Hantavirus is very different to COVID. Here’s why the ‘Andes virus’ won’t cause the next pandemic

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Rhys Parry, Research Fellow, Virology, The University of Queensland

For many people, news of a virus outbreak on a cruise ship immediately brings back memories of COVID spreading when the Ruby Princess docked in Sydney in March 2020. Of the passengers and crew who disembarked, 575 had COVID. The virus then spread to the community.

So it’s understandable people are concerned that passengers from the MV Hondius need to be quarantined after potential exposure to Andes virus, a rodent-borne hantavirus.

However, the comparison with COVID only goes so far. Andes virus is serious and authorities are right to respond cautiously. But experts, including from the World Health Organization, note it doesn’t have the characteristics needed to become “the next COVID”.

As of May 11, European health authorities have reported nine cases linked to the cruise ship, including seven confirmed and two probable cases. Three deaths have been reported.

Five Australians and one New Zealander are being repatriated to Australia for quarantine and monitoring. The passengers will initially quarantine at the Centre for National Resilience near RAAF Base Pearce in Western Australia.

Here’s what you need to know about Andes virus, the risk of transmission, and how it’s different to the virus that caused COVID.

How do hantaviruses spread?

Hantaviruses are a group of viruses usually carried by mice, rats and other rodents. People are most commonly infected after inhaling tiny particles of contaminated rodent urine, droppings or saliva.

Most hantaviruses are not known to spread between people. Andes virus is the exception. After the initial spillover from infected rodents, it is the only hantavirus with well-documented person-to-person transmission.

But that doesn’t mean it spreads easily between people. Further human-to-human spread is uncommon, but it can occur in close-contact settings such as households, among caregivers, during intimate contact, or after prolonged exposure in crowded or poorly ventilated indoor areas.

That is very different from SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently through the air. People could infect others before they even realised they were sick.

Early estimates suggested each person infected with SARS-CoV-2 passed the virus to roughly two or more others, on average, in populations who had never encountered it before.

Andes virus can cause onward human-to-human transmission, but requires a perfect storm of conditions: symptomatic people in crowded, poorly ventilated spaces with close contact over time. This was the case on the MV Hondius.

This difference in transmission potential is why SARS-CoV-2 caused a pandemic and Andes virus has only produced contained outbreaks.

What are the symptoms of Andes virus?

Early symptoms of Andes virus infection can look like many other illnesses, including fever, headache, muscle aches, nausea and fatigue.

In some people, infection can progress to hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, a life-threatening condition in which breathing becomes difficult.

How long after contact can you get symptoms?

The WHO recommends people exposed to Andes virus monitor for symptoms for 42 days after their last potential exposure.

This reflects the outer limit of the time between infection and symptom onset. It doesn’t mean people are infectious for 42 days.

Australian authorities have announced the returning passengers will initially spend three weeks in quarantine, with further monitoring arrangements to follow.

Melbourne’s Doherty Institute will undertake the testing using polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which detects the virus’s genetic material and blood-based antibody testing, known as serology.

A negative test early after exposure is useful, but not always definitive. If the virus is still incubating, there may not yet be enough viral genetic material or antibody response to detect.

How does the virus progress?

The long incubation period reflects how Andes virus progresses, compared to SARS-CoV-2.

COVID symptoms typically appear within days because the virus replicates rapidly in the respiratory system.

Andes virus progresses differently. Severe disease is linked to blood-vessel dysfunction and inflammatory responses. The breathing problems associated with the complication hantavirus pulmonary syndrome aren’t caused by the virus directly destroying lung tissue, but by the immune system’s delayed response. This causes fluid to leak into the lungs and makes breathing difficult.

How deadly is it?

Fatality rates vary significantly between hantavirus species.

European and Asian hantaviruses typically cause death in less than 1–15% of cases, while hantavirus pulmonary syndrome from American strains, including Andes virus, can reach up to 50%.

For context, in 2025, eight countries across the Americas reported 229 hantavirus cases and 59 deaths. These are severe infections, but they remain rare events.

A virus doesn’t become a pandemic simply because it’s deadly.




Read more:
Hantavirus: here’s what you need to know about the infection that killed Gene Hackman’s wife, Betsy Arakawa


Can Andes virus be treated?

There is no specific antiviral drug for Andes virus. Health care for infected people focuses on close monitoring, supporting their breathing and managing complications to the heart and kidneys.

There is no licensed vaccine to prevent Andes virus.

However, there is also good news in how quickly the scientific response has come together after this outbreak started. Swiss laboratories collaborated quickly to sequence the complete genetic code of the virus from one patient and made it publicly available within days.

This gave researchers around the world a reference to compare other cases against. This can support faster confirmation of suspected cases, while helping public health teams identify which cases are linked to the outbreak and who needs monitoring or isolation.

Bottom line

The instinct to see another COVID in every viral outbreak is understandable but, in this case, misleading.

The Andes virus is dangerous to those infected, but it isn’t a good candidate for pandemic spread. It incubates slowly, typically spreads through close contact, and transmission appears most efficient when people are symptomatic.

It’s important to get the Andes virus under control but it’s not a pandemic threat like COVID.

The Conversation

Rhys Parry receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC).

ref. Hantavirus is very different to COVID. Here’s why the ‘Andes virus’ won’t cause the next pandemic – https://theconversation.com/hantavirus-is-very-different-to-covid-heres-why-the-andes-virus-wont-cause-the-next-pandemic-282595

Conspiracy theories: do 300,000 Kiwis really believe Canada is building an army of mutant super-raccoons?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By John Kerr, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Public Health, University of Otago

Enn Li Photography/Getty Images

Four percent of Americans – roughly 12 million people – believe that “lizard people” secretly control the Earth. At least, that was the finding of an infamous 2013 public opinion survey.

Do so many people really believe such outlandish claims? Or do results like these partly reflect people giving silly answers or deliberately skewing surveys for fun?

US psychiatrist Alexander Scott believes the latter plays a significant role.

Using the survey as an example, he coined the term “the Lizardman constant” to describe the idea that a certain amount of noise and trolling will always exist in surveys about unusual beliefs.

As Scott warned: “Any possible source of noise – jokesters, cognitive biases, or deliberate misbehaviour – can easily overwhelm the signal.”

As researchers who study uncommon beliefs such as conspiracy theories, we wanted to investigate how this kind of cheeky trolling can muddy the waters.

Trolls and true believers

Building on earlier Australian research, we surveyed New Zealanders to test how common dishonest or joking responses were in conspiracy theory surveys.

We did this in two ways. First, we directly asked people a yes/no question at the end of the survey:

“Did you respond insincerely at any earlier point in this survey? In other words, did you give any responses that were actually just joking, trolling, or otherwise not indicating what you really think?”

Second, we included in the survey a “conspiracy theory” so ridiculous we could assume most, if not all, people who said they believed it were taking the mickey.

We asked them if they believed:

The Canadian Armed Forces have been secretly developing an elite army of genetically engineered, super intelligent, giant raccoons to invade nearby countries.

In our representative online sample of 810 New Zealanders, 8.3% of respondents confessed to being insincere in the survey.

Another 7.2% said they thought the Canadian raccoon army theory was probably or definitely true. That proportion – similar to findings from Australia – would equate to more than 300,000 adult New Zealanders.

To complicate things slightly, there was some overlap between those admitting to insincere answers and those claiming to believe the raccoon conspiracy. Combined, 13.3% of respondents fell into one or both groups – roughly one in eight people not appearing to take the survey seriously.

Importantly, these respondents were also much more likely to endorse other conspiracy theories, inflating estimates of how widespread those beliefs really are.

For instance, 6.5% of the full sample endorsed the claim that governments around the world are covering up the fact that 5G mobile networks spread coronavirus.

