Category: The Conversation – USA

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Wayne Unger, Associate Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University

The U.S. Supreme Court has cleared the way for a chain of crisis pregnancy centers based in New Jersey to challenge a subpoena from New Jersey’s attorney general.

First Choice Women’s Resource Centers operates at several locations throughout New Jersey. There are more than 2,500 of these Christian-led nonprofits in the United States. Most try to discourage pregnant women from obtaining abortions. Some offer free medical services, such as over-the-counter pregnancy tests and sonograms. Many give their clients clothing, diapers and other items that the parents of babies require.

First Choice caught the attention of Matthew Platkin in 2023 while he served as the state’s attorney general. He suspected that it violated New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act by misleading its donors about its mission and operations. According to court filings, Platkin wanted to determine if First Choice had misled its donors and patients into believing that the centers provide “comprehensive reproductive health care services, including abortion care and contraception, when they in fact have an objective of deterring individuals from seeking such services.”

As part of New Jersey’s investigation, Platkin issued a subpoena demanding that First Choice produce donation records, including the personal information of the donors, over a 10-year period so that his office could “contact a representative sample” of them to determine if they had “been misled” by First Choice about what the group does – that is, whether or not it provided abortions.

First Choice asserted that the subpoena violated its First Amendment rights, and that it had a right to sue New Jersey’s attorney general in federal court to quash the subpoena.

The Supreme Court sided with First Choice in its unanimous ruling on First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport. The case now bears the name of New Jersey’s current attorney general, Jennifer Davenport.

In my view as a privacy and constitutional law scholar, the court ruled correctly by concluding that issuing a subpoena for personal information regarding a crisis pregnancy center’s donors may deter those donors from supporting the organization.

Quashing New Jersey’s subpoena

After First Choice sued to block the subpoena, Platkin argued that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to decide the case. That’s because First Choice’s alleged injury – deterring donors from supporting the organization – had not yet materialized because New Jersey had not yet tried to enforce the subpoena in court.

In other words, Platkin argued that the case was premature.

But First Choice argued that merely issuing a subpoena can deter donors from making a gift. To further its argument, First Choice presented what it said was an “anonymous declaration from several donors describing the present chill on their First Amendment-protected association.” In its view, the injury was real and concrete enough for the federal courts to decide the case.

The justices have now cleared the way for First Choice to continue with its lawsuit against New Jersey authorities in federal court.

Court ruled on a related case in 2018

The First Choice case might sound similar to a case the court decided in 2018.

In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, the Supreme Court considered a different First Amendment claim asserted by a California-based organization that counsels crisis pregnancy centers.

In 2015, California enacted the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act, better known as the Reproductive FACT Act. That law required clinics to inform their patients of California’s free or low-cost access to family-planning services, prenatal care and abortion. Several anti-abortion groups objected to California’s mandate, claiming the Reproductive FACT Act unconstitutionally compelled crisis pregnancy centers to disclose a message they do not support.

The Supreme Court agreed. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the court, concluded that the Reproductive FACT Act required clinics to “provide a government-drafted script about the availability of state-sponsored activities” that the clinics opposed.

In the court’s view, this violated the clinics’ First Amendment rights because it compelled them to speak a message containing an implicit viewpoint – support for abortion – that the clinics fundamentally opposed.

Both cases sit at the intersection of abortion politics and the First Amendment, but they raise distinct questions. The prior one, which addressed California’s attempt to regulate crisis pregnancy centers, asked whether the government can force those centers to make mandated statements. This new one, First Choice, asks whether the government can force the centers to disclose their donors’ identities.

Precedent set in an old NAACP case

The court has found previously that donations are a form of protected speech, including in its Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission ruling. In that 2010 decision, the majority recognized that “All speakers, including individuals … use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech.”

As Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote in the Free Choice ruling, each right protected by the First Amendment “necessarily carries with it a corresponding right to associate with others.” Without such a right, he added, “no two men could safely share the same soapbox.”

This crisis pregnancy center ruling also reaffirms what the court decided about seven decades earlier in NAACP v. Alabama. The NAACP, founded in 1909, is one of the nation’s biggest civil rights groups.

In this 1958 ruling, the court concluded that any government actions that “may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate” warrant the highest form of protection under the First Amendment.

That ruling protected the privacy of NAACP members in Alabama. While there were no donors involved in that case, I believe that the rights of donors in the First Choice case are analogous to the rights of the NAACP’s members in the 1958 case – in that both have the right to the protection of their privacy.

In the 1950s, Alabama Attorney General John Patterson wanted to shut down the local NAACP chapter, based on his belief that the civil rights organization was “causing irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama” by operating within the state as an unincorporated association.

As a part of his effort to oust the NAACP from Alabama, Patterson sought the membership lists of the local chapter, which, if disclosed, would have unquestionably caused “intimidation, vilification, economic reprisals, and physical harm.”

Similarly, in the 2026 First Choice case, Gorsuch, who wrote the 9-0 decision, “demands for private donor information inevitably carry with them a deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.”

That is similar to Alabama’s demand for the NAACP’s membership list in 1958.

“It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association,” Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan II declared in the ruling, which essentially shut down Alabama’s effort to ban the NAACP.

“This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations,” Harlan added.

How to read this ruling

Many conservatives today will surely see the court’s decision as a win for the anti-abortion movement and its associated organizations. And many progressives will perceive it as another ruling from a supermajority conservative court that favors the rights of Americans who oppose access to abortion over those who support abortion rights.

