Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caroline Millar, Visiting Scholar, Queen’s Business School (Organisation, Work and Leadership), Queen’s University Belfast
The core premise of feminism is this: women can do anything. And yes, these days in developed economies, women without children earn about the same as men. The problem is not the opportunities available to them. It’s the opportunities that disappear as women become mothers.
This disconnect between paid work and care work is evident. In my research on work and motherhood, I have often found that organisations give little thought to the tensions that arise between women’s work and care identities.
A 2025 overview of how care is understood in feminist economic debates recognises the fundamental value of unpaid and underpaid care. But it doesn’t discuss how to reconcile paid work and care.
The unpaid work women do in the home alongside their paid work leads to reduced participation in the workforce, income inequality between the genders, time-poverty, and increased stress for women.
The challenges and constraints that women encounter in the workplace have long been recognised. But caring is also often viewed in a negative way – something that interrupts and stymies their participation in paid work. Motherhood is frequently framed as something that curtails ambition and income.
In contrast, paid work is valued because it generates financial resources. These perspectives speak to the outdated concept of the “ideal worker”, and the capitalist priorities of productivity and efficiency that underpin this idea.
Across academic research, financial resources are often seen as a means to buy exemption from some aspects of motherhood. Other research concedes that caring for older relatives can be rewarding, but then cites all the problems that caregivers may experience.
In short, it is almost impossible to find caring for children framed in a positive way. One paper positions care work as “responsibilities” and “obligations” that fall on women. But this framing is directly at odds with how the women I have spoken to understood their role as mothers: they talked fondly of their children, attended their needs and enjoyed spending time with them.
Rediscovering the value of care
The problem for both feminism and capitalism is that mothers must routinely combine paid work and caring responsibilities in order to make a living. This reflects the tensions that the research identifies but does not resolve: women are navigating systems that position care as a disruption rather than an important and valued form of work and identity.
Older women often recount their career success through a lens of sacrifice, while many younger parents resist long-hours cultures, experimenting with ways to share work and care. What this suggests is that there is a need for employers to have a more nuanced appreciation of parenting identities.
However, work structures often still rely on outdated breadwinner/caregiver identities – dictating how parents juggle paid work and care, and limiting the space for more flexible hybrid roles.
A model where the mother becomes the breadwinner and the father the caregiver is not ideal either. It may appear progressive, but in practice care work continues to be pressed to the margins and the financial precarity it leads to is not acknowledged or fixed. It is simply transferred to the male caregiver.
Breadwinner/caregiver norms are just not suited to society and family dynamics any more. But they can be dismantled and replaced by hybrid roles that allow people to combine work and care identities.
Flexible working arrangements can help parents to do a good job at work and at home. Andrey_Popov/Shutterstock
While the tensions of work and motherhood have not disappeared, other groups have emerged and are developing momentum. For example, fathers who understand and value their parenting role are prompting a groundswell of change.
In the UK, campaigns such as Parenting Out Loud, as well as demands for extended, government-funded paternity leave (for example, six weeks of leave paid at 90% of income), seek to enable fathers to care and bond with their children without worrying about work pressures. These movements imagine a future where care is equally valued and recognised for its importance to society.
Governments, employers and trade unions have an opportunity to create work cultures that enable parents to do their jobs well at the same time as caring. Structures that value both work and care will allow everyone to contribute to the economy while actively participating in their caregiving roles.
Acknowledging an employee’s care identity needs to extend far beyond workplaces begrudgingly accommodating a mother working from home to care for a sick toddler. It involves enabling and trusting parents to respond to routine parenting challenges in an appropriate way – without penalty or judgment. For example, a dad being able to take emergency leave to respond to his child’s sickness, or a mum arriving late to work after supporting a teenager who is stressed by exams.
Funded, high-quality and reliable care infrastructure is essential, alongside flexible working. The persistent motherhood wage penalty is a good barometer to see how things are changing: interventions that normalise combining work and care will narrow this pay gap, and give a clear indication of what works.
Caroline Millar received PhD funding from Department for the Economy (NI).
Kimberly Milne was 28 when she climbed over the barrier of a motorway bridge and jumped to her death. That night, witnesses saw her cowering from her husband, Lee Milne, in a retail park in Dundee, as he trapped her against a wall. CCTV footage showed her trying to get away while he shouted, drove a car at her and pulled her back into his orbit.
In the year before her death, he had choked her, dragged her by the hair, hit her until she fell and lost consciousness, and apologised, promising he was “not that type of guy”. He went through her phone, controlled her movements and, according to messages shown in court, created a situation where leaving felt impossible: “How can I leave him if he’s saying he’s going to do himself in without me?”
In a first-of-its-kind case in Scotland, Lee Milne has now been held criminally responsible for his wife’s suicide. The 39-year-old was convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to eight years in custody.
In Spain, Noelia Castillo, 25, underwent euthanasia after a long and highly contested legal battle. In early adulthood, she reported multiple incidents of sexual assault. Days after being gang-raped, she attempted suicide by jumping from a building. She survived, but with irreversible paraplegia, chronic physical pain, neurological damage and profound psychological suffering.
Her euthanasia was legally granted on the basis of that condition. But the question remains: if the injuries that made her life unbearable followed a suicide attempt triggered by sexual violence, can her death be understood without that violence?
Homicide has long been treated as the most extreme outcome of abuse. But recent evidence suggests that abuse-related suicide may be at least as common, if not more so. Yet it remains far less recognised in law, policy and public understanding.
In 2022, an England-wide study found that people who had ever experienced intimate partner violence were almost three times as likely to have attempted suicide in the previous year, even after adjusting for other adversities.
Data in England and Wales suggests that what might be termed “perpetrator-produced suicide” (where sustained abuse produces the conditions in which a person ends their own life) is not uncommon. The Domestic Homicide Project, a research project led by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, recorded 98 suspected suicides following domestic abuse between April 1 2023 and March 31 2024. This was more than the 80 intimate partner homicides recorded, overtaking them for the second year in a row.
This suggests that fatal outcomes linked to domestic abuse may be being categorised as individual acts, rather than perpetrator-produced harm. The result is underrecognition of abusers’ role in their victims’ suicide. There have only been five prosecutions of this kind in England and Wales, leading to just one confirmed conviction for manslaughter.
In Kimberly Milne’s case, the court found that sustained physical and psychological abuse was a significant contributing factor in her death. The judge concluded that Lee Milne’s actions drove his wife to a point of despair, from which she took her own life.
In Castillo’s case, the question of responsibility remains unresolved. The violence that preceded her suicide attempt and ultimately led to her death sits outside the frame of legal accountability. The law breaks these events apart: the assault is treated as a crime, the suicide attempt as her own act, and the later death as a medical decision, rather than recognising how violence can set the whole chain in motion.
‘Choice’ under coercion
To understand the link between suicide and domestic violence or coercive control, we must ask: what does it mean to “choose” to end one’s life, when that choice is made under coercion or threat?