But once we removed the insincere responders, that figure dropped by more than half to 2.7%.

Across 13 different conspiracy theories, the estimated proportion of believers fell substantially once those respondents were excluded.



Another interesting insight from our study was that people endorsing contradictory conspiracy theories were much more likely to show signs of responding insincerely.

Previous studies have found some people appear to believe conspiracy theories that directly contradict each other. In our survey, for example, some participants agreed both that COVID-19 is a myth and that governments are covering up the fact that 5G networks spread the virus.

But nearly three-quarters of those respondents also showed signs of joking or dishonest answers.

This suggests genuinely believing contradictory conspiracy theories may be less common than previously thought.

Not every conspiracy believer is joking

Our findings add further weight to the idea that surveys may overestimate how many people truly believe some conspiracy theories – thanks, in part, to trolls.

But does that mean all conspiracy theory research is bunk?

Fortunately not. Most research in this area is not focused on counting conspiracy believers, but on understanding why people hold these beliefs and what effects they can have.

We tested several well-established findings from earlier conspiracy theory research to see whether they still held up once insincere respondents were removed from the data.

For example, previous studies have found that people who endorse conspiracy theories are more likely to see the world as a dangerous and threatening place.

We found the same pattern. In fact, removing insincere respondents made little difference to the broader relationships identified in earlier research.

Nevertheless, we recommend that future surveys include ways to gauge whether respondents are answering sincerely and account for this in the analysis. At the very least, researchers should acknowledge that trolls and joking responses can distort their results.

While our research suggests some people are taking the mickey in surveys, it also shows a significant minority genuinely appear to believe some of these claims.

In some cases – such as believing authorities are covering up the fact that the Earth is flat – this may be relatively harmless. But other conspiracy beliefs can lead to real-world harm.

Good-quality research is essential for understanding how sincere believers end up down these rabbit holes, and how those beliefs influence real-world behaviour.

Research into why people embrace conspiracy theories – and the real-world consequences of those beliefs – remains important.

But when surveys suggest millions may believe in lizard overlords or genetically engineered raccoon armies, it is also worth remembering the “Lizardman constant”: some respondents may simply be having us on.


The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Ross, Mathew Ling and Stephen Hill to this article.


The Conversation

John Kerr is supported by a Royal Society Te Apārangi Mana Tūānuku Research Leader Fellowship.

This research was supported by the Marsden Fund Council from Government funding, managed by Royal Society Te Apārangi.

Mathew Marques does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Conspiracy theories: do 300,000 Kiwis really believe Canada is building an army of mutant super-raccoons? – https://theconversation.com/conspiracy-theories-do-300-000-kiwis-really-believe-canada-is-building-an-army-of-mutant-super-raccoons-282478

We found hundreds of huge ancient mass graves hidden in the Sahara desert

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Julien Cooper, Lecturer, Department of History and Archaeology, Macquarie University

We have been on a years-long campaign of satellite remote sensing of the vast desert landscapes in Eastern Sudan.

This involved using satellite aerial imagery to systematically and painstakingly search for archaeological features in Atbai Desert of Eastern Sudan, a small part of the much larger Sahara.

Our team – which includes archaeologists from Macquarie University, France’s HiSoMA research unit, and the Polish Academy of Sciences – wanted to tell the story of this desert region between the Nile and the Red Sea, without having to excavate.

One mysterious archaeological feature stood out. We kept finding large, circular mass graves filled with the bones of people and animals, often carefully arranged around a key person at the centre.

Likely built around the fourth and third millennia BCE, all these “enclosure burial” monuments have a large round enclosure wall, some up to 80 metres in diameter, with humans and their cattle, sheep and goats buried inside.

Our new research, published in the journal African Archaeological Review, reveals how we found 260 previously unknown enclosure burials east of the Nile River, across almost 1,000km of desert.

Who built them?

Already known from a few excavated examples in the Egyptian and Sudanese deserts, these large circular burial monuments have long puzzled scholars.

What seemed once isolated examples emerge now as a consistent pattern. It is suggestive of a common nomadic culture stretching across a vast stretch of desert.

Most are within the borders of modern Sudan on the slopes of the Red Sea Hills. Unfortunately, satellite imagery alone cannot communicate the whole story of these enclosure burial builders.

The carbon dates and pottery from the few excavated monuments tell us these people lived roughly 4000–3000 BCE, just before Egyptians formed a territorial kingdom we know of as Pharaonic Egypt.

But these “enclosure burial” nomads had little to do with urbane and farming Egyptians.

Living in the desert and raising herds, these were Saharan desert nomads through and through.

A new elite?

Some enclosures show “secondary” burials arranged around a “primary” burial of a person at the centre – perhaps a chief or other important member of the community.

For archaeologists, this is important data for discerning class and hierarchy in prehistoric societies.

The question of when Saharan nomads became less egalitarian has plagued archaeologists for decades, but most agree it was around this time of the fourth millennium BCE that a distinctive “elite” class emerged.

This is still a far cry from the sort of huge divisions between ruler and ruled as seen in societies such as Egypt, with its pharaohs and farmers. However, it ushers in the first traces of inequality.

Animals held in high esteem

Cattle seem very important to these prehistoric nomads (a theory also supported by ancient local rock art in the area).

Burying themselves alongside their herd, these nomads show they held their animals in esteem.

Thousands of years later, local nomads chose to reuse these now “ancient” enclosures for their burial plots – sometimes almost 4,000 years after they were first built.

In other words, the prehistoric nomads created cemetery spaces that lasted for millennia.

What happened to these people?

No one can say for sure.

The few dates we have for these monuments cluster between 4000–3000 BCE, nearing the end of a period when the once-greener Sahara was drying, a phase scientists call the “African Humid Period”.

From north to south, the summer monsoon gradually retreated, reducing rainfall and shrinking pastures. This led nomads to abandon thirsty cattle, increase the mobility of their herds, migrate to the south or flee to the Nile.

The monuments are overwhelmingly located near what were then favourable watering spots; near rocky pools in valley floors, lakebeds and ephemeral rivers.

This tells us that when the monuments were being built, the desert was already quite challenging and dry.

At some point, as grass and bush made way for sand and rocks, keeping their prized cattle became unsustainable.

Having large herds of cattle in this desert, at this period, may have been a way of showing off an expensive and rare possession – a prehistoric nomad’s equivalent to having a Ferrari. This may help explain why cattle were frequently buried alongside their owners in enclosure burial monuments.

A bigger story

These enclosure burials are only one part of the greater story of human adaptation to climate change across North Africa.

From the Central Sahara, to Kenya and Arabia, keeping cattle, goats and sheep transformed societies. It changed the food they ate, the way they moved around, and community hierarchies.

It’s no coincidence communities changed how they buried their dead at the same time as they adopted herding lifestyles.

These burial enclosures tell us even scattered nomads were extremely well-organised people, and expert adapters.

Our discovery reshapes the story of the Sahara deserts and the prehistory of the Nile.

They provide a prologue for the monumentalism of the kingdoms of Egypt and Nubia, and an image of this region as more than pharaohs, pyramids and temples.

Sadly, many of these enclosure monuments are currently being destroyed or vandalised as a result of unregulated mining in the region. These unique burials have survived for millennia, but can disappear in less than a week.

Maria Gatto (Polish Academy of Sciences) was an author on our paper. We also want to acknowledge Alexander Carter, Tung Cheung, Kahn Emerson, Jessica Larkin, Stuart Hamilton and Ethan Simpson from Macquarie University for their contribution. We are also grateful to the National Corporation of Antiquities and Museums (Sudan).

The Conversation

Julien Cooper receives funding from the Australian Research Council, (Future Fellowship, FT230100067).

