Category: English

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Adam Simpson, Visiting Scholar at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University; Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South Australia

Sanae Takaichi has made history by becoming Japan’s first female prime minister. However, this was hardly a win for feminist or progressive politics.

Takaichi is a right-wing ultraconservative whose policy positions derive from traditionalist perspectives on the role of women, Japanese history and society more broadly.

She has the same anti-immigrant positions as conservatives and right-wing populists the world over, defending “national identity and traditional values”, while emphasising the importance of strong economic growth.

Far from solving Japan’s economic problems, however, policies that restrict immigration tend to cause labour shortages and inflation.

Japan is the canary in the coalmine for many developed countries suffering a
demographic crisis due to falling birth rates. Japan’s population has declined for 16 consecutive years.

Unless Takaichi adopts a more pragmatic approach on immigration, her tenure could be one of economic stasis and relative decline.

How did Takaichi become prime minister?

Takaichi was elected leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party earlier this month. Her rise to prime minister was delayed, however, when the LDP’s junior partner, the Komeito party, withdrew from the governing coalition over the LDP’s handling of a political funding scandal.

The LDP has minorities in both the upper and lower houses of Japan’s Diet, or parliament, and requires coalition partners to govern.

After extensive negotiations that will require compromises from all sides, the right-wing Japan Innovation Party, known as Ishin, agreed to support Takaichi and her LDP-led government.

However, the new coalition is still two seats short of a majority in the lower house and will require additional parliamentary support. This means Takaichi’s minority government will be more precarious and constrained than previous governments.

Japan’s demographic crisis

Japan’s population peaked at around 128 million in 2008 and has steadily declined ever since. It’s around 124 million today.

Last year, the fertility rate (the average number of children a woman has in her lifetime) fell to a record low of 1.15.

Under current projections, Japan’s population is expected to fall to 87 million by 2070 and 63 million by 2100, when only half the population will be of working age.

The issue is therefore not simply one of a declining population, but also an ageing population, with rising pension and medical costs. Many professions in Japan, such as teachers, doctors and caregivers, are already facing acute labour shortages.

Immigration as a political lightning rod

While previous governments have acknowledged the declining population is a significant problem, they have done little to address the issue. Various initiatives have brought foreign residents or workers into the country, but there has been a reluctance under LDP governments to introduce programs with the scale and commitment – in terms of integrating immigrants into Japanese society – to make a significant difference.

This means these programs have had only modest success. Japan’s number of foreign-born residents reached a record high of 3.6 million this year, representing around 3% of the population. But this is far lower than many other developed economies.

This increased foreign population has resulted in a record number of “foreign” babies being born in Japan, with Chinese, Filipino and Brazilian mothers topping the list. This has somewhat offset the
declining figures for newborns from Japanese parents.

Japan’s tourism industry is also booming, with almost 37 million visitors coming last year.

Taken together, this increasing number of foreigners in Japan has resulted in the rise of anti-immigrant parties and policies, including the far-right Sanseito party. This, in turn, prompted the LDP to move further to the right to avoid losing votes to Sanseito and other populist parties.

This partly explains why Takaichi’s nationalist rhetoric has resonated with the ageing conservative LDP base.

Takaichi advocates for foreign workers in specified fields where the country has labour shortages, albeit under strict criteria (such as Japanese language ability, training and oversight). And she opposes the mass settlement of immigrants, or the large-scale granting of political rights to foreign residents.

While her policies have so far been short on detail, she has framed foreigners as a danger to national cohesion that needs to be strictly controlled.

Pro-natalist policies pushed instead

Across the world, older populations tend to be more susceptible to anti-immigrant scare campaigns from right-wing conservative media and politicians.

Japan is no exception. Politicians such as Takaichi, therefore, see electoral benefits in colouring immigration and foreigners as a threat to social harmony or cultural heritage.

Unfortunately, as a result, ageing countries like Japan that are most in need of immigration are often the most resistant to it.

Instead, many right-wing conservatives in these countries promote pro-natalist policies – encouraging women from the dominant racial or ethnic group to have more babies – as a solution that boosts populations and maintains cultural and racial homogeneity.

Hungary is one such example. The right-wing nationalist government of Viktor Orban has provided generous financial benefits to parents at a cost of around 5% of Hungary’s GDP. Though Hungary’s birth rate was above the European average in 2023, it has fallen since then.

Conservatives are pushing Japan to take a similar pro-natalist approach rather than rely on increased immigration.