The court, for example, overturned the nationwide right to abortion in 2022 in its Dobbs v. Jackson’s Women’s Health Organization ruling.

I think both interpretations are wrong because this case is more about free speech than abortion.

The fundamental principle the court asserted in NAACP v. Alabama remains intact – there is a vital relationship between the right to privacy and the freedom to associate.

Since its ratification in 1791, the First Amendment has protected much more than the rights that are expressly mentioned in its text. It protects the right to speak freely, just as it protects the right not to speak and the right to speak anonymously.

The First Amendment protects the right to associate with groups and organizations, just as it protects the right to associate with those groups and organizations anonymously.

It protects the right to think freely, to hold certain beliefs and to reject others. And as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in the First Choice case, the First Amendment protects individuals’ rights to associate with organizations that align with their beliefs by donating to them.

Wayne Unger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Supreme Court bolsters donors’ free speech rights in unanimous crisis pregnancy center ruling – https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-bolsters-donors-free-speech-rights-in-unanimous-crisis-pregnancy-center-ruling-281211

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Michal Raucher, Associate Professor of Jewish Studies, Rutgers University

When people picture a rabbi, they may imagine a man standing in front of a congregation in a synagogue. But “rabbi” means much more than that. For example, a rabbi could be a teacher, a nonprofit executive for a Jewish organization, or a scholar of Jewish law – and, increasingly, some of those roles are held by Orthodox women.

For decades, liberal denominations have permitted women to be ordained. Orthodox Judaism, however, has largely prohibited it. Yet attitudes toward women’s study of rabbinic texts is changing, leading some Orthodox leaders to conclude that women are qualified for rabbinic jobs.

Israel’s chief rabbis – known as the Rabbinate, and historically seen as the top authority for the country’s Orthodox institutions – do not recognize women as rabbis or permit their ordination. But on April 27, 2026, after an hourslong delay and an emergency injunction from the country’s High Court of Justice, three women sat for one of the Rabbinate’s exams about Jewish law. The exam followed a legal battle over the course of the past few years, culminating in a High Court of Justice decision in July 2025 that women must be allowed to take the tests. The chief rabbis appealed the decision, but the court rejected their request for a retrial.

These tests are required to apply for public sector jobs as any kind of Jewish religious authority in Israel: ensuring that restaurants adhere to Jewish dietary laws, for example. Passing does not make someone an ordained rabbi; ordination is conferred through private rabbis and schools, and most Orthodox communities do not recognize female rabbis. But it does allow women to apply for jobs previously available only to men and receive higher salaries for the educational jobs they have already. Most importantly, the High Court of Justice’s decision recognized that women have achieved high levels of education in rabbinic law.

I am a scholar of Jewish women and gender who researches religious authority among Orthodox women. While there have always been highly educated women, the court’s ruling reflects a growing trend among Orthodox women, while also opening up professional opportunities.

From Torah to Talmud

Formed in the 19th century, Orthodox Judaism is oriented around a strict observance of Jewish law and commitment to traditional gender roles. The denomination contains many divisions, each one adjusting their observance of Jewish law differently in response to modernity. While boys and men have been traditionally educated in Torah and rabbinic texts, historically girls and women did not have access to any formal Jewish education.

In the early 20th century, Jewish Polish teacher Sarah Schenirer revolutionized Orthodox girls’ education by founding the Bais Yaakov school system, now found in many countries. The Bais Yaakov education focused on teaching women Torah, while maintaining women’s place within the Jewish home.

But soon another debate arose: whether women could study Talmud. This text, composed between the second and seventh centuries C.E., contains the building blocks of rabbinic law. Studying the Talmud means learning the language, references and argument style of the Jewish legal system, called “halakha.”

Supporters and opponents of Talmud study for women both argued that it would forever alter orthodoxy. Opponents feared that if women understood Talmudic discussions, they would be interested in participating more in public religious life, upsetting the gender norms at the heart of orthodoxy.

Yet, in the 1970s, some well-known rabbis in Israel and America invited women into Talmud study. Since then, the number of Orthodox institutions that offer advanced Talmud study for women has grown significantly. Fifty years ago, there were only two options: Stern College of Yeshiva University in New York, or Michlelet Bruriah in Israel, now called Midreshet Lindenbaum. Today, dozens of institutions offer programs for Orthodox women who want to study rabbinic law.

The institutions where women can learn Talmud and rabbinic law span the Orthodox landscape. Many are affiliated with open or modern orthodoxy, which have embraced changes related to gender roles. Some cater to the Haredi or “ultra-Orthodox” population, and others to communities in between.

Most students who complete these programs are not seeking traditional ordination as rabbis. But the women graduate prepared for several other types of religious leadership, such as Jewish education, or as halakha guides for other women. Some programs prepare students to answer Jewish legal questions in particular areas, such as practices during menstruation or childbirth.

Feminist network

This growth in opportunities for Orthodox women is the result of a network of Orthodox feminists working across borders since the 1970s.

Michlelet Bruriah, for example, was founded by two American Jews who immigrated to Israel in the 1960s. Several other educational institutions developed through this network – including Matan, Nishmat and Drisha, which are currently located in Israel.

Yeshivat Maharat, the first Orthodox seminary to ordain women as rabbis, is in New York. Several of its teachers and students came from these Israeli institutions, and some of their donors have also supported the schools in Israel.

The lawsuit challenging the Israeli chief rabbis’ restriction on women taking the Jewish law exam was filed by several people involved in this network.