Maël Crépy receives funding from the CNRS (HiSoMA) and the Ifao (NOMADES research program).

Marie Bourgeois receives funding from Ifao (NOMADES research program).

ref. We found hundreds of huge ancient mass graves hidden in the Sahara desert – https://theconversation.com/we-found-hundreds-of-huge-ancient-mass-graves-hidden-in-the-sahara-desert-281978

In an ant colony, the queen isn’t in charge. So who is?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Tanya Latty, Associate Professor in Entomology, University of Sydney

Photo by Prabir Kashyap on Unsplash

Imagine trying to build a house without a blueprint, find a shortcut through an unfamiliar city without a map, or govern a large organisation with no leaders and no meetings.

It sounds impossible. Yet tiny-brained ants, working without leaders or blueprints, have been solving problems like these for millions of years – and no, the queen isn’t the boss telling them what to do.

By almost any measure, ants are a wildly successful group of animals – there’s an estimated 20 quadrillion of them on Earth and they thrive on every continent but Antarctica.

How have these minuscule animals managed to take over the world (and our kitchens)? The answer is teamwork.

Bustling colonies

Ants are social animals that live in colonies ranging from a few individuals to vast continent-spanning supercolonies containing billions of ants.

Bustling ant colonies display many of the features we associate with human societies, including:

In humans, this level of social complexity usually involves clear governance hierarchies, with leaders and middle managers directing our activities.

But ants don’t work that way. So who is in charge in an ant colony?

The answer is simple: no one.

The queen isn’t in charge

Ant colonies are a classic example of a self-organised system, where complex behaviour emerges from the combined actions of many ants. Each follow relatively simple rules while communicating and interacting with each other.

The human brain works in a similar way: individual neurons have simple behaviours and cannot think on their own, but together they give rise to the full range of human thought and behaviour.

An ant climbs over a flower.
No boss, no problem.
Tanya Latty

The queen, whom many people assume is in charge, has little involvement in decision-making or leadership.

Instead, her role is to maintain the colony’s workforce by producing new ants.

In some ant species, workers will even kill their queens under particular conditions, such as declining productivity!

By working together, ant colonies are capable of complex behaviours and problem-solving skills far exceeding the abilities of an individual ant.

For example, some ant species run sophisticated transportation networks linking their colony to many food sources.

When a foraging worker finds a good source of food, such as some crumbs in your kitchen, she lays down drops of attractive chemicals called “pheromones” as she walks home.

Other ants in the colony are attracted to the trail, reinforcing it with more pheromones as they go. As a result, the colony can rapidly deploy large numbers of workers to quickly collect food.

While an individual ant is only aware of the foods she herself has visited, the trail network allows the colony as a whole to be “aware” of many foods.

Should a food source disappear or decline in quality, the colony can quickly refocus its efforts.

Ants can also optimise their trail networks by finding shortcuts.

Since pheromone trails evaporate over time, shorter paths that are traversed more quickly get reinforced more often. Longer paths, by contrast, receive less traffic and get reinforced less often, which in turn causes the pheromone trail to fade and become less attractive.

This simple feedback loop allows the colony to “discover” shorter routes that take less time to traverse while eliminating longer routes.

The resulting transportation network can be remarkably efficient.

Remarkable architects

Nest construction is another impressive example of the power of self-organisation.

Ant nests can be vast and intricately structured, with chambers for raising the young, food storage, and waste.

Yet no ant has a blueprint for the final nest design, nor is a boss ant in charge of directing construction activities.

Instead, ants use simple rules to create their remarkable nest architecture.

For example, in the black garden ant Lasius niger, nest building ants excavate soil and form it into small pellets.

These pellets carry chemical cues making other ants more likely to deposit their own pellets nearby.

Over time, this leads to the formation of structures such as pillars, walls, and eventually roofs, without any ant understanding the overall design.

This process, where individuals respond to cues left behind by other individuals, is called “stigmergy” and it underpins the construction of other insect-built structures such as termite mounds and honeycomb.

More humans, more problems – but not so for ants

The use of simple behavioural rules enables ants to coordinate remarkably effectively as a group.

In a study where groups were tasked with moving a T-shaped object through a tight space, human performance did not improve with group size.

When participants were instructed not to speak, performance actually declined as groups got bigger.

Similarly, it has long been known that as human group size increases, the performance of individual team members tends to decrease, a phenomenon known as the Ringelmann effect.

Ants, by contrast, showed the opposite pattern: as group size increased, their performance actually improved.

So next time you see a line of ants marching around your house, resist the urge to spray or whack them away.

Instead, take a moment to appreciate these tiny masters of teamwork.

The Conversation

Tanya Latty co-founded and volunteers for conservation organisation Invertebrates Australia, is former president of the Australasian Society for the Study of Animal Behaviour and is on the Education committee for the Australian Entomological Society. She receives funding from the Australian Research Council, NSW Saving our Species, and Agrifutures Australia.

ref. In an ant colony, the queen isn’t in charge. So who is? – https://theconversation.com/in-an-ant-colony-the-queen-isnt-in-charge-so-who-is-278196

Instagram can now read all users’ private messages. Will this make kids safer or just boost ad targeting?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Joel Scanlan, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Law; Academic Co-Lead, CSAM Deterrence Centre, University of Tasmania

Meta’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg in 2019. Anthony Quintano, CC BY-NC

As of May 8 end-to-end encryption is no longer available on direct messages on Instagram.

Meta, in announcing the policy reversal, said it had done so because few people used the feature. But this has raised questions about its impact on user privacy and whether it will improve child safety on the platform.

Instagram has long been a focal point for discussion about online safety – whether in relation to body image concerns, cyberbullying or sexual extortion. This policy change by Meta directly affects how safety and moderation are implemented in private messages.

This is important considering research has found that perpetrators first contacted roughly 23% of Australian sexual extortion victims on Instagram, the second most frequent method of contact, behind Snapchat (at 50%).

What is end-to-end encryption?

End-to-end encryption is a way of scrambling a message so only the sender’s and recipient’s devices can read it. The platform carrying the message, in this case Instagram, can’t access it.

This same technology is present by default on WhatsApp, Signal, iMessage, and (since late 2023) Facebook Messenger.

Meta’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg first promised to bring end-to-end encryption across Meta’s messaging products back in 2019, under the slogan “the future is private”.

Instagram tested encrypted direct messages in 2021. It rolled them out as an opt-in feature in 2023.

End-to-end encrypted direct messages never became the default, and the low adoption rate of opting in to use the feature is Meta’s justification for removing it. As a spokesperson told The Guardian:

Very few people were opting in to end-to-end encrypted messaging in DMs, so we’re removing this option from Instagram.

There is a circular logic to this: Meta has killed off a feature it buried so deep that most users never knew it existed, then cited low usage as the reason for its removal.

What does this mean for Instagram users?

In practical terms, every message you send on Instagram now travels in a form Meta can read.

Meta’s privacy policy lists the content of messages users send and receive among the data it collects. In principle, this enables the company to use this data to personalise features, train artificial intelligence (AI) models, and deliver targeted advertising.

While Meta has publicly committed not to train its AI models on private messages unless users actively share them with Meta AI, it has made no equivalent public commitment about advertising.

That leaves open the possibility that Meta could use unencrypted Instagram direct messages for ad targeting. And without encryption, Meta’s AI commitment is now backed by policy alone, not by the technology itself.

A clear reversal

This reads as a clear reversal of Meta’s privacy-first posture which Zuckerberg announced seven years ago.

Meta has been under sustained pressure from law enforcement, regulators and child protection organisations who argue end-to-end encryption creates spaces where platforms can’t detect child sexual exploitation and grooming. Australia’s eSafety Commissioner has been clear that the deployment of end-to-end encryption “does not absolve services of responsibility for hosting or facilitating online abuse or the sharing of illegal content”.