My research explores weaponised attachment, where perpetrators of abuse deliberately use emotional bonds to control their victims. They form attachment through grooming, trauma-sharing and vulnerability, and then use that attachment to influence decisions about whether to stay, leave or seek help. Coercion often operates by shaping how decisions are made – narrowing the options a person can see and making the choice to leave feel impossible.
Abuse and coercion can change the options a victim thinks are available. hxdbzxy/Shutterstock
Research in behavioural economics and cognitive psychology shows that people make choices within the set of options they perceive as available, not the set that objectively exists. Under threat and loss, people seek more risk and are more likely to choose extreme options to escape unpleasant states.
When coercion shapes what a person sees as their obligations and options, a resulting decision cannot be treated as fully self-authored. It is made, but under conditions structured by another. In cases of perpetrator-produced suicide, the issue is not simply whether a victim “chose” to die, but whether that choice was made with the authority required for responsibility. The same mechanism operates in cases where victims are said to have “consented” to abuse.
Justice for victims
This conviction could change how criminal justice systems approach perpetrator-produced suicide. It could lead to more homicide-style investigations where suicide follows coercive control. In investigations, this would mean greater emphasis on patterns of abuse over time, rather than isolating the final event.
For this shift to be meaningful, changes are needed. First, there is a need for better recording of perpetrator-produced suicides, which are currently fragmented or likely misclassified as individual deaths. Second, what police consider as evidence must expand to include patterns of coercion, digital traces and how the relationship unfolded over time, rather than focusing only on what happened in the final moments.
Third, the law needs to be clearer about when sustained abuse leads to responsibility for a death, moving beyond vague labels like “vulnerability” and focusing on how a person’s options were restricted.
Finally, risk assessment practices should move away from predicting isolated incidents towards identifying coercive environments that generate escalating harm. Without these changes, this landmark ruling risks remaining an exceptional case, rather than a foundation for future accountability.
If you’re struggling with suicidal thoughts, the following services can provide you with support: In the UK and Ireland – call Samaritans UK at 116 123. In the US – call the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline at 1-800-273-TALK (8255) or IMAlive at 1-800-784-2433. In Australia – call Lifeline Australia at 13 11 14. In other countries – visit IASP or Suicide.org to find a helpline in your country.
Mags Lesiak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Italian referee Marco Guida signals that he is taking account of time-wasting during a Serie A football match.Marco Iacobucci Epp/Shutterstock
Football fans, broadcasters and even head coaches have been complaining this season about excessive time-wasting spoiling the flow of the men’s game.
In the Premier League, the proportion of a match where the ball is in play is at a near-record low. Football’s world governing body Fifa has a target of 60 minutes of ball-in-play per game. Yet two Premier League matches this season had only just above 45 minutes of action – less than half the total match time.
There are numerous factors explaining this decrease. One is the length of time players are taking over each corner, throw-in and free-kick. Repeated injury stoppages (including some that are allegedly faked by players seeking to delay a game) are also blamed – along with lengthy decision-making by each game’s video assistant referee (VAR).
Video reviews have increased the number and length of stoppages, particularly for penalties, red cards and goals. There is now a benefit to staying down after contact in the penalty area while officials check for possible infringements. What might once have been a marginal appeal can trigger a lengthy interruption that, according to our research, is not always fully accounted for in the time added by the referee at the end of each half.
With concerns mounting about how time-wasting could turn off viewers of the men’s World Cup in North America this summer, new rules are being introduced allowing referees to start five-second countdowns at throw-ins and goal-kicks. Teams may also face sanction if their substituted players take longer than ten seconds to leave the field of play.
So, will this make a difference to the amount of action fans see this summer?
Our research, published in the Journal of Sports Economics, suggests no amount of rule-tightening will solve football’s issue with time-wasters until referees are properly supported to withstand the psychological pressure placed on them by players, team officials and fans during each game.
We found that the time taken up by stoppages is often added inaccurately, depending on unconscious biases of referees who alone decide how much time is added. This can especially benefit home teams with stronger support in the stadium.
Football has always been played in continuous rather than active time. Unlike sports where the clock stops, football absorbs interruptions rather than isolating them. This design goes back to the sport’s early history.
When the match length was standardised in the 19th century, a simple running clock was practical. One interpretation is that 90 minutes became the standard because it reliably produced 60 minutes of ball-in-play action. By the 1890s, this length of match was ingrained in the official rules by the International Football Association Board (Ifab).
The concept of added time was formally adopted in 1891 and applied at the referee’s discretion. It was – and still is – supposed to correct the most obvious losses of time during the 45 minutes of each half.
But added time is not measured mechanically. It is estimated by humans who often apply rules of thumb under pressure from players, managers and spectators.
At the last World Cup in 2022, Fifa extended the amount of added time referees could add at the end of each half in an attempt to discourage players from time wasting. It came close to delivering Fifa’s 60-minute target for ball-in-play. But it came at the expense of games that seemed to go on forever.
Decisions were not the same
We analysed the 2022 World Cup and 2024 European Championship for differences in how referees added time on at the end of the first and second halves. According to Fifa and Ifab, added time should be applied consistently across both halves, since the rules governing stoppage time are identical.
In practice, these decisions were not the same. Referees added on substantially more time in the second half than the first – in part because of the rising stakes of each game as it nears a conclusion. These patterns were stronger at the World Cup, which probably related to Fifa’s edict to increase ball-in-play time.
In particular, we found that referees allowed substantially more stoppage time in tight second halves, while first halves in close (low-scoring) contests were sometimes cut short. This can advantage the trailing team in second halves, giving them a greater chance of getting back to parity since the rate of goal-scoring generally increases as football matches near their conclusion.
Added time is often framed as a technical adjustment. But it is truly where football’s human element is exposed.
Should football introduce a stop-clock?
Does this mean football should follow the path of sports like basketball, American football and rugby and adopt a stop-clock, ending each half when the official time expires (with stopped-clock pauses along the way)? The appeal might seem obvious. But it would also change the nature of football.
We believe matches would grow even longer, interruptions would multiply and lengthen, and the continuous flow that gives the game its rhythm and tension would be under even greater threat.
The temptation to factor in television commercial windows might also grow. This summer’s World Cup will already include three-minute hydration breaks in the middle of every half to mitigate high temperatures in games.
Ultimately, added time is a reminder of what football is: a sport played in running time that cannot be perfectly measured. Referees will never be fully consistent, because the moments they arbitrate are charged with uncertainty – despite VAR’s best (and worst) efforts.
But the game’s authorities are still right to be addressing the issue of time wasting ahead of this summer’s World Cup. One of football’s great attractions is the pace at which it is played. Lose this and the game becomes a lot less beautiful.
Carl Singleton receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (UKRI). He is affiliated with the Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research through the IZA@LISER network.
