HPV: what you need to know about the common virus linked to cancer

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Dan Baumgardt, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Bristol

Few viruses are as widespread – and sometimes misunderstood – as the human papillomavirus, or HPV. It’s so common that most of us – up to 80% – will encounter it at some point in our lives, often without even realising it. Understanding HPV matters, given that it is linked to several types of cancer.

Scientists have identified more than 200 types of HPV, making it one of the most diverse viral families known – and a complex one at that. Many strains are low risk, causing either no symptoms or benign warts. HPV types 1, 2 and 4, for instance, are responsible for the common skin wart. Many will have experienced these, including the familiar verruca (plantar wart) picked up at swimming pools.

Some strains, such as HPV 6 and 11, cause genital wartssmall growths that appear on the genitals or around the anus. Treatments such as creams, surgical removal or freezing can get rid of the visible warts, but they don’t remove the virus itself. This means the virus can still be passed to sexual partners until the body’s immune system clears it.

Most seriously, certain types of HPV – particularly 16 and 18 – have known links to cancer. They belong to a group of about 14 high-risk strains that can enter human cells and damage their DNA. This damage interferes with the cells’ normal controls on growth and division, which can lead to the development of cancer.

Repeated or persistent infection with these strains increases the risk of developing cancer. So, too, does smoking, which reduces the ability of the immune system to clear the virus.

Because HPV comes in so many forms – from harmless skin warts to strains linked with cancer – it’s easy to see how myths and confusion can take hold. To separate fact from fiction, here are five key points that everyone should know about the virus.

1. HPV is not just associated with cervical cancer

While cervical cancer remains the most recognised HPV-related malignancy, the virus is also linked to cancers of the vulva, vagina, anus, penis, mouth and throat. Emerging evidence suggests some types may also contribute to developing skin cancer.

This broad cancer risk explains why the widely available HPV vaccine is recommended for both sexes. The vaccine’s ability to prevent HPV infection makes population-wide immunisation beneficial, as transmission may occur between heterosexual and homosexual partners alike.

2. You don’t need to have symptoms or genital warts to pass the virus on

HPV can remain on the skin for months before the immune system clears it, allowing transmission through contact even before genital warts appear and after they’ve been treated. This is why condoms should be used for at least three months after visible warts have resolved.

A condom in gold packaging.
A condom should still be used three months after genital warts have resolved.
AtlasStudio/Shutterstock.com

3. HPV transmission can occur from more than just vaginal or anal sex

Oral and throat cancers can develop following HPV infection acquired through oral sex. The incidence of mouth and throat cancer is increasing worldwide, with oral sex now the most significant behavioural risk factor. Using condoms during oral sex can help reduce this risk.

HPV can also spread through the use of sex toys. One study highlighted the ability of transmissible HPV to remain on sex toys and the need to develop proper hygiene practices for cleaning, and avoiding shared use.

4. Condoms are not 100% effective at preventing spread

Condoms can lower the risk of HPV transmission, but they can’t offer full protection, as uncovered skin can still carry the virus.

This is why many sexually active people will come into contact with a strain of the virus at some point in their lives, even when practising safe sex.

5. Even vaccinated women need to have smear tests

Current HPV vaccines target the main high-risk virus types but cannot cover all cancer-causing strains, or treat existing infections. In rarer cases, cervical cancer can also arise without HPV infection. This is why women aged 25 to 64 are still invited for cervical screening every five years, even after vaccination.

Women should also seek urgent medical review for other indicators of cervical cancer. These include pain or bleeding after sex, bleeding between periods or after menopause, and changes in vaginal discharge.

Even though the HPV vaccine is widely available, uptake has dropped in some areas. The COVID pandemic disrupted routine vaccination programmes, while misinformation about the vaccine’s safety and effectiveness has shaken trust. In some places, low awareness of HPV’s link to different cancers – and of the need to vaccinate boys as well as girls – has also made public understanding more difficult.

The World Health Organization has set a target of fully vaccinating 90% of girls by age 15 by 2030. At present, only about 48% of girls worldwide are fully vaccinated, so there is more work to be done.

Although HPV is often harmless, the potential consequences of some strains are too significant to ignore. But no one should be fearful of an active sex life. For those eligible for the HPV vaccine, protection is not just for the individual, but also for future sexual partners who could otherwise be exposed. By staying informed and taking preventative measures, we can reduce the effect of this common virus and keep ourselves and others safer.

The Conversation

Dan Baumgardt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. HPV: what you need to know about the common virus linked to cancer – https://theconversation.com/hpv-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-common-virus-linked-to-cancer-263678

Blair’s ID cards failed in the 2000s – could Starmer’s version fare better?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tim Holmes, Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Policing, Bangor University

The UK government is once again looking at the possibility of introducing identity cards, with the prime minister Keir Starmer announcing plans for a new scheme for all UK citizens.

The argument is familiar. With tougher ID systems, illegal immigration would be harder and the UK less appealing. But it also raises a familiar set of questions. How would such a scheme work? And what lessons are there to be learned from the last time the UK had ID cards?

Identity cards were compulsory during the second world war, but the system was scrapped in 1952 after growing unease about police powers and civil liberties.

Fifty years later, Tony Blair’s Labour government proposed new biometric ID cards backed by a national database. Ministers claimed they would help tackle terrorism, illegal immigration and identity theft while giving people secure access to public services.

At the time, terrorism, illegal immigration and identity theft were major concerns. The 9/11 bombers had avoided detection in the US, 23 illegal immigrants had died while cockle picking in Morecambe Bay in 2004 and people were increasingly falling victim to online fraud and identity theft.

In 2006 the Identity Cards Act was introduced. The scheme would introduce cards for citizens with new biometric security features and data stored on a national database. Eventually, whether you wanted a card or not, you could not function in UK society without one.

Some argued it would lead the UK to becoming a surveillance society. Protest groups warned of the risks, while Liberal Democrat MP Simon Hughes vowed to go to prison rather than accept the card and the power it gave the state.

In the end, the cards were never tested. The scheme collapsed in 2010, undone not by principle but by cost and a change of government.

2025 proposals

Rising public concern over illegal immigration has once again led to calls for solutions.

The UK government’s latest proposals follow a home affairs committee inquiry into digital IDs and electronic visas in June. It examined whether migrants should be required to use them to prove their status when applying for jobs. The argument being that with a tougher ID system, illegal immigrants would be deterred from attempting to enter the country.

The UK is already far more digitally monitored than it was 20 years ago. Biometric passports, digital driving licences and online identity checks are used as a matter of course.

In 2010, when the last ID card scheme was scrapped, public attitudes towards surveillance were generally favourable when used in public spaces. But monitoring in private spaces was not.

In 2025, attitudes towards surveillance vary depending on the type. There is now more concern around the mass surveillance of people’s online activities, for example.

Identity schemes are used in 142 countries around the world, 70 with electronic ID. Biometric technology has improved considerably over the past 20 years. More than 120 countries now use facial recognition in passport systems, while UK police forces have integrated the technology into their work.

The question is not whether cards can verify identity – they can. It’s whether they reduce crime or illegal immigration. That depends on how essential they become to everyday life. If an ID check is required for employment, housing and access to services, people without documents may be pushed into the margins, rather than required to leave the country.

In 2005, writer Arun Kundnani argued that ID cards risked becoming “exclusion cards”, creating a new underclass of people unable to access services legally but still present in the shadow economy. That would give organised crime networks even greater power over undocumented migrants, offering illegal routes into housing and work.