This argument deserves to be taken seriously. The harms are real and disproportionately fall on young people.

However, sexual extortion research shows perpetrators don’t tend to stay on the platform where they make first contact, with more than 50% of sexual extortion victims saying perpetrators asked them to switch platforms.

Meta still uses end-to-end encryption on its other platforms, such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, and it needs to apply a consistent approach to child safety. Predators routinely ask victims to switch platforms, so the company’s safety approach needs to work for Instagram and their end-to-end encrypted services.

A false choice

Meta and privacy advocates often frame this as a choice between end-to-end encryption or child safety. But that’s a false choice. It’s not an “either-or” situation, even if they make it sound like one.

The technology already exists to detect harmful content while keeping messages encrypted in transit. It just has to run in the right place: on the user’s device, before the device encrypts and sends the message, or after it receives and decrypts it.

On-device approaches have a contested history, and any deployment must be genuinely privacy-preserving by design. But technology companies must weigh the objection against the harms that continue to occur. A safety by design approach is needed.

On-device safety measures have been demonstrated at scale with Apple’s on-device nudity detection for images sent or received via Messages, AirDrop and FaceTime. A 2025 study demonstrated high-accuracy grooming detection using Meta’s AI model designed specifically for on-device deployment on mobile phones.

Recently, both Apple and Google have started to take measures towards app store–based age verification in some jurisdictions.

The highest-profile real-world deployment of these is Apple enabling device-level privacy-preserving age verification in the UK.

Social media and private messaging companies, along with operating system vendors (Microsoft, Apple, and Google), all have a role to play in ensuring harmful content is detected, whether or not end-to-end encryption is used. Progress has been slow. But we, as a community, need to demand more from these companies.

The Conversation

Joel Scanlan is the academic co-lead of the CSAM Deterrence Centre, which is a partnership between the University of Tasmania and Jesuit Social Services, who operate Stop It Now (Australia), a therapeutic service providing support to people who are concerned with their own, or someone else’s, feelings towards children. He has received funding from the Australian Research Council, Australian Institute of Criminology, the eSafety Commissioner, Lucy Faithfull Foundation and the Internet Watch Foundation.

ref. Instagram can now read all users’ private messages. Will this make kids safer or just boost ad targeting? – https://theconversation.com/instagram-can-now-read-all-users-private-messages-will-this-make-kids-safer-or-just-boost-ad-targeting-282496

Racial gerrymandering may be here to stay

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Claire B. Wofford, Associate Professor of Political Science, College of Charleston

A recent Supreme Court decision is sparking a major push for partisan redistricting. Douglas Rissing, iStock/Getty Images Plus

The outrage was swift and severe when the U.S. Supreme Court, by an ideologically divided 6-3 vote, recently struck down Louisiana’s majority Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Critics lambasted the court for gutting the Voting Rights Act, the federal law that had until recently garnered strong bipartisan support and had ensured Black political representation in the South for more than half a century.

Many analysts see Jim Crow-era disenfranchisement of Black voters on the horizon.

Whether Louisiana v. Callais will wreak this kind of havoc remains to be seen, although some Southern states have already begun to redraw their legislative districts, aiming to ensure Republican control. Several Black legislators – all Democrats – are expected to lose their seats in the upcoming midterm elections. Democrats are threatening to retaliate with their own redistricting plans.

Because of a 2019 decision by the court, such political gerrymanders, where a legislative district is crafted to ensure partisan control, cannot be challenged under federal law. Both parties had taken full advantage of that ruling.

Prior to the Callais ruling, however, legislators had to be sure that when they sought partisan control of a district, they did not excessively dilute the voting power of minority residents. Multiple lawsuits had challenged political gerrymanders on exactly these grounds.

After Callais, that guardrail is gone. Indeed, lest they provoke the same type of litigation faced by Louisiana, state legislators must now ignore the race of voters altogether. From here on out, gerrymandering is fine, but only if it’s race-neutral.

This does not mean, however, that the race-blind mapmaking process envisioned by the Supreme Court majority will manifest. Based on our recently published research, it may, in fact, be just the opposite.

Race, we found, is – at least in the South – a more reliable predictor of how someone will vote than their party identification. And that makes race, we believe, a potentially irresistible lure for those designing congressional districts.

Three men in suits with the one on the left, who is Black, swearing an oath with his right hand raised.
In 1972, Andrew Young, left, was the first Black person to be elected to Congress from the deep South since Reconstruction.
AP Photo

Race a more reliable predictor

We are both political scientists – one of us an expert on Congress and national elections and the other a constitutional law and Supreme Court scholar. In Southern states, race and political party overlap significantly, with the vast majority of Black voters favoring Democrats and most white voters favoring Republicans. And in our study, we document that in this region, mapmakers actually have an incentive to take race into account when conducting a political gerrymander.

Political gerrymandering is the process of drawing electoral districts to favor one party over another. In most states, the responsibility for drawing districts rests with the state legislature. Thus, the party that controls state legislatures very often controls elections – at both the state and congressional level.

The goal of partisan redistricting is to maximize the chance that candidates from that political party will win elections. Our study shows that using both the race and party of voters to redraw districts, rather than just party alone, better ensures partisan advantage.

The research we conducted was motivated by a claim made by Justice Samuel Alito in another recent racial gerrymandering case decided by the Supreme Court, Alexander vs. South Carolina NAACP. He argued in the court’s majority opinion that when drawing districts to favor one party, mapmakers would need to look only at voters’ party affiliation – their race would be irrelevant to ensuring partisan control.

It is a straightforward, seemingly sensible claim. It is also wrong.

Our study uses an original dataset of precinct-level election results in South Carolina from 2010 to 2020 to explore how well a precinct’s racial and partisan composition before redistricting predicts how it votes over the following decade.

What we found reveals a more complicated picture than Alito – and the subsequent Callais decision – presumes.

A precinct’s Democratic and Republican vote share prior to redistricting was the strongest predictor of future election results. But there are two problems with relying on only such partisan data when gerrymandering a district.

First, our analysis showed that roughly a quarter of a precinct’s voters in the next election did not follow what the partisan data predicted – a sizable amount, given the supposed ease of gerrymandering by party.

Second, precinct election results are surprisingly volatile. Our analysis shows that the effect of preredistricting partisanship varies with election cycles, national conditions, gradual changes in party coalitions and other factors. A precinct that leaned Republican in the election before redistricting may vote very differently in a midterm wave year when the president is unpopular, precisely the type of election coming in November.

By comparison, the analysis shows that voters’ race is a more reliable predictor than their party of how they will vote in the next election. Consequently, it seems that, at least in Southern states, legislators have a genuine, data-driven incentive to use racial data when drawing partisan districts.

A man with white hair and glasses who looks stern and is pointing at someone not in the photo.
Republicans in South Carolina want to draw a new congressional map, and it could eliminate the district that has for decades elected Democrat Jim Clyburn.
Kevin Wolf/AP Photo

Will race still affect political gerrymanders?

Consider this redistricting scenario: South Carolina’s Republican-led legislature wants to flip the state’s lone Democratic congressional seat – long held by prominent African American U.S. Rep. Jim Clyburn – for the 2026 midterms. A simple approach is to identify those who voted for Donald Trump in 2024 and then just redraw the district to add enough of those voters to ensure Republican control.

The plan backfires, however. Not only does Clyburn hold his seat, but a neighboring district also elects a Democrat. What went wrong?

Simply put, the legislature failed to realize that past partisan returns are an imperfect predictor of future voting behavior.