David Butler and Robert Butler do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – in French – By Didier Courbet, Professeur et Chercheur en Sciences de la Communication & Psychologie de la santé, Aix-Marseille Université (AMU)
Mike Fincke, astronaute de la Nasa et ingénieur de vol de l’Expédition 73, à bord de l’International Space Station (ISS), la Station spatiale internationale, en août 2025.NASA, CC BY-NC-SA
L’aphasie, une subite perte de la parole, ne se retrouve sous le feu des projecteurs que lorsqu’elle touche des personnalités médiatiques. Pourtant, ce trouble, qui entraîne non seulement de grandes difficultés de communication, mais aussi une grande détresse psychique, affecte des centaines de milliers de personnes en France.
En janvier dernier a eu lieu la première « évacuation médicale » de l’histoire de la Nasa. Quatre astronautes de la Station spatiale internationale (ISS) ont été ramenés sur Terre en urgence. Ce n’est toutefois que le 27 mars que l’agence spatiale états-unienne a donné plus de détails sur l’incident à l’origine de ce rapatriement exceptionnel.
Le public a alors appris que, le 7 janvier dernier, un membre de l’équipage, l’astronaute Mike Fincke, a expérimenté un épisode d’aphasie. Cet ancien colonel de l’US Air Force âgé de 59 ans s’est subitement retrouvé incapable de parler, alors qu’il était en train de prendre son repas.
En France, on estime que plus de 300 000 personnes souffrent d’aphasie. Pourtant, cette affection reste peu connue du grand public. Rien d’étonnant à cela, puisque ce sujet fait rarement la une des médias, sauf lorsqu’une célébrité en est victime, comme ce fut le cas pour Jean-Paul Belmondo et Sharon Stone au début des années 2000, ou Bruce Willis en 2022. Voici ce qu’il faut savoir de ce trouble.
Quand le langage se perd
L’aphasie est une déficience acquise du langage. Elle résulte le plus souvent d’un accident vasculaire cérébral (AVC), mais peut également survenir à la suite d’un traumatisme crânien, d’une tumeur cérébrale, d’une infection ou d’une maladie neurodégénérative.
Ce trouble se manifeste par des difficultés d’expression ou de compréhension du langage oral ou écrit. Mike Fincke, l’astronaute de l’ISS, a rapidement retrouvé ses capacités à parler. Malheureusement, ce n’est pas le cas de la majeure partie des personnes aphasiques, lesquelles vivent en permanence avec cette affection.
L’aphasie est reconnue par l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) comme un « handicap de communication ». Elle entraîne en effet des limitations importantes en matière de communication, qui conduisent également à des restrictions durables de participation sociale, familiale, professionnelle et même citoyenne.
Des capacités cognitives préservées
Globalement, chez les personnes aphasiques, les pensées, les sentiments, « l’intelligence » et les capacités cognitives utilisées dans la vie quotidienne ne sont pas altérées. De nombreux travaux ont montré que les processus cognitifs fondamentaux peuvent demeurer préservés malgré des atteintes sévères du langage.
Les personnes aphasiques savent ce qu’elles veulent dire, formulent des intentions de communication claires et conservent leur capacité à comprendre le monde et à prendre des décisions. Elles sont capables d’évaluation, de jugement, de discernement, de décision et gardent de manière générale leurs aptitudes à effectuer des choix fondés sur des préférences, à planifier des actions, à élaborer des solutions pour des situations problématiques du quotidien.
Ces patients rencontrent cependant des difficultés parfois majeures pour exprimer leurs pensées et interagir avec autrui. Ce problème constitue une source de frustration et de souffrance intenses et persistantes non seulement pour elles, mais également pour leur entourage.
Un point important à garder à l’esprit est que les conséquences de l’aphasie vont au-delà de problèmes pratiques de communication. Les personnes qui en souffrent développent souvent des troubles psychologiques majeurs. Si l’on considère l’ensemble des maladies et des handicaps, l’aphasie est celle qui est liée aux souffrances psychologiques et sociales les plus fortes, davantage encore que les handicaps lourds, comme la tétraplégie, ou des maladies fortement angoissantes, comme le cancer.
En témoigne le taux important de suicides, de troubles dépressifs et anxieux ainsi que de stress délétère chez les personnes qui souffrent d’aphasie. En outre, leurs aidants, souvent démunis, se retrouvent eux-mêmes fréquemment en forte détresse psychologique.
Une détresse sévère et insuffisamment prise en charge
Dans les mois qui suivent un AVC, quasiment toutes les personnes aphasiques souffrent d’une détresse psychologique élevée. Celle-ci résulte d’un fort sentiment de solitude et d’une faible satisfaction sociale. Par ailleurs, les trois quarts d’entre elles présentent des symptômes de dépression.
Ce handicap de communication contraint de nombreux individus à développer des stratégies d’évitement : limiter les contacts téléphoniques, abandonner des loisirs impliquant des échanges verbaux ou des discussions avec les autres, comme des repas entre amis. La participation sociale diminue dans un grand nombre de cas. Les relations avec les amis se raréfient, limitant alors les contacts à la famille proche, à la condition que celle-ci ne les délaisse pas à son tour… L’individu est souvent isolé socialement, parfois marginalisé.
Il ressent dès lors une « solitude existentielle » liée à la difficulté à participer pleinement aux échanges de la vie quotidienne. L’identité individuelle et sociale, tout comme l’image de soi, s’altèrent également. Il est difficile pour la personne aphasique de parler d’elle, de ses idées, de se confier, de s’affirmer, de se défendre, c’est-à-dire de développer ces comportements essentiels à l’équilibre mental et au lien social.
La difficulté à parler peut en outre dégrader le sentiment d’autonomie, de compétence et l’estime de soi. Ce mouvement est alimenté par de fréquentes expériences sociales déclenchant des malentendus et des dévalorisations, possibles sources d’anxiété sociale. De plus, certains des rôles sociaux antérieurs à l’aphasie (professionnels, associatifs, etc.) sont souvent profondément modifiés ou abandonnés, ce qui prive la personne de fonctions socialement valorisées et de repères identitaires majeurs.
Des erreurs de jugement aux conséquences considérables
Largement méconnu du grand public et de certains professionnels de santé insuffisamment formés, ce handicap invisible est mal compris socialement, ce qui conduit fréquemment à des interprétations erronées.
Nombreux sont les expériences vécues et témoignages rapportés par les cadres de la Fédération nationale des aphasiques de France, révélant des situations aussi choquantes qu’intolérables au regard des droits humains. C’est, par exemple, le cas de cet homme aphasique qui s’est retrouvé placé en cellule de dégrisement par des représentants des forces de l’ordre qui pensaient, à tort, qu’il était ivre.
Aberrante aussi, la situation de cette femme aphasique qui, à la suite d’une expertise judiciaire, a été jugée comme n’étant plus en possession de ses capacités intellectuelles. Le psychologue, désigné « expert judiciaire », ne connaissait pas l’aphasie… Après s’être entretenu avec elle, il a estimé, de manière erronée, qu’il était impossible qu’elle ait pu prendre elle-même des décisions concernant ses achats et ses dépenses, ce qui a conduit à accuser son aidant familial d’avoir agi à sa place. Les proches de cette femme ainsi que les médecins qui la suivaient ont alors dû rapidement se mobiliser pour faire innocenter son aidant, injustement accusé.
