Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Joanna Syrda, Assistant Professor in Business Economics, University of Bath

The idea of a “trophy” wife or husband may not sound like a very romantic basis for marriage. It implies one half of a couple brings physical attractiveness to a relationship, while the other half brings status and money.

But the lack of romance in this idea does not mean that attractiveness and wealth don’t both play a part in many real relationships. Sociologists call it “beauty-status exchange”, and it has traditionally reflected the gendered idea that men prioritise physical attractiveness in the search for a spouse, while women opt for wealth or earning potential.

While it might seem like an old-fashioned concept, my research suggests that, after marriage, some heterosexual couples still try to find a balance between money and attractiveness – but now it may be common for this to affect both sexes in more similar ways.

I found that increases in one spouse’s share of household income were strongly linked to reductions in the other spouse’s body mass index (BMI). It appeared that when the share of household income earned by the wives in my sample rose, their husbands tended to exercise more and slim down.

And when the husbands’ income share rose, their wives tended to respond in a similar way. So the beauty-status exchange lives on – only now it appears to be more equal.

My research used 20 years of US data about more than 3,700 dual-earning heterosexual couples, comparing the share of total household income with changes in both partners’ BMI and how often they exercised.

What was once widely thought of as a gendered, one-sided exchange, may have become a mutual process of balance, maintained in part through deliberate changes in fitness routines. These effects are largely symmetrical, holding true for both men and women.

BMI is, of course, an imperfect measure of physical attractiveness. It has many limitations and captures only one dimension of a person’s appearance and fitness.

But it is one of the few measurements consistently available for both partners in large and detailed data sets. It has also been linked with perceptions of attractiveness in previous research, which makes it widely used in studies about couples and relationship dynamics.

Equilibrium

Economists and psychologists have long described relationships as systems that strive for equilibrium. Each partner can compare what they give and receive and adjust when things feel out of balance.

Building on this idea, my study introduces the concepts of “static” and “dynamic” beauty-status exchange.

The static version refers to the one-off trade between attractiveness and status that shapes who marries whom. This is a pattern documented in previous research showing that higher-earning men are, on average, more likely to partner with women with lower BMI – a proxy for “socially defined physical attractiveness”.

The dynamic version captures how this exchange continues within marriage, as couples adjust to shifts in income and resources to maintain balance over time.

Relationships, in other words, evolve. As incomes rise or fall, people respond not just financially but physically, subtly reshaping themselves to preserve what feels like fairness or desirability within the relationship

This search for balance aligns with the fact that in some of the world’s wealthiest countries – including the US, the UK and parts of Europe – the share of households in which wives earn as much as or more than their husbands has increased.

As this financial equality grows, so too does cultural equality in expectations about appearance. The rise of male grooming markets and the normalisation of skincare and body image conversations among men all signal a shift: men now invest far more in how they look than previous generations did.

Dynamic beauty–status exchange captures this broader trend at home. Economic parity between partners is matched by a new form of aesthetic parity, where both men and women feel motivated to maintain attractiveness in response to changes in status or income.

What was once a one-way cultural expectation appears to have quietly become a two-way performance of equality. The beauty–status exchange hasn’t disappeared; it has simply evolved.

Where once men’s income and women’s appearance were traded asymmetrically, today’s dual-earner couples may engage in a more reciprocal form of exchange. Beauty–status exchange is, of course, only one of many ways couples adjust to maintain balance, alongside emotional support, housework and childcare for example.

But it offers a clear window into how economic change can reshape behaviour within marriage.

Overall, shifts in income share are mirrored by shifts in behaviour and body weight. Marriage, it turns out, remains a dynamic marketplace of mutual adjustment.

Joanna Syrda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How husbands and wives try to find a balance between beauty and status – new research – https://theconversation.com/how-husbands-and-wives-try-to-find-a-balance-between-beauty-and-status-new-research-269303

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jeff Da Costa, PhD Researcher in Hydrometeorology, University of Reading

After major disasters, public debate often treats them as unexpected or unprecedented. This reaction is not necessarily about the absence of warnings. It reflects how societies process shock – and how authorities often explain disruption as unavoidable, rather than the result of earlier choices.

Extreme weather is rarely unpredictable. Days, sometimes weeks, in advance, scientists are able to warn of an increased risk of storms, floods, droughts or other hazards. Yet the cycle repeats.

To understand why this is, colleagues and I reconstructed the scientific warnings and the official responses to major floods in Luxembourg in July 2021 – my home country’s most damaging disaster on record. Those floods caused far more damage than they would have done if early action was taken, but Luxembourg isn’t an outlier: many other countries suffer from the same problems we identify.

