How Pennsylvania’s new paid leave bill leaves the sandwich generation behind

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kate Perepezko, Research Scientist, Miami University

Approximately 63 million Americans are family caregivers. Jub Rubjob/Moment Collection via Getty Images

The number of family caregivers has grown from 53 million Americans in 2020 to 63 million as of 2025. This number is expected to increase as the baby boomer generation ages and faces the limitations of our current health and social services systems.

A family caregiver is an unpaid individual who provides assistance to a family member who needs support due to illness, disability or aging.

The population of metro Pittsburgh is one of the oldest in the country, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. This means an increasing proportion of the local population will require care from family caregivers as they age. In Allegheny County, the number of residents age 65 and older is projected to grow by 50,000 by 2050.

Despite their critical role in supporting the aging population, however, family caregivers are not often provided with medical training or help with navigating the health and social services systems. This puts them at significant risk of experiencing physical and mental strain that can lead to burnout and leaving the workforce before retirement age. Caregivers and those they support can also develop health complications based on these factors.

This is particularly true for women, who provide a disproportionate amount of care in the U.S.

I study ways to improve the quality of life for aging adults and their care partners. My work centers on how family caregiving can improve mental health for families. I also examine the toll that caregiving takes on families navigating serious illness and decline.

Sandwich generation caregivers

The “sandwich generation” refers to adults – typically in their 40s and 50s – who are simultaneously caring for their aging parents while raising their own children. They are “sandwiched” between two generations of dependents and often face significant financial and emotional pressures as a result.

A woman wearing glasses stands at a podium.
Pennsylvania is currently debating paid leave legislation through the Family Care Act, proposed by Democratic Rep. Jennifer O’Mara.
Rep. Jennifer O’Mara/Instagram

These caregivers often find themselves caught between work and unpredictable caregiving demands. Without formal protections like paid leave, they may feel forced to reduce hours, turn down promotions or leave the workforce altogether. These decisions can add to the financial strain they’re already under.

Where the law falls short

Several national and state programs exist to support older adults.

The federal Older Americans Act funds services like meal delivery, transportation and caregiver support, and Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services helps older adults receive care at home rather than in a facility. But systemic barriers – from eligibility gaps to access issues – limit their reach.

Federal initiatives like the RAISE Family Caregivers Act offer some hope for family caregivers. It outlines specific actions the government can take to help caregivers, including making it easier for them to balance caregiving with their jobs.

In addition, several states have implemented paid family leave policies. California, for example, offers up to eight weeks of paid family caregiving leave – replacing up to 90% of wages for lower earners. Washington and Massachusetts both provide up to 12 weeks, with wage replacement rates of 90% and 80%, respectively, and include job protection so caregivers don’t have to choose between their loved one and their livelihood.

Pennsylvania may be next. Legislators are currently debating the Family Care Act, paid leave legislation proposed by state Rep. Jennifer O’Mara. The bill, approved by the Pennsylvania House in March 2026, would allow employees to take up to 12 paid weeks off after the birth of a child or to care for a family member during a serious illness. Spotlight PA reports that the House-approved bill proposes employers cover the cost, with grants available for small businesses.

The state Senate’s version of the Family Care Act, pending in the Labor & Industry Committee as of May 2026, would fund benefits through employee payroll deductions of up to 1% of their income. This addresses a critical gap in existing federal law, which guarantees only unpaid leave.

Even if passed and signed into law, the proposal may fall short for sandwich generation caregivers, who face simultaneous, overlapping demands on both ends of the age spectrum. Many of these caregivers have already reduced hours or left the workforce entirely. A benefit tied to employment may never reach the people who need it most.

Pittsburgh’s generational tug-of-war

Pittsburgh-based sandwich generation caregivers face competing demands: securing reliable, affordable childcare – a growing problem in Allegheny County driven by staffing shortages and limited spots – while simultaneously managing eldercare responsibilities. Without a state or federal paid leave mandate, many Pittsburgh workers, like those in lower-wage or part-time roles, have no guaranteed access to the time off they might need to meet either obligation.

Paid leave policies vary by employer, and without a universal federal mandate, coverage is uneven – often weakest for lower-wage workers, part-time employees and people at small businesses.

Research has shown that sandwich generation caregivers already use most of their paid time off for caregiving tasks. This means they have limited time to take care of their own health. The proposed Family Care Act caps paid leave at 12 weeks per year. While this is an improvement from having no mandatory paid leave, it’s designed to supplement – not replace – standard sick days. The Family Care Act would cover intermittent leave for singular events, like childbirth or surgery. But sandwich generation caregiving is chronic, overlapping and resource-intensive in ways the bill isn’t designed to address.

A historic-looking building behind a sign that says
The Pennsylvania paid leave bill would give workers paid leave for up to 12 weeks.
arlutz73/iStock collection via Getty Images Plus

In addition, the act proposes a partial wage replacement – 90% of wages for a weekly benefit cap ranging from $573 to $995 per week, depending on the individual’s earnings.

Caregivers who step back from work to care for a child or an aging parent are disproportionately lower- and middle-income workers. A 90% wage replacement rate at a lower-wage tier means those workers don’t have to choose between a paycheck and showing up for their family.

Yet this coverage is still likely insufficient for caregivers who often face significant financial strain related to caregiving, such as out-of-pocket expenses for care.

While the Family Care Act – whether it is funded through employee and employer payroll contributions – is a step forward, it still falls short for sandwich generation caregivers. What this population needs is the ability to take flexible time off as needs arise, not just in one block. However, intermittent leave presents administrative challenges for employers, like scheduling disruptions and paperwork burdens that could make it harder to put into practice.

The Conversation

Kate Perepezko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How Pennsylvania’s new paid leave bill leaves the sandwich generation behind – https://theconversation.com/how-pennsylvanias-new-paid-leave-bill-leaves-the-sandwich-generation-behind-281273

Les groupes armés comblent un vide politique au Mali : il est essentiel d’y remédier pour mettre fin à la violence

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Norman Sempijja, Associate professor, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique

Le Mali est en proie à des troubles politiques depuis 2012. Cette année-là a été marquée par un coup d’État militaire et la prise de contrôle des régions du nord de ce pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest par des groupes armés. Au cours des années qui ont suivi, les efforts visant à mettre en place des gouvernements de transition ont échoué. Cette situation a abouti à l’interdiction de tous les partis politiques en mai 2025.

De plus, le pays a connu des vagues d’interventions militaires menées par des acteurs extérieurs tels que la France, les États-Unis et, plus récemment, la Russie. Tous ont investi massivement pour tenter de contenir la menace extrémiste au Mali.

Mais les groupes liés à Al-Qaïda et à l’État islamique ont continué à étendre leur influence. Et fin avril 2026, le gouvernement militaire a été contraint de repousser des attaques coordonnées menées par des séparatistes et des djihadistes à travers tout le pays. Le ministre de la Défense, le général Sadio Camara, a été tué.