Ces situations révèlent combien la confusion entre troubles du langage et altération des capacités intellectuelles peut conduire à des jugements erronés, avec des conséquences parfois graves, au point de dénier les droits humains fondamentaux. La méconnaissance de l’aphasie contribue non seulement à la mise à l’écart des personnes qui en sont victimes, mais aussi à leur « infantilisation », voire au développement d’attitudes agressives à leur égard.
Ce déficit de sensibilisation renforce leur stigmatisation sociale, leur isolement relationnel, et donc leur mal-être. Les problèmes psychologiques et sociaux liés à l’aphasie sont aujourd’hui largement documentés, et les recherches dépeignent un tableau particulièrement alarmant.
Quelles solutions ?
Malgré l’ampleur de ces difficultés et la souffrance ressentie, l’accès aux soins psychologiques demeure fortement restreint. Les psychothérapies classiquement pratiquées par les psychologues et les psychiatres reposent essentiellement sur le langage verbal, ce qui les rend peu accessibles aux personnes aphasiques. Leur souffrance est donc rarement prise en compte.
C’est d’autant plus problématique que les politiques publiques ignorent l’aphasie, en dépit de son coût économique considérable, estimé pour la France à plus d’un milliard d’euros annuels, en intégrant les dépenses de soins, les pertes de productivité et l’aide informelle apportée par les proches aidants.
Heureusement, des recherches scientifiques récentes montrent que des solutions existent pour venir en aide aux personnes aphasiques. Par exemple, il existe des psychothérapies non centrées sur le langage dont l’efficacité est scientifiquement documentée. Cependant, ces dernières ne sont pas connues en France, car les personnels soignants sont insuffisamment formés aux troubles du langage en général, et à ce handicap de la communication en particulier.
Dès lors, des personnes aphasiques et leurs aidants ont pris eux-mêmes les choses en main, via le tissu associatif, dans une logique « d’empowerment collectif ».
Ainsi, la Fédération nationale des aphasiques de France (FNAF), qui se mobilise depuis des années pour améliorer la reconnaissance, la visibilité et l’accompagnement des personnes aphasiques dans notre pays, s’apprête à lancer bénévolement un plan de grande ampleur pour contribuer à agir pour la santé mentale et le bien-être des personnes aphasiques, en proposant des formations gratuites aux psychiatres, aux psychologues et aux orthophonistes de l’Hexagone.
Au niveau international, l’Association internationale aphasie (AIA) cherche à mettre en place une journée internationale de l’aphasie. La FNAF a également demandé qu’une telle journée soit reconnue par l’État en France et, plus particulièrement, par le ministère de la santé, qui est chargé des personnes en situation de handicap.
Pour prendre en charge un problème d’aphasie, la Nasa n’a pas hésité à rapatrier ses astronautes depuis l’espace. Reste maintenant aux pouvoirs publics français à montrer qu’ils ont eux aussi « les pieds sur terre », en soutenant a minima les actions associatives visant à mieux faire connaître l’aphasie et à améliorer l’accompagnement des personnes qui en sont victimes.
Didier Courbet est membre du conseil d’administration et du conseil scientifique de la Fédération Nationale des
Aphasiques de France (FNAF).
Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
Hungary’s most consequential election in decades has just delivered an important victory for democracy and accountability.
For Hungarians, opposition leader Péter Magyar’s emphatic defeat of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz Party ends 16 years of corruption and quasi-authoritarianism.
The outcome will also be felt widely, from Moscow to Washington and beyond.
In a contest characterised as a referendum on whether Hungary should pivot west or continue its authoritarian drift, Magyar’s victory is a stern rebuke to the dark, transnational forces of nativism, division and the politics of resentment that have become part of mainstream political discourse.
Perhaps the most surprising thing about the election was not the turnout (more than 74%, shattering previous records), or even the result (a two-thirds supermajority for Magyar’s Tisza party, winning at least 138 of 199 parliamentary seats).
Both had been predicted for some time, and Orbán’s soft authoritarianism had always left the door ajar for a possible opposition victory at the polls.
Rather, the biggest surprise might have been Orbán’s immediate concession. He didn’t try to manufacture a crisis or use his security services to hold onto power. Given the strength of anti-government sentiment in Hungary, such a move could have led to a “colour revolution” – the type of massive street protests seen previously in Ukraine, Georgia and other countries.
This could have turned bloody. Liberal Hungarians, and the European Union more broadly, will be heaving a collective sigh of relief.
Why Orbán was suddenly vulnerable
Having won office, Magyar will need to move quickly but also carefully to bring change, so as not to alienate too many former Fidesz voters.
He has already asked President Tamaś Sulyok to resign, along with other Orbán loyalists. The Tisza supermajority in parliament is important here. It will be required for constitutional amendments to dismantle the architecture of Orbán’s authoritarian state.
Fortunately, this will be easier in Hungary than fully fledged autocratic systems. Indeed, Orbán’s longevity can somewhat be attributed to the fact that his brand of authoritarianism was only partial.
Certainly, it had the structural elements of an autocracy. That included widespread, government-controlled gerrymandering to ensure Fidesz victories, and the cynical diversion of state funds to cities and provinces controlled by Orbán’s political allies.
In addition, the nationalised media ecosystem was heavily supportive of the government, although alternative voices kept debate alive via foreign-owned news organisations.
But Orbán’s success also came from facing weak and easily fragmented or coopted oppositions. Magyar – a former Orbán ally – ran a disciplined campaign that nullified the electoral advantage for Fidesz.
Ultimately, though, when voters have a choice – even a constrained one – they will eventually reject governments that rely on blame and victimhood to mask their inability to offer people a better future.
Under Orbán, Hungary was consistently ranked the most corrupt nation in Europe. In 2025, it ranked last in the EU on relative household wealth. It had also suffered rampant inflation and economic stagnation after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Video footage of country estates built by Hungary’s elites, complete with zebras roaming the grounds, perfectly symbolised the popular outrage with wealth inequality.
A setback for Putin, Trump and right-wing populism
Hungary’s new start also sends a powerful message to other nations. Clearly the biggest loser from the election is Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which had hastily tapped Kremlin powerbroker Sergey Kiriyenko and a team of “political technologists” to assist Orbán.
Under Orbán, Hungary was the strongest pro-Kremlin voice in the EU. It regularly stymied aid packages for Ukraine, tied up decision-making on the war in bureaucratic processes, and held the European Commission to ransom by threatening hold-out votes.
In fact, just days before the election, Bloomberg published a transcript of a phone call between Orbán and Putin from October 2025, in which Orbán compared himself to a mouse helping free the caged Russian lion.
This came on the back of revelations that Orbán’s foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, and other Hungarian officials had regularly been leaking confidential EU discussions to Moscow.
