Category: The Conversation

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An ancient oracle warned invading Persia would backfire – from Croesus to Trump, rulers have failed to listen

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

Photo by Stefano Bianchetti/Corbis via Getty Images

Invasions of ancient Persia were always daunting tasks. They often led to disaster.

In the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, the Persian empire came to dominate a vast and varied geography with Iran at its heart.

Comprising modern Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the Persian Gulf and parts of other neighbouring countries, the Persian Empire was established and ruled by the Achaemenids. This powerful dynasty lasted all the way to about 330 BCE when Alexander the Great defeated its last ruler, Darius III.

But in the early days of this Achaemenid Persian expansion (546 BCE), the legendary King Croesus (from Lydia, in western Turkey) decided to challenge it.

Reputedly the richest man in the world, Croesus consulted the famed Oracle of Apollo at Delphi (in Greece). The oracle, according to ancient writer Herodotus, told Croesus:

that if he should send an army against the Persians he would destroy a great empire.

Croesus’ subsequent invasion and defeat by the Persian king, Cyrus, saw the destruction of his own empire. The oracle accurately foretold the outcome but not as Croesus had hoped.

Croesus wasn’t the last ruler to invade Persia and realise he’d bitten off more than he could chew.

From the 6th century BCE to the 4th century CE, Greeks and Romans invaded Persia multiple times. The risks were high, the logistics complicated.

In fact – as US President Donald Trump is now discovering – wars like these, in this part of the world, are a lot easier to start than they are to end.

Complex and high-risk

The vast resources and manpower of the Achaemenid empire, together with its varied geography, made any invasion of Persia complex and high-risk.

When Alexander the Great (also known as Alexander III of Macedon) invaded in 334 BCE, he led stunning military successes against the Persians over the next few years.

But by the time of his premature death in Babylon in 323 BCE, organisation of the vast territory he had conquered was a hodge-podge of short-term arrangements.

Over time, the memory of Alexander in the Iranian territories he conquered was one of contempt. The Persian territory he conquered couldn’t be held by his successors.

Around 70 years after Alexander’s death, a new dynasty emerged in Iran.

Known as the Arsacid Parthians, they would dominate much of the former Achaemenid territory for centuries.

The Arsacid Parthians became the key rivals of the Romans as they (the Romans) expanded further east from the 1st century BCE onwards.

The first invasion of the Parthian empire by the Romans ended in total disaster – for the Romans.

The Roman general Crassus invaded Parthian imperial territory in southern Turkey in 53 BCE. The Parthian army annihilated Crassus’ forces near the city of Carrhae. Around 20,000 Roman soldiers died (including Crassus and his son) and 10,000 were captured.

This disaster would live in the Roman memory for centuries.

‘A source of constant wars and great expense’

Even when Roman invasions of the Parthian empire in the 2nd century CE were successful, there was often a sting in the tail. The emperor Trajan invaded all the way to the Persian Gulf in 116/117 CE but couldn’t hold any of his gains.

Later in the 2nd century CE, Roman invasions of the Parthian empire did see territorial gains in Mesopotamia (southern Turkey).

But one contemporary Roman writer, Cassius Dio, thought these gains were more trouble than they were worth:

He [emperor Septimius Severus] used to declare that he had added a vast territory to the empire and had made it a bulwark of Syria. On the contrary, it is shown by the facts themselves that this conquest has been a source of constant wars and great expense to us.

From loss to ultimate humiliation

In the 3rd century CE, the Sasanian dynasty took control of Iran and Mesopotamia from the Parthians. The Sasanian Persians inflicted serious defeats on invading Roman armies in the centuries ahead.

The Roman emperor Gordian III died in battle against the Sasanians in 244 CE. He led a large-scale invasion of the Persian empire but died trying to attack the capital, Seleucia-Ctesiphon. His successor (Philip I) signed a humiliating peace treaty to ransom what was left of the army.

But the ultimate humiliations for Roman emperors were yet to come.

In 260 CE, the emperor Valerian was captured by the Persian king, Shapur I.

Legendary accounts claimed Valerian served as a footstool for Shapur when he mounted his horse.

Rock reliefs from the 3rd century depicting Valerian and Philip I in subjection to Shapur survive in Iran to this day.

Around a century later, the emperor Julian died while invading the Persian empire. Leading an army of 60,000 men, Julian suffered a heavy defeat and was killed north of the Persian capital, Seleucia-Ctesiphon.

The ensuing peace treaty saw Rome lose key territory and fortresses in northern Mesopotamia.

It would take more than a century for Rome to recover from this defeat.

Most ancient invasions of the Persian empire caused serious problems for those who prosecuted them.

The varied and sometimes harsh nature of the geography was an important factor. The national resolve and military preparedness were others.

While the current US-Israel war against Iran is different in many ways to ancient wars directed at Persia, the 3rd-century Sasanian rock reliefs are reminders of what can go wrong.

The Conversation

Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. An ancient oracle warned invading Persia would backfire – from Croesus to Trump, rulers have failed to listen – https://theconversation.com/an-ancient-oracle-warned-invading-persia-would-backfire-from-croesus-to-trump-rulers-have-failed-to-listen-279750

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Iran’s president appeals to Americans − but does his office still hold any real power?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Roxane Razavi, Visiting scholar in contemporary Middle Eastern history, Princeton University

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attends the Quds Day march in Tehran on March 13, 2026. Hassan Ghaedi/Anadolu via Getty Images

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian penned an open letter to “the people of the United States” on April 1, 2026, in which he implored Americans to “look beyond” misinformation that portrayed Iran as a threat to the world.

It was, perhaps, his most prominent intervention during the current conflict. Despite being the president of a country in the midst of crisis, Pezeshkian hasn’t had the highest of war profiles.

Criticized by conservatives at home for his conciliatory tone, the reformist politician has also been sidelined by Iran’s adversaries. Western media initially appeared more interested in the musings of Pezeshkian’s son, Yousef. President Donald Trump has barely mentioned Pezeshkian, other than in an oblique social media post on April 1 in which he claimed “Iran’s new regime president” had asked the U.S. for a ceasefire – something denied by Iran.

International attention has instead largely centered on the role of Iran’s supreme leader. First, it was about who would succeed Ali Khamenei after his killing in the first strikes of the war, and then what was known about his successor and son, Mojtaba Khamenei.

As a researcher of contemporary Iranian politics, I think this focus on the supreme leader over the president inadvertently confirms a trend in Iran that has been happening for years: the cementing of a political structure that increasingly resembles a centralized dictatorship.

A man clasps his hands while sat in front of a photo of three men.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian records a video message on March 20, 2026.
AA Video/Anadolu via Getty Images

An uneasy balance

The concentration of power around one figure sits uneasily with one of the founding impulses of the 1979 revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic. A wide spectrum of revolutionary actors – Islamists, leftists and secular nationalists – were involved in the ousting of the shah. But they shared at least one principle: the rejection of monarchy.

The idea that one generation could not determine the political future of the next was precisely what many revolutionaries, despite their internal differences, had fought against.

As such, the system that initially emerged in 1979 was neither a pure theocracy nor a conventional republic. The supreme leader would exercise ultimate religious and political authority, and an elected president was to embody the republican dimension of the state. This second part gave institutional form to the revolutionary promise that people, through elections, would periodically renew political authority.

In the first decade after the revolution, this balance functioned, albeit in a fragile and conflictual manner.

The authority of Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s first supreme leader, coexisted with the presidency – most notably during the brief presidency of Abolhassan Bani Sadr. Elected in 1980, Bani Sadr quickly came into conflict with clerical factions over the direction of the revolution and the conduct of the Iran-Iraq war.

Accused of political incompetence, Bani Sadr was impeached by parliament in 1981 and subsequently fled into exile.

A man in glasses stands behind microphones
Iran’s first post-revolution president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, in exile in France in 1981.
Marc Bulka/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

The presidency of his successor, Ali Khamenei, marked a period of relative alignment with the supreme leader. Operating under Khomeini’s authority, Khamenei operated less as an autonomous political force than as an instrument embedded within a broader clerical and revolutionary consensus.

The dynamic between president and supreme leader was further redefined by the 1989 constitutional revision following Khomeini’s death and the elevation of Khamenei from president to supreme leader. The post of prime minister was abolished, consolidating executive authority in the presidency. At the same time, the institutional and political supremacy of the supreme leader was strengthened.

The weakening presidency

The presidency of Mohammad Khatami, who was elected in 1997, demonstrated that the office could still function as a significant locus of power. As Khatami’s tenure showed, presidents were still able to shape public discourse and policy agendas, particularly in areas such as cultural policy, foreign relations and economic management.

