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February 16, 2026

Trump has scrapped the long-standing legal basis for tackling climate emissions

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Robyn Eckersley, Redmond Barry Professor of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne

Regulating climate emissions just became more difficult. US President Donald Trump announced on Thursday the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has repealed its own 2009 legal finding that greenhouse gas emissions endanger human health.

Vindicated by a Supreme Court ruling in 2007, and based on scientific evidence, this so-called endangerment finding by the EPA provided the legal warrant for the regulation of greenhouse gases by the federal government. It underpinned the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan, which regulated emissions from power plants. In his first term, Trump had tried to weaken it but a new version was introduced by the Biden administration.

Without the endangerment finding, and in the absence of new laws passed by both Houses of Congress, the federal government lacks the legal mandate for direct regulation of greenhouse emissions. The science hasn’t changed, but the obligation to act on it has been scrubbed out.

If you imagine the United States as a collection of big greenhouse gas pots with lids, the Trump administration has been lifting the lids off one by one, releasing more emissions by stepping up fossil fuel extraction, production and consumption. This legal finding held down the biggest lid on climate emissions — and Trump has pulled it right off. This will have a structural effect globally.

What is the endangerment finding, and how was it developed?

In 1970, when the US environment movement was at its most influential, Congress passed an important piece of legislation called the Clean Air Act. It empowered the new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to declare something a pollutant if it endangered public health. Initially, it was used to regulate pollutants such as smog or coal ash, the byproducts of industry.

During the George W. Bush presidency, the EPA made a ruling that greenhouse gases were also a pollutant within the meaning of the Clean Air Act. This ruling was challenged in 2007 by fossil fuel interests in the case of Massachusetts v EPA, but the court ruled (five judges to four) that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases were “air pollutants” that endangered human health and welfare. It directed the EPA to assess their impact on human welfare — allowing the agency to regulate them.

However, the Bush administration did not push the EPA to implement the ruling.

How was the endangerment finding used for climate action?

President Barack Obama promised to act on climate during his election campaign but faced a hostile Senate when he came to power. His efforts to enact an emission trading bill failed.

However, the endangerment finding allowed him to use his executive power to direct the EPA to regulate emissions. In his first term, the EPA issued new vehicle emissions regulations for cars and light trucks, and some power plants and refineries.

In his second term, Obama extended those regulations to all power plants. These moves represented the US’s first significant steps towards emissions reductions. They enhanced Obama’s diplomatic credibility in the negotiations for the Paris Agreement in 2015. This provided a footing for bilateral cooperation with China on clean energy, helping to build diplomatic trust between the world’s two biggest emitters. Their lead negotiators worked together in the final days of the negotiations to get the Paris Agreement over the line.

Why has Trump overturned it?

On February 12, Trump announced the EPA would rescind the legal finding it has relied on for nearly 20 years. Among all the wrecking balls he has swung at efforts to decarbonise the US economy, this is the biggest. He claims the legal finding hurts Americans. The EPA’s director, Trump-appointed Lee Zeldin, called the rule the “holy grail of climate change religion”.

“This determination had no basis in fact — none whatsoever,” Trump told the media on Thursday. “And it had no basis in law. On the contrary, over the generations, fossil fuels have saved millions of lives and lifted billions of people out of poverty all over the world.”

But without federal action to curb emissions, the impact of climate change will intensify. The US is the “indispensable state” when it comes achieving the goals and principles of the Paris Agreement. Although China’s annual aggregate emissions are much higher than the US’s, the US is the world’s largest historical emitter, which makes it the most causally responsible for the global heating that has already occurred.

Yet the Trump administration regards climate change as a hoax. Trump has withdrawn the US not only from the Paris Agreement but also the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. In short, the US is now actively fanning the flame of global heating.

In a case of history repeating itself, the arguments being made by Zedlin are pretty much the same as those once put forward by the original opponents of the endangerment finding: claiming that the original legislation was supposed to apply only to local pollutants such as smog, but not greenhouse gases, and that the science isn’t clear.

Those arguments don’t stack up, because there is indisputable evidence that increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases do indeed harm human health and welfare. The EPA is obliged to regulate harmful pollutants at the specific source.

What’s next?

This move will trigger court cases, which won’t be resolved quickly. Zedlin and Trump will face a crowd of litigants, including environment groups and NGOs. The Trump administration will likely ignore these and steam ahead with its “drill, baby, drill” slogan.

If the lawsuits fail, or Trump ignores them, it will be devastating. There will be no overarching federal legislation directly regulating emissions in the US. What’s more, a new Democrat president committed to climate action will not have this easy lever to regulate greenhouse gases. Instead, they will have to get new climate legislation through an intensely polarised Congress.

However, there are ways forward. Assuming Trump is prepared to leave office after his second term (admittedly, a big if), it is possible a new Democratic administration might have the numbers in Congress to enact new climate legislation. In the meantime, climate action is continuing to ratchet up at the state and city level in many US states.

Robyn Eckersley currently receives funding from the Norwegian Research Council.

– ref. Trump has scrapped the long-standing legal basis for tackling climate emissions – https://theconversation.com/trump-has-scrapped-the-long-standing-legal-basis-for-tackling-climate-emissions-275921

February 15, 2026

Ramaphosa and a stable electricity system in South Africa: the devils are in the detail

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mark Swilling, Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Development, Stellenbosch University

The strategic significance of the reference to energy reform in South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address cannot be overstated.

Many media reports carried a sense of elation about how this clears the way for resolving the country’s long-term energy crisis. This sentiment is premature: there are many devils in the details that need to be attended to before the country can celebrate.

Ramaphosa announced that the soon-to-be established Transmission System Operator will own South Africa’s transmission assets. This would include all main powerlines and sub-stations. This was contrary to what had been expected, particularly by South Africa’s state-owned power utility Eskom. Its assumption was that it would retain ownership of the transmission assets via its subsidiary, the National Transmission Company of South Africa, that was established in 2024.

Ramaphosa disagreed.

We are restructuring Eskom and establishing a fully independent state-owned transmission entity. This entity will have ownership and control of transmission assets and be responsible for operating the electricity market.

He went on to say:

Given the importance of this restructuring for the broader reform of the electricity sector, I have established a dedicated task team under the National Energy Crisis Committee to address various issues relating to the restructuring process, including clear timeframes for its phased implementation. It will report to me within three months.

The implications of this statement are far-reaching.

Surprise move

The National Transmission Company of South Africa, established in July 2024, is the
current owner and operator of the national grid transmission system. It is entirely owned by Eskom Holdings. It was assumed that, within five years, it would be spun out of Eskom and reconstituted as the Transmission System Operator. In other words, in addition to owning the transmission assets, this entity would be the overall operator of the national grid, the manager of the build programme, and operator of the energy market provided for by the Energy Regulation Amendment Act.