Another loser from the Hungarian election is the Trump White House.
The pre-election Budapest visit by US Vice President JD Vance to shore up support for Orbán was breathtakingly hypocritical. Vance farcically demanded an end to foreign election meddling, while engaging in precisely that. The White House then doubled down, with Trump promising on Truth Social to aid Orbán with the “full Economic Might of the United States”.
JD Vance puts Donald Trump on speakerphone during a speech in Hungary.
Now, though, Trump is very publicly on the losing side. And like the debacle of his Iran war, he tends to chafe at losing.
The election also shows that US foreign interference campaigns are not invulnerable, though the White House will doubtless continue excoriating Europe. The Trump administration’s view that Europe is heading for “civilisational erasure”, necessitating US efforts to “cultivate resistance” and “help Europe correct its current trajectory” is documented in its 2025 National Security Strategy.
But the broader movements representing what Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar calls the “Putinisation of global politics” have been repudiated by Hungary’s election result.
Under Orbán, Hungary was a hub for ultraconservative voices. Think tanks like the MAGA-boosting US Heritage Foundation and Hungary’s Danube Institute regularly held prominent dialogues bemoaning Europe’s capitulation to wokeism.
The Hungarian iteration of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), sponsored by the American Conservative Union, was a key calendar for Western right-wing politicians and commentators, including former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, Reform UK leader Nigel Farage, and former Fox News host Tucker Carlson.
China will also be keenly watching Magyar’s new government, especially since it has viewed Hungary as a soft entry point to the EU. The large-scale investment in electric vehicle manufacturing, especially battery production, are part of a growing Chinese business footprint in the country.
For Beijing, the question will be whether Magyar seeks to sacrifice this lucrative investment to burnish his European credentials.
What about the winners?
In addition to Hungarians outside Orbán’s orbit of elites, the EU will welcome the news that it remains an attractive force.
Ukraine, too, may find it easier to secure European assistance. At the very least, smaller Ukraine detractors like Slovakia will have to choose between acquiescing quietly or thrusting themselves uncomfortably into the open.
And with the US midterm elections fast approaching, far-right American politicians, including Trump himself, will be studying Hungary’s lessons closely. If they conclude that Orbán’s brand of authoritarianism was too soft, a more hardline path looms as an ominous alternative.
Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.
The landslide victory of Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party in Hungary’s parliamentary election represents much more than a routine change of government. It marks the fall of an “electoral autocracy”, a regime that used elections to shroud and legitimise a system designed to keep the ruling Fidesz party and its leader, Viktor Orbán, in power indefinitely.
The Orbán regime was founded on three pillars. The first was the concentration of power in Orbán’s hands and the destruction of constitutional restraints and oversight mechanisms.
Propelled to power in 2010 by a wave of revulsion at corruption scandals and economic crisis, Orbán quickly took over key state institutions like the judiciary, the taxation office, the prosecutor’s office and the election commission. Each were stacked with Fidesz loyalists, who transformed them into instruments of the regime.
The second pillar was corruption. The Orbán regime enriched Hungary’s elite by transferring vast resources to a group of loyal oligarchs and Orbán cronies.
It achieved this through skewered tendering processes to award massive state contracts to people like Lőrinc Mészáros, a former gas-fitter who had been one of Orbán’s close childhood friends. In 2010, Mészáros was a minor local businessman, but his wealth doubled every year of Orbán’s rule. By 2018, he was the richest man in Hungary.
The third pillar was the media, slowly subjugated by a pincer movement of government institutions and loyal oligarchs.
Legislation passed in 2011 created a Fidesz-controlled Media Council, which was empowered to impose fines for “unbalanced” reporting. This had a chilling effect on journalists.
At the same time, the regime distributed lavish subsidies and advertising contracts to pro-regime outlets. And loyal oligarchs acquired the last bastions of the Hungarian mainstream media. In 2016, one of Hungary’s most influential newspapers, Népszabadság, was purchased by a company linked to Mészáros and promptly shut down.
The culmination of this war of attrition was the creation of a massive media conglomerate, the Central European Press and Media Foundation. It came to control hundreds of media holdings donated by pro-regime businesses. The result was the consolidation of the regime’s control over an estimated 80% of Hungary’s media market.
Orbán justified this concentration of power by posing as a defender of Hungary’s sovereignty and traditional values against threats to the nation.
His rule was punctuated by a series of scare campaigns constructed around external threats – the philanthropist George Soros, the European Union, refugees and Ukraine. He used these threats to justify increasingly draconian controls over civil society and the domestic opposition.
Who is Péter Magyar?
What enabled opposition leader Péter Magyar to topple this system in Sunday’s election was the fact he was an insider.
As a moderate conservative and former Fidesz functionary, Magyar was not easy to stigmatise using the regime’s usual stereotypes. At the same time, he had deep knowledge of the inner workings of the system.
In early 2024, he broke with Fidesz during a massive scandal over a presidential pardon for a man convicted of covering up paedophilia in a children’s home. And he became an anti-corruption crusader.
On his Facebook page, Magyar reflected he had always believed in Fidesz’s vision of a “national, sovereign, civic Hungary”, but had slowly come to realise:
[…]this is really just a political product, a sugar coating that serves only two purposes: to conceal the operation of the power factory and to amass immense wealth.
A few weeks later, he magnified the impact of this bombshell by releasing audio recordings of a conversation in which his ex-wife, former Justice Minister Judit Varga, discussed how Orbán’s Cabinet chief had organised the removal of files in a corruption case.
Before the Orbán regime had time to react, Magyar had emerged as the leader of an obscure centre-right party, Tisza, in the elections to the European parliament. In a blow to Fidesz, it came from nowhere to win 30% of the vote. The result transformed Magyar into the undisputed leader of Hungary’s democratic movement.
Taking down an autocrat
Magyar undermined the Orbán regime in two ways.
The first was to neutralise Orbán’s populist, anti-elitist politics by focusing on corruption. Magyar repeatedly drew attention to the luxurious estate at Hatvanpuszta, a 19th century country estate and model farm that was massively redeveloped after 2018.
Although formally owned by Orbán’s father, Győző, it was widely believed to be a personal retreat of Viktor Orbán himself. Magyar called Hatvanpuszta “the heart of the system”, and likened it to one of Putin’s palaces.
The second was to reach out to Orbán’s rural heartland. In 2025, Magyar walked hundreds of kilometres in a series of political marches across the Hungarian countryside, visiting the small towns and villages that traditionally voted for Fidesz.
Péter Magyar walks across border the Hungarian border to Romania.
His party, Tisza, soon overtook Fidesz in the pre-election polls, but a peaceful transition of power was far from inevitable.
During its final years, the Orbán regime had became increasingly repressive. It used the security services to conduct a covert operation to penetrate the Tisza party’s computer servers. It also laid espionage charges against the country’s famous investigative journalist, Szabolcs Panyi, for exposing how Orbán’s foreign minister was collaborating with the Kremlin.