But a major turning point in the power of the office occurred in 2009 with the contested reelection of the hard-liner president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, amid widespread allegations of electoral fraud.

It led to mass demonstrations that became known as the “Green Movement.” The state responded with the repression of protesters, followed by a consolidation of the security apparatus – particularly the expanding influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps around the supreme leader.

At the same time, it marked the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s falling out of favor. His populist rhetoric and attempts to build an independent political base led to confrontations with clerical authorities in the early 2010s. It also exposed the regime’s intolerance for even a relatively autonomous presidency.

It contributed to a power struggle between Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that became public in 2011 when the then-president sought to dismiss Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi – only to be overruled by Khamanei.

Ahmadinejad was subsequently excluded from the 2017 presidential race by the Guardian Council, a body handpicked by the supreme leader. In so doing, Khamenei made it clear that while the office of the presidency could remain, it would cease to function as an independent center of decision-making and power.

Since then, presidents have continued to be elected, but their capacity to reshape the political order has been diminished sharply.

Two women hold posters with a man's face on it.
Supporters of hard-line Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Salah Malkawi/Getty Images

The presidency of Hassan Rouhani briefly appeared to be an exception. His election in 2013, and the subsequent negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, generated both domestic expectations and significant international attention.

Yet the durability of the agreement remained contingent on decisions taken beyond the presidency, both internationally and domestically. Its eventual unraveling during the first Trump administration confirmed suspicions among Iranian hard-liners around the supreme leader that reform, an independent power center in the presidency and diplomacy with the U.S. had been a mistake.

With even the limited form of democratic expression as embodied through an elected president suppressed, political disengagement has followed. Although voter turnout remained significant in the years immediately following 2009, a longer-term trend has seen people give up faith in elective politics in Iran. In the last election, held in 2024, just 39.9% of Iranians turned out to vote.

Consolidation of power

This diminishing of the role of the presidency and political legitimacy forms the background to any questions of succession now. But by reducing the political future of the country to the identity of future supreme leaders, observers risk normalizing the transformation of what was historically a contested and hybrid political system into one defined by a single office.

The bloody suppression of the January 2026 protests, the constraints imposed by wartime conditions and the increasing marginalization of elective institutions have all contributed to weakening the presidency.

The fallout of the current war may, of course, see a reorganization of political institutions in Iran. But for now, when Pezeshkian seeks diplomacy with Americans, the pertinent question is: Does his office still matter?

The Conversation

Roxane Razavi receives funding from the EHESS (PhD funding).

– ref. Iran’s president appeals to Americans − but does his office still hold any real power? – https://theconversation.com/irans-president-appeals-to-americans-but-does-his-office-still-hold-any-real-power-278705

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Where is transatlantic intelligence-sharing headed under the Trump administration?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Hager Ben Jaffel, Docteure en relations internationales spécialisée dans la sociologie du renseignement et de la sécurité, Institut catholique de Lille (ICL)

Repeated threats to annex Greenland, controversial diplomatic statements, and, more broadly, the antagonistic stance of the American executive toward Europeans point to an unprecedented climate of distrust among transatlantic allies, of which the latest Davos forum provided a revealing example. But what about alliances between intelligence services?

Often perceived as domestic instruments of political power, intelligence services are, in fact, highly internationalised and enjoy significant autonomy in their dealings with foreign counterparts, though this can occasionally be disrupted by political interference.

A history of long-standing collaborations

Cooperation between intelligence services is not new. Some partnerships date back at least to the First World War and are often the result of agreements between services themselves rather than formal decisions by governments. Whether bilateral or multilateral, these alliances underpin a wide range of activities: liaison officers posted abroad, listening stations, participation in international conferences, and routine exchanges of information.

International cooperation built on common ground and trust

Research in the social sciences has shown how, over time, a dense network of relationships has developed around shared interests. Counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and other perceived imminent threats have provided strong justification for cooperation, including the exchange of data on individuals, organizations or states considered “dangerous.” The widely held belief that sharing information helps prevent attacks has also encouraged the expansion of surveillance mechanisms – often at the expense of robust democratic oversight.

One example is the many partnerships between the National Security Agency (NSA) and several European counterparts. These collaborations have enabled the pooling of advanced technologies – such as artificial intelligence and algorithmic analysis – to collect and process large volumes of private communications. This work also depends on explicit alliances between intelligence agencies and major tech companies, which have become key intermediaries that, willingly or not, make their users’ data available to intelligence services.

The solidarity and trust on display should not obscure the fact that international cooperation remains a space marked by strong rivalries. Services compete to access information, shape priorities and secure an advantageous position in relationships where resources – financial, human, or technical – are unevenly distributed. In this context, espionage between services and other disloyal practices are also part of the game.

These dynamics suggest that intelligence alliances follow a logic of their own rather than unwavering loyalty to political authority. It is in this context that the Danish military intelligence service monitored the communications of several European political leaders on behalf of the NSA. Above all, because they possess in-depth knowledge of the threats facing the world, intelligence services are able to position themselves at the heart of security decision-making, making political leaders dependent on their expertise.

Continuity despite political interference

That said, these alliances are not immune to political pressures. Disputes between intelligence services and political leaders have always existed, but the openly hostile attitude of the “reactionary internationale” embodied by the Trump administration and its MAGA supporters has raised concerns about a possible breakdown – or at least a significant weakening of cooperation.

Faced with an unfavourable political context, they are often able to adjust and even turn the situation to their advantage.

Several European intelligence services have thus strengthened their cooperation, even raising the possibility of creating a European Five Eyes – in reference to the Anglosphere intelligence alliance linking Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to countries in Europe and Asia.

Others have specifically developed units to better anticipate the unpredictability of the American executive, with tangible effects: staffing in the unit dealing with the United States within France’s DGSE has increased, and the budgets of several European intelligence services are set to rise, benefiting from broader increases in defence spending.

More broadly, history shows that ties between services remain strong even when governments hold divergent positions. In the early 2000s, exchanges between the DGSE and the CIA continued despite disagreements over the war in Iraq.

A more recent example is Brexit, which did not lead to any major rupture in relations between the British police and their European counterparts, who continue to facilitate the flow of intelligence.

As in any relationship, signs of caution, distrust, or even ambivalence can emerge. For example, the British and Danish intelligence services have indicated that they are limiting – but not completely halting – their exchanges with their American counterparts, concerned about the legal implications and, more broadly, the politicisation of US intelligence. Irritated by repeated provocations over Greenland, the Danish military intelligence service went so far as to designate the United States as a national security threat, alongside China and Russia.

Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to assume that, under more normal circumstances, intelligence sharing would happen without any restrictions. Services do not share all their secrets, all the time, with everyone. On the contrary, the restraint shown by some reflects a routine asymmetry in exchanges that persists and can even be heightened during periods of turbulence.

Signs of continuity are evident, underscoring a key reality: intelligence primarily falls under the purview of career professionals, not politicians. Earlier this year, the Davos forum hosted European and Anglo-American intelligence chiefs, including the CIA, in a key meeting to preserve ties with the “Old Continent”.

Trump and the ‘deep state:‘ a love-hate relationship

Concerns among European services are partly linked to Donald Trump’s stated desire to dismantle the “deep state.” While he did follow through on some threats by dismissing personnel within intelligence agencies, these institutions have neither disappeared nor ceased to function. In practice, the executive branch remains dependent on them.

The appointment of controversial figures to lead several agencies, instead of career officials, reflects an effort to align leadership more closely with political and ideological priorities. Current international developments show that intelligence services remain essential to the implementation of foreign policy. Long criticised, the CIA now appears to have returned to favour with the White House, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the fight against drug trafficking and the conflict in Iran to reaffirm its relevance and legitimacy to political power.

Taken together, these developments highlight the complexity of the relationship between intelligence services and political power – one shaped by both distance and proximity.

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The Conversation

Hager Ben Jaffel ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Where is transatlantic intelligence-sharing headed under the Trump administration? – https://theconversation.com/where-is-transatlantic-intelligence-sharing-headed-under-the-trump-administration-279135

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Les médias français sont-ils racistes ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Pascale Colisson, chercheure en science de l’information et de la communication, IPJ, associée à la chaire management diversités et cohésion sociale, Université Paris Dauphine – PSL

Allusion au fait que l’« Homo Sapiens descend des singes », au « chef de tribu », au « mâle dominant » : sur la chaîne Cnews, Bally Bagayoko, nouveau maire de Saint-Denis, en Seine-Saint-Denis, a été victime de propos racistes. Ce dernier appelle à un grand « rassemblement citoyen » contre le racisme et les discriminations samedi 4 avril. Mais au-delà de ces attaques récentes, il est essentiel d’interroger les stéréotypes qui imprègnent la culture médiatique dominante.

