Category: The Conversation

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World Water Day: Three steps towards gender equity in water governance

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Sadaf Mehrabi, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Environmental Engineering, Iowa State University

When systems fail and crises occur, gendered burdens become more visible in households. (Unsplash/Yianni Mathioudakis)

Every March, the United Nations marks World Water Day to raise awareness about water scarcity and inequality. This year’s theme — water and gender — focuses on how women and girls often face the brunt of water inequities.

Highlighting how unequal access to water impacts women and girls is essential, but even when issues of leadership and participation are acknowledged, the dominant narrative remains incomplete.

Gender inequity is still framed primarily as a problem of access and representation. It’s also a governance problem.

When people hear “water and gender,” a familiar image may come to mind: women and girls in the Global South walking long distances to collect water, missing out on education and employment as a result. That reality remains urgent but the conversation cannot stop there.

In high-income countries, gendered water inequities have not vanished but shifted into less visible forms embedded in governance, trust and crisis response. These inequities are not limited to moments of failure; they are built into how water systems are governed.

Modern water infrastructure creates an image of neutrality and efficiency. Water appears as a service delivered through pipes and utilities. However, even when systems function, decisions about risk, cost and communication are not neutral.

When systems fail and crises occur, gendered burdens become more visible in households: managing bottled water, protecting children, bearing financial and emotional strain and navigating institutions that may no longer be trusted.

Water burdens and governance

The years-long water crisis in Flint, Mich., made gendered inequities painfully clear. Residents experienced sustained stress, anxiety and financial hardship alongside a collapse in trust in public institutions. But for women in particular, the crisis meant more than inconvenience.

Research shows that when confidence in piped water collapsed, the burden of securing safe water shifted back onto households, disproportionately onto women as they navigated conflicting official advice and decided which water sources could be trusted for different household uses.

Water crises are not just technical malfunctions but governance failures that redistribute risk and responsibility downward.

Another example comes from Detroit, where households had their water supply shut off due to unpaid water bills. The shutoffs disproportionately impacted low-income and racially marginalized women and their families.

In Canada, nearly 40 long-term drinking water advisories persist in Indigenous communities where, often, women hold domestic responsibilities as water carriers and advocates for water stewardship.

These examples highlight how even in “developed countries” water inequity can emerge through health, systemic and policy issues. These outcomes are not accidental but produced by water system governance.

Water decisions are made by regulators, municipalities and other public agencies. These institutions determine which risks are prioritized, how problems are framed, and whose concerns are taken seriously, often compounding challenges for those at the intersection of gender, race, income and caregiving roles.

Those with the most power over water policy, from governments to the heads of international organizations, are still predominantly men. This shapes not only who is represented, but how risks are interpreted and decisions are made.

When leadership spaces remain narrow, so do the assumptions behind water policy. This is where gender becomes an issue. One way this becomes visible is in how people perceive and respond to water crises.

Research consistently shows that more diverse decision-making groups produce more effective, equitable and sustainable outcomes. This is a finding reflected in global governance frameworks such as those advanced by UN Women.

Yet, increasing diversity in these spaces is not just a matter of access or representation. It is also shaped by how majority groups respond to the threats embedded in water crises that can influence how underrepresented individuals are viewed, judged or heard.

A map of canada showing locations for current and lifted water advisories
As of March 21, 2026, there were 40 active long-term drinking water advisories on public systems on reserve in 38 communities.
(Indigenous Services Canada)

Trust and decision-making in water relations

Water crises are often both technical and psychological problems. How these crises are framed can evoke fear. Decades of social psychology research has found that when people face existential threats, they tend to disengage, deny risk or gravitate toward those with similar identity and values, which creates distance from those who are different.

In our research, we found that these responses can reinforce gender biases in how water decision-makers are perceived and evaluated. People may be more likely to trust those who look like them, making it harder to diversify decision-making spaces precisely when diverse perspectives are needed most.

In systems where leadership is already concentrated, they can reinforce existing power structures and narrow whose expertise is trusted. If water governance is to be both effective and inclusive, these psychological dynamics cannot be ignored.

Importantly, other emotional responses bring opportunities for enhanced water relations. Awe, empathy and compassion can strengthen feelings of connection, belonging and trust. These are essential components for effective water governance and diplomacy.

Resilient water systems depend on more than engineering capacity. They depend on institutional legitimacy and public trust. Research on water reuse, one of the most contested areas of water policy, shows that public support varies widely depending on experience, perceived risk and confidence in water systems.

Towards gender equity in water governance

A serious water policy agenda should do at least three things:

First, move beyond diversity head counts. Utilities and regulators should track both representation as well as who holds decision-making authority, especially during crises.

Without transparency about who shapes operational, emergency and communication decisions, commitments to equity remain superficial.

Second, governments must consider women’s unequal burden in crisis planning. Water policy continues to assume uniform public behaviour and equal capacity and responsibility to adapt.

However, emergency frameworks should assess how crisis communication, compliance demands and service disruptions will affect different groups, especially those with care-giving responsibilities, low incomes or limited institutional trust.

Third, apply gender analysis where systems fail, not just where systems are measured. Analytical tools such as Gender-Based Analysis Plus help highlight all who are impacted by the issue or action at hand, identify and address challenges early, and call attention to ways in which actions can be tailored to meet diverse needs.

However, these tools should be used not only for access and representation but also for system governance, emergency response, affordability pressures, policy development and public communication. This is where governance decisions most clearly translate into unequal lived outcomes.

World Water Day’s focus on gender is a start, but it’s not enough. If gender inequity is treated only as an access issue, we miss how it shapes authority, trust and decision-making. Water policy may appear gender-neutral, but it’s not. Crises makes this visible. They do not create inequity but expose what governance has already produced.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. World Water Day: Three steps towards gender equity in water governance – https://theconversation.com/world-water-day-three-steps-towards-gender-equity-in-water-governance-279048

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The Swedish concept of ‘döstädning’ or death cleaning is about more than just getting rid of things

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lynn Akesson, Professor Emerita of Ethnology in the Department of Arts and Cultural Sciences, Lund University

The Swedish painter Margareta Magnusson died on March 12 aged 92. She became famous in 2017 for coining the smart and humorous concept of döstädning in a book known in English as The Gentle Art of Swedish Death Cleaning. The book was rapidly translated into an impressive number of languages, exporting the notion of death cleaning internationally.

Death cleaning is a decluttering practice where you go through what you own and get rid of things so that, when you die, the process of sorting your affairs is easier on your loved ones.

The year the book was published, the concept found its way into the Swedish Language Council’s annual list of new words. These annual lists feature new expressions that, the council hopes, say “something about today’s society and the year that has passed”. This undoubtedly holds true for death cleaning.

While döstädning quickly became part of everyday Swedish language, the habit of cleaning out belongings before dying was not entirely new. It is, however, no coincidence that the concept appeared when it did rather than, say, in the 1950s when ordinary homes were not yet so crowded with things. The increasing need for death cleaning has to do with living in a consumer society amid an accelerating overflow of possessions.

In earlier times, the importance of setting matters right before death was more concerned with relations: with God, relatives, friends, enemies, neighbours and so forth. In a Christian context, this last rite is known as Commendation of the Dying, known also as death bed rites.

In 1734, the establishment of an estate inventory, or bouppteckning, (a comprehensive list of a deceased person’s assets, property and debts at the time of death) became mandatory in Sweden by law. Although the law was not strictly enforced in its first decades, the inventories that do exist from this time are fascinating.

These early inventories belong to a range of people, from wealthy noblemen to widows of limited means with no more possessions than a set of clothing and few kitchen utensils. Many things listed were manufactured at home, and the few items that were purchased were highly valued. In a society like this, there was no need for death cleaning in the sense of clearing out. On the contrary, objects were passed on between generations or sold at well-attended local auctions.

Death cleaning is a form creating order and tidiness, which have often come with moral narratives closely tied with them. In this, the role of death cleaning now and in the past does have something in common.

In both cases, a person’s posthumous reputation is at stake, and leaving behind an untidy home or unsolved personal matter tells an unwanted story to the living of the person who has passed. Different stories can be crafted by getting rid of belongings or leaving them in good condition to pass on. What a person’s death cleaning looks like is a matter shaped by time and culture.

In memories collected by The Folk Life Archives at Lund University of the decades around 1900, people stress the importance of well-filled cabinets and cupboards as part of an impressive estate inventory. Such bounty was also meant to elicit admiration among visitors at the local auction. At that time, it was important to demonstrate good housekeeping by displaying your possessions, the more the better. Reading The Gentle Art of Swedish Death Cleaning, talking to people engaged in death cleaning and in my general work, I have seen how, nowadays, the same effect is achieved by leaving behind a minimum of things.

