Category: The Conversation

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Iran war: the search for an ‘off ramp’

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor, The Conversation

This is the text from The Conversation UK’s World Affairs Briefing email. Sign up here to receive weekly analysis of the latest developments in international relations, direct to your inbox.

From the defiant tone struck by Iran’s newly appointed supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, in his first statement as leader on Thursday, it appears that the ayatollah has no intention of calling an end to Iranian resistance. Instead, Khamenei – who did not appear in public but whose words were read out on state media – said Iran was preparing to open new fronts in the war and would continue to block the strait of Hormuz.

He also vowed to avenge Iran’s “martyrs”, among whom he counts his own father and wife, stressing that “every member of the nation who is martyred by the enemy is an independent subject for revenge”.

The messages coming from the Trump administration continue to be mixed. The president himself seems to change his mind on this fairly regularly. He told a rally in Kentucky on March 11 that while: “You never like to say too early you won. We won.” On Monday March 9 he was saying that: “I think the war is very complete, pretty much … we’re very far ahead of schedule.”

But at the same time he has also declared that nothing short of “unconditional surrender” will do and that he wants to pick Iran’s new leader personally.

Andy Gawthorpe believes Donald Trump is talking himself out of seeking an early exit ramp from the war. He explains that whether a conflict is a success or failure is “typically judged against the goals the combatants set for themselves”. But, he notes, not only has Trump set some lofty and unlikely goals, but his senior advisers are also introducing other factors into the equation.

Gawthorpe says it may be that the war aims as expressed by secretary of state and national security adviser, Marco Rubio, are more realistic. Rubio wants to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its navy. This is a more achievable wishlist, although it might cost the US a fortune and seriously deplete its stock of air defence interceptors, with as yet unknown consequences for global geopolitics.

For Trump to stick with his stated aims but be forced to settle for less risks looking as if the war is a failure. And that would be a disaster for the Republican Party just months away from the midterm elections.



Read more:
Trump says the Iran war will end ‘very soon’ – but it is not clear how

It’s all so different from what the president promised on the campaign trail. Back then the message was “America first” and “no new wars”. Trump’s message to his base has always been that America has been drawn into unnecessary and costly foreign conflicts on the back of what previous “liberal” administrations have seen as pointless nation-building missions to boost democracy in support of a rules-based order. Rather than being “number one”, the US had become a “do-gooder” abroad while neglecting American families suffering the fallout of globalisation at home.

So what are we to make of the reality of Trump 2.0? Bamo Nouri and Inderjeet Parmar, both experts in US foreign policy at City St George’s, University of London, believe that very little has materially changed. They write that US foreign policy, even when cooperating with regional partners and proxies as it has over the years, has been based on the overarching principle of supporting American hegemony. America first without the baseball cap, if you like.

The language is different. As Nouri and Parmar conclude: “Liberal internationalists justified primacy through universalist ideals. America first recasts it in nationalist terms: sovereignty, strength, deterrence.”



Read more:
Middle East conflict shows the real meaning of Trump’s ‘America first’ foreign policy

Over the past 14 months, the EU has had to scramble to adjust to the new realities of US foreign policy under Trump 2.0 – a new world in which European security is a long way down the agenda. This has been most evident over Russia’s war in Ukraine, which has put huge economic pressure on the EU (and other European allies such as the UK) as they’ve scrambled to find funds to support Kyiv. This has put a great deal of pressure on EU solidarity, and at least two member states, Hungary and Slovakia, are at loggerheads with the rest of the EU and threaten to derail its plans to continue to supply Ukraine with weapons.

Now the US-Israeli war in Iran is threatening to expose yet more fissures, write Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff.



Read more:
Iran and Ukraine are changing the EU and testing its unity

Meanwhile, following the assassination of Iran’s former supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, on the opening day of the war, Luca Trenta and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, point out that the groundwork for that was all laid by the US, which “helped plan the operation, provided key intelligence to identify Khamenei’s location and destroyed Iranian defences to pave a path for his executioners, [but] did not pull the trigger”. The actual killing strike was delivered by Israeli warplanes.

It is, they write, something of a tradition going back many decades and spanning several continents, for the US to hatch assassination plots but allow a proxy to do the killing.



Read more:
Ali Khamenei’s killing continues long US tradition of letting others pull the trigger

View from the Gulf

Trump always claimed the Abraham accords, which aimed at normalising relations between Israel and the Gulf states, as one of the great foreign policy successes of his first term. But it’s hard to see how the stability and prosperity for all that were the aim of the accords will survive this conflict.

While so much of the Middle East was wracked with conflict over three decades (the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf wars of Bush father and son, and the Arab Spring) the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been largely tranquil. (A nascent uprising in Bahrain in 2011 was quickly and savagely put down with the help of its neighbours.)

Boats in marina surrounded by skyscrapers.
Dubai marina.
frank_peters/Shutterstock

Instead, stability, safety and modernity were the hallmarks of their success. But now, writes economist Emilie Rutledge of the Open University, this is at risk. For those states whose wealth has been underwritten by their oil exports, this will of course be a challenging time. But perhaps more important is the reputational damage as the hordes of businesspeople, holidaymakers and lifestyle influencers raced to get flights (some of the latter group without the pets they had delighted in posing with on Instagram). Whether and how quickly these countries’ reputations will recover will be down to how long and damaging the conflict turns out to be, Rutledge concludes.



Read more:
The Middle East conflict has swiftly exposed economic vulnerability in the region

The same goes for the price of oil, writes Adi Imsirovic. Usually oil markets are robust enough to absorb short-term supply shocks, but a lot will depend on how long Iran is able to keep the strait of Hormuz closed for. Imsirovic, an expert in energy systems at the University of Oxford, weighs up the economic and geopolitical risks of a prolonged conflict.



Read more:
These are shaky times for oil markets. An expert explains what a prolonged war will mean for prices

We’ll miss them when they’re gone

One of Iran’s great gifts to the world is its cultural heritage. The country has 29 Unesco world heritage sites spanning thousands of years of artistic, literary and architectural greatness. From the Achaemenid ceremonial capital at Persepolis to the tomb of Cyrus the Great at Pasargadae, Shiraz, the “city of poets, gardens, and wine” and the Safavid-era Persian glories of Isfahan, Iran is pretty much unparalleled as a store of cultural wonderment.

Deliberately targeting cultural monuments is prohibited under numerous international conventions. But precious things are often also delicate and easily damaged. British-Iranian academic Katayoun Shahandeh of SOAS, University of London, identifies several important sites that have already been damaged in the air campaign. They will be hard to properly repair, she concludes: “Once destroyed, these monuments cannot truly be replaced.”

The Conversation

– ref. Iran war: the search for an ‘off ramp’ – https://theconversation.com/iran-war-the-search-for-an-off-ramp-278253

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Inside the Manosphere: Louis Theroux opts for superficial spectacle over serious scrutiny

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Annabel Hoare, PhD Candidate in Gender-Based Political Violence, Anglia Ruskin University

The recent Netflix hit series Adolescence crystallised growing public concern about the proliferation of male supremacist beliefs targeted at young men. So Inside the Manosphere, Louis Theroux’s new documentary for the same platform, arrives at a critical moment in the masculinity debate.

Inside the Manosphere sets out to explore a group of prominent “manfluencers” who promise young men status, wealth and sexual success through a worldview shaped by misogynistic and male-supremacist beliefs about gender and power.

By crafting a stylised storyline that focuses on the few people benefiting from this phenomenon, the documentary risks presenting an idealised portrait of the manosphere that downplays the insecurity, hostility and exploitation that sustains it.

Despite moments of scrutiny, this documentary’s glamorisation of its subjects (epitomised by a slow motion shot of one subject stepping out of a sports car) renders the interrogation superficial. In other words, the show presents performative, profit-driven masculinity through the same aspirational lens that fuels these figures online appeal.

In doing so, Inside the Manosphere simplifies the vast range of misogynistic and male-supremacist attitudes, beliefs and identities circulating online and downplays the sheer scale of the harm caused by it.

What the documentary reveals

While this documentary is limited in its portrayal, it does offer viewers a glimpse behind the curtain of a growing “manfluencer” economy.

In following around several notable figures, Theroux places a spotlight on how these influencers carefully curate online identities that project moral authority, financial success and masculine credibility. And all while functioning as lucrative personal brands built on selling solutions to the anxieties of their audience. In this way, Theroux exposes the commercial logic that is driving the rise in extreme misogyny, where provocation, controversy and algorithmic engagement translate directly into profit and visibility.

The film also introduces viewers to the notion of “the red pill”, a metaphor borrowed from The Matrix (1999). This is widely used in manosphere spaces to describe an awakening to what some believe are the hidden truths governing gender relations and social power.

Through his exploration of the red pill idea, Theroux repeatedly stumbles upon an idea at the crux of what makes this worldview so exploitable: that men need to earn their worth in society. The red pill worldview frames modern society as hostile and stacked against men, portraying mainstream institutions and feminism as forces that have obscured the “true” rules governing gender and status.