Les propos tenus dans certains médias à l’encontre de maires noirs nouvellement élus provoquent réactions et indignations sélectives et interrogent la responsabilité des journalistes dans la perpétuation des stéréotypes racistes. Mais si certains propos véhiculés consciemment par une parole d’extrême droite cristallisent le débat, cela ne doit pas occulter le fait que ces biais racistes s’invitent depuis toujours, sous une forme plus ou moins consciente, dans les productions médiatiques.

Selon le sociologue Samuel Bouron, l’extrême droite diffuse ses idées en jouant sur la culture du buzz et la captation des affects, mais aussi sur les contraintes journalistiques en détournant leurs normes. Une stratégie portée par la recherche de l’audience fondée sur l’économie de l’attention et la surmédiatisation de certains faits, en particulier les faits divers contribuant à la fabrique de paniques morales, ce que le sociologue britannique Stanley Cohen définit par « une réaction collective disproportionnée à des pratiques culturelles ou personnelles en général minoritaires, considérées comme “déviantes” ou néfastes pour la société ».

Les stéréotypes, constante de la production médiatique

Nombreux sont les rapports, études et travaux de recherche qui montrent comment les stéréotypes liés à l’origine, la couleur de peau, la religion, se croisant parfois avec le lieu de résidence, en particulier les banlieues, imprègnent de façon plus ou moins consciente et conscientisée les pratiques professionnelles. La sociologie du journalisme montre ainsi comment les acteurs et actrices du métier partagent une identité aux contours flous, marquée par des représentations sociales très ancrées, très souvent stéréotypées, et assez peu conformes à la réalité.

Dès 2000, des travaux sur la représentation des minorités dites visibles à la télévision sont réalisés, lesquels pointent la minorisation et la disqualification de ces minorités. C’est d’ailleurs à partir de 2000 que le CSA, ancêtre de l’Arcom, modifie le cahier des charges des télévisions publiques et les conventions des chaînes privées pour leur imposer de « prendre en considération, dans la représentation à l’antenne, la diversité des origines et des cultures de la communauté nationale ».

Par ailleurs, les chaînes publiques comme les chaînes privées doivent rendre un bilan annuel sur « la représentation des minorités », obligation étendue aux radios en 2005.

Pourtant, le baromètre de la diversité, publié tous les ans par le CSA puis par l’Arcom depuis 2012, signale que, sur la période 2013-2023, les personnes non blanches sont représentées en moyenne à hauteur de 15 %, mais dans les programmes d’information/magazine/documentaire, elles apparaissent deux fois plus souvent parmi celles ayant une attitude négative que parmi celles ayant une attitude neutre. Cette attitude négative relève souvent d’activités décrites comme marginales ou illégales.

Si, sur cette période, les personnes perçues comme noires étaient représentées en moyenne 1,5 fois plus souvent parmi celles ayant une attitude négative que parmi celles ayant une attitude neutre, on observe une recrudescence de leur représentation négative puisque, en 2023, elles étaient 4 fois plus souvent représentées parmi les personnes ayant une attitude négative que parmi les personnes ayant une attitude neutre.

Les Noirs ont un corps, les Blancs ont un cerveau

Les nombreux travaux de recherche dans le domaine du sport montrent de façon significative une récurrence des renvois aux dispositions naturelles et une dimension « animale » voire « sauvage » pour les athlètes de couleur, des qualités de stratèges, de tacticiens et d’éthique pour les athlètes blancs.‬

Dans un autre cadre, des travaux ont mis en lumière le positionnement médiatique de l’origine des personnes au prisme de l’égalité des sexes. Nacira Guénif-Souilamas a ainsi analysé le stéréotype de la « beurette » qui porte une injonction à l’émancipation, et donc d’intégration, avec en sous-texte les valeurs républicaines contre le machisme présupposé inhérent au « garçon arabe », perçu comme naturellement violent et prédateur et supposément opposé à l’égalité femme-homme.

Les traitements médiatiques de l’origine, de l’immigration ou encore de l’islam se rejoignent souvent au sein d’un même territoire, celui que l’on réduit au terme de « banlieue », une désignation très réductrice au regard de la multiplicité des situations économiques et sociales de ces grands ensembles urbains. Les « banlieues » concentrent ainsi une forme d’intersectionnalité des stéréotypes négatifs. Une réalité mise en lumière en particulier par l’analyse de la couverture médiatique de la banlieue par le « 20 heures » de France 2 réalisée par le sociologue Jérôme Berthaut en 2013.

Cela commence par la conférence de rédaction, puissant lieu de prescription des priorités éditoriales et des bonnes façons de faire du journalisme. Cela se poursuit par l’action sur le terrain où les contraintes qui pèsent sur les reporters les encouragent à opter pour des procédés de raccourcis qui favorisent, dès la phase de la collecte de l’information, la mobilisation, sous un mode non réflexif et relevant de la routine, de stéréotypes récurrents sur « les banlieues ». Ceci se poursuit au moment du choix final, dans la sélection des sources, des images gardées au montage, les commentaires et la validation de la hiérarchie.

Les travaux de Julie Sedel complètent l’analyse en relevant la place prépondérante donnée aux faits divers violents lorsque les médias traitent des quartiers défavorisés de banlieue :

« La montée d’un traitement “fait-diversier” des “banlieues”, qui s’est opéré dans les années 1990 dans la presse, constitue bien le symptôme d’une dépolitisation dans la mesure où est évacuée la dimension “sociale”, c’est-à-dire aussi, politique, conflictuelle, au profit d’un fétichisme des “faits” et, en particulier, des faits de délinquance », écrit-elle.

La composition des rédactions en question

D’un point de vue qualitatif, j’ai mené un travail de recherche sur la diversité dans les médias fondé sur des entretiens avec 40 jeunes journalistes travaillant dans tous types de médias, pour tenter d’éclairer le débat sur trois dimensions : 1) Comment le fait de ne pas se reconnaître dans le groupe dominant affecte la façon dont on se positionne dans une rédaction, à la fois de façon personnelle et professionnelle ; 2) Quels sont les freins qui limitent les personnes, dites de la diversité, dans le fait d’être pleinement reconnues pour ce qu’elles sont, et pleinement légitimes à exercer le métier de journaliste ; 3) Quelles sont leurs marges de manœuvre en matière de transformation organisationnelle et de production de l’information.

Ces jeunes journalistes expriment toutes et tous le fait de vivre l’expérience minoritaire :

« Et comme d’habitude, je comptais en arrivant le nombre de personnes noires dans la rédaction, et j’étais toujours la seule, systématiquement la seule. »

Bien souvent, la prise en compte de la diversité ethno-raciale reste un impensé : il s’agit moins d’une volonté d’exclusion que d’une absence de prise en considération de la question soulevée :

« Bien sûr, on est ouverts, on est tous bienveillants, on n’est pas du tout racistes. Après les journalistes, ils sont tous blancs, les seuls Arabes, ils sont aux réseaux sociaux et les seuls Noirs, ils font le ménage. Mais on va t’expliquer que c’est parce qu’on n’a pas les profils et que, de toute façon, comme on ne voit pas les couleurs, quand on recrute, on ne fait pas attention. Bah oui, mais quand on ne voit pas les couleurs, on ne recrute que des gens blancs. »

Plusieurs témoignages évoquent des situations de racisme à la suite de certains faits d’actualité, en particulier ceux qui relèvent d’attentats, de terrorisme et d’islam. S’instaure un présupposé identitaire de leurs sympathies ou affinités, et un procès en militantisme récurrent dès qu’ils et elles tentent de proposer un autre récit médiatique.

