Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Luke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Marist College

On the eve of Uganda’s 2021 presidential election, it was clear that regardless of how Ugandans voted, the incumbent, Yoweri Museveni, would most likely be declared the winner. Amid mounting repression, accusations of vote rigging, and an internet blackout, that is exactly what transpired. Museveni was declared the winner for his sixth consecutive term in office.

Five years on, that prediction could just as easily and accurately be applied to the 15 January 2026 vote. This should not be taken as evidence that national politics in Uganda have remained static. Far from it.

It is true that state repression has remained a constant since the 2021 polls. Museveni’s main opponent continues to be a youthful, charismatic political outsider. But the landscape of opposition politics has shifted significantly along with speculation about 81-year-old Museveni’s potential successor.

Moreover, recent elections in Mozambique and Tanzania offer a pointed political lesson. Though an oppressive and entrenched ruling party can virtually assure its electoral triumph at the polls, it does not mean that everything after the election will go to its plan.

As a researcher of democracy and its discontents in African politics (with a particular focus on east Africa), I have followed the Ugandan case closely over the last six years. In this article, I will elaborate on the four key sources of continuity and change which mark the country’s politics heading into the upcoming election.

Bobi Wine remains the face of opposition

Robert Kyagulanyi entered the political scene in 2017 as an independent candidate in a parliamentary by-election, which he won by a landslide. Better known by his stage name, Bobi Wine, the 43-year-old popular musician-turned-presidential candidate has defied the predictions of friends and foes alike to become the undisputed face of Uganda’s political opposition.

In my academic research, I have documented his remarkable political rise and ideological evolution.

In an era of African politics marked by growing intergenerational tensions, Bobi Wine has been able to mobilise the younger generation in opposition to almost four decades of Museveni’s rule.

His captivating narrative: rising from humble origins in a ghetto of Kamwookya to a life of pop stardom and political defiance. This has made him a global icon, attracting attention in the West, as the subject of an Oscar-nominated documentary and Spotify podcast.

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Read more:
Bobi Wine has shaken up Ugandan politics: four things worth knowing about him

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Since 2017, he has carved a national political reputation in Uganda. Notably, he:

• led protests against the constitutional amendment that lifted presidential age limits, allowing Museveni to run again in 2021

• mobilised against a new social media tax that would limit (young) people’s access to social media debates

• led his party, the National Unity Platform (NUP), to a strong showing in the 2021 election.

With 57 seats in parliament, National Unity Platform became the country’s official opposition party. It won impressive support in traditional ruling party strongholds.

The party’s massive rallies and Bobi Wine’s recent attempts to build bridges across ethno-regional divides suggest that the National Unity Platform is still the country’s best hope of toppling Museveni at the polls.

But the opposition faces the ruling party’s continued use of violence to manipulate the election. This makes it difficult to know how the National Unity Platform might perform in a free and fair election. More troubling, the incumbent’s iron grip on the Ugandan military makes it nearly impossible to imagine a peaceful transfer of power.

State repression persists

As Bobi Wine’s popularity has risen, so has state violence against his movement. Nationwide protests against his arrest in November 2020 led to police killings of at least 54 people.

Bobi Wine’s political stance has also come at a great cost to himself. He has been arrested, tortured, shot in the leg, and survived multiple assassination attempts.

In the run-up to the 2026 election, prominent the National Unity Platform members remain in detention and have been tortured. In November 2024, opposition veteran Kizza Besigye was renditioned from Nairobi and has since been held in a maximum security prison.

Bobi Wine has likened the campaign trail to “a war”. Video footage recently captured police and defence force soldiers beating National Unity Platform security personnel.

The severity of the violence has led the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to warn of a “deepening crackdown on Uganda’s opposition” and urge the Museveni regime to “cease … such repressive tactics”.

Museveni’s manoeuvrings

The Museveni regime has effectively coopted key political opponents, infiltrated opposition parties, and sowed the seeds of distrust and division among and within them.

In July 2022, the Democratic Party (DP) leader Norbert Mao was appointed as Museveni’s new justice minister. Mao once bragged that he could “never be bought”. Subsequently, the Democratic Party – Uganda’s second oldest political party – entered into a formal cooperation agreement with the ruling National Resistance Movement.

Meanwhile, Besigye has left the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) after accusing fellow party leaders of accepting “dirty money” from State House.

Even National Unity Platform “isn’t really safe from Museveni’s infiltration”. In early 2024, a high-ranking leader, Mathias Mpuuga, left the party, amid allegations of corruption and wrongdoing during his tenure as leader of the opposition. Mpuuga subsequently started a new party, the Democratic Front. He has since publicly criticised his former party leader.

Breeding internal suspicion and division undermines the opposition’s ability to mount a united front against the incumbent.

The rise of Muhoozi

The 2026 elections raise political questions about the fate of Uganda post-Museveni. In the last five years, speculation has centred on the Ugandan president’s eldest son, Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba.

There is a widely held belief that Museveni is grooming his son, the current defence force chief, to be his presidential successor.

The constitution prohibits serving members of this institution from running for political office. Yet Muhoozi has made his own ambitions for political power clear.

Uncharacteristic of a decorated military officer, Muhoozi is given to erratic and at times shocking public outbursts. He also constantly stokes controversy.

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Museveni’s first son Muhoozi: clear signals of a succession plan in Uganda

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But Museveni appears to continue to lay the groundwork for his son’s political ascendance. A cabinet reshuffle in March 2024, and more recent party elections, phased out “the old guard” in favour of Muhoozi loyalists. This suggests that the influence and power of Museveni’s son is growing.

As political scholar Kristof Titeca recently noted, the National Resistance Movement’s electoral victory in January is certain. But the politics of “succession are not”.

Paying close attention to the fortunes of Muhoozi loyalists on key party committees and within Museveni’s new cabinet after the election, perhaps the Ugandan president’s last, will reveal much about the fate of the Muhoozi project. And the political future of Uganda more broadly.

Luke Melchiorre receives funding from NORHED-II.

– ref. Uganda election: Museveni will win, but the landscape has changed since his last victory – https://theconversation.com/uganda-election-museveni-will-win-but-the-landscape-has-changed-since-his-last-victory-271535

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saana Hansen, Postdoctoral Researcher in Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Helsinki

Each December, long-distance buses, minibus taxis and private cars stream northwards from South Africa as Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second biggest city, prepares for its annual ritual: the seasonal homecoming of “injiva” – migrants returning for Christmas.

The old industrial city, where businesses have declined and shops and restaurants struggle to survive, fills temporarily with cars with South African number plates and people dressed in trendy clothes signalling urban South African lifestyles. Trailers are loaded with remittances known as “Christmas boxes” containing cooking oil, soap and other groceries. A jumping castle is erected in the park, and popular music merges with laughter in the restaurants.