In response, the red pill philosophy reframes masculinity as a competitive hierarchy that must be continuously navigated and optimised. By casting masculine value as something that must continually be earned, followers are left striving to keep up with ever-shifting standards of status and success. Meanwhile, influencers profit from offering the supposed path to achieving them.

Although the documentary repeatedly brushes against this critical dynamic, it rarely pauses to interrogate its significance, nor the harms these masculine norms produce, including the mental health struggles of those who internalise them. As a result, it falls short of the kind of sustained scrutiny that Theroux himself has argued is what gives spotlighting such figures its social value.

Instead, this documentary portrays the manosphere through a stylised and aspirational aesthetic. Slow-motion shots of his subjects in the gym, driving high-performance sportscars, wearing expensive watches and living in luxury apartments frame these influencers’ lifestyles with a cinematic sheen.

This means the show echoes the same aspirational aesthetics that underpin much of these influencers’ own branding. Elsewhere, clips of manfluencer content appear against stylised backdrops of red and black binary code over-dubbed with synth-wave music. This has the effect of rendering the content closer to internet theatre than a harmful ideological phenomenon.

The result risks trivialising the gravity of the misogynistic and male-supremacist ideas being promoted. Rather than showing how this booming economy has contributed to the normalisation of misogynistic ideas that have inspired mass violent attacks, and violence against women and girls, this documentary risks misleading viewers that the manosphere is no more than an entertainment culture.

The narrative framing of this documentary becomes clear in the way Theroux himself describes the manosphere’s composition, origins and ideological epicentre. Far from being largely made up of “relatively uncontroversial comedians and podcasters”, the manosphere encompasses a far broader network of forums, content and communities united by an anti-feminist and male-supremacist worldview.

While the misogynistic beliefs and male oppression narratives commonly seen online seem new due to their crossover with modern lifestyle, fitness, financial and entertainment cultures, these ideas did not originate with contemporary influencers, as Theroux suggests. Rather, they draw on much older traditions of anti-feminist thought.

These include “men’s self-help” movements centred on reclaiming declining masculine identities and political men’s rights movements that predate the internet. Recognising these historical roots is important because their familiarity makes these ideas more resonant and persistent.

While Theroux’s characterisation appears intended to justify the documentary’s focus on manfluencers, it inadvertently falls into the very trap that allows manosphere content to proliferate online: its ability to hide in plain sight.

The attention economy

How this documentary portrays the manosphere matters, not just for how it informs viewers, but for how it interacts with the forces that feed the phenomenon itself. On the internet, attention functions as the most valuable currency. Content that is provocative and engaging spreads quickly, rewarded by social media algorithms and amplified by cycles of debate and outrage.

In attempting to place a spotlight on the manosphere, this documentary becomes entangled in the spectacle that sustains it. The danger is that viewers may come away with a clear understanding of the style and aspirations of the manosphere. But they are left in the dark as to its harmful effects both to young men and women – and how this harm occurs.

As a result, Inside the Manosphere further fuels the attention economy that allows these figures to thrive. In these spaces, visibility equals power: controversy attracts clicks, clicks drive engagement, and engagement extends the reach and legitimacy of the ideas themselves.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org; if you click on one of the links and go on to buy something, The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

The Conversation

Annabel Hoare does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Inside the Manosphere: Louis Theroux opts for superficial spectacle over serious scrutiny – https://theconversation.com/inside-the-manosphere-louis-theroux-opts-for-superficial-spectacle-over-serious-scrutiny-277902

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Iran’s ruling structure explained

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Eric Lob, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University

People gather in a rally to support Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, the successor to his late father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as supreme leader, in Tehran, Iran, on March 9, 2026. AP Photo/Vahid Salemi, File

Iran’s new ruler is already a marked man.

U.S. President Donald Trump has said Mojtaba Khamenei, who replaced his slain father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the country’s supreme leader, is an unacceptable choice and threatened to assassinate him if he does not agree to U.S. demands.

Although the supreme leader possesses disproportionate power, he is not the single authority. Instead, he is one of several positions and institutions through which the Islamic Republic’s 47-year-old regime organizes its ruling structure. Below is a rundown of how each of these entities functions and interacts with one another.

The supreme leader

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the position and office of supreme leader was created by the Iranian Constitution. It is based on the concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist, or “Velayat-e Faqih.”

Under Twelver Shiism – the sect of Shiite Islam that Iranians follow – the concept asserts that state affairs should be administered by righteous jurists, or faqih, until the return of the 12th imam, who is believed to have gone into hiding in 874 C.E. This concept was conceived by the first supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who ruled Iran for 10 years until his death in 1989.

Initially, the constitution called for the supreme leader to be a grand ayatollah and “source of emulation,” or marja’ al-taqlid – the highest-ranking cleric in the Shiite religious hierarchy. In 1989, the constitution was amended to allow Khamenei, who was a midranking cleric at the time, to assume the position from the ailing Khomeini.

Although the supreme leader is a lifetime appointment, Article 111 of the constitution authorizes the Assembly of Experts to dismiss him if he is deemed politically and religiously incapable or unqualified.

Inside the Islamic Republic or ruling system, the supreme leader is the ultimate religious and political authority. He commands the armed forces, supervises the state media and appoints the chief justice, who is the head of the judiciary.

According to articles 57 and 110 of the constitution, the supreme leader sets domestic and foreign policy and supervises all branches of the government, including the executive, legislature and judiciary. Through the Guardian Council, he has the power to vet electoral candidates and veto parliamentary laws.

The presidency

Following the revolution in 1979, the new constitution established the position, or office, of the president. The first presidential election was held in 1980.

While the supreme leader is the head of state, the president is the head of the government. After the supreme leader, the president is the second-in-command of the executive branch. As such, he answers to the supreme leader and executes his decrees.

Every four years, presidential elections take place with the participation of Iranians at least 18 years old.

A man sits on the floor next to a man seated on a chair.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, left, sits next to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a mourning ceremony on July 12, 2024.
Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP

If reelected, the president cannot consecutively serve for more than two terms. It should be noted that every president has done so, except for Ebrahim Raisi, who governed from 2021 to 2024 and died in a helicopter crash before the end of his first term.

Before the election, all candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council, which is controlled by the supreme leader.

As the chairman of the Cabinet, the president appoints its ministers, pending a parliamentary vote of confidence. That said, the supreme leader has the authority to dismiss and reinstate them, along with the vice president.

Assembly of experts

In 1979, the Assembly of Experts of Leadership, or Majles-e Khobregan-e Rahbari, was created in the new constitution and held its first election the same year. Article 111 of the constitution authorizes the assembly to appoint, supervise and, if necessary, remove the supreme leader.

In this sense, the assembly acts as a deliberative body and is legally required to convene at least twice every six months. Its proceedings have remained strictly confidential and closed to the public.

The Assembly of Experts contains around 80 members. As ayatollahs or mujtahids, they are experts in Islamic law and exercise independent reasoning, or ijtihad. During the Islamic Republic’s history, the number of members has ranged from 82 in 1982 to 88 in 2016 and 2024. They serve eight-year terms and are directly or popularly elected by Iranians citizens.

At the same time, and as with other elections, the Guardian Council – which is controlled by the supreme leader– vets all the candidates who apply to run for office or enter the election, making the process far from free and fair.

In essence, the supreme leader approves the candidates who are potentially elected to a body that oversees him. For this reason, as observers point out, the assembly has not been known to seriously supervise or overtly challenge him.

A group of men in Shia Muslim religious attire gather at a political forum.
Members of Iran’s Assembly of Experts meet after an election that decided the composition of the new assembly in May 2024.
AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

In the past two elections for the Assembly of Experts in 2016 and 2024, the Guardian Council disqualified hundreds of candidates. Many of them were moderates and reformists who opposed the supreme leader on various issues.

Consequently, the choice among voters was largely limited to conservatives and hard-liners who currently dominate the assembly.

Guardian Council

According to the Iranian Constitution, the Guardian Council, or Shoura-ye Negahban, has the power to veto laws passed by the popularly elected parliament. It is also authorized to vet candidates in elections, including those for the presidency, parliament and Assembly of Experts.

The council is composed of 12 jurists and lawyers who specialize in Islamic law and jurisprudence. They serve six-year phased terms in which half the members change every three years. The supreme leader appoints half of the council’s members and can dismiss them at will anytime. The chief justice appoints the other half, with a parliamentary vote of confidence.

Since the supreme leader also appoints the chief justice, he consequently controls the council. At the same time, the council has been known to assert a degree of agency and autonomy, as evidenced by the supreme leader occasionally ordering it to reverse bans on particular people running for public office.

Since the late 1990s, the council has disqualified a growing number of reformist candidates, many of whom have been at odds with the supreme leader over certain issues.

Consequently, conservatives and hard-liners, including those affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard, have increasingly dominated the parliament and Assembly of Experts.

Nevertheless, the Guardian Council has been unable to prevent reformists and moderates from participating in elections and even winning them, as in the case of current President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Expediency Discernment Council

In 1988, the constitution was amended to establish the Expediency Discernment Council of the System, or Majma’-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam.