With Takaichi as prime minister, Japan is unlikely to see an improvement in women’s independence and status in society, a significant rise in birth rates, or increased immigration. Japan’s demographic crisis is therefore set to continue, and probably worsen, in the foreseeable future.

Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Japan’s economy needs foreign workers, not the nationalist approach pushed by its new leader – https://theconversation.com/japans-economy-needs-foreign-workers-not-the-nationalist-approach-pushed-by-its-new-leader-267417

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kinda Alsamara, Lecturer in the School of Languages and Cultures, The University of Queensland

Women’s political participation is often treated as a measure of a country’s commitment to equality and democracy.

Earlier this year, Syria’s new leader, President Ahmed al-Sharaa, described his country as moving in a “democratic direction” after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship in late 2024. He said:

If democracy means that the people decide who will rule them and who represents them in the parliament, then, yes, Syria is going in this direction.

Yet, in Syria’s recent parliamentary elections, women only won six seats in the 210-member body. Exclusion was not merely reflected in the outcome, it was engineered into the very structure of the process.

A long history of marginalisation

Assad ruled Syria with an iron fist for more than two decades through widespread repression, war crimes and systematic violence against civilians.

Parliamentary elections were highly controlled, with Assad’s Ba’ath Party and its allies dominating every vote. Women held between 6% and 13% of seats from 1981 to the end of Assad’s tenure, according to estimates from a global organisation of national parliaments.

Although the parliament had little real power, it served to legitimise Assad’s rule through the appearance of a democratic process.

In December 2024, al-Sharaa’s Islamist-led coalition took advantage of the power vacuum created by the decline of Iran’s regional influence and the collapse of its allied armed groups to oust Assad and dissolve Syria’s symbolic legislature.

Al-Sharaa’s rise was initially hailed as a potential turning point toward political reform and reconciliation. However, early signs suggest that entrenched patterns of marginalisation – especially of women – are continuing to shape Syria’s politics.

How women (and others) were sidelined

The recent parliamentary elections in early October did not factor in the people’s will, nor were they permitted to vote. They weren’t involved in the process at all.

Instead, the elections were overseen by a government body called the Supreme Judicial Committee for Elections, appointed by al-Sharaa. Its composition was revealing: nine men and only two women.

The process was complicated and deliberately exclusionary. The Supreme Judicial Committee was tasked with forming electoral subcommittees around the country, which then reviewed applicants for individuals to be appointed to electoral colleges. Only those selected were allowed to participate in the voting process or nominate candidates.

Ordinary citizens had no direct role in the election.

Under this framework, the electoral colleges selected representatives for two-thirds of the parliament seats. Al-Sharaa will appoint the remaining third.

Unsurprisingly, women’s representation in the subcommittees was minimal. Drawing on raw figures published on the official Syrian election website, women only constituted about 11% of all subcommittee members (18 out of roughly 180 nationwide).

Even where women did have decent representation, no female parliamentarians were elected. In Damascus, for example, women comprised nearly a third of the registered applicants (44 out of 145) for the electoral college and a third of the local subcommittee members. Yet, not a single woman from the capital was elected.

Minority representation was also limited. Of the 119 members elected so far, only ten belong to religious or ethnic minorities, including Kurds, Alawites and Christians (who won just two seats). Christians are believed to make up 10% of Syria’s 24 million population.

Previous research on gender and political institutions has shown that exclusionary electoral structures tend to produce exclusionary outcomes. Syria’s case fits this broader pattern.

Syrian officials have explained women’s exclusion as a cultural matter. Mohammad Taha al-Ahmad, the head of the Supreme Judicial Committee for Elections, appeared on television to express “surprise” at the low number of female candidates, attributing it a society that traditionally views politics as the domain of men. He said the results also reflected alliances (based on established male networks) that formed among members of the subcommittees.

While such attitudes undoubtedly shape gender dynamics, they cannot by themselves account for the low participation of women in the election.

Women were constrained from the outset. Invoking “culture” shifts the blame away from the institutional barriers.

Ultimately, this was not a free or fair election. When women’s involvement is reduced to symbolic inclusion under state supervision, elections cease to be instruments of representation and become performances of legitimacy.

What can be done?

Reversing this pattern requires more than rhetoric. There must be institutional reform, including:

• gender quotas that reserve a proportion of candidacies or seats for women, allowing them to gain political experience and visibility

• increased funding, training and local networking initiatives to help women build community-based constituencies

• reforming electoral processes to move toward more direct, transparent voting that limits alliances among elites and presidential control

• instituting new school curricula and civil society programs that normalise women’s participation in public life and challenge gendered perceptions of political leadership.