Rabbi Seth Farber, for example, is an American immigrant to Israel and the founder of ITIM, a nonprofit that advocates for Jewish religious pluralism within Israeli society. He filed the lawsuit along with his wife, Michelle Cohen Farber, another American immigrant to Israel. She uses the title “rabbanit,” which traditionally refers to someone married to a rabbi. In her case, it also refers to her own expertise in Jewish legal texts: She co-founded Hadran, an organization that promotes Talmud study among women.

Other petitioners include Rabbanit Avital Engelberg, an Israeli-born graduate of Yeshivat Maharat who directs the seminary’s Israeli branch.

Impact

Women’s training allows them to enter a variety of fields. Opportunities for Orthodox women’s religious leadership is growing, and it’s not all about ordination. “Yoatzot halacha,” for example, counsel other women about issues related to marriage, sex and reproduction.

More broadly, these programs – and the fact that women have now actually taken one of the Rabbinate’s exams – validate women’s religious leadership. For decades, many Orthodox Jews have looked to Israel’s Orthodox Rabbinate as the arbiter of religious authenticity. The ruling from the Israeli High Court of Justice forces Orthodox Judaism worldwide to recognize that women can achieve high levels of Talmudic education.

Finally, the proliferation of educational programs reflects – and creates – a need within orthodoxy. It is not just a small cadre of women seeking these opportunities. Programs continue to open because there is a demand among Orthodox women for the chance to study rabbinic texts. As more institutions create programs for women, they are creating a new reality: one where Orthodox women are religious leaders.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on Nov. 19, 2025.

Michal Raucher received funding from the Israel Institute, the University of Cincinnati, and the Hadassah Brandeis Institute to conduct research related to this article.

– ref. Three women sit for Israeli Rabbinate’s exam, amid growing recognition for Orthodox Jewish women’s religious leadership – https://theconversation.com/three-women-sit-for-israeli-rabbinates-exam-amid-growing-recognition-for-orthodox-jewish-womens-religious-leadership-281847

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Kyle Fiore Law, Postdoctoral Research Scholar in Sustainability, Arizona State University

Caring about future generations means believing that people who will live decades or centuries from now deserve ethical consideration. In practice, that means taking their interests into account when making all kinds of decisions across a range of issues – from aggressively cutting carbon emissions to investing in pandemic preparedness initiatives and regulating powerful emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.

While it may sound like a niche moral view to care about future generations in this way, our new research, published in the academic journal Futures, suggests otherwise. In fact, Americans appear to care substantially about future generations. Nevertheless, they also systematically underestimate how much other Americans care.

To study this, we conducted two online surveys of U.S. adults, totaling 1,000 respondents. The samples were built to roughly match the U.S. population in age, gender, race or ethnicity, and political affiliation. In one survey, people told us their own views about future generations. In the other, a different group told us what they thought the average American believes.

We examined this in three ways. First, we asked how many future generations people think society should keep in mind when making collective decisions. For example, when setting climate targets or designing pandemic response systems, how many future generations should count as stakeholders in that decision? Second, we asked how many future generations elected officials should keep in mind when making decisions about laws and public policy. Third, we asked how far into the future people still deserve “moral concern.”

For the third question, participants were shown a list of the present generation and the next 50 generations, with each generation defined as a 25-year period. They then indicated how many of those generations still belonged inside their “moral circle.” In plain terms: If someone will live 100, 200, or even 1,000 years from now, does their suffering matter – and do we have some responsibility to help make their lives go better?

We found that Americans, on average, extended at least some moral concern about 28 generations into the future, or roughly 700 years. But there was a mismatch about when other people’s concern faded – respondents guessed that it happened around 21 generations out, about 175 years sooner.

A similar pattern appeared on the policy questions. Americans said society and government should take into account people living roughly 16 to 17 generations ahead, respectively – around 400 to 425 years into the future. But they assumed other Americans would endorse a shorter horizon of only about 13 generations, or roughly 325 years. In other words, Americans are more future-oriented than they think their fellow citizens are.

Why it matters

Public support for long-term policies depends partly on what people think other people value. Research on climate policy, for example, shows that Americans often underestimate how much support already exists for major mitigation measures. When people wrongly think their view is unusual, they can become less likely to speak up, join with others or pressure leaders to act.

Our findings suggest a similar dynamic may shape support for future-oriented policies more broadly. For issues such as pandemic preparedness, nuclear risk and emerging technologies, decisions made now can affect people far into the future.

It’s possible that a person might support stronger emissions cuts, better disease-prevention systems or safeguards on high-risk technologies, but stay quiet if they assume most other Americans do not care about those kinds of long-term consequences.

What’s next

For climate change, misperceptions are partly driven by partisan polarization, visible disagreement among leaders and vocal opposition from skeptics. Together, they can make public support appear weaker than it is.

Concern for future generations, by contrast, is much less overtly politicized – meaning it does not divide along party lines the way climate policy does. Most Americans, regardless of political affiliation, say they care about people living centuries from now. Yet this concern is rarely voiced in everyday conversation, in media coverage or in political debate.

Future research needs to examine why concern for future generations isn’t more visible in public life, such as in the media or voiced in everyday conversations. As a result, people might assume that others do not care as much as they actually do.