The council’s chairman and other members are appointed by the supreme leader every five years. The council originally consisted of 13 members.

The Expediency Discernment Council initially acted as an administrative assembly that mediated and resolved disputes and differences between the Guardian Council and parliament over legislation.

Throughout the years, and based on articles 110 and 111 of the constitution, the council evolved into a body that advises the supreme leader on domestic and foreign policy and strategy.

Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, Khamenei relied on the Expediency Discernment Council to reduce the powers of the reformist-majority parliament and pressure it to approve the chief justice’s six appointees to the Guardian Council.

He also expanded the Expediency Discernment Council to 34 members – 25 of whom he appointed – and stacked it with conservatives.

Since 2007 it has consisted of 27 members, all of whom are appointed by the supreme leader. In the mid-2000s, Khamenei delegated some of his authority to the council to supervise the three branches of government.

A wide angle photo of a political body and its permanent seats.
The Iranian parliament in Tehran, Iran, on Sept. 28, 2025.
AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Iran’s parliament

The Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran serves as Iran’s parliament and consists of a unicameral national legislative body. Representatives serve four-year terms and are elected by a popular vote.

Alongside the executive branch, the parliament can introduce legislation or propose new laws. That said, its capacity to pass laws is constrained when the Guardian Council construes them as contradicting or conflicting with the constitution and religion.

The parliament votes to approve the president’s Cabinet appointees. Alongside the supreme leader, it can also dismiss them and impeach the president for official misconduct.

Since 1979, the parliament has been chaired or led by six speakers, including, since 2020, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a conservative former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, which serves as the main armed force of Iran.

During the 2024 parliamentary election, which had a historically low voter turnout of 41%, the Guardian Council disqualified most moderate and reformist candidates. This paved the way for conservatives and hard-liners to secure a sweeping majority of 233 out of 290 seats.

It is inside this complex landscape of individuals and institutions that Mojtaba Khamenei has been appointed supreme leader. Although he stands at the pinnacle of the Islamic Republic’s ruling structure, it does not rely on him alone.

The Conversation

Eric Lob is affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

– ref. Iran’s ruling structure explained – https://theconversation.com/irans-ruling-structure-explained-277913

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How governments can help Indigenous communities disproportionately impacted by wildfires

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Tara McGee, Professor, Earth & Atmospheric Sciences, University of Alberta

Nearly every summer over the past decade, the story has been the same across many parts of Canada: wildfires rage out of control and skies are filled with smoke. Communities are often forced to evacuate.

Wildfires disproportionately impact Indigenous communities. Over the last four decades, 42 per cent of wildfire evacuations across Canada have been of Indigenous communities.

Thirteen years ago, there was little understanding of evacuation experiences of First Nations’ communities, despite them being so frequently impacted. That’s when we partnered with seven First Nations in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Ontario, as well as 16 departments and agencies involved in wildfire evacuations, to establish the First Nations Wildfire Evacuation Partnership (FNWEP).

Since 2013, the FNWEP has explored the evacuation experiences of First Nation residents, identified factors that affect experiences in positive and negative ways and recommended ways to reduce negative impacts of wildfire evacuations.

In 2021, we published our book, First Nations Wildfire Evacuation Experiences: A guide for communities and external agencies. The book is laid out so that each chapter is a stage of a wildfire evacuation, all the way from seeing smoke in the distance to returning to the community after the event is over.

We summarized findings from our research in each chapter, along with practical recommendations and steps that communities and external agencies can take to better prepare for wildfire evacuations.

Evacuation challenges

A video explaining the FNWEP and the challenges faced by evacuated Indigenous communities (SSHRC)

Through our research, we learned that many First Nations often lack adequate resources to prepare for and respond to wildfires, and many do not have anyone devoted full-time to emergency management.

Specific factors that complicate the evacuation of Indigenous Peoples from their community include:

  1. Being out on the land when the decision to evacuate is made, making it difficult to notify people and arrange transportation

  2. The fear of home loss compounded by existing housing shortages

  3. A lack of media interest in the evacuation of Indigenous communities, so it’s harder to get information

  4. Language issues and lack of translation

  5. Poverty caused by colonization

  6. Large multi-generational families living in one home, making transportation coordination difficult

  7. Health concerns

  8. Worries about the costs of evacuation and reimbursement

Additional challenges include short warning times, transportation challenges including multi-stage evacuations, inadequate information available for evacuees, crowded accommodation, culture shocks, family separation and racism.



Read more:
Evacuations of Indigenous communities during wildfires must prioritize keeping families together

Separated families

One of the most severe cases of family separation occurred in 2011 when people from Sandy Lake First Nation were sent to 12 different host communities, which led to reduced support for evacuees. In some cases, community leaders and a select group of residents stayed behind in the community to communicate with government agencies and evacuees, provide advice, deal with problems and look after the community.

We documented other things that just didn’t make sense. For example, when âmaciwîspimowinihk (Stanley Mission) in northern Saskatchewan was evacuated in 2014, car seats were not allowed on evacuation buses. Evacuees had to hold babies for the entire journey to the host communities. One host community was Regina, with evacuees on the road for almost 12 hours.

The most inappropriate case of accommodation for evacuees was when Deer Lake First Nation was accommodated in the Rideau Regional Centre in Smiths Falls, Ontario in 2011.

The centre was built to house people with developmental disabilities in 1951 and closed in 2009, two years before the evacuation occurred. The site and its condition were inappropriate. Some evacuees slept on the floor because they were not given a cot, some rooms were not cleaned and the shower stalls in common washrooms had no curtains or doors.

Community resilience

We found many other cases where evacuation experiences were improved because of the resiliency of people from the communities. Community leaders played the critical role of liaisons between their own and the host community, attended agency meetings, communicated what they learned to evacuees, advocated for evacuees and dealt with problems that arose.

In Sandy Lake First Nation, the chief who remained in the community recorded videos in Oji-Cree and English so evacuees could see community leaders and their community and receive daily updates during their evacuation.

Youth in Mishkeegogamang Ojibway Nation and other First Nations set up private Facebook groups so evacuees could share information. In addition to community liaison roles, First Nation community members volunteered to help in many ways, including sitting with Elders, organizing and picking up prescriptions, providing child-care services and security, and dropping off meals.

Recommendations for better evacuations

An overarching factor that affected all evacuations was jurisdiction. Wildfire management and emergency management are under provincial jurisdiction, but First Nations are under federal jurisdiction. This adds significant complexity to every wildfire evacuation. We documented examples where community leaders did not know which external agency to call to initiate an evacuation.

However, despite consistent research findings and advocacy, many of the communities we worked with who were evacuated between 2011-15 have been re-evacuated since, and again experienced many of the same issues we documented.

In 2025, the Auditor General of Canada again pointed to consistent failures in emergency management by Indigenous Services Canada, despite a dramatic increase in funding over the last decade from $13 billion in 2019-20 to almost $24 billion in 2023-24. The auditor general also found that evacuation services standards have only been met in one province: Ontario.

Federal and provincial governments should increase and provide long-term funding directly to First Nations for emergency management. They can also support the construction of buildings with air scrubbers and purifiers so that people do not have to evacuate their communities only because of air quality. In addition, they could simplify reimbursement processes to make post-wildfire recovery a less daunting process.

Governments must also increase investment in wildfire prevention and mitigation to reduce the need for evacuations including FireSmart programs. They should also fund and support Indigenous fire guardian programs across Canada, where Indigenous Peoples are employed year-round to do fire prevention, mitigation, response and recovery.

As wildfire season becomes more severe year after year, governments can take concrete steps now to ensure the most affected communities are well-equipped to deal with evacuations — and recover from them.

The Conversation

Tara McGee receives funding from Natural Resources Canada for the First Nations Wildfire Evacuation Partnership. The partnership previously received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Amy Cardinal Christianson is affiliated with the Indigenous Leadership Initiative. She previously worked for the Canadian Forest Service (Natural Resources Canada) and Parks Canada. Her association with the First Nations Wildfire Evacuation partnership over the last decade has been through in-kind contributions.

– ref. How governments can help Indigenous communities disproportionately impacted by wildfires – https://theconversation.com/how-governments-can-help-indigenous-communities-disproportionately-impacted-by-wildfires-275198

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As Paralympians compete for medals, the world debates Russia’s right to be there

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Laura Misener, Professor & Director, School of Kinesiology, Western University

At the 2026 Milano-Cortina Winter Paralympic Games, the biggest debate surrounding the event has little to do with sport.

This year’s Paralympics represent the first major international sporting event since the 2014 Paralympic Winter Games in Sochi in which Russia has competed under its national flag. The ban included the recent Olympic Games, where Russia and Belarus were not allowed to send teams.

Six Russian and four Belarusian para-athletes are competing at the Paralympics, marking the end of a 12-year period of exclusion rooted first in state-sponsored doping and then Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The decision to let Russia and Belarus back in has sparked heated public debate. People are asking hard questions about fairness, disability rights and who gets to decide the rules of international sport.

While some international sport federations cling to the idealistic notion that sport and politics are separate, this situation demonstrates the deeply entrenched role of geopolitics in major sporting events.

Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter explicitly prohibits political demonstrations and displays. Yet the reality for those at the Games is very different.



Read more:
The IOC’s ban of a Ukrainian athlete over his helmet reveals troubling double standards

Russia returns to the Paralympics

In 2022, Russian athletes competed under the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) flag rather than their national flag. This sanction was already in place as punishment for the preceding Russian doping scandal.

However, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolded in the lead-up to the Games, the IPC went further, ruling that results for Russian and Belarusian athletes would not be counted in the official medal table.

At the IPC General Assembly in 2025, members voted to allow Russia and Belarus to return to the Games. This meant that athletes from those countries could compete under their own flags and national anthems.

Following this decision, 16 countries formally boycotted the Paralympic opening ceremony. Fewer than 40 per cent of athletes were present, with many deliberately absent from opening ceremonies in an act of solidarity with Ukraine.

Inclusion for athletes, silence for victims

On the one hand, the IPC’s founding mission is to “make for an inclusive world through Para sport.” The exclusion of athletes on the basis of their government’s actions appears to conflict with this principle of universality.

IPC president Andrew Parsons framed the reinstatement of Russia and Belarus as consistent with what the movement stands for: a democratic organization treating all national Paralympic committees equally under due process.

People with disabilities, including para athletes, are often excluded or overlooked in society. Supporters argued that punishing disabled athletes for their government’s conduct conflicts with disability-rights principles.

Disability rights work aims to dismantle discriminatory practices that exclude people because of social, political or embodied difference.

But the decision exposed a deeper tension. The IPC already includes athletes from states involved in active conflicts. That makes it harder to argue exclusions are applied consistently.

On the other hand, the IPC’s mission of building “an inclusive world” is undermined when a state actively destroys the lives and bodies of civilians, many of whom may themselves become disabled.

Rob Koehler, director general of Global Athlete, stated: “There is simply no justification for allowing Russia and Belarus back while the invasion continues.”

The Canadian Paralympic Committee opposed the reinstatement, indicating that the ongoing war contradicts the Olympic Truce. Further, Karen O’Neill, the committee’s president, stated that no evidence has emerged to suggest the doping issue has been resolved.

The inclusion of Russian war veterans injured fighting in the war with Ukraine has been upsetting for some athletes. Yet this debate continues to overshadow the far more pressing issue of Paralympic athletes receiving the attention and respect they have long been denied.

When neutrality becomes complicity

While the IPC president maintains that the focus must remain on sport and athletic competition, this stance carries a serious risk.

Allowing Russia back could send the wrong message that sport has no red lines; it suggests participation matters more than accountability. The IPC had a defining opportunity to demonstrate moral leadership.

History shows that international sport is capable of precisely this kind of leadership. As Richard Pound, a former Canadian International Olympic Committee member, has argued, sport has a proud tradition of standing in opposition to oppressive regimes.

In 1970, South Africa was banned from the Olympics because of apartheid — the government’s policy of racial segregation. It was a powerful moment when sport took a clear moral stand.

Giovanni Malagò, president of the Milano-Cortina organizing committee, said in his opening-ceremony speech:

“We cannot ignore that these Games are taking place in an increasingly and profoundly divided world, torn apart by wars, grief and suffering, at one of the most dramatic turning points of our time.”

This sentiment has cast a shadow on the messaging and importance of inclusion and celebration of sport at the Paralympic Games. Paralympic athletes have fought hard for recognition, and the politics of these Games have dominated public attention.

What the debate reveals about sport and politics

Sport has always been more than entertainment. It reflects the social and political climate in which it takes place, often exposing tensions and contradictions within society.

This is especially clear in the Paralympic context, where questions of inclusion, disability rights and geopolitical conflict sit side-by-side. The debates surrounding Russia’s return to the 2026 Winter Paralympic Games show how sport can both mirror and magnify broader ethical dilemmas.

Athletes and sporting bodies have long been part of wider social change, but the current events reveal how sport is also entangled with deeper issues — discrimination, war, unresolved doping concerns and the struggle over who gets to participate and under what conditions.

The Paralympic movement was built on the idea that sport should be open to everyone. But that ideal is being tested by a world dealing with war, political division and unresolved cheating scandals.

It is unfortunate that this controversy is drowning out what the Paralympics are meant to be about — celebrating remarkable athletes and promoting inclusion.

The Conversation

Laura Misener receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

– ref. As Paralympians compete for medals, the world debates Russia’s right to be there – https://theconversation.com/as-paralympians-compete-for-medals-the-world-debates-russias-right-to-be-there-278019

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Why Friday the 13th was bad luck for the Knights Templar and their legacy

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Patrick Masters, Lecturer, University of Portsmouth

In Ridley Scott’s 2005 epic Kingdom of Heaven, The Knights Templar are portrayed as violent extremists. The film is about a crusader, Balian of Ibelin, who is fighting to defend the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem from the first Sultan of Egypt and Syria, Saladin.

The Knights Templar were formed on Christmas Day 1119, as a revolutionary type of knighthood in which knights lived as monks, taking vows of poverty and piety. Their mission was to protect travellers on the dangerous roads of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. So it struck me as interesting that in Scott’s crusades film they would be portrayed as antagonists of the Crusader Kingdom.

Their singling out in Kingdom of Heaven was the spark that led to my book The Knights Templar: Crusade, Myth and Hollywood. What I found was that villainising the order was fairly common in films that include them. However, rather than being a modern trope, their vilification can be traced back to 700 years ago.

On Friday October 13 1307, the grandmaster Jacques de Molay was arrested by a debt-ridden pope along with every other Templar found in France. The sudden arrest caused widespread shock throughout Europe. Some of the confessions that would be extracted from them would have a mysterious occult edge and it would be these that would shape the order’s legacy from then on.

The Templars amassed vast riches, land, and political power for nearly 200 years. Their downfall began in 1291 with the loss of the Crusader states, or Outremer (modern Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey). After the Crusader capital of Acre fell to the Mamluk forces of Egypt and Syria, the Templars were left without a cause, making the order appear redundant and vulnerable to criticism.

The two figures central to their downfall were French Pope Clement V and French King Phillip IV, who was burdened with significant debt and had previously moved against groups within his power, such as Italian bankers in 1291 and the Jews in 1306, seizing their property and assets to ease his financial problems.

Friday 13th

On Friday October 13 1307, Jacques de Molay was in France negotiating another crusade. That military campaign would never happen and instead, he and every Templar in France (around 2000 of them) were suddenly arrested and imprisoned in the Paris Temple.

Although the news shocked Christendom, Clement V had written to Phillip IV in 1305 detailing the rumours about the Templars and plans for an investigation. Phillip IV issued the Templars’ arrest order a month prior, charging them with blasphemy, sodomy and heresy.

The first charges related to the initiation into the order, where, according to the Order for Arrests, initiates must deny Christ and spit on an image of him three times. The document then details how the initiate is stripped naked and kisses the receiving Templar on “the lower part of the dorsal spine”, “the navel” and “on the mouth”.

Once in the King’s clutches, the Templars were deprived of sleep and shackled with irons. Templar Ponsard de Gizy described in detail how he was unable to move in a pit for three months, with his hands tied behind his back so tightly that blood ran down his fingernails.

Those who did not confess faced the rack and suffered the strappado – this is where the victim was strung up by the hands, which were bound behind their back. Under these horrific conditions, 134 of the of the 138 Templars questioned in Paris confessed to some or all of the charges. Under torture, even the grandmaster admitted to denying Christ, but instead of spitting on his image, he claimed to have spat on the floor instead.

It wasn’t the charge of blasphemy, however, that haunted the Templars’ legacy, it was the accusations of worshipping false idols.

Extracted under torture, Hugues de Pairaud describes worshipping a head with two feet under its face and two feet behind it. Very few Templars had any knowledge of the mysterious head idol, and only nine admitted to knowing about it. Those who did gave contradictory accounts: the head with feet was described as having a beard, of being painted on a beam and made of wood, silver, and gold leaf. Others claimed to worship an idol called Baphomet and a bearded head called Yalla.

The origin and identity of the idol Baphomet are mysterious. However, historian Sharan Newman suggests it’s most likely a corruption of the name Mohammed.

The Templar order was abolished in 1312 and Jacques de Molay was burned at the stake in 1314 as a relapsed heretic. The majority of the Templars caught in France were either executed or confined to prison indefinitely. However, it wasn’t until the 16th century that the Templars’ heresy entered popular imagination.

The German physician Heinrich Agrippa’s 1531 book De Occulta Philosophia, recontextualised the failed order alongside witchcraft. While French writer Guillaume Paradin detailed the Templars’ sordid heresy in his 1552 Chronicle of Savoy. In his history of Savoy, the Templars engage in orgies with women after initiates worshipped an image covered in human skin with glowing carbuncles for eyes.

The salacious occult imagery of the 16th century remained a widely held perception of the Templars into the 20th and 21st centuries. This lasting association is clear in cinema.