A heavily Democratic area that is predominantly Black will vote Democratic far more consistently than a heavily Democratic area that is predominantly white. Two precincts that look identical on a partisan map can behave very differently at the ballot box. And a legislature that fails to take this into account has taken an unreliable route to partisan advantage.

If Republican legislators want to oust Democratic officials, the most reliable route is to oust from a district the minority Democratic voters who would have elected them.

This is not to suggest that legislators should use race in this way. It certainly smacks of racism and echoes the type of electoral machinations used during Jim Crow. But that analogy is not exactly on point. The approach we identified targets the power of Black voters not because they are Black, but because they are such reliable Democrats.

To many, that may be a difference that makes no difference. More litigation over gerrymanders is inevitable. If litigants can demonstrate that race was a “predominant” factor that “drove” redistricting, or that mapmakers purposefully attempted to diminish the power of Black voters because of their race, legal liability can still follow.

Voting rights advocates should be aware of the temptation legislators may have to let race affect their political gerrymanders.

Perhaps minority voters are as free from invidious discrimination as Alito’s majority opinion in the Callais case suggests. This does not mean, however, that those charged with ensuring all voters are fairly represented in American democracy will be colorblind. Our findings show that race could easily remain embedded in the political gerrymandering landscape, despite vehement claims to the contrary.

The Conversation

Jordan Ragusa has served as an expert witness in racial gerrymandering litigation, most notably in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP. He also serves on the advisory board of Charleston Civil Rights and Civics (C3), an educational non-profit that fosters civic engagement and civil rights awareness among high school students

Claire B. Wofford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Racial gerrymandering may be here to stay – https://theconversation.com/racial-gerrymandering-may-be-here-to-stay-282349

Trump-Xi summit will be no ‘Nixon in China’ moment – that they are talking is enough for now

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Rana Mitter, Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School

Xi and Trump: A plastic friendship at best? Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images

Meetings between Chinese and American leaders are not exactly routine, but few are historically groundbreaking.

The exceptions include the very first visit by a sitting U.S. president to China, when Richard Nixon met with Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in February 1972 – at a time when America did not even formally recognize the People’s Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the U.S. in 1979 generated a similarly iconic moment when the reformist Chinese leader donned a Stetson at a Texas rodeo, a sign that he would be willing to engage with America in a way that Mao contemplated only near the end of his life.

Donald Trump may harbor hopes that his upcoming visit, slated for May 14-15, 2026, could have similar historical significance to those moments half a century ago. It will, after all, be the first face-to-face meeting of U.S. and Chinese leaders in Beijing since Trump’s own visit nearly a decade ago in 2017.

Two men in suits shake hands.
Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong welcomes U.S. President Richard Nixon to his house in Beijing in 1972.
AFP via Getty Images

Yet the outcomes of this Trump summit with Xi Jinping are likely to be vague because the goals for both leaders are also only partially evident. The visit is being driven by trade imperatives, but there are other issues that threaten U.S.-China relations in the longer term.

It will be extremely hard for the two sides to address these more deep-rooted divides. Indeed, as an analyst of U.S.-China relations, I believe the world’s two largest economies will have an essentially competitive relationship for years to come, and areas of plausible cooperation – whether on climate change or AI regulation – are increasingly hard to find.

Taiwan: A change in US position?

One area that has been a source of contention for quite some time is Taiwan. Xi has made it clear that the unification of the island with the mainland cannot be left to “another generation” but has left it vague – up to now – as to how that goal will be achieved.

The summit has been preceded by lots of chatter about U.S. preparedness to honor its somewhat ambiguous promise to defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion – with Chinese analysts concluding that the war in Iran has severely weakened Washington’s capabilities on this front.

However, there are plenty of signs that Xi would rather find peaceful means to unite with Taiwan that avoid all-out war, particularly as the examples of Russia in Ukraine and the U.S. in Iran show that the outcomes of wars are not predictable.

Instead, China has seemingly concentrated its efforts on influencing the upcoming January 2028 Taiwan presidential election. The leader of the island’s major opposition Kuomintang party, Cheng Li-wun, recently visited the mainland and had a photo op with Xi – a sign that she thinks dealmaking with China might just be acceptable to the Taiwan electorate despite its deep distrust of Beijing.

To further fuel the narrative of a seemingly inevitable path toward unification, it would be helpful for Xi to have signals that the U.S. is no longer committed to defending Taiwan.

China will push for a change from the official position that the U.S. “does not support Taiwan independence” to “the U.S. opposes Taiwan independence.” The latter change sounds minor but would have great significance, as it would essentially be an acknowledgment that the U.S. recognizes unification, by some means, as a legitimate goal in its own right.

Trump has kept his own position ambiguous: He has noted more than once that Taiwan is very close to China and very far from the U.S., but he has also authorized major arms sales to the island that have infuriated Beijing.

The outline of a man is seen in front of a large ship.
Taiwanese navy warships anchored in Keelung, Taiwan.
Annabelle Chih/Getty Images

Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party does not specifically endorse independence, as it knows that’s a red line for Beijing, but it would regard this change in American language as a serious blow to its position. It’s unlikely that the U.S. would make such a major concession during Trump’s visit – but that won’t stop Beijing from asking for it.

AI: The battle for global leadership

A more tentative but increasingly important area for discussion during the Xi-Trump summit is technology in general and AI in particular.

Just three years ago, the attitude of the U.S. government was summed up in the phrase of then national security adviser Jake Sullivan: “small yard, high fence.”

In other words, there would be only a few restricted areas of technology, but they would be fiercely guarded.

In 2026, things have changed. In some areas, tech restrictions have just become looser; the U.S. government now permits the sale to China of some high-specification, American-manufactured chips that were previously restricted. That policy was probably driven by the sense that China was developing its own domestic alternatives anyway and that the U.S. was losing market share.

Yet there is growing concern both in the U.S. and China that AI developments are moving too fast for governments – or companies – to know fully what the technology is capable of doing, let alone being able to regulate it.

China and the U.S. both desire to dominate AI and set the global norms and standards surrounding it. But they are also aware that AI has the potential to cause immense damage.

There has been loose discussion of whether any joint form of supervision or regulation of AI between the U.S. and China might be possible. And that could well form part of the discussions during the leaders’ summit.

But realistically, both sides see themselves in fierce competition, and the likelihood that either American or Chinese companies would restrain themselves may be fanciful.

The trade elephant in the room

The most substantial achievements of the summit, however, are likely to be in the least glamorous area: remedying the trade deficit.

Trump’s tariffs aim to make the United States’ global trade partners pay a higher price for entry to the American market, and China’s persistent and massive trade surplus has been a prime target for the U.S. president.

Four people sit on chairs surrounded by flags.
U.S. first lady Melania Trump, Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, in West Palm Beach, Fla., on April 6, 2017.
Jim Watson /AFP via Getty Images

While there are many American products that China would like to buy, most of them are not products that the U.S. government is willing to let them have, including high-tech equipment that could be used for military purposes.

Instead, the key products are likely to be agricultural, including U.S. soybeans and beef. Look out for concessions from China that would benefit farmers in key Republican states, such as Iowa.

The current tariff dispute between the U.S. and China has frozen into a standoff: The U.S. has agreed to allow China’s goods into its immense market at manageable tariff rates, and China has – mostly – agreed to allow critical minerals and rare earths to flow to U.S. manufacturers.

That truce lasts until October, but the summit may see it extended.

Neither side is keen to restart the trade war that marked the summer of 2025, when Trump announced tariffs of over 100% on China and the U.S. was in danger of having key mineral supplies cut off as a result.

Summit to talk about? Perhaps not

So how consequential will the Trump-Xi summit be? Well, don’t expect another “Nixon meets Mao” moment.

The circumstances more than a half-century on are also remarkably different. Today’s China, unlike in 1972, has an economy and military second only to the U.S. and a central position in global organizations, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, particularly as the U.S. retreats from such institutions.