The Research Brief is a short take on interesting academic work.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Americans care more about future generations than many think – and that gap could matter for policy – https://theconversation.com/americans-care-more-about-future-generations-than-many-think-and-that-gap-could-matter-for-policy-280315

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Deana L. Weibel, Professor of Anthropology, Grand Valley State University

The astronauts on Artemis II’s trip to the Moon in April 2026 didn’t just have an amazing journey through space. They also saw something extraordinary. They were the first humans to see a total solar eclipse from space.

A solar eclipse happens when the Moon moves in front of the Sun. In a total eclipse, the Sun’s central disc is covered completely.

From Earth, the circle of the Sun is about the same size as the circle of the Moon. With the bright circle blocked, you can see the undulating rays of the Sun’s corona, or outer atmosphere, that are normally too dim to be observed.

I’m a cultural anthropologist who studies awe-inspiring aspects of space exploration. I have been lucky enough to have seen two total solar eclipses. The first one was in Nebraska in 2017, the second in Indiana in 2024.

During my second total eclipse, the period of totality – that short span when you can remove your protective glasses and look directly at the eclipse – lasted close to 4 minutes. I saw waves of diffuse light snaking around an ink-black hole in the sky. It looked very wrong – almost alien.

On Aug. 12, 2026, there will be another total solar eclipse, visible only from Greenland, Iceland, Spain and the Balearic Islands of the Mediterranean. Some fortunate viewers in Spain and nearby islands may see the eclipse just before sunset, low on the horizon. The Moon illusion, a phenomenon where the Moon looks bigger when it’s near the horizon, might make this eclipse look unusually large.

Unusual eclipse perspectives

Astronauts will occasionally also have less common eclipse experiences. I interviewed one I call by the pseudonym “Jackie” in my research about astronauts’ experiences of awe. She was part of an astronaut training group that did a flight exercise during a total solar eclipse.

Jackie and her squad flew their jets in the shadow of the Moon. This lengthened their time in totality because they could follow and stay within the shadow. Jackie was most impressed with how the Sun’s corona seemed to shift and ripple.

“It’s not static … it’s alive,” she told me.

On April 6, 2026, the astronauts of NASA’s Artemis II mission saw another kind of unusual eclipse as they flew around the Moon. At one point during their flight, the Moon and the spacecraft aligned so that the Moon was directly between them and the Sun, blocking the Sun’s disk in a way that looks very different from what we see on Earth.

Astronaut Victor Glover said it felt like they “just went sci-fi.”

The astronauts were so close to the Moon that the Moon looked bigger than the Sun and hid more of its bright circle. Earth was also in view, and sunlight reflected from the Earth onto the Moon in a phenomenon NASA calls “earthshine.” This dim light is very similar to the moonlight that shines on the Earth at night.

Imagine the Sun hidden behind the Moon, creating a hazy halo around the Moon’s edges. At the same time, faint light reflected from Earth softly illuminates the Moon, revealing mountains and craters in a dim twilight. Now imagine this striking scene lasting 54 minutes.

This sight was, without a doubt, one of the most unusual eclipses ever seen by human eyes.

Although Artemis’ astronauts are trained to think scientifically, this experience propelled them into a state of awe. They talked openly about how their brains were “not processing” what they observed. While NASA kept them busy with a variety of tasks, the sound of emotion and excitement in their voices as they broadcast live from their lunar flyby was unmistakable.

The psychology of awe

Researchers have studied the effects of awe on the human brain, including awe felt during solar eclipses. Moments of wonder like these can transform how you feel and even how you think, making you more thoughtful and open-minded.

In my own work I’ve found these experiences can change how astronauts understand their own place in the universe.

One astronaut said she gained an awareness of the fragility of our planet that now shapes everything she does, while another described becoming more curious after returning to Earth. A third said the awe he experienced in lunar orbit changed his understanding of time and infinity.

Space travel creates many opportunities for awe, but a solar eclipse from behind the Moon, as Mission Commander Reid Wiseman put it, required “20 new superlatives.”

It’s an experience most of the earthbound eclipse-chasers heading to Greenland or Iceland or Spain this summer will only dream about. Whether eclipses happen in space or on Earth, though, close encounters with the grandeur of our universe can make you feel profoundly human.

Deana L. Weibel is currently working on a project with funding from the National Air and Space Museum’s Aviation Space Writers Foundation Award. She has published a book, The Ultraview Effect: What We Can Learn from Astronauts about Awe, Humility, and Exploring the Unknown, with the University of California Press.

– ref. Seeing an eclipse from Earth is awe-inspiring – for astronauts seeing one from space, the scene was even more grand – https://theconversation.com/seeing-an-eclipse-from-earth-is-awe-inspiring-for-astronauts-seeing-one-from-space-the-scene-was-even-more-grand-281488

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Caroline Wagner, Professor of Public Affairs, The Ohio State University

“On behalf of President Donald J. Trump,” read 22 emails sent from the White House Presidential Personnel Office on Friday afternoon, April 24, 2026, “I am writing to inform you that your position as a member of the National Science Board is terminated, effective immediately.”

The email was signed “Thank you for your service.”

The distinguished scientists and engineers who made up the National Science Board did not know the firings were coming. Several had been reappointed by Trump himself during his first term. The board was scheduled to meet the following week to finalize a report on the state of American science.

When asked why the entire board was removed, a White House spokesperson cited the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., stating that the case raised constitutional questions about the National Science Board, its independence and its role in the agency it oversees, the National Science Foundation. Specifically, whether non-Senate confirmed appointees can exercise the authorities that Congress gave the board when it authorized the NSF in 1950.