Another unresolved question is cost. The last scheme collapsed under the financial weight of setting up the infrastructure and issuing cards nationwide. With public finances tight, the government could find itself facing the same problem again.

Surveillance

There are also broader questions about trust. Academic Clive Norris, who has studied mass surveillance, has warned that constant monitoring encourages the view that ordinary citizens cannot be trusted: “If we are gathering data on people all the time on the basis that they may do something wrong, this is promoting a view that as citizens we cannot be trusted.”

Digital identity cards could bring benefits. For those entitled to live and work in the UK, they might make access to services simpler and faster. But the debate is about more than efficiency. It goes to the heart of how much oversight the state should have over everyday life, and whether a costly system would achieve its stated aims.

The last attempt at ID cards was sunk before it could be tested. Two decades on, the UK is more accustomed to digital surveillance and more anxious about immigration. The question is whether that makes this the right time for a second attempt – or whether the country risks repeating old mistakes.

The Conversation

Tim Holmes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Blair’s ID cards failed in the 2000s – could Starmer’s version fare better? – https://theconversation.com/blairs-id-cards-failed-in-the-2000s-could-starmers-version-fare-better-264517

Sortir du piège de la dette : les alternatives au modèle FMI pour le Sénégal

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Souleymane Gueye, Professor of Economics and Statistics, City College of San Francisco

Depuis février 2025, le Sénégal est secoué par les révélations du rapport de la Cour des comptes sur une dette publique bien plus élevée que ce qui avait été annoncé. Une première mission du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) , en mars dernier, avait confirmé une sous-évaluation massive de la dette (passée à près de 100 % du PIB). Le FMI a dépêché une deuxième mission “spéciale” du 19 au 27 août suite à un deuxième audit. Celui-ci a montré que la dette réelle du pays était bien plus lourde que prévu, atteignant près de 119 % du PIB en 2024.

Depuis plus de quarante ans, le Sénégal s’est engagé dans une coopération continue avec le FMI. Cette relation, justifiée à ses débuts par le besoin de rétablir les équilibres macroéconomiques, s’est traduite par une succession de programmes d’ajustement structurel, de stabilisation budgétaire et de réformes économiques.

Si elle a permis une certaine stabilité du cadre macroéconomique, elle a aussi généré une dépendance chronique vis-à-vis de l’endettement extérieur et a freiné la capacité du pays à définir une stratégie économique souveraine. Les révélations récentes de la Cour des comptes et la révision spectaculaire de la dette publique par le FMI confirment que ce modèle est à bout de souffle.

Dans une étude récente, j’ai examiné l’évolution des relations entre le Sénégal et le FMI. J’estime que cette coopération de plus de quatre décennies a laissé des traces profondes sur l’économie nationale. Aujourd’hui, l’enjeu pour le Sénégal est de redéfinir ce partenariat et de repenser les relations avec le FMI, afin d’éviter de reproduire le suivisme des régimes précédents.

Une coopération héritée de l’ajustement structurel

Les années 1980 inaugurent une ère d’austérité avec les premiers plans d’ajustement structurel. Sous l’impulsion du FMI, le Sénégal a réduit les dépenses sociales, privatisé des secteurs stratégiques et ouvert son économie à une concurrence internationale déséquilibrée.

Les promesses de modernisation se sont vite traduites par un affaiblissement de l’État, la disparition de pans entiers du tissu productif national et une pauvreté endémique. Le secteur agricole, notamment les filières arachidière, cotonnière et rizicole, ainsi que dans le secteur industriel les industries de transformation des produits halieutiques et du phosphate, ont particulièrement été touchés.

L’objectif officiel de réduction des déficits s’est payé d’un coût social et économique élevé, dont les séquelles sont encore visibles dans le pays.




Read more:
Sénégal : ce que révèle la dégradation de la note sur la dette cachée et les notations de crédit


Des réformes macroéconomiques sans transformation sociale

Au tournant des années 2000, avec les initiatives PPTE (Pays pauvres très endettés) et les mécanismes concessionnels, le Sénégal a bénéficié des initiatives d’allégements de dette et de la facilité pour la réduction de la pauvreté et la croissance. Mais la logique est restée la même : dépendre des financements extérieurs pour stabiliser le cadre macroéconomique, sans s’attaquer aux causes structurelles du sous-développement.

Le Plan Sénégal Émergent (PSE) lancé en 2014 a certes dopé la croissance par les infrastructures et l’énergie, mais sans transformation profonde du marché du travail ni réduction significative de la pauvreté et des inégalités. Il a contribué à accroître le taux de pauvreté, qui atteint 39 %. Il a aussi approfondi les inégalités : les 20 % les plus riches concentrent 48 % des revenus, tandis que les 20 % les plus pauvres ne disposent que de 5 %, soit un indice de 0,45.

De plus, il a créé les conditions d’une insécurité alimentaire inquiétante, touchant près de 3 500 000 personnes. Le chômage des jeunes (27,7 %), la précarité et l’informalité demeurent massifs.

Les politiques de développement du capital humain et social n’étaient pas au coeur des préoccupations des autorités étatiques. Il s’en est suivi une inadéquation entre la formation, la qualification professionnelle et les besoins réels du marché du travail d’une part et d’autre part, aucune attention n’était accordée à la mise en place de politiques d’emplois sérieuses en direction des jeunes, des femmes et des couches les plus vulnérables de la société.

L’absence manifeste d’une bonne stratégie de développement économique diversifiée adossée aux réalités économiques du pays explique aussi le manque de création d’emplois durant la mise en exécution du PSE.

D’autres facteurs expliquent le manque de transformation du marché de l’emploi, notamment la négligence du secteur agricole et la mauvaise gouvernance marquée par la corruption. Cette situation favorise une gestion défaillante des ressources publiques et crée une dissymétrie entre les investissements massifs dans les infrastructures et le secteur minier, d’une part, et leur faible impact réel sur le marché du travail, d’autre part. En conséquence, le développement économique et social du pays reste limité.

Le choc des révélations de 2025

Le rapport de la Cour des comptes (février 2025), confirmé par l’audit du cabinet Forvis Mazars, a révélé l’ampleur des « déclarations erronées » des autorités du régime précédent dans la gestion des finances publiques. La dette, présentée comme soutenable, est passée brutalement de 74,4 % à 111 % du PIB en 2023, puis 118,8 % en 2024.

Cette révision dramatique démontre l’absence de transparence et l’inefficacité des mécanismes de contrôle censés accompagner la coopération avec le FMI. L’institution elle-même, en validant pendant plusieurs années des données sous-estimées, porte une responsabilité dans cette crise de crédibilité.

De la transparence à la dépendance renforcée

La mission du FMI d’août 2025 a salué l’engagement du Sénégal à corriger ses pratiques budgétaires et annoncé une série de mesures techniques : centralisation de la gestion de la dette, audits des arriérés, création d’une base de données unifiée, renforcement du Compte unique du Trésor.

Si ces mesures peuvent améliorer la gouvernance financière, elles ne changent rien à la logique de dépendance. Le nouveau communiqué de presse du FMI, présenté comme aligné sur la Vision 2050 (référentiel de développement du Sénégal), reprend les conditionnalités classiques du FMI : rigueur budgétaire, discipline macroéconomique et promesse d’inclusion sociale. Mais l’expérience historique démontre que ces engagements se traduisent rarement en progrès tangibles pour les populations.