This change in cultural preferences naturally reflects changes in material conditions. In societies where goods are relatively easy to acquire – both in terms of cost and availability – we all have a lot more. As such, death cleaning has become a good deed. Not burdening surviving relatives with sorting through unwanted items has become an act of love and care. However, it is worth noting that the idea of death cleaning is an ideal not everybody can live up to. Many people still find it difficult to part with their belongings.

The international fascination with the Swedish art of death cleaning invites reflection on widespread fantasies of the Nordic region. Media representations of Scandinavia frequently emphasise tropes of minimalism and emotional restraint. Such framing may contribute to the global appeal of döstädning, yet risks obscuring the more complex and culturally grounded logic underpinning the practice.

Positioned within Swedish everyday life, death cleaning is less an exotic cultural curiosity and more a meaningful negotiation of material abundance, kinship responsibilities and existential reflection.

The Conversation

Lynn Akesson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The Swedish concept of ‘döstädning’ or death cleaning is about more than just getting rid of things – https://theconversation.com/the-swedish-concept-of-dostadning-or-death-cleaning-is-about-more-than-just-getting-rid-of-things-279030

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The television will not be revolutionised: HBO Max’s UK launch shows how streaming now resembles the TV it replaced

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anthony Smith, Lecturer in Screen Studies, University of Salford

The Warner Bros. Discovery streaming service HBO Max has launched in the UK. If you’re trying to work out the best way to access its content, you are faced with a choice that surely shouldn’t be this complicated.

You could subscribe to HBO Max Basic with Ads, which provides access to HBO shows like Euphoria and The White Lotus, and some films in Full HD. However, Warner Bros movies that have recently ended their theatrical run, such as the Oscar-winning Sinners and One Battle After Another, will not be available via this tier.

Alternatively, you could sign up to the Sky-owned Now platform’s new Entertainment & HBO Max Membership. This tier automatically includes the same HBO Max Basic content with ads, but displayed at a lower screen resolution. Want your Now service to match the picture quality of HBO Max’s cheapest tier? For that, you’ll need Now’s Boost add-on at an increased cost.

Neither option gives you everything, and both require you to read the small print to fully understand the restrictions they impose. And this is before you have even considered the other six monthly subscription plans HBO Max is offering at launch and the various price points available on Now. By the time you’ve weighed it all up, you might ask, wasn’t streaming supposed to make watching television simpler?

A Knight of the Seven Kingdoms is another prequel series to Game of Thrones on HBO Max.

The erosion of simple streaming

When the subscription video-on-demand (SVOD) sector emerged in the late 2000s and early 2010s with Netflix at its forefront, it was marketed as something liberating. It was presented as offering a clean break from the linear broadcast, cable and satellite television services it sought to replace. Viewers could watch what they wanted, when they wanted, free of commercial interruption, and at their own pace. The sector promised a personalised viewing experience free from broadcasters’ schedules.

Yet the range of options facing UK viewers at the launch of HBO Max appears to be at odds with the sector’s founding promise of convenience and autonomy. As my colleague Laura Minor and I argue in our book Television Goes Back to the Future: Rethinking TV’s Streaming Revolution (2025), streaming platforms have already begun eroding that promise.

For instance, many SVOD services now regularly adopt weekly episode releases for series rather than the full-season drops that once distinguished streaming from traditional broadcasters. A further example is the sector’s introduction of ad-supported tiers, reintroducing the commercial interruption that subscription platforms originally promised to leave behind.

HBO Max’s UK launch, however, generates a more specific kind of friction for consumers. That is, its arrival creates uncertainty over what viewers are getting, from whom, and at what cost – a confusion rooted in the shared history between HBO and Sky in the UK.

For 15 years, British viewers have associated HBO’s prestige programming with Sky. The channel Sky Atlantic was launched in 2011 largely as a vehicle for HBO shows after Sky secured exclusive UK rights to them. Series like Game of Thrones, The Sopranos and Succession all had their UK home on Sky Atlantic. For many British viewers, HBO content has become synonymous with Sky programming.

Now, with HBO Max having arrived as a standalone service, that cultivated brand association has been distorted but not cleanly severed – Sky and Warner Bros Discovery struck an updated distribution agreement in 2024 ensuring an ongoing relationship between the two companies. This branding muddle was evident in the weeks leading up to HBO Max’s launch, when the hit Game of Thrones prequel series A Knight of the Seven Kingdoms was identified on the Now platform as Sky Atlantic programming, while HBO Max’s own UK page branded it as an HBO Original.

Both descriptions were technically accurate, but for a viewer trying to make sense of the streaming landscape, the effect was disorientating. Now has since relabelled the show as HBO Max content to coincide with the HBO Max launch, but the example illustrates the deeper confusion about where HBO content now sits in the UK market, caught between a long-standing association with Sky and a new platform asserting its own identity.

Uncertainty about HBO Max’s future adds to the complexity of the platform’s launch. Paramount Global agreed to acquire Warner Bros Discovery in late February 2026, and Paramount’s CEO David Ellison has confirmed plans to ultimately merge HBO Max and Paramount+ into a single streaming service.

How the combined service will operate and how the shift will affect existing UK subscriptions remains entirely unclear. HBO Max, then, has arrived in the UK as a platform that may not exist in its current form for long. Viewers are being asked to familiarise themselves with a new platform and navigate its relationship with Sky and Now, while its parent company simultaneously plans to fold it into something else.

The brand muddle stemming from HBO’s entanglement with Sky, and the corporate uncertainty over what Paramount Global intends to do with the HBO Max service are specific to this case.

However, the broader confusion surrounding HBO Max’s UK launch is symptomatic of a streaming sector that has come to resemble the television landscape it aimed to revolutionise. Viewers are now confronted by a sprawl of overlapping brands, tiers and add-ons that demands the kind of careful navigation more commonly associated with conventional cable and satellite TV packages.

This is a trend that looks set to continue, with analysts noting that streamers are becoming increasingly focused on bundling strategies and diversifying the range of subscription tiers they offer. This means the experience of subscribing to streaming services in 2026 feels more like a return to complexities it was supposed to move beyond – rather than a liberation from them.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org; if you click on one of the links and go on to buy something, The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

The Conversation

Anthony Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The television will not be revolutionised: HBO Max’s UK launch shows how streaming now resembles the TV it replaced – https://theconversation.com/the-television-will-not-be-revolutionised-hbo-maxs-uk-launch-shows-how-streaming-now-resembles-the-tv-it-replaced-277932

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The Sudanese revolution seven years on: undone but not defeated

Source: The Conversation – France – By Robert Kluijver, Visiting researcher at Leiden University’s Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

In 2019, a popular uprising in Sudan ended 30 years of Omar al-Bashir’s Islamist military dictatorship. Protesting masses brought down the regime and imposed a return to civilian rule. While a political settlement was being negotiated at the national level, local communities experimented with self-governance. But the armed forces seized power again, fell out among themselves, and plunged the country into war – producing one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent years.

What has become of the revolutionary impulse amid all this mayhem? What are the prospects for a return to civilian rule?

Despite the ongoing fighting, Sudanese civilians are starting to return home, pushed by dire conditions inside Sudanese displacement camps or driven back by hostility in neighbouring countries. Egyptian authorities have been expelling Sudanese refugees with or without papers.

Entrepreneur and women’s empowerment activist Randa Hamid describes a typical returnee’s experience: arriving at Port Sudan, the country’s only operational international airport, driving to a largely empty Khartoum, reduced to rubble and stripped of infrastructure, finding home and workplace thoroughly looted, and encountering local officials more interested in self-enrichment than in reconstruction. Sad, but safer than it has been the past years.

Since the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) reconquered Khartoum in March 2025, a degree of stability has returned to parts of the country. The SAF now controls central, northern and eastern Sudan while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) hold the west; the south remains contested.

The SAF’s main political ally is the Muslim Brotherhood, whose networks provide fighting forces and governance experience to the military. Civilian positions are filled by old-regime figures: the corrupt oligarchy that provoked the revolution is reclaiming power uncontested.

Anniversary celebrations of the uprising last December were followed by the arrest of their organisers – while pro-democracy activists are hunted down by the SAF.