We have been studying and doing science policy. One of us (Wagner) has worked closely with the National Science Board several times and regularly uses their database on scientific and engineering progress. The other of us (Olds) led the National Science Foundation’s Directorate for Biological Sciences from 2014 to 2018 and has previously called for reform of the board.

We argue that the dismissal is not just a political act dressed in constitutional language; it is the resurfacing of an argument almost as old as the National Science Foundation itself — one that nearly killed the agency in its cradle.

Truman’s 1947 veto

In 1945, the science advisor of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vannevar Bush, proposed that a new federal science agency be governed by a part-time board of eminent volunteer scientists. This agency came to be called the National Science Foundation, and the board – not the president – was designated to choose its director for a six-year term.

Bush’s intent was to insulate basic research from political pressure. But with Roosevelt’s death in April of that year, it would be up to the following president, Harry Truman, and Congress to make the final decision.

Harley Kilgore, a senator from West Virginia, objected to the board’s formation and its independent role. He argued that vesting public authority in scientists not directly accountable to the president was constitutionally suspect and democratically unsound. The board should not choose the director. President Truman’s 1947 veto signaled agreement.

A series of lively hearings on the creation of the National Science Foundation served to forge the post-war science system. Out of these debates came the 1950 compromise that finally established NSF and the National Science Board, giving each side something.

The director would be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Above the director sat the National Science Board – also presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed, but serving staggered six-year terms designed to outlast any single administration. The board would set NSF policy, approve major grants and report independently to the president and Congress on the state of American science. The director would handle operations.

The structure was deliberately uneasy. It was meant to allow scientific judgment and political accountability to coexist without one absorbing the other.

What the board has done

For 75 years, the National Science Board has carried out three functions. It has overseen the agency’s largest research investments – telescopes, polar research stations, supercomputing facilities. It has produced periodic reports on the state of American science, first issued in 1972. And it has served as an independent voice to advise the president and Congress on long-term scientific priorities.

The board’s remit has expanded over time. The 1968 Daddario Amendments broadened the NSF’s mandate. The America COMPETES Acts of 2007 and 2010 added duties around workforce and research infrastructure. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 brought research security and coordinating emerging technologies into the board’s portfolio.

Through all of this, the dual governance structure held. The board functioned as a bridging device – a mechanism by which scientific judgment could inform federal decisions without scientists becoming political officers, and political priorities could shape research agendas without dictating findings.

Reviving the original argument

The Trump administration’s removal of all sitting members of the National Science Board echoes a debate from the agency’s founding: Should officers with federal authority over spending operate beyond the president’s discretion? An independent board with power over a federal agency is a constitutional outlier, regardless of its competence or track record. The contrary view, which has governed the National Science Board for 75 years, is that expert bodies can be shielded from political pressures.

The Supreme Court has moved partway toward the president’s position in recent years. Seila Law v. CFPB (2020) struck down protections against the removal of the head of an independent agency. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) ended a court’s ability to defer to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous laws.

U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc (2021) – the case the Trump administration cited in its justification for dismissing the National Science Board – held that certain officers who were not confirmed by the Senate had been improperly exercising authority reserved for executive branch officials.

Members of the National Science Board are presidentially appointed and were historically confirmed by the Senate, though this requirement was eliminated by the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011.

These legal questions will likely be tested in court.

Separation of science and state

The National Science Board’s ousting sits atop a deeper conflict between science and the state.

The 1950 compromise that founded the National Science Foundation rested on a teetering wager: that scientific inquiry, partially insulated from political control, would over time produce goods useful enough to the American public to justify being unencumbered by political steering.

For 75 years, this wager paid off. American science led the world. The measures the compromise built – peer review, the National Science Board, reports on scientific progress – allowed political and scientific judgment to inform each other without collapsing into one another.

The current moment tears the Band-Aid off this old conflict and the complex system underneath. If political accountability requires that no expert body be insulated from presidential control, the 1950 settlement that founded the NSF cannot survive in its present form. Then the question becomes what could replace the NSF – and whether the benefits the state has come to expect from American science can be produced under different arrangements.

The historical record on political intervention in scientific operations is consistent. Soviet biology under Trofim Lysenko. German physics under the Nazis. Chinese science during the Cultural Revolution. In each case, the institution of science survived in name but stopped producing what science is supposed to produce: verifiable, trusted knowledge. While the names on the doors stayed the same, the work changed to serve politics.

The firing of the National Science Board has brought back the old question that Truman thought he had answered in 1950: how much politics should intervene in science. Now, that question is shaking the very foundations of U.S. science.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How much should politics influence science, and vice versa? National Science Board’s ousting resurrects an existential debate – https://theconversation.com/how-much-should-politics-influence-science-and-vice-versa-national-science-boards-ousting-resurrects-an-existential-debate-281709

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jeffrey A. Lee, Professor of Geography and the Environment, Texas Tech University

Your goofy but lovable cousin just told you that you should stop eating eggs because he read somewhere that a study showed they are bad for you.

How much should you trust your relative on such matters? More importantly, how much should you rely on one newly published bit of research when deciding what to make for breakfast?

To be clear, this is not an article about the health-promoting or health-torpedoing properties of eggs. It’s about how scientific knowledge is built piece by piece from many studies. What scientists know is refined over time as new results either do or don’t point to the same conclusion.

I’m a geographer who’s been doing and teaching science for many decades, with a sideline of teaching and writing about how science is done. Many people, quite understandably, take a single experiment or study as the be-all and end-all of knowledge because that’s how research often is presented by the press or on social media. But the better way to approach new research is to find how it weaves together with other work on the topic to create big-picture understanding.