The 1972 Spanish/Portuguese horror film Tombs of the Blind Dead portrays undead Templars rise from their graves to prey on a group of teenagers. The undead Templar recently resurfaced again in the 2017 film The Mummy, where the titular villain raised Templars from their tombs to act as her minions.

There are Templars across cinema enacting evil and its interesting to think about how this all came to be because of a handful of confessions about worshipping false idols, which were obtained through torture.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

The Conversation

Patrick Masters wrote the book The Knights Templar: Crusade, Myth and Hollywood. In 2018, he received funding from the Templar Heritage Trust to present a paper at the International Medieval Conference.

– ref. Why Friday the 13th was bad luck for the Knights Templar and their legacy – https://theconversation.com/why-friday-the-13th-was-bad-luck-for-the-knights-templar-and-their-legacy-278033

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Have we passed ‘peak sheep’?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caroline Flanagan, Head of School, Agriculture, Anglia Ruskin University

Farmers are drastically reducing their sheep flocks. EddieCloud/Shutterstock

The classic view of British countryside is of hilly green fields, stone walls and sheep dotted about in the distance.

But that scene could be disappearing as farmers move away from keeping sheep, or reduce their flocks, in many areas of the country.

The total number of sheep and lambs decreased by 3.8%, to 13.3 million in June 2025. Breeding flock numbers have also dropped from 6.8 million in 2021 to 6.4 million in 2025.

Meanwhile, the nation’s eating habits also appear to be shifting as mutton and lamb production has dropped from 400,000 tonnes per year in the early 1990s to 276,000 tonnes today.

The geographical distribution of sheep across the UK is changing too, with Scotland – long celebrated for its hill flocks – reporting marked declines of sheep numbers particularly in the northwest and the Highlands.

So has the UK reached “peak sheep”?

The largest fall in sheep numbers occurred after the 2001 foot and mouth outbreak, and in England this decline deepened when government subsidies related to numbers of sheep were replaced with subsidies for looking after the land in 2024/25. This reduced the incentive to keep large flocks and led farmers to retain fewer animals. Simultaneously, UK and global dietary habits have been changing. UK red meat consumption fell by 13.7g per day per head between 2008 and 2019.

Cost, health concerns and the difficulty of positioning lamb as a fast food option have reduced demand. In 2021 60% of lamb was purchased by shoppers aged 55 plus, with younger consumers increasingly preferring alternative protein sources such as chicken and processed meat.

Planning for the future on low-income hill farms is also problematic. In the UK, 84% of farmers are over 45 (and 38% over 65), with many young people reluctant to enter an uncertain industry. On upland and hill farms, the average farm profit was just £32,000 in 2023/24, 69% of which came from government payments due to be phased out by 2027.

However, sheep are adaptable to changing circumstances and their ability to select plants to sustain themselves might offer a route to securing their future as the national flock continues to shrink.

A Scottish sheep farmer talks about some of his challenges.

That fastidious eating, once essential for survival, is proving invaluable for conservation. Many native breeds excel at balancing shrub browsing with grazing in areas inaccessible to machinery. Conservation success stories include the restoration of violets vital for fritillary butterflies and the maintenance of biodiverse mosaic grasslands.

Sheep eat different plants to cattle, so they can be deployed as appropriate to eat selectively, tackling problem plants that cattle might not. They also have less impact on the soil, which in some instances is beneficial.

Some rewilding supporters worry that sheep can harm nature in certain situations, but when they’re carefully managed, sheep can actually help store carbon and are important for looking after landscapes such as fens, saltmarshes, moorland and meadows.

Poorly managed, they can hinder conservation efforts, grazing too close to the soil. But the rise of “flying flocks” – mobile groups shepherded across different sites – demonstrates how sheep can support flexible land use on both lowland and upland farms. Meanwhile, the UK’s commitment to net zero, and the expansion of solar energy have created another niche.

Sheep, conveniently sized and behaviourally suited, are ideal for grazing underneath solar panels, keeping vegetation under control.

So, where does this leave the UK’s sheep industry?

We may be witnessing a move to lower levels with new breeds, and other changes emerging. In lowland areas, you may already be seeing more sheep, as arable farmers turn to them to graze cover crops which are used to avoid soils laying bare over long periods of time. Cover crops enhance soil structure and biodiversity, providing nutrients to the soil.

Lowland sheep are heavier, better suited to meat production and can be stocked more densely than on upland terrain, boosting efficiency. A growing proportion of the UK’s lamb supply is likely to come from lowland flocks, with reducing reliance on the traditional flow of breeding ewes from the hills. So sheep are more likely to be seen on the lower levels, and there could be fewer of them.

Beyond their ecological contributions, sheep produce a remarkable annual bonus. From carpets and jumpers to natural insulation and high-end suits, wool is natural, renewable, sustainable and biodegradable. As the clothing industry increases the use of natural fibres, demand and prices are rising, this could offer a more lucrative alternative product for sheep farmers to sell.

Sheep still have a vital place in the UK. The country may have reached “peak sheep”, but given their versatility, their capacity to thrive in tough environments, our growing commitment to sustainable land management and our deepening understanding of their grazing behaviour, sheep are well placed to help us be better custodians of our landscapes.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Have we passed ‘peak sheep’? – https://theconversation.com/have-we-passed-peak-sheep-277815

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Peut-on faire confiance aux sondages politiques ? Un statisticien nous donne les clés pour les décrypter

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Léo Gerville-Réache, Modélisation statistique, Université de Bordeaux

En vue de l’élection présidentielle de 2027, nous allons être matraqués de sondages. Quelle confiance accorder à ces chiffres ? Pour le comprendre, il faut se pencher sur les statistiques, déterminer comment elles sont construites et déterminer les biais et les incertitudes.

Le dimanche 7 juillet 2024, le verdict des urnes a balayé des semaines de « certitudes statistiques ». Alors que les instituts plaçaient le Rassemblement national (RN) et ses alliés en tête avec une fourchette de 170 à 230 sièges, les résultats définitifs ont figé le compteur à 143 sièges, reléguant le parti à la troisième place.

Comment un appareil statistique aussi sophistiqué a-t-il pu manquer la physionomie de l’Assemblée à ce point ? La réponse ne réside pas seulement dans de « mauvais chiffres », mais dans un décalage structurel entre ce que la loi encadre, ce que la statistique permet, et ce que le public entend.

Le « sondage » contrôlé contre la « projection » libre

Depuis la loi no 2016-508 du 25 avril 2016, la Commission des sondages est chargée de veiller au respect de la réglementation. Elle s’est dotée d’un site donnant accès aux notices explicatives de l’ensemble des sondages électoraux publiés, et publie régulièrement des communiqués. Le 18 juin 2024, à l’occasion des élections législatives, la commission alerte sur une distinction juridique fondamentale qui échappe souvent au grand public :

  • Le sondage (contrôlé) : une enquête statistique sur un échantillon représentatif de l’ensemble du territoire hexagonal. La commission exerce ici un contrôle systématique sur la méthode de sélection, les quotas et les redressements.

  • La projection en sièges (non contrôlée) : c’est un exercice de « traduction » du vote national en sièges parlementaires. La commission est formelle : elle n’exerce aucun contrôle sur ces chiffres et recommande la prudence.

Pourquoi ? Parce que la projection est tributaire de 577 réalités locales : offre politique spécifique, notoriété des candidats et, surtout, les configurations de seconds tours (triangulaires, désistements) qui dépendent du taux de participation. En somme, la loi encadre la « matière première » (l’intention de vote), mais laisse le « produit fini » (la projection en sièges) dans une zone grise méthodologique.

Le mirage des marges d’erreur

L’un des plus grands malentendus réside dans l’affichage des marges d’erreur, perçues à tort comme une mesure globale de la fiabilité. Depuis la loi de 2016, chaque première publication d’un sondage doit obligatoirement indiquer sa marge d’incertitude. Pourtant, la quasi-totalité des instituts français utilise la méthode des quotas, une technique sur laquelle la notion mathématique de marge d’erreur n’a techniquement « pas de sens », comme les instituts l’admettaient eux-mêmes devant le Sénat.

En « théorie des sondages », on distingue explicitement :

  • les sondages « aléatoires », où chaque individu de la population cible du sondage a une probabilité connue et non nulle de faire partie de l’échantillon de répondants, et on se sert de ces probabilités pour établir des marges d’erreur. Ici la « représentativité » est, par construction, indiscutable.

  • les sondages par « quotas » où il s’agit de contrôler que la structure de l’échantillon de répondants au sondage est similaire à celle de la population cible (essentiellement : sexe, âge, catégorie socioprofessionnelle, région de résidence et catégorie d’agglomération). Ici, la « représentativité » est seulement partiellement contrôlée, et la probabilité de chaque individu, d’appartenir à l’échantillon, est inconnue.

Pour comprendre l’origine de cette ambiguïté sur les marges d’erreur, il faut remonter au rapport no 54 du Sénat de 2010 qui a entériné un glissement sémantique majeur en estimant qu’il était « tout à fait possible » de considérer que les quotas génèrent des incertitudes « similaires » à la méthode aléatoire.