Current prospects for peace are bleak. The SAF is seeking total victory over the RSF rather than a negotiated settlement, presaging many more months or years of conflict. Any eventual deal between them would probably amount to Sudan’s division. Given the fragmented nature of both forces and ongoing contests over areas such as South Kordofan and Blue Nile, even that would be unstable.

From resistance to emergency response

The Sudanese resistance committees (RCs) that drove the revolution had formed as neighbourhood solidarity groups in the years before it.

IMF-mandated neoliberal policies under Omar al-Bashir had withdrawn the state from its social functions, forcing communities to rely on one another. Alongside trade unions and professional organisations, the RCs mobilised mass sit-ins that brought the regime down.

Crucially, they declined to join the transitional civilian-military coalition – the Forces for Freedom and Change – that governed briefly under former UN official Abdullah Hamdok. Their wariness of co-optation proved well founded when the military staged a coup in October 2021.

The committees instead maintained their horizontal, participatory approach, established a national charter and became incubators of cultural creativity, youth entrepreneurship and public life. With hindsight, the Sudanese revolution was an early instance of the Gen Z mobilisation now visible globally. It was remarkable for the full participation of women and the absence of the racism historically embedded in Sudanese public life.

When fighting erupted between the SAF and RSF in Khartoum in April 2023 and spread rapidly, the resistance committees became targets of both factions. Their members fled abroad if they could, to continue their civilian advocacy. Those who remained devoted themselves to setting up Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) – virtual spaces, typically messaging groups, through which communities share information, needs and resources.

Jasour Abu Algasim was involved in the revolutionary movement from its earliest days and helped establish an ERR in Khartoum. He noted that state collapse allowed resistance committees to play a stronger public role. When war came, they pivoted from society building to survival.

Mohamed Younis, Director in Sudan of the Center for Civilians in Conflict, points out that solidarity initiatives unconnected to any political agenda – communal kitchens, volunteer brigades repairing infrastructure, community evacuations – emerged in nearly every affected community.

While international agencies struggled with security and logistical obstacles, local solidarity groups became the primary collective survival mechanism. Attention from abroad, however, was focused on the ERRs, which were twice nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The aid dilemma

Donors frustrated by the difficulty of reaching those most in need have begun insisting that NGOs channel funds through the response rooms, viewing them as the most authentically democratic forces available. The logic is appealing, but Younis identifies the following unintended consequences.

Donor accountability requirements – detailed documentation of recipients, bio-data, dedicated administrative capacity – consume the very resources ERRs need for direct assistance. Both volunteers and communities face danger if such records fall into hostile hands. The ERR’s role shifts from autonomous community actor to service provider for foreign donors, typically via chains of international and local NGOs that each add their own requirements and consume a share of the budget.

This leaves no room for local strategic input. Communities are reduced to “beneficiaries” of programmes designed elsewhere. The vertical control mechanisms that donors and NGO partners impose skew the horizontal decision-making that characterises self-governing bodies. Internal accountability to volunteers and community members is replaced by external accountability to funders. Finally, this chain of command causes the response rooms to be perceived – by combatant factions and potentially by local populations – as instruments of foreign political agendas.

The result, notes Younis, is a perverse taxonomy of “good” and “bad” ERRs, distinguished not by service to communities but by compliance with donor requirements. Meanwhile the vast landscape of grassroots solidarity activity outside the ERR label goes unrecognised. “Decolonisation of aid” has therefore become a priority for the Sudanese civilian sector. Yet the trend toward increasing donor control over shrinking aid flows is likely to intensify rather than abate.

External factors

Sudan’s revolution alarmed the region’s autocracies much as the Arab Spring had eight years earlier. Containing democratic contagion remains a priority for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as more distant regional powers. They also support strongman rule to facilitate the control over Sudan’s mineral wealth – particularly gold – and its rich agricultural lands.

Western support for democratisation meanwhile has grown tepid. Multilateral bodies such as the African Union, the UN and the EU, unable to reach civilian forces inside Sudan, rely on exiled politicians and civil society leaders. The current coalition of civilian forces in exile, Sumoud (“steadfastness”), follows its predecessor Tagadum, which collapsed over the question of a government-in-exile.

Sarra Majdoub, a member of the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, has witnessed successive civilian peace initiatives. She noted that efforts by exiled civil society leaders to reconnect with civilians inside the country are blocked by hostile authorities, unreliable communications, the dispersal of the population and material hardship.

Diasporic communities, by contrast, are readily mobilised online and end up occupying the entire bandwidth of “Sudanese civil society.” The question of how representative they are, or whether they can influence events on the ground, remains unresolved.

Civilian rule versus vertical governance

Sudan’s future will be determined by the clash between two colossal forces. On one hand, the military-landowning bloc, backed by regional powers and holding a monopoly on violence. It has ruled the country with few interruptions since independence in 1956. On the other, the mostly young Sudanese masses who tasted the promise that the revolution offered before the country was plunged back into war.

Hadia Hasaballah, a university professor in Omdurman who participated in the first wave of the uprising, now heads the women’s section of Sumoud. Rather than relying on existing political formations, she calls for the recognition of the youth-led mass movement in Sudan that embodies the values of the revolution: freedom, peace and justice. She is adamant that the regression to Islamist rule visible under the SAF – two women were sentenced to death by stoning in February 2026 – is no longer acceptable to Sudanese women, youth and minorities. They experienced the freedoms of the revolutionary period and will not simply relinquish them.

The Sudanese crisis reflects a wider tension in democratic politics between representational and participatory models. The resistance committees and emergency response rooms embody an emergent participatory politics being actively suppressed by actors with interests in vertical control.

Yet the Sudanese activists and analysts, on whose expertise this article draws, agree on one thing: the groundswell of young people of all backgrounds, united around freedom, peace and justice, constitutes a remarkable and durable foundation for genuine civilian rule. How they can wrest control from the military is, for now, nearly inconceivable – but eventually, they will.

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The Conversation

Robert Kluijver ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. The Sudanese revolution seven years on: undone but not defeated – https://theconversation.com/the-sudanese-revolution-seven-years-on-undone-but-not-defeated-278245

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BBC gets a new director general: how others have fared in the hardest job in UK media

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simon Potter, Professor of Modern History, University of Bristol

Matt Brittin has been named the new director general of the BBC. He joins the broadcaster after almost two decades working at Google: he was its president in Europe, the Middle East and Africa before leaving in 2024. He is already on the board of the Guardian Media Group.

The director general is the most senior executive at the BBC. The first director general was John Reith (later Lord Reith), a near legendary figure who dominated the organisation during its foundational period in the 1920s and 1930s.

Reith played a key role in establishing broadcasting in Britain and creating the BBC. He had an obsession with controlling all elements of the BBC’s work and was determined to increase his own power at the expense of subordinates and of the BBC’s board of governors.

Reith made the director general the most powerful office in the BBC. That power has since been diluted over the decades, but in theory the director general still has oversight of all the varied aspects of the BBC’s work. They must also defend the corporation from public criticism and take responsibility when things go wrong. Given the amount of criticism that the BBC has faced in recent years, this may be the hardest job in the UK media.

Crucially, the director general is regarded as editor-in-chief of BBC news content, and ultimately carries the can when problems arise in its current affairs coverage. This has brought down several directors general in the past.

In 2011, George Entwistle resigned over revelations concerning the BBC and the Jimmy Savile sexual abuse scandal, and his mishandling of unfounded allegations broadcast by the BBC concerning Lord McAlpine. Entwistle only served 54 days in post.

Tim Davie resigned from the top job last year amid accusations that BBC current affairs coverage had breached its own editorial code on impartiality. Most notably, footage of a speech by Donald Trump had been misleadingly edited when shown on Panorama. The BBC still faces an unprecedented $10bn (£7.5bn) lawsuit from the US president.

Brittin will need to deal with these editorial issues. One of his first tasks will be to hire a new CEO of News, as Deborah Turness resigned along with Davie.

He will also have to lead the BBC into a brave new world. The TV licence system, which provides the BBC with most of its funding, is likely to be drastically reformed or abolished entirely. This may be accompanied with major changes in how the BBC is run and functions, as its royal charter is renewed over the coming year.

More and more of us are replacing analogue radio and live television with streaming. With his tech background, Brittin may be well placed to lead the BBC through this transition. He also faces the unenviable task of defending the BBC against inevitably escalating criticism during the charter review period. Candidates for the job do not seem to have been lining up at the doors of Broadcasting House.

Changing the BBC

How have previous directors general fared in times of profound change? The BBC struggled to find an effective leader during the second world war until William Haley, an experienced newspaper editor and director, was appointed. Haley expertly steered the BBC through the final stages of the war and into peacetime, navigating difficult questions about government intervention, possible commercial competition and, with the rise of TV, technological change.