In an opinion piece in December 2025 Dan Marokane, Eskom Group CEO elaborated on an announcement by the Minister of Energy and Electricty when he wrote:

Under the chosen modality, the (Eskom-owned) National Transmission Company of South Africa will remain the owner of transmission assets, entering a right-of-use agreement with the newly established Transmission System Operator … responsible for independently operating transmission assets, whether owned by the National Transmission Company of South Africa or private sector players under the envisioned Independent Transmission Projects programme.

This approach took some parts of government and major business and investment associations by surprise.

The objections by business stem from concerns about how the build-out of new energy capabilities will be financed. The US$25 billion plan on the table provides for a grid transmission build programme over the next 10 years to stabilise South Africa’s energy output.

But where will the money come from?

The money question

South African business and Enoch Godongwana, the Minister of Finance, argue that the only affordable and sustainable way to fund this kind of infrastructure build is to rope in the private sector. That there’s money available is not disputed. As a sustainable development scholar my own research for the National Planning Commission shows that there is a surplus of investment capital in South Africa to fund the just transition.

But there are concerns that investors will be reluctant to invest this capital in an Eskom subsidiary because Eskom’s balance sheet is compromised. And because of its track record and low ratings, Eskom is not regarded by some investors as trustworthy. And even if they do invest in Eskom, because of a perceived higher risk, this would raise the cost of capital and push up electricity prices.

Reportedly, Ramaphosa’s statement came after various consultations during December and January.

Why it matters

The widely supported government-approved Transmission Development Plan established by the National Transmission Company of South Africa makes provision for a R400 billion investment strategy over a 10-year period.

This will make it possible to build 14,400kms of new lines, 271 new
transformers and rehabilitate the existing infrastructure.

Given the state’s fiscal constraints, massive increases in public funding to achieve the plan’s targets are unlikely. It follows that the bulk will have to come from domestic
investors.

That means, if South Africa is truly committed to achieving the plan’s targets then it needs to make sure that the conditions are in place to unlock private capital for public infrastructures.

This is not privatisation. The aim is to mobilize South African capital to meet South Africa’s needs.

The danger of a return to loadshedding

If the conditions for increased private investment in this publicly-owned transmission infrastructure are not put in place, it is very likely that loadshedding will return in 2029.

Eskom’s Medium Term Adequacy Outlook makes clear the risks South Africa faces come 2029/30 when the three oldest power stations – Hendrina, Camden and Grootvlei – need to be decommissioned, and more after them.

The outlook also makes clear that if the much-needed 6GW of gas infrastructure does not come on-line in time to replace coal power, loadshedding is highly likely by 2029. But there is widespread doubt about this gas infrastructure materialising by 2029/30.

And so, if the National Transmission Company of South Africa cannot access the capital needed at the right price to massively expand the grid over the next five years, then the renewables (mainly wind) plus extensive backup that the country needs to prevent loadshedding by 2029/30 will not be able to connect into the national grid.

That will almost certainly result in the return of loadshedding.

Many analysts have raised doubts about whether Eskom has the headroom to raise the required debt against its own balance sheet. If they are correct, creating a “fully independent Transmission System Operator” that controls and owns its own assets is then presented as an easier way to raise debt at a lower price. In turn, this is supposed to have a beneficial impact on tariffs, and prevent loadshedding.

But this is a simplistic understanding of the solution.

The independent Transmission System Operator will take a few years to get established. The report the president wants will describe how the assets can be transferred over time without harming Eskom’s financial position. Sudden shifts should be avoided.

Furthermore, this report will have to deal with the details where the devils reside. In particular, if the Transmission System Operator is fully independent, then what matters is the full independence of the revenue system from Eskom, cost-reflective tariffs and revenue certainty (which includes a solution to the growing mountain of municipal arrears).

The call for a fully independent Transmission System Operator may give lenders the security they need, but the hidden threat is that the risk of revenue shortfalls gets transferred to the sovereign (and ultimately the tax payer).

In the meantime, the transmission build programme must be accelerated. Our research described how the energy transition can be accelerated. We also set out why a renewables-based economy enabled by the transmission build programme is not only the lowest-cost option compared to the alternatives, it is also central to “green growth” which the President described as “[t]he biggest opportunity of all… .”

To establish a fully independent state-owned Transmission System Operator within five years, alignment across three fronts will be required:

government-wide support for the policy direction described by the President,
managerial interests within the National Transmission Company of South Africa who see their futures beyond Eskom and act out accordingly over the medium- to long-term,and
a South African investment community prepared to make big ticket long-term investments in a pipeline of large-scale transmission projects over the next decade.

But this can only work if a revenue model can be designed that is independent of Eskom, guarantees cash flow discipline and ensures cost-reflective tariffs. No document to date addresses this crucial nexus.

With policy and revenue certainty, South African investors will be able to make 20-year investments to implement the Transmission Development Plan. By ensuring that the country avoids loadshedding, these policy-enabled investments will drive accelerated green growth.

Mark Swilling receives funding from National Research Foundation. He is affiliated with the National Transmission Company of South Africa in his capacity as a non-Executive Director. He writes in his academic capacity.

– ref. Ramaphosa and a stable electricity system in South Africa: the devils are in the detail – https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-and-a-stable-electricity-system-in-south-africa-the-devils-are-in-the-detail-276014

February 15, 2026

Is teasing playful or harmful? It depends on a number of factors

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Naomi Andrews, Associate Professor of Child and Youth Studies, Brock University

Picture this: a group of girls are sitting at a table in the lunchroom when a boy walks by. One girl turns to another girl and laughingly says: “Oh, isn’t that your boyfriend? You should go kiss him!”

A different girl chimes in: “Yeah, go give him a big kiss!” The girl in question responds: “Shh, stop that. I don’t want him to hear you!” and she smiles, but her face goes red. Her friends continue, making kissing noises and laughing. The others in the group join in laughing as well.

How should the girl interpret that behaviour? Were the teasers being playful — or taunting her in an aggressive way?

The answer to that question is: it depends. Teasing is a common but complex behaviour that can serve pro-social functions, such as bonding, signalling relational closeness. But it can also have anti-social functions and harm the targeted person.

Like all complex social behaviours, teasing interactions are influenced by a number of factors, like the relationship between teaser and target, the content of the tease and the local and broader context.

Study about harmful or playful teasing

In our recent study, we developed a model that organizes these various factors and the links between them.

The study used semi-structured interviews with 27 university students, who we asked to describe a teasing interaction from their adolescence that they experienced as harmful and playful.

Based on the interviews with participants, we developed a model to capture the many dynamics involved in teasing (such as the relationship between parties) and profiles of both harmful and playful teasing that shows where these factors differ.