And a disinformation campaign, apparently of Russian origin, prepared the ground for a government crackdown by raising the spectre of post-election violence and attempts to assassinate Orbán.
But what broke the regime was the tidal wave of popular support for Magyar’s campaign. In the lead-up to the election, fractures began to emerge within the regime. A combination of whistleblower testimony and leaks from the security forces shone a spotlight on its abuses of power.
When the scale of Magyar’s victory became clear on election night, there was no room to dispute the verdict of the people. Orbán was finished.
Robert Horvath has received funding from the Australian Research Council.
A year ago this month, Canadians delivered a result that seemed impossible just a few weeks earlier: another Liberal minority government, this time under newly chosen leader Mark Carney. Now, after three byelections, the Liberals have a majority for the first time since 2019.
It’s been an astonishing reversal of fortune for the Liberals. For more than two years, the Conservatives had held a comfortable advantage in the polls. Many analysts treated a Conservative victory as all but inevitable.
Two major developments upended what had appeared to be a predictable political landscape — and, if the byelection results are any indication, their effects may be lasting.
The first was the return of Donald Trump to the United States presidency. This brought an immediate wave of tariffs and an adversarial posture toward Canada. The policy shock had economic consequences, but it also triggered a shift in how Canadians perceived the risks facing the country.
With Carney newly installed as leader, the Liberals entered the election presenting not continuity but transformation in the face of Trump’s threats about making Canada the 51st American state.
Taken together, these shocks reshaped voters’ priorities. Instead of evaluating parties along familiar ideological lines, many Canadians approached the election as a question of who could best protect the country during an unusually turbulent moment. It seems that a year later, Canadian voters are still regarding the Liberals in this light.
New data from the 2025 Canadian Election Study (CES) has helped illuminate this dynamic. When asked which party was best suited to manage Canada’s relationship with the United States, Canadians across nearly all partisan groups — including those who typically support other parties — chose the Liberals most often (57.8 per cent).
While Liberal and Conservative partisans selected their own respective parties more than 80 per cent of the time, what’s noteworthy is that strong majorities of NDP (71.6 per cent) and Bloc (62.8 per cent) supporters also selected the Liberals.
The significance of this pattern is hard to overstate. The relationship with the U.S. dominated voter concerns during the election. One in five Canadians mentioned the relationship with the U.S., Trump or tariffs as the most important issue in the 2025 Canadian federal election.
This was the second most common response behind general economic concerns, which were closely tied to the U.S. situation. About one in three Canadians said the economy was the most important issue.
Instead, a sizable majority of Canadians supported the use of retaliatory tariffs (68.7 per cent), and more Canadians identified the Liberals as the party best able to manage the economy (48 per cent versus 39 per cent for Conservatives).
This shift in perceived competence had profound cascading effects. Strategic voting among NDP supporters, in particular, proved decisive. While partisans typically remain loyal to their own party, 2025 saw an unprecedented number of traditionally NDP voters casting ballots for the Liberals.
While more than 80 per cent of NDP supporters voted for their own party in 2021, a majority of NDP partisans voted for the Liberals in 2025, a highly unusual pattern for partisans in most elections.
This trend extended to Bloc voters as well, though to a lesser extent, leading to a Liberal minority that was unimaginable six months earlier.
Carney and the Liberals still popular
As we approach the one-year anniversary of this election, the aftermath of those choices is still visible in public opinion.
Polling conducted in early 2026 shows the Liberals holding a six‑point lead in national vote intention, along with a 52 per cent government approval rating. Carney’s net favourability sits at +20.
These indicators, as well as the byelection results, suggest that voters have not experienced the “buyer’s remorse” that sometimes follows strategic elections. Instead, many appear reassured by the combination of stability and technocratic competence they sought in 2025.
Multiple floor-crossings by Conservative and NDP members — the most recent is longtime Conservative MP Marilyn Gladu, whose defection left the Liberals just one seat short of a majority before the byelections — suggest optimism about the Liberal government’s stability.
Whether this stability endures will depend heavily on developments outside Canada’s borders. But for now, Canadians seem broadly satisfied with the strategic choice they made in April 2025.
The Canadian Election Study was funded from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (grant #891-2019-2011).
Daniel Rubenson receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Laura Stephenson has received funding from SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) and Max Bell Foundation for her research.
Lewis Krashinsky receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (#756-2024-0366).
Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Kalpana Jain, Senior Religion + Ethics Editor, Director of the Global Religion Journalism Initiative, The Conversation
President Donald Trump and Pope Leo XIV, the U.S.-born head of the Catholic Church, had an unusual and acrimonious public exchange over the weekend.
In a scathing attack on Truth Social, the social media platform he launched in 2022, Trump accused the pope of being “WEAK on Crime and terrible for Foreign Policy.” The lengthy post on April 12, 2026, told Leo to “focus on being a Great Pope, not a Politician.”
Later that night, Trump told reporters that he was “not a big fan of Pope Leo” and did not think the pope was “doing a very good job.” Leo has repeatedly called for peace amid wars in the Middle East and described Trump’s April 7 threat to destroy Iranian civilization as “truly unacceptable.”
“I do not look at my role as being political, a politician,” the pope said, adding, “I will continue to speak out loudly against war, looking to promote peace, promoting dialogue and multilateral relationships among states, to look for just solutions to problems. Too many people are suffering in the world today. Too many innocent people are being killed. And I think someone has to stand up and say, ‘There’s a better way to do this.’”
The public nature of Trump’s criticism may feel unprecedented. But there have long been tensions between the United States and the Vatican’s effort to seek peace, as scholars writing for The Conversation have shown in past articles.
1. History of anti-Catholicism
In February 2016, Pope Francis criticized Trump’s campaign pledge of building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. Back then, too, Trump attacked Francis for being a “very political person.”
Temple University historian David Mislin wrote how the comments suggesting that the pope was interfering in U.S. politics reminded some commentators of an “older religious bigotry.”
During the 19th century, when large numbers of Catholics immigrated to the U.S., they were looked at with suspicion. Some Americans claimed that “Catholics maintained allegiance to the church first and to American values and institutions second,” Mislin explained.
“Anti-Catholic cartoons suggested that Catholics would use political power to dismantle the nation’s institutions,” he added.
It was once “unthinkable” for American presidents to be seen with the pope. Dwight Eisenhower became the first U.S. president to visit the Vatican in 1959.
President Dwight Eisenhower with Pope John XXIII on Dec. 6, 1959, at the Vatican. AP Photo
Faggioli, a professor at Trinity College Dublin, wrote in the lead-up to Francis’ trip to the United States. That visit reflected “a story about change in religion and politics,” he noted – about relations between the papacy and the Catholic Church, on one side, and the United States, on the other.
Francis addressed Congress on this trip, which, according to Faggioli, “would have shocked most Americans only 30 years ago.”