Au cours de la dernière décennie, les interventions étrangères ont souvent mal interprété ce qui se passait sur le terrain. Les groupes extrémistes ont tiré parti de problèmes tels que les conflits fonciers, la corruption et la concurrence pour les ressources afin de se légitimer, s’alignant souvent sur les tensions au sein de la communauté. La faiblesse des institutions étatiques et des forces de sécurité a permis à des groupes tels que le Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans (JNIM) et l’État islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) de consolider leur pouvoir.

Ces groupes se sont adaptés en formant des alliances et en adaptant leurs discours aux revendications locales, donnant la priorité aux problèmes immédiats plutôt qu’aux objectifs idéologiques.

Nous sommes des politologues qui avons mené des recherches sur la situation sécuritaire au Mali et au Sahel. Notre article récemment publié a montré que les groupes armés non étatiques du Sahel, en particulier au Mali, sont devenus des acteurs clés du pouvoir. Ils influent sur la gouvernance locale en comblant les lacunes laissées par des institutions étatiques faibles.

Alors que des acteurs extérieurs tels que la France, les États-Unis et la Russie accordent la priorité à la lutte contre le terrorisme et à la consolidation de l’État, ils négligent souvent les fonctions de gouvernance que remplissent ces groupes armés non étatiques. Ces groupes fournissent souvent des services essentiels et acquièrent une légitimité locale.

Reconnaître le rôle des groupes armés en tant que détenteurs du pouvoir local ne signifie pas accepter ou légitimer leurs actions. Cependant, ignorer cette réalité a conduit à des politiques qui n’atteignent pas leur cible. Lorsque les interventions se concentrent uniquement sur des solutions militaires, elles risquent de passer à côté des raisons pour lesquelles les populations interagissent avec ces groupes.

Nos conclusions remettent en question les interventions conventionnelles qui se concentrent uniquement sur la défaite des groupes armés non étatiques ou le rétablissement d’un contrôle étatique centralisé. Nous soutenons que les solutions sécuritaires seules sont insuffisantes. Nous préconisons une approche plus nuancée qui intègre le potentiel des groupes armés non étatiques en matière de gouvernance, de légitimité et d’action locale. Des groupes armés non étatiques ont assuré la gouvernance de territoires dans des pays comme la Colombie, la Syrie et le Soudan du Sud, entre autres.

Les groupes armés en tant qu’autorités de facto

Au Mali, les groupes armés ne sont pas seulement des forces combattantes. Dans de nombreuses régions du pays, ils jouent un rôle plus complexe. Il est difficile d’estimer le nombre exact de groupes opérant au Mali. Le plus grand et le plus connu, le JNIM, est une coalition de cinq organisations et revendique plus de 10 000 combattants dans le pays.

Dans le centre et le nord du Mali, à la frontière avec l’Algérie, l’État est souvent distant, absent ou fait l’objet de méfiance. Les groupes armés comblent ce vide. Ils règlent les différends, font respecter les règles, perçoivent les impôts et assurent parfois un minimum d’ordre.

Pour les communautés vivant dans l’insécurité quotidienne, ces fonctions ne sont pas abstraites. Elles ont des effets concrets sur la vie quotidienne.

Notre étude a établi que cela ne signifie pas nécessairement que la population approuve ces groupes ou soutient leur idéologie. Beaucoup n’y adhèrent pas. Cependant, lorsqu’il y a peu d’alternatives, les gens s’adaptent. Ils suivent les règles parce qu’ils en ont besoin pour survivre, pas parce qu’ils y croient.

Cette distinction est importante. Elle aide à expliquer pourquoi ces groupes sont si difficiles à déloger. Leur force ne provient pas seulement des armes, mais aussi de leur ancrage profond dans les réalités locales.

Pourquoi les stratégies militaires échouent

Les efforts internationaux se sont largement concentrés sur la lutte contre ces groupes et la reconstruction de l’autorité de l’État malien. Bien qu’elles partent d’une bonne intention, ces interventions négligent souvent un élément essentiel : qu’advient-il des espaces laissés vacants par ces groupes ?

L’intervention française de 2013 en est un exemple. L’armée française a aidé l’armée malienne à reprendre le contrôle du nord du pays face à l’avancée des islamistes lors de l’opération Serval. L’objectif était d’empêcher les forces extrémistes d’avancer vers Bamako. Cela n’a pas mis fin au conflit. De nombreux combattants se sont déplacés vers des zones rurales où l’État était peu présent et ont tissé des liens avec les communautés locales.

Dans le centre du Mali, où l’élevage bovin est une source de revenus essentielle, cette dynamique a contribué à propager la violence entre les communautés peules et dogon, renforçant ainsi les griefs exploités par les groupes extrémistes.

Parallèlement, les tentatives de renforcement des institutions de l’État se sont heurtées à des difficultés. Dans certaines régions, les forces de sécurité sont perçues comme inefficaces, voire abusives.

Face à cette réalité, les populations se tournent souvent vers tous ceux qui sont capables de leur offrir un certain niveau de prévisibilité et de protection, même s’il s’agit d’un groupe armé.

L’implication des acteurs extérieurs s’est également fragmentée progressivement. Le retrait de la France, la montée du sentiment anti-occidental et l’arrivée de forces liées à la Russie ont créé un paysage d’interventions encombré et parfois conflictuel.

Les différents acteurs ont des agendas divergents, et leur présence ne se traduit pas toujours par une sécurité accrue. Dans certains cas, elle peut même aggraver la situation en renforçant les tensions ou en affaiblissant la confiance dans des institutions déjà fragiles.

Pris entre deux feux, les civils font quotidiennement des choix difficiles. Leurs décisions sont rarement idéologiques, mais plutôt dictées par la survie.

Repenser la réponse

Nous concluons de nos constatations qu’une approche plus réaliste commencerait par une écoute des réalités locales. Elle s’attaquerait aux lacunes qui permettent aux groupes armés de s’implanter. Cela implique d’améliorer l’accès à la justice et à la sécurité, de soutenir les institutions locales et de prendre au sérieux les griefs. Cela signifie également reconnaître que la légitimité se construit à partir de la base, et non d’imposé d’en haut.

L’expérience du Mali montre qu’il y a des limites claires à ce que la force militaire peut accomplir à elle seule. Tant que les interventions négligeront les réalités quotidiennes de la gouvernance et de la survie, elles auront peu de chances d’apporter un changement durable. Tant que ce changement ne se produira pas, les groupes armés resteront difficiles à déloger, non seulement parce qu’ils sont capables de se battre, mais aussi parce que, dans de nombreuses zones, ils font désormais partie intégrante de ceux qui organisent la vie quotidienne.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Les groupes armés comblent un vide politique au Mali : il est essentiel d’y remédier pour mettre fin à la violence – https://theconversation.com/les-groupes-armes-comblent-un-vide-politique-au-mali-il-est-essentiel-dy-remedier-pour-mettre-fin-a-la-violence-281885

How musical instruments have informed stage design over Eurovision’s history

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Catherine Baker, Reader in 20th Century History, University of Hull

Digital techniques like projection mapping, holograms and interactive performance now define the Eurovision contest’s production values. But this year’s UK act Look Mum No Computer has a more retro approach to technology.