Une différence d’appréciation qui se cristallise particulièrement sur certains sujets de société vus comme clivants, comme ceux de l’origine, de l’islam et du voile :

« Le directeur du web (d’une chaîne de télévision nationale) vient nous voir et nous dit : “Ah, super votre émission ! mais ce serait bien de montrer comment les femmes sont soumises, comment elles sont obligées de porter le voile.” Et on lui explique que notre sujet, c’était une petite femme de 1,60 m, voilée, qui prend des repris de justice pour les insérer socialement en leur faisant faire des maraudes, de l’aide humanitaire, etc. Et il fait comprendre un peu plus directement qu’il aimerait avoir ce sujet-là, sur les femmes voilées soumises, qui correspond à son imaginaire. »

Le choix médiatique de montrer à l’écran une femme portant le voile est si clivant qu’il peut générer une forme d’autocensure, anticipant sur les réactions présupposées de la hiérarchie :

« Pour le JT, moi, je n’ai jamais filmé une femme voilée. Je le savais, avec des collègues, qu’au montage, ça ne passait pas. Donc pourquoi aller filmer ? À part si tu fais un sujet sur l’islam. Mais, par exemple, un sujet sur l’informatique, une femme voilée qui est prof, tu ne peux pas aller la filmer. Ils ont tellement peur du téléspectateur ou de ce qu’ils projettent sur le téléspectateur, il y a un truc de l’ordre du : “On va se prendre 15 000 lettres, il va y avoir les tweets, machin, donc faisons simple.” »

Ces jeunes journalistes jouent de leur marge de manœuvre, même restreinte, pour semer des petites graines, en proposant un traitement de l’information, visant à sortir de l’assimilation de certaines personnes à certains sujets, qui relève souvent de stéréotypes très ancrés dans la profession :

« Pour le premier tour de l’élection présidentielle, j’ai recueilli des témoignages d’électeurs ou d’abstentionnistes et il y avait madame Martin, il y avait monsieur Sekou, éboueur à Pantin, qui a la nationalité française depuis quinze ans et pour qui le vote, c’est super important, il y avait une femme d’origine maghrébine, une jeune femme blanche. Mon objectif, c’est d’essayer d’aller vers des profils les plus différents possibles pour des sujets de monsieur et madame Tout-le-Monde. »

On voit à quel point la question du racisme et des stéréotypes dans les médias relève de causes multifactorielles, qui participent à la perpétuation d’un modèle dominant des récits. Le chemin est encore long et il commence par le fait de sortir d’une forme de déni, à tous les niveaux de l’organisation. Le mot de la fin sera celui d’un jeune journaliste :

« Je ne pense pas que le fait d’être d’autres origines ou d’avoir une histoire différente permette d’être un meilleur journaliste. Cela permet d’avoir un regard différent, une parole différente, ça oui. Je ne dis pas que quelqu’un qui a toujours vécu en milieu aisé, blanc, aseptisé, et d’une culture en particulier, ferait un moins bon journaliste, mais il aura un regard différent. En fait, je pense qu’il faut tous les regards et toutes les expériences pour raconter toutes les histoires qui composent une société, pour raconter le monde de la manière la plus fidèle possible. »

The Conversation

Pascale Colisson ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Les médias français sont-ils racistes ? – https://theconversation.com/les-medias-francais-sont-ils-racistes-279934

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Comment est fixé le prix d’un litre de carburant ?

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Salomée Ruel, Professeur, Pôle Léonard de Vinci

Pour un litre d’essence à 2,03 euros, le droit d’accise (ex-TICPE) représente 40,4 %, le pétrole brut 28,6 %, la distribution 14,4 %, la TVA 8,6 %. Gautier Normand/Shutterstock

Les prix à la pompe montent comme une fusée, mais descendent comme une plume. Un paradoxe en apparence mystérieux. En réalité, un litre de carburant est la somme de trois paramètres : le produit, à savoir le pétrole brut qui est ensuite raffiné, le couple logistique et distribution, et surtout les taxes. Comprendre cette décomposition clarifie les éventuelles marges de manœuvre de l’État, des producteurs et des distributeurs.

Au début était le produit, l’« or noir ». Le carburant vient du pétrole brut, souvent indexé sur le prix du Brent, converti du dollar vers l’euro, puis transformé dans des raffineries. À l’ouverture de la bourse, le 15 février 2026, le prix d’un baril de Brent était de 68,54 dollars (59,77 euros), de 100,88 dollars (87,98 euros) le 24 mars 2026 et de 106,6 dollars (92,97 euros) le 30 mars 2026.

Décomposition du prix de SP95 en France en 2026.
Roole

Logiquement, lorsque le prix d’un baril de Brent augmente (ou quand l’euro baisse), le coût de matières premières dans le prix final du carburant augmente lui aussi. À l’inverse, si le prix du pétrole brut diminue, mécaniquement le coût de matière première baisse, mais pas toujours instantanément ! En effet, il existe des délais liés aux stocks ou aux circuits d’approvisionnement.

Un ordre de grandeur aide à se repérer : un baril de Brent contient 159 litres. Une variation de dix dollars supplémentaires par baril (8,69 euros) fait monter le prix d’un litre d’essence de 6 cents de dollars (0,052 centime d’euro) « avant taxes », auxquels s’ajoutent les effets du taux de change et du raffinage.

Prix d’un baril de Brent au 31 mars 2025, 73,76 dollars ; au 31 mars 2026, 115,04 dollars.
Boursorama

Du dépôt pétrolier vers la station-service

Une autre partie du prix concerne le transport, le stockage et la vente de carburant depuis les dépôts pétroliers vers les stations-service.

Ces coûts logistiques augmentent année après année du fait de l’inflation – 5,2 % en 2022 et 0,9 % en 2025. Des salaires plus hauts ou une mise aux normes auront des conséquences sur le prix du carburant. D’après l’Insee, depuis 2022, les coûts de transport-distribution ont augmenté « plus modérément » que le pétrole brut et le raffinage, mais tout de même d’environ + 9 centimes d’euros par litre sur la période étudiée.

Avant même la marge des stations-service, une part du prix reflète des marges en amont, notamment la marge de raffinage et les conditions du marché de gros. Elles peuvent varier rapidement, notamment en cas de tensions logistiques.

Autre point important : malgré les débats, la marge nette d’une station-service reste généralement faible. De 2 centimes d’euros par litre pour les stations en grande distribution à environ 8 centimes d’euros par litre pour des stations plus onéreuses du réseau des indépendants.

Les consommateurs peuvent suivre en temps réel les prix des carburants dans les stations-service de l’Hexagone.
Gouv.fr

Taxes de l’État

Les taxes, fixées par l’État et complétées par les régions, sont la part la plus visible du prix d’un litre de carburant. Elles représentent entre 50 % et 60 % du prix final, selon le type de carburant et le niveau du baril. Résultat : quand le prix du brut varie, seule une partie du prix à la pompe peut s’ajuster, le reste étant fiscal et donc relativement rigide.

Deux éléments sont à prendre en compte :

  • L’accise (ex-taxe intérieure de consommation sur les produits énergétiques, ou TICPE), qui représente 36 % du prix à la pompe du gazole et 39 % de celui du sans-plomb (SP95). Le montant fixe par litre (en 2026, hors majorations régionales, est de 68,29 centimes d’euros par litre pour l’essence et 59,40 centimesd’euros par litre pour le gazole. L’accise nationale est stable depuis 2018.

  • La taxe sur la valeur ajoutée (TVA), à 20 % depuis 2006, qui s’applique sur le prix hors taxe, mais aussi sur l’accise. Quand le prix du produit monte, la TVA augmente mécaniquement.

En 2025, toutes les régions, sauf la Corse, ont adopté la majoration maximale du taux de l’accise.

Effets contre-intuitifs d’une baisse de taxe

Du côté de l’État, le principale marge de manœuvre est fiscale. Par exemple, modifier l’accise temporairement ou durablement, et jouer sur des dispositifs de compensation comme les « remises » universelles ou ciblées.

En 2026, le gouvernement de Sébastien Lecornu privilégie un plan de soutien de 70 millions d’euros avec des « aides ciblées ».



À lire aussi :
Comment la révolution iranienne engendra le second choc pétrolier de 1979

Toute baisse de taxe a un coût budgétaire très significatif, car l’accise sur les carburants reste une recette majeure. En 2022, les remises sur les prix à la pompe avaient coûté plus de huit milliards d’euros à l’État ; en 2023, les chèques carburants près d’un milliard.

À noter un élément essentiel contre-intuitif : quand les prix augmentent, les automobilistes finissent souvent par réduire leur consommation. Or, l’accise est perçue par litre. Par conséquent, si les volumes baissent, les recettes d’accise baissent aussi, ce qui peut annuler (voire inverser) le gain de TVA lié à un prix plus élevé.

Marges (faibles) des distributeurs

Affiche de l’« opération transparence » carburant.
40 millions d’automobilistes, CC BY-NC

Côté distributeurs, les stations-service, comme celles Shell, Avia, TotalEnergies, Carrefour, Leclerc ou Esso, peuvent ajuster leurs marges. Sur un produit très concurrentiel comme le carburant, il n’est question que de quelques centimes seulement.