These are historically rooted signs of achievement and success earned abroad. They are a refashioned form of the festive season of colonial-era injivas: men from the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe who worked in South African mines and farms, returning home typically once a year with gifts.

Yet, it is common knowledge that this performance is often hard-earned, and injivas – both women and men – struggle to meet these expectations. The real-life migration experiences include economic and legal uncertainties and discrimination in the labour market, low wages and difficulty in sending remittances home.

Amid the festive return lies a quieter and more solemn south-north movement – that of Zimbabwean migrants who have passed away and are taking their final journey home. Contrasting with the festivities surrounding Christmas visits, the coffin-shaped trailers along the A6 highway from the Beitbridge border post to Bulawayo are a reminder that migration’s promise of prosperity comes with risk and loss.

This homecoming, which I studied for my PhD in anthropology and have described in a recent paper, is shaped by bureaucracy, cost and intergenerational care.

The study reveals how a life-sustaining web of care is maintained. It contributes to anthropological discussions on migration, kinship, the state, documentary practices, law and development.

The moral duty and economic headache of return

The migration pattern between Zimbabwe and South Africa has its roots in colonial-era labour migration and has intensified since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. In the early 2000s, Zimbabwe’s economic collapse, marked by hyperinflation, political violence and mass unemployment, drove millions to seek economic opportunities and protection in South Africa.

Estimating the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa is difficult due to the largely unregulated nature of this mobility, but figures generally range between one million and three million.

Although deceased migrants, documented or not, can be buried in South African soil, bringing a body home is a vital act in Zimbabwe, as in many other African contexts. It is to restore the deceased to the lineage and to enable the spirit to be mourned and settled so it will protect younger generations. Failing to do so risks spiritual and social disorder. The respectful return in death, like the festive Christmas return of the able-bodied injivas, reinforces ties between generations.

Despite the religious and cultural importance of burial at home, repatriating a body from South Africa poses economic challenges to a family. It’s not only a moral duty but also a financial burden. So, in principle, only those whose death has been unforeseen return in coffins. Those who can will return home before they die to save the cost of repatriation.

Families make extraordinary efforts to make repatriation possible. Relatives collect and borrow money, and reach out to kin across borders. Burial societies mobilise payments from their members to collect the funds for embalming, transportation, paperwork and funerals. These obligations reveal the importance of the ancestral continuity being an economic matter, and sustenance of family welfare continuing after death.

Formal and informal burial societies

Since the 1990s, Bulawayo’s once-thriving industries have largely collapsed, leaving its old mills and factories deserted or refunctioning as spaces for religious congregations, education and garages. Amid these modest ventures, funeral services stand out in the city’s otherwise melancholic landscape.

As Zimbabwe’s economic and political instability pushes many to seek livelihoods in South Africa, the funeral industry has expanded. The Beitbridge border, crossing the Limpopo River between Zimbabwe and South Africa, has long organised the movement of labour and remittances, governing also the return of bodies.

Indeed, funeral parlours and burial societies date back to the colonial era when injured and dead migrants had to be sent home. Today, carrying prosperous names such as Doves, Kings & Queens and African Pride, funeral parlours function as key institutions in managing transnational death.

Besides these licensed funeral services, people belong to informal money pooling societies that mobilise money collectively to cover the cost of death. While some collect steady monthly deposits, others gather money ad hoc during emergencies.

These societies blur boundaries between formal and informal systems. Many “undocumented” migrants, who cannot have bank accounts, participate through friends or relatives with legal status, contributing to pooled funds tracked via mobile communication apps and bank transfer receipts. Societies sustain solidarity networks, and transparent contributions signal both moral and financial responsibility, shaping participants’ social standing.

Bureaucracies of transnational death

Between the death and the burial, numerous legal and bureaucratic steps must be completed, from obtaining death certificates and health clearances to coordinating with South African and Zimbabwean authorities.

Often, identity documents from Zimbabwe need to be collected to prove that the deceased is a Zimbabwean national. When the deceased has not revealed their identity to the South African authorities and remains “undocumented”, or has two legal identities, the disparity needs to be explained in affidavits.

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These administrative steps are not simply procedural; they are part of the politics of death. The paperwork that allows a body to move, such as a stamp, a signature, or an affidavit, is both a form of recognition and a reminder of inequality. While some deaths can move across borders with relative ease, others become delayed or trapped in institutional procedures.

Bureaucracy is a space where care, legality and belonging intertwine. State officials may draw not only on formal guidelines but also their cultural logics of care. They are central in navigating the legal and bureaucratic challenges. Immigration officers might be sympathetic and share the cultural understanding of the importance of returning home respectably.

The homecoming of the dead mirrors, in reverse, the December journeys of the living. Both are seasonal movements that bind families across generations, space and time. The same routes that carried migrants south in search of work now carry their bodies northward, accompanied by papers, payments and prayers.

In the end, the bureaucracies that regulate transnational death are not merely state procedures, but central to how families remake connection, dignity and belonging under precarious conditions.

This research was supported by funding from the Academy of Finland. The author is currently supported by the Kone Foundation.

– ref. The price of going home: Christmas boxes and the final return from South Africa to Zimbabwe – https://theconversation.com/the-price-of-going-home-christmas-boxes-and-the-final-return-from-south-africa-to-zimbabwe-268046

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicolette V Roman, SARChI: Human Capabilities, Social Cohesion and the Family, University of the Western Cape

At the end of the year, many families reunite to enjoy time together. These times can be happy, yet sometimes they reveal tensions, unsatisfied needs and difficult relationships. The reality is that being together does not necessarily mean you are connected. Families can be both joyful and anguished or distressed at the same time.

These contradictions are brought into focus during festive periods. They show just how strong the ties of a family are, and remind us that family life is not just a social structure but a continuous practice of connecting and caring.

In our work at the Centre of Interdisciplinary Studies of Children, Families and Society at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa, we pose what seems on the surface a very simple question: what do families do to not only survive, but thrive together?

We find repeated themes in our research: families thrive (or do well) when trust is fostered, when care is given and when all members feel they belong.

Family cohesion enables individuals to feel safe and connected. It is not about being perfect or agreeing always, but being able to trust and get along with each other.

We’ve found that more unified families can:

• communicate openly

• adapt to change

• support each other in the trials of life.

These virtues are not something to be assumed. An example is trust, which is not automatic. It is constructed gradually, by respecting each other, the consistency of a present caregiver, the fairness of shared tasks, the assurance that a person’s voice is heard.

In cases where trust breaks down, families tend to say that they feel uncertain, or even unsafe, in their own homes. Yet when trust is strong, it creates the invisible thread which helps families to survive change.

Our studies show that disagreement can coexist with closeness, provided families have ways to repair relationships after tension. One parent in our research said it best:

We fight, we cry, but we still sit together for supper.

That small act of sitting together is part of the work of care that holds families intact.