Le piège d’une économie à deux vitesses

L’économie sénégalaise affiche en 2025 une croissance record de 12,1 % grâce au boom pétrolier et gazier. Mais la croissance hors hydrocarbures reste limitée à 3,1 %, confirmant le risque d’une économie duale où la manne énergétique masque la stagnation des autres
secteurs. Cette dépendance aux hydrocarbures, adossée à un endettement massif, fragilise l’avenir du pays et l’expose aux chocs extérieurs. En poursuivant dans cette voie, le Sénégal risque de voir ses marges de souveraineté réduites à néant.

Pour une rupture nécessaire

Quarante ans de coopération avec le FMI montrent une constante : la dépendance aux financements extérieurs et la reproduction des déséquilibres structurels. Face à cette impasse, une rupture s’impose. Elle passe par :

  • la mobilisation des ressources internes (épargne nationale, appel à la diaspora, lutte contre la corruption et les détournements) ;

  • une politique industrielle et agricole endogène, tournée vers la création d’emplois et la sécurité alimentaire ;

  • la réorientation des priorités budgétaires vers l’éducation, la santé et la protection sociale ;

  • une gouvernance renforcée, fondée sur la transparence et l’appropriation nationale des réformes.

Le nouveau cycle de coopération proposé par le FMI, malgré son habillage technique et son discours sur la transparence, risque de reproduire le schéma de dépendance qui a marqué les décennies passées. Le Sénégal se trouve face à un choix historique : continuer dans la voie du suivisme, au prix d’une souveraineté économique toujours plus réduite, ou engager une véritable rupture pour construire un modèle de développement autonome, inclusif et résilient.

C’est seulement au prix de cette rupture que le pays pourra transformer la manne énergétique en un levier de prospérité partagée et durable. Il pourra aussi inscrire les financements extérieurs dans une logique de transformation systémique et structurelle de l’économie, au service des priorités nationales définies dans l’Agenda national de transformation Vision 2050.

The Conversation

Souleymane Gueye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Sortir du piège de la dette : les alternatives au modèle FMI pour le Sénégal – https://theconversation.com/sortir-du-piege-de-la-dette-les-alternatives-au-modele-fmi-pour-le-senegal-263755

Cameroun : l’élection présidentielle risque d’entraîner une instabilité, quel que soit le vainqueur

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Manu Lekunze, Lecturer, University of Aberdeen

Les Camerounais éliront le 12 octobre 2025. Le président sortant, Paul Biya, au pouvoir depuis près de 43 ans, sera candidat.

En 2025, comme lors de la dernière élection de 2018 et de toutes les élections présidentielles depuis 1992, il est raisonnable de s’attendre à ce que le parti au pouvoir l’emporte. Et les partis d’opposition contesteront certainement les résultats.

Si Biya remporte l’élection, à la fin de son nouveau mandat en 2032, il aura été au pouvoir pendant un demi-siècle. Ce sera un exploit qu’aucun autre chef d’État n’aura réalisé à l’ère moderne.

De plus, en 1968, Biya occupait simultanément les fonctions de directeur du cabinet civil du président et de secrétaire général de la présidence (le poste le plus important du gouvernement après celui de président). En 1979, il est devenu Premier ministre et, en novembre 1982, il a succédé à Ahmadou Ahidjo à la présidence.

Par conséquent, compte tenu du niveau d’éducation limité d’Ahidjo et de ses problèmes de santé à la fin de son mandat, on peut dire que Biya tient les rennes du pouvoir depuis 1968.

En tant que spécialiste de la sécurité internationale, j’ai mené des recherches sur la sécurité au Cameroun depuis plus de 10 ans, notamment sur l’insurrection séparatiste dans les régions du Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest, Boko Haram dans la région de l’Extrême-Nord, et les implications sécuritaires du maintien au pouvoir de Biya.

À mon avis, malgré les nombreuses critiques adressées au régime de Biya, il a su contribuer à réguler la vie publique et préserver une certaine stabilité. Au cours des 42 dernières années, les investisseurs étrangers et les partenaires de sécurité externes n’ont pas eu à s’inquiéter de changements politiques radicaux au Cameroun.

Cette élection, qu’elle débouche sur un nouveau mandat ou sur une transition, risque de compromettre la stabilité à laquelle les partenaires externes du Cameroun se sont habitués. Elle pourrait accroître les tensions ethniques ou régionales résultant d’une marginalisation prolongée. Elle pourrait également amorcer un processus de transition qui pourrait prendre du temps à se consolider, laissant place à l’instabilité, y compris à davantage de conflits armés.

Menaces d’insurrection

Parmi les griefs les plus souvent cités par les séparatistes figurent l’abolition du système fédéral et le changement du nom officiel du Cameroun en 1984, qui est passé de République unie du Cameroun à République du Cameroun (nom adopté par l’ancienne colonie française du Cameroun en 1960).

Les séparatistes font valoir que le mot « unie » indiquait clairement que le Cameroun actuel était composé de deux parties égales. La suppression de ce mot signifie que l’une a absorbé l’autre.

Ils sont également mécontents de la sous-représentation des anglophones aux postes gouvernementaux de haut niveau.

En tant que secrétaire général de la présidence, Biya n’était pas un simple spectateur lors du référendum de 1972 qui a mis fin au système fédéral de gouvernement du pays. Il est également chargé de nommer les hauts fonctionnaires depuis 1982.

Certains séparatistes pensent que si son gouvernement avait répondu aux protestations de 2016, celles-ci n’auraient pas dégénéré en insurrection.

Les manifestations organisées en 2016 par des avocats et des enseignants anglophones contre la domination perçue des francophones ont déclenché une répression violente de la part des forces de sécurité. Cela a conduit à la formation de groupes séparatistes armés qui ont déclaré un État indépendant appelé « Ambazonie » et ont déclenché un conflit armé avec le gouvernement.

De même, on pourrait dire que l’approche de Biya en matière de politique étrangère a contribué à la croissance et à la puissance de Boko Haram, un groupe terroriste régional, au Cameroun. Le groupe a exploité les failles de l’architecture sécuritaire du Cameroun et la stratégie de Biya consistant à faire profil bas sur la scène politique internationale.

L’International Crisis Group et plusieurs analystes estiment que si le gouvernement camerounais avait réprimé les activités de Boko Haram, l’insurrection aurait eu du mal à prendre l’ampleur qu’elle a connue en 2014 et 2015.

À mon avis, la réticence de Biya à attirer l’attention internationale sur le Cameroun l’a rendu hésitant à agir contre Boko Haram.

En résumé : il est peu probable que le statu quo permette de faire face à la menace d’une insurrection persistante.




Read more:
Comprendre le conflit meurtrier en cours dans les régions anglophones du Cameroun


Les élections peuvent aggraver les divisions

Maurice Kamto était le principal candidat de l’opposition lors de la dernière élection présidentielle. Sa contestation des résultats a provoqué une certaine crise post-électorale. Sa candidature à l’élection de 2025 a été rejetée.

Kamto appartient à l’ethnie Bamiléké, originaire de la région Ouest, où règne déjà un sentiment d’exclusion politique.