Haley significantly altered the BBC’s radio offering to provide listeners with more choice, and set out to reestablish its television service, fending off the threat of commercial competition for almost a decade.

In the 1960s, Hugh Carleton Greene (brother of the novelist Graham Greene), shook up British broadcasting yet again, helping the BBC adapt to the possibly existential challenge posed by a young and feisty ITV. Greene focused on providing crowd-pleasing entertainment, but also pushed the boundaries of taste and opinion by establishing the political satire show That Was The Week That Was, and supporting hard-hitting dramas like Cathy Come Home and Up The Junction.

Haley and Greene both demonstrated what a confident director general, intent on securing the changes that would allow the BBC to survive, could achieve.

Old BBC microphone
Past directors general have navigated the BBC through times of peace, and war.
seeshooteatrepeat/shutterstock

A more divisive figure was John Birt, later Baron Birt, who held the post from 1992 to 2000. Birt had made his name working for the BBC’s competitors in commercial TV. He was a devotee of new ideologies of corporate leadership and change. At the BBC he was determined to break up the dominance of its powerful departmental leaders and to impose central control.

In the wake of scandals over public affairs coverage that toppled one of his predecessors, Alasdair Milne, Birt demanded adherence to a new editorial code. And in order to prevent Margaret Thatcher’s government privatising the BBC, he set up a complex system of internal markets and external programme commissioning. Business consultants and highly-paid senior managers were recruited from the private sector to spearhead reform. Over 10,000 staff were laid off. Some people thought that Birt saved the BBC, but the playwright Dennis Potter likened him to a Dalek.

Brittin, like Birt, is an outsider to the BBC. Will he be a Dalek, or The Doctor that the BBC needs to vanquish its political and commercial adversaries? Appointing a leader from the world of big tech might give the BBC a valuable weapon in a media landscape dominated by the US-based streaming giants.

Brittin may also have the corporate leadership skills needed to bring a large, fiendishly complex organisation full of independently minded people through the massive changes that seem necessary if the BBC is to survive and flourish. Whether he has the equally crucial skills needed to be the public face of the BBC, defending it on-air and in the press against its many assailants, remains to be seen.

The Conversation

Simon Potter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. BBC gets a new director general: how others have fared in the hardest job in UK media – https://theconversation.com/bbc-gets-a-new-director-general-how-others-have-fared-in-the-hardest-job-in-uk-media-279263

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Waste being used to tackle erosion poses a health risk – an anthropologist explains the dilemma

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Declan Murray, Research Associate, Anthropology, University of Manchester

A field of waste fills in the gully that has formed between houses on either side in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Declan Murray, CC BY-NC-ND

I was standing with a waste management supervisor – let’s call him David – at the back of a major fruit and vegetable market in Dar es Salaam, the biggest city in Tanzania. David and I watched as his team raked the market’s waste from a holding bay into the back of a big, yellow tipper truck.

“We’re not taking this to Pugu,” David said. “We’re taking this to an illegal site”.

Pugu is Dar es Salaam’s only official landfill site. All of the rotten produce, peel, leaves, water bottles, soft plastic and cardboard being loaded into the truck should have been sent there. But Pugu is a two-hour drive away. Fuel costs are expensive and there will probably be a queue of trucks waiting to dump through the site’s single entrance. People also have to pay to dump waste at Pugu.

By going to an illegal site, David can save time and money.

“No photos,” David said as we neared the illegal site. I put my phone away. We drove down a steep, compressed sand track riven with dried-up channels. Ahead of us, the ground levelled out into a field of many colours; a field of waste.



Read more:
The world’s waste mountain is rising at an alarming rate

I could make out the outlines of popular white plastic milk packets and blue plastic pouches used to package snacks around the city. These were tangled up with old clothes and used nappies. On the far side, the land rose steeply again, populated with houses overlooking the site.

While the team dumped the waste from the market, I introduced myself to some locals sat watching nearby. They were at pains to tell me that this was not a valley. It was a gully, they said. There is no river here. Instead, they told me that heavy rain had caused the land to give way and several houses to collapse. In order to stem the erosion they had asked local leaders to bring waste to fill in the gully, to literally fill in the land, and so protect the remaining houses from collapse.

In my 2025 study, I defined this practice as “literal landfilling”. It’s apparently widespread and longstanding in the city, yet it has been curiously missing from official and academic discussions of the waste management system in the city. Until now.

big yellow truck backs into building to fill up with waste
A tipper truck gets filled up at the market in Dar es Salaam.
Declan Murray, CC BY-NC-ND

A waste win?

Between 2022 and 2024, I spent nine months studying the waste management system in Dar es Salaam as part of a wider research programme on plastic waste in developing countries. That residents welcomed the waste of contractors like David made the literal landfill seem like a win-win-win for contractors; local authorities and residents. Markets, streets and neighbourhoods are cleared of waste, contractor profits are maintained and no more residents lose their homes. But at what cost?

Colleagues of mine found that pathogens like cholera and E. coli can thrive on plastic surfaces for three to four weeks. Plastic waste might even be driving the emergence of new diseases.

I asked some of the local residents whether they were worried about the health consequences of living right next to this open landfill site. Most conceded they get ill but this was a minor inconvenience relative to the possibility of losing the concrete home they have built.

Rather than being a happy alignment of interests, my research shows that literal landfilling is a trade-off between short-term, visible economic gain and longer-term, unknowable losses to human and environmental health.

In 2023, the World Bank launched the Dar es Salaam Metropolitan Development Project (DMDP), a US$438 million (£330 million) initiative to improve urban services in the city.

Joining a long history of initiatives and plans to solve the city’s waste management problems, the DMDP hopes to modernise Pugu to improve access and reduce waiting times. It also promises the introduction of transfer stations around the city where contractors can deposit waste for sorting and then return quicker to collection than having to drive out to Pugu.

If realised, these plans could resolve the supply side of the literal landfill equation – contractors will no longer be incentivised to dispose of waste in gullies. However, the DMDP makes no mention of gully erosion in the city nor are there any other schemes to address it.

Until the literal landfill is recognised in official and academic discussions of waste management in Dar es Salaam, residents will still look to protect their assets unfortunately at a cost to their health. The demand for waste will remain.

The Conversation

Declan Murray does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Waste being used to tackle erosion poses a health risk – an anthropologist explains the dilemma – https://theconversation.com/waste-being-used-to-tackle-erosion-poses-a-health-risk-an-anthropologist-explains-the-dilemma-277101

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God on their side: how the US, Israel and Iran are all using religion to garner support

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Toby Matthiesen, Senior Lecturer in Global Religious Studies, University of Bristol

America’s secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, sports an array of tattoos with Christian messaging, including one which reads “Deus Vult”, God wills it, and is associated with the medieval crusades. So perhaps it shouldn’t come as a surprise that, while leading a Christian service at the Pentagon on March 25, Hegseth reached for biblical language to describe the war against Iran.

He called on God to “break the teeth” and kill the “wicked” enemies “who deserve no mercy” and should be “delivered to the eternal damnation prepared for them”. In other words, for Hegseth this is a holy war in which he calls on god to “grant this task force clear and righteous targets for violence”.

This war is not primarily about religion. But leaders on all sides have used religion to justify their actions. Not for decades have political leaders of all three major Abrahamic faith traditions invoked parts of their respective traditions to legitimise war in this way. The way faith and religious scripture and doctrine have been used by the US and Israel to justify launching their war in Iran is a worrying development, and one that highlights the growing relationship between religion and authoritarian nationalism.

It has also deepened the animosity with Iran, where politicians and religious leaders have themselves invoked religious and messianic narratives. But Iran is an Islamic Republic in which religion has a significant constitutional role.

The Israeli prime minister used religious imagery on February 28 while announcing the start of the war. He invoked the Jewish holiday of Purim, which fell on March 2-3 this year, and which celebrates the Jewish escape from a plot by Haman, an evil Persian official, to annihilate the Jews in the ancient Persian Empire. He said:

My brothers and sisters, in two days we will celebrate the holiday of Purim. 2,500 years ago, in ancient Persia, an enemy rose against us with the exact same goal of completely destroying our people. But Mordechai the Jew and Queen Esther, with their courage and resourcefulness, saved our people. In those days of Purim, the lot was cast, and the wicked Haman fell along with it. Even today on the holiday of Purim, the lot was cast, and the end of the evil regime will also come.