A musician and YouTuber, Look Mum No Computer builds experimental synths from vintage equipment, sometimes even parts from toys and games consoles. His past projects include synths built into Sega Megadrives and Gibson Les Paul guitars, an orchestra of Star Wars robots, and his most popular YouTube video, a Furby orchestra.

Working for the past two years on our book Designing Eurovision: Performance Scenography on an International Stage, we have had the opportunity to track the history of Eurovision design and its current innovations.

Eurovision’s rules on musical performance and on-stage instruments would not always have accommodated an act like Look Mum No Computer, who tours with his own modular synth. In its early days in the late 1950s and 60s, all entries had to be performed by a live concert orchestra – limiting how far composers could follow transatlantic rock’n’roll trends.

The contest’s rules are determined by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which has overseen the annual contest for its member broadcasters since 1956. In 1973, the EBU began allowing prerecorded backing tracks, but insisted all instruments had to appear on stage. This rule allowed bands, like Yugoslavia’s Korni Grupa in 1974, to perform with their guitars and drums or to combine these with orchestral accompaniment like ABBA’s winning 1974 performance.

Electronic dance music was not such an easy fit when it started appearing in the 1990s. In 1996, the requirement for all instruments to be on camera meant Gina G’s UK entry Ooh Aah, Just A Little Bit had to bring PCs on stage.

Phasing out live orchestras altogether after 1998 upset some fans but modernised Eurovision’s sound. This move gave contest producers more space to employ new digital stage technologies, including video walls and LED floors. These made the broadcast more spectacular but dramatically increased its costs and environmental impact. It also caused issues of competitiveness since better-funded nations could invest in high-end digital staging with international creative teams, while those with lower budgets must be much more resourceful to be competitive.

Well before this transformation into a mega-event, however, musical instruments that were likely new to many Eurovision audiences were made focal points in how performances were staged. Switzerland’s 1976 entry by acoustic folk band Peter, Sue and Marc featured a clown playing a barrel organ. The Guadeloupian steel drums on Joëlle Ursull’s 1990 French entry White And Black Blues anticipated the staging of many percussion-driven pop acts that used traditional ethnic instruments in the 2000s.

Since on-stage instruments are played to prerecorded tracks and not wired for sound, Eurovision performances can feel different for instrumentalists than vocalists, who must always sing live – one rule that has endured throughout Eurovision’s history. All backing vocals also had to be live until 2021, when the EBU first allowed recorded backing during COVID.

Instruments on stage today are part of a much more complex scenography, harnessing the latest in lighting and digital design. The Norwegian folk metal band Gåte in 2024 presented a full digital spectacle, including video wall effects of crashing waves, dramatic lighting, and camera angle switches synced to their drum blasts. It also included the physical feat of guitarist Magnus Børmark throwing his instrument two metres into the air.

Eurovision’s “liveness” as a broadcast depends on complex technical programming and weeks of rehearsal to ensure every version of a contest performance is consistent, and meets competition rules. Asking how Look Mum No Computer’s work might translate to the Eurovision stage underlines how the contest’s relationships between musical instruments and digital design can make us reflect on what makes performances live and how technology has helped to visualise sound.

The Conversation

Catherine Baker received funding from the British Council to research the cultural relations and soft power of the Eurovision Song Contest in 2023. This article is based on a separate project and does not represent any previous project partners’ views.

Amy Skinner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How musical instruments have informed stage design over Eurovision’s history – https://theconversation.com/how-musical-instruments-have-informed-stage-design-over-eurovisions-history-276668

Israel’s destructive actions in Lebanon are normalising war without rules

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amra Lee, PhD candidate in Protection of Civilians, Australian National University

In late April, Amal Khalil, a 43-year-old Lebanese journalist, was killed in a double-tap Israeli strike in southern Lebanon. When rescue teams tried to reach her and another injured journalist, they reportedly also came under fire.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said Israel’s “deliberate and consistent targeting of journalists” was “aimed at concealing the truth of its aggressive acts against Lebanon”, despite a ceasefire that had been agreed to by Israel days earlier.

Both Aoun and Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam declared they would pursue international accountability for her death. Khalil was the ninth journalist to be killed in Lebanon so far this year. Israel says the incident is under review.

The incident had parallels to the killing of six-year-old Hind Rajab in Gaza in March 2024. She and her family were fired on by Israeli forces while trying to evacuate Gaza City by car. Hind survived the initial attack, but remained trapped for hours, on the phone with Palestinian Red Crescent workers trying to reach her.

Even after following an approved route, the two medics sent to rescue Hind in a clearly marked ambulance were killed, as was Hind herself. A subsequent investigation by Forensic Architecture found 355 bullet holes in the car carrying her and her family.

These are not isolated incidents. This is a clear pattern across war zones in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan and Lebanon. Militaries using drones and AI-assisted weapons systems – marketed for their precision – are changing the face of war and driving increasing numbers of civilian deaths.

These growing attacks on civilians, journalists and humanitarian personnel are leading many to fear a new normal setting in: war without rules.

Performative adherence to law

At a Chatham House event in London last month, UN Humanitarian Chief Tom Fletcher spoke plainly: “1,000 dead humanitarians in three years – when did that become normal?”

Fletcher identified the absence of legal accountability as an enabler of escalating attacks on aid workers.

Part of this is the performative adherence to international humanitarian law – often repeated in political statements and media coverage – as militaries simultaneously carve out exceptions for the use of force.

For example, Israel has continued to issue evacuation orders for residents of southern Lebanon in recent weeks. It has cited its compliance with international humanitarian law, while also expanding its control over territory there.

When evacuation orders primarily serve to shift populations, rather than protect them, it is a violation of the rules of war.

Self-assessments of legal compliance have also enabled systematic attacks on civilian infrastructure in Lebanon to continue, such as healthcare and food and water systems. Some 1.2 million people now facing crisis levels of food insecurity.

Ceasefires, too, have become performative. Experts argue they are merely serving to divert public attention from Israel’s broader goals in both Gaza and Lebanon.

Six months on, for instance, the Gaza ceasefire is failing to meet its stated objectives. There is no peace or safety for residents. More than 800 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire came into effect and 60% of people have lost their homes. Humanitarian aid continues to be obstructed, while children suffer from acute malnutrition.

The ‘Gaza playbook’

Last month, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich openly threatened to make Dahiyeh, a suburb of southern Beirut, look like Khan Younis in Gaza.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz has also said all “houses in villages near the Lebanese border will be destroyed, in accordance with the model used in Rafah and Beit Hanoun in Gaza”.

This is precisely what is happening now, despite the ceasefire. Israel created a “buffer zone” in Gaza where it has expanded territorial control, and the same thing is taking place in southern Lebanon.

There were countless warnings, including from the UN secretary-general, that insufficient action over Gaza would have consequences – not only for Palestinian civilians and international law, but wider peace and security.

What can be done?