Issa Tchiroma, figure de l’opposition qui a occupé des fonctions ministérielles pendant de longues périodes depuis 1992, a démissionné en 2025 pour se porter candidat aux élections d’octobre. Tchiroma est originaire du nord (régions de l’Adamaoua, du Nord et de l’Extrême-Nord). Il existe une certaine attente quant à la rotation de la présidence entre le nord et le sud. C’est au tour du nord, car Biya, le deuxième président, est originaire du sud, tandis que le premier président, Ahidjo, était originaire du nord.

Tchiroma risque de dénoncer un traitement injuste s’il ne remporte pas les élections. Il a déjà protesté publiquement contre le fait qu’on l’empêche de quitter le pays.

Les violences dans la région natale de Kamto, le Bamiléké, ou dans le nord de Tchiroma pourraient étendre les zones du territoire camerounais touchées par l’insurrection. Certaines parties du nord-ouest (où opèrent les séparatistes) et de l’ouest sont reliées à l’Adamaoua, puis aux régions du nord et de l’extrême nord (où opère Boko Haram). Une coalition entre les Bamiléké et le nord contre le sud (base électorale de Biya) pourrait sérieusement compromettre la sécurité du Cameroun. Cette division pourrait entraîner plus qu’une insurrection périphérique.

Si le Cameroun est déstabilisé en raison du maintien au pouvoir de Biya ou d’une transition bâclée, cela menacera la sécurité dans la région de l’Afrique centrale.

La voie à suivre

Mes recherches sur l’insurrection séparatiste montrent clairement que les responsables camerounais et leurs soutiens internationaux doivent s’attaquer au sentiment de marginalisation ou d’exclusion politique.

L’âge et la longévité de Biya au pouvoir, ainsi que la perspective d’un nouveau mandat de sept ans, soulèvent des questions quant à la transition éventuelle et à l’origine ethnique du prochain président.

Il serait nécessaire de parvenir à un consensus prudent afin de garantir qu’un groupe politiquement important comme les Peuls, les Bamilékés ou les anglophones ne se sente pas sérieusement marginalisé ou exclu de la vie politique.

The Conversation

Manu Lekunze reçoit un financement des conseils de recherche britanniques

ref. Cameroun : l’élection présidentielle risque d’entraîner une instabilité, quel que soit le vainqueur – https://theconversation.com/cameroun-lelection-presidentielle-risque-dentrainer-une-instabilite-quel-que-soit-le-vainqueur-264427

Four victims, no remorse: Erin Patterson given a life sentence for mushroom murders

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Rick Sarre, Emeritus Professor in Law and Criminal Justice, University of South Australia

Erin Patterson, having been convicted in the Supreme Court of Victoria two months ago on three counts of murder and one count of attempted murder, has today received a life sentence from the trial judge, Justice Christopher Beale.

He ordered a non-parole period of 33 years. Given her age (50) and the 676 days she’s already spent in detention, this means Patterson will not be eligible to apply for parole until 2056, when she is in her 80s.

Erin Patterson’s story is now one of the most well-known true crime cases in Australia. Nine weeks ago, a jury found her guilty of poisoning her lunch guests in July 2023 at her home in Leongatha with foraged death-cap mushrooms she had baked into individual servings of Beef Wellington.

In sentencing, Justice Beale said he had no hesitation in finding Patterson’s offending falls into the “worst category” of murder and attempted murder.

So after months of media frenzy and myriad headlines, the sentencing now bookends the case, pending any appeal. Here’s how the judge reached his decision and what happens now.

A lengthy prison term

The life sentence was as expected, given Patterson’s lawyer, Colin Mandy, did not oppose the prosecution’s bid for the maximum sentence for murder in Victoria.

The matter that exercised the judge’s mind, principally, in considering the sentence was the length of the non-parole period. The standard such period for murder in Victoria is 20 years.

If there’s more than one victim, however, the minimum non-parole period increases to 25 years.

While it’s possible to sentence a murderer to life without parole, it is very unusual.

In 2019, the judge who gave a life sentence to James Gargasoulas, the man who drove down Bourke Street Mall in Melbourne, killing six people, set a non-parole period of 46 years.

What did the judge consider?

The factors taken into account in sentencing relate to the nature of the crime and the personal circumstances of the person convicted.

The final outcome is informed by principles that vary only slightly across Australia’s states and territories.

The main one here, arguably, was denunciation: the sentence needs to reinforce in the public mind the abhorrence of her conduct.

Indeed, there was no plea of guilty, and no remorse from Patterson at any time.

Moreover, when considering a non-parole period, a judge takes into account what is referred to as “proportionality”. This can be a limiting feature where there is lesser culpability, but an exacerbating feature where there are multiple deaths.

One might refer to it colloquially as a person receiving their “just desserts”.

In this instance, the judge was mindful of the fact there were four victims.

He was also mindful of Patterson’s “harsh” prison conditions, telling the court:

you have effectively been held in continuous solitary confinement for the last 15 months and at the very least there is a substantial chance that for your protection you will continue to be held in solitary confinement for years to come.

Deterrence, as a regular feature of the sentencing exercise, in this case becomes a companion to denunciation.

Rehabilitation was always unlikely to have any impact on the sentence, given the life term. There was no submission by defence counsel that his client had a diagnosed mental disorder or would benefit from any form of an ongoing remediation or restorative program.

Huge personal tolls

What dominated the submissions at the pre-sentence hearing in August were the victim impact statements.

In Victoria, such statements have been in place since 1994, but it has only been since 2005 that the court has been required to take account of the impact of the crime on any victim when sentencing.

Only since 2011 have victims been granted the right to read a statement aloud in court or have a nominated representative do so on their behalf.

In the Patterson pre-sentence hearing, the sole survivor of the meal, Ian Wilkinson, read his own statement and described the loss of his wife Heather. He said he felt “only half alive without her”.

Patterson’s estranged husband Simon did not attend the pre-sentence hearing, so his statement was read to the judge by a family member. His children, he wrote:

have […] been robbed of hope for the kind of relationship with their mother that every child naturally yearns for.

The Wilkinsons’ daughter, Ruth Dubois, also addressed the judge with her own statement. She highlighted the wider victims of the crimes, namely medical staff, investigators, shop owners (who had had their names scrutinised), mushroom growers, the health department and taxpayers.

“I am horrified,” she said, “that our family is even associated, through no choice of our own, with such destructive behaviour towards the community”.

Will there be an appeal?

Patterson’s counsel has 28 days in which to appeal. An appeal would either be against conviction or the sentence or both.

In relation to an appeal against conviction, defence counsel would need to establish that the trial judge made a mistake in admitting (or ruling out) certain evidence or failing to properly explain the defence case.

The former, a mistake about evidence, is the more common appeal ground.

Less likely is the latter appeal ground because it would be difficult for defence counsel to assert that his client’s case was given too little regard by the judge, given the amount of time (almost two days) Justice Beale devoted to explaining the defence case to the jury.

When appealing the length of the non-parole period, either counsel can argue the duration was either manifestly inadequate (a prosecution submission) or manifestly excessive (a defence submission). It remains to be seen if either side will pursue this option.

Whatever the case, there would not be too many observers surprised by the judge’s final determination.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Four victims, no remorse: Erin Patterson given a life sentence for mushroom murders – https://theconversation.com/four-victims-no-remorse-erin-patterson-given-a-life-sentence-for-mushroom-murders-264128

No, organ transplants won’t make you live forever, whatever Putin says

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Julian Koplin, Lecturer in Bioethics, Monash University & Honorary fellow, Melbourne Law School, Monash University

Getty Images

What do world leaders talk about when they think we’re not listening? This week it was the idea of living forever.