Netanyahu has also compared Iran to the biblical Amalekites (a theme he has used to refer to Hamas in Gaza, drawing criticism from the United Nations). The Amalekites were arch enemies of the Jewish people, who the Old Testament God ordered to be completely destroyed, “men and women, children and infants, cattle and sheep, camels and donkeys”. Netanyahu’s government rests on an alliance with religious Zionists, who frequently invoke religious references to justify Israel’s policies.



Read more:
Attack on Gaza: Israeli rhetoric fuels fears of ethnic cleansing as IDF assault continues to push south

American evangelism

The first amendment of the US constitution, meanwhile, guarantees freedom of religion and effectively prevents one faith being favoured over any others. That said, about 70% of Americans identify with a religious faith (the vast majority are Christians) and there is evidence of the growing influence of evangelical Christianity on the Maga movement and the Trump administration.

On March 5, the US president was joined for prayers in the Oval Office by a group of evangelical pastors. Placing their hands on him, prayed “for your grace and protection over him…and over our troops”. The video of the American president engaging in a group prayer while engaged in a major war went viral.

At the start of the war, hundreds of US troops reported being told by their commanders that the war was “part of God’s divine plan” and that: “President Trump has been anointed by Jesus to light the signal fire in Iran to cause Armageddon and mark his return to Earth.”

Evangelical movements have vastly increased their political influence in the US and across the world. They often support right-wing politicians domestically and Israel internationally, believing in Christian Zionism or that the strengthening of the state of Israel will ultimately lead to the erection of the Temple in Jerusalem and hasten the arrival of the day of judgement.

Challenged by evangelical movements, the Catholic church, in contrast, has condemned the war as “immoral” and “unjust”, and denounced Israel’s attacks on Christians in Lebanon. Pope Leo, himself an American, has called the war a “scandal to the whole human family”.

Iranian martyrdom

The Israeli killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei broke a norm in international relations in more ways than one. It is the first assassination of a head of state by a foreign country in many decades. And it is the first time in centuries – perhaps ever – that one of Shi’ism’s most senior Grand Ayatollahs has been killed by a foreign power.

Many other senior Shia clerics – some of whom had had a difficult and sometimes even antagonistic relationship with Khamenei and the system he represented – declared him a martyr. Assuming his father’s role as supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei delivered remarks that heavily emphasised martyrdom and messianism – including an opening reference to the “Hidden 12th Imam”, who is meant to return on the day of judgement, according to Shia doctrine.

In Iran, Twelver Shia messianism and Iranian nationalism have long been interwoven, especially since the revolution of 1979. Now, Iran’s Shia clerics have declared the defence of the homeland as a sacred duty.

What the other branches of Islam think of the war is more complicated. Some senior non-Shia clerics, including the mufti of Oman – a prominent scholar of the Ibadi branch of Islam – declared Khamenei a martyr. The Sunni mufti of Iraq even argued that all Muslims should support Iran. There have been protests denouncing the war in Pakistan, India, Yemen, Indonesia and beyond.
But other major Sunni clerical institutions or movements have not been so vociferous in their condemnation for the death of Khamenei or the need to support Iran. This – quite apart from the at times bitter antagonism between Sunnism and Shi’ism – also has to do with the fact that Iran swiftly started attacking major Sunni-majority countries that host American military bases.

Messianic and apocalyptic elements of all three major Abrahamic faith traditions have been instrumentalised by increasingly authoritarian leaders in a global confrontation. While there are voices in all three traditions criticising this use of religion, it is setting a dangerous precedent. And while the war has been criticised as being in breach of international law, the reckless use of religion to support this war has not. This should change.

The Conversation

Toby Matthiesen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. God on their side: how the US, Israel and Iran are all using religion to garner support – https://theconversation.com/god-on-their-side-how-the-us-israel-and-iran-are-all-using-religion-to-garner-support-279337

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Droits de douane américains : encore plus de chaos… et 10 milliards d’intérêts à payer

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Antoine Bouët, Directeur, CEPII

La décision de la Cour suprême des États-Unis concernant les droits de douane mis en place par Donald Trump ne lève pas toutes les questions posées par ce qui ressort désormais comme un abus de Donald Trump par rapport au texte constitutionnel. Car le président possède d’autres moyens pour imposer sa politique sans vote du Congrès. Sans oublier que va se poser la question des droits perçus illégalement et qu’il faudra bien rembourser. Rien que le paiement des intérêts pourrait représenter 10 milliards de dollars (plus de 8,66 milliards d’euros) !

La Cour suprême des États-Unis a jugé illégale l’utilisation de l’International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) par l’administration Trump pour imposer des droits de douane et a rappelé qu’aux États-Unis le pouvoir du portefeuille (Power of the Purse) appartient au Congrès.

Ce verdict annule automatiquement :

  • les trafficking tariffs imposés en février 2025 aux produits du Canada, de la Chine et du Mexique du fait de la contrebande de fentanyl et des flux migratoires – les « tarifs réciproques », compris entre 10 % et 50 %, imposés aux produits de tous les pays ayant un excédent commercial vis-à-vis des États-Unis et annoncés le 2 avril 2025, « jour de la Libération »,

  • ainsi que les tarifs sanctionnant certains pays (Brésil, Cuba, Russie, Venezuela).

Cela présage-t-il une accalmie du côté des droits de douane américains ? Au contraire, la situation est devenue encore plus chaotique, et la crédibilité de l’équipe au pouvoir est de nouveau sérieusement écornée. Pour trois raisons.

Pour remplacer l’IEEPA, l’administration américaine a déjà annoncé la mise en place d’une surtaxe généralisée de 10 % au nom de la section 122 du Trade Act de 1974. Cette disposition législative donne l’autorisation au président d’imposer immédiatement un droit de douane de 15 % maximum, en sus des droits existants, pour résoudre un problème de « déficit important et sérieux de balance des paiements ». Cette surcharge tarifaire ne peut s’appliquer que pendant cent cinquante jours et ne peut être prolongée que si le Congrès donne son accord.



À lire aussi :
Droits de douane américains : en attente d’une décision historique de la Cour suprême

Un argument fallacieux

Ces cinq mois seront l’occasion pour l’administration de procéder à des enquêtes, au titre de la section 301 du Trade Act de 1974, sur les pratiques déloyales de 60 partenaires commerciaux des États-Unis (dont l’Union européenne) accusés de ne pas assez restreindre l’importation de produits fabriqués à l’aide de travail forcé, produits qui seraient une concurrence déloyale pour les exportateurs américains ! Ces enquêtes viennent d’être lancées (12 mars 2026).

C’est bien évidemment un argument fallacieux permettant à l’administration américaine d’essayer de remplacer les droits de douane IEEPA, invalidés par la Cour suprême, par des droits de douane section 301. Ceux-ci, à la différence des droits de douane au titre de la section 122, pourraient être pérennes.

Du temporaire qui peut durer combien de temps ?

Notons néanmoins qu’une « enquête 301 » a pour but de dénoncer la pratique déloyale d’un partenaire et, par le biais d’une menace d’un droit de douane ou de son application, de la faire cesser. Un droit de douane section 301 est donc normalement par nature temporaire. Mais l’administration américaine a manifestement pour objectif d’appliquer ces droits de douane de manière pérenne pour protéger l’économie américaine et faire pression sur ses partenaires de façon à obtenir une ouverture de leur économie aux produits américains.

L’application de la section 122 pose aussi un certain nombre de problèmes qui ont déjà entraîné des contestations juridiques.

D’abord, la surtaxe doit être généralisée et universelle. Elle doit s’appliquer à tous les biens et à tous les pays. Or, les droits IEEPA avaient inclus un certain nombre d’exemptions en matière de partenaires et de biens, et le nouveau droit section 122 confirme ces exemptions.

Quel déficit prendre en compte ?

En outre, et plus fondamentalement, cette loi a pour objet un déficit de la balance des paiements et non de la balance commerciale. La distinction est importante. La balance commerciale synthétise les échanges de biens ou de biens et services. La balance des paiements y ajoute les transferts internationaux de revenus, les investissements directs et les investissements de portefeuille. Par construction, une balance des paiements est équilibrée, mais, par abus de langage, le terme de « déficit de la balance des paiements » s’est imposé pour décrire une situation de déséquilibre externe. Alors qu’un déficit commercial, justification de la politique protectionniste de Donald Trump, décrit un excès d’importations de biens sur les exportations de biens, un déficit de la balance des paiements survient lorsqu’il n’y a pas assez de flux financiers privés entrants pour financer un déficit de la balance courante (qui comprend les échanges de biens, de services et de revenus).