Both the U.S. and Chinese sides know that they can expect limited cooperation at best from their opponent.

But after a period, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, when communication between the countries atrophied, it’s still important that they are talking at all.

The Conversation

Rana Mitter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Trump-Xi summit will be no ‘Nixon in China’ moment – that they are talking is enough for now – https://theconversation.com/trump-xi-summit-will-be-no-nixon-in-china-moment-that-they-are-talking-is-enough-for-now-282295

Why political gerrymandering in the South will likely continue to consider voters’ race despite Supreme Court ruling

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Claire B. Wofford, Associate Professor of Political Science, College of Charleston

A recent Supreme Court decision is sparking a major push for partisan redistricting. Douglas Rissing, iStock/Getty Images Plus

The outrage was swift and severe when the U.S. Supreme Court, by an ideologically divided 6-3 vote, recently struck down Louisiana’s majority Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Critics lambasted the court for gutting the Voting Rights Act, the federal law that had until recently garnered strong bipartisan support and had ensured Black political representation in the South for more than half a century.

Many analysts see Jim Crow-era disenfranchisement of Black voters on the horizon.

Whether Louisiana v. Callais will wreak this kind of havoc remains to be seen, although some Southern states have already begun to redraw their legislative districts, aiming to ensure Republican control. Several Black legislators – all Democrats – are expected to lose their seats in the upcoming midterm elections. Democrats are threatening to retaliate with their own redistricting plans.

Because of a 2019 decision by the court, such political gerrymanders, where a legislative district is crafted to ensure partisan control, cannot be challenged under federal law. Both parties had taken full advantage of that ruling.

Prior to the Callais ruling, however, legislators had to be sure that when they sought partisan control of a district, they did not excessively dilute the voting power of minority residents. Multiple lawsuits had challenged political gerrymanders on exactly these grounds.

After Callais, that guardrail is gone. Indeed, lest they provoke the same type of litigation faced by Louisiana, state legislators must now ignore the race of voters altogether. From here on out, gerrymandering is fine, but only if it’s race-neutral.

This does not mean, however, that the race-blind mapmaking process envisioned by the Supreme Court majority will manifest. Based on our recently published research, it may, in fact, be just the opposite.

Race, we found, is – at least in the South – a more reliable predictor of how someone will vote than their party identification. And that makes race, we believe, a potentially irresistible lure for those designing congressional districts.

Three men in suits with the one on the left, who is Black, swearing an oath with his right hand raised.
In 1972, Andrew Young, left, was the first Black person to be elected to Congress from the deep South since Reconstruction.
AP Photo

Race a more reliable predictor

We are both political scientists – one of us an expert on Congress and national elections and the other a constitutional law and Supreme Court scholar. In Southern states, race and political party overlap significantly, with the vast majority of Black voters favoring Democrats and most white voters favoring Republicans. And in our study, we document that in this region, mapmakers actually have an incentive to take race into account when conducting a political gerrymander.

Political gerrymandering is the process of drawing electoral districts to favor one party over another. In most states, the responsibility for drawing districts rests with the state legislature. Thus, the party that controls state legislatures very often controls elections – at both the state and congressional level.

The goal of partisan redistricting is to maximize the chance that candidates from that political party will win elections. Our study shows that using both the race and party of voters to redraw districts, rather than just party alone, better ensures partisan advantage.

The research we conducted was motivated by a claim made by Justice Samuel Alito in another recent racial gerrymandering case decided by the Supreme Court, Alexander vs. South Carolina NAACP. He argued in the court’s majority opinion that when drawing districts to favor one party, mapmakers would need to look only at voters’ party affiliation – their race would be irrelevant to ensuring partisan control.

It is a straightforward, seemingly sensible claim. It is also wrong.

Our study uses an original dataset of precinct-level election results in South Carolina from 2010 to 2020 to explore how well a precinct’s racial and partisan composition before redistricting predicts how it votes over the following decade.

What we found reveals a more complicated picture than Alito – and the subsequent Callais decision – presumes.

A precinct’s Democratic and Republican vote share prior to redistricting was the strongest predictor of future election results. But there are two problems with relying on only such partisan data when gerrymandering a district.

First, our analysis showed that roughly a quarter of a precinct’s voters in the next election did not follow what the partisan data predicted – a sizable amount, given the supposed ease of gerrymandering by party.

Second, precinct election results are surprisingly volatile. Our analysis shows that the effect of preredistricting partisanship varies with election cycles, national conditions, gradual changes in party coalitions and other factors. A precinct that leaned Republican in the election before redistricting may vote very differently in a midterm wave year when the president is unpopular, precisely the type of election coming in November.

By comparison, the analysis shows that voters’ race is a more reliable predictor than their party of how they will vote in the next election. Consequently, it seems that, at least in Southern states, legislators have a genuine, data-driven incentive to use racial data when drawing partisan districts.

A man with white hair and glasses who looks stern and is pointing at someone not in the photo.
Republicans in South Carolina want to draw a new congressional map, and it could eliminate the district that has for decades elected Democrat Jim Clyburn.
Kevin Wolf/AP Photo

Will race still affect political gerrymanders?

Consider this redistricting scenario: South Carolina’s Republican-led legislature wants to flip the state’s lone Democratic congressional seat – long held by prominent African American U.S. Rep. Jim Clyburn – for the 2026 midterms. A simple approach is to identify those who voted for Donald Trump in 2024 and then just redraw the district to add enough of those voters to ensure Republican control.

The plan backfires, however. Not only does Clyburn hold his seat, but a neighboring district also elects a Democrat. What went wrong?

Simply put, the legislature failed to realize that past partisan returns are an imperfect predictor of future voting behavior.

A heavily Democratic area that is predominantly Black will vote Democratic far more consistently than a heavily Democratic area that is predominantly white. Two precincts that look identical on a partisan map can behave very differently at the ballot box. And a legislature that fails to take this into account has taken an unreliable route to partisan advantage.

If Republican legislators want to oust Democratic officials, the most reliable route is to oust from a district the minority Democratic voters who would have elected them.

This is not to suggest that legislators should use race in this way. It certainly smacks of racism and echoes the type of electoral machinations used during Jim Crow. But that analogy is not exactly on point. The approach we identified targets the power of Black voters not because they are Black, but because they are such reliable Democrats.

To many, that may be a difference that makes no difference. More litigation over gerrymanders is inevitable. If litigants can demonstrate that race was a “predominant” factor that “drove” redistricting, or that mapmakers purposefully attempted to diminish the power of Black voters because of their race, legal liability can still follow.

Voting rights advocates should be aware of the temptation legislators may have to let race affect their political gerrymanders.

Perhaps minority voters are as free from invidious discrimination as Alito’s majority opinion in the Callais case suggests. This does not mean, however, that those charged with ensuring all voters are fairly represented in American democracy will be colorblind. Our findings show that race could easily remain embedded in the political gerrymandering landscape, despite vehement claims to the contrary.

The Conversation

Jordan Ragusa has served as an expert witness in racial gerrymandering litigation, most notably in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP. He also serves on the advisory board of Charleston Civil Rights and Civics (C3), an educational non-profit that fosters civic engagement and civil rights awareness among high school students

Claire B. Wofford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why political gerrymandering in the South will likely continue to consider voters’ race despite Supreme Court ruling – https://theconversation.com/why-political-gerrymandering-in-the-south-will-likely-continue-to-consider-voters-race-despite-supreme-court-ruling-282349

The women’s rights crisis in Afghanistan is an ongoing humanitarian calamity

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Sepita Hatami, Gender Studies researcher; PhD candidate in Comparative Literature, Western University

Where is one of worst places to be a woman? Afghanistan.