Power differences, motives

As described by research participants, harmful teasing often includes content that is sensitive to the target, and might include a power difference between teaser and target based on factors like gender or sexuality, culture or racialization, as well as wealth or popularity. Some harmful content expressed was about sexuality (more than one participant mentioned homophobia) and ethnicity or religion (one participant was teased about wearing her hijab).

Playful teasing, on the other hand, often happens between close friends and is based on positive motives (for example, to be friendly, for encouragement). However, there is also substantial overlap between playful and harmful teasing.

Teasing can also start out as playful but “cross the line” to become harmful. Our systematic review of existing research about peer teasing revealed that youth consider a few key factors to determine what “crosses the line.”

The teaser’s body language, facial expressions and tone of voice combine to indicate the meaning behind the tease. Intent is important, and a teaser whose intent is clearly playful is less likely to cross the line.

Changes across development

The interplay between relationships and teasing content is also important. Youth in our study indicated that friends should know what to say and what not to say. That is, given their closeness, friends should know what specific content would cross the line. That said, teasing from friends can still hurt, particularly because they can have intimate knowledge of the target’s vulnerabilities.

Other research also points to important changes across children’s development. For example, researchers have noted that teasing is almost always interpreted as harmful by younger children. It isn’t until adolescence that youth recognize the potential for teasing to be playful.

This suggests that advances in cognitive, social and emotional skills across the transition to adolescence may better help youth understand the complexity and nuance that can be a part of these interactions.

For adults working with youth — or thinking about their own lives — it’s important to remember a social interaction may look harmless from the outside, but can still have negative consequences for those involved.

As for the distinction between teasing and bullying, what our research shows is that some harmful teasing can be considered bullying as it meets the hallmarks of that negative behaviour (power differential, intent, repetition), but not always.

Limits of playful teasing

Based on findings from our review and across our multiple studies, we suggest some insights around the limits of playful teasing that could be relevant for youth or adults in their own lives — or adults supporting children and youth.

A good starting place for playful teasing is when the teaser has a positive, close relationship with the person they are teasing. The person being teased should feel comfortable enough to ask for the teasing to stop if they want; and then the teasing should stop right away.
Teasing shouldn’t involve part of the target’s identity or involve sensitive topics. This is why having a close, positive relationship is a good prerequisite, so that the teaser knows what topics are “off-limits.”
We should always be careful about teasing around an audience, as this can amplify the harm — even when the audience involves other friends.
Check in with the person you’re teasing and pay close attention to their reaction. Often playful teasing is reciprocal.
Repeated teasing — even about seemingly benign topics — is more likely to feel harmful.

Lastly, even if a teaser means to be playful, being teased can still hurt. Be prepared to make amends and engage in relationship repair if the playful tease “crosses the line” and harms someone.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Is teasing playful or harmful? It depends on a number of factors – https://theconversation.com/is-teasing-playful-or-harmful-it-depends-on-a-number-of-factors-273676

February 15, 2026

When norovirus hits the Olympics: The science behind the spread

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jennifer Guthrie, Assistant Professor of Microbiology and Immunology, Western University

Norovirus outbreaks have repeatedly shadowed major international events, and the Olympics are no exception. When thousands of athletes from around the world gather in one place, attention is usually on records broken and medals won. Yet the size and intensity of the Games can create conditions that allow infectious microbes to spread.

The outbreak at the 2026 Milan-Cortina Winter Games has already affected several teams, illustrating the real-world impact of such infections. Highly contagious and able to survive for days on surfaces, norovirus is one example of a pathogen that can move efficiently in these environments.

While norovirus outbreaks are often reported on cruise ships and in schools, global sporting events present additional challenges. Meals are served in centralized facilities, training and recreational spaces are shared and participants travel from countries around the world. In these environments, norovirus can spread rapidly through shared spaces and close contact.

Outbreaks at events like the Olympics are more than logistical setbacks. They reveal how the virus’s biology and the realities of mass gatherings make containment difficult.

What is norovirus?

Illustration of blue norovirus particles — Norovirus is the leading cause of food-borne illness worldwide, causing hundreds of millions of cases each year.
(CDC/ Jessica A. Allen)

Norovirus is a highly contagious virus that causes acute gastroenteritis, an inflammation of the stomach and intestines. It is the leading cause of food-borne illness worldwide, causing hundreds of millions of cases each year.

Although infections are often brief, typically lasting 24 to 72 hours, symptoms can be intense. Sudden onset vomiting, watery diarrhea, nausea, stomach cramps and sometimes low-grade fever or body aches are common. Most healthy adults recover quickly, but young children, older adults and people who become dehydrated can experience serious complications.

One reason norovirus spreads so efficiently is its extremely low infectious dose: fewer than 20 viral particles may be enough to cause illness. By comparison, many other viruses require far higher doses to trigger infection.

In practical terms, microscopic contamination on food, surfaces or hands can be enough to make someone sick. The virus spreads primarily through the fecal–oral route, via contaminated food or water, direct person-to-person contact or touching contaminated surfaces and then the mouth.

Norovirus is also remarkably resilient. It can survive on surfaces for days, withstand freezing temperatures and resist many common disinfectants. It is not reliably killed by alcohol-based hand sanitizers, making thorough hand-washing with soap and water essential. Adding to the challenge, infected individuals can spread the virus before symptoms appear and may continue shedding it for days after recovery.

These characteristics of high infectivity, environmental persistence, and the ability to spread before and after symptoms appear make norovirus particularly difficult to control, especially in settings where large numbers of people live, eat and interact in close proximity.

Why the Olympics are a perfect storm

The Olympic Games bring together thousands of athletes, coaches, support staff and spectators for several weeks of intense competition. With back-to-back events, team meetings and travel between venues, athletes are in near-constant contact with teammates, competitors and staff. In the shared spaces of the Olympic Village, even small exposures can allow infections to move quickly.

The rapid turnover of participants and the arrival of athletes from multiple countries further increase the risk. Different viral strains can be introduced, and those infected may unknowingly carry the virus to others or even back home.

In this environment, speed is everything: norovirus can cause illness within a day or two of exposure, allowing outbreaks to spread quickly and challenging even the most well-prepared health teams.

Containment challenges during major sporting events

Isolation, sanitation and rapid testing are critical but difficult at scale. Containing norovirus during a global event like the 2026 Winter Olympics highlights the practical hurdles organizers face. In early February, a norovirus cluster among the Finland women’s hockey team forced the postponement of their opening game against Canada, as more than a dozen players were either ill or quarantined, showing how quickly an infectious outbreak can disrupt competition plans.

Testing is a key limitation. Norovirus is often diagnosed based on symptoms, and although laboratory tests are available, results may be delayed and capacity strained during a massive event. Because people can spread the virus before symptoms appear, transmission may already be underway by the time cases are confirmed.