He also noted how much world Catholicism had been influenced by American ideas in recent years, becoming “much more American than it used to be – and much more American than Italian, for that matter.” Catholic teachings “on religious freedom and democracy and the new sensibility on the role of women in the Church came to Rome largely thanks to the experience of Catholics in the United States,” Faggioli wrote.
His broader point was that the Vatican and the U.S. have had an influence on each other – something that can be “seen only over a long period of time.”
Francis’ predecessor, Joseph Ratzinger – who became Pope Benedict XVI – may have often seen political alliances as a necessity for the church’s survival in times of secular decline. “Francis rejected this approach,” D’Angelo wrote.
Pope Francis talks to Myanmar’s President Htin Kyaw during their meeting at the Presidential Palace in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, on Nov. 28, 2017. Max Rossi/Pool Photo via AP
“The sacred must not be instrumentalised by the profane,” Francis stated in Kazakhstan in 2022. In other words, religion should not be a tool in the hands of the powerful. Francis also made constant appeals for peace amid the Ukraine and Gaza wars, though he avoided direct condemnation – which, at times, led to some criticism.
Even so, as D’Angelo said, it was “another major transformation” in how the church related with political power.
Trump’s Truth Social post accused Leo of “catering to the radical left.” Mark Yenson, a religious studies scholar at Western University in Canada, explained why such terms may not be applicable in the context of the papacy, where “conservative” and “liberal” labels don’t work the same way as in polarized American politics.
Many Americans viewed Benedict as more conservative than Francis, his successor. Yet some of the two popes’ history suggests that they appealed to shared principles, which were theological rather than political, Yenson wrote in 2025. These were “not reducible to liberal versus conservative categories.”
As he wrote, “The role of the pope, highlighted in Francis’ teaching on ecology, is to inspire a different kind of social and moral imagination, one not reducible to particular ideological positions.”
Leo, like Francis, has been critical of the Trump administration. Yenson reminds readers that the pope’s choice of name hearkens to Pope Leo XIII, who initiated modern Catholic social teaching and emphasized peace and justice. Additionally, he wrote, Leo’s “career as a missionary, bishop and Vatican cardinal outside of the U.S. means that his context is not confined to the polarizations of the U.S. Catholic Church and its bishops.”
Far from an isolated spat, Trump and Leo’s exchange might well show a recurring dynamic – in which papal intervention on global issues is rarely seen as neutral.
Source: The Conversation – in French – By Geneviève Lessard, Professeure titulaire, experte en violence conjugale et familiale, Université Laval
Chaque année, des dizaines de milliers de femmes et d’enfants sont victimes de violences conjugales et familiales au Québec. Face à cette réalité, une question s’impose : comment mieux agir ? Et si la réponse passait par une recherche menée avec celles et ceux qui vivent et combattent ces violences au quotidien ?
Ces chiffres rappellent l’ampleur du problème et l’importance des actions collectives visant à le contrer. Mais pour y parvenir, il ne suffit pas de documenter le problème : la recherche doit se faire avec ceux et celles qui vivent ces réalités au quotidien et qui accompagnent les personnes touchées.
Les violences conjugales surviennent dans les relations intimes et prennent plusieurs formes : coups, paroles blessantes, contrôle sur les décisions ou les finances, pratiques sexuelles non consenties, pour ne citer que quelques exemples. Les victimes sont souvent réduites au silence et il est très difficile, voire dangereux pour elles de s’en sortir.
Les violences familiales envers les enfants incluent des gestes violents (punition corporelle, cris, dénigrement) ou le fait de ne pas répondre à leurs besoins fondamentaux (soins, supervision, affection). Elles comprennent aussi les situations où les enfants grandissent dans un foyer où se produisent des violences conjugales.
Si toutes les recherches visent à développer de nouvelles connaissances, certaines ont aussi un objectif plus large d’influencer les pratiques et politiques sociales. C’est le cas des recherches partenariales. Les acteurs du terrain concernés par le problème étudié sont impliqués dès le début. Ils participent à définir les priorités et restent actifs tout au long du projet.
Cette approche collaborative permet de construire ensemble des connaissances et de proposer des solutions adaptées aux besoins du terrain. Elle reconnaît l’importance et la complémentarité de différents types de savoirs : scientifiques, pratiques et issus de l’expérience.
Au Canada, en Belgique et ailleurs dans le monde, ce type de recherche est de plus en valorisé pour sa contribution à la transformation des sociétés et des réponses sociales à des problématiques complexes comme les violences conjugales et familiales.
Ce que la recherche partenariale peut apporter… et ce qu’elle exige
Ce domaine est sensible et parfois controversé. Les victimes de violence sont souvent jugées par la société et même par certains intervenants professionnels. On entend souvent « Pourquoi ne quitte-t-elle pas ce conjoint violent ? » Les intervenants et les chercheurs spécialisés dans le domaine ne s’entendent pas toujours sur la définition du problème et des solutions, par exemple : faut-il aider les auteurs de violence ou les punir plus sévèrement ?
Pourtant, la collaboration entre chercheurs et acteurs de terrain est essentielle à l’émergence de solutions novatrices comme les tribunaux spécialisés, les cellules régionales de crise et les services intégrés, qui montrent que travailler ensemble permet de mieux protéger les victimes et prévenir les homicides familiaux.
Plusieurs exemples de projets concrets plaçant la collaboration au centre des recherches et interventions en violence conjugale sont décrits dans un numéro spécial de la revue Travail social. La protection des enfants est également reconnue comme une responsabilité collective et plusieurs scientifiques ont récemment plaidé pour une mobilisation collective, afin d’agir davantage en prévention des violences familiales.
Malgré ses avantages, la recherche en partenariat demeure un chemin pavé de défis. Les chercheurs doivent y consacrer beaucoup de temps et d’énergie, parfois au détriment de leur rayonnement dans les grandes revues internationales, afin de se consacrer aux besoins locaux de leurs partenaires. De leur côté, les partenaires doivent patienter pour obtenir des résultats exploitables, car le rythme de la recherche ne correspond pas toujours aux besoins immédiats du terrain. Mais leur implication étroite les rapproche des connaissances en développement et leur offre un pouvoir d’influence sur le processus.
Les dernières décennies de recherche en partenariat nous renseignent sur certaines stratégies gagnantes, notamment :
inclure dans les recherches une grande diversité d’expertises, pour enrichir le plus possible les résultats et arriver à proposer des solutions plus complètes ;
obtenir l’engagement durable des organismes partenaires ;
créer des comités décisionnels et opérationnels équilibrés, composés à la fois de chercheurs et d’acteurs de terrain ;
considérer la voix et l’expertise des personnes concernées, adultes et enfants, de façon sécurisée et respectueuse ;
favoriser les débats d’idées avec une approche ouverte et inclusive de diverses expertises, incluant les groupes vulnérables.
Déjà des milliers d’abonnés à l’infolettre de La Conversation. Et vous ? Abonnez-vous gratuitement à notre infolettre pour mieux comprendre les grands enjeux contemporains.