Or, Pascal Ardilly (inspecteur général de l’Insee et auteur de l’incontournable livre les Techniques de sondage), auditionné par le Sénat, précisait explicitement que faire l’hypothèse de marges d’erreur similaires pour les résultats d’un sondage, qu’il soit issu de la méthode des quotas ou de la méthode aléatoire, relevait d’une hypothèse très forte et non vérifiée d’absence de biais pour la méthode des quotas.

Un glissement analogue apparaît avec l’usage tronqué de la notion d’« échantillonnage contrôlé » attribuée à Jerzy Neyman (considéré comme l’un des fondateurs de la statistique moderne).

En omettant le mot « aléatoire » dans l’expression originelle « échantillonnage aléatoire contrôlé », on fait comme si le contrôle des quotas pouvait se substituer au hasard. Pourtant, scientifiquement, le mot « aléatoire » change tout : le « contrôlé » n’est pas une ambiance mais un hasard encadré par un plan de sélection rigoureux qui permet de construire mathématiquement des marges d’erreur.

C’est ce qui rend la notion de « représentativité » si exigeante : elle ne peut être revendiquée que si les marges d’erreur découlent scientifiquement du plan de sélection, ce que la méthode des quotas ne peut pas invoquer, en toute généralité. En reprenant une formulation de compromis – « les marges d’erreur… le cas échéant par référence à la méthode aléatoire » – la loi a figé des mots statistiques sans en figer les conditions de validité, laissant croire au public que la marge d’erreur affichée (en général, seulement lors de la première publication) est l’assurance tous risques d’un chiffre qui se veut destin.

Quand la convergence fabrique l’erreur collective

En science, il est souvent rassurant de constater que diverses études donnent des résultats « compatibles ». Malheureusement, il peut s’agir d’une hallucination collective !

En 2024, les principaux instituts de sondage dont les travaux étaient relayés dans les médias, donnaient, quelques jours avant le second tour, des projections très éloignées des résultats définitifs.

Ce phénomène est ce que j’appelle une « communauté de biais ». Lorsque plusieurs instituts utilisent des méthodes similaires et des redressements basés sur les mêmes hypothèses (comme le report de voix entre blocs), une erreur commune peut se produire. La stabilité des chiffres n’est alors pas un gage de fiabilité, mais le symptôme d’une confiance collective dans une erreur collective.

La présidentielle : un cadre « pur » qui n’élimine pas les biais

Dans le cadre de l’élection présidentielle, le dispositif semble pourtant idéal : on sort des incertitudes liées aux 577 scrutins locaux pour revenir au « sondage pur », tel que défini et strictement contrôlé par la commission. Cependant, il est impératif de comprendre que le contrôle réglementaire assure une transparence démocratique, mais ne garantit en rien une « vérité » statistique. Le malentendu principal réside dans la confusion entre la marge d’erreur théorique et la fiabilité globale.

Lors de l’élection présidentielle de 2012, par exemple, pour une intention de vote de 25 %, les marges d’erreur « théoriques » affichées étaient de l’ordre de 1,8 à 2,7 points (selon le nombre de répondants). Après analyse statistique des écarts des résultats de tous les candidats entre le scrutin et les dernières estimations, elles se situaient en réalité entre 4 et 6 points. Pour exemple, un candidat crédité de 25 % d’intention de vote était essentiellement prévu entre 23 % et 27 % alors que la précision sincère du sondage se situait entre 21 % et 29 %.

Ce décalage s’explique par la nature même de l’erreur totale, qui n’est pas qu’une simple variance (un flou lié à la taille de l’échantillon et sa variabilité), mais peut aussi être un biais (un décalage structurel). Ce biais est alimenté par la vie réelle des sondages : non-réponses, indécisions, modes de collecte ou ajustements méthodologiques plus ou moins assumés.

Lorsque tous les acteurs utilisent des méthodes de redressement et des panels « similaires » (électeurs recrutés essentiellement sur Internet et qui répondent régulièrement aux sondages qui leur sont soumis), ils peuvent produire une histoire cohérente… mais erronée dans la même direction.

Ce constat impose, il me semble, une véritable « hygiène du commentaire » : il faut cesser de considérer les « fourchettes » affichées (lorsqu’elles le sont) comme le curseur permettant de décider si une campagne « stagne », « bouge » ou « bascule ».

2027 : Vers une maturité de l’information électorale ?

À l’approche du double scrutin de 2027 – l’élection présidentielle suivie d’élections législatives – l’enjeu n’est pas seulement de savoir qui « gagnera », mais de définir comment nous acceptons d’être informés (voire influencés). La séquence de 2024 a servi de rappel brutal : un appareil « statistique », aussi sophistiqué soit-il, peut totalement manquer la physionomie d’une assemblée si l’on confond l’intention de vote nationale avec la projection locale en sièges.

Pour l’élection présidentielle de 2027, le défi sera de ne pas se laisser enfermer dans le confort d’un chiffre unique. Le cadre sera « pur » et contrôlé par la Commission des sondages, mais l’expérience de 2012 (et en réalité celle de bien d’autres) nous rappelle qu’une marge d’erreur « théorique » de deux points peut masquer une imprécision réelle de plus de cinq points une fois les biais potentiels intégrés. Il est temps que les médias et le public adoptent un « pacte de sobriété » : privilégier les fourchettes larges et admettre qu’à trois points (voire cinq points) d’écart, rien n’est clair.

Concernant les législatives qui suivront, la vigilance devra être redoublée sur les projections en sièges. Comme l’a souligné la Commission des sondages, ces exercices ne bénéficient d’aucun encadrement méthodologique strict et dépendent de paramètres locaux (offres politiques, désistements) qu’un sondage national ne peut saisir. Continuer à présenter ces projections comme des résultats scientifiques et fiables, c’est entretenir une « confiance collective dans une erreur collective ».

En définitive, mon propos appelle une alliance entre culture statistique et culture civique. La loi de 2016 a ouvert la « boîte noire » en imposant la transparence des notices. Il appartient désormais aux acteurs du débat public de transformer cette transparence en une véritable « hygiène du commentaire ».

Un chiffre n’est pas un destin, c’est une mesure ; et en démocratie, le destin n’appartient qu’au vote, une fois les hypothèses, les méthodes, les estimations et les projections remises à leur juste place.

Et pour les élections municipales ? Dans les grandes villes (Paris, Lyon, Marseille…), les instituts s’appuient le plus souvent sur leurs panels, puis filtrent les répondants pour ne retenir que les personnes inscrites sur les listes électorales de la commune (et, le cas échéant, de l’arrondissement/secteur). La méthode des quotas et les redressements restent les principaux outils statistiques mobilisés pour estimer les intentions de vote. Restons vigilants !

The Conversation

Léo Gerville-Réache ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Peut-on faire confiance aux sondages politiques ? Un statisticien nous donne les clés pour les décrypter – https://theconversation.com/peut-on-faire-confiance-aux-sondages-politiques-un-statisticien-nous-donne-les-cles-pour-les-decrypter-276475

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Le pouvoir des communes face à l’État : enjeu caché des municipales

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Luc Rouban, Directeur de recherches (CNRS) au Cevipof, Sciences Po

À un an de l’élection présidentielle, les municipales de 2026 sont un scrutin charnière, révélateur de l’état réel du paysage politique français. Cependant, derrière l’affrontement partisan se joue un enjeu plus profond : savoir si la commune reste un lieu essentiel de notre démocratie, ou si elle s’est muée en simple rouage administratif.

Les élections municipales de 2026 vont revêtir une importance particulière. Tout d’abord, parce qu’elles vont constituer un test pour mesurer les rapports de force politiques avant l’élection présidentielle de 2027 qu’elles précèdent immédiatement, une situation qui ne s’était pas reproduite depuis 2001. Ensuite, parce qu’elles interviennent dans un contexte de trouble, voire d’usure démocratique. La séquence ouverte par les élections législatives de 2024, faite d’instabilité et d’impuissance gouvernementale, est venue parachever un processus de décomposition et de recomposition politique amorcé depuis 2017 et la première victoire d’Emmanuel Macron.

Mais derrière les enjeux partisans se profile un enjeu caché, celui de la conception même du rapport au politique. Les élections municipales de 2026 vont raviver un très ancien débat sur ce que sont les communes et le pouvoir local. S’agit-il d’une forme d’organisation urbaine destinée à rationaliser l’action publique ou bien de l’expression plus ou moins spontanée de libertés venant se concrétiser dans une communauté ?

La nationalisation des élections municipales

Bien qu’elles soient locales par définition, les élections municipales vont revêtir une valeur nationale. Dans l’état actuel de confusion politique, chaque parti entend montrer qu’il dispose d’un ancrage territorial et se trouve ipso facto en mesure de répondre aux attentes des Français sur le terrain. Le Rassemblement national (RN) est devenu le parti dominant, mais n’a pas pu réunir un vivier d’élus locaux suffisant pour démontrer son omniprésence et a préparé environ 700 listes. Son espoir est de conquérir quelques grandes villes, comme Calais ou Toulon. La question se posera de savoir si la suprématie des Républicains (LR) dans les villes de plus de 9 000 habitants, actée en 2020, pourra se prolonger sans entériner « l’union des droites » avec le RN.