As the UN targets “early warning for all” by 2027, it’s worth noting the issue is not that warnings were missing. It is that warning systems are often designed to act on certainty rather than probability – and that’s not how forecasting works. By the time warnings become visible to the public, it is often too late.

Weather forecasts may look definitive on your phone, but they are probabilistic by nature. They are created by running a series of computer simulations of the future weather. The level to which the outcomes of different simulations agree with each other provides the likelihood of hazardous conditions, not guaranteed outcomes. These allow forecasters to identify elevated risk well before impacts occur, even if the precise location of an event and their size remain uncertain.

Crucially, uncertainty is usually greatest further ahead, when preventative action would be most effective. Acting early therefore almost always means acting without certainty. This is not a weakness of science, but an inherent feature of anticipating complex systems under changing conditions. The real challenge lies in how institutions are organised to interpret, trust and act on those probabilities.

Acting on certainty

Most warning systems rely on predefined procedural thresholds: alert levels, activation protocols and emergency plans that kick in once specific criteria are met. Forecasting may indicate that flooding is increasingly likely, for example, but measures such as evacuations or road closures can only be triggered after formal thresholds are crossed.

Before that point, risk information passes through many layers of interpretation and judgment, where early signals are often noted but not acted upon.

Thresholds serve important purposes. They help coordinate response, clarify chains of command and reduce unnecessary disruption. But they also embed a structural preference for certainty. Action is authorised only once risk is framed as imminent, even when credible evidence already points to escalating danger.

This attitude was apparent in the days leading up to the July 2021 floods. Our study shows that multiple forecasts at European and national levels indicated a high probability of extreme rainfall and flooding, in some cases up to a week in advance. This information was available across different parts of the warning system. At that stage, uncertainty about precise impacts remained, as would be expected. What mattered was how the system was designed to handle that uncertainty.

Too early for warning

Because Luxembourg’s response measures were tied to procedural thresholds, early signals could not translate into anticipatory action. The country’s water administration and its national weather service had access to relevant information, but they operated within a framework that did not authorise a collective interpretation of what was happening or encourage action before thresholds were crossed.

This was not a scientific miscalculation, nor was it necessarily an operational mistake by individual agencies. Meteorological and hydrological services most likely did as much as their mandates allowed. The decision to wait for formal triggers was human and institutional rather than technical,
reflecting a system designed to prioritise procedural certainty over sound decision-making.

By the time action was authorised, for many people it was too late. Evacuations or installing flood gates became far more difficult, particularly for communities with limited experience of such severe floods. From the perspective of those affected, warnings appeared late or did not arrive at all – even though the risks had been identified earlier throughout the system.

Luxembourg is a particularly instructive illustration of what can go wrong, because it is a small, wealthy and well-connected country. The issue was not necessarily a lack of resources or scientific capacity, but of institutional design and societal readiness to act on risk.

Learning and resilience

The effectiveness of early warning systems over time depends on their ability to learn from extreme events. This requires open, independent analysis of what worked, what did not work and why. In several neighbouring countries affected in 2021, such as Germany and Belgium, formal inquiries and external reviews were carried out. In Luxembourg, they were not.

When expert critique is discouraged or avoided, learning slows. Questions about system performance remain unresolved and the same structural vulnerabilities are likely to persist. This creates a systemic risk in its own right: societies become less able to adapt warning systems, interpret uncertainty and act earlier on emerging threats.

As someone who has worked within these systems and continues to research disaster risk governance, I have seen how asking difficult questions can be treated as destabilising rather than constructive. Resilience depends on confronting uncomfortable truths, not avoiding them.

The risk of extreme weather is increasing across Europe and beyond. Early warning systems are rightly central to disaster risk reduction. But their effectiveness depends on how societies authorise action under uncertainty. This is a choice, not an inevitability.

Uncertainty cannot be eliminated. The challenge is to decide how much uncertainty is acceptable when lives and livelihoods are at stake. Systems designed to wait for certainty – for procedural, organisational, financial or reputational reasons – are more likely to deliver warnings that arrive too late to feel like warnings at all.

If resilience to future climate risks is to be sustainable, warning systems must be designed to learn, adapt and act earlier on credible risk.

Jeff Da Costa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why do disasters still happen, despite early warnings? Because systems are built to wait for certainty – https://theconversation.com/why-do-disasters-still-happen-despite-early-warnings-because-systems-are-built-to-wait-for-certainty-275021

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Chee Meng Tan, Assistant Professor of Business Economics, University of Nottingham

Japan said goodbye to its last two giant pandas on January 27, as twins Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei were returned from their host country to China. Their departure has left Japan without any pandas for the first time since 1972, when Tokyo and Beijing normalised diplomatic ties.