En régime de change fixe, un déficit de la balance des paiements se résout par des pertes de réserves de change et d’or de la banque centrale. Or, les États-Unis ne sont plus en régime de change fixe depuis le début des années 1970. En régime de changes flottants, ce déficit peut se résoudre par une dépréciation de la monnaie nationale, le dollar. Cela correspond bien à la situation actuelle. Or, il est difficile de constater, aujourd’hui, un déficit de la balance des paiements américaine et une absence de flux financiers entrants privés aux États-Unis.

Élément intéressant, lors de la défense de l’utilisation de l’IEEPA par l’exécutif américain devant les tribunaux en juillet 2025, les juristes de la Maison-Blanche ont insisté sur ce point : un déficit commercial ne peut être considéré comme un déficit de la balance des paiements ; donc la section 122 du Trade Act de 1974 ne peut pas être utilisée pour résoudre le problème économique actuel des États-Unis !

L’utilisation de la section 122 du Trade Act de 1974 par l’administration Trump pour appliquer des droits de douane est déjà contestée par la compagnie alimentaire Burlap & Barrel et par les procureurs et gouverneurs de 24 États démocrates. Les arguments précédents, différenciant déficit commercial et déficit de la balance des paiements, sont repris par les plaignants. La Cour du commerce international doit écouter les plaignants et l’administration le 10 avril et pourrait rendre son verdict une semaine plus tard.

Un problème de crédibilité

Une autre dimension du problème écorne aussi la crédibilité de l’administration américaine : le remboursement des droits de douane indûment collectés entre février 2025 et février 2026 sous couvert de l’IEEPA. La Cour du commerce international a, en effet, sommé l’Agence de protection des douanes et des frontières des États-Unis de rembourser ces taxes.

La tâche est compliquée : il y aurait 165 milliards de dollars (plus de 142,9 milliards d’euros) à rembourser à 330 566 importateurs, selon Brandon Lord, le directeur exécutif pour le commerce de cette agence, soit en moyenne 499 143,89 dollars (432 508,18 euros) par opérateur commercial. Il faut évidemment vérifier chaque demande de remboursement, et chaque importateur a fait, sur la période considérée, plusieurs opérations d’importation. Il y aurait au total 53 173 939 opérations à vérifier ! Brandon Lord estime à cinq minutes le temps nécessaire à la vérification d’une opération. Si cela est fait manuellement, il en déduit que l’opération nécessitera 4 431 161 hommes-heures, soit 506 hommes-année !

Près de 10 milliards d’intêts à verser ?

Il faut donc privilégier une procédure automatique de vérification et de remboursement. Mais cette tâche est compliquée, car la plupart des importateurs n’ont pas la possibilité de recevoir des transferts électroniques. L’agence a promis de définir une solution en quarante-cinq jours ! Mais le temps presse, car le Trésor américain devra rembourser les taxes collectées, mais aussi les intérêts qui courent sur les sommes prélevées, évaluées à 650 millions de dollars (soit 563,38 millions d’ euros) par mois. Si le problème n’est pas résolu avant la fin de l’année, cela fera presque 10 milliards de dollars (plus de 8,66 milliards d’euros) d’intérêt à verser !

Dernier tracas pour l’équipe de la Maison-Blanche, les accords commerciaux conclus avec 20 pays en 2025 s’appuient sur les droits de douane appliqués sous couvert de l’IEEPA. Ces accords sont donc fragilisés, car ils mentionnent tous explicitement l’utilisation de l’IEEPA comme base juridique du tarif appliqué par les États-Unis.

France 24, 2026.

Des accords à revoir

Pour illustration, prenons le cas de l’Union européenne. En août 2025, l’accord de Turnberry prévoyait que les exportations européennes taxées traditionnellement à moins de 15 % seraient taxées à 15 %, les produits taxés à plus de 15 % ayant un droit inchangé. Donc un produit taxé traditionnellement à 10 % serait taxé à 15 % du fait du seul accord de Turnberry. Mais, avec la section 122, du fait de l’application de la surcharge tarifaire de 10 points de pourcentage, il pourrait être maintenant taxé à 20 %. L’accord de Turnberry est dans ce cas plus intéressant.

Prenons un autre cas de figure : un produit dont le droit aux États-Unis avant l’investiture de Donald Trump était de 0 %. Quand c’est l’Union européenne qui l’exporte, du fait de l’accord de Turnberry, il passe à 15 %. Mais avec la section 122, les concurrents directs des Européens ne vont être pénalisés que d’un droit de douane de 10 %. La situation est donc défavorable aux Européens si l’accord est conservé.

Pour les Européens, il sera aussi important de connaître le sort, donc le droit de douane, que leur réserve l’enquête 301 : sera-t-il opportun de le contester et de réclamer l’application de l’accord de Turnberry ? Ou, au contraire, d’accepter le nouveau tarif américain sur les exportations européennes ? La position de l’Union européenne est donc difficile à définir, et l’impact du verdict de la Cour suprême sur l’accord de Turnberry est incertain.

Si la Cour suprême des États-Unis a bien rappelé avec force les limites du pouvoir présidentiel, elle n’a pas mis fin au chaos induit par la politique commerciale américaine. Bien au contraire !

The Conversation

Antoine Bouët ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Droits de douane américains : encore plus de chaos… et 10 milliards d’intérêts à payer – https://theconversation.com/droits-de-douane-americains-encore-plus-de-chaos-et-10-milliards-dinterets-a-payer-279017

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Ce qu’un trou béant dans le tablier d’un pont à Châteauguay révèle sur le vieillissement des infrastructures au Canada

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Amirreza Torabizadeh, PhD candidate, Civil Engineering, Concordia University

A hole on the Sauvagine Bridge in Chateauguay, Québec, on March 4, 2026. (Eric Allard, Mayor of Chateauguay/Facebook)

Lorsqu’un trou profond est récemment apparu d ans le tablier d’un pont à Châteauguay, au Québec, bien des gens ont naturellement manifesté leur inquiétude. Plusieurs résidants ont même exprimé des réticences à emprunter le pont après avoir vu des images montrant l’armature d’acier exposée et le béton endommagé, et certaines personnes ont déclaré aux médias locaux qu’elles réfléchiraient à deux fois avant de l’emprunter.

Pour les automobilistes qui empruntent le pont tous les jours, cette situation soulève une question : comment une chose aussi grave a-t-elle pu se produire soudainement sur un pont qui demeure ouvert à la circulation ?

En réalité, ce genre d’incident ne survient que rarement du jour au lendemain. Ce que le public perçoit comme une défaillance soudaine n’est souvent que l’aboutissement visible d’une détérioration qui progressait à l’intérieur de la structure depuis de nombreuses années.

(CTV News)

Des ponts Canadiens construits il y a des décennies

Souvent, ce n’est pas le pont en entier qui est atteint dans de telles situations, mais le tablier, soit la plate-forme de béton sur laquelle circulent les véhicules. Bien que grave, une faille localisée du tablier n’équivaut pas à un effondrement de la principale structure porteuse du pont.



À lire aussi :
De nouvelles technologies permettent de détecter plus tôt les problèmes des ponts vieillissants

Les ponts sont généralement conçus au moyen de plusieurs éléments structurels sur lesquels se répartit la charge totale de l’ouvrage, et les ingénieurs évaluent minutieusement ces éléments avant de décider si la circulation peut se maintenir en toute sécurité sur les différentes parties du pont.

Néanmoins, l’apparition de ce type de dommages met en lumière un défi plus vaste auquel sont confrontées les villes partout au Canada : le vieillissement des infrastructures.

De nombreux ponts actuellement en service ont été construits il y a plusieurs décennies, souvent dans les années 1950, 1960 ou 1970. Or, au fil du temps, le rigoureux climat canadien entraîne une détérioration progressive des structures en béton armé.

Au Québec, les cycles de gel et de dégel, les infiltrations d’eau et le recours aux sels de déglaçage en hiver créent ensemble des conditions particulièrement dures pour les tabliers de pont. Les chlorures contenus dans les sels de voirie peuvent pénétrer dans le béton et corroder l’armature d’acier. À mesure que progresse la corrosion, les zones de rouille grandissantes provoquent des fissures et des dislocations à l’intérieur du béton, ce qui entraîne parfois le détachement de parties du tablier.

Comme ce processus se déroule en profondeur, la détérioration n’est pas toujours immédiatement visible en surface. Lorsque des fissures ou des trous apparaissent, les dommages peuvent déjà avoir progressé depuis des années.

