationale pour la Recherche (ANR).

Nikos Smit does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who’s got the power? Studies of male and female primates show it’s not simple – https://theconversation.com/whos-got-the-power-studies-of-male-and-female-primates-show-its-not-simple-263292

September 16, 2025

Refugee protection in Egypt: what’s behind the return train to Sudan

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Dina Wahba, Senior Researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, University of Freiburg

A special train left the Egyptian capital of Cairo for Aswan, a town close to the border with southern neighbour Sudan, in July 2025. The train, publicised by the Egyptian government as shiny, air-conditioned and free of charge, runs a weekly service. It is transporting Sudanese refugees who are willing to go back home. Sudan, however, has been in the midst of civil war since April 2023.

The train arrives in Aswan after around 12 hours. Travellers then continue via bus or ferry into Sudan. Little is known about what happens when travellers arrive in the country.

As at mid-2025, more than 190,000 Sudanese refugees had gone back home from Egypt. This is a five-fold increase in returns from 2024. Egypt hosts the largest number of Sudanese who have fled the war. More than 1.2 million Sudanese have crossed into Egypt since April 2023, making them the largest refugee community there.

The army-led Sudanese government – which regained control of Khartoum in March 2025 after losing the capital two years earlier – promotes return as part of its alleged efforts for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.

However, camouflaged behind Egypt’s voluntary return programme is a far more complex political reality, with refugees in the centre.

Initially, Egypt kept its borders relatively open, allowing women, children and older men to enter visa-free under a long-standing deal with Sudan.

As refugee numbers rose, however, new restrictions were imposed and brutally enforced from June 2023. These restrictions were codified in a new law adopted in 2024.

We have studied socio-political dynamics in Egypt and African refugee politics. In our view, while the voluntary return initiative is widely promoted by Egyptian and Sudanese authorities as a sign of solidarity and reconstruction, it masks a policy environment aimed at reducing the Sudanese population in Egypt.

Egypt has a contentious history of refugee protection. In recent years, refugees have faced hostile sentiments from host communities and rising xenophobia. Sudanese refugees in particular have been denied access to public spaces or rental property, and have faced physical violence.

The government’s response has focused on appeasing domestic audiences in the face of economic decline by providing external scapegoats. This does not bode well for the future of refugee protection in Egypt.

Countries often scapegoat refugees and other migrants to retain legitimacy with their own citizens, especially when there are pervasive inequalities that states cannot or will not bridge. This is the case in Egypt.

Egypt and Sudan’s shifting relations

Refugee hosting is never just a question of humanitarian or ethical protection measures. It is deeply embedded in domestic and external policy interests, as well as the global geopolitical context.

Egypt changed its open-border agreement with Sudan on 10 June 2023. It required all Sudanese to obtain visas before entry. Wait times stretched to two to three months, and an illicit market of visa “facilitators” sprang up, charging between US$1,500 and US$2,500 per person.

Egypt’s reception of displaced Sudanese took a more restrictive and controlling approach, including deportations. Its asylum law, passed in December 2024, formalises these harsh measures. Vague national security clauses enable status revocations and penalise the “illegal” entry of refugees.

Politically, Egypt has backed the Sudanese army as the cornerstone of stability. It backed Sudan’s October 2021 military coup and has aligned with the army in the ongoing civil war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

While the civil war continues to rage in many regions of Sudan, army-led forces have control of the centre and east of Sudan, supporting the push for the special train programme.

Additionally, Egypt has been a core beneficiary of European Union (EU) efforts to stop onward migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe. Though Egypt is no longer one of the most significant routes to Europe – this has shifted to Libya – Egyptians make up one of the largest national groups of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. With rising numbers of refugees in Egypt, the EU fears the situation could spiral.

To address this, Egypt signed a 7.4 billion euro (US$8.7 billion) deal with the EU in March 2024 to increase control of its (sea) borders and cooperate on returns from Europe. Thus, Egypt’s return of refugees to Sudan is in the EU’s interests.

Under such complicated settings, refugees become pawns. Egypt’s train, therefore, serves domestic policy interests of reducing Sudanese refugees, addresses the general hostile environment these refugees face and supports Cairo’s external policy interests.

What about the refugees?

When it comes to Sudan, the big question is whether states are violating a core tenet of refugee protection: the principle of non-refoulement. This states that countries cannot return refugees to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

Many Sudanese may choose to return not because they’re hopeful but as a result of economic hardship in Egypt, uncertainty with regard to their legal status, and fear.