The Chinese government has long pursued a strategy of giving or loaning giant pandas, which are found exclusively in China, to other countries to strengthen international ties and boost its global image. Widely known as “panda diplomacy”, this practice has seen more than 30 pandas sent to – or born in – Japan over the past 50 or so years.

However, relations between Tokyo and Beijing are currently tense. Comments made in November by Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, that her country could respond militarily to a Chinese attack on Taiwan prompted an angry response from officials in Beijing.

And soon after, China announced it would be recalling Japan’s last two pandas from the Ueno Zoo in Tokyo a month ahead of schedule. The Tokyo metropolitan government had been negotiating with China to extend the pandas’ stay or loan new bears in their place. But these talks were put on hold and the pandas have subsequently been returned.

Panda diplomacy

China’s practice of sending pandas to foreign countries can be traced to the 7th century, when Empress Wu Zetian gifted two bears to Japan as a gesture of goodwill. However, modern panda diplomacy is often associated with the 1970s. That decade saw China open up and gift pandas to a number of major economies in an attempt to build ties, including the US and Japan in 1972, France in 1973 and the UK in 1974.

Due to declining wild panda populations, China stopped gifting pandas to other countries by 1984. Pandas were instead sent to foreign zoos on long-term loans, often lasting up to 15 years, with countries paying as much as US$1 million (£738,000) in “conservation fees” per year to keep them.

By the peak of panda diplomacy in 2019, a total of 21 countries or territories outside of China, Macau and Hong Kong had pandas. These were South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Qatar, Russia, Taiwan, Germany, Spain, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Mexico, Australia, Thailand, Finland, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, US and UK. That number has now dropped to 16.

One reason for this decline is that China has to be careful about which countries it chooses to engage in panda diplomacy with. Many Chinese people regard the giant panda as a national treasure, with the animal carrying deep emotional significance. Because of their status, the perceived mistreatment of pandas abroad can cause Beijing to receive intense backlash from nationalist circles at home.

For instance, when panda Le Le died of natural causes at Memphis Zoo in the US in 2023 and photos of his female companion Ya Ya looking thin and sickly surfaced online, speculation arose on Chinese social media that the US had mishandled the pandas. Some went as far as to accuse Chinese authorities of colluding with the zoo to cover up the incident.

For many of these people, the alleged mistreatment of the pandas was symbolic of what they saw as the US’s bullying of China. As one comment on the Weibo Chinese social media platform put it: “Treating our national treasure with such an attitude is an outright provocation of China”. Despite insistence by the Chinese foreign ministry that both pandas had been “well taken care of” in the US, Ya Ya’s stay was not extended.

The desire to avoid more public backlash may help explain why China recalled Japan’s last two pandas early and did not extend their stay. With tensions between China and Japan running high, it would have been difficult for officials in Beijing to justify why these cherished national symbols should stay in the hands of what many Chinese people see as a belligerent rival.

Panda diplomacy remains an effective tool of soft power for China. This was demonstrated by the 178,000 visitors that flocked to Ueno Zoo to catch a glimpse of Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei in the month after it was announced they would be returned. The public response was so strong that the zoo had to restrict visitor numbers to the panda viewing area to 4,800 people per day, with each visit limited to one minute.

Yet there are limits to using pandas as diplomatic tools, and not just due to the strength of nationalist feeling within China towards them. China’s practice of sending pandas to foreign nations has been heavily criticised by conservationists and animal advocates, who argue the bears are used as pawns in a game of geopolitical chess.

There are also question marks over whether the practice enhances conservation. While foreign zoos that host pandas send China millions of US dollars a year in conservation fees, the species is currently listed as “vulnerable” by the International Union for Conservation of Nature.

Panda diplomacy is a delicate balancing act. While it can help strengthen China’s international relationships, it also exposes Beijing to public backlash whenever its furry ambassadors become entangled in political disputes or welfare controversies.

Chee Meng Tan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. China’s panda diplomacy is becoming a liability for Beijing – https://theconversation.com/chinas-panda-diplomacy-is-becoming-a-liability-for-beijing-274658

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Matthew Barnfield, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London

Since Reform UK took in several high-profile Conservative defectors in the space of a few weeks, a debate has arisen about whether these new recruits benefit or harm Nigel Farage’s party.

Some suggest that the loss of Suella Braverman and Robert Jenrick, among others, hastens the demise of the Conservative party, to Reform’s benefit. But there’s also the risk that in embracing high-profile Conservatives, Reform is tying its image to the unpopular government they once represented. Apparently there is danger for Farage in becoming “Tory party 2.0” – a new version of the same party the electorate roundly rejected in 2024.