Until such reforms are enacted, Syria’s elections will continue to reflect not popular will, but the entrenched hierarchies of a state that governs through exclusion.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Syria’s new leader promised democracy. Then he excluded women from parliamentary elections – https://theconversation.com/syrias-new-leader-promised-democracy-then-he-excluded-women-from-parliamentary-elections-267625

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Dennis Altman, Vice Chancellor’s Fellow and Professorial Fellow, Institute for Human Security and Social Change, La Trobe University

The latest allegations against Prince Andrew, in Virginia Giuffre’s book Nobody’s Girl, and reports that he and his wife, the Duchess of York, maintained contact with Jeffrey Epstein after his conviction for soliciting prostitution from a minor, present an ongoing problem for the royal family.

Giuffre, who died by suicide earlier this year, accused Andrew of sexually assaulting her on three occasions when she was 17. He has repeatedly denied the accusations.

King Charles moved swiftly, ordering his brother to forsake both his title of royal highness and surrender the other orders of nobility that are bestowed on children of the monarch, whether deserved or not.

The removal of royal titles from Prince Andrew – still his name – is hardly the first time the royals have been ruthless in pursuit of respectability. Like other royal families who have survived into the 21st century, they combine celebrity with a keen sense of self-preservation.

History suggests that when scandal strikes, the royal instinct is to remove embarrassments from public view. This is more difficult when dealing with adults in an era of celebrity journalism. When Prince John, son of George V (who was king from 1910-1936), was found to be epileptic, he was carefully removed from public view and even from contact with his family. John died aged 14 and is largely forgotten.

More distressing was the revelation through a television documentary that two cousins of Queen Elizabeth II who had intellectual disabilities were institutionalised and ignored by the family, although the palace has denied this.

But these are minor examples compared to the scandals surrounding the abdication of Edward VIII, the refusal to allow Princess Margaret to marry Peter Townsend and the very public exile of Prince Harry to California. It seems the second in line to the throne has a peculiarly troubled life, as Prince Harry made clear in his memoir, Spare.

Those scandals all revolved around unsuitable marriages: Edward abdicated when he was forbidden to marry Wallis Simpson; Margaret finally married Tony Armstrong Jones and subsequently divorced him; Harry’s defection from Britain was the direct consequence of his marriage to Meghan Markle.

But whereas Edward could not marry a divorced woman, Charles divorced Diana while heir to the throne and after her death married his long-time mistress, Camilla. In time, Camilla has gone from being excoriated as “the other woman” to a widely accepted queen.

One has to go back a century at least to find a royal prince whose alleged behaviour is so clearly reprehensible – and presumably criminal – as that of Andrew. That he has escaped prosecution is itself troubling, although he paid Guiffre a very considerable settlement while maintaining his total innocence.

Like Harry, Andrew can only be removed from the line of succession by an act of parliament, but he is, after all, only eighth in line to the throne. The king has clearly decided Andrew will no longer be part of the official royal family, unlike his other siblings Anne and Edward.

Perhaps luckily, the prince cannot be shipped off to become a colonial governor, as was the fate of the Duke of Windsor during the second world war. Andrew will presumably be left to his own devices in the grounds of Windsor Castle, banished from family gatherings, which are always at the mercy of the paparazzi.

Hard questions may be asked about the cost to the British taxpayer of maintaining Andrew and Sarah, who live in a luxurious lodge and presumably are well cared for by servants. The British public seem largely unconcerned at the cost of maintaining even non-working members of “the firm”, rather as Australians rarely question the cost of maintaining seven vice-regal residences to maintain the fiction we are a monarchy.

Will this scandal affect the position of the royals? Almost certainly not: in Britain, as in Australia, the enthusiasm for abandoning constitutional monarchy appears to be declining. People can separate their outrage at Andrew from their respect for the monarchy, which is helped by the rise of populist autocrats such as US President Donald Trump.

When Trump visited Britain last month, he was a guest of Charles, who used his role as head of state consummately to flatter Trump with pomp and ceremony, while making clear he did not endorse all his positions.

With the popular William and Kate patiently waiting their turn, the British monarchy is likely to manage even a scandal as great as this one.

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Dennis Altman is the author of God Save the Queen: the strange persistence of monarchies, Scribe 2021.

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If you or someone you know is struggling, help is available. In Australia, you can contact Lifeline at 13 11 14 for confidential support.