Russian president Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping were caught off-guard at a military parade in Beijing discussing the possibility of using biotechnology to pursue immortality. In particular, Putin suggested repeated organ transplants could keep a person young forever.

There’s a lot to unpack here. The idea of lifespan extension is less outlandish, and less objectionable, than it might seem. But as a bioethicist, I do have some concerns.

Could transplants allow us to live forever?

Putin’s suggestion that we can achieve immortality via repeated organ transplants is almost certainly false.

One obvious question is where these organs would come from. Transplantable organs are a scarce medical resource. Using them to sustain the life of an ageing autocrat would deprive others of life-saving transplants.

However, Putin may have been envisaging lab-grown organs created using stem cells. This approach would not deprive others of transplants.

Unfortunately for Putin, while scientists can grow miniature “organoids” that model some aspects of human tissues, creating full-size transplantable organs remains far beyond current capabilities.

Even if, hypothetically, we had access to limitless replacement organs, ageing erodes our body’s general resilience. This would make recovering from repeated transplant surgeries – which are significant operations – increasingly unlikely.

Our ageing brains present an even deeper obstacle. We can replace a kidney or a liver without any threat to our identity. But we cannot replace our brains; whoever inhabits our bodies after a brain transplant would not be us.




Read more:
An artificial heart may save your life. But it can also change you in surprising ways


Other approaches

There may be better routes to increasing longevity.

Scientists have prolonged the lives of laboratory animals such as monkeys, mice and fruit flies through drugs, genetic alterations, dietary changes and cellular reprogramming (which involves reverting some of the body’s cells to a “younger”, more primitive state).

It’s always challenging to translate animal studies to humans. But nothing suggests human ageing is uniquely beyond modification.

In 2024, Putin launched a national project to combat ageing. Could Russia deliver the necessary scientific breakthrough?

Perhaps, though many experts are doubtful, given Russia’s fragile research infrastructure.

But Putin is not alone in funding longevity research. Breakthroughs might come from elsewhere – including, potentially, from major investments in anti-ageing biotechnologies from billionaires in the West.

Anti-ageing research could bring benefits

Whether they are authoritarian presidents or Silicon Valley billionaires, it’s easy to sneer at wealthy elites’ preoccupation with lifespan extension.

Death is the great leveller; it comes for us all. We understandably distrust those who want to rise above it.

But we need to disentangle motives and ethics. It is possible to pursue worthwhile projects for bad reasons.

For example, if I donate to an anti-malaria charity merely to impress my Tinder date, you might roll your eyes at my motivations. But the donation itself still achieves good.

The same applies to lifespan extension.

Anti-ageing research could have many benefits. Because ageing raises the risk of almost every major disease, slowing it could make people healthier at every age.

If we value preventing diseases such as heart disease, cancer and dementia, we should welcome research into slowing ageing (which could in turn help to reduce these problems).

Is seeking longer lives ethical?

Putin and Xi might seem less concerned with improving population health than with postponing their own deaths. But is it wrong to want longevity?

Many of us dread death – this is normal and understandable. Death deprives us of all the goods of life, while the prospect of dying can be frightening.

Nor is it suspect to want more than a “natural” lifespan. Since 1900, life expectancy in wealthy countries has risen by more than 30 years. We should welcome further improvements.

The most serious ethical concern about lifespan extension is that it will result in social stagnation.

Our views become increasingly rigid as we age. Young minds often bring new ideas.

If Taylor Swift is still topping the charts in 2089, many other musicians will miss out. And we will miss out on enjoying the evolution of pop music.

Music is one thing; morals are another. The 21st century is raising many new challenges – such as climate change and AI developments – that may benefit from fresh moral perspectives, and from the turnover of political power.

A Russia still ruled by Putin in 2150 will strike many as the starkest version of this worry. Fortunately, we need not be too concerned about a 200-year-old Putin. He is no longer young, and significant lifespan extension is probably decades away.

Still, the prospect of ageless autocrats should give us pause. We should welcome technologies that slow ageing and help us stay healthier for longer, while remembering that even good technologies can have bad effects.

If we succeed in dramatically extending lifespans, we will need to work out how to prevent our societies from becoming as static as some of the elites who lead them.

The Conversation

Julian Koplin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. No, organ transplants won’t make you live forever, whatever Putin says – https://theconversation.com/no-organ-transplants-wont-make-you-live-forever-whatever-putin-says-264573

With global powers barred, can Pacific nations find unity at their annual summit?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Meg Keen, Head of Pacific Research Program, Australian National University

It’s been a testing time for Pacific regional unity.

So far this year, there have been rifts between Cook Islands and New Zealand over security arrangements with China; New Caledonia and France over independence for the French territory; and among various Pacific nations over deep-sea mining.

Now, geopolitical tussles are buffeting the annual Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders’ meeting, held this week in Solomon Islands.

As regional leaders began preparing for their apex annual summit, there were disagreements over the regular dialogue with Pacific development partners held after the main meeting. Development partners include major outside powers such as the United States, China, France, United Kingdom and Japan, among others.

Last month, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele called off the meeting with these global partners. He argued that excluding outsiders will allow time to complete a review among members on how such external engagements occur.

However, most believe he was bowing to Chinese pressure to exclude Taiwan – Solomon Islands switched its allegiance from Taipei to Beijing in 2019.

Chinese rhetoric against Taiwan is sharpening. Earlier this year, a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in New Zealand was blunt about the inclusion of Taiwan in the Pacific Islands Forum:

Taiwan is a province of China […] and has no qualification or right to participate in Forum activities whatsoever.

At last year’s summit in Tonga, China’s special envoy to the Pacific, Qian Bo, flexed his diplomatic muscles and insisted on the removal of a mention of Taiwan from the final communique.

Even so, the PIF 1992 Honiara Declaration does sanction a Taiwan dialogue during the annual gathering for those wanting to meet on a bilateral basis — that arrangement has persisted for more than three decades.

Next year’s host Palau will reinstate the more inclusive status quo.

An official statement from Taiwan ahead of this year’s forum makes clear it is in the region to stay:

We firmly believe in the inclusive spirit of “The Pacific Way” [and…] look forward to ongoing participation in the PIF.

The Pacific pushes back

Most members are not happy with the exclusion of partner nations, but all are still coming this week and will work out their differences, as they have done in the past.

Tuvalu, Palau and Marshall Islands recognise, and have development partnerships with, Taiwan. They believe the exclusion of outside powers is a missed development opportunity. Tuvalu Prime Minister Feleti Teo has been clear:

We do not need the competition and conflict overshadowing our development agenda in the Pacific.

Even countries that recognise China worry about the cost of exclusion. Senior representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Samoa (all of whom are PIF members and will attend the summit) have expressed their disappointment in the decision to keep partner nations away.

The decision to call off the partner dialogue is divisive, but it is only a hurdle, not a hard stop. Those nations with diplomatic missions or visit visas to Honiara, including China, may well hold quiet bilateral meetings on the margins of the summit this week. However, Taiwanese representatives will not be present.

Setting the Pacific agenda

While exclusions and sharp reactions grab media headlines, much more crucial issues are on the summit agenda this year.

Climate change is top of the list. Buoyed by the recent Vanuatu-led triumph at the International Court of Justice, which ruled that states have a legal obligation to combat climate change, Pacific nations will look for more avenues to collectively seek climate justice.