That’s what most people think when it comes to the topic of the women’s rights crisis under the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan. But this only tells part of the story.

Focusing on the word “rights” hides something more serious underneath: how people live and survive in this situation. What’s unfolding in Afghanistan is not just a women’s rights crisis, but a humanitarian disaster.

It affects how people access health care, education, food systems and basic supports and whether these system can function at all when half the population has been systematically removed from them. It forces families to deal with women’s limited access to work and services, often pushing households into deeper economic and social vulnerability.

The Taliban has steadily removed women from public spaces including work, health care and education. Recently, for example, female health-care workers were stopped at the gates of a United Nations office and banned from entering the facility by Taliban authorities.

These ongoing removals are incrementally creating a system that determines who has the right to exist, to provide assistance and to receive assistance.

What’s happening in Afghanistan is not simply gender discrimination; rather, it’s pushing an entire gender out of public systems altogether. The predicament of Afghan women is less a social problem and more a structural crisis that shapes institutions and everyday life.

Gender apartheid

This is why the situation in Afghanistan is increasingly referred to as a form of gender apartheid rather than a women’s rights crisis. The exclusion of women reveals how institutions are built and will be maintained in the future.

Gender apartheid refers to a situation in which people are banned from certain spaces or activities based on their gender identity.

This discriminatory and violent practice in Afghanistan has been widely documented and heavily reported on, but the situation continues to deteriorate daily.

Its effects are also accumulative, with each restriction reinforcing others and deepening the overall crisis. These systemic rights violations would be increasingly difficult to reverse even if political bodies and the ruling government changed tomorrow.

That’s because removing women from professional spaces leads to schools losing teachers, hospitals losing trained staff and aid networks losing access to half the population. And this loss isn’t temporary; it limits how systems can respond to the growing needs around them.

When women get barred from institutions, the problem isn’t just that these organizations suffer in their service delivery and performance. It also results in the loss of institutional memory — the skills, professional knowledge and experience that is no longer transferred to future generations.

Over time, institutions also scale down or suspend certain services due to a shortage of female workers. As services shrink, significant gaps appear in the networks of care and support leaving entire groups of people without consistent access to support.

Blocking aid and support

The Taliban refusal to allow female workers into UN and UNICEF offices is one of many examples happening today in Afghanistan that ban qualified women from entering places where they can deliver urgent care and assistance.

This effective crackdown on women’s rights is blocking aid and support in a society where it’s desperately needed.

Male workers are also limited in the ways they can assist female patients due to Taliban gender norms and restrictions, so support for women cannot be simply reassigned to them. This affects several aspects of humanitarian aid including health care, food distribution and protection systems.

It also delegates the burden of these unmet needs into households where women must provide unpaid labour and care-giving responsibilities.

Taliban rule consequently delays or prevents life-saving interventions for women and children, a violation of the human right to survive.

It’s not just UN and UNICEF offices where women workers are banned from entry: they’re being turned away at other aid organizations, hospitals, schools and various public institutions in a widespread erosion of human rights. The Taliban has put in place a network of human rights violations across the entire humanitarian system.

Humanitarian aid also depends on access to information and correct data: who is hungry, who is unsafe and who needs protection. In Afghanistan, where women are limited in who they can interact with and where female staff are largely absent from outreach, surveys and home visits, this information becomes incomplete.

Poor data leads to incomplete distribution of assistance and mismatched allocation of aid. As a result, the most vulnerable populations can remain invisible in official assessments.

This invisibility especially affects households headed by women and those living in remote or rural areas with already limited access.

Normalizing crises

The impact of Aghanistan’s gender apartheid might not be visible to many outside the country, but in the near future, humanitarian systems will break down.

Future generations of female professionals have already been eliminated by the Taliban’s ban of girls from schools.

UNICEF estimates the ban could cost Afghanistan 25,000 teachers and health-care workers. In a country where women are prohibited from receiving care from male providers, banning women from both education and health-care work creates a profound medical emergency.




Read more:
The Taliban wages war on women, but their voices roar on the page. Here are 5 essential books by Afghan women writers


Over time, systems will be redesigned without women as providers even as they remain central as recipients. As gender restrictions disrupt the flow of resources, knowledge and care, the capacity to deliver services is declining every day despite high demand. Many women are also pushed into informal or hidden work that is insecure and vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

Gender apartheid in Afghanistan will not end through recognition alone. Naming systemic terror does not stop it and, without action, repeated exposure to crisis can instead normalize it through compassion fatigue. Humanitarian organizations now face a stark choice: operate under restrictive conditions and risk legitimizing them, or withdraw and leave people without support.

The longer the situation persists, the more the exclusion of women in Afghanistan risks becoming a normalized structure rather than an emergency. The question is no longer only how to restore what’s been lost, but whether systems once dependent on women’s participation can be rebuilt at all.

The Conversation

Sepita Hatami does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The women’s rights crisis in Afghanistan is an ongoing humanitarian calamity – https://theconversation.com/the-womens-rights-crisis-in-afghanistan-is-an-ongoing-humanitarian-calamity-281686

¿Qué nos cuenta la guerra entre EE. UU. y España por Cuba sobre el intervencionismo y la geopolítica actual?

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Francisco López-Muñoz, Catedrático de Farmacología y Vicerrector de Investigación y Ciencia, Universidad Camilo José Cela

Lienzo de la batalla naval de Santiago de Cuba (3 de julio de 1898), obra de Ildefonso Sanz Doménech, que supuso una victoria decisiva de Estados Unidos. Benjamín Núñez González/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

En un momento en el que la geopolítica internacional se ve de nuevo sometida a los vaivenes de una política intervencionista estadounidense y su corolario de conflictos bélicos, merece la pena recordar lo sucedido con España hace 128 años. Salvando algunas diferencias propias de contextos históricos diferentes, lo ocurrido presenta muchas similitudes con los procesos actuales.

El 25 de abril de 1898 se formalizó la declaración de guerra de Estados Unidos a España. Un acto que acabó con el prolongado proceso de crisis del sistema colonial español y dio inicio a un nuevo estatus geopolítico de alcance global.

El origen inmediato del conflicto hay que situarlo en la insurrección de 1895, que desencadenó la conocida como Guerra de la Independencia cubana. El levantamiento frente al dominio español evidenció la incapacidad de la metrópoli para sofocar la disidencia, al tiempo que se adoptaban medidas de una dureza extrema contra la población. Es el caso de la política de reconcentración del general Valeriano Weyler, precedente de los campos de concentración, que costó la vida a más de 100.000 cubanos debido al hambre y las enfermedades.

Prensa amarilla

Estas medidas generaron una creciente presión internacional, especialmente en EE.UU., donde intereses económicos y una opinión pública influida por la prensa sensacionalista o “amarilla” (yellow journalism) favorecieron la intervención bélica. El pretexto se basó en un deber humanitario y solidario con la sangre cubana derramada, “que ha herido el sentido moral del pueblo de los Estados Unidos y afrentado la civilización cristiana”. Y todo ello, olvidando la inestimable y esencial ayuda española, un siglo antes, en el proceso de independencia de las Trece Colonias del Reino Unido.

La explosión del acorazado USS Maine en el puerto de La Habana el 15 de febrero de 1898, no suficientemente esclarecida y considerada por algunos investigadores incluso como una operación de falsa bandera, supuso la justificación definitiva para la entrada estadounidense en guerra. Se trata, pues, de un proceso calculado de escalada de tensiones que combinó factores políticos, económicos y mediáticos en el contexto de un cambio de poder colonial en el área del Caribe y el Pacífico. Todo ello por mor de la Doctrina Monroe, con el claro objetivo final de anexionar o adquirir la isla.