Dennis Altman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How damaging to the royal family is the scandal surrounding Prince Andrew? – https://theconversation.com/how-damaging-to-the-royal-family-is-the-scandal-surrounding-prince-andrew-267983

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Scott McLean, Adjunct Associate Professor, University of the Sunshine Coast

Ange Postecoglou has been sacked by two Premier League clubs in four months: Tottenham Hotspur in June (two weeks after winning the Europa League), then Nottingham Forest in October after just 40 days and eight games (with six losses and two draws).

His time at Forest was the shortest non-interim reign in Premier League history.

The Premier League’s average tenure for managers is short and trending shorter, currently around two years.

Remove the combined 15 years of Pep Guardiola (nine years at Manchester City), and Mikel Arteta (six years at Arsenal), and that two-year average plummets for the remaining 18 managers, highlighting a league-level state of constant reset.

So, what does Postecoglou’s latest sacking say about his coaching style, and the team owners and boards who make these decisions?

What is ‘Ange-ball’?

Postecoglou’s playing style, nicknamed “Ange-ball”, is brave, attacking and high-intensity.

It is a style that has delivered multiple league titles and cups across three continents – Australia, Asia and Europe – and the 2015 Asian Cup with the Australian national team.

With the ball, Postecoglou uses “inverted full-backs” (left- and right-sided defenders who can move into midfield to create a numerical advantage), and prioritises quick passes and build-up play from the back rather than playing the ball long.

Without the ball, his sides press high up the field and try to win it back fast, accepting risk in the space left behind the high defensive line.

It’s exciting and effective when executed properly, but is vulnerable if personnel don’t fit key positions or if players are still learning their roles.

It was these vulnerabilities that may have proved his downfall.

Was Nottingham Forest a great fit?

Nuno Espírito Santo, the manager Postecoglou took over from at Forest, was the opposite to “Ange-ball”.

His team was comfortable sitting behind the ball with a compact shape and lower defensive block. With the ball, he prioritised quick and direct counterattacks and a threat at set-pieces (such as corners and free kicks).

Essentially, it was a “minimise chaos” model.

Swapping to Postecoglou’s controlled chaos overnight is like taking a fleet of delivery vans to a Formula One grid.

Which begs a basic question: if Forest wanted instant results, was Postecoglou the right choice for a squad that was recruited and set up to play a contrasting style?

If you change any operating system, you must accept a period of bugs.

Postecoglou’s method asks for lightning-quick centre-backs, midfielders who can resist pressure and keep the ball, and full-backs who can step into midfield.

If you haven’t recruited for that and you don’t allow time for players to learn it, you’re setting the coach up to fail.

It’s telling that £120 million (A$247 million) of Forest’s summer signings were not included in Postecoglou’s final team selection.

Systems change is behaviour change. It needs repetition, role clarity, and a bit of psychological safety.

None of that happens in a few weeks.

Is Postecoglou’s style unsustainable?

Elite sport is a performance business and Postecoglou’s performances were deemed untenable at both Spurs and Forest.

But do proactive coaches like Postecoglou succeed at the very highest level?

Yes, when clubs support the vision. Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City, Mikel Arteta’s Arsenal and Roberto De Zerbi’s (former) Brighton all play with brave positioning, pressing and attack-minded structures.

Further, they recruit or develop players who fit that philosophy.

Postecoglou was mostly unwavering in his risk-and-reward style, yet he showed he could adapt. He won the Europa League by playing a more measured and defensive style.

Ultimately, after two years in charge at Tottenham, he was let go after a poor Premier League finish.

Nottingham Forest sacked him minutes after a 3–0 loss to Chelsea, before the players could even take their boots off, let alone settle into their new roles.

Owners, control, and the ‘do something’ button

Sacking a coach provides a visible lever, a perceived control mechanism that calms headlines and fan unrest, even though research on managerial turnover shows in-season changes don’t always generate improvements and can increase performance variance in the short term.

In other words, you might get a brief “new manager bounce” but you also amplify unwanted noise.

In the business world, a new chief executive needs roughly 18 months to show a transformation is working, and about two to three years to complete a full turnaround. And this assumes they can assemble the right team in their first six to nine months, and the board stays the course.

If global businesses give leaders time to show a plan is working, then sacking a football manager after a handful of games isn’t “elite standards” – it’s absurd.

Either club owners need to rethink their timelines, or they should stop pretending they want real transformation at all.