Already Vanuatu, Fiji and Samoa have submitted a resolution to the Rome Statute (the treaty that established the International Criminal Court) for a new crime of “ecocide” to be added in recognition of the irreversible damage to ecosystems from climate change.

They are also pushing hard for more money to deal with biodiversity losses, and ensuring a new “loss and damage” fund to help vulnerable states recover from climate disasters is effective.

Another high priority will be next year’s COP31 climate meeting, which Australia and the Pacific are proposing to co-host. This would be a chance to push harder for global climate action to speed up mitigation and adaptation. Pressure will be on Australia to deliver on its host bid promises, and for others to step up or out of the way.

Pacific nations also need better access to targeted funds to adapt to rising temperatures and sea levels. They are working to capitalise their own Pacific Resilience Facility to make communities disaster-ready. However, the ambitious aim to secure US$1.5 billion (A$2.3 billion) from the global community will be set back by the decision to exclude partner countries from the talks.

Working together to combat problems

Another priority on the PIF agenda is advancing economic integration. Supply chains, labour mobility and regional connectivity all need a boost.

For example, poor internet connectivity is hindering economic development, while inadequate infrastructure is impeding the movement of people, goods and information across the vast region.

With rising geopolitical pressures and donors crowding in to offer aid and curry influence in the Pacific, regional frameworks and rules of engagement need strengthening. Former PIF senior officials Sione Tekiteki and Joel Nilon argue:

By building on existing frameworks and creating a cohesive set of standards, the Pacific can assert its autonomy.

Significantly, the Blue Pacific Oceans of Peace Declaration will be launched at this year’s meeting — a move to advance Pacific sovereignty. It aims to prevent regional militarisation, keep the Pacific nuclear-free, and protect oceans from nuclear waste and degradation.

This reflects a determination to cooperatively manage transnational pressures such as ocean exploitation, pollution, and crime and security intrusions from foreign elements.

Tensions between global powers permeate all corners of the world, and the Pacific is no different. External players can pull at the fabric of regionalism, but PIF members are the threads that bind the region.

In the past, external pressures have led to improved collective management. The development of one of the world’s largest sustainable tuna fisheries is a good example. Let’s hope that will be true in the future and unity will hold.

The Conversation

Meg Keen leads the Pacific Research Program at the ANU which receives funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). All research conducted under this program is independent.

Meg Keen is a non-resident fellow of The Lowy Institute.

ref. With global powers barred, can Pacific nations find unity at their annual summit? – https://theconversation.com/with-global-powers-barred-can-pacific-nations-find-unity-at-their-annual-summit-264331

How MPs’ ‘abandoned’ cats became the unexpected symbol of Indonesia’s protests

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ken M.P. Setiawan, Senior Lecturer in Indonesian Studies, The University of Melbourne

Instagram/animals_hopeshelterindonesia

During Indonesia’s recent mass protests, the looted homes of politicians in Jakarta revealed unexpected victims: cats reportedly left behind or stolen as their owners fled for safety.

The cats have gone viral on social media. Their politician owners – celebrities-turned-MPs Uya Kuya and Eko Patrio of the National Mandate Party (PAN) – were accused of “abandoning” their pets. This is a framing they reject, arguing they just didn’t have any opportunity to collect them before fleeing looters.

Wherever the truth lies, images of these frightened cats rescued by concerned citizens have struck a deep chord in cat-obsessed Indonesia.

Protesters and netizens quickly came to view these incidents as symbolic of politicians’ betrayal of their duty toward society’s most vulnerable.

Pets are political

Cats are hugely popular in Indonesia, which boasts the highest rate of cat ownership in the Asia-Pacific.

Indonesia is a majority Muslim country, and the high status of cats in Islam may help explain why cats are so popular there.

Beyond the cultural significance of cats, however, the recent incidents also offer insights into the nature of political image-making in Indonesia.

The phenomenon of politicians using cats and other animals to bolster their popularity is of course not new, nor is it uniquely Indonesian.

From Winston Churchill’s wartime cat Nelson, to Bill Clinton’s cat Socks or Downing Street’s “chief mouser” Larry, politicians have long used pet cats to carefully curate their public images as warm, approachable, relatable and humane.

The prime example from Indonesia is President Prabowo Subianto and his rescue tabby cat Bobby Kertanegara.

Bobby boasts almost 1 million followers on Instagram. Images of Prabowo feeding, playing with, and cuddling him helped transform the former army general’s public image in the lead-up to last year’s presidential election. He went from strongman with a questionable human rights record to a cuddly, sweet, animal-loving grandpa.

Now Indonesia’s “first cat” Bobby gets wheeled around in a luxury pet stroller and has his own security detail. He makes appearances at state functions where he receives gifts from foreign leaders. This includes a bespoke scarf Bobby recently received from Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka and former Jakarta governor and 2024 presidential candidate Anies Baswedan have also used their pets to bolster their public image in Indonesia.

The recent protests

The recent protests in Jakarta were triggered by a proposed rise in MP allowances but also by general resentment towards the political class.

Anger has intensified over coverage of politicians’ lavish lives, as ordinary Indonesians struggle with high living costs and youth unemployment rates.

During the recent protests, several high-profile politicians had their houses looted.

Kuya and Patrio were reported to have left behind their cats, some of which were taken by looters or rescued by concerned citizens.

While many of these claims have been disputed by the politicians, commentary on viral posts have asked: if politicians can’t take responsibility for their own pets, how can they be trusted to care for the citizens they are supposed to represent?

Political image-crafting

Social media attention for these cats soon triggered a response from their owners.

Both Kuya and Patrio refuted claims the cats were “abandoned”. They argue there was no opportunity to grab the cats when their homes were targeted for looting, with the animals fleeing on their own.

Both have appealed for their pets to be returned, which has received some support from netizens.

The damage to the politicians’ reputations, however, has been done.

In the age of social media, pets have proven to be a double-edged sword.

Once used to soften politicians’ images and generate public support, these cats have now been drawn into a narrative that positions politicians as uncaring and out of touch. They have become metaphors for what some see as the elites’ betrayal of the people.

These cat incidents also reveal the precarious nature of political image-crafting in the age of social media.

Where once social media enabled political pets to be used to drive public adoration, it has now become a vehicle for backlash.

The Conversation

Ken M.P. Setiawan receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is a Board Member of EngageMedia, a nonprofit organisation that promotes digital rights, open and secure technology, and social issue documentary in the Asia-Pacific.

Charlotte Setijadi has previously received research funding from Singapore’s Ministry of Education and the Singapore Social Science Research Council. She is currently one of the co-convenors of the University of Melbourne’s Indonesia Forum.

Elisabeth Kramer receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is affiliated with the Australia-based Indonesia Council and the Australian Consortium for In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS).

ref. How MPs’ ‘abandoned’ cats became the unexpected symbol of Indonesia’s protests – https://theconversation.com/how-mps-abandoned-cats-became-the-unexpected-symbol-of-indonesias-protests-264511

Deuda autonómica: quién gana y quién pierde con su condonación

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By José Guillermo Rodríguez Sánchez de la Nieta, Investigador, Hacienda Pública: Federalismo fiscal, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha

El Consejo de Ministros del Gobierno de España acaba de aprobar el martes el Anteproyecto de Ley de Medidas Excepcionales de Sostenibilidad Financiera para las Comunidades Autónomas de Régimen Común, lo que permitirá mutualizar 83 252 millones de euros de deuda autonómica. La propuesta de condonación (el dinero pendiente de pago por parte de las comunidades autónomas pasa a ser deuda estatal), presentada el pasado febrero, parte del reconocimiento del impacto de la crisis financiera entre 2010 y 2013 en el sobreendeudamiento autonómico.