Leer más:
Doctrina Monroe: más de dos siglos de “América para los americanos”


Posiblemente, si el gobierno español hubiera cumplido los compromisos contraídos al firmar la Paz de Zanjón (1878) y hubiera dotado a sus posesiones ultramarinas de una justa autonomía, como había comenzado a hacer el Reino Unido, se habría podido desactivar el movimiento emancipador y tal vez se hubiera evitado el choque armado con EE. UU.

La construcción premeditada de una declaración de guerra

Tras semanas de creciente tensión, el primer mandatario de EE. UU., William McKinley, remitió al Congreso, el 11 de abril de 1898, un mensaje solicitando autorización para intervenir en Cuba. Inicialmente evitó una declaración explícita de guerra, optando por enmarcar la acción en términos humanitarios y de protección de los intereses estadounidenses. Sin embargo, el Congreso, influido por la opinión pública y por actores políticos expansionistas, como el entonces subsecretario de Marina y futuro presidente, Theodore Roosevelt, dio un paso más allá. El 19 de abril se aprobó una resolución conjunta de las dos cámaras reconociendo la independencia de Cuba y exigiendo la retirada inmediata de las fuerzas españolas de la isla.

Este documento incluía la conocida Enmienda Teller, aprobada por el Senado el día anterior. Por medio de esta, EE. UU. se comprometía formalmente a no anexionarse Cuba tras el conflicto, en un intento de legitimar la intervención como una acción altruista y no imperialista. La presencia armada se justificaba con el fin de pacificar de la isla. El texto señalaba la “determinación de que, cuando se hayan alcanzado estos objetivos, dejará el gobierno de la Isla a su pueblo”. La resolución equivalía, en la práctica, a un ultimátum.

España, bajo la regencia de María Cristina de Habsburgo-Lorena, que encarnaba la continuidad institucional durante la minoría de edad de Alfonso XIII, respondió rompiendo relaciones diplomáticas el 21 de abril, lo que precipitó los acontecimientos.

Ese mismo día, la Armada estadounidense inició el bloqueo de Cuba. Un acto de guerra de facto que precedió a la declaración formal del 25 de abril. Jurídicamente, esta secuencia es relevante, pues el conflicto comenzó materialmente antes de ser reconocido oficialmente, lo que obligó al Congreso a introducir una cláusula retroactiva. La disposición establecía que el estado de guerra existía desde cinco días antes.

Esta retroactividad fue una decisión con implicaciones legales, que daba cobertura jurídica a las operaciones militares ya iniciadas, la captura de buques y la aplicación del derecho de guerra. Una medida que refleja la importancia de dotar de cobertura jurídica a acciones que, en la práctica, ya estaban en curso.

Los desastres de la guerra

Desde la perspectiva estratégica, la declaración formalizó una guerra breve, diplomáticamente calculada y cuidadosamente preparada. EE. UU. había acelerado su programa de modernización naval en las décadas anteriores, lo que le permitió entrar en conflicto con una clara superioridad material. Por el contrario, España, bajo el Gobierno presidido por Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, se vio empujada a un conflicto bélico para el que no estaba plenamente preparada. Culminaba de este modo un estado de guerra casi permanente durante todo el siglo XIX. España poseía unas capacidades militares especialmente obsoletas en el ámbito naval y vivía una gran presión fundamentada en el honor nacional, lo que explica la dificultad política de aceptar el ultimátum sin combatir.

Las derrotas de los almirantes Patricio Montojo y Pascual Cervera frente al comodoro George Dewey y al almirante William T. Sampson en las batallas de Cavite (1 de mayo de 1898) y de Santiago de Cuba (3 de julio de 1898) sellaron el destino del conflicto en apenas ocho meses.

Ramón y Cajal, visionario

Algunos de los más agudos y acertados análisis sobre este conflicto bélico se los debemos al Premio Nobel Santiago Ramón y Cajal, quien estuvo destinado durante 14 meses en Cuba, entre 1874 y 1875, como capitán médico durante la primera guerra de independencia, conocida como la Guerra de los Diez Años.

El 26 de octubre de 1898 escribía en el diario madrileño El Liberal:

“Llegado el duro trance de la guerra, nuestros quijotes políticos parecen tomar como valor actual la energía bélica del pasado, sin considerar que el mundo ha cambiado en torno nuestro, que los débiles de ayer se han hecho todopoderosos… Hemos caído ante los Estados Unidos por ignorantes y por débiles. Éramos tan ignorantes, que hasta negábamos su ciencia y su fuerza”.

En su obra autobiográfica Recuerdos de mi vida (1901), Cajal reflexiona sobre los desaciertos de la política ultramarina:

“¡Tan peligroso y arduo resultaba patentizar a los ojos del pueblo… que una nación de 90 millones de habitantes, con riquezas inmensas, recursos industriales y aprestos bélicos inagotables, había de aplastar irremediablemente a un país pobrísimo, de 17 millones de almas, y anemiado, además, por cuatro asoladoras guerras civiles!”.

Y en su obra El mundo visto a los ochenta años, publicada en 1934, poco antes de su muerte, refiere como “en la guerra con los Estados Unidos no fracasó el soldado o el pueblo (que dio cuanto se le pidió), sino un gobierno imprevisor, desatento a los profundos e incoercibles anhelos de las colonias, e ignorante de las codicias solapadamente incubadas, como del incontrastable poderío militar de Yanquilandia”.

El nacimiento de una nueva potencia mundial

El 12 de agosto de 1898 el gobierno español firmó un armisticio con EE. UU., tras una breve guerra en la que apenas perdieron 300 hombres en combate frente a unos 1 000 españoles.

La firma del Tratado de París, el 10 de diciembre de 1898, formalizó el fin de las hostilidades y supuso la cesión de Cuba (bajo tutela), Puerto Rico, Filipinas y Guam (la mayor de las islas del archipiélago de las Marianas) a EE.UU. y el colapso definitivo del imperio español. Esto generó una absoluta crisis moral, política y social en la Península, popularmente conocida como el “Desastre del 98” y un proceso de reacción popular y político que fraguó en el movimiento regeneracionista liderado por Joaquín Costa.

Desde la perspectiva militar, la derrota puso de manifiesto la necesidad de modernización de las Fuerzas Armadas y de revisión de la doctrina estratégica española.

Sin embargo, para EE. UU. la guerra representó su consolidación como potencia emergente con proyección global, marcando el inicio de una política exterior más activa e intervencionista. Ocho años después, en 1906, cuando le otorgaron a Cajal el Premio Nobel de Medicina, le concedieron también el Premio Nobel de la Paz al entonces presidente Theodore Roosevelt.

Al tener noticia de este hecho, Cajal comentó:

“¿No es el colmo de la ironía y del buen humor convertir en campeón del pacifismo al temperamento más impetuosamente guerrero y más irreductiblemente imperialista que ha producido la raza yanqui?”.

En suma, la declaración de guerra del 25 de abril de 1898 constituye un caso paradigmático de notable interés desde la perspectiva jurídico-política y estratégica. Muestra cómo las democracias modernas formalizan el paso de la tensión a la guerra, integrando legitimidad interna, narrativa pública, cálculos diplomáticos y acción militar efectiva.

Su devenir y resolución dieron lugar a la reconfiguración del equilibrio de poder a finales del siglo XIX, que inauguró una nueva etapa en la historia militar y política internacional.

The Conversation

Francisco López-Muñoz no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. ¿Qué nos cuenta la guerra entre EE. UU. y España por Cuba sobre el intervencionismo y la geopolítica actual? – https://theconversation.com/que-nos-cuenta-la-guerra-entre-ee-uu-y-espana-por-cuba-sobre-el-intervencionismo-y-la-geopolitica-actual-282328