Sanitation must also intensify quickly. Norovirus survives on surfaces and requires chlorine-based disinfectants applied thoroughly to high-touch areas across venues and athlete housing. Scaling these measures across large facilities demands rapid co-ordination and staffing.

Isolation is another essential tool. Separating symptomatic or exposed athletes can interrupt transmission but may disrupt team routines. After one player on Switzerland’s women’s hockey team tested positive, the entire team entered precautionary isolation and missed the opening ceremony, showing how a single case can have wide-reaching effects.

Containment ultimately depends on co-ordination among organizers, medical teams and public health authorities, along with clear communication to safeguard both health and competition.

Beyond the Games

The Olympics showcase the best of global unity, but they also reveal how tightly interconnected our world has become.

Managing infectious diseases at events of this scale requires constant preparedness, reminding us that public health planning is as essential as athletic preparation.

Jennifer Guthrie receives funding from the Canada Research Chairs program, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.

– ref. When norovirus hits the Olympics: The science behind the spread – https://theconversation.com/when-norovirus-hits-the-olympics-the-science-behind-the-spread-275782

February 15, 2026

The IOC’s ban of a Ukrainian athlete over his helmet reveals troubling double standards

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Adam Ali, Assistant Professor, School of Kinesiology, Western University

On Feb. 12, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) banned Ukrainian skeleton athlete Vladyslav Heraskevych from competition for wearing a helmet that featured images of fellow Ukrainian athletes who had been killed in Russia’s invasion of his home nation.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, close to 15,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed and 40,000 have been injured since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

Over the past four years, more than 450 Ukrainian athletes — including those adorned on Heraskevych’s helmet — have been killed, with many more injured or left with long-term disabilities.

The IOC’s decision has once again placed the Olympic movement at the centre of a longstanding debate over neutrality, political expression and human rights.

Neutrality and expression

The IOC stated that Heraskevych violated the athlete expression guidelines, saying:

“It is a fundamental principle that sport at the Olympic Games is neutral and must be separate from political, religious and any other type of interference. The focus at the Olympic Games must remain on athletes’ performances, sport and the harmony that the Games seek to advance.”

The IOC’s current rules on athlete expression stem from Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, which doesn’t permit any kind of “demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda” in Olympic areas.

The IOC’s decision has already been decried as unlawful and discriminatory by legal and human rights experts, who argue that it is inconsistent with the IOC’s application of its own policies in other instances.

For example, Italian snowboarder Roland Fischnaller displayed a Russian flag on his helmet, even though Russia’s national symbols were officially banned at the Games.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the IOC initially barred Russian athletes from competing under their national flag but later permitted some to participate as neutral athletes. This has drawn criticism, particularly in cases where Russian athletes have been linked to activity supporting the war in Ukraine.

While some might justifiably point to contradictions in the application of Olympic rules on athlete expression, as well within the policies themselves, the IOC’s decision illuminates a longer-standing concern.

As many scholars, activists and others have argued for decades, the IOC, with its current structure, is ill-equipped to provide global leadership in promoting peace and human rights through sport.

The limits of the Olympic Truce

This contradiction can be traced as far back as the Olympic Truce, first instituted in the 9th century BC in ancient Greece. In its contemporary form, the truce is intended to protect “as far as possible, the interests of the athletes and sport in general, and to harness the power of sport to promote peace, dialogue and reconciliation.”

In practice, however, peacemaking has been more of a rhetorical than actualized endeavour within the Olympic movement. The IOC frequently emphasizes sport’s perceived ability to help athletes and fans from different parts of the world overcome prejudice and discrimination through the Olympic Games.

Yet this key part of the Olympic mission is complicated by the IOC’s wish to maintain its image as an “essentially apolitical international organization, as political scientist Liam Stockdale has noted.

Maintaining a politically neutral stance while claiming to promote peace in global conflicts — such as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine — is both contradictory and a purposeful form of naivete that allows the IOC to “sportswash” its way to further fill its financial coffers.

Although the IOC has often remained silent — and at times restricted athletes’ voices — on matters of social justice and human rights, its sanctions on Russia demonstrate that it is willing to take explicit positions when it deems necessary.

This stands in stark contrast to its banning of Heraskevych for highlighting the costs of Russia’s military adventure — Ukrainian lives.

Double standards at play

The debate over neutrality has also extended beyond Ukraine. The IOC has faced intense criticism over its continued silence towards Israel’s military campaign in Palestine following the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas.

Israel’s actions have been described as constituting genocide by human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, an independent United Nations commission and academic experts.

Hundreds of Palestinian athletes have been killed in Israeli attacks, according to the Palestine Olympic Committee and the Palestinian Football Association.

Committees, sport clubs, scholars and other advocates have called for Israel to be banned from the 2024 Paris Games and the current Winter Games in Italy.

To date, however, the IOC has not imposed restrictions on Israeli athletes or officials, maintaining its position that the Games must remain politically neutral. This reveals the IOC’s double standards in determining whose human rights and livelihoods are worth speaking up for, and whose they consider disposable.

Such actions mean it’s that much more imperative for athletes like Heraskevych to continue using one of global sport’s largest spectacles to shed light on atrocities taking place in Ukraine, Gaza and elsewhere, while athletic feats are celebrated on the ice, slopes and half-pipes in Italy.

Adam Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The IOC’s ban of a Ukrainian athlete over his helmet reveals troubling double standards – https://theconversation.com/the-iocs-ban-of-a-ukrainian-athlete-over-his-helmet-reveals-troubling-double-standards-275896

February 15, 2026

Gene-edited meat in Canada: To label or not to label?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Gwendolyn Blue, Professor, University of Calgary

The Canadian government’s recent approval of the first gene-edited animal to enter the food system has reignited debates over whether foods produced using genetic engineering techniques should be labelled.

Gene-edited animals, including faster-growing fish, heat-tolerant cows and disease-resistant pigs, have already been approved in the United States, Japan and several countries in South America. These decisions, including Canada’s approval, were made with limited public awareness and input.

Advocacy groups such as the Canadian Biotechnology Action Network, political parties including the Bloc Québécois and organic pork producers are calling for mandatory labelling of gene-edited meat in Canada.

Public demand

Public opinion research indicates that many Canadians view labelling gene-edited foods as essential. Polling commissioned by the Canadian Health Food Association suggests many Canadians want greater transparency about the use of gene editing for food production.

Studies in the United States also suggest that consumer acceptance increases when the benefits of gene editing are clearly communicated.

Similarly, a survey commissioned by the company that developed Canada’s first approved gene-edited pig found that many Canadians would consider purchasing gene-edited pork if health and environmental benefits were delivered.

Why label gene-edited meat?

Food labelling serves multiple purposes: it provides information about a product’s ingredients and the production methods involved. Labels also play a democratic role by promoting transparency and accountability. This in turn allows consumers to make choices that reflect health considerations as well as their ethical, political and environmental values.