Détecter les problèmes à l’avance

Pour les ingénieurs, l’un des principaux défis consiste à comprendre les effets des dommages sur la performance structurelle de l’ensemble du pont. Les inspections visuelles restent un outil essentiel pour détecter ces dommages, mais elles ne permettent pas toujours de déterminer l’incidence de la détérioration sur le comportement structurel de l’ouvrage.

Nos recherches ont montré que la modélisation informatique peut apporter des informations importantes sur l’interprétation des dommages. Les simulations numériques permettent de reproduire des mécanismes tels que la fissuration, la dégradation des matériaux et les variations de l’interaction entre l’armature d’acier et le béton. En intégrant ces effets dans les analyses structurelles, les ingénieurs sont mieux en mesure d’évaluer la capacité que conserve une structure vieillissante et de détecter les vulnérabilités potentielles avant qu’elles ne dégénèrent en problèmes plus graves.



À lire aussi :
Comment mieux construire ? Voici un nouveau guide qui assure la durabilité et la résilience des infrastructures

Outre les inspections visuelles et les données de surveillance, la modélisation computationnelle peut également constituer un moyen économique d’évaluer le vieillissement des infrastructures. Dans le cadre de simulations, des scénarios virtuels permettent aux ingénieurs d’étudier les effets des mécanismes de détérioration — tels que la fissuration, la corrosion ou la dégradation de l’adhérence entre l’armature et le béton — sur le comportement structurel d’un pont.

Ces simulations permettent d’évaluer l’incidence de dommages localisés comme la détérioration du tablier d’un pont sur le comportement structurel de la construction. Comme ces analyses s’appuient principalement sur des outils informatiques plutôt que sur des essais physiques à grande échelle, elles peuvent fournir de précieux renseignements à un coût relativement bas et contribuer à éclairer les décisions en matière d’entretien et de mise à niveau.

Sécurité à long terme

L’incident survenu à Châteauguay nous rappelle une fois de plus que les infrastructures du Canada vieillissent rapidement. Pour garantir la sécurité publique, les décideurs doivent adopter une approche proactive plutôt que réactive.

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Pour assurer la sécurité, il est nécessaire de mettre au point de meilleurs outils de compréhension des processus invisibles qui affaiblissent les structures au fil du temps. Ces outils permettront d’intervenir plus rapidement et en meilleure connaissance de cause pour effectuer des travaux de réparation et de modernisation.

À mesure que les ponts du pays vieillissent, le maintien de leur sécurité à long terme nécessitera à la fois des inspections et un entretien réguliers, des analyses techniques avancées et, au besoin, le recours à des techniques de renforcement efficaces.

Les problèmes peuvent commencer par de gros trous qui apparaissent dans le tablier des ponts, mais ces incidents mettent en évidence la nécessité d’un débat beaucoup plus large sur la manière dont les pouvoirs publics entretiennent et rénovent les infrastructures dont dépendent quotidiennement des millions de personnes.

La Conversation Canada

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

– ref. Ce qu’un trou béant dans le tablier d’un pont à Châteauguay révèle sur le vieillissement des infrastructures au Canada – https://theconversation.com/ce-quun-trou-beant-dans-le-tablier-dun-pont-a-chateauguay-revele-sur-le-vieillissement-des-infrastructures-au-canada-279302

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Réemploi des matériaux : Pourquoi est-ce si compliqué dans le bâtiment ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Sébastien Bourdin, Professeur de géographie économique, IÉSEG School of Management

Le bâtiment est, de nos jours, responsable de 15 % des déchets produits en France, loin devant les déchets ménagers. Marek Studzinski/Unsplash, CC BY

Dans le bâtiment, donner une seconde vie aux matériaux relève encore du parcours du combattant, et ce, malgré des bénéfices environnementaux avérés.

Premier producteur de déchets en France, loin devant les ménages, le secteur du bâtiment génère chaque année près de 42 millions de tonnes de déchets, soit environ 15 % des déchets nationaux. Béton, briques, tuiles, plâtre, menuiseries : ces matériaux issus des chantiers de construction et de démolition constituent pourtant un gisement colossal de matériaux de seconde vie encore largement sous-valorisé.

Face à cet enjeu, les pouvoirs publics ont choisi de s’appuyer sur un instrument bien connu des politiques environnementales : le principe du pollueur-payeur, décliné depuis mai 2023 sous la forme d’une responsabilité élargie du producteur (REP) pour les produits et matériaux de construction du bâtiment (PMCB), aujourd’hui largement critiquée.

Mais derrière ce dispositif réglementaire se joue un choix politique majeur  : continuer à privilégier le recyclage des déchets du bâtiment ou encourager le réemploi des matériaux de seconde vie. Dans un cas, on concasse, on transforme. Dans l’autre, on dépose et on réintègre. Deux approches de l’économie circulaire avec des impacts environnementaux bien différents.

Qu’est-ce que la REP ?

Le principe de la REP est simple : les entreprises qui mettent sur le marché des matériaux de construction doivent financer leur fin de vie au moyen d’une éco-contribution intégrée au prix de vente. Ces fonds sont ensuite collectés auprès de ceux qui mettent les matériaux sur le marché et gérés par des éco-organismes agréés par l’État, chargés d’organiser et de financer leur collecte, leur tri et leur valorisation.

Avant la REP, la gestion des déchets du bâtiment reposait largement sur les entreprises de travaux qui intervenaient sur les chantiers : elles devaient contractualiser directement avec des opérateurs, assumer les coûts de collecte, de transport et de traitement, et organiser elles-mêmes le tri sur les chantiers, dans un cadre souvent hétérogène selon les territoires, ce qui favorisait parfois les dépôts sauvages.

Sur le papier, la REP devait donc apporter une contrepartie claire : une reprise facilitée, voire gratuite, des déchets de chantier en échange d’une contribution intégrée au prix des matériaux neufs. Dans la pratique, toutefois, la mise en œuvre de ce principe s’est révélée plus complexe.

REP Bâtiment : qui fait quoi ?

  • Quatre éco-organismes, agréés par l’État, se partagent aujourd’hui la mise en œuvre de la REP Bâtiment en France.
  • Valobat traite l’ensemble des catégories de produits et matériaux ;
  • Ecominéro intervient essentiellement sur les produits minéraux (béton, gravats, tuiles, briques…) ;
  • Ecomaison et Valdelia couvrent les autres produits et matériaux non minéraux (bois, plastiques, menuiseries, isolants…).
  • Leurs actions sont coordonnées par l’OCAB (Organisme coordonnateur agréé pour la filière bâtiment), qui harmonise les règles entre filières, répartit les obligations de collecte sur le territoire et propose un guichet unique aux acteurs concernés.

Un dispositif encore difficilement opérationnel sur le terrain

Premier écueil : le nombre de points de reprise des déchets. Alors que l’objectif était de proposer un maillage dense et accessible, la réalité demeure contrastée. En mars 2025, sur environ 6 385 points recensés, à peine 1 000 acceptaient effectivement l’ensemble des sept flux de déchets définis par la loi.

Deuxième source de friction : le montant des écocontributions. La REP devait, en principe, compenser les coûts d’évacuation des déchets par la gratuité de la reprise, sous réserve du tri et du dépôt dans des points agréés. Or, le déploiement du réseau des points de reprise s’est accompagné d’une montée en charge rapide des budgets des éco-organismes : 121 millions d’euros en 2023, 170 millions en 2024, avec une projection à 610 millions d’euros en 2027 selon un rapport du Sénat.

Ces budgets étant alimentés par les écocontributions versées par les metteurs sur le marché, leur montée en charge s’est mécaniquement traduite par une hausse des écocontributions intégrées au prix de vente des matériaux neufs.

À titre d’illustration, selon le barème Valobat de 2025, l’écocontribution applicable aux briques en terre cuite s’établissait à 1,88 euro par tonne commercialisée, contre 14,48 euros par tonne pour certains panneaux en bois biosourcé. Si cette augmentation peut s’expliquer par les coûts de structuration d’une filière encore récente, elle a pour effet immédiat d’alourdir le coût des matériaux, sans que l’amélioration du service de reprise soit uniformément perceptible sur le terrain. Pour beaucoup d’entreprises, la REP apparaît ainsi comme une charge supplémentaire dans un secteur déjà sous tension.