South African families

South African families and households are diverse in their structures: nuclear, single-parent, multigenerational, child-headed or based on emotional connection and choice. That’s the result of cultural richness as well as the heritage of apartheid, which disturbed traditional family life through forced migration, labour relations and systemic marginalisation.

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In our qualitative research in urban communities, families mixed both traditional values and contemporary realities. Grandmothers are usually key figures in caregiving and young people contribute meaningfully to family and household life. But families face significant pressures. Many struggle to meet basic needs, like shelter and food, as well as intangible needs like love, respect and understanding. Family cohesion may be eroded when these needs are not met.

Unmet needs also reflect what we call “bad care”. By that we mean not getting care, or getting inadequate care.

The impact of bad care on people is among the most interesting things that we discovered during our research. It occurs when care-giving responsibilities are not shared equally, when intangible needs are not met or when family members can’t talk to each other. The consequences of unmet intangible needs are usually quite powerful.

For example, a grandmother may make sure her grandchildren are fed, dressed and safe every day. But if her desire for love, connection, or relaxation is not met, she may feel like no one cares about her or that she is being taken for granted. As one grandmother described it, being “the glue” that kept the family together meant her personal needs for rest, emotional support, or simply being cared for were overlooked.

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Older South Africans need better support and basic services — and so do their caregivers

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Some families expect their younger members (daughters in particular) to take care of other people, even if they are not prepared or haven’t consented. In our study, one interviewee said that since the death of her grandmother, she was supposed to be the one who would keep the family together though she did not consider herself ready. Her personal needs such as being heard, respected and given space to grieve were placed on hold.

A care-giver who feels as though no one is noticing or supporting them might end up feeling depressed, angry, or burned out. They might not ask for help, for fear of being judged or rejected. One woman said she never talked to her family about her concerns since they “have their own problems” and “don’t want to listen”. This silence, which can be caused by pride, fear, or a lack of trust, can hurt relationships and make people feel even more alone.

Bad care also refers to being given care that is not responsive to all the needs of a family member. Families who only consider aspects like food, shelter and money might lose sight of emotional and spiritual needs. And as those are not fulfilled, the emotional fabric of the family starts to fall apart.

During the holidays, these family behaviours tend to get worse. Being back under one roof brings out disparities in money, values, or hopes. Adult children come home with fresh experiences, parents remember the sacrifices they made, and grandparents hope their traditions will live on.

Care becomes the language that connects people of all ages in this mix. It can be said in words, like when people talk, laugh, or say they’re sorry. It often happens softly, like when people share a meal made with love, offer to help, or take a moment to listen.

Care is not seasonal. It is every day and intentional. The family is not a luxury; it is the pillar of wellbeing. Once the decorations are packed away and the noise fades, what remains are the relationships we have tended.

Nicolette V Roman receives funding from National Research Foundation (NRF), Social Sciences Research Council – African Peace Network.

– ref. Family time: how to survive – and even thrive – over the holidays – https://theconversation.com/family-time-how-to-survive-and-even-thrive-over-the-holidays-269035

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Shirley C. Strum, Professor of the Graduate Division, School of Social Sciences and Emerita, Department of Anthropology, University of California, San Diego

Conflict between humans and baboons can tear communities apart. Shirley C. Strum has studied wild olive baboons in Kenya for more than 50 years. In that time she’s come to understand the species intimately. In this article she argues that humans have taken from nature (without asking) for too long. And that now it’s time for us to rethink this relationship.

What have you learnt about baboon behaviour and habits over the past 51 years?

During my studies I have found that baboons are smart and sophisticated, and they need each other to be successful because of an unwritten “golden rule” – “do unto others as you would have them do unto you”.

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Baboons aren’t yet endangered, because they adapt to new human environments. Part of this adaptability includes flexible primate hands (not trunks or hooves), primate intelligence, and the combined knowledge of their social group.

My research over the decades has provided a great deal of evidence of this.

As far as conflict with wildlife is concerned, you can’t ignore the growth in human population everywhere. In 1972, when I started my research, Kenya’s population was 12 million. Now it is pushing 60 million people.

This rate of population growth means more land is used for infrastructure and food. Development has converted wildlife areas into rural, suburban and urban human environments over the last 50 years.

As a result, human-wildlife conflict has increased. In Kenya, most wildlife exists in parks, reserves and surrounding areas. Kenya Wildlife Service recorded 10,000 episodes in these areas in 2024.

My research demonstrated that the cost of raiding has to outweigh the benefits for the baboons. Once tasted, human foods, including field crops, are ideal. Baboons are a special case of conflict because they can outsmart most humans. And baboons can be very destructive when they lose their fear of humans as they have in some parts of Cape Town, South Africa.

How can baboons be stopped from raiding farms and homes?

This depends on both the context and the history of baboon troops in the area.

The best solution to resolving conflicts is to prevent them. Changing human behaviours is difficult. And preventing bad baboon behaviour – like raiding human foods – is easier than trying to change baboon behaviours once they occur.

But this is an increasingly rare opportunity today because of the humanisation of the landscape.

What approaches have been tried and which ones have been successful?

The Gilgil Baboon Project – after translocation it became the Uaso Ngiro Baboon Project – started on a 45,000 acre (18,000 hectare) cattle ranch with more wildlife than cattle. We tried many control techniques, old (guarding and chasing) and new (playback of baboon alarm calls, leopard scats and lithium chloride taste aversion).

The ranch was then sold to Gikuyu Embu Meru Association, which distributed land to its members. Baboons began enjoying the new foods, raiding crops regularly.

Research demonstrated that the costs of raiding had to outweigh the benefits for baboon to stop raiding. It might surprise you that baboons do not eat human food out of spite but because of deep evolutionary imperatives. Their foraging aim is always to get the most nutrition for the least expenditure of energy.

Once tasted, human foods are special. They are large packages of easy to digest fare, the equivalent of baboon fast food. This makes baboons very difficult to control given the benefit of eating human food.

Some observations about solutions.

Boundaries: To prevent baboons raiding, you must draw a line beyond which baboons cannot go and reinforce it frequently and consistently. Given how much a baboon has to gain, she or he can devote plenty of time to waiting for the right moment.

Because of the growth of human population, many places already have baboon raiders. In this case, fields must be guarded by people all the time, homestead doors and windows can’t be left open (unless window bars prevent baboons of any size getting in) and many other human time-consuming and costly coping behaviours have to be used to control baboon raiding.

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Remember, to control raiding the cost must exceed the benefit. You have to use up baboon time, forcing them to look for other things to eat. But harming a baboon doesn’t work unless it is directly linked to the raiding and in full view of the rest of the group.

If the baboon habit of eating human food has become a “tradition”, it is difficult to extinguish.

Translocation: If you have enough money and time, translocating the baboons might be an alternative. Translocation means moving them to a new place in their historical range. I pioneered translocation for primates in 1984 when I moved three troops from Kekopey Ranch near Gilgil, Kenya to a place where crops couldn’t grow, the Eastern Laikipia Plateau in Kenya.