Debates over the labelling of gene-edited meat often hinge on tensions between ethical principles such as protection and autonomy. On the one hand, governments are tasked with protecting the food supply and ensuring food safety. On the other hand, individual consumers have the right to know how food is produced and to make choices accordingly.

Proponents of labelling argue that consumers have a fundamental right to know what’s in their food, how it was produced and what potential risks are involved.

With gene-edited meat, public concerns include health and safety risks, as well as environmental consequences, animal welfare, corporate control of the food system via patents and licensing and threats to food sovereignty.

For example, gene-edited animals could potentially be harmed by unintended consequences, including off-target side effects. It is imperative to ensure traceability in commercial settings with clear mechanisms to report on animal health and welfare.

By enhancing consumer choice, labelling can also foster market competition.

Opponents of labelling argue that gene-edited foods are scientifically proven to be safe and that labelling could mislead consumers into assuming there is a risk where none exists. They argue that labels can create fear and confusion, potentially undermining the adoption of breeding techniques that could enhance health, reduce environmental impacts and improve food security.

Labelling also has political consequences. Market-based approaches shift responsibility to individual consumers, which can foreclose other avenues for collective decision-making about how food systems should be governed.

Mandatory versus voluntary labelling

Canada currently doesn’t require the labelling of genetically modified (GMO) or gene-edited foods. Under the Food and Drugs Act, labelling is mandated only when a product poses a health or safety concern.

This is at odds with approaches elsewhere. For example, the U.S. National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard requires companies to label genetically engineered foods, while decisions about the labelling of gene-edited foods are made on a case-by-case basis.

In Canada, voluntary labelling is permitted provided it’s truthful and not misleading. The Canadian Standards Board, scheduled soon to cease operations due to budget cuts, provides guidance on voluntary labelling for genetically engineered foods. Notably, its definition of genetic engineering excludes both conventional breeding and gene editing.

The Canada organics sector relies on voluntary non-GMO food labelling. Similar to international organic standards, certified organic products in Canada prohibit the use of genetically engineered and gene-edited seeds, feed and food.

Following Health Canada’s approval of gene-edited pigs in January, organic pork producer duBreton introduced Canada’s first verified non-gene-edited and non-cloned meat label.

This proposed label was also a response to a now-paused federal proposal to exclude cloned animals from the definition of novel foods, a move that would allow cloned meat to enter the market without consumer or government notification.

A lack of public engagement

The labelling of gene-edited meat raises several questions. Food labels can support consumer autonomy and transparency, but labels are not good at conveying complicated information. Labels also privilege market forces for making collective decisions, instead of other democratic processes such as public deliberation and stringent regulation.

In a regulatory context that largely promotes biotechnology while offering few opportunities for meaningful public engagement, it remains unclear whether labelling is the most effective democratic approach to gene-edited meat in Canada.

As gene-edited animals potentially become more common in global food systems, the question is not just whether to label these products, but which political opportunities labelling creates or restricts — and for whose benefit.

Gwendolyn Blue receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. She is also affiliated with the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council funded training program, Genome Editing for Food Security and Environmental Sustainability (GEFSES).

– ref. Gene-edited meat in Canada: To label or not to label? – https://theconversation.com/gene-edited-meat-in-canada-to-label-or-not-to-label-274904

February 15, 2026

Does South Africa have a future without power cuts? Ramaphosa intervenes, but the drama isn’t over

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rod Crompton, Visiting Adjunct Professor, African Energy Leadership Centre, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his 2026 State of the Nation address, announced that the country’s electricity transmission assets would move out of state-owned Eskom. This will happen once the newly established National Transmission Company of South Africa is unbundled into a fully independent company.

This is not the first time Ramaphosa has used his State of the Nation address to keep South Africa’s electricity reforms on track. In 2021, he raised the cap on private power generation from 1MW to 100MW. Minister Gwede Mantashe at the time admitted that the president had “twisted his arm”.

In 2022, Ramaphosa removed the cap altogether, unleashing a torrent of private investment.

Why did Ramaphosa need to intervene again in 2026?

Many would naturally expect a national electricity transmission company to have transmission assets. But for those who have followed South Africa’s long, zigzag road toward market reforms since it became government policy in the
white paper on Energy Policy in 1998, it is less of a surprise.

I was involved in drafting the white paper and the 2019 Eskom roadmap. I worked in the Department of Minerals and Energy, was a regulator at the National Energy Regulator of South Africa for 11 years and subsequently sat on the Eskom board for six years until I resigned in 2024.

If nothing else, Eskom management has a dogged determination in pursuit of their objectives. In this fight, where ideology and serious money are intertwined, it’s difficult to predict the outcome. It’s important because it’s a prelude to bigger fights to come.

Reverse creates alarm

In December 2025, Ramaphosa’s Minister of Electricity and Energy, Kgosientsho Ramokgopa, announced that instead of being unbundled into a fully independent company, the National Transmission Company of South Africa would remain a wholly owned Eskom subsidiary, with its assets staying inside Eskom. Only the System Operator would move outside Eskom.

This announcement was alarming for several reasons:

The South African Wholesale Electricity Market is meant to commence operations in April 2026. Eskom, as the dominant generator, would have a conflict of interest in a competitive market if it owned both generation and transmission assets.
It appeared, politically, to reverse an important advance made by the Electricity Regulation Amendment Act, which came into effect in January 2025. The act created the expectation that the National Transmission Company of South Africa would become fully independent outside Eskom within five years.
After severe electricity shortages between 2008 and 2024 (what Eskom terms “loadshedding”), analysts predict a return to power cuts around 2030 unless more renewable power stations are built in time. There is no shortage of willing investors, but the transmission grid is congested, especially in the western parts of the country where the wind and sunshine are best. The
bulk of electricity demand is in the east, so the grid must be strengthened to transport power from west to east.

Ramaphosa predicted in his 2026 State of the Nation address that “by 2030, more than 40% of our energy supply will come from cheap, clean, renewable energy sources”.

Eskom plans to debottleneck the grid, targeting 14,500km of new transmission lines and 133,000 MVA (MegaVolt-Ampere) of additional transformers by 2034 at an estimated cost of US$27.5 billion.

An independent National Transmission Company of South Africa will need assets to borrow against if it is to contribute to grid expansion.

However, both Eskom and the state are effectively broke. The government cannot afford to continue the massive bailouts Eskom has needed to stay afloat over the last decade. Consequently, it must turn to the private sector.

It is planning public-private partnerships to enable private investors to expand the grid. But if Eskom’s transmission assets remain inside Eskom, those investors – as well as prospective investors in new generation capacity – would be less inclined to invest.