À gauche, la fin du Nouveau Front populaire met en concurrence La France insoumise (LFI) et le Parti socialiste (PS) pour le leadership dans la perspective de la présidentielle de 2027, avec l’engagement de députés LFI à l’assaut de Paris ou de Marseille. Le PS va mesurer la portée de sa stratégie de recentrage et d’alliance avec Les Écologistes pour espérer récupérer des villes passées à droite en 2014, comme Reims ou Toulouse. Pour le bloc central, l’enjeu est celui de savoir ce que pèse encore le macronisme, alors que Renaissance a préféré soutenir des candidats Horizons (à Paris), divers droite (à Lyon) ou d’anciens LR (à Marseille).

Projeter sur les élections municipales les enjeux de l’élection présidentielle permet aux partis politiques de renforcer leur légitimité alors qu’ils sont désormais faibles et incapables de canaliser la violence sociale. Cette instrumentalisation occulte cependant la nature du débat démocratique que soulèvent ces élections.

Une histoire du long terme

Pour comprendre ce dont se revêt le pouvoir municipal dans la France de 2026, il faut bien cerner l’importance d’un débat historique qui entoure l’apparition du fait communal au détour des IXe et Xe siècles. Les communes, souvent issues des paroisses catholiques, se sont alors multipliées dans un cadre juridique nouveau, celui de chartes passées avec des autorités de tutelle – rois, seigneurs, autorités ecclésiastiques – qui leur concédaient des libertés de gestion mais, surtout, reconnaissaient l’existence de pouvoirs sociaux autonomes : les communes deviennent des personnes morales.

On doit surtout retenir le fait qu’elles deviennent l’expression d’une solidarité entre les habitants, qui se doivent « foi, assistance et conseil ». Ceux-ci participent à des assemblées générales convoquées « à corz cornant et à cloiche sonant », selon un modèle institutionnel qui se diffuse en Europe.

Deux facteurs sociopolitiques vont jouer un rôle décisif dans l’invention de la commune, que l’on retrouve très clairement dans la France du XXIe siècle : d’une part, un mouvement de différenciation et d’individuation, qui conduit à l’affirmation d’une identité locale collective ou communautaire et, d’autre part, un effondrement du pouvoir central, marqué par l’instabilité et l’inefficacité. Petit parallèle historique : Louis II dit le Bègue reste roi des Francs deux ans (877-879), Charles III le Gros trois (884-887), tout comme Louis III (879-882), et le dernier roi carolingien, Louis V, un an (986-987). Comme le souligne Émile Durkheim dans un texte de 1903 : « L’activité de la société est en raison inverse de l’activité de l’État. » L’émancipation de la société conduit à inventer de nouvelles structures politiques qui permettent de se protéger et d’affirmer ses libertés.

De l’institution communautaire à l’institution oligarchique

Cette conception de la commune va disparaître sous l’effet d’un mouvement de concentration oligarchique qui s’opère à partir du XIVe siècle, puis d’une nouvelle doctrine juridique venant à l’appui de la centralisation monarchique à partir du XVIᵉ siècle, qui fera progressivement de la commune un simple rouage de la puissance royale, dont les représentants, les maires, ne sont plus élus mais titulaires d’offices, dont l’achat devient une aubaine financière pour l’État. En 1555, un édit royal crée les généralités (ancêtres de nos préfectures) sous la conduite d’un intendant nommé par le roi qui va contrôler les finances communales et vérifier si les élus ne s’octroient pas trop d’indemnités.

Cette évolution oligarchique et de concentration du pouvoir municipal est le produit de deux facteurs opposés. Le premier, apparu très tôt, est le besoin de disposer de maires ayant fait des études juridiques et disposant d’un bagage universitaire. Très vite, dès le XIIIe siècle, les bourgeois sont à la recherche de bons maires pour leur commune, ce qui implique déjà un certain savoir-faire professionnalisé. Cette nouvelle élite va s’associer à la bourgeoisie marchande et aux Parlements pour contrer le pouvoir royal mais, de ce fait, s’insérer dans de plus vastes réseaux sociaux et familiaux. Le second, inverse, mais jouant paradoxalement dans le sens d’une dévitalisation de l’idée communale et communautaire originelle, tient à la construction de l’État moderne, qui impose de disposer de rouages locaux et appuie les élites locales dans leur lutte contre la noblesse et les seigneurs.

Les conseils et les « jurés » ou les « échevins » vont rapidement s’imposer, tandis que les assemblées de citoyens disparaissent peu à peu. Bien que la Révolution et les régimes républicains qui lui succèdent fassent de l’élection démocratique le ressort du pouvoir municipal, ce dernier se réduit désormais à un contre-pouvoir plus ou moins fragile par l’insertion des maires dans la notabilité, qui conduit aux fonctions politiques nationales.

Le pouvoir municipal à la croisée des chemins

En 2026, le pouvoir municipal se retrouve en tension entre ces deux acceptions de la commune. La première est celle du pouvoir direct des citoyens, tel qu’il s’exprime positivement dans l’investissement dans les assemblées participatives locales et, négativement, dans les agressions dont les maires font l’objet en nombre croissant. L’idée d’un pouvoir de proximité, efficace et rapide, est partagée par une majorité de citoyens. Le Baromètre de la confiance politique du Cevipof montre ainsi qu’a émergé une autre idée du pouvoir politique, moins partisan et plus soucieux du détail des vies ordinaires.

Alors que le pouvoir central est fortement critiqué, le pouvoir local est apprécié : si 22 % des enquêtés ont encore confiance dans l’institution présidentielle, 60 % font confiance à leur maire, 58 % à leur conseil municipal. Bien plus, la demande de décentralisation est forte. Les enquêtés estiment à 79 % qu’il faudrait donner plus de pouvoir aux collectivités locales face l’État. Cette moyenne ne varie ni en fonction du niveau de diplôme, ni de la catégorie socioprofessionnelle, ni même du vote au premier tour de l’élection présidentielle de 2022 puisque cette proportion est de 82 % chez les électeurs de Jean-Luc Mélenchon, de 81 % chez ceux d’Emmanuel Macron et de 83 % chez ceux de Marine Le Pen. On est donc en présence d’une demande générale.

La commune reste le lieu de l’efficacité immédiate et de son évaluation rapide par les administrés. La gestion municipale reste d’ailleurs assez étrangère aux engagements partisans. Ce n’est pas par hasard si le facteur qui joue le plus sur le niveau de confiance dans les maires, bien avant la position politique ou les variables sociologiques lourdes, est constitué par le niveau de confiance dans les entreprises privées. Cette observation introduit cependant la seconde dimension du pouvoir municipal.

Celui-ci s’est concentré entre les mains des maires dans un cadre institutionnel où la « prime majoritaire » du scrutin laisse peu de place aux oppositions puisqu’une victoire modeste dans les urnes peut conduire à disposer d’une majorité écrasante de conseillers municipaux. Jusqu’à 50 000 habitants, en moyenne, les listes gagnantes ont obtenu en 2020 autour de 80 % des conseillers, 73 % entre 50 000 et 100 000 habitants et 69 % dans les grandes villes au-delà de 100 000 habitants avec une diversification de la compétition électorale.

Mais on observe aussi un renforcement récent du caractère oligarchique du pouvoir municipal, notamment par le développement des politiques de communication qui personnalisent fortement l’action municipale et valorisent la seule image du maire. Le profil socioprofessionnel des maires est devenu par ailleurs de plus en plus étroit, privilégiant les catégories supérieures ou moyennes diplômées. Entre 2014 et 2020, la proportion de maires issus des catégories supérieures est passée en moyenne dans l’Hexagone de 25 % à 43 %, et dans les outre-mer de 42 % à 49 %. Le mouvement est général, même si la taille des communes vient le moduler, puisque cette proportion passe de 34 % dans les communes de moins de 500 habitants à 72 % dans celles de 30 000 habitants et plus.

Origine sociale des maires de France en 2019 et 2025

Même si les maires bénéficient d’un crédit perdu par le personnel politique national, ils constituent néanmoins une oligarchie souvent impuissante. Les communes dépendent étroitement des dotations financières de l’État et doivent s’insérer dans un carcan de normes nationales tant en matière de santé, d’environnement que de développement urbain ou économique. L’autonomie locale est encore réduite par la nécessité de s’insérer dans des intercommunalités qui décident de plus en plus de la vie quotidienne des habitants, en matière de transports ou de voirie. La décentralisation a été interprétée comme une déconcentration de l’État, laissant les tâches routinières et ingrates au local.

La question municipale résume donc, en 2026, les deux orientations contradictoires qui mettent la démocratie à l’épreuve de l’arbitrage entre deux efficacités politiques. La première reste fidèle à une anthropologie politique faisant du local un lieu de solidarité, de participation et d’identité, ce qui explique pourquoi la France a toujours 35 000 communes. La seconde fait de la gestion municipale un facteur d’adaptation territoriale d’une action publique unitaire et verticale supposée intégrer la société française.