Leer más:
Condonación de la deuda autonómica española: de sus causas objetivas y el riesgo moral de perdonar


La situación actual de la deuda autonómica

El estado de la deuda autonómica, según los últimos datos disponibles, es cuanto menos preocupante. Las comunidades de régimen común aglutinan 324 000 millones de euros de deuda, de los cuales el 65 % está en manos del Estado. Cataluña (89 700 millones), Comunidad Valenciana (60 368) y Andalucía (40 490) concentran más de la mitad del endeudamiento total, acompañadas por Madrid (39 651), aunque esta última con una evolución más contenida.

El contraste más llamativo está en la evolución: Murcia ha disparado su deuda más de un 300 % desde 2012, seguida por la Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura y Andalucía, todas muy por encima de la media. En cambio, Galicia, Canarias o Baleares han mantenido un endeudamiento mucho más controlado. Estos datos muestran que el problema no es homogéneo: algunas regiones arrastran un sobreendeudamiento estructural, mientras que otras han gestionado con mayor disciplina. De ahí que la condonación tenga efectos tan desiguales según el territorio.

Los mecanismos adicionales de financiación autonómica han canalizado desde 2012 más de 439 000 millones de euros, de los que aún quedan por devolver unos 210 000. Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana y Andalucía concentran casi el 70 % de estos recursos, lo que explica su elevada dependencia del Estado: en su caso, más del 80 % de la deuda está en manos del Tesoro. En contraste, comunidades como Galicia, Canarias o Castilla y León apenas han recurrido a esos instrumentos. Madrid es la excepción, con un 0 %, gracias a su mayor capacidad de acudir a los mercados.

El saldo vivo pendiente de devolución refleja esa brecha: Cataluña debe todavía casi 80 000 millones y la Comunidad Valenciana más de 54 000. En definitiva, los datos confirman que la condonación no solo alivia cuentas autonómicas, sino que también redistribuye riesgos entre territorios, beneficiando especialmente a quienes más dependieron del auxilio financiero del Estado.

El resultado de la condonación

El artículo 13 de la Ley Orgánica 2/2012 de Estabilidad Presupuestaria y Sostenibilidad Financiera reconoce implícitamente que las comunidades de régimen común deberían tener un porcentaje de deuda del 13 % de su producto interior bruto (PIB). A marzo de 2025, solo Canarias, Navarra y el País Vasco cumplen esta premisa, mientras que la Comunidad Valenciana, Cataluña, Castilla-La Mancha y la Región de Murcia tienen porcentajes por encima del 30 % de su PIB.

La propuesta de condonación, que consta de tres fases, es asimétrica y beneficia especialmente a las comunidades de Andalucía, Cataluña y la Comunidad Valenciana, con 23, 21 y 13 % respectivamente del total condonado. Andalucía, Asturias, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid, Canarias, Navarra y País Vasco entrarían en porcentajes de deuda plenamente válidos para endeudarse en los mercados financieros.

Por contra, la Comunidad Valenciana (35 % de deuda sobre su PIB tras la condonación), Cataluña (26 %), Región de Murcia (25 %) o Castilla-La Mancha (21 %) necesitarían ajustes adicionales para poder financiarse en los mercados financieros en el corto plazo.

Al comparar la ratio deuda/PIB antes y después de la condonación se aprecia que la reducción media del 7 % no basta para garantizar que todas las comunidades puedan financiarse sin problemas en los mercados. La Comunidad Valenciana, con un 35 % de deuda sobre su PIB incluso tras la quita, seguirá en una situación de vulnerabilidad financiera, lo que apunta a que serán necesarias medidas adicionales de disciplina fiscal, o una reforma más profunda del sistema de financiación autonómica. Este dato contrasta con comunidades como Andalucía o Galicia, que, gracias a la condonación, logran situarse en niveles considerados aceptables por los organismos supervisores.

Ganadores y perdedores

Es evidente que las comunidades de régimen común tienen un problema importante con su deuda. Por ello, la propuesta de condonación significará un alivio financiero importante para todas ellas. Sin embargo, la deuda pública no desaparece, se reparte. Es decir, en términos absolutos, encontramos ganadores y perdedores.

Antes de la condonación, la deuda per cápita se situaba en torno a 7 021 euros de media. Tras la operación, comunidades como Castilla-La Mancha (-509 €), Cataluña (-294 €), Comunidad Valenciana (-249 €) o Andalucía (-359 €) ven reducida la carga de sus habitantes, lo que supone un alivio directo en términos de sostenibilidad financiera.

Sin embargo, en territorios como Madrid (+594 €), La Rioja (+436 €) o Cantabria (+414 €), la deuda per cápita aumenta, ya que asumen parte del esfuerzo solidario. El contraste es evidente: mientras un castellanomanchego se libera de más de 500 euros de deuda, un madrileño soporta casi 600 euros adicionales. Esto ilustra que la condonación no elimina deuda, sino que la redistribuye, generando percepciones de ganadores y perdedores.

En clave divulgativa, puede decirse que la medida funciona como una mutualización: se aligera la mochila de quienes más pesada la tenían pero a costa de que otros carguen con un poco más en las suyas.

El ahorro de intereses

El reparto del ahorro en intereses refleja también la desigualdad territorial de la condonación. Aunque todas las comunidades se benefician en mayor o menor medida, las diferencias son notables: algunas logran un respiro financiero considerable mientras que otras apenas perciben impacto.

La condonación de deuda permitirá ahorrar 6 700 millones en intereses, concentrados en la Comunidad Valenciana y Cataluña, mientras que regiones como Canarias, Galicia o Asturias apenas percibirán alivio. En definitiva, los datos confirman que la condonación no solo reduce la carga financiera, sino que reabre el debate sobre la equidad del reparto y la necesidad de una reforma del sistema de financiación autonómica.

Una propuesta alternativa

La condonación de deuda no afecta por igual a todas las comunidades autónomas. Todo depende del criterio con el que se reparta: si se sigue la propuesta del Gobierno, si se distribuye de manera estrictamente per cápita o si se aplica la fórmula de población ajustada que se utiliza en el sistema de financiación autonómica.

Según la propuesta aprobada por el Consejo de Ministros, las comunidades más beneficiadas son Canarias (51 % de su deuda condonada), Andalucía (46 %), Galicia (33 %) y Extremadura (31 %), todas por encima de la media. Sin embargo, si el reparto se realizara de manera estrictamente per cápita, el mapa sería distinto: Asturias alcanzaría un 45 % y Baleares un 27 %, frente al 19 % de Cataluña o el 16 % de la Comunidad Valenciana, que quedarían entre las menos favorecidas.

La fórmula de población ajustada –la que suele emplearse en el sistema de financiación autonómica porque pondera factores como envejecimiento, dispersión geográfica o insularidad– también ofrece un panorama diferente: Canarias subiría hasta un 64 %, mientras que regiones como Murcia o la Comunidad Valenciana apenas superarían el 15 %.