Both groups would fear that Eskom, as controller of the transmission assets, would discriminate against them in the emerging competitive market. Both want a level playing field and a fully independent grid to underpin the electricity market. Allowing Eskom to own the grid threatens investment and the market reform trajectory and also raises the spectre of future loadshedding.

Politically, Ramaphosa’s announcement is a public rebuke of his Minister of Electricity and Energy, who appears to have fallen under Eskom’s sway as it seeks to prolong its near-monopoly in the electricity market. Globally, monopolies do not relinquish market power easily.

In effect, Ramaphosa was settling a dispute between Eskom and the faction in his African National Congress that supports a developmental state dominated by state-owned companies, on one hand, and the National Treasury and those who recognise that depending on Eskom to solve the country’s electricity problems is unlikely to end well, on the other.

Ramaphosa went out of his way to say:

We are establishing a level playing field for competition, so that we are never again exposed to the risk of relying on a single supplier to meet our energy needs.

Why do Eskom and Ramokgopa want to keep the transmission assets inside Eskom?

The battle lines

They point to Eskom’s US$25 billion debt and note that lenders provided funds against the security of Eskom’s assets. If those assets shrink by removing the transmission lines, the lenders will object and demand repayment. Eskom would be unable to comply. Lenders with government guarantees would then turn to the government, which would also be unable to repay, leading to financial collapse.

This alarmist view ignores that utilities with debts in many countries have been restructured during market reforms. If they could negotiate solutions with lenders, why can’t Eskom?

Some believe Eskom is using debt as an excuse to retain market power, pointing to its legal challenge against the National Energy Regulator’s decision to grant electricity trading licences to five private traders.

Others believe Eskom is not receiving good financial advice and wonder why the National Treasury is not more forthright, given its extensive work in this area.

Eskom also cites its worry over:

the US$6.27 billion owed by municipalities
the need “to take account of the establishment of Eskom Green … proposed new subsidiary to house Eskom’s renewable energy business” and
the requirement for lender consents on a loan-by-loan basis.

Energy Council of South Africa chief executive James Mackay describes the unbundling framework as a “hot potato,” noting that “timing, risk and ensuring Eskom Generation doesn’t collapse (are) equally important”.

Ramaphosa recognises that difficulties remain:

Given the importance of this restructuring for the broader reform of the electricity sector, I have established a dedicated task team under the National Energy Crisis Committee to address various issues relating to the restructuring process.

It must report to him in three months.

Ramaphosa’s comments in his address prompted Eskom’s probably shortest-ever press release, in which it pledged full support for the task team.

So, it’s not a done deal.

Notably, Eskom does not endorse the president’s announcement. It more likely sees the task team as another platform to advance its views in the ongoing contestation over the path and pace of South Africa’s electricity reforms.

It will be interesting.

Rod Crompton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Does South Africa have a future without power cuts? Ramaphosa intervenes, but the drama isn’t over – https://theconversation.com/does-south-africa-have-a-future-without-power-cuts-ramaphosa-intervenes-but-the-drama-isnt-over-276015

February 15, 2026

As Alberta separatists court the U.S., prosperity is fuelling a sovereigntist turn

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Tamara Krawchenko, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria

In the past year, leaders of Alberta’s main separatist organization have travelled repeatedly to Washington, D.C., for quiet meetings with senior American government officials in the Treasury and State departments. They’ve reportedly discussed everything from adopting the American dollar to building an independent Alberta military.

These highly unusual interactions — which prompted Canada to warn the Donald Trump administration to respect Canadian sovereignty — are unfolding just as a new Angus Reid poll shows 29 per cent of Albertans would vote, or are inclined to vote, for separation if a referendum were held today.

This is a clear minority, but it’s also an indication of some discontentment. The more interesting question is why a province that has long been among Canada’s richest feels so hard done by that some are willing to contemplate breaking up the country.

Alberta defies the usual template

Andrés Rodríguez‑Pose, a professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics, argues that populist eruptions are rooted in regions suffering persistent economic decline, demographic loss and a pervasive sense that they have been “left behind” in a globalized economy.

In Europe and the United States, voters in deindustrialized regions have used the ballot box to punish political leaders for abandoning them. The core grievance is material and territorial: my region is poorer, ignored and slipping further behind.

Alberta does not fit that template.

Its economy has grown faster than any other province since 1950, and it still sits near the top of Canada’s income and employment league tables, even after oil price shocks.

In fact, a central anomaly of Canadian federalism is that Alberta’s economic heft far exceeds its population and representation in Ottawa, feeding a sense of under‑recognized importance rather than marginality.

Alberta is not a place that “doesn’t matter” economically; the anger of those who want to separate stems from believing it matters a great deal and is nonetheless disrespected.

A long history of grievance politics

To understand today’s sovereigntist turn, we need to situate it in Alberta’s political culture. For nearly a century, Alberta political leaders have fused populism, “western alienation” and oil politics into a powerful narrative about Ottawa exploiting the province’s resources.

From Social Credit premiers William Aberhart and Ernest Manning through to Progressive Conservative Peter Lougheed, provincial governments portrayed hard‑working Albertans as besieged by federal political leaders and eastern “money powers” siphoning off “their” oil wealth.

That story hardened during the National Energy Program in the 1980s and was revived against former prime minister Justin Trudeau’s climate policies and carbon pricing, which UCP governments portrayed as an attack on a fossil‑fuel‑based way of life.

Recent scholarship shows how this individualism, free‑market ideology and fossil‑fuel identity has been continually updated through the Reform Party, the “firewall” letter, Jason Kenney’s “Fair Deal Panel” and, most recently, Premier Danielle Smith’s Alberta Sovereignty Within a United Canada Act.

Alberta’s sovereigntist politics are therefore less an aberration than a radicalization of longstanding themes: populist anti‑elite rhetoric, resentment of Ottawa and a deep attachment to oil and gas.

The Alberta Prosperity Project

The Alberta Prosperity Project (APP) crystallizes this paradox. Its leaders speak the language of hardship and urgency — “we see the writing on the wall” — and claim Alberta must seize “freedom, prosperity and sovereignty” from a confederation that no longer shares its “values” and “entrepreneurship.”

Their draft fiscal blueprint, The Value of Freedom, promises that independence would unleash tens of billions in savings, eliminate personal income tax, slash other taxes and transform Alberta into “the most prosperous country in the world.”

Central to this case is the complaint that Albertans pay too much to Ottawa and get too little back in return — especially through equalization and other transfers. In this telling, sovereignty — or at least a radically “restructured” relationship with Canada — is the only way to stop Ottawa from siphoning off the fruits of Alberta’s oil.

Yet this narrative glosses over Alberta’s own choices. During boom years, successive Conservative governments — strongly backed by many of the same constituencies now drawn to sovereigntist rhetoric — cut taxes, kept royalties comparatively low and resisted building a large, Norway‑style savings fund.