The UN Refugee Agency advances three “durable solutions” for the return of refugees:

local integration, which is difficult in Egypt
resettlement to a third country, which has become increasingly difficult in the current global environment. The US, for instance, suspended all its resettlement programmes in January 2025.
returning voluntarily to the country of origin.

Where possible, states aim to return people – both refugees and other migrants – voluntarily. This is often done with the assistance of the International Organisation for Migration. However noble this process may be, migrants may still feel coerced.

Though army-controlled areas in Sudan like Khartoum, Sennar and El Gezira have seen relative calm, key conflict zones like Darfur and Kordofan are still actively contested. Humanitarian agencies caution that the ongoing violence undermines the voluntary nature of return.

What can be done

Usually after a conflict ends, the UN Refugee Agency draws up tripartite agreements with the countries of origin and asylum, and itself. This establishes the conditions for refugees to return and establishes proper reintegration programmes.

In the Egypt and Sudan case, however, it’s not clear who is financing the return train. Where is the tripartite agreement between Sudan, Egypt and the UN Refugee Agency? Is this even on the table given the continuing conflict in Sudan?

The trickiest part is what happens in the long run for those returning to conflict. This can amount to what scholars call “slow deportation”, where return, even when allegedly voluntary, undermines a serious commitment to refugee protection.

What Sudanese refugees need is not air-conditioned trains. Rather, they need protection of their full political, social and legal rights, as the world promised in the aftermath of the atrocities of the second world war in 1951.

Franzisca Zanker receives funding from the European Research Council for the project “The Political Lives of Migrants: Perspectives from Africa” (Grant no: 101161856).

Dina Wahba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Refugee protection in Egypt: what’s behind the return train to Sudan – https://theconversation.com/refugee-protection-in-egypt-whats-behind-the-return-train-to-sudan-264917

September 15, 2025

Inequality in Africa: what drives it, how to end it and what some countries are getting right

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

The relationship between inequality and economic growth is a complex one, especially in Africa. Inequality is the result of a host of factors, including policy choices, institutional legacies and power structures that favour elites. Professor Imraan Valodia, director of the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies spoke to Ernest Aryeetey, emeritus professor of Development Economics at the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana about the issues.

What policy choices have African governments made that have worsened inequality?

Firstly, structural adjustment policies. Many African countries undertook these during the late 20th century, often encouraged by international financial institutions. These policies included public sector retrenchments, the removal of subsidies, and reduced social services. They disproportionately affected the poor by weakening the state’s role in redistributing public goods, and limiting access to essential services.

The programmes also increased income inequality by choosing free markets over social protection. Later efforts to address the consequences were often “too little, too late.”

Secondly, taxation and fiscal policies. Most tax systems in Africa have relied on indirect taxes (such as VAT or consumption taxes) rather than progressive, direct taxes on income and wealth. As a result, poorer households often bear a heavier relative tax burden while the wealthiest benefit from exemptions or evasion.

Early post-independence taxation rarely did much to redistribute wealth, and efforts to tax the informal sector have been minimal or poorly designed. They have failed to capture significant resources for social spending.

Thirdly, education and healthcare investment. Policy choices have often perpetuated access gaps between urban and rural populations and among socioeconomic classes. Investments tended to favour cities and privileged groups, so that not everyone had the same opportunities. This “urban bias” in public spending reinforced existing inequalities. Rural people’s needs remained unmet.

Fourthly, weak social protection. Until the expansion of more comprehensive schemes in the 2000s, many Africans were left poor and vulnerable, without adequate safety nets.

Fifth, economic structures favour elites. African governments have often maintained or even reinforced economic structures that concentrate wealth and opportunity for just a few. Examples include policies favouring extractive industries or resource sectors controlled by politically connected groups. Land tenure, trade policies and access to state contracts and licences have frequently favoured the powerful.

Sixth, limited regional and gender inclusion. Early public policies rarely met the needs of women, youth, rural areas, or marginalised regions. Exclusion from land ownership or financial services, and limited emphasis on affirmative action, reinforced systemic inequalities. Only in recent decades have some governments begun to address these gaps, but progress remains uneven.

Are these choices linked to the capture of public policy by elites?

Yes. Privileged groups have often shaped or manipulated state policies in ways that protect their interests and reinforce inequality.

Colonial and postcolonial legacy. Policies and institutions established during and after colonialism often allocated resources and power to a narrow elite, either colonial settlers, expatriates or local collaborators. Today’s elites inherited and sustained many of these structures. They still control wealth, land, and market opportunities.

Economic structure and resource control. Many African economies remain oriented around extractive industries and primary commodities such as oil and minerals. Policies around resource extraction, trade and land tenure have often favoured elites through preferential access, tax exemptions and regulatory loopholes.