Now is the time for more principled confrontation from political leaders and concerned states to clearly call out performative adherence to international law and ceasefires.

The normalisation of Israel’s “Gaza playbook” strategies in Lebanon, without sustained outside political pressure, will only continue to escalate the threats to civilians and wider international peace and security.

Middle powers have important roles to play, too. Practically speaking, states can use what’s called “universal jurisdiction” to bring domestic legal action against Israeli leaders and individuals accused of crimes. This could include legal action for the targeting of aid workers and journalists.

A broad coalition of UN member states must also come together to reinforce international law against the forces and practices undermining it.

The “Hague Group” is one such path forward. Formed in early 2025, its membership has expanded to include more than 40 nations aimed at supporting international law, the right to self-determination and the prohibition on taking territory by force.

From Gaza to Lebanon to Iran, greater political action is needed to reinforce international law. The world cannot afford the reverberating human and security costs of continued impunity and war without rules.

The Conversation

Amra Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Israel’s destructive actions in Lebanon are normalising war without rules – https://theconversation.com/israels-destructive-actions-in-lebanon-are-normalising-war-without-rules-281538

Why climate action stalls, despite widespread popular support

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Laurie Parsons, Reader in Human Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London

Workers in developing countries, like these men on a building site in Bangladesh, are more likely get heat stress as temperatures rise. Mahmud Hossain Opu/ Royal Holloway, University of London, CC BY-NC-ND

What’s the link between the global economy and the climate? Consumption drives extraction and carbon emissions. But there is more.

The inequalities of the global economy don’t just shape what goes into the atmosphere. They affect our understanding of the climate and our perspectives when it comes to possible solutions. The lenses through which we see the world reflect the inequalities within it. The greater the centralisation of power, the greater the control over our knowledge about it.

This was a conclusion that the writer and revolutionary Antonio Gramsci reached, while languishing in prison after a failed revolution against the fascist Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Unable to understand why ordinary people didn’t rise up against the dictator, despite their clear economic interest in doing so, he coined the term “hegemony”: the conflation of power and knowledge, whereby the views and interests of a political economic elite are adopted by the rest of society as common sense.

This perspective explains a lot about our seeming inability to escape the environmental status quo.

woman working on wall construction, wearing red dress, hot weather
The largest determinant on whether a person becomes heat stressed is the work that a person does.
Mahmud Hossain Opu/ Royal Holloway, University of London, CC BY-NC-ND

Successive polls indicate overwhelming public support for resolving excessive carbon emissions and the problems this excessive use of fossil fuels is creating for communities around the world.

In the UK, 60% of people support net zero. In Germany, 81% of the population want to expand renewable energy, while 55% cite it as “very important to them”. In Italy, 80% of people support a renewables only energy policy. Even in the US, 57% want the government to do more to address climate change.

With the exception of the US, this majority is greater than that which has elected any political party since the turn of the 20th century. So with a super-majority in favour of decarbonisation, how does the world remain stuck on such a steep upwards trajectory of carbon emissions?

Almost every country has a stated commitment to decarbonisation. Wind and solar energy are the cheapest forms of energy in history.

Yet a record quantity of carbon was pumped into the atmosphere last year. And record amounts of coal, oil and gas are still being extracted from the Earth.

Statistics like this can make even thinking about climate change a demoralising business. This is precisely the problem. Our overwhelming political will is sapped by being locked into a system that obscures the most effective pathways (phasing out fossil fuels, for example), while continually moving us towards less effective ones.

If you’re worried that global garment production is on course to triple in size by 2050, common narratives suggest that simply choosing the “greenest” brand will help fix the problem. Worried about the carbon cost of flying? Never fear: a budget airline’s apocryphal claims to be sustainable can assuage that nagging guilt.

Feeling the heat?

But the politics of climate change isn’t just about what we buy. It’s a full-body experience.

Take heat stress. According to the UN’s International Labour Organization, 70% of workers experience heat stress throughout the year. That figure falls to 29% in Europe and rises to 93% in sub-Saharan Africa.

These two continents have big differences in temperature, but temperature is in fact only a small part of the problem.

The largest determinant on whether a person becomes heat stressed (the point at which their body is pushed beyond its normal thermal limits) is the work that a person does. People working in construction, agriculture and other high-intensity roles – the kind that dominate in developing countries – are at the highest risk. Sedentary service sectors, or office jobs to you and me, are the safest in terms of heat stress.

When it comes to the environment, what you feel depends on what you do.

two Bangladeshi workers in colourful clothing passing bricks to each other, grey stone wall
Construction workers in Bangladesh are more at risk of heat stress than garment workers who work inside.
Mahmud Hossain Opu/ Royal Holloway, University of London, CC BY-NC-ND

My new book, Climate Hegemony, highlights how a farmer is almost twice as likely as a garment worker to experience changing rainfall patterns, because everybody’s experience of the environment is filtered through how they spend their life.

That’s the problem. The populations of the developed world, consumers of most fossil fuels globally, may favour climate action. But as long as they continue to benefit from a global economy that reduces their risk through air conditioning and wealth, tackling climate change will remain alongside world peace and eliminating global hunger: moral aspirations, rather than tangible policy.

It is a testament to the persuasive powers of the fossil fuel industry that this hegemony is sustained – even in the face of precipitously falling renewable energy prices. Campaigns outflank arguments for renewable energy through widespread political lobbying and by support for conservative thinktanks and social movements, such as the campaign against net zero.

Individually, these activities might seem nefarious, but together they present as common sense, just as Gramsci complained from his cell in 1929.

As Gramsci found out, it is not easy to change minds. Yet by challenging the deeply embedded norms and assumptions of our current environmental impasse, it is possible to access something many environmentalists have felt starved of in recent years: hope.

The changing climate acts not only through emissions, but through everything we do, make and think. With different assumptions about which climate actions are possible, we arrive at different politics and different outcomes.

So, however much it might feel like it, the climate impasse is far from insurmountable. A world of ways to reshape our relationship to the environment are waiting, if only we can learn to see them.

The Conversation

Laurie Parsons receives funding from The Wellcome Trust and UK Research and Innovation.

ref. Why climate action stalls, despite widespread popular support – https://theconversation.com/why-climate-action-stalls-despite-widespread-popular-support-282002

Why politicians can’t fix potholes permanently

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ali Rahman, Assistant Professor of Civil Engineering, University of Leeds

David Michael Bellis/Shutterstock

Potholes are a safety risk, source of vehicle damage and recurring annoyance in the UK. They gain special visibility at times of local elections, given that the vast majority of roads are maintained by local authorities. A survey conducted in April found that road condition was the top local issue for voters throughout Britain ahead of the May 7 elections.

The Asphalt Industry Alliance’s (AIA) 2025 report indicates that 17% of the local road network in England and Wales is in poor condition. It estimates that the backlog of repairs would take a staggering 12 years to clear, costing £16.81 billion.

While it’s easy for politicians to point to numbers of potholes filled as a way to gain votes from frustrated drivers, this does nothing to solve the problem in the long run.