At the same time, Alberta chronically under-invested in health care, education and social services relative to its fiscal capacity, leaving systems stretched even before the COVID-19 pandemic. When oil prices fell, the result was not simply federal neglect but the exposure of a model that had privileged low taxes and immediate consumption over long‑term resilience.

In other words, the Alberta Prosperity Project is right that Albertans feel squeezed — but its account of who did the squeezing is selective. Sovereigntists who blame Ottawa and equalization for every shortfall ignore the role of provincial policy in creating the ongoing boom-and-bust cycle in Alberta.

‘Fossilized’ regionalism

Another source of discontent lies in the collision between Alberta’s oil‑dependent economy and the global climate transition.

Scholars say Alberta regionalism is “fossilized” — decades of political and economic investment in oil and gas have locked in expectations about jobs, identity and provincial autonomy.

As federal and international climate policies intensify, many Albertans interpret decarbonization as a threat. In a 2023 poll, three in five Albertans said they believe the province is right to resist the federal government’s net-zero goals.

The fear is not that Alberta has been excluded from growth, but that it will be deliberately left behind in the next economy while its existing wealth is constrained or stranded.

The Alberta Prosperity Project’s fiscal plan doubles down on hydrocarbons, promising prosperity through continued or expanded oil and gas development while railing against “externally imposed limits” on emissions.

Idiosyncrasies

The Alberta Prosperity Project embodies the idiosyncrasies of this approach. It calls for an independent, low‑tax petro‑state, denounces federal redistribution and promises world‑leading prosperity. Yet it rarely acknowledges that the same political camp has historically opposed higher royalties, stronger stabilization funds and robust social investment when times were good.

It presents the climate transition as an illegitimate imposition rather than a predictable structural shift that responsible governments could have prepared for.

Recent revelations that APP leaders have been workshopping state‑building with senior U.S. officials shows this isn’t just a symbolic protest, but an attempt to secure external backing for an oil‑centred future that Canada’s constitutional order and climate obligations cannot sustain.

Alberta’s sovereigntist discontent is a three-way collision: long‑cultivated politics of grievance against Ottawa; a self‑inflicted fiscal and social vulnerability rooted in decisions made during boom years; and a global energy transition that threatens a deeply embedded regional identity.

The danger? In insisting on a future of perpetual oil‑funded prosperity while railing against transfers and federal authority, movements like APP offer Albertans a superficially compelling story that cannot be reconciled with either Canada’s Constitution or the realities of a warming world.

Tamara Krawchenko is a Research Lead with the University of Victoria-led Accelerating Community Energy Transformation initiative; a Research Fellow with the Institute for Research on Public Policy; an expert panelist with the Canadian Climate Institute and; a board member with Ecotrust Canada.

– ref. As Alberta separatists court the U.S., prosperity is fuelling a sovereigntist turn – https://theconversation.com/as-alberta-separatists-court-the-u-s-prosperity-is-fuelling-a-sovereigntist-turn-274914

February 15, 2026

Africa’s trade blocs were designed to unite the continent: four reasons they haven’t delivered

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Professor of Practice, International Human Rights Law, Tufts University

In a rapidly fracturing world, regional integration could be a source of resilience for the African continent.

The African Union agreed in 2019 to establish the African Continental Free Trade Area founded on the building blocks laid by eight regional economic communities. These are the Arab Maghreb Union, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Cen-Sad), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (Eccas), the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

But integration has made slow progress.

The World Bank issued a report 45 years ago which said a larger regional market would increase production and reduce “long-term obstacles to development”. Those obstacles included infrastructure deficits, payment and settlement systems, and political risk.

They persist to this day. Based on my research over more than three decades of work on regionalism in Africa, I suggest there are four main reasons why.

Integration experiments suffer from colonial dependency.
Integration has failed to address the informal nature of enterprise in Africa.
African countries do integration as an add-on to pre-existing colonial arrangements, instead of re-imagining them.
Regional integration in Africa has been burdened by mission creep, which makes its goals unclear.

I argue that institutions created by Africa’s leaders for this purpose must facilitate the continent as a space in which every African can thrive and diminish the tendency for national politics to trump shared progress.

The burden of colonial dependency

At the conclusion of the Berlin West Africa Conference in February 1885, European powers and the United States of America appointed themselves “to regulate the conditions most favourable to the development of trade and civilization … in Africa.”

In 1973, a pioneering study of Foreign Investments in the East African Common Market concluded that most of Africa’s post-colonial regional integration arrangements were “based on pre-independence links and institutions.”

For instance, the East African Common Market was successor to Britain’s colonial East African Federation and precursor of today’s East African Community. The Community’s recent effort to expand beyond this original geography has come at the price of cohesion, which endangers it.

Ecowas was the first to transcend patterns of colonial dependency. Uniquely, it included countries that won their independence from France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Fifty years after Ecowas was founded, recent developments suggest the experience continues to be uneasy.

One reason for this is because the post-colonial association or partnership agreements between the European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries is designed to farm and extract goods that are sent to be processed in Europe. From there, African countries import the processed goods at higher prices. This makes it impossible for Africa to grow industries that can employ its own people to process what it produces.

Informal nature of business activity

Around Africa, colonial rule thrived by routing or taking over indigenous enterprise. Those who survived it did so by going underground or operating informally. Since independence, most governments in the continent have failed to redress this historical pattern criminalising African enterprise.

As recently as 2023, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimated informal cross-border trade in Africa at “between 30% and 72% of formal trade between neighbouring countries.” This excludes a huge proportion of African enterprise from the benefits of regional integration.

Integration as an add on, instead of a shared future

African countries continue to enter into regional integration not to re-imagine but as add-ons to pre-existing colonial arrangements. Recent estimates put the number of these arrangements at over 156. For a continent of 55 countries, this means confounding overlaps of both membership and mission.

In response, many have advocated rationalisation of Africa’s regional integration arrangements.

The AU’s decision to recognise eight regional economic communities was supposed to respond to this. But it has not eliminated the overlaps. For instance, Tanzania and the DRC respectively belong to the EAC and SADC. Eritrea and Sudan were simultaneously in the IGAD, Comesa, and Cen-Sad. French-speaking west African countries belong to both Ecowas and the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa, better known as l’UEMOA.

What needs to happen next

Popular resentment against continuing colonial projects in parts of Africa may be high but it requires political imagination to transform that into constructive energy.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger exited Ecowas following rupture in relations with the colonial power, France. However, they still belong to l’UEMOA, whose currency system is backed by France.

It will take more than formal rules of market access or tax harmonisation to shrink informal trade. Women, for example, do over 70% of informal cross-border trade in Africa. An effective solution to this problem will require better frontier regimes and eliminate policies that discourage women from lawful enterprise.