Policy design and fiscal choices. The design of tax systems has typically favoured indirect taxes (like VAT). These do not affect elite wealth. Efforts to tax high incomes, property or capital gains are underdeveloped or easily evaded.

Social protection and service delivery. Safety nets and public goods (like quality education, healthcare, or infrastructure) often target formal sector workers or urban residents (where elites reside). They neglect the informal sector, rural poor and marginalised groups.

Political patronage and governance. State resources, positions and contracts go to loyalists, family members, or ethnic/regional networks.

What have been the 3 biggest inequality drivers?

Firstly, regressive fiscal policies. These include broad based taxes such as transaction levies and VAT. They take a larger share of low income earners’ cash flows. Wealthier groups benefit from exemptions or low tax rates.

Secondly, rapid, elite led privatisation and market liberalisation. Selling state assets or opening key sectors (energy, telecoms and transport) to politically connected investors concentrates profits and market power. Informal workers and small firms are left with reduced earnings.

Patronage, corruption and political capture keep things that way.

Thirdly, under-investment in universal social services. Cuts to health, education and social safety nets limit upward mobility for the poor and maintain regional and gender gaps.

Lastly, resource dependence and economic structure. Many African economies focus on industries like oil, minerals and cash crops. These benefit political and business elites but don’t diversify industries or create jobs. The benefits of growth go mostly to the already privileged. Most citizens and entire regions are excluded.

Which countries have managed best to change this?

Rwanda has a progressive income tax structure. Low value mobile money transactions are exempt from tax. Key utilities such as electricity and water remain largely public, which has reduced the impact of taxes on the poor.

Rwanda has also made efforts towards inclusive governance. Examples include quotas for women, investments in health and education, and a focus on rural inclusion.

Botswana has pursued a cautious privatisation agenda. The state retains majority ownership in diamonds, telecoms and banking. Revenues were channelled into universal primary education and health.

Despite its dependence on diamonds, it does well at channelling resource wealth into national savings, infrastructure and public services. This while maintaining relatively high institutional quality and political stability.

Ethiopia, pre 2020 reforms which saw the role of the private sector being broadened.

Before then, the country had focused on massive public investment in primary education, health extension services and rural road networks. At the same time it avoided large scale privatisation of basic utilities. This limited the social service gap.

In addition, it has invested in manufacturing and export-led growth. This has generated jobs and gradually shifted the economy away from depending on primary commodities. Inequality has reduced compared to resource-dependent peers.

Have technology advances affected inequality differently on the continent?

Yes.

Technology has the potential to reduce inequality by expanding access to markets, services, information and financial inclusion. But gaps in digital infrastructure, affordability and skills have caused technology to sometimes reinforce, rather than alleviate, disparities in African countries.

Digital divide and urban-rural gaps. Access to digital technologies is highly uneven. Rural areas, the poor, women and less-educated groups are less likely to use the internet or benefit from digital services. This divide is much starker in Africa than in advanced economies, where technology adoption is nearly universal. As a result, new technologies can benefit urban, educated and higher-income groups the most. This widens inequalities if not accompanied by robust, inclusive policies.
Mobile leapfrogging, but patchy inclusion. Africa’s rapid leap to mobile phone use has often skipped fixed-line infrastructure. This has brought financial inclusion and new markets to millions, such as M-Pesa in Kenya. Still, large parts of the continent remain excluded due to affordability, lack of electricity, limited digital skills and language barriers.
Economic structure and global value chains. Limited integration into global value chains and a small high-tech sector mean most jobs on the continent remain in low-productivity informal work.

Why do the effects differ?

Firstly, late, unequal adoption. The industrial revolution and subsequent technological advances arrived late and unevenly. Colonial and postcolonial legacies left Africa behind in both education and infrastructure. This made it harder for broad segments of the population to benefit from new technologies.

Infrastructure scarcity forces societies to adopt mobile solutions directly, bypassing legacy banking but also making them vulnerable to policy shocks.

Secondly, policy and market failures. Inadequate regulation, weak competition and high costs of devices and data are brakes on digital transformation. Digital public goods, such as e-government and online education, reach only connected groups. And digital skills gaps further entrench the social digital divide.

Imraan Valodia receives funding from a number of foundations and institutions that support independent academic research.

– ref. Inequality in Africa: what drives it, how to end it and what some countries are getting right – https://theconversation.com/inequality-in-africa-what-drives-it-how-to-end-it-and-what-some-countries-are-getting-right-265265