Today, however, there are very few places left where baboons can’t get into trouble.

Killing: The final option is to remove the baboons. I call it “killing” because fancy names don’t hide the reality. However, it isn’t as easy as it sounds. You first need to understand baboons. Second, the baboons can’t be killed by a helicopter gunship or even professional hunters. They are too wily. Killing a whole baboon group has its challenges. Even if you succeed (which I doubt), removing one group from a population means another troop will soon take its place.

These are hard choices that I don’t take lightly. It is one thing to view wildlife from the safety of your home or vehicle but another to have baboons steal your food, take your livestock, or decimate your crops.

What needs to change?

Human views about baboons have changed over the last 50 years from positive to negative. Today, social media is rife with conflict between baboons and humans in southern Africa. Nature is real, but our ideas about nature are cultural and based on our experiences and attitudes.

We are faced with a difficult dilemma: humans cause the problem but wild creatures pay the price. Conflict between baboons and humans won’t change unless human behaviour and attitudes change.

Dr Strum has a new book published by Johns Hopkins University Press: Echoes of Our Origins: Baboons, Humans and Nature. It is available on Amazon US and Amazon UK.

Shirley C. Strum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Managing conflict between baboons and people: what’s worked – and what hasn’t – https://theconversation.com/managing-conflict-between-baboons-and-people-whats-worked-and-what-hasnt-264821

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Alexander M. Laskaris, Visiting Scholar, University of Florida

Kidnapping for ransom has a long history in the west African Sahel. In 1979, a rebel group led by Chad’s future president Hissène Habré kidnapped a French archaeologist and a German medical doctor in the north of the country. The kidnappers asked for the release of political prisoners, among other demands.

Over the decades kidnapping became an industry in the Sahel. Governments were willing to pay financial and political ransoms even if they denied it publicly. This industry fuelled the expansion of jihadist groups from Algeria to the Sahel (south of the Sahara) between the early 2000s and mid-2010s. The most spectacular of these kidnappings was the abduction of 32 European tourists in 2003. It was carried out by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in the Algerian Sahara. A €5 million ransom was reportedly paid for the hostages.

Using conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, we examined the evolution of abductions and forced disappearances in 17 west African countries over the last 24 years. We are scholars with personal experience as a former ambassador to Chad and Guinea and a geographer.

We analysed nearly 58,000 violent events. These events have caused the death of more than 201,000 people from January 2000 through June 2024.

Our findings suggest that the kidnapping industry has experienced a major shift. We discovered that most of the victims of kidnappings for ransom were westerners until the end of the 2010s. Since then violent extremist organisations have turned to local civilians. Both western and local hostages represent lucrative resources that ultimately fuel insurgencies in the west African Sahel.

A lucrative industry

Armed groups have learned that seizing a western hostage is a low-risk and high-reward proposition. It leads to financial gain and political accommodation. The exact amount of money paid is difficult to assess due to the opacity of the negotiations and the number of intermediaries involved. An estimated US$125 million was paid by European countries to liberate hostages captured by al-Qaida and its affiliates in this region from 2008 to 2014.

These resources have fuelled the international development, training and arms purchases of armed groups. For example, in October 2025, the United Arab Emirates allegedly paid a US$50 million ransom. They also allegedly delivered military hardware to al-Qaida-affiliated militants for the release of Emirati hostages in Mali.

The revenues generated from ransom payments have facilitated the development of alliances between militant groups and local leaders. They have also made the recruitment of young combatants from Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso easier for extremist organisations, by offering significant financial incentives.

As security expert Wolfram Lacher explains, kidnapping for ransom was the most important factor behind the growth of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Mali.

The common perception is that when a westerner is taken hostage in the Sahel, a mighty military apparatus is deployed to rescue them. However, there is little to suggest that western military pressure on terrorist or criminal networks contributes to hostage recovery. Indeed, the most likely outcome of an armed rescue operation has proven to be the death of the hostage. Most of the time, the reason for their release has been ransom and concessions negotiated by local partners.

Local civilians increasingly targeted

In the last decade, the number of foreigners living or travelling in the Sahel has plummeted. Due to terrorism and political unrest, travel to the region is strongly discouraged by western countries.

Jihadist militants have therefore turned to local targets and started abducting a growing number of civilians from the region. Our report reveals that abductions and forced disappearances have experienced a twenty-fold increase since Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was formed in 2017.

Kidnappings tend to occur both along major transport corridors and in rural areas. There, jihadist groups have implemented a predatory economy based on looting and ransoming civilians. In the central Sahel, this kidnapping economy has spread to most rural areas. This includes the south of the Wagadou forest in Mali to the W National Park at the border between Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger.

The brutal local economics of kidnap for ransom is also vibrant in the Lake Chad region. Although the kidnapping of westerners is, on a per capita basis, far more lucrative in the Sahel, these groups are doing a brisk business of kidnapping civilians, as shown on the map below.

In late November 2025, for example, more than 300 children were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in a Catholic school in western Nigeria. Our analysis shows that about a third of these events involve abductions of girls and women.

Civilians are usually released unharmed shortly after their motorbikes, food items, phones and animals have been taken, or ransom has been paid.

Should ransoms be paid?

The question of whether hostage situations should be resolved by paying a ransom depends on the parties involved.

For Sahelian governments, acceding to ransom demands weakens their political position and provides material support for those who threaten them. The same applies to foreigners in the Sahel – relief workers, missionaries, business people, tourists – for whom every ransom paid makes their position more precarious.

For western governments responsive to family, media and political pressure, however, bringing hostages home via ransom is always the easiest solution. Media coverage focuses on joyful reunions, not moral hazard.

In the United States, the 2020 Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act reorganised the internal hostage response capacity of the government. By streamlining the process by which accommodations are made to the kidnappers, the act established clear lines of authority, while giving families both better support and access to decision-makers.

Left unresolved is the tension between the prohibition on paying ransom to terrorist organisations and the reality that, for kidnapping victims and their families, the best response is to pay. Given the vastness of the Sahel and the lack of any effective security response, caving to ransom demands is the best hope for a successful resolution.

We should not criticise families for demanding action from their governments, for acceding to terrorist organisations’ ransom demands, or for rejoicing when hostages are liberated. At the same time, however, one should also not be afraid to state the obvious: their joy leads inevitably to another westerner’s or African’s trauma.

The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government.

Olivier Walther receives funding from the OECD Sahel and West Africa Club.

– ref. Kidnapping for ransom in the Sahel: analysis of 24 years of data shows a new trend – https://theconversation.com/kidnapping-for-ransom-in-the-sahel-analysis-of-24-years-of-data-shows-a-new-trend-270714

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Malyn Newitt, Emeritus Professor in History, King’s College London

The Zambezi is Africa’s fourth longest river, flowing through six countries: Angola, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, where it becomes the largest river to flow into the Indian Ocean.