No hay una única manera de medir la justicia del reparto: según el criterio escogido, las comunidades aparecen como más o menos beneficiadas. De hecho, territorios con sobreendeudamiento estructural, como la Comunidad Valenciana, apenas logran un 19 % de quita en la propuesta actual, mientras que otras con menor peso de deuda relativa, como Canarias, se sitúan en lo más alto. Esto explica buena parte del debate político y técnico: lo que para unos es un alivio necesario, para otros puede percibirse como un trato desigual.

The Conversation

José Guillermo Rodríguez Sánchez de la Nieta recibe fondos de un contrato predoctoral de investigación cofinanciado por la Universidad de Castilla la Mancha y el Fondo Social Europeo

Juan José Rubio Guerrero no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Deuda autonómica: quién gana y quién pierde con su condonación – https://theconversation.com/deuda-autonomica-quien-gana-y-quien-pierde-con-su-condonacion-264518

¿Cómo era ser anciano en la prehistoria?

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Cristina de Juana Ortín, Personal docente e investigador, miembro del grupo de investigación ART-QUEO, UNIR – Universidad Internacional de La Rioja

Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock

A día de hoy, el 40 % de las personas desempleadas mayores de 50 años afirma haber sufrido discriminación por su edad, según el Centro Internacional sobre el Envejecimiento (CENIE). Mientras, la OMS advierte que una de cada cinco personas mayores de 50 años han sufrido edadismo en el ámbito sanitario.

En España, el término edadismo aparece por primera vez en el último informe anual del Defensor del Pueblo (2024) y, desde 2022, está incluido en el Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua.

Convivimos con una forma sutil de discriminación benevolente que infantiliza a las personas mayores y les resta autonomía y voz, incluso cuando las intenciones son buenas. Esta situación conlleva menor autoestima, rechazo e invisibilidad social. Sin embargo, todo ello forma parte de una construcción cultural reciente.

Valiosos por su experiencia

Este rechazo al envejecimiento contrasta con la supervivencia de mayores en la prehistoria. Los ancianos, así como los heridos graves o con problemas genéticos, sin duda alguna, contribuían al grupo. Si no podían aportar físicamente, su valor social estaría relacionado con su capacidad como depositarios de memoria y conocimiento.

En las sociedades primitivas, la edad avanzada no estaba vinculada a estigmas, sino a experiencias. Los estudios osteológicos, dentales y arqueológicos permiten afirmar practicas de cuidado, longevidad creciente y valor social de personas de edad avanzada y sobrevivientes a graves accidentes. En estos casos, todo el grupo debía formar parte de una adaptación de las dietas y la movilidad.

Viejos a los 40

En muchos contextos prehistóricos, superar los 40 años ya podía ser una longevidad significativa. Por eso, algunos especialistas hablan de “anciano” a partir de esta edad, si se evidencia deterioro físico funcional.

En prehistoria, es complicado contar con un umbral cronológico absoluto para hablar de ancianidad como hacemos en la actualidad. Debemos aplicar criterios osteológicos y funcionales para determinar ese estado de edad avanzada.

Entrada de la cueva donde vivía el anciano de Shanidar (Kurdistán iraquí).
Wikimedia Commons., CC BY

Entre ellos, se encuentra el desgaste extremo de molares o pérdida completa de dentición sin remplazo. En algunos casos, también, la remodelación del hueso mandibular, que indica que el individuo sobrevivió bastante tiempo sin dientes funcionales.

Asimismo, son indicativos de la edad cambios en el esqueleto asociados a artrosis, osteoporosis, degeneración vertebral o formaciones de hueso adicional en respuesta al estrés articular (exostosis). Y otras circunstancias, como la comparación con patrones de mortalidad dentro de un grupo. Si el promedio de vida de un grupo humano es de 25-30 años y aparece un individuo de 45-50, este puede considerarse un anciano en términos relativos.

Ancianos prehistóricos famosos

Uno de los ancianos prehistóricos más reconocidos es el Homo erectus de Dmanisi, el Cráneo 4, de hace más de 1,8 millones de años. Sabemos que sobrevivió varios años prácticamente sin dentición (endetulismo). Esto supone graves dificultades para masticar y la necesidad de asistencia alimentaria u otras formas de cuidado social.

Excavación del sitio de Dmanisi, Georgia.
Georgian National Museum., CC BY

Por otro lado, Nandy o el fósil Shanidar 1, un neandertal de hace más de 50 000 años, ha sido de los más estudiados. Se estima que sobrevivió con una grave discapacidad hasta los 40 años o más. Había sufrido un golpe lateral en la cara, fracturas y amputación del brazo derecho en el codo, lesiones en la pierna derecha, degeneración sistemática y sordera.

Sobrevivir a todo ello en una sociedad de cazadores-recolectores es sin duda una evidencia de cuidados prolongados por parte de su grupo.

Sobrevivir en tiempos difíciles

En el yacimiento de Dolni Vestonice (actual República Checa), se encontraron los restos de un joven adulto con graves anomalías del desarrollo, conocido como Doln V-stonice 15. El estudio de sus huesos evidencia la presencia de osteoartritis. Su patrón óseo obedece a prácticas de transporte pronunciado y repetitivo o arrastre de cargas pesadas. Esos datos indican la capacidad del grupo para mantener vivo a un individuo gravemente afectado, pero también enfatizan en la necesidad de que todas las personas participen en la elevada movilidad de las poblaciones en el Paleolítico.

Venus de Dolní Věstonice (República Checa).
Wikimedia Commons., CC BY-SA

Tanto en Dolni Vestonice como en la Gran Dolina (Atapuerca), donde una niña neandertal con síndrome de Down bautizada como Tina sobrevivió hasta los 10 años, muestran como los seres humanos trataban de no dejar a nadie atrás. Ayudar al prójimo se convirtió en una tarea fundamental para la supervivencia del grupo.

Abuelas de las cavernas

En este contexto, las mujeres ancianas siguen prácticamente ausentes de los discursos científicos y divulgativos sobre el pasado humano. En parte, debido a la limitación de los propios restos, que suelen ser fragmentos de mandíbula o cráneo que no permiten determinar el sexo.

Pero, los prejuicios modernos no deben condicionar nuestros estudios del pasado. Mientras nuestra sociedad tiende a asociar la vejez con deterioro, pasividad o dependencia, en 1998 ya se abría una nueva línea de estudio: la llamada “hipótesis de la abuela”.

La antropóloga evolutiva estadounidense Kristen Hawkes y sus colegas, con esta hipótesis, explicaban como la menopausia podría tener un significado relevante para la especie humana. Para ellos, el envejecimiento femenino está asociado a nuestra madurez tardía, con implicaciones para la organización social del hábitat y la importancia del aprendizaje extendido.

Por otra parte, Cat Bohannon, en su reciente obra Eva (2025), insiste en la mayor longevidad femenina. Diferentes mecanismos biológicos protegen a las mujeres para sobrevivir a sus compañeros. Y su valor reside en su conocimiento: sobre crisis anteriores, sobre contratiempos en los partos, sobre soluciones ante dificultades alimentarias.

Visibilizar a las ancianas prehistóricas no es solo una tarea científica pendiente, también lo es educativa. Necesitamos construir nuevas narrativas sobre el pasado que incluyan a todos los individuos (mujeres, niños y ancianos), para enriquecer por extensión las narrativas del presente.

The Conversation

Cristina de Juana Ortín no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. ¿Cómo era ser anciano en la prehistoria? – https://theconversation.com/como-era-ser-anciano-en-la-prehistoria-262968