C’est pourquoi la Fédération nationale de l’automobile et l’association 40 millions d’automobilistes (opposée aux radars urbains et aux pistes cyclables à Paris après le confinement) ont lancé le 19 mars 2026 « l’opération transparence ». L’enjeu : afficher à leur caisse le détail précis du prix d’un litre de carburant.

« Rockets and Feathers »

« Les prix montent comme une fusée, mais descendent comme une plume. » En économie, ce phénomène est connu sous le nom de Rockets and Feathers. Une étude sur le marché britannique souligne que les prix de détail s’ajustent plus rapidement quand les coûts augmentent que lorsqu’ils baissent. Une autre étude, aux États-Unis, confirme cette contradiction.

Évolution des prix des carburants en France de 2007 à 2026.
Roole, CC BY-NC

Cette asymétrie apparaît pour plusieurs raisons.

Délais et stocks

Une station vend « aujourd’hui » du carburant acheté « hier ». Si le brut baisse, le prix « théorique » baisse tout de suite, mais le carburant en cuve a été payé à l’ancien coût.

À l’inverse, quand les coûts montent, le risque de vendre à perte rend l’ajustement plus rapide. Car, la vente à perte est une pratique commerciale interdite.



À lire aussi :
Pourquoi les frappes sur l’Iran nous rappellent qu’il est urgent d’abandonner le pétrole

Coûts d’ajustement et de coordination

Dans beaucoup de réseaux de distribution, les prix sont modifiés « par salves » plutôt qu’en continu. Les stations ne révisent pas leur affichage à chaque microvariation du marché, mais à des moments précis (par exemple, une ou deux fois par jour), souvent en regardant les prix des stations voisines. Ce mode d’ajustement peut rendre les baisses plus lentes, parce que la station attend davantage d’informations (confirmation de la baisse) ou le « bon moment » pour s’aligner.

Comportement des automobilistes

Quand les prix flambent, les consommateurs comparent plus, changent de station, et la concurrence « s’active » : d’où les mises à jour de prix plus régulières. Quand les prix baissent, la pression concurrentielle est généralement moins intense. La baisse se diffuse alors plus lentement.

Taxes « rigides »

La présence d’une accise fixe, ou « rigidifie », le prix. Quand le produit baisse, la part fiscale reste la même. Logiquement, la baisse totale à la pompe est mécaniquement moins spectaculaire que la variation du pétrole (et donc, parfois moins visible).

Coûts à long-terme

Quand l’actualité géopolitique se tend, notamment dans le détroit d’Ormuz, c’est surtout le « paramètre produit » qui s’emballe, puis qui se transmet implacablement vers les pompes des stations-service. Par conséquent, les automobilistes voient leur facture en carburant augmenter inexorablement.

Pour pallier ces hausses tarifaires, l’État dispose d’un levier réel via les taxes (TVA et droit d’accise), mais il est politiquement sensible et coûteux pour les finances publiques.

Les producteurs de pétrole, comme le Canada, l’Arabie saoudite ou le Kazakhstan, influencent l’amont via le niveau de production et le prix d’un baril de pétrole brut (Brent). Les distributeurs jouent surtout sur la vitesse de répercussion des prix, avec des bénéfices limités.

Ces marges de manœuvre existent, mais elles sont rarement immédiates, et presque toujours assorties d’un coût à moyen terme et long terme.

The Conversation

Salomée Ruel ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Comment est fixé le prix d’un litre de carburant ? – https://theconversation.com/comment-est-fixe-le-prix-dun-litre-de-carburant-279632

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Pam Bondi’s extreme political loyalty to Trump wasn’t enough to save her job

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Austin Sarat, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst College

President Donald Trump participates in a roundtable discussion in Memphis, Tenn., with Attorney General Pam Bondi on March 23, 2026. AP Photo/Bruce Newman

After President Donald Trump fired Attorney General Pam Bondi on April 2, 2026, news reports suggested that she fell from grace, not for being too independent, but for not being effective enough at defending him and prosecuting his political enemies.

As The New York Times reported the previous day, Trump was disappointed with “Ms. Bondi’s handling of the Jeffrey Epstein files, which has become a political liability for Mr. Trump among his supporters. He has also complained about her shortcomings as a communicator and vented about what he sees as the Department of Justice’s lack of aggressiveness in going after his foes.”

The president has long indicated that whoever served as attorney general in his administration should see themselves as his lawyer rather than as someone representing the U.S. government.

During his first presidential term, Trump was gravely disappointed with Jeff Sessions, his first attorney general, who recused himself from the investigation into alleged political interference in the 2016 election. He replaced Sessions with William Barr, who abandoned Trump when the president did not accept the results of the 2020 election.

Having learned from those mistakes, Trump set out to find a political ally and loyalist to take the helm at the Justice Department in his second administration.

As a scholar of law and politics, and someone who has written about the role of the attorney general, I think Trump’s desire has a familiar ring to it. It is not unusual for presidents to put people who share their views and policy preferences into the role. But Trump has gone far beyond what is usually done.

A man dressed in a suit and tie lifts his right hand in front of a panel of lawmakers.
Jeff Sessions is sworn in as attorney general before the House Judiciary Committee on Capitol Hill on Nov. 14, 2017.
AP Photo/Alex Brandon

Bondi’s ascent

Florida Congressman Matt Gaetz was Trump’s first choice for attorney general during the president’s second term. Many commentators viewed Gaetz as a firebrand who was temperamentally unsuited for that position. Some criticized him for calling the president an “inspirational leader of a loving and patriotic movement” in the aftermath of the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol. In the face of growing opposition generated in part by allegations of his misconduct, Gaetz withdrew.

Trump turned to Bondi a few hours later. She had served as Florida’s attorney general and drawn praise from across the political spectrum for her professionalism.

A bipartisan group of former state attorneys general wrote a letter attesting to their “firsthand knowledge of her fitness for the office” and her “wealth of prosecutorial experience and commitment to public service.”

In addition, as PBS noted at the time of her appointment, Bondi was “a longtime Trump ally and was one of his lawyers during his first impeachment trial, when he was accused — but not convicted — of abusing his power as he tried to condition U.S. military assistance to Ukraine on that country investigating then-former Vice President Joe Biden.”

She also showed her loyalty by attending Trump’s New York trial for paying hush money to porn actor Stormy Daniels, with whom he allegedly had an affair.

At the time of her nomination, Bondi seemed to have the attributes of an attorney general. She had the credentials to take on the job of running the DOJ and the confidence of the president who appointed her.

From confirmation to downfall

During her confirmation hearings, Bondi promised to safeguard the Justice Department’s independence and bolster its transparency. She also vowed to not serve as the president’s personal attorney.

And in response to a question from Rhode Island Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, she pledged in January 2025 that “there will never be an enemies list within the Department of Justice.”

But she also showed her willingness to joust with Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee. She hewed to the MAGA script by refusing to say that the president had lost the 2020 election. And she mounted a spirited attack on the Biden Justice Department, which she claimed had been “weaponized for years and years and years.”

A woman speaks in front of a microphone as a man stands behind her.
Attorney General Pam Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche speak to reporters in Washington on March 18, 2026.
Nathan Posner/Anadolu via Getty Images

Once in office, Bondi took on the difficult task of leading the Justice Department while also pleasing the president. She stood by when Trump used an appearance at the department to give, according to The New York Times, a “grievance-filled attack on the very people who have worked in the building and others like them.” The Times added: “He appeared to offer his own vision of justice in America, one defined by personal vengeance rather than by institutional principles.”

Bondi apparently did not do enough to deliver on that version of justice.

Last year, Trump had to urge Bondi to take action against his political enemies, including former FBI Director James Comey, California Senator Adam Schiff and New York Attorney General Leticia James.

“They’re all guilty as hell,” Trump posted on his social media platform, Truth Social, “but nothing is going to be done. “We can’t delay any longer, it’s killing our reputation and credibility,” he added. “They impeached me twice, and indicted me (5 times!), OVER NOTHING. JUSTICE MUST BE SERVED, NOW!!!”

Bondi took her marching orders and launched investigations of those the president named. However, she was not able to secure any convictions. NBC News quoted a former official in the Trump White House who said that failing to secure indictments “is a problem for job security with the president.”

If that wasn’t enough, Trump was also reportedly frustrated with the way Bondi had handled the release of the Epstein files, first promising full disclosure and then botching the rollout of the files.

Contending visions of the attorney general’s job

Bondi’s tenure illustrates the conflicting visions of what an attorney general should do that animate today’s American politics.

The questions Democrats asked her during her confirmation were designed to get her to commit to their view of what the attorney general should do. Those questions signaled their belief that anyone occupying that office should maintain their distance from the president and uphold the Justice Department’s independence.