The entire length of the river is referred to as the Zambezi Valley region and it carries with it a rich history of movement, conquest and commerce.

Great Britain colonised Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe; Germany colonised Namibia. The beginning and the end of the Zambezi, in Angola and Mozambique, were Portuguese colonies.

Malyn Newitt is a historian of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and has written numerous books on the subject, and one on the Zambezi in particular. We asked him about this history.

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When and how did the Portuguese encounter the Zambezi?

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to establish permanent relations with the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. After the explorer Vasco da Gama’s successful return voyage from Europe to India (1497-1499) the Portuguese heard about the gold trade being carried on in the ports of the Zambezi River. By the middle of the 1500s they were trading there, from their bases on the coast of modern Mozambique. From Sofala and Mozambique Island, they sent agents to the gold trading fairs inland.

Between 1569 and 1575 a Portuguese military expedition tried to conquer the gold producing regions of what became known as Mashonaland (today part of Zimbabwe). This failed, but permanent settlements were made in the Zambezi valley from which Portuguese control was gradually extended over the river up to the Cahora Bassa gorge in modern Mozambique.

Portuguese adventurers, with their locally recruited private armies, began to control large semi-feudal land holdings known as prazos. These reached their greatest extent in the mid-1600s.

During the 1700s and early 1800s the area of Portuguese control was limited to the Zambezi valley. Here the elite of Afro-Portuguese prazo holders traded gold and slaves.

The first half of the 1800s saw drought, the migrations of the Nguni (spurred by Zulu-led wars in southern Africa) and the continuing slave trade. During these disturbed conditions, Afro-Portuguese warlords raised private armies and extended their control up the river. They went as far as Kariba (on the border between modern Zambia and Zimbabwe) and through much of the escarpment country north and south of the river.

This eventually brought them into conflict with Britain, whose agents were expanding their activities from South Africa. It resulted in an 1891 agreement which drew the frontiers in and around the Zambezi valley which still exist today.

Who are the people who live along the river?

The people who have inhabited the length of the Zambezi valley have often been generically referred to as Tonga. For the most part they’ve organised their lives in small, lineage-based settlements. Their economy is based on crop growing and occupations relating to trade and navigation on the river.

Because of the lack of any centralised political organisation, the valley communities were often dominated by the powerful kingdoms on the north and south of the river. This might involve raiding and enslavement or simply paying tribute to the kings. On the upper reaches of the river in Zambia, populations became subject to the large Barotse kingdom in the 1800s.

On the lower river many of the people came under the overlordship of prazos. They worked as carriers, artisans, boatmen and soldiers. Because of the extensive gold and ivory trade, a fine tradition of goldsmith work developed and men became skilled elephant hunters.

Throughout history, valley communities have often been loosely organised around spirit shrines with mediums. These are very influential in providing stability and direction for people’s lives.

How did the Portuguese understand these cultures?

For 400 years the Portuguese controlled the lower reaches of the Zambezi, in Mozambique. They wrote many accounts of the people of the region which show a complex interaction. Portugal’s administration and system of land law controlled matters at the apex of society, but could not control African culture.

The Portuguese were few in number and intermarried to some extent with the local population. This produced a hybrid Afro-Portuguese society in which everyday life was carried on according to African traditional practice. Agriculture, transport, artisan crafts, mining and warfare reflected local traditions.

Although the Portuguese tried to introduce Christianity, it failed to attract many people away from the spirit cults. It became diluted with local religious ideas.

The Portuguese built square, European-style houses in the river ports and on the estates along the river. But most of the population retained the traditional African hut design. Afro-Portuguese were often literate but literacy did not penetrate far and the Portuguese language never replaced the local languages.

How did silver play a role in all this?

Late in the 1500s the Portuguese became obsessed with the idea that there were silver mines in Africa comparable to those discovered by the Spanish in the New World. Considerable effort was made to locate these mines in Angola and in the Zambezi valley.

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Read more:
The incredible journey of two princes from Mozambique whose lives were upended by the slave trade

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Military expeditions were dispatched and skilled miners were sent from Europe to test the ores that had allegedly been discovered. Attempts to find the mines throughout the 1600s helped to sustain Portuguese interest in the Zambezi settlements. No silver was ever discovered – not surprisingly, as there is no silver in southern Africa.

Can you bring us up to today? What impact has development had on the river?

Until the 1900s the Zambezi defied most attempts at development. The river was difficult to navigate – too shallow in the dry season, too dangerous during the floods. These fluctuations determine the pattern of migrations and agricultural production.

Moreover, as the river passed through a series of gorges which blocked navigation it was only on its upper reaches, beyond the Victoria Falls, on the borders of Zimbabwe and Zambia, that it was able to act as a major highway.

And the river constituted a major obstacle to any contact between people north and south of it. The first bridge was only built in 1905, to carry the railway from South Africa to the copper belt. In the 1930s, British engineers built a second rail bridge across the lower Zambezi. But the first road bridge was only built in 1934, at Chirundu at the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. This at last linked the areas north and south of the river.

Meanwhile the floods of the Zambezi came to be contained by the building of the Kariba Dam (opened in 1959) and the Cahora Bassa Dam (1974). As a result much of the Zambezi below the Victoria Falls has altered drastically and been turned into a succession of large inland seas.

Large sectors of the population have been forcibly removed and the floods no longer keep sea water from invading the delta. Meanwhile water extraction for irrigation, and increasingly frequent droughts, have endangered the river’s very existence.

The Zambezi has become an example of what happens when the natural resources of a great river have been thoughtlessly over-exploited.

Malyn Newitt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The history of the Zambezi River is a tale of culture, conquest and commerce – https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-zambezi-river-is-a-tale-of-culture-conquest-and-commerce-269217

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alessandro De Cola, Univertsity Assistant (Postdoc), Universität Wien; Università di Bologna

A dynamic new “consumer class” emerging from Africa is attracting international attention. With the prospect of rising incomes and a young population, international consulting firms see the continent as the next frontier for consumer goods. Global entrepreneurs even warn of the increasing savviness of African buyers.

But the influence of African consumers on global markets is far from a new thing. In the 1800s, the continent’s consumer demand called the tune for European factories.

We’re a team of economic and social historians, anthropologists, and African studies specialists. Our research project investigates the roots of these dynamics.

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Africa is the world’s largest market for Guinness beer – how its ad campaigns exploit men

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Focusing on the African demand for goods like arms, beads and cloth, our research calls into question the Eurocentric idea that Africa was just a supplier of cheap labour and raw materials before the “Scramble for Africa” by colonial powers.

Instead, in the 1800s, the continent was a key driver of industrial production, compelling manufacturers to tailor their goods to African preferences.