Where do potholes come from?

Potholes are not isolated road surface defects, but rather the end-product of a hidden road deterioration process. In typical asphalt roads, bitumen ages, stiffens and becomes brittle over time. Traffic passage causes the road surface to crack.

Once cracks form, water enters the road structure. The weight of vehicles and freeze-thaw cycles over winter cause these cracks to expand and widen, eventually resulting in a pothole. By the time it appears on the road surface, the structural integrity of the subsurface is already compromised.

In the wake of climate change, the UK’s increasingly wet winters accelerate this process, especially on roads that have reached the end of their structural life.

The UK’s approach to repairing potholes is largely reactive: a short-term, localised patch job after the road has failed. Experimental studies show that while this approach is relatively inexpensive per intervention, it suffers from severe underperformance.

These repair jobs often last for just weeks or months in wet or winter conditions before needing to be done again. This “patch and repeat” cycle leads to escalating costs, network disruption and inconsistent road quality.

A much better approach would be preventative maintenance – intervening before failure occurs. Preventative treatments, including surface dressing and crack sealing, yield superior cost-effectiveness because they substantially reduce the frequency of patch failure and replacement.

It’s important to note that filling potholes, in itself, does not add life to roads, apart from temporarily keeping them safe. It is the construction equivalent of throwing good money after bad.

More ambitious would be to establish a predictive and proactive road management system that spans the road’s entire lifecycle. This includes designing and constructing resilient road structures, conducting frequent monitoring, and applying targeted, timely preventive maintenance.

Emerging technology such as advances in data analytics, AI, automation, digital twins and non-destructive testing may make this approach increasingly feasible.

Economics of potholes

Evidence suggests that preventative maintenance would be longer lasting, and significantly more cost-efficient. Spending £1 today on preventative maintenance leads to £4.20 saved within 10 years.

This payback reflects the current poor condition of the local road network in Britain. More sustainable road maintenance would have a rapid effect.

Similar evidence exists for the climate impact. Traditionally, potholes are fixed again and again using cold-mix or hot-mix asphalt – a mixture of stones and petroleum-based bitumen derived from crude oil. This makes the process incredibly carbon-intensive.

Preventative maintenance reduces the long-term carbon costs because roads stay in good condition for longer. As extreme weather such as floods or heatwaves becomes more frequent, the risk of damage to road surfaces increases, making resilience a crucial factor in highway maintenance.

Put another way, preventative road maintenance could be a key part of local authority’s net zero ambitions – whereas the current approach is a liability to this goal.

The electoral focus on fixing potholes therefore seems odd, since the medium- to long-term solution (from a cost, road quality and carbon perspective) is more preventative maintenance.

road maintenance
Preventative maintenance is a cost-effective alternative to the UK’s ‘patch and repeat’ approach.
Daz Hopper Photography/Shutterstock

Why are Britain’s roads so pothole-plagued?

The simple reason that local authorities can’t fix potholes permanently is a lack of funding. However, like many political issues, it is more nuanced.

Our work with the National Highways & Transport Network has found that the public’s satisfaction with roads is substantially driven by the condition of roads within a one-kilometre radius of where they live.

Politically, potholes are obviously visible – they are also classed as safety defects, so there are legal requirements for local authorities to “fix” them in a timely manner. But underlying road condition, while crucial to the emergence of potholes, is more hidden and does not get as much political bandwidth.

Local authorities receive various funding pots for road maintenance, but this funding can sometimes be reallocated to other authority services, such as adult social care. This seriously constrains funding that is spent on road maintenance, although the UK government has recently announced new rules to stop councils from diverting road maintenance funds.

Taken together, this means that preventative maintenance is crowded out by limited funds and the need to repeatedly fix holes that result from a lack of preventative maintenance.

A review of current local road maintenance budget allocations reveals that reactive maintenance consumes 25% of budgets. But the pothole problem is getting worse, which suggests this figure will rise over time.

The relatively recent extra money for road maintenance (£0.5 billion annually) allocated could help, but it won’t go very far unless put into preventative treatments.

Changing to a longer-term solution requires different approaches to government funding and policymaking. But this demands political will at all levels of government, at a time when local authority budgets are already very constrained.

The Conversation

Professor Phill Wheat receives funding from the NHT CQC Network to which he is affiliated as the academic lead.

Ali Rahman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why politicians can’t fix potholes permanently – https://theconversation.com/why-politicians-cant-fix-potholes-permanently-281797

Our Land: who owns the countryside? New documentary explores the access divide in England and Wales

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ben Mayfield, Lecturer in Law, Lancaster University

Directed by Orban Wallace, Our Land explores the countryside access debate in England and Wales through interviews, pastoral shots, lavish illustrations and a walk in the country where the sun always seems to shine.

One percent of landowners own 50% of English and Welsh land. But the right of open access to land by the public, or the “right to roam”, extends to only 8% of this land.

Our Land follows the path of earlier activists such as Marion Shoard and Tom Stevenson who once advanced the access campaign through their experiences and storytelling. Here, the documentary’s star is naturalist and conservationist Nadia Shaikh.

Shaikh explores the teaching power of the English countryside by leading a group of trespassers on a nature walk. She describes her own complex and deep-felt attachment to the countryside as a place of education and personal identity.

Our Land is a title with two meanings – private land ownership for the landowners v the campaign for shared rights in land. The film explores different attitudes to ownership as well as the physical borders between landowners and, in the words of access campaigner and contributor Guy Shrubsole, “the peasants”.

The documentary was filmed during the Darwall v Dartmoor (2023) legal dispute. Landowner Alexander Darwall successfully challenged and outlawed the longstanding right to wild camp on Dartmoor National Park in the High Court. Later overturned by the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, the High Court ruling in favour of the landowner caused ripples of protest among walkers and campers. They temporarily lost the right to wild camp in Dartmoor – the only place in England where this was allowed by law.

Hedge fund manager Darwall is the most controversial landowner to feature in Our Land, but he is not interviewed in person. Instead, veteran documentary star Francis Fulford (he’s appeared in nine shows, including one about his estate and family) fills the role of aristocratic landowner and pantomime villain.

Fulford provides an insight into the landowner outlook: proud of his family’s place in English and colonial history as well as its roots on the Great Fulford estate. Fulford describes his family as having owned the estate since “time immemorial” and his love of the English countryside is unquestionable.

Indeed, many of the landowners interviewed have a paternal view of the countryside in which they view themselves as temporary guardians. Where opinions differ is how the countryside is best preserved and the extent to which the public should be allowed access to it.

Access and trespass

Trespass itself is a civil matter rather than a criminal offence, which is just as well because the documentary features trespass aplenty.

For instance, campaigning author Nick Hayes crosses the fences of the Drax estate in Dorset to deliver a copy of his Book of Trespass. He discusses the colonial history of the great estates and the role of wider access as a response to the decolonisation movement.