But right from the start of the republic, presidents have chosen close political allies to serve as attorney general.

It’s common for presidents to appoint their friends and supporters to be attorneys general. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt, many presidents have chosen their campaign manager or their party’s national chairperson to be attorney general of the United States.

But even compared with this history, Trump and his allies have a radically different vision, seeing the attorney general as just another Cabinet member whose responsibility is to carry out the president’s policies and implement his directions. As Trump put it in a 2017 interview with The New York Times, he has the “absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department.”

In the end, it seems that Bondi was fired for her failure to be effective in the political role assigned to her. It is likely that the president will want to replace her with someone even more political than she was, who promises to deliver more of the results he wants.

The Conversation

Austin Sarat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Pam Bondi’s extreme political loyalty to Trump wasn’t enough to save her job – https://theconversation.com/pam-bondis-extreme-political-loyalty-to-trump-wasnt-enough-to-save-her-job-279926

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Will row over Iran conflict spell the end of Nato?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor, The Conversation

This is the text from The Conversation UK’s World Affairs Briefing email. Sign up here to receive weekly analysis of the latest developments in international relations, direct to your inbox.

Anybody who tuned in to Donald Trump’s prime-time speech to the American people last night hoping to hear that he plans an end to the US attacks on Iran and will focus instead on reaching an agreement over opening up the Strait of Hormuz would have been bitterly disappointed. I know I was.

Instead of a strategy to restore the vital flow of oil and gas through the strait – something which would have immediately calmed the markets and started to bring down energy prices – the US president opted for a familiar mix of revisionism, self-aggrandisement and bloodcurdling threats.

So we heard that it was never his intention to force regime change in Iran (despite having said exactly that on day one of the special military operation). We had the miraculous achievements of his administration over the past year which had restored “a dead and crippled country after the last administration” to what is now “the hottest country anywhere in the world by far”.

And instead of seeking a deal with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, Trump promised to “hit them extremely hard over the next two to three weeks. We’re going to bring them back to the Stone Ages, where they belong.”

Along the way, the US president took a potshot at America’s Nato allies who have been reluctant to get involved in this war, exhorting them to “build up some delayed courage. Should have done it before. Should have done it with us as we asked.”

Donald Trump addresses the American people, April 1 2026.

In the event, Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte and many of Nato’s European leaders will probably feel as if they have got off lightly. Trump and his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, have been outspoken in their criticism of Nato in recent days. Rubio told Fox News host Sean Hannity that the US would “reexamine the value of Nato”, while the president, when asked if the US was reconsidering its Nato membership, said the question was “beyond reconsideration”, adding that the alliance is a “paper tiger, and Putin knows that too, by the way.”

Trump is not the first US president to question the operation of Nato and worry about the outsized burden borne by the US. But none before has done so much to publicly undermine the alliance. But then, as Andrew Gawthorpe explains, Nato’s focus on European security has been a huge benefit to the US over the decades. Gawthorpe, an expert in American foreign policy at Leiden University, presents us with a cost-benefit analysis of US leadership of Nato, spelling out the many advantages which he says “generations of American strategists, military officers and diplomats have viewed as worthwhile”.

It’s not as if the US-Israeli military operation in Iran is a matter for Nato in any case, writes David Galbreath. Nato is a defensive alliance. Article 5 of its founding treaty holds “an armed attack against one NATO member shall be considered an attack against all members, and triggers an obligation for each member to come to its assistance”. This is clearly not the case in Iran.

To be sure, as Galbreath notes, Nato’s focus has shifted at times over the years. From aiming purely at collective defence – defined as coming to the aid of a fellow member whose territory is threatened by a third party – at times Nato has intervened in issues of regional security, most notably in the 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia.

But an individual member’s foreign policy adventures have never mandated nato’s involvement: indeed the US actively opposed the UK and France during the Suez crisis in 1956 and in turn UK minister, Harold Wilson, resisted pressure from US president Lyndon Baines Johnson to get involved in the US war in Vietnam. It would, Galbreath concludes, be tragic if – having weathered these storms – Nato falls apart over this war of questionable legality.



Read more:
Nato has survived some serious rifts but the Iran war shows how the US has soured on the transatlantic alliance

Israel’s forever war?

Not just questionable legality, either. After the US president’s speech last night the world is no wiser as to how long this might continue. But Trump’s enthusiasm for Operation Epic Fury will, to an extent, be calibrated by how he and his close advisers judge it might affect his party’s chances in the midterm elections in November. High gasoline prices and inflation (as well as continuing entanglement in a war – something he pledged not to do on the campaign trail in 2024) are likely to lose him votes.

For Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the calculation will be different. He also faces an election in the autumn. But when Israelis cast their ballots on October 27, they’ll be voting on different issues. Netanyhu’s appeal to voters on security grounds is a potent one. There’s a clock in Tehran which counts down to 2040 by which time the late supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei swore Israel would no longer exist.

A leader who could neutralise that threat for good could use that accomplishment to good purposes on the campaign trail, whether or not his methods are deemed legal in international law.

Leonie Fleischmann, a scholar of Israeli politics at City St George’s, University of London, has researched Israeli security policy over decades, particularly when it comes to the way it has been enacted by Netanyahu. The current prime minister, she writes, is a disciple of the founder of Revisionist Zionism, Ze’ev Jabotinsky. For Jabotinsky, the watchword was “strength first, diplomacy second”.

But, Fleischmann notes, there is an important secondary concern for Netanyahu beyond the security of his people. That is that at present the polls suggest that while his party might be the most popular with voters, the support is not enough to enable him to form a coalition government. And if he loses, Netanyahu could face trial for bribery and corruption and a possible jail term. So arguably, his security is at stake, too.



Read more:
Why Benjamin Netanyahu needs the Iran conflict to continue

On the Russian front

There’s a bizarre twist to the US-Israeli operation in Iran. In the initial years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow was relying heavily on Shahed drones supplied by Iran. Now Russia is returning the favour, supplying its drones to Iran and – as a bonus – providing data to help Iran identify and hit its targets.

Meanwhile Kyiv is understandably increasingly concerned that US involvement in the Middle East has inevitably meant that US munitions previously available for purchase by Ukraine’s allies are instead being used against Iran. If so – and it seems a reasonable assumption – it will seriously undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

ISW map showing the state of the war in Ukraine, April 1 2026
State of the war in Ukraine, April 1 2026.
Institute for the Study of War

Meanwhile, in an attempt to control rising oil prices, the US has removed some sanctions preventing Russia from selling its oil. So the war in Iran has the potential to be an utter disaster for Ukraine.

The one silver lining towards the end of last year was that Russia was losing far more men on the battlefield than Ukraine. But Charlie Walker and Bettina Renz have been following Russia’s recruitment and write that good salaries and lavish signing on bonuses continue to attract plenty of new soldiers.

Walker and Renz believe that Vladimir Putin has worked hard in recent years to repair and enhance conditions in the Russian military, prompting the in-house newspaper of the defence ministry to trumpet that “contract soldiers are becoming the country’s middle class”. Needless to say, the in-house defence ministry newspaper is bound to take a rosy view of conditions in the military, but the confidence with which this has been asserted suggests that anyone hoping for a collapse in Russian military morale in 2026 might be disappointed.



Read more:
Despite massive casualties in Ukraine, Russia is unlikely to run out of soldiers anytime soon – here’s why

Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.

The Conversation

– ref. Will row over Iran conflict spell the end of Nato? – https://theconversation.com/will-row-over-iran-conflict-spell-the-end-of-nato-279898

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The nonprofit status of NCAA athletic departments is starting to raise questions

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Andrew Urbaczewski, Professor of Business Information and Analytics, University of Denver

University of Michigan star forward Yaxel Lendeborg revealed that he’d been offered millions of dollars to transfer to another school. Gregory Shamus/Getty Images

With all the talk of busted brackets, game-winning shots, point spreads and Cinderellas, it was easy to miss the eye-popping offer University of Michigan star forward Yaxel Lendeborg claimed to have received during the first weekend of March Madness.

Lendeborg told The Associated Press that the University of Kentucky had dangled between US$7 million and $9 million to entice him to transfer there in 2025.

Though University of Kentucky head coach Mark Pope called it “100% false” in a subsequent interview, the numbers being thrown around show just how big a business college sports have become. CBS and Turner are paying the NCAA about $1.1 billion annually through 2032 to air March Madness games. Recent court decisions, settlements and NCAA policy changes have opened the door for top college athletes like Lendeborg to earn millions of dollars.