This challenges the conventional view of globalisation as a flow of goods and ideas from dominant economies to so-called peripheral regions. In fact globalisation has always been a connected process – one in which African consumers, though often overlooked, played a decisive role in shaping global markets.

Arms

Analysis of the arms trade takes us to the Congo River estuary in the late precolonial era. Before the late 1800s and colonialism, this region was free of direct European political control.

The illegal slave trade lasted at least until the mid-1850s, when the export of legitimate goods finally began to gather momentum. From roughly the 1850s, one of the products most consistently favoured by consumers in the Congo estuary was the so-called “trade gun”.

These rugged, muzzle-loading muskets were deemed outdated by European manufacturers and traders. In the Congo estuary these firearms remained in high demand.

Trade guns could be flintlocks (using a flint to ignite gunpowder) or percussion guns (using a small, explosive cap to ignite it). Flintlocks were more popular because flintstones were more readily available in Africa.

Moreover, smoothbore muzzle-loaders, commonly made from “soft” wrought iron rather than “hard” steel, were not only cheaper but also a more accessible technology than rifles for African consumers. Although flintlocks were sometimes not effective for big-game hunting, they had substantial military value.

Understanding the role of these weapons in African history, however, requires looking beyond just their function. Imported firearms were also commonly given symbolic meanings shaped by local norms and power structures.

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Read more:
The incredible journey of two princes from Mozambique whose lives were upended by the slave trade

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For example, among Kikongo speakers in the lower Congo, gunfire was used as a sign of rejoicing during celebrations and funerals. Noise was believed to drive away bad spirits and aid passage into the spirit world.

Although the gun trade in the lower Congo is not always easy to quantify, it is documented, for example, that the Nieuwe Afrikaansche Handels Vennootschap imported an annual average of about 24,000 guns between 1884 and 1888. The majority of these were discarded French percussion guns that had been modified into flintlocks in Liège.

The development of the arms trade in the lower Congo also mirrors broader changes within the European firearms industry. African consumer demand was not just driven by European industrial output, but was rather an active force that shaped and sustained global economic integration throughout the 1800s.

Beads

Venetian glass bead producers were well aware that their specialised industry depended on demand from Africa and Asia. It is almost impossible to find out exactly how many glass beads were poured into the African continent in the 19th century. Glass beads went through many different hands (in many different ports) before they reached the shores of Africa, and the available information on Venetian production is not consistent.

Historians have shown that, during the 1800s, beads produced in Venice were a key commodity exchanged for ivory along the east African caravan routes connecting the Swahili coast to the Great Lakes. These routes were established by Arab traders and Nyamwezi traders (from today’s Tanzania) on expeditions financed by Gujarati merchants from India.

As demand for ivory grew in European and American markets, these traders began penetrating deeper into the continent to discover new sources of elephant tusks and rhino horns. They established new market centres in the process.

Glass beads were portable and relatively cheap. This made them especially suitable as a form of money in everyday transactions. Beads had a major importance in securing food for caravan porters. Bringing the wrong type of beads could spell disaster for an expedition. This required an updated knowledge of the kinds of beads that were more in demand along specific routes.

Through the caravan leaders, information was gathered by European agents in major commercial hubs such as Zanzibar. This was mailed or telegraphed to their companies’ headquarters, allowing producers to respond to demand as promptly as possible.

Today, sample cards displaying the most requested kinds of glass beads, preserved in European and American museums, are the most tangible product of this information chain.

Cloth

African demand also influenced technological innovation. On the coast of east Africa and in Sudan, people eagerly imported millions of yards of American unbleached cotton cloth. This helped build the fortunes of US industries – so much so that “merikani” (from “American”) became a general term for this product – and, later, of Indian manufacturers.

Its spread, however, was limited by transport costs. Ethiopian markets were supplied mainly by local production, with a robust tradition of cotton spinning and weaving. The cloth was distinctively white and soft – praised by travellers as comparable to the finest European textiles. In Ethiopia, the only clear technological advantage enjoyed by western producers was dyes, especially after the introduction of synthetic colours in the 1870s.

Ethiopian weavers eagerly sought coloured yarn from Europe and India to pair with their own white cloth. This demand stimulated the spread of new dying technology abroad. The situation changed significantly after the unification of Ethiopia under Menelik II, whose reign brought stability and infrastructure development.

Coarse, unbleached cotton became widely available even in the interior, offering a cheap and easily washable option for ordinary people: 12 million square yards from the US were imported in 1905-1906 alone. Meanwhile, Ethiopian elites continued to favour local cotton but complemented it with imported accessories like felt hats and umbrellas. Coloured cloth, once a luxury, became a popular consumer good.

The big picture

The story of how arms, glass beads and cloth were commercialised in Africa and how production and distribution had to adapt to the continent’s needs provides a more nuanced picture of how global trade as we know it took shape.

Our research emphasises that globalisation was not ignited in the global north, but depended on consumers located far from the centres of production.

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We discussed these topics in an online seminar series now available on YouTube.

The research on which this article is based was financed by the European Union – Next Generation EU, Missione 4 Componente 1 CUP J53D23000530006

– ref. Early shoppers: how African consumers set global trade trends in the 1800s – https://theconversation.com/early-shoppers-how-african-consumers-set-global-trade-trends-in-the-1800s-266794

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

Nigerians have been waiting anxiously for the economy to “turn a corner”, following economic reform initiatives undertaken by President Bola Tinubu in 2023. These included removing the country’s fuel subsidy and freeing up its foreign exchange market.

There have been signs of improvement. Key among these are stronger economic growth, and a rise in capital inflows and diaspora remittances. Foreign reserves have risen to the highest level in seven years. Core inflation has declined and the foreign exchange market is less volatile.

But ordinary Nigerians aren’t feeling the benefits. There’s anger and resentment, as evident in the nationwide protest in June 2025 against hunger and insecurity.

How might one explain this mismatch?

The answer lies in living conditions, which have not improved and may well have deteriorated since the economic reforms.

Many Nigerians are still without jobs – the unemployment rate has been estimated at about 30%. But this is an underestimate, considering that millions of under-employed Nigerians in the informal sector are counted as employed.

Because of the lack of jobs, about 93% are engaged in low-income informal sector activities. Public spaces and highways in the country have been taken over by roadside hawkers and other informal sector workers.

Nigerians are also chronically poor and food insecure. According to the World Bank, the number of poor people in Nigeria rose from 81 million in 2019 to 139 million in October 2025. Most have no safety net or means of protection from unforeseen events like illness, natural disasters or loss of jobs.

As an economist who has studied the Nigerian economy for over four decades, I argue that Nigeria needs a radical shift in its economic policy approach. Macroeconomic stability can’t be expected to automatically create jobs and alleviate poverty. Time and again, trickle-down economics has been shown to be a flawed economic philosophy.

It is time for the Tinubu administration to take decisive and unprecedented steps to translate macroeconomic improvements into better living conditions for Nigerians.