Addressing mission creep

Rationalisation of Africa’s integration arrangements may already be quietly underway. Much of the focus is on membership overlaps. Since 2000, for instance, Ecowas has lost 25% of its membership, reducing it from 16 to 12 member states. Rwanda has withdrawn from Eccas and Eritrea from IGAD.

But the problem may be lack of clarity in the mission of Africa’s integration arrangements. In addition to economic issues, Africa’s regional integration regimes have also assumed burdens of collective security and governance oversight. The outcomes have been both unconvincing and destabilising. The exit in 2025 of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from Ecowas is a recent example.

Without a clear political commitment to a shared future, Africa’s governments have been unable to manage the contradictions between economic integration, collective security and governance in one mission. The time has come for them to decide what they must prioritise so that regional integration in Africa will finally get the opportunity to prove and improve the continent’s prospects.

Chidi Anselm Odinkalu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Africa’s trade blocs were designed to unite the continent: four reasons they haven’t delivered – https://theconversation.com/africas-trade-blocs-were-designed-to-unite-the-continent-four-reasons-they-havent-delivered-274471

February 15, 2026

Digital monitoring is growing in South Africa’s public service – regulation needs to catch up

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Lesedi Senamele Matlala, Senior Lecturer and Researcher in Public Policy, Monitoring and Evaluations, University of Johannesburg

Government departments across South Africa are increasingly relying on digital tools to evaluate public programmes and monitor performance. This is part of broader public-sector reforms. Their aims are to improve accountability, respond to audit pressure and manage large-scale programmes with limited staff and budgets.

Here’s an example. National departments tracking housing delivery, social grants or infrastructure rollout rely on digital performance systems rather than periodic paper-based reports. Dashboards – a way of showing visual data in one place – provide near real-time updates on service delivery.

Another is the use platforms that collect mobile data. These allow frontline officials and contractors to upload information directly from the field.

Both examples lend themselves to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to process large datasets and generate insights that would previously have taken months to analyse.

This shift is often portrayed as a step forward for accountability and efficiency in the public sector.

I am a public policy scholar with a special interest in monitoring and evaluation of government programmes. My recent research shows a worrying trend, that the turn to technology is unfolding much quicker than the ethical and governance frameworks meant to regulate it.

Across the cases I’ve examined, digital tools were already embedded in routine monitoring and evaluation processes. But there weren’t clear standards guiding their use.

This presents risks around surveillance, exclusion, data misuse and poor professional judgement. These risks are not abstract. They shape how citizens experience the state, how their data is handled and whose voices ultimately count in policy decisions.

When technology outruns policy

Public-sector evaluation involves assessing government programmes and policies. It determines whether:

public resources are used effectively
programmes achieve their intended outcomes
citizens can hold the state accountable for performance.

Traditionally, these evaluations relied on face-to-face engagement between communities, evaluators, government and others. They included qualitative methods that allowed for nuance, explanation and trust-building.

Digital tools have changed this.

In my research, I interviewed evaluators across government, NGOs, academia, professional associations and private consultancies. I found a consistent concern across the board. Digital systems are often introduced without ethical guidance tailored to evaluation practice.

Ethical guidance would provide clear, practical rules for how digital tools are used in evaluations. For example, when using dashboards or automated data analytics, guidance should require evaluators to explain how data are generated, who has access to them and how findings may affect communities being evaluated. It should also prevent the use of digital systems to monitor individuals without consent or to rank programmes in ways that ignore context.

South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act provides a general legal framework for data protection. But it doesn’t address the specific ethical dilemmas that arise when evaluation becomes automated, cloud-based and algorithmically mediated.

The result is that evaluators are often left navigating complex ethical terrain without clear standards. This forces institutions to rely on precedent, informal habits, past practices and software defaults.

Surveillance creep and data misuse

Digital platforms make it possible to collect large volumes of data. Once data is uploaded to cloud-based systems or third-party platforms, control over its storage, reuse and sharing frequently shifts from the evaluators to others.

Several evaluators described situations where data they’d collected on behalf of government departments was later reused by the departments or other state agencies. This was done without participants’ explicit awareness. Consent processes in digital environments are often reduced to a single click.

Examples of other uses included other forms of analysis, reporting or institutional monitoring.

One of the ethical risks that came out of the research was the use of this data for surveillance. This is the use of data to monitor individuals, communities or frontline workers.

Digital exclusion and invisible voices

Digital evaluation tools are often presented as expanding reach and participation. But in practice, they can exclude already marginalised groups. Communities with limited internet access, low digital literacy, language barriers or unreliable infrastructure are less likely to participate fully in digital evaluations.

Automated tools have limitations. For example, they may struggle to process multilingual data, local accents or culturally specific forms of expression. This leads to partial or distorted representations of lived experience. Evaluators in my study saw this happening in practice.

This exclusion has serious consequences especially in a country with inequality like South Africa. Evaluations that rely heavily on digital tools might find urban, connected populations and make rural or informal communities statistically invisible.

This is not merely a technical limitation. It shapes which needs are recognised and whose experiences inform policy decisions. If evaluation data underrepresents the most vulnerable, public programmes may appear more effective than they are. This masks structural failures rather than addressing them.

In my study, some evaluations reported positive performance trends despite evaluators noting gaps in data collection.

Algorithms are not neutral

Evaluators also raised concerns about the growing authority granted to algorithmic outputs. Dashboards, automated reports and AI-driven analytics are often treated as the true picture. This happens even when they conflict with field-based knowledge or contextual understanding.

For example, dashboards may show a target as on track. But in an example of a site visit, evaluators my find flaws or dissatisfaction.

Several participants reported pressure from funders or institutions to rely on the analysis of the numbers.

Yet algorithms reflect the assumptions, datasets and priorities embedded in their design. When applied uncritically, they can reproduce bias, oversimplify social dynamics and disregard qualitative insight.

If digital systems dictate how data must be collected, analysed and reported, evaluators risk becoming technicians and not independent professionals exercising judgement.

Why Africa needs context-sensitive ethics

Across Africa, national strategies and policies on digital technologies often borrow heavily from international frameworks. These are developed in very different contexts. Global principles on AI ethics and data governance provide useful reference points. But they don’t adequately address the realities of inequality, historical mistrust and uneven digital access across much of Africa’s public sector.

My research argues that ethical governance for digital evaluation must be context-sensitive. Standards must address:

how consent is obtained
who owns evaluation data
how algorithmic tools are selected and audited
how evaluator independence is protected.

Ethical frameworks must be embedded at the design stage of digital systems.

Lesedi Senamele Matlala is affiliated with the South Africa Monitoring and Evaluation Association (SAMEA). I am the chairperson

– ref. Digital monitoring is growing in South Africa’s public service – regulation needs to catch up – https://theconversation.com/digital-monitoring-is-growing-in-south-africas-public-service-regulation-needs-to-catch-up-273288