« La REP PMCB est un échec. Nos entreprises payent 3 % de plus sur leurs matériaux pour un service proche de zéro. Et doivent finalement repayer derrière pour la récupération des déchets. Le moratoire ne donne rien. C’est même pire qu’avant. Cessons l’acharnement thérapeutique, il faut tout reprendre à zéro ! », déclarait Olivier Salleron, le président de la Fédération française du bâtiment.

Troisième fragilité : l’opacité du dispositif. Les fédérations professionnelles pointent l’absence de données lisibles sur l’utilisation des fonds, les coûts réels de collecte des déchets et les performances environnementales obtenues. Cette opacité nourrit une défiance croissante envers les éco-organismes. Elle affaiblit aussi l’acceptabilité économique du dispositif et la propension des acteurs à s’y conformer. D’autant que certaines collectivités continuent d’assurer la collecte et le tri sans compensation, tandis que d’autres voient leurs demandes de contractualisation refusées, laissant s’accumuler les flux en déchetterie.

Données issues des rapports d’activité de 2024.

Ces dysfonctionnements ont fini par rattraper le dispositif. « Il y a trop de prélèvements au regard du financement assuré par la REP, pas de visibilité sur leur devenir et une performance environnementale défaillante. Une grande partie des déchets est incinérée ou exportée, et non recyclée », constatait en décembre dernier le ministre délégué Mathieu Lefèvre. Un constat qui fait suite à la décision, quelques mois plus tôt, de l’État de mettre la filière sous moratoire jusqu’à mi-2026, avec l’ambition affichée de « refonder » le dispositif pour en garantir la soutenabilité économique.

L’annonce des premières orientations, le 19 février dernier, des premières orientations marque ainsi une tentative de traduction opérationnelle de cette refonte.

Parmi les mesures avancées figure le renforcement du maillage territorial des points de reprise, en s’appuyant prioritairement sur les déchetteries professionnelles, afin de mieux couvrir les besoins et de soulager les collectivités d’une charge jugée excessive. Le pilotage serait régionalisé, avec des dispositifs spécifiques prévus pour les « zones blanches ». Autre axe majeur : la baisse des coûts, via une réorientation des flux financiers (et des écocontributions) vers les matériaux dits « non matures » – plastiques, laines minérales, membranes – afin de structurer leurs filières de recyclage.

Ces annonces répondent principalement aux difficultés de financement et d’organisation du recyclage. Mais on peut encore s’interroger sur la place accordée au réemploi dans le dispositif.

Le réemploi, parent pauvre de la REP

Si le recyclage – qui consiste à transformer le déchet en matière première secondaire – est aujourd’hui industriellement structuré et largement pratiqué, le réemploi – l’utilisation d’un matériau de seconde vie tel quel ou après remise en état – demeure marginal.

Les gains environnementaux associés au réemploi sont pourtant solidement documentés. Une étude scientifique de 2024 comparant des produits de construction réemployés à leurs équivalents neufs montre que le réemploi réduit significativement les impacts environnementaux, principalement en évitant l’étape de production des matériaux neufs, généralement la plus émettrice. L’exemple des briques est particulièrement éclairant : une analyse du cycle de vie menée dans le cadre d’un projet européen montre qu’un mur en briques réemployées présente une empreinte environnementale nettement inférieure à celle d’un mur en briques neuves, y compris lorsque ces dernières sont recyclées en fin de vie. L’écart tient principalement à l’évitement de la phase de cuisson, procédé particulièrement énergivore et fortement émetteur de CO2.

Or, dans les faits, le recyclage capte l’essentiel des gisements et des financements. Plus simple à organiser, plus compatible avec les logiques industrielles existantes et mieux soutenu par les dispositifs actuels, il tend à reléguer le réemploi au second plan. Le cadre réglementaire demeure historiquement structuré autour du traitement des déchets plutôt que de leur évitement.

L’arrêté du 10 juin 2022, qui fait office de cahier des charges pour la REP, fixait pourtant un objectif de 5 % de réemploi à l’horizon 2028, sur un gisement estimé à 21 millions de tonnes par an – un objectif qui paraît aujourd’hui difficilement atteignable au regard des résultats observés.

Les données de l’Ademe, portant sur environ 11 000 producteurs adhérents, illustrent ce déséquilibre :

  • 182 millions de tonnes de matériaux ont été mises sur le marché en 2024 ;

  • 10,7 millions de tonnes de déchets ont été collectées ;

  • Le réemploi plafonne à 29,3 kilotonnes, soit moins de 0,3 % des tonnages collectés.

Les raisons du non-réemploi

Pourquoi, dès lors, le réemploi demeure-t-il marginal malgré les objectifs affichés ? Notre étude de terrain, publiée dans Business Strategy & the Environment, menée en 2025 auprès de 69 professionnels du bâtiment (maîtres d’ouvrage, architectes, constructeurs, bureaux de contrôle, laboratoires…) montre que le réemploi des matériaux inertes – briques, dalles béton, pavés, tuiles –, qui représente 80 % des déchets du bâtiment, ne bute pas sur un seul problème technique, mais sur une accumulation de contraintes qui se déploient tout au long de la chaîne de valeur, depuis la programmation jusqu’à la mise en œuvre sur le chantier.

Prenons l’exemple d’un promoteur immobilier qui souhaite intégrer, dans une nouvelle opération, des briques issues d’un ancien immeuble qu’il n’a pas construit et dont il connaît mal l’histoire. Dès la phase de cadrage, les premières difficultés apparaissent. Les diagnostics déchets – désormais obligatoires – suffisent à dire que ces briques peuvent être recyclées, mais ne permettent pas de documenter leur réemploi : on ne connaît ni leur état réel, ni leur mode de fixation, ni leur résistance résiduelle, ni leur exposition passée à l’humidité ou au gel.

Résultat : l’architecte ne sait pas si ces briques pourront être utilisées en façade porteuse ou seulement en parement décoratif. Le doute porte sur des risques très concrets : fissures, perte de résistance mécanique, non-conformité aux exigences actuelles.

Vient ensuite le verrou de la conformité des matériaux. Qui supporte le risque si un matériau se révèle non conforme ? Le maître d’ouvrage ? L’entreprise chargée de la dépose ? Le revendeur ? Faute de règles et de recommandations professionnelles, la responsabilité reste un élément bloquant. Chacun se protège.

Dans le doute, les briques sont très souvent écartées – non parce qu’elles seraient inutilisables, mais parce qu’aucun cadre clair ne permet d’en sécuriser l’usage. Le risque n’est pas seulement juridique : c’est aussi celui d’un refus en contrôle, d’un retard de chantier, ou de surcoûts liés à des essais supplémentaires en laboratoire, qui finissent par désavantager économiquement les matériaux réemployés face aux produits neufs certifiés.

Enfin, la réalité du chantier rattrape les intentions. Déposer des briques sans les casser prend du temps. Il faut ensuite repérer les gisements disponibles, les trier, reconditionner les lots sélectionnés, les stocker. Or, les calendriers des opérations de déconstruction et de construction coïncident rarement : des briques peuvent être disponibles aujourd’hui, alors que le chantier susceptible de les réemployer ne démarrera que dans six mois. Sans solution de stockage tampon ni logistique organisée, le gisement repéré se perd.

Sous la pression des délais, les entreprises se replient sur des matériaux neufs, jugés plus simples à intégrer, tandis que les reconditionneurs – qui travaillent sur des flux diffus, hétérogènes, à faible tonnage mais à forte intensité de main-d’œuvre – jugent les soutiens des éco-organismes insuffisants.

Ce décalage crée un effet d’éviction : même lorsque le réemploi est plus vertueux sur le plan environnemental, il devient économiquement moins attractif que l’orientation rapide des matériaux vers les filières de recyclage, dont le modèle économique repose sur des soutiens financiers de la REP calculés à la tonne, ce qui favorise les volumes élevés.

Le paradoxe est là : la REP est avant tout conçue pour collecter et trier des déchets. Tout est organisé pour alimenter des filières de recyclage déjà en place. À l’inverse, le réemploi suppose d’agir plus tôt : identifier les matériaux en amont des opérations de déconstruction (ou de réhabilitation), organiser leur dépose sans casse, leur stockage temporaire et leur remise sur le marché. Or ces étapes amont sont encore peu financées et peu outillées par la REP. Résultat : le système favorise mécaniquement le recyclage de masse et laisse le réemploi en marge.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

– ref. Réemploi des matériaux : Pourquoi est-ce si compliqué dans le bâtiment ? – https://theconversation.com/reemploi-des-materiaux-pourquoi-est-ce-si-complique-dans-le-batiment-277385