Luc Rouban, est l’auteur de la Société contre la politique aux Presses de Sciences Po. Cet article est publié en partenariat avec Conférence Sciences Po.

The Conversation

Luc Rouban ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Le pouvoir des communes face à l’État : enjeu caché des municipales – https://theconversation.com/le-pouvoir-des-communes-face-a-letat-enjeu-cache-des-municipales-276931

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Protéger les filles, canaliser les garçons ? L’éducation à l’information face aux stéréotypes de genre

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Anne Cordier, Professeure des Universités en Sciences de l’Information et de la Communication, Université de Lorraine

Plus enclines à douter de leurs pratiques d’information, les filles sont aussi plus souvent questionnées sur leurs émotions face à l’actualité. Prendre conscience des biais de genre qui pèsent sur les usages numériques est un préalable pour faire de l’éducation à l’information un levier d’émancipation et aider adolescentes et adolescents à construire leur autonomie critique. Explications.

Travail, santé, espace public… Chaque année, en mars, dans le sillage de la Journée internationale des droits des femmes, on s’arrête sur les inégalités de genre dans différents domaines de la vie sociale. Et si nous faisions ce pas de côté dans un champ moins visible, celui des pratiques d’information des adolescents et de leur accompagnement ?

Lire l’actualité, chercher des sources pour un exposé, suivre des créateurs et créatrices de contenus, débattre en ligne : ces activités font partie intégrante de leur quotidien. En tant que pratiques culturelles, elles sont traversées par les mêmes rapports sociaux de genre que le reste de la vie sociale.

En outre, le numérique n’est pas un espace « hors-sol », neutre ou désincarné, mais un espace socialement situé où se rejouent des normes et des tensions sociétales. Les inégalités de genre y prennent des formes parfois spécifiques, mais toujours en lien avec les contextes sociaux, médiatiques et politiques. Et leur traitement éducatif n’échappe pas à ces cadrages.

Dès l’enfance, un numérique sous conditions

Les rapports genrés au numérique, à l’information et aux médias se construisent tôt, dans la socialisation familiale.

Des enquêtes de terrain menées auprès de collégiennes avaient en 2015 montré combien l’utilisation d’Internet au sein de la famille se faisait en fonction de la réalisation des tâches ménagères à destination de la collectivité. Autrement dit les filles déclaraient devoir s’acquitter d’impératifs liés à la vie, notamment matérielle, de la famille en général. Les garçons, eux, n’évoquaient quasiment jamais cette conditionnalité.

Dix ans plus tard, lors d’une enquête ethnographique menée au sein d’un collège d’éducation prioritaire, les adolescentes glissent les mêmes impératifs de tâches de gestion familiale lors de l’évocation de leurs pratiques numériques à domicile.

Ces observations font écho aux travaux sur la division sexuée du travail domestique dès l’enfance, prolongeant également les recherches sur l’informatique et les cultures numériques historiquement construites comme des territoires masculins. Cette assignation symbolique continue d’agir, y compris dans les usages informationnels, ceux-ci étant fortement dépendants de l’accès aux objets techniques.

Autorités masculines, expertes invisibles

Les contenus consultés et les légitimités associées sont aussi marqués par une distinction fortement genrée. Quand on demande aux adolescentes et adolescents de citer des figures d’autorité à leurs yeux dans le champ de l’information, les noms masculins dominent largement. De Hugo Décrypte à Mister Géopolitix en passant par Gaspard G, les modèles invoqués sont très majoritairement masculins. Ce sont également eux qui sont les plus reconnus par les adultes, à l’école comme dans les médias,

Les créatrices de contenu diffusant des savoirs scientifiques, dans le domaine de la santé ou de l’histoire, médiatiques et politiques, existent pourtant (citons pour exemples Camille Aumont-Carnel ou encore Charlie Danger. Mais elles sont moins citées, moins reconnues comme autorités. Lorsque des figures féminines sont évoquées, elles sont souvent renvoyées à l’influence, au marketing, à l’esthétique ou au lifestyle.

Cette dissymétrie rappelle le phénomène des « oubliées du numérique » décrit par Isabelle Collet : les femmes ont contribué à l’histoire de l’informatique, mais leur rôle a été invisibilisé. Aujourd’hui, ces femmes participent aux médiations des savoirs en ligne et à l’enrichissement des cultures juvéniles, mais leur reconnaissance est inégale.



À lire aussi :
Pourquoi les filles ont délaissé l’informatique

Or ces modèles comptent dans la construction des adolescentes : renvoyant à des hiérarchies symboliques, ils peuvent orienter la façon dont elles se projettent, ainsi que leurs sentiments de légitimité, en structurant la représentation de qui « sait », qui « explique », qui « fait autorité ».

Chez les filles, plus d’autocensure, moins de confiance en soi

Dans les nombreuses enquêtes menées auprès d’adolescents âgés de 13 à 17 ans, tous milieux sociaux confondus, il ressort que le sentiment de compétence informationnelle est fortement genré.

Lorsqu’on demande aux adolescentes et aux adolescents si elles ou ils ont « peur de prendre une information fausse pour une vraie », le constat est sans appel : les filles répondent à l’affirmative, là où les garçons apparaissent plus nuancés. Plus encore, lorsqu’on leur demande si cela leur est déjà arrivé de prendre une information fausse pour une vraie, les filles sont très majoritairement convaincues que oui, alors que les garçons envisagent de façon très minoritaire la possibilité d’avoir cru une fausse information.

Rien n’indique pourtant une supériorité cognitive masculine dans l’évaluation de l’information. Les études sur les compétences informationnelles montrent que la difficulté à distinguer l’information fiable de l’information trompeuse est largement partagée.

Le doute des filles n’est pas le signe d’une incompétence ; il est le reflet de mécanismes bien connus d’autocensure et de moindre confiance en soi des filles dans des domaines perçus comme techniques ou stratégiques. Il peut aussi être interprété comme une prudence épistémique. À l’inverse, la sur-confiance peut exposer à des biais. Mais cette dissymétrie alimente des prises de parole inégales et des dynamiques de légitimité différenciées.

Travailler le sentiment de compétence pour dépasser les assignations

Ces représentations sociales se prolongent dans les dispositifs éducatifs. Les émotions face à l’information – choc, peur, dégoût – sont plus aisément verbalisées par les filles. Les garçons sont moins sollicités sur leur ressenti face à des contenus violents, comme si la robustesse émotionnelle était attendue d’eux.

Dans les discours politiques et médiatiques, les filles apparaissent fréquemment comme un public à protéger des dangers du numérique, notamment des violences sexistes et sexuelles. Cette vulnérabilité est bien réelle, dans l’espace public hors ligne comme en ligne, comme le rappelle le rapport 2026 de l’Anses sur l’usage des réseaux sociaux numériques et la santé des adolescents.

Mais, protéger sans outiller, c’est maintenir dans une position de fragilité. Symétriquement, les garçons sont souvent perçus comme porteurs de comportements problématiques qu’il faudrait « canaliser », selon une logique d’essentialisation qui rappelle d’autres espaces sociaux.

Cette essentialisation pose question. Elle ne doit pas conduire à nier les vulnérabilités bien réelles des filles confrontées à des problématiques singulières, mais elle ne peut constituer l’horizon exclusif de l’action éducative.

« Tour de France de l’éducation aux médias et à l’information : les scolaires sensibilisés à Poitiers » (France 3 Nouvelle-Aquitaine).

L’éducation aux médias et à l’information (EMI) gagnerait à dépasser cette double assignation, d’abord en intégrant systématiquement des créatrices de contenus scientifiques et journalistiques dans les corpus scolaires comme dans les discussions en famille.

Pour travailler explicitement le sentiment de compétence, il s’agit d’inciter les jeunes à verbaliser les stratégies d’évaluation, en montrant qu’elles s’apprennent, qu’elles ne relèvent ni d’un « don » ni d’un tempérament. Et l’on peut interroger les émotions de toutes et tous face à l’information perçue comme violente ou anxiogène, en proposant des espaces de discussion sur le ressenti face à l’information.

L’enjeu est d’accompagner filles et garçons vers une autonomie critique joyeuse, faisant la part belle à l’expérimentation, au débat, à la production de l’information, et la compréhension des logiques économiques et politiques. Il s’agit que toutes et tous se perçoivent comme acteurs informationnels légitimes dans l’espace public.

Les pratiques informationnelles juvéniles ne sont ni futiles ni homogènes. Elles sont des lieux d’expérimentation, de sociabilité et de construction de soi. Les penser au prisme du genre ne vise pas à opposer mais à comprendre pour mieux accompagner.

The Conversation

Anne Cordier a reçu des financements de la Direction du Numérique pour l’Education, dans le cadre du projet GTnum EMILIE.

– ref. Protéger les filles, canaliser les garçons ? L’éducation à l’information face aux stéréotypes de genre – https://theconversation.com/proteger-les-filles-canaliser-les-garcons-leducation-a-linformation-face-aux-stereotypes-de-genre-277866