How science works

Most research studies are undertaken either to fill a gap in our knowledge or to test an existing theory to see whether it deserves the confidence people have in it. After identifying the topic, scientists design a study to achieve those ends. They may run an experiment to learn more about how a chemical affects certain cells, for instance, or collect data in the field to track a natural phenomenon, such as how water temperatures affect hurricanes.

Then the researchers submit their findings to a peer-reviewed journal, where other experts – the scientists’ peers – decide whether it’s quality research deserving of publication.

Not all journals have rigorous peer review. Papers are highly unreliable if published by “paper mills” – journals that appear scholarly but will publish anything if the authors pay a fee.

Peer review doesn’t guarantee that the conclusions are valid, but it increases the chances that they are. Individual papers might be wrong because of honest mistakes, such as unforeseen limitations in the experimental design or, rarely, from outright fraud.

No scientific paper solves a problem once and for all. Neither does it negate all previous research. Well-done research contributes a bit to the scientific community’s understanding of a topic. The next, and crucial, step is putting individual studies in context with other research on the topic.

Even if there is current consensus, a new study may reveal a weakness, and that could lead to more research to figure out what is more likely to be correct. Scientific knowledge is constantly being refined as new information comes to light.

Adding more evidence bit by bit

One question to ask as you consider a particular finding is whether it has been directly replicated, meaning other researchers repeated the experiment to see whether they got the same results. Unfortunately, replication is relatively rare in science; more common are similar studies using comparable data, different methods, or both.

Your confidence can grow when scientists have performed a bunch of related research that’s gone through peer review, been published in scholarly journals and mostly points in the same direction. Of course, if they don’t agree, then your confidence should be weaker.

Sometimes researchers may compile these comparisons in what’s called a systematic review. They may use statistical techniques to perform meta-analysis on data from many different studies at once. Generally speaking, the more good data used to test an idea, the better.

An additional issue is how many studies have been done on a topic. There are thousands of studies on the causes of lung cancer, but there may be only one or two on how a couple of particular genes affect hair loss. Scientists’ confidence in what is known about lung cancer, then, is far greater than what is known about how those genes may have contributed to my baldness.

Appreciating the strength of the evidence is as important as understanding the evidence itself.

Get a helping hand

The idea of expertise has fallen out of favor in some quarters. But experts are vital when it comes to understanding scientific issues. An expert in this sense is someone who has been immersed in the topic for years, knows how to evaluate the relevant studies, and, ideally, has done research on it.

With such a background, an expert is a good judge of how likely any one study is to be wrong. Equally important, they also must try to control the all-too-human impulse to accept what they like and reject what they don’t.

Unfortunately, most people rarely have direct access to experts. The next best thing is someone educated in the general topic – verifiably educated, not someone who browses the internet for a few hours.

Healthcare professionals who have years of training, clinical experience and requirements to keep up with the literature in their field can help you make good decisions based on new medical research. But be careful. You want to rely on someone who updates their recommendations as the state of scientific knowledge evolves, but not someone who latches onto every new outlandish discovery.

In practice, some healthcare practitioners – hopefully a small minority – are not trustworthy on such matters. If someone is selling you something that sounds too good to be true, assume that it is. They may even have a financial or personal stake in their recommendation.

Consider the source

You should retain some skepticism about what you read in the popular press and even more about what you see on social media.

A good journalist who knows how to assess new studies can act as a guide and help you understand scientific issues. You’re looking for journalists who can accurately and objectively report on new research and help put it in context with what else is known. Unfortunately, there is no list of good versus bad journalists, but general guidance is available, such as that from nonprofit journalism organization The Trust Project.

Journalists who are well versed in how science works can also help you spot whether there are any conflicts of interest at play. Was that study that encourages staying energetic by eating a pound of candy a day sponsored by a snack food company? That would be a major red flag.

I’m not saying that everyone needs to do a thorough literature review before speaking about a scientific issue or deciding whether to eat eggs a couple of times a week. But I do encourage you to adopt a little humility about what you know and understand, along with a realistic appreciation for the limits of both your own knowledge and what the scientific community understands.

And definitely don’t make life-altering decisions based on an article describing one scientific study, even if your cousin tells you to.

Jeffrey A. Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘A study showed…’ isn’t enough – scientific knowledge builds incrementally as researchers investigate and revisit questions – https://theconversation.com/a-study-showed-isnt-enough-scientific-knowledge-builds-incrementally-as-researchers-investigate-and-revisit-questions-271929

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Sarah J. Morath, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for International Affairs, Wake Forest University

Chemical giant Monsanto has argued for years that if the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency approves a pesticide label without requiring a cancer warning, states cannot hold its manufacturer liable in court for failing to warn consumers about cancer risks. The U.S. Supreme Court has now taken up the question after hearing oral arguments for and against that position on April 27, 2026.

Between 2009 and 2019, the EPA repeatedly concluded there is no evidence that glyphosate causes cancer in humans. The agency has, therefore, allowed glyphosate-based weed killers, including Monsanto’s Roundup, to remain on the market without a cancer warning on its label. That’s despite a 2015 report from the International Agency for Research on Cancer, a branch of the World Health Organization, that classified glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans” based on “limited” evidence of cancer in humans from real-world exposure and “sufficient” evidence of cancer in experimental animals. A 2025 study had similar findings in lab rats.