Yet athletic departments are still operating as tax-exempt nonprofits, even as a growing chorus of voices, from academia to politics, is wondering whether this designation should be reevaluated.

The nonprofit mission

Most private universities operate as 501(c)(3) organizations under the tax code. This IRS designation means it is a nonprofit that serves a public or charitable mission. These nonprofits don’t have to pay federal taxes and can receive tax-deductible donations.

Because public universities are already government entities, they don’t need to apply for 501(c)(3) status. However, their affiliated fundraising arms – including those supporting athletics – are set up as separate nonprofit foundations and typically need to apply for and receive that designation.

According to the IRS, nonprofits can receive this tax-exempt status if they advance the following missions: “religious, educational, charitable, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering national or international amateur sports competition (as long as it doesn’t provide athletic facilities or equipment), or the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”

This designation means that universities will reinvest any leftover funds after expenses – they don’t use the word “profit” – into programs that advance the university’s mission. These include facilities, research, academic departments and scholarships.

Donors to a university are able to receive tax deductions for their support. They can usually direct their donations toward funding a specific mission – perhaps in memory of a favorite professor, supporting cancer research or to support extracurricular activities such as sports.

In March 2025, for example, philanthropists Maurice and Carolyn Cunniffe gave $100 million to Fordham University to support STEM education, and in December 2025, Acrisure CEO Greg Williams and his wife, Dawn, gave $401 million to Michigan State University, designating over 70% of their historic donation to Michigan State athletics.

A windfall for some college athletes

I want to return to one phrase from the IRS’ requirements for being designated as a tax-exempt nonprofit: “fostering national or international amateur sports competition.”

In 2026, there’s very little about college basketball and football – and, increasingly, sports such as golf and ice hockey – that could be considered “amateur,” which technically means that athletes are not paid salaries or wages for playing and do not compete as their primary profession.

In recent years, the NCAA has allowed athletes to earn money through endorsements and sponsorships. Meanwhile, the recently approved settlement in House v. NCAA allows schools to share roughly 20% to 22% of its revenue from licensing, media rights and ticket sales directly with athletes, further complicating the traditional definition of amateurism.

The compensation college athletes can receive happens on top of a five-year scholarship that covers the full cost of attendance for some athletes. At the University of Denver, where I teach, five years of attendance is valued at over $435,000.

Greg and Dawn Williams made a historic $401 million donation to Michigan State University, $290 million of which was earmarked for athletics.

Schools argue that athletics are part of their educational mission, with revenue from football and basketball funding sports that make far less money, such as swimming and gymnastics.

But it’s gotten to the point where playing certain college sports can be as lucrative – if not more so – than being a professional athlete.

Chicago Bears quarterback Caleb Williams reportedly had to take a pay cut as a rookie after leaving the University of Southern California.

Former Notre Dame women’s basketball standout Olivia Miles passed up likely being the second pick in the WNBA draft and instead transferred to Texas Christian University, where, according to a recent ESPN E60 report, she is earning over 10 times what she would have been paid in the WNBA, through a mix of sponsorships and direct payments.

Eligibility extensions

Some college athletes, such as quarterback Diego Pavia, who most recently played for Vanderbilt University, have sued the NCAA to extend their eligibility beyond the current limit of four seasons and five calendar years. It isn’t unheard of for a player to get seventh, eighth and ninth years of eligibility.

Meanwhile, student athletes are routinely playing for two, three or four different schools during their collegiate years. The so-called “transfer portal” – a period when college athletes make it known that they are willing to switch schools – operates like a free agent market in pro sports leagues.

This is a far cry from college sports in the 1970s and ’80s, when student athletes were expected to earn their degrees in four years. Until 1968 – and 1972 for football and basketball – freshmen weren’t even allowed to play at the varsity level. The thinking went that they needed a year of adjustment to get a handle on their coursework.

For some of today’s college athletes, school isn’t in the picture. Before the 2026 College Football Playoff national championship, a reporter asked University of Miami quarterback Carson Beck, a transfer from Georgia, whether he had to worry about class that week.

His response?

“No class. I graduated two years ago.”

A business separate from the university?

This isn’t to say college athletes definitely don’t deserve to be compensated beyond the value of their scholarships. Perhaps they do. But the idea that athletic departments and their associated fundraising arms should be classified as tax-exempt nonprofits promoting education and amateur sports strains credulity.

In November 2025, U.S. Sen. Maria Cantwell submitted a letter to the chief of staff for the U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation.

“Given the evolving market dynamics of college sports,” she wrote, “legitimate questions have been raised about whether it is time to rethink the tax-exempt regime under which college sports currently operates.”

At this point, college sports strike me as a business only loosely tied to the university. Education scholar John R. Thelin has pointed out how athletics can function like a separate corporation, tied to the university only through scholarships, logo licensing and marketing.

So what might happen if athletic departments lost their tax-exempt, charitable status?

For one, the government would treat them as businesses, and businesses pay taxes. And their donors and boosters would no longer be eligible to receive tax deductions for gifting money to a program, just like a regular customer at a restaurant doesn’t receive a tax break for regularly dining there.

This isn’t unheard of: Some universities already have taxable, for-profit arms, whether it’s in real estate development, hospitality or startup incubators.

To some donors, their love for their alma mater may outweigh any tax benefit. But others may find themselves more willing to fund other causes – in or outside a university – that more closely align with the nonprofit mission.

The Conversation

Andrew Urbaczewski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.

– ref. The nonprofit status of NCAA athletic departments is starting to raise questions – https://theconversation.com/the-nonprofit-status-of-ncaa-athletic-departments-is-starting-to-raise-questions-278184

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Kratom poisonings surged 1,200% over the past decade, and regulators are struggling to keep up with the dangers

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Andrew Kolodny, Medical Director of Opioid Policy Research, Brandeis University

Kratom powder is produced by the plant Mitragyna speciosa. iStock via Getty Images Plus

Proposals to ban or regulate kratom, a plant-based substance sold in gas stations, convenience stores and vape shops, are making headlines in local newspapers across the United States. But as lawmakers debate whether to regulate or ban kratom, public health problems associated with the drug continue to rise.

In late March 2026, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that hospitalizations and poisonings involving kratom have increased by more than 1,200% over the past decade.

At legislative hearings, families share tragic stories of lives cut short by kratom overdoses and addiction.

On the opposing side, lawmakers are also hearing from lobbyists representing the kratom industry and kratom users who insist that it is a safe, natural substance that boosts mood and energy, relieves pain and even helps people overcome opioid addiction.

As a physician who treats opioid addiction and studies the opioid crisis, I have followed this debate closely.

Scientific evidence shows that kratom carries real risks that are often downplayed or misunderstood. Kratom’s rising use over the past decade coincided with the opioid crisis, as people searched for alternatives to prescription opioids. Because kratom comes from a plant and is marketed as “natural,” many people wrongly assumed it was safe. That belief helped fuel its use. Today, about 1.7 million Americans report using kratom each year.

Alabama is one of six states that have banned kratom as of early 2026. But it still makes its way onto store shelves in the state.

How kratom works

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has warned consumers for more than a decade that kratom can cause serious problems, including liver disease, seizures, addiction and death.

According to the FDA, research and adverse event reports make clear that “compounds in kratom make it so it isn’t just a plant – it’s an opioid.”

Kratom comes from the plant Mitragyna speciosa, a tropical evergreen tree native to Southeast Asia.

People use kratom to experience the opioid effects, including pain relief and improved mood. But with daily use, tolerance to these effects results in a need for higher doses, and users experience withdrawal symptoms when they try to stop.

Kratom’s effects come from compounds in its leaves, including mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragynine, often called 7OH. After kratom is consumed, some of the mitragynine is changed in the body into 7OH. This matters because mitragynine is a weak opioid, while 7OH is a much stronger opioid, which can increase the intensity of the opioid effects and lead to overdose. Both compounds bind to opioid receptors in the brain, which triggers chemical changes that, with regular use, can lead to dependence and withdrawal symptoms similar to those caused by oxycodone or heroin.

Some in the kratom industry argue that only newer products with boosted levels of 7OH are dangerous. But the evidence does not support that claim. Deaths linked to kratom were already rising before the newer 7OH products appeared on the market in late 2023.

Kratom is not a treatment for opioid addiction

Another claim often made in legislative hearings is that kratom can treat opioid addiction. The American Kratom Association, a lobby group that represents the kratom industry and its consumers has even promoted kratom as a solution to the opioid crisis. One of the group’s videos claims that kratom can eliminate opioid addiction altogether.