Polling since the defections should indeed give Farage some pause here. Recent figures from YouGov show that significantly fewer people now see Reform and the Conservatives as all that different from each other. The proportion who see the parties as different has fallen by ten percentage points since September.

Polling also shows that 63% of Labour voters 67% of Liberal Democrat voters and 64% of Green voters didn’t like Reform anyway and therefore haven’t changed their opinions about the party since the defections. No surprises there.

Conservatives are the only group for whom this is not a majority position. As a percentage, the group of Conservative voters whose negative opinion of Reform UK remains unchanged is about half that of other parties.

That’s partly because a bigger chunk of Conservative voters are positive about Reform UK in general. Almost a quarter say they were already, and remain, positive about Reform, compared to around 5% for supporters of other parties. But it’s also because the defections have had a much bigger effect on Conservative voters. While the proportion whose opinion has worsened is similar to other parties, over a fifth of Conservatives say they now have a more favourable view of Reform as a result of the defections. Negligible numbers of other parties’ supporters feel that way.

That the Conservatives stand out here matters. If Reform is going to push past its recent plateau in the polls, it will mostly likely be by winning over more Conservative voters. And if “Tory party 2.0” is likely to appeal to anyone, it’s Tory voters.

As political scientists have been arguing for a while, Reform is not going to win over many people who currently intend to vote Labour, Liberal Democrat, or Green. Those voters are in the so-called “left bloc”. Reform and the Conservatives form the “right bloc”. Voters rarely move between blocs; they move within them.

This bloc structure suggests that Reform needs two things to work in its favour. First, it needs to look more viable than the Conservatives. If voters can’t tell which of the two has a better chance of forming a government, it becomes harder to unite behind either. Second, Reform needs enough right-bloc voters’ preference for the Conservatives to be weak enough that they would consider switching to Reform in a pinch.

The defections help on both fronts. High-profile Conservatives moving to Reform make it look like those politicians see Reform as a viable route into government. On the preference side, the defections are improving more Conservatives’ opinions of Reform than they are worsening.

Conservatives are also coming to see the two parties as less different, and that is just as plausibly a good thing as a bad thing for Reform. If Reform looks closer to a party they already like, Conservative voters may have fewer qualms about switching.

But the risk here is that potential Reform voters will be turned off. And indeed, 17% of Reform supporters say the defections have made them more negative about the party – the highest figure for any party’s supporters.

Reform has done especially well at attracting people who did not vote at all in 2024. No surprise there: the arrival of a radical right-wing challenger party has been shown to boost turnout by mobilising voters who feel their views are not represented by the mainstream.

Another risk is that these voters may be more prone to disengaging again if Reform starts to look too much like part of the traditional party system. Both theory and evidence suggest that when parties are too similar, voters are less likely to turn out as the perceived difference made by their vote reduces. Populist parties are especially vulnerable here because their voters tend to share a common disillusionment about democracy with non-voters.

Coming to look ever more like Tory party 2.0 might not dent Reform’s chances of bringing Tory voters on board. But it does risk disenchanting people who were on board before, when they looked like something completely different from the status quo – or those yet to be convinced of voting at all in the next election.

Matthew Barnfield receives funding from The British Academy.

– ref. Reform has been warned that defecting Tories will damage its brand – and the first evidence is in – https://theconversation.com/reform-has-been-warned-that-defecting-tories-will-damage-its-brand-and-the-first-evidence-is-in-275201

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Thomas Caygill, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Nottingham Trent University

Keir Starmer is in the middle of his worst crisis yet following further damaging revelations about Peter Mandelson’s friendship with convicted paedophile Jeffrey Epstein.

Emails released by the US government revealed the depth of Mandelson’s friendship with Epstein and confirmed that it continued after Epstein’s conviction in 2008.

Starmer insists that Mandelson lied to him and to the team responsible for vetting him as a candidate to be the UK ambassador to the United States. According to Starmer, Mandelson’s answers gave the impression that he barely knew Epstein.

When emails came to light in September showing that the relationship was deeper than claimed, the prime minister dismissed him. Starmer has, however, now admitted that he knew at the time of the vetting that Mandelson had remained in contact with Epstein after he was convicted of sex offences.

Read more:
What exactly is misconduct in public office and could Peter Mandelson be convicted?

The prime minister’s judgement over appointing Mandelson as his ambassador was being called into question even before these latest revelations. Mandelson had previously resigned twice (in 1998 and 2001) from Tony Blair’s government following scandals, and it was public knowledge that he had been friends with Epstein. All of this should have ruled him out of consideration.