Several U.S. lawsuits have used the 2015 report to win legal cases claiming that Monsanto failed to warn them of the chemical’s dangers. One of the first, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., ended in a US$80 million verdict against Monsanto in 2019. The jury found that Edwin Hardeman, a California man who used the weed killer on his properties, had proved that Roundup had caused his cancer and that Monsanto had failed to warn consumers of the dangers of its product. That finding was upheld on appeal.

In the years since, Monsanto, now owned by German chemical giant Bayer, has paid out over $10 billion to settle about 100,000 claims from people who said their health was harmed after they were exposed to Roundup. But Monsanto continues to say that a federal law passed in 1947 and significantly amended in 1972, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, bars states from imposing any labeling requirement beyond what the federal government has approved – meaning state courts cannot hold the company liable for failing to include a warning that the U.S. EPA does not require.

While the law was originally administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, today the Environmental Protection Agency regulates the registration, use and sale of pesticides in the United States. Companies that wish to sell pesticides must, according to the law, demonstrate that they will not “cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,” including “water, air, land, and all plants and man and other animals … and the interrelationships which exist among these.”

As a scholar of environmental and food law, I know the Supreme Court’s decision in the case will affect tens of thousands of pending cases of those alleging harm from glyphosate.

A short history of the case

The case before the Supreme Court began in 2019, when John Durnell, a resident of St. Louis, sued Monsanto in a Missouri state court, claiming that his regular use of Roundup in neighborhood beautification efforts over many years had caused him to develop non-Hodgkin lymphoma, a type of blood cancer.

As it had done in previous cases, Monsanto sought to dismiss the lawsuit by claiming the federal law prevented Durnell from making those claims in state court. But the trial proceeded, and in 2023 a Missouri jury found that Monsanto had, in fact, failed to warn Durnell of the danger and awarded him $1.25 million in damages.

In February 2025, a state appeals court upheld the jury’s verdict, ruling that Missouri’s laws requiring companies to warn of dangers are not preempted by federal law. Both Missouri and federal law, the appeals court found, require companies to label products with adequate warnings to protect public health. The fact that the EPA had not required a cancer warning on Roundup did not, in the court’s view, absolve Monsanto of its separate obligation under Missouri law to warn consumers of known dangers.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal in the case, seeking to determine whether federal law bars states from holding a company liable for failing to include a warning that the EPA reviewed and chose not to require.

At the Supreme Court

During the oral argument, lawyer Paul Clement, representing Monsanto, claimed that Missouri was trying to require a different label than federal law allows, and that the company could not have added a cancer warning on its own. The company argued that EPA regulations prohibit manufacturers from changing safety warnings without the agency’s prior approval, a step Monsanto never took.

Principal Deputy Solicitor General Sarah Harris, a top Justice Department attorney, told the court the Trump administration agrees with Monsanto’s interpretation of the law.

Durnell’s attorney, Ashley Keller, argued that registration of a pesticide with the EPA does not exempt a company from civil liability for its product’s safety.

Legal commentators have suggested the justices are split but that perhaps a majority favors Monsanto’s position.

What comes next

A Supreme Court ruling in Monsanto’s favor would block Durnell’s claim. Other efforts are also underway to defend corporations from similar claims by consumers alleging products were dangerous.

In February 2026, President Donald Trump signed an executive order calling glyphosate “crucial to the national security and defense” because of its role in boosting food production by killing weeds in farmers’ fields.

Congress is also considering a proposal that would prevent state and local governments from imposing stricter labeling requirements than approved by the EPA. That legislation could also prevent courts from holding manufacturers liable for harms caused by products whose labels the EPA had approved. Six states have also introduced bills to limit pesticide manufacturers’ liability. If successful, those efforts would effectively shield pesticide companies from lawsuits similar to Durnell’s.

A broader legal principle is also at stake: whether Congress or federal agencies can block states from protecting people when federal regulators have not required companies to warn the public about potential harm.

In April 2026, Sen. Ted Cruz, a Texas Republican, introduced a bill that would prevent people from filing lawsuits in state courts that seek to hold oil and gas companies responsible for environmental damage, including their contributions to climate change. In late 2026 or early 2027, the Supreme Court is also expected to hear a case about whether existing federal law already blocks those lawsuits.

Together, these efforts reflect concerted efforts to protect large corporations from consumers’ claims that products have harmed them and to prevent states from holding companies accountable when federal regulation falls short.

Sarah J. Morath does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Supreme Court considers how much states can protect consumers when federal agencies won’t – https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-considers-how-much-states-can-protect-consumers-when-federal-agencies-wont-281584

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Anne Toomey McKenna, Affiliated Faculty Member, Institute for Computational and Data Sciences, Penn State

Google tracks the vast majority of cellphones in the United States, collecting your location, usage and device data through installed software and apps. The tracking occurs by various autonomous processes you cannot see or stop, even when you turn off location history, and Google and other companies keep that data for years. Outside of your control and wherever you go, your cellphone continuously creates a durable and revealing digital trail, and law enforcement agencies can get warrants to obtain it.

But some of those warrants aren’t looking for data about a specific person. Instead, police are compelling tech companies to reveal every cellphone in a particular area during certain time periods. Called geofence warrants, their use is at the heart of a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that will determine what the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable search and seizure mean in the digital age.

The Supreme Court case Chatrie v. United States involves the hunt for a suspect in an armed bank robbery in busy Midlothian, Virginia, in May 2019, and how police settled on a man named Okello Chatrie as the perpetrator.