Why reforms aren’t feeding through

Most Nigerians have not felt the impact of improvements in macroeconomic performance because of the following:

Economic growth is not robust enough: Growth needs to be 6%-8% a year for at least five years, for most Nigerians to feel the impact of an improved economy. Much of that growth must come from labour-intensive sectors of the economy, particularly manufacturing and agro-processing.

Jobless growth: Employment-intensive sectors of the economy haven’t been affected by the reforms. The manufacturing sector, for instance, remains weak due to the high cost of imported raw materials, poor infrastructure, competition from cheap imported goods, and the high cost of borrowing.

Income stagnation and declines in real purchasing power: The few Nigerians with jobs have found that their income lags behind the rate of inflation. The fact that Nigeria’s inflation rate has fallen does not mean that prices have decreased. It simply means that prices are rising more slowly than they did before. And the minimum wage in Nigeria is one of the lowest in the world.

Non-inclusivity of growth: The gains from macroeconomic stability in Nigeria have not been broadly shared. There are two reasons. First, the main drivers of growth are sectors that are not labour-intensive: oil and gas, financial services, digital services, hospitality, music, art and design. Second, many Nigerians don’t have the skills and competencies to be employed in these sectors.

Perverse sectoral distribution of capital inflows: Although foreign capital has increased, much of it is portfolio investment in bonds, government treasury bills, and the stocks of financial institutions. The opportunities for employment generation are therefore very limited.

Economic challenges that need to be addressed

To translate recent policy reforms into better living standards, more needs to be done.

Job creation: The government should work with the private sector to resuscitate the manufacturing sector and agro-processing. Incentives should be given to foreign and domestic investors to invest in manufacturing and agro-processing. A rejuvenated manufacturing sector will integrate the Nigerian economy into global value chains.

Only about 2% of capital inflows this year is foreign direct investment. The rest is portfolio investment in government bonds and securities, as well as corporate stocks – especially in banking. Portfolio investment does not create jobs. Equity investment in manufacturing, agro-processing and even agriculture is preferable for job creation.

Cash transfers: Reduce the huge cost of running the country and use the savings for cash transfers for vulnerable Nigerians. Only about 8.4 million households (out of a population of 238 million) have received cash transfers of between N25,000 and N75,000. This is grossly inadequate. Giving more people cash would represent a big change for many Nigerians, no matter how small the transfer. Cash transfers that are paid for by a reduction in governance cost will not create inflation but enable Nigerians to invest in economic activities and be productive.

Public works: The government should accelerate the rate of job creation by using direct labour for targeted public works projects. Nigeria has many bad roads and dilapidated public buildings.

Streamline the foreign exchange market: There is still a gap between the official and parallel rates of exchange. There are many black-market foreign currency traders. In a well-functioning foreign exchange market, a sprawling black market should not exist.

Reduce the size of the informal sector: This can be done through the development of the manufacturing sector, which will draw surplus labour from the informal sector.

Economic development should be about people, their well-being and their economic dignity. While stabilising the economy, the government should intentionally put in place mechanisms to ensure that macroeconomic improvements result in better living conditions.

Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s economy has improved but ordinary people still feel the pinch: economist offers some solutions – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-economy-has-improved-but-ordinary-people-still-feel-the-pinch-economist-offers-some-solutions-271496

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Anne Fitchett, Retired Honorary Associate Professor in the School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of the Witwatersrand

Every year, millions of tonnes of food end up in South Africa’s landfills. This is a wasted resource that deepens environmental damage, worsens food insecurity and costs the economy billions. But there are opportunities to turn what we throw away into value for people, the planet and local economies.

A new study investigates the true cost of current waste practices and the potential of alternative approaches. We spoke with one of the researchers, Anne Fitchett, about organic waste management and how the country can move towards a more sustainable, circular approach.

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What are the challenges facing waste management, particularly food waste?

Globally, waste management is a serious challenge as waste increases and systems of production and consumption become more complicated. In South Africa, the most common approach to the disposal of waste is simply to dump it on landfill sites. This currently amounts to a staggering ten million metric tons annually. The country is rapidly running out of space for landfill. Adding to the problem are inadequate planning, weak implementation of recycling policy (such as separation at source), and high transport costs that encourage illegal dumping.

In particular, food waste carries additional ethical and environmental concerns. Hunger and food insecurity is widespread in South Africa, affecting an estimated 15 million people. Organic waste, which includes garden waste, farming waste and food waste, is a major contributor of greenhouse gas emissions through decomposition. Food waste on a landfill also creates odours and pest infestations. Vulnerable people are affected most: waste pickers and low-income households who have no choice but to live near waste dump sites.

What interested us was the opportunities that food waste offers. Instead of being a costly problem, from the viewpoint of economic, social and ecological effects, how can this waste be managed differently, to provide benefits instead?

How is it currently done in South Africa and how did you work out the cost?

In South Africa, organic waste forms the largest single fraction of general waste going to landfill, making up around 27% of all disposed waste. Food waste contributes about one-third of this category.

We explored different ways of calculating the costs of managing food waste, so that we could compare landfill dumping with other approaches. We decided on a social cost-benefit analysis, as this includes economic, social and environmental costs into a single calculation. This makes it much easier for policy makers and municipalities to make informed choices.

We determined the direct costs from municipal and national data sets. The social and environmental costs had to be monetised to integrate into the calculation. To do this, we used what are called hedonic pricing models. This is the price people are willing to pay to avoid a negative environmental impact, which we derived from the local and international research. We also used life-cycle cost analysis for some of the values. Here, we factor in all the different costs that a particular method needs, such as capital cost, operating cost, maintenance, and final residual or salvage value at the end of its useful life.

Through this analysis method, we calculated that landfill practices impose an estimated R8.7 billion (US$0.5 billion) annual burden on the economy, environment and communities across South Africa. Because much of this is a hidden cost, the real “dis-amenity” (the combination of negative values) is often undervalued and these costs materialise in other ways, to the detriment of the economy, society and the environment.

What alternative methods did you test and what were the outcomes?

We explored various means:

• aerobic composting (decomposition with air circulation)

• anaerobic digestion (decomposition in a sealed container)

• processing through vermicomposting (harnessing the services of earthworms that eat the food waste and produce nutrient-rich deposits)

• black soldier flies (the larvae of which feed on the waste and produce animal feed and organic fertiliser).

We calculated that windrow composting, where organic waste is placed in long rows and turned periodically to maintain oxygen levels, generates some benefits through the sale of the compost. It also saves in greenhouse gas emissions by replacing more costly fertilisers for farming.

In-vessel composting was the one method we analysed that had higher costs than benefits, even though it produces better quality compost and almost no air pollutants. (But this was still a marked improvement over landfilling.) In this method, the waste is in a closed environment, where air-flow, moisture and temperature can be controlled to speed up the composting process.