Pressure has been mounting on the government to release documents detailing Mandelson’s vetting to show how much was really known about his ties to Epstein. It is these documents specifically that are at the centre of the latest speculation that Starmer cannot survive in his job.

The Conservative party tabled a humble address motion in the House of Commons on February 4 calling for all vetting documents and related correspondence to be made public. Humble address motions, if passed, compel the government to carry out the actions specified in the motion.

Starmer has a large majority and could have fought off this manoeuvre had he had the support of his own MPs. But they are furious with him. Some have briefed that this scandal is the final straw after a series of poor judgement calls from the prime minister (previously mostly in relation to policy, where U-turns have been required).

They made it clear to the whips that they would rebel if instructed to vote against the Conservative motion. As a result, the government decided to table an amendment to the motion to give itself control over which documents would be released.

Its stated aim was to prevent any material that could be prejudicial to national security or international relations from being made public. Starmer has also said that a police investigation into Mandelson also precludes publication of some documents because they may prejudice any case against him.

This amendment was tabled the night before the debate and vote but it quickly became clear that trust in the prime minister and his government had completely evaporated and that Labour MPs would not support the amendment. In response, a last-minute manuscript amendment was drafted and tabled to ensure that documents pertaining to Mandelson’s appointment would instead be given to the (cross-party) Intelligence and Security Committee for review and publication. That would prevent the government from deciding what to release.

This amendment was suggested in the chamber by Angela Rayner (the former deputy prime minister and deputy Labour leader) and is a sign of how serious the situation has become for the prime minister. It signals clearly that his own MPs no longer trust him or his government to handle the release of documents appropriately.

The government has now lost control of the process, and this could lead to the publication of documents that further damage its reputation — not only regarding what the government did or did not know about Mandelson’s relationship with Epstein, but also potentially embarrassing correspondence about Donald Trump and members of his administration.

The wording of the government’s initial amendment attempted to block the release of documents that might affect international relations. That suggests there may be damaging revelations of the kind that forced one of Mandelson’s predecessors as US ambassador, Kim Darroch, to resign. Darroch was forced to stand down as ambassador in 2019 after leaked emails showed he’d called the first Trump administration “”clumsy and inept”.

Labour MPs have had enough

The level of frustration on the Labour backbenches is now comparable to that of Conservative MPs during the final months of Boris Johnson’s premiership. The focus of retribution is currently directed at the prime minister’s chief of staff, Morgan McSweeney, who MPs blame for this error of judgement (as he was a political ally of Mandelson). They see McSweeney has having given poor advice to the prime minister and blame him for the poor operation of Downing Street over the past 18 months.

Even if the immediate pressure is on McSweeney, losing him would still be destabilising for the prime minister. A similar dynamic played out under Theresa May when her party forced her joint chiefs of staff, Fiona Hill and Nick Timothy, from office after the 2017 election.

Either way, Starmer’s days as prime minister appear to be numbered. The real question is how long he can remain in office. Labour MPs are not naturally inclined toward regicide – indeed, the party has never removed a sitting prime minister from office before. Any challenger needs the support of 80 MPs to trigger a leadership election – one in which Starmer would be entitled to stand himself. That remains a high threshold.

And, in the first instance, none of the apparent heirs to the leadership are currently positioned to launch a credible challenge. Andy Burnham was prevented from standing in the upcoming Gorton and Denton byelection, so won’t become an MP any time soon. Angela Rayner has yet to resolve the tax issues that forced her resignation from government last year. Wes Streeting is viewed as being too closely aligned politically with Mandelson to mount a challenge over this scandal.

There are, however, further moments of danger on the horizon. The loss of the Gorton and Denton byelection could weaken the prime minister further. Some in the party are still angry over Burnham being blocked, which many believe may have cost Labour a winnable seat.

Upcoming local elections in England, as well as the parliamentary elections in Scotland and Wales, also look set to be torrid for Labour. It is likely that Starmer will limp on into the local elections, but beyond that his future will depend on his MPs – specifically, whether they choose to fire the starting gun on a leadership challenge or whether they can talk him into announcing his resignation as leader of the party, thereby triggering a leadership election.

Labour’s 2024 manifesto front cover simply read “Change”, but in recent weeks politics has felt uncomfortably reminiscent of 2022. That is Labour’s problem.

Thomas Caygill has previously received funding from the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust and the Economic and Social Research Council.

– ref. How much trouble is Keir Starmer in? – https://theconversation.com/how-much-trouble-is-keir-starmer-in-275292