The documentary explains how the English and Welsh culture of access differs from that of close neighbours like Scotland. The Land Reform (Scotland) Act (2003) is celebrated, and contrasted with the exclusionary laws of England and Wales. Shrubsole stands over the border with one foot trespassing in England, the other “lawfully” in Scotland.

The Land Reform Act provides a much wider right to roam the Scottish countryside than the Countryside and Rights of Way Act in England (2000). It has a presumption in favour of public access and only minor exclusions such as private gardens and some industrial land. By contrast, the English “right to roam” supplements our existing network of footpaths, but extends only to mountain, moor, heath, down and common land. Great swathes of land are left inaccessible to the public.

The law is a central character in the access debate but exists only in the background of this documentary. We learn about the Norman conquest and enclosure of the commons in the 12th to 19th century. It was a process of consolidating, privatising and fencing off shared agricultural land (common land) in Britain, transforming it into individually owned, fenced fields. This change abolished traditional communal rights for grazing and farming.

However, there is less about the mixed success of earlier attempts to open countryside such as the Access to Mountains Act (1939), post-war National Parks Act (1949) or the Countryside and Rights of Way Act. English legislative failures might be able to teach us as much as Scotland’s successes.

Disagreement and concession

As the documentary draws to its conclusions there are some limitations to the format of landowners and campaigners being interviewed separately. We hear from both sides of the access debate but there are few opportunities to see the two sides in conversation.

Fulford is goaded from behind the camera on his views about sharing his land with visitors, but no representatives from either side have the opportunity to join one another in debate.

This leaves some assertions unchallenged, such as those of the affable Hugh Inge-Innes-Lillingston, owner of the Thorpe estate in Staffordshire. On the topic of rewilding, he contends that land cannot be truly rewilded if public access is allowed. But this reductive position ignores the nuanced ways that visitors and wilderness can coexist.

Throughout, many of the featured landowners and access campaigners agree on the artificial nature of landownership, their individual powerlessness to effect change and on the social and legal constructs that trap us all in an uncomfortable standoff.

As the documentary closes with trespassers talking and singing around a fire, I was left wishing that the cast of landowners could have joined them in their conversation.


The climate crisis has a communications problem. How do we tell stories that move people – not just to fear the future, but to imagine and build a better one? This article is part of Climate Storytelling, a series exploring how arts and science can join forces to spark understanding, hope and action.


The Conversation

Ben Mayfield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Our Land: who owns the countryside? New documentary explores the access divide in England and Wales – https://theconversation.com/our-land-who-owns-the-countryside-new-documentary-explores-the-access-divide-in-england-and-wales-282001

How a repurposed medical device is helping us investigate ancient climate tipping points

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Edward Forman, PhD Candidate, Climate Tipping Points, University of Southampton

Asja Radja / wiki, CC BY-SA

Imagine being tasked with counting every blade of grass in a field, noting every single species as you go. This is not far from the challenge many scientists face when analysing microscopic samples packed with thousands of tiny particles.

Imaging flow cytometry (IFC) solves this by guiding particles single-file past a camera and lasers, capturing detailed images of tens of thousands per second. It records the particles’ size, shape and optical properties, turning what was once painstaking manual work into automated analysis.

IFC has become a staple of biomedical research, with scientists using it to study blood viruses or classify tumour cells. It’s also increasingly used in environmental science – for example, to monitor water quality and detect microplastics.

Now, we’re using this medical tech on ancient mud, peat and lake sediments. It may help us identify exactly when ancient climate tipping points were crossed.

Blood to mud

To predict future climate change, we need to understand how things changed in the past. To do this, scientists use natural archives such as sediment found at the bottom of lakes or oceans, long “cores” drilled into peat or ice, or stalagmites and stalactites found in caves.

Under the hood of the IFC machine.
Nisha Lamichhane, CC BY

These archives effectively work as layered climate logbooks, recording environmental change over hundreds to thousands of years. As researchers dig deeper into sediment, peat or ice, they move further back in time. Each layer captures conditions at the time it was formed, from temperature and precipitation to the strength of ocean currents and wind belts.

Microscopic fossils and climate change

The abundance of certain microscopic fossils can be used to reconstruct these past conditions. For instance, the presence of certain species of pollen in peat or algae in lake sediments reflects changes in the climate system.

Pollen preserved in Amazon rainforest mud today is very different from that in Arctic tundra. In the far future, geologists will be able to tell from the fossilised form of this pollen which region once had tropical trees, and which had cold-weather shrubs.

Example of peat sample images including pollen and spores under three different wavelengths of light.
Edward Forman, CC BY

This approach to reconstruction underpins a large portion of palaeoclimate research. Traditionally, however, it has involved counting thousands of particles by eye under a microscope. Because this is so time-consuming, only a small fraction of the total sample is analysed, while the rest is estimated by scaling up those results.

IFC dramatically speeds up counting, meaning climate reconstructions that previously took months can now be done much faster.

This makes it possible to produce higher-resolution records by analysing more samples, and to quantify rare species. Scientists using this technology can focus on questions that were previously too time-consuming to address, such as exactly when a certain environmental change occurred in the deep past.

Also, IFC digitises each sample, making results easier to share, reproduce and reanalyse, promoting more robust, open science.

Hidden patterns and tipping points

As IFC makes it feasible to count a much larger fraction of any given sample, it allows us to detect subtle changes that would have taken too long to detect manually.

Uncovering these small shifts in the particles found in a given place could provide early warning signals of abrupt climate change. For example, we can trace the migration of wind belts via the abundance of non-native pollen species at particular locations. Such movement of the winds may be responsible for triggering sudden change, perhaps by melting ice sheets or drying out a rainforest.

As a result, we may be able to precisely date the timing of past climate tipping points – and with that, the order in which these thresholds were crossed. This could let us distinguish between cause and consequence, as we can determine which changes happened first.

This approach also has the potential to uncover entirely new data, such as the presence of rare species at particular sites. These new records can then act as novel proxies for climate change – leading to more detailed reconstructions and deeper insights into how the climate works.

A tool designed to scan blood now offers us an exciting opportunity to read Earth’s history in finer detail and decipher hidden mechanisms. It could also help us predict abrupt changes in the near future.

The Conversation

Edward Forman is affiliated with Climate:Change.

Zoë Thomas receives funding from a UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship.

ref. How a repurposed medical device is helping us investigate ancient climate tipping points – https://theconversation.com/how-a-repurposed-medical-device-is-helping-us-investigate-ancient-climate-tipping-points-281417

The ocean is fighting climate change and we’re trying to help it – here’s how

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katryna Niva, Cassar Lab, Duke University

Diliana Nikolova / shutterstock

We replaced the stove with plywood, turning the kitchen of the dive boat into an impromptu research lab. Plugging in wires and connecting tubing, we assembled a scientific instrument within the cramped cabin.

Then we cast off into Halifax Harbour, Canada, surveying the turquoise waters for signs of an unusual test: could we use the ocean itself to remove carbon dioxide from the air?

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) is the most important driver of climate change, but it cannot be seen. Its build-up in the atmosphere is gradual. Its worst consequences take time to emerge. Even if emissions fell sharply tomorrow, the CO₂ already released would continue to warm the planet.