Detective Joshua Hylton was granted a geofence warrant that compelled Google to search its database and identify every cellphone in a 17½-acre area around the bank, including private residences and a church, for a period of two hours. Working closely with Google, police ultimately narrowed in on Chatrie. When the trial court denied Chatrie’s motion to suppress the geofence-derived evidence, Chatrie appealed.

The Supreme Court will decide if, when and how law enforcement can use geofences. It matters because all cellphone-carrying people can end up in tomorrow’s geofence, like all those who were unknowingly grabbed in the Chatrie search. And nearly all users are unaware of these fences. No one specifically consents to be included in them, but people have no choice. What happened in the Chatrie case is a feat otherwise impossible but for advances in location tracking technology and advanced AI systems.

As a privacy, electronic surveillance and tech law attorney, author and legal educator, I have spent years researching, writing, educating and advising about these kinds of privacy and legal issues, and my books on electronic surveillance and evidence are routinely cited and relied upon by courts grappling with these issues.

How geofences work

Geofences are part of modern life. By carrying your smartphone and other devices, you generate location and other device activity data. That data is collected, stored, analyzed, and bought and sold by multiple companies. The location history data being collected about you is what makes geofences possible, and it is comprehensive and precise.

Location history relies on a variety of sources of data that can include cell tower location, cellphone data such as connections to Wi-Fi networks and Bluetooth sources, and cellular data sent via cell tower. This means the communications you received and sent and the apps you used can be swept up in a geofence.

Advanced AI technologies analyze that data to discern increasing amounts of personal and behavioral data – insights about people, groups and activities – that can be used for a variety of purposes, including targeted advertising. Your rich location history and device data get snatched up regularly in such fences by private companies; your present and past self travels through them constantly.

A geofence can be in real time, for instance to identify and track who is at a protest, or any period in the past decade or so. It can be dynamically generated, like a circle around a specific location, or it could be a predefined set of boundaries, such as a specific address or area defined by streets or other geographical boundaries. One geofence warrant that Google received covered 2.5 square miles of San Francisco for a period of 2½ days.

There has been a significant increase in law enforcement’s use of geofence warrants over the past decade. Google revealed in court that it received a 1,500% percent increase in geofence requests from 2017 to 2018, a 500% percent increase from 2018 to 2019, and by 2020, it had 11,500 geofence warrants in a year. Between 2021 and 2023, geofence warrants made up over 25% of all warrants that Google received from law enforcement agencies in the United States.

Search warrants and the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment is the foundation on which all U.S. electronic privacy laws rest. When government agents want to search or seize a person, place or thing – absent consent or emergency – the Fourth Amendment requires agents to obtain a court-approved warrant based on probable cause. Agents do this by providing a judge with enough evidence to establish probable cause that the person, place or thing to be searched or seized is associated with a crime.

The resulting warrant must describe with “particularity” the specific person, place or thing to be searched or seized. If these requirements are not met, the search is unreasonable and therefore unlawful, and evidence obtained in that search cannot be used in court, barring a good-faith exception.

The Fourth Amendment’s “particularity” requirement strictly forbids general warrants, historically used by British troops against Colonists to engage in overly broad or all-encompassing searches.

Reverse warrants

The only “particularity” that police can specify in applying for a geofence warrant is that a crime occurred at a particular time and place. Hence, geofence warrants are often called reverse warrants because they literally reverse the traditional process of conducting an investigation to identify a suspect and then obtain a warrant to gather information on that suspect. Geofence warrants gather all devices in a time and place, and then, aided by technology, police sift through for potential suspects.

The execution of a geofence warrant is very different from that of a typical warrant. Litigation records reveal a collaborative effort between law enforcement and Google that follows a three-step process. First, law enforcement officials specify in the warrant a time and place to be searched. The data they’re seeking is not merely a list of cellphone devices in the area; it is usually more detailed. For instance, it could include data about whether a device accessed a particular email account or app or sent a text at the time it was in the area of the geofence.

Second, the company provides the officials with an anonymized list of users or devices matching the warrant’s criteria. At this point, things start to become more fluid, and the officials may seek additional information about specific users outside of the initial search parameters.

Third, law enforcement officials then analyze the information and request that the company “unmask” certain users. In complying, Google may tell police the account holder’s name, their address, their email address, and even whether they were communicating or using certain apps during the relevant time. The officials then decide whether any of the users may be connected to the crime.

This close work between the private entity – usually Google – and law enforcement throughout the geofence warrant process raises significant privacy and civil liberties concerns. It also does not appear that there is any court review or judicial oversight during this give-and-take between law enforcement officers and Google in the geofence warrant process.

A split among appeals courts

In the Chatrie case, the trial court took issue with the geofence warrant police used, finding that it lacked particularized probable cause. But the trial court also determined that the officers in question had relied on the defective warrant in good faith, and thus it ruled the geofence evidence could be used against the defendant.

On appeal to the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, a divided panel affirmed the trial court’s decision, and it concluded, over vigorous dissent, that obtaining the geofence data was not a search. The full 4th Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision.

But the 4th Circuit’s 2024 Chatrie decision stands at odds with the 5th Circuit’s 2024 decision in United States v. Smith. In the Smith case, the 5th Circuit ruled that “geofence warrants are modern-day general warrants and are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” This split among the federal appeals courts should be resolved by the Supreme Court in its Chatrie decision.

Chatrie and the Supreme Court

For decades, the court has grappled with law enforcement’s use of technologies to track the location of people or things, issuing decisions about cell site location