If owners want true transformation, they must resist reaching for the “do something” button at the first bump and tolerate some initial mess.

Where to from here?

No one more than Postecoglou will understand that from a league results standpoint, he failed at both Spurs and Forest.

Perhaps his full-throttle approach in the world’s toughest league was naive.

It’s hard to know whether other clubs will be put off by these recent sackings and Postecoglou still has a place in top-level management. Time will tell.

Scott McLean is the Director of sports consulting company- Leverage Point Consulting

– ref. Ange Postecoglou’s sackings may say more about the Premier League’s attention span than him – https://theconversation.com/ange-postecoglous-sackings-may-say-more-about-the-premier-leagues-attention-span-than-him-267848

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andreas Schloenhardt, Professor of Criminal Law, The University of Queensland

The spectacular heist of jewellery from the Louvre museum in Paris has many people wondering how a theft like this could occur in broad daylight and what might happen to the items that were stolen from the museum.

In a matter of minutes, four thieves were able to enter through a first-floor window, break into secure glass displays, and take nine items of jewellery of immeasurable value.

Although an alarm was set off and museum guards were nearby, the thieves were able to escape quickly, using motor bikes to get away. They dropped one stolen item, a diamond and emerald-encrusted royal crown that had belonged to Empress Eugénie, Napoleon III’s wife.

Their loot include jewellery from French imperial times – brooches, necklaces, earrings and a tiara. The French prosecutor’s office said the jewels were worth some 88 million euros (A$157 million), not including their historical value.

The speed and professionalism of the heist shows this was a well-planned crime, carried out by highly skilled perpetrators. That suggests they are linked to organised criminal groups.

Several media outlets reported a number of smaller thefts from French museums in recent weeks, including gold nuggets from the Paris Natural History Museum. There is no suggestion these thefts were linked to the Louvre heist.

What might happen to the loot?

The stolen jewellery includes well-known pieces that are easily recognisable. This will make it difficult, if not impossible, to sell them on the black market, even to well-heeled collectors and buyers.

This problem is well-known from other museum heists – such as the theft of the Canadian “Big Maple Leaf” giant gold coin from Berlin’s Bode Museum in 2017 or the famous heist of 13 masterpieces by Degas, Manet and Rembrandt from the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston in 1990. Those paintings have never been recovered.

Instead, most experts believe one of two scenarios are more likely.

In the first, the jewellery would be broken down into smaller pieces. Diamonds and other gemstones may be taken out, altered and then offered for sale. Silver and gold may be used to manufacture other pieces or may be sold separately.

This scenario would make it easy to conceal the origin of the pieces and sell them openly or online. The combined value, however, would be significantly lower compared to leaving the pieces intact. It is thus doubtful the thieves targeted the specific jewellery for this purpose.

Scenario two would involve the thieves, or more likely the masterminds behind them, trying to sell the pieces back to the Louvre or trying to extort money from the French government for their return.

This may be done through brokers or other middlemen and may not happen for a while, until there is less public and media attention and the perpetrators feel sufficiently safe to contact – directly or indirectly – museum or state authorities.

Given the historical significance of the pieces coupled with the embarrassment caused by the heist, the Louvre and the French government would be keen to have the pieces returned as swiftly as possible and might be willing to negotiate, albeit secretively.

Much of this remains, however, speculation. Only a few days have passed since the heist occurred and many questions about the events, perpetrators and their motives remain unanswered. And just who may be behind this spectacular heist from France’s largest museum has everyone guessing.

Similarities with a Dresden museum heist

The Louvre theft brings to mind the jewellery heist at the Green Vault at the Zwinger Palace in Dresden, Germany, in 2019.

In this case, the perpetrators had closely examined the museum’s security system for many days and were able to enter the building without being caught on camera. They entered through a window on the first floor and within minutes stole 21 pieces of jewellery from several displays.

Unlike the Paris heist, the Dresden thieves entered at night and used brute force to damage the displays to take their loot.

Some years after the robbery, German authorities were able to identify and arrest the thieves involved in the heist – all five were members of a notorious Berlin-based crime family.

The perpetrators have since been tried and convicted and are serving long jail times. Most of the jewellery was retrieved and returned – unaltered – to its famous home.

It is hoped the French authorities will soon be similarly successful.

Andreas Schloenhardt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What will happen to the Louvre jewellery after the heist? There are two likely scenarios – https://theconversation.com/what-will-happen-to-the-louvre-jewellery-after-the-heist-there-are-two-likely-scenarios-267966