That is why scientists and policymakers are increasingly turning to carbon dioxide removal (CDR): taking CO₂ that has already been released back out of the air. So far, most large-scale CDR has focused on land, such as reforestation. But land is finite, competes with food production and biodiversity, and stored carbon can be lost through fire or deforestation. As emissions continue to outpace what these approaches alone can manage, attention has turned toward the ocean.

The overlooked role of the ocean in carbon storage

The ocean covers about 70% of the Earth’s surface and holds roughly 50 times the amount of carbon found in the atmosphere. Before the industrial revolution, carbon moved between air and sea in near balance. As industrial activity increased atmospheric CO₂, more of it dissolved into seawater and the ocean became more acidic.

Person on board small scientific boat, large bridge in background
Katryna Niva sailing through Halifax Harbour, investigating the effects of enhancing ocean carbon storage.
Katryna Niva

All that dissolved carbon has resulted in the ocean storing about a third of human CO₂ emissions since the industrial revolution — substantially slowing the pace of climate change. The emerging question is whether we can build on this natural service. The field exploring that possibility is known as marine carbon dioxide removal (mCDR).

All mCDR approaches aim to reduce the amount of dissolved CO₂ at the ocean surface, converting it into more stable forms. When surface CO₂ is reduced, more CO₂ from the atmosphere dissolves into the sea.

Reducing surface CO₂ – so the sea absorbs more

One approach involves adding alkaline minerals – often crushed or processed rocks like limestone or basalt – to seawater. This reduces acidity and increases the capacity of seawater to absorb more carbon and store it for centuries to come. This is the strategy under development by Planetary Technologies in Halifax Harbour, Canada. There, alkaline minerals have been introduced to seawater through the cooling water discharge pipe of a natural gas burning power plant.

Another approach relies on biology. The ocean is filled with microscopic organisms that photosynthesise, using dissolved CO₂ to grow and reproduce. Some of this carbon sinks into deeper waters, through a process known as the “biological carbon pump”. By adding the nutrients that these organisms need to thrive, this effort hopes to increase microorganism populations and, ultimately, strengthening the biological carbon pump.

How do we know it works?

Whether chemical or biological, these approaches face the same questions: how much additional CO₂ is actually being removed from the atmosphere? And what are the ecological consequences?

The processes involved are invisible to the naked eye. The organisms are microscopic. The carbon transformations are chemical. Yet if marine carbon removal is to scale to climate-relevant levels, it will require rigorous measurement, transparency and public trust.

In the Cassar Lab at Duke University, we develop instruments to detect subtle changes in seawater chemistry. They continuously measure dissolved gases and other tracers, allowing us to reconstruct what microorganisms are doing and how carbon is moving through the system.

In August 2025, we deployed one of these tools in the turbulent waters surrounding one of the world’s first coastal ocean alkalinity enhancement projects, off Nova Scotia, Canada. This instrument was a mass spectrometer that extracts and quantifies dissolved gases from seawater. These readings give us insight into the ecosystem’s balance between photosynthesis and respiration – and therein, an understanding of how stressed or healthy the surrounding ecosystem is. Working alongside researchers tracking the chemical changes of the mCDR work underway, we focused on understanding how marine microorganisms were responding.

Another instrument, known as the Gopticas, allows a precise quantification of how much photosynthesis is happening in a seawater sample. The Gopticas was recently exhibited Prototypes for Humanity, an international innovation initiative based in Dubai, highlighting how tools developed for fundamental oceanography can also underpin climate accountability. This allows stronger quantification of ecosystem health as well as carbon influx.

A scalable approach to mCDR monitoring

We are now forming a team that can deploy these tools to directly quantify the amount of CO₂ being converted into longer-lived forms – and to spot early signs of ecological disruption.

This kind of monitoring is crucial. It allows us to distinguish between carbon that is briefly cycled near the surface and carbon converted into forms likely to remain stored for centuries. It also provides early warning if an intervention begins to disrupt marine biology. The work in Halifax marked the first application of our instruments to mCDR initiatives, but we look forward to applying these same approaches across regions and mCDR approaches.

Plume of whiteish material in blue-green sea
The alkalinity plume in the waters of Halifax Harbor, Canada.
Katryna Niva

Developing robust methods to quantify both carbon removal and ecological impact before large-scale deployment is essential. Without credible verification, claims of carbon removal risk outpacing evidence. And without clear evidence of environmental safety, public support will falter.

If marine carbon dioxide removal is to make a meaningful contribution to climate mitigation, it must rest on precise measurement and accountability. Governments, regulators and investors will need confidence that reported carbon removal is real and durable – and that marine ecosystems are protected.

Standing on the deck of the dive boat, staring out at the plume of alkaline waters emerging from the pipe, it’s easy to be struck by a feeling of awe. This experiment is tiny compared to global climate change – a drop in the ocean. But it offers a glimpse into a more optimistic future.


This article was commissioned in conjunction with Prototypes for Humanity, a global initiative that showcases and accelerates academic innovation to solve social and environmental challenges. The Conversation was a media partner of Prototypes for Humanity 2025.

The Conversation

Katryna Niva works for Duke University. Her research is also supported in part by the Carbon to Sea Initiative.

This article was commissioned in conjunction with Prototypes for Humanity, a global initiative that showcases and accelerates academic innovation to solve social and environmental challenges. The Conversation was a media partner of Prototypes for Humanity 2025

Alireza Merikhi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The ocean is fighting climate change and we’re trying to help it – here’s how – https://theconversation.com/the-ocean-is-fighting-climate-change-and-were-trying-to-help-it-heres-how-271554

Sept penseurs francophones pour comprendre la condition intellectuelle contemporaine

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Christophe Premat, Professor, Canadian and Cultural Studies, Stockholm University

Qu’est-ce qu’être intellectuel aujourd’hui depuis l’Afrique ou ses diasporas, sinon occuper une position instable, prise entre héritages coloniaux, contraintes globales et luttes pour une autonomie critique, au prix fréquent d’une marginalisation sociale ?

Comme le montre l’ouvrage Sensibilités intellectuelles africaines, auquel j’ai contribué, l’intellectualité africaine ne peut être comprise sans prendre en compte les formes sensibles, éthiques et cognitives par lesquelles les penseurs habitent leur époque. L’intellectuel n’est pas seulement producteur de savoir, il est un sujet situé, traversé par des contradictions, engagé dans un monde qu’il contribue à transformer.


Sortir de l’« intellectuel exotique »

  • Penser la rupture critique – Jean-Godefroy Bidima

La philosophie de Bidima ouvre sur une autre manière de penser, plus relationnelle, plus située, attentive aux formes concrètes de production du sens. Elle s’enracine dans une revalorisation d’une éthique de la palabre.

Loin d’une vision folklorisante, la palabre est chez Bidima une véritable figure philosophique du débat et du jugement. Elle désigne un espace de parole où la vérité ne se décrète pas, mais se construit collectivement, dans la confrontation des points de vue, dans la temporalité longue de l’échange, dans l’attention aux voix multiples.