Des projets porteurs de changement
En Belgique, un projet a mobilisé acteurs policiers, judiciaires, médicaux et associatifs pour évaluer l’impact de la crise sanitaire liée à la Covid-19. Cette collaboration a permis de dégager des recommandations concrètes pour mieux coordonner tous les acteurs concernés, dépasser les cloisonnements entre institutions et assurer une prise en charge complète des victimes (santé mentale, services sociaux, justice). Le projet a montré que des idées nouvelles, testées sur le terrain pendant la pandémie, ont bien fonctionné. Cela a aidé à obtenir un soutien politique plus solide et durable.
Le deuxième exemple, en cours au Québec et baptisé Retranche la violence, vise à identifier les facteurs clés favorisant la sortie des violences conjugales et familiales, afin d’améliorer les pratiques et les politiques publiques. Cette recherche mobilise plus de 60 membres issus des milieux communautaire, institutionnel, politique et universitaire, ainsi que des personnes expertes de vécu, pour conseiller l’équipe. L’approche partenariale est centrale et tous les comités sont composés en diversifiant les expertises.
Nous croyons que plus on implique d’acteurs, plus la société peut changer : réduire les violences conjugales et familiales, identifier plus vite les situations qui surviennent et offrir des réponses mieux adaptées aux besoins des victimes et des auteurs, adultes ou enfants, pour en atténuer les conséquences délétères.
Pour que la recherche ait un véritable impact et transforme concrètement la vie des personnes confrontées à la violence, il faut un engagement collectif : population, universités, milieux de pratique et institutions politiques doivent se mobiliser dans des projets rassemblant tous les acteurs concernés.
Égaliser les rapports de pouvoir entre des acteurs diversifiés demande un effort constant et l’équilibre n’est jamais parfait. Mais cet effort peut être payant à moyen terme, notamment pour une alliance plus forte dans les luttes ou revendications communes aux différents partenaires.
Geneviève Lessard a reçu un financement du CRSH pour projet de Partenariat intitulé “Sortir des violences intimes, familiales et structurelles à l’ère post-pandémique : des pratiques et politiques ancrées dans l’expérience des personnes concernées” (Retranche la violence, titre abrégé).
Elle est aussi responsable du financement reçu par le FRQ dans le programme des regroupements stratégiques pour le centre de Recherches Appliquées et Interdisciplinaires sur les Violences intimes, familiales et structurelles.
Aline Thiry a reçu des financements de Belspo.
Célyne Lalande a reçu des financements de Conseil de recherche en sciences humaines du Canada. Elle travaille à Université du Québec en Outaouais, une institution universitaire qui bénéficie du développement des connaissances et sa diffusion.
Fabienne Glowacz a reçu des financements de Belspo.
Caroline Robitaille ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alexander Bor, Post-doctoral Researcher, Democracy Institute, Central European University
Hungarian voters have overwhelmingly rejected the 16-year rule of authoritarian strongman Viktor Orbán, electing his one-time political ally, Péter Magyar, to replace him. Magyar’s Tisza party has secured a two-thirds majority in parliament and therefore a supermajority. This will allow the new government to roll back some of the illiberal measures introduced Orbán governments over the years. Magyar has said that he intends to work for a “free, European” Hungary, which would reverse his predecessor’s rejection of Brussels.
One of Magyar’s key election promises was to restore press freedom, and reform state-run media, which, under Orbán, had become a powerful tool for distributing disinformation.
This huge win for Tisza followed a campaign marred by what many foreign monitors claimed were unprecedented levels of disinformation, foreign interference and government propaganda. In fact, the result may come as a surprise to those who believe that in information autocracies such as Hungary, where access to news and political discussion is controlled by what have been dubbed “spin dictators”, election results can easily be controlled by the ruling party.
Orbán is a textbook example of an information autocrat. The propaganda arsenal deployed by his ruling Fidesz party in this campaign was as formidable as ever. Pro-government election billboards blanketed the country, financed not just by Fidesz but by the government itself and by powerful publicly owned agencies such as the state energy conglomerate MVM, by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) – Hungary’s central bank – and by a host of government-aligned NGOs.
State communication channels were repurposed wholesale for partisan messaging. Pro-government media and troll networks amplified existential warnings about the opposition.
But Fidesz’s tactics went further than messaging. Elaborate theatrics were deployed to scare or influence voters. A bomb was allegedly defused in Serbia that had supposedly targeted Hungarian election infrastructure. Ukrainian cash and gold assets were seized on spurious grounds concerning some shadowy threat from Ukraine’s “war mafia”. Each spectacle seemed designed to lend weight to Fidesz’s warnings about external interference.
Fidesz attempted to fire up its electoral base by framing the election as an existential struggle for Hungary itself. Since it was first elected in 2010, Fidesz has relied almost exclusively on this strategy, painting its challenger as a danger to the country, and turning elections into a matter of life and death.
But this time around, Fidesz has learned to its cost that it was insufficient to stick to the playbook that has kept it in power for 16 years. Things have changed – most notably the Hungarian economy, which has essentially flatlined since 2022, with near-zero real GDP growth compounded by the highest inflation in the EU. The second big shift has been political – the consolidation of the opposition behind a single credible challenger to Orbán. Previously, Fidesz had been able easily defeat the fragmented and ineffective coalitions it had previously faced.
Orbán’s failing appeal
Despite Orbán’s considerable arsenal of information manipulation tools, his election pitch appears to have been broadly rejected. This appears to have been a failure of strategy, unexpected from such a wily political veteran. In his annual “state of the nation” address in February, Orbán promised more of the same, to protect Hungary from change and outside threats such as from Brussels.
But that’s a pitch to true believers, not to the wavering or undecided. There was no attempt to build bridges to new groups or attempt to extend his electoral coalition.
Having watched Fidesz govern all this time, I believe that answer is that the voter manipulation system the party built built over the years is poorly suited for this purpose. Persuading new voters to come round to your side is hard and requires credibility, good arguments and strong messages, none of which the government has any more. Much easier to focus on fear caused by slander, misinformation and the moral panic button.
This clearly didn’t work. In February, a survey found that only 23% of Hungarians believed the government’s central claim that victory for Magyar and his Tisza party would result in Hungary being dragged into a foreign war, a theme hammered on by Orbán in his state of the nation speech. Even among Fidesz voters, nearly half – 43% – said they didn’t believe this.
Political science literature is clear on the risks of negative campaigning helps explain why. Attack messages can attract attention – but their effectiveness hinges on whether voters find them credible. Dishonest attacks can boomerang, eroding trust in the attacker rather than the target. And this clearly happened in Hungary in this election campaign.
All of which points to a broader lesson about information control in illiberal regimes: it can easily be overstated. Hungary’s 2026 election has revealed that an information autocracy can have its limits. And in the face of a faltering economy and a united and credible opposition, Orbán’s campaign reached those limits – and failed as a result.
Alexander Bor receives funding from European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.