That incorrect claim is based on a partial truth. If someone in opioid withdrawal uses kratom, their withdrawal symptoms may temporarily improve. But the same effect occurs with any opioid. A person dependent on heroin can relieve withdrawal by taking oxycodone, and a person dependent on oxycodone can relieve withdrawal by taking heroin.

But relief of withdrawal symptoms does not make a drug a treatment for opioid use disorder; it simply shows that the drug is an opioid. Effective, evidence-based treatments already exist, including medications such as buprenorphine and methadone, which have been shown to reduce cravings, prevent withdrawal and lower the risk of overdose. These medications also allow patients to feel and function normally.

When it comes to kratom, the FDA has been clear: It is not approved for any medical use and should not be used to treat opioid addiction.

Using kratom exposes people to risks that are not well understood. Some research suggests its primary compound may cause dangerous heart problems, including sudden death. Kratom has also been found to contain high levels of lead, which can damage the brain and other organs. For women of childbearing age, kratom may pose a risk to the fetus if pregnancy occurs. And using kratom during pregnancy may lead to infants experiencing opioid withdrawal at birth.

Newborn baby lying face down with monitors attached in a hospital bed.
Kratom poses particular threats to pregnant women and has the potential to cause opioid withdrawal in newborns.
Salwan Georges/The Washington Post via Getty Images

Bold claims, limited evidence

Some advocates argue that keeping kratom available could help states reduce deaths from fentanyl and other opioids. But the available evidence does not support this idea.

If kratom were helping reduce fentanyl overdose deaths, states that banned kratom might be expected to have a higher rate of fentanyl deaths. That has not been the case. For example, Vermont, one of the first states to ban kratom, has not fared worse than other states. In fact, Vermont has seen one of the largest declines in opioid overdose deaths in the country.

Kratom supporters often point to personal stories from users who say it helps them. These experiences should not be dismissed, but personal stories are not the same as scientific evidence.

With opioids, cycles of withdrawal followed by relief when a dose is taken can make a drug seem helpful, even when it is causing harm. That is why controlled studies, which can reliably distinguish true benefits from the relief of withdrawal symptoms, would be needed to prove that kratom’s benefits outweigh its risks. But those studies have not been done.

For now, the evidence shows that kratom is an opioid with real risks – not a harmless supplement.

The Conversation

Andrew Kolodny is president of Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing, a nonprofit organization that advocates for more cautious use of prescription opioids and served as an expert witness on behalf of state and local governments in the national opioid litigation.

– ref. Kratom poisonings surged 1,200% over the past decade, and regulators are struggling to keep up with the dangers – https://theconversation.com/kratom-poisonings-surged-1-200-over-the-past-decade-and-regulators-are-struggling-to-keep-up-with-the-dangers-277161

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Humans’ closest invertebrate ancestors date back much further than thought – how we discovered the fossils that show this

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Luke Parry, Associate Professor of Palaeobiology, Department of Earth Sciences, University of Oxford

Artist’s impression of Earth’s earliest complex animals during the late Ediacaran period – before the ‘Cambrian explosion’. Xiaodong Wang, CC BY-SA

Animal life is extraordinarily diverse and complex, having colonised almost all environments on Earth – from hostile hydrothermal vents in the deep sea to the skies across our continents.

But the planet was not always teeming with complex animal life. For the first 3.7 billion years after it originated, life was small, simple and largely confined to the oceans. This microbe-dominated world was a tumultuous place, with several major swings in its climate.

But all this appears to have changed about 538 million years ago (mya) during the Cambrian period. This critical juncture in the history of life saw animals bursting on to the scene in an event known as the “Cambrian explosion”.

All sorts of animals easily recognisable as groups alive today appeared in the fossil record, from echinoderms (starfish, sea cucumbers, urchins) and arthropods (spiders, crustaceans, insects) to various types of worm. This seemingly abrupt appearance of animals in a geological “blink of an eye” has puzzled scientists from Charles Darwin onwards.

Many of these new lifeforms belonged to a group of animals called Bilateria, so-named for their symmetrical left and right sides. This group now contains all animals with brains and complex musculature.

However, a longstanding question for palaeontologists has been whether this astonishing diversification event happened all at once during the Cambrian explosion – or if ancestors of Cambrian and modern animal groups can be traced further back in time. Our new study, published in the journal Science, could help to resolve this question.

Strange bodies

The preceding Ediacaran period (635-538 mya) was much more enigmatic than the Cambrian. Many organisms from that period have defied efforts to classify them. Their strange bodies – often resembling shapeless sacs or thin, quilted pillows – have no obvious counterparts among living species, let alone modern animals.

As a result, interpretations of Ediacaran creatures have encompassed almost all multicellular forms of life – from fungi and lichens to an extinct kingdom unrelated to anything multicellular alive today. These Ediacaran organisms lived in close association with mats of microbes that smothered the seafloor – a type of ecosystem that did not survive the advent of grazing bilaterians.

More recent evidence relating to their reproductive strategy and how they grew and developed has suggested they were, in fact, animals – albeit very simple ones without any direct, living descendents.

A fossil (plus artist's reconstruction) found in the Jiangchuan biota (~554-539mya).
This fossil (plus artist’s reconstruction), found in the Jiangchuan biota (~554-539mya), is an early cnidarian: the phylum that includes jellyfish, sea anemones and corals. Scale bar: 2mm.
Gaorong Li and Xiaodong Wang., CC BY-SA

It isn’t until the very end of the Ediacaran period that the fossil record gives hints that more complex – and recognisable – animals were around. And most of the evidence for these bilaterian animals has come from fossilised burrows and trails, suggestive of complex animal life but telling us little about the animals that made them.

This has led to much debate about the nature of the transition from the Ediacaran to the Cambrian period – the start of which geologists have defined by the action of complex animals churning up ocean sediment for the first time.

A discovery to fill the fuzzy gap

In spring 2023, one of us, Gaorong Li – then a PhD student at Yunnan Key Laboratory for Palaeobiology (YKLP) – made a discovery that helps to clarify this fuzzy gap between the weird Ediacaran world and the recognisable, complex animal-dominated Cambrian period.

Along with my PhD supervisors Wei Fan and Peiyun Cong, we explored Ediacaran rocks in the Chinese region of Eastern Yunnan. We were principally looking for fossil algae (seaweeds), the focus of my PhD thesis, in rocks known for well-preserved fossils called the Jiangchuan biota.

What we found in addition was a bizarre worm that lived tethered to the seafloor by an anchoring disc, and which could turn its strange proboscis inside out to collect food. These specimens were clearly complex animals, but not as they are known today.

We nicknamed it the “bugle worm”, and our team are still figuring out exactly where this strange beast fits into the classification of animals. Previously, it had been described based only on the disc anchoring it to the seafloor and named Cycliomedusa – but we found the whole organism, revealing it as something unexpected and strange.

As we continued splitting more and more rocks, it became clear there were more animals hiding in the Jiangchuan biota. In 2024 – now joined by a team from the University of Oxford including the co-authors of this article, Luke and Frankie – we went back into the field and pieced together this new fossil community.

We found some fossilised organisms characteristic of both the Ediacaran and Cambrian periods. But surprisingly, we also found some that had previously only been known from the time of the Cambrian explosion. These included a primitive animal similar to the Cambrian organism Mackenzia, as well as various worms and swimming predators called ctenophores.

Most striking of all, we found the oldest evidence for the group to which we humans belong: the deuterostomes.

A deuterostome cambroernid fossil from the Jiangchuan biota and artist’s reconstruction.
A deuterostome cambroernid fossil from the Jiangchuan Biota (~554-539mya), plus artist’s reconstruction (scale bar: 2mm).
Gaorong Li and Xiaodong Wang, CC BY-SA

Several of these specimens have a stalk and tentacles, and closely resemble a group of Cambrian fossils called cambroernids. These now-extinct animals are related to living starfish and acorn worms – the closest invertebrate relatives to humans. This shows our own evolutionary story has its roots in the Ediacaran period.

The discovery of diverse, complex animals in the Jingchuan biota suggests several animal groups shared the world with the weird and wonderful Ediacarans for millions of years. Diverse complex animal life has a more ancient heritage than the Cambrian explosion.

The Conversation

Luke Parry receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and the Leverhulme Trust.

Frankie Dunn receives funding through an NERC Independent Research Fellowship.

Gaorong Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Humans’ closest invertebrate ancestors date back much further than thought – how we discovered the fossils that show this – https://theconversation.com/humans-closest-invertebrate-ancestors-date-back-much-further-than-thought-how-we-discovered-the-fossils-that-show-this-279793