La palabre est ainsi une pratique épistémique et politique mettant en jeu une rationalité qui ne se réduit pas à l’argument abstrait, mais qui intègre les affects, les expériences, les positions sociales. Elle permet de penser autrement la délibération, en dehors des modèles strictement occidentaux de la raison discursive, tout en évitant toute idéalisation naïve.

Dans cette perspective, l’intellectuel n’est plus celui qui parle de manière surplombante, mais celui qui participe à des dispositifs de co-élaboration du sens. Il doit apprendre à écouter, à se décentrer, à inscrire sa parole dans un tissu relationnel.

Seloua Luste Boulbina radicalise cette exigence en montrant que la colonisation a produit une infrastructure mentale durable. Dans la perspective de Boulbina, penser ne consiste jamais à habiter une langue comme un sol stable, mais à se tenir dans l’écart entre les langues, là où les concepts vacillent et où leur prétendue universalité se fissure.

Sa philosophie relève ainsi d’une déconstruction active : penser “entre les langues”, c’est dès lors assumer une position de discontinuité, de déplacement et d’hybridité, où aucune appartenance linguistique ou conceptuelle ne peut être tenue pour évidente.

Avec Diagne, la sortie de l’aliénation ne passe ni par le rejet ni par la pure déconstruction, mais par la traduction. Celle-ci est pensée comme une opération philosophique majeure : traduire, c’est faire circuler les idées, mais aussi les transformer.

Il défend une conception relationnelle du savoir, où les traditions philosophiques ne sont pas closes, mais en dialogue. L’Afrique n’est pas en périphérie : elle participe activement à la reconfiguration des savoirs. Dans cette optique, l’intellectuel devient un passeur, capable de naviguer entre plusieurs univers linguistiques et conceptuels.

L’intellectuel face au pouvoir : entre critique et marginalité

La pensée de Mbembe s’ancre dans une interrogation radicale sur les formes historiques de la violence. Esclavage, colonisation, postcolonie : ces expériences ne sont pas seulement des événements passés, mais des structures qui continuent d’informer le présent.

Le concept de postcolonie occupe ici une place centrale. Il ne désigne pas simplement la période qui suit les indépendances, mais un régime de pouvoir spécifique, caractérisé par l’imbrication du passé colonial et des formes contemporaines de domination. La postcolonie est un espace où s’entrelacent continuités et transformations. Les logiques de commandement, de violence et de dépendance héritées de la colonisation y sont reconfigurées plutôt que dépassées. Mbembe insiste notamment sur la dimension quotidienne et diffuse du pouvoir postcolonial. Celui-ci ne s’exerce pas seulement de manière coercitive, mais aussi à travers des formes de complicité, de théâtralisation et d’intériorisation.

Le pouvoir et les sujets qu’il gouverne sont pris dans une relation ambivalente, faite à la fois de soumission, de détournement et de participation. Cette ambivalence produit une condition marquée par ce que Mbembe décrit comme une « convivialité » paradoxale avec le pouvoir, où domination et adhésion coexistent.

La postcolonie est ainsi un espace où le politique se mêle à l’affectif, au symbolique, au corporel, produisant une expérience du monde marquée par l’excès, la précarité et l’incertitude. L’intellectuel, chez Mbembe, est celui qui affronte cette configuration complexe. Il travaille à partir d’un monde marqué par ce qu’il appelle une « grande nuit », c’est-à-dire une histoire dense de dépossession et de violence, mais aussi de résistances et de réinventions.

Avec Jean-Marc Ela, la réflexion sur l’intellectuel s’ancre dans une exigence théologique et politique forte : penser à partir du vécu concret des populations, en particulier des mondes ruraux africains longtemps marginalisés par les savoirs dominants.

Sa théologie, proche de la théologie de la libération, rompt avec une approche abstraite et désincarnée du religieux comme du savoir. Elle affirme au contraire que toute pensée authentique doit émerger des conditions réelles d’existence, des expériences de précarité, des luttes pour la dignité et des formes ordinaires de résistance.

Critiquer le développement comme injonction

  • Dénoncer l’injonction au développement – Aminata Traoré

Aminata Traoré propose une critique frontale du discours du développement, qu’elle analyse comme une nouvelle forme de domination. Les politiques économiques globales imposent des normes qui dépossèdent les sociétés de leur capacité d’autodéfinition. Le développement devient une injonction, un cadre contraignant qui reproduit des dépendances.

Son travail met en évidence la dimension politique, culturelle et symbolique de ces processus. L’intellectuel est ici une figure de résistance, qui travaille à restaurer des marges d’autonomie et à redonner sens à la notion de souveraineté. Cette critique s’inscrit pleinement dans les analyses du livre sur la marginalisation structurelle de l’Afrique dans les dynamiques globales.

Pour une habitation poétique du monde

  • Habiter le déphasage – Felwine Sarr

Chez Felwine Sarr, l’intellectuel se caractérise par un décalage avec son environnement. Ce déphasage tient à une lucidité particulière qui lui fait percevoir les contradictions et les non-dits du monde. Une telle perception rend difficile toute adhésion simple et installe une tension intérieure. Cette tension n’est pas seulement inconfortable, elle est aussi la condition d’une pensée critique exigeante.

Cependant, cette lucidité ne conduit pas uniquement à une forme de malaise. Elle ouvre un espace de création. L’intellectuel ne se limite pas à analyser ou à dénoncer, il imagine d’autres possibles et esquisse de nouveaux horizons. Sa clairvoyance devient alors une ressource qui permet de transformer la critique en invention.

Il en résulte une figure à la fois exposée et créatrice, dont la force tient précisément à cette capacité à faire de la lucidité un principe d’ouverture plutôt qu’un simple constat.

  • Une condition plus qu’une école

Ces penseurs ne forment pas une école au sens strict, mais donnent à voir une condition partagée. Ils tracent un espace de pensée où l’exigence intellectuelle naît du rapport concret au monde et d’un refus des solutions toutes faites. Leur diversité ne fragilise pas leur portée, elle en constitue la force, en montrant que la figure de l’intellectuel africain ne se laisse pas réduire à un modèle unique. Cette pluralité apparaît comme une manière d’habiter le réel plutôt que comme une doctrine à suivre. Elle engage aussi un rapport singulier à l’Afrique, non pas comme une essence figée ou un simple objet d’étude, mais comme un horizon de pensée.

The Conversation

Christophe Premat est directeur du Centre d’études canadiennes de l’Université de Stockholm et professeur en études culturelles francophones. Il a codirigé avec Buata B. Malela l’ouvrage Sensibilités intellectuelles africaines (éditions Hermann, 2025), consacré aux formes contemporaines de l’intellectualité africaine.

ref. Sept penseurs francophones pour comprendre la condition intellectuelle contemporaine – https://theconversation.com/sept-penseurs-francophones-pour-comprendre-la-condition-intellectuelle-contemporaine-281903