We also evaluated anaerobic digestion with bio-gas capture, which takes place in an enclosed environment, but with air excluded. The biogas percolates to the top of the tank where it is extracted for cooking and other uses. This has a much higher capital and operational cost, but generates saleable methane and carbon dioxide gases, as well as a digestate that can be sold for soil enhancement.

Vermicomposting is a process where organic waste is broken down by earthworms and microbes into material that can add nutrients to soil. It also produces worm biomass as a high-protein animal feed. This produces a higher net benefit than any of the other methods described so far.

The best performer from the social cost-benefit analysis was black soldier fly processing. The flies’ eggs are hatched and the larvae are transferred to the food waste, which the larvae feed on. When the larvae reach maturity, they are harvested for protein-rich animal feed and their deposits (called frass) are collected for use as fertiliser.

Studies agree that anaerobic digestion offers the best performance from a purely environmental appraisal.

Our study suggests that a combination of anaerobic digestion and black soldier fly processing could be the optimal solution, taking into account social and economic aspects.

How can these findings be used to shape policy?

Our study offers a number of pointers. It is essential to look at gate fees to landfill sites. Some of the sites are not charging at all, and the closest to charging an economic rate is the Western Cape province. This should be weighed against the possible avoidance of formal waste disposal altogether, inadvertently promoting illegal dumping. Linked to this is the lack of compliance with waste legislation that was identified at many of the sites across the country.

Municipalities should be encouraged, through government policies, to invest in alternative technologies, like vermicomposting and black soldier fly processing. A strategic combination of economic incentives, regulatory compliance and sustainable practices is essential to achieve long-term national waste management objectives.

The results of our study highlight the urgent need for an integrated strategy that incorporates economic, ecological, social and governance dimensions to transform food waste into a resource. The current default to landfill is simply not a sustainable option. With targeted policies and investments, food waste could shift from being a costly liability to serving as a cornerstone of South Africa’s circular economy and sustainable development agenda.

Gabriel Pereira, a master’s student, was a co-author on the research and article.

Anne Fitchett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Food waste in South Africa is dumped in landfills – study weighs up healthier and more sustainable options – https://theconversation.com/food-waste-in-south-africa-is-dumped-in-landfills-study-weighs-up-healthier-and-more-sustainable-options-268715

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Ernest Harsch, Researcher, Institute of African Studies, Columbia University

Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea and Gabon have all suffered regime change in the last five years, led by men in military uniform.

Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau experienced the same fate in 2025. Benin looked to join the list in early December, but the civilian government held onto power – just.

The academic literature on coups in Africa has highlighted a wide range of influences and triggers. These include:

• personal and institutional rifts within the armed forces

• susceptibility to both elite manipulation and popular pressure

• instigation by foreign powers against governments deemed hostile to their interests.

In a recent paper I added a further question: to what extent were democratic failings an element in the coups of the past six years?

I am a journalist and academic who has focused on African political and development issues since the 1970s. Among my most recently published books is Burkina Faso: A History of Power, Protest and Revolution.

In the paper I explored underlying shortcomings of Africa’s democracies as one major factor leading to military seizures. I focused on the recent coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Gabon.

I selected those cases because each of their takeovers was mounted against an elected civilian government. In some instances, I found, factors other than poor elections were also at play. The juntas in both Burkina Faso and Niger cited political defects of their elected, if somewhat ineffective, governments. But they mainly blamed their predecessors’ failure to put down growing jihadist insurgencies.

Insecurity was also a factor in Mali. But Mali, Guinea and Gabon all had elections commonly perceived to have been rigged or in violation of constitutional term limits. They provoked popular opposition which prompted officers to step in.

My main finding was thus that popular disappointment in elected governments was a prominent element. It established a more favourable context enabling officers to seize power with a measure of popular support.

That finding suggests that in order to better protect democracy in Africa, it is not sufficient to simply condemn military coups (as Africa’s regional institutions, such as the African Union and Economic Community of West African States, are quick to do). African activists, and some policymakers, have urged a step further: denouncing elected leaders who violate democratic rights or rig their systems to hang onto power.

If elected leaders were better held to account, then potential coup makers would lose one of their central justifications.

Problems are bigger than rigged polls

The problems, however, go beyond rigged polls, errant elected leaders, and violated constitutions. Many African governments, whether they are democratic or not, have great difficulty meeting citizens’ expectations, especially for improvements in their daily lives.

The deeper structural weaknesses of African states further contribute to hampering effective governance. As Ugandan anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani, Kenyan political scholar Ken Ochieng’ Opalo, and other African scholars have pointed out, those shortcomings include the externally oriented and fragmentary nature of the states inherited from colonial rule. These exclude many citizens from active political engagement and ensure government by unaccountable elites.

In particular, a neoliberal model of democracy has been widely adopted in Africa since the 1990s. That model insists that democracy be tethered to pro-market economic policies and greatly limit the size and activities of African states. That in turn hinders the ability of even well-elected governments to provide their citizens with security and services.

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Read more:
South African protesters echo a global cry: democracy isn’t making people’s lives better

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Conducting elections while continuing to subject African economies to the economic policy direction of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank has left them with a “choiceless democracy,” as Malawian economist Thandika Mkandawire termed it. That is, while voters may sometimes be able to change top leaders, they cannot alter basic economic policies. Such policies generally favour austerity and cutbacks over delivering jobs, education and healthcare.

So in addition to improving the quality of democratic systems on the continent, “coup proofing” African states will also require giving greater scope to popular input into real decision making, in both the political and economic spheres.

That will depend primarily on Africans themselves fighting for the democracies they want. Clearing the way for them means ending the all-too-common repression of street mobilisations and alternative views that displease the ruling elites.

Support for democracy

There may be general unhappiness with the flaws of Africa’s electoral systems. Surveys nevertheless demonstrate continued strong support for the ideals of democracy. Many ordinary Africans, moreover, are mobilising in various ways to advance their own conceptions of democratic practice.

For example, when the Macky Sall government in Senegal used repression and unconstitutional manoeuvres to try to prolong his tenure, tens of thousands mobilised in the streets in 2023-24 to block him and force an election that brought radical young oppositionists to power.

In Sudan, the community resistance committees that mobilised massively against the country’s military elites outlined an alternative vision of a people’s democracy encompassing national elections, decentralised local assemblies, and participatory citizen engagement.

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Read more:
Africans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?

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Findings by the Afrobarometer research network, which has repeatedly polled tens of thousands of African citizens, provide solid grounds for hope. Surveys in 39 countries between 2021 and 2023 show that 66% of respondents still strongly preferred democracy to any alternative form of government.

For anyone committed to a democratic future for Africa, that is something to build on.

Ernest Harsch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Coups in Africa: how democratic failings help shape military takeovers – study – https://theconversation.com/coups-in-africa-how-democratic-failings-help-shape-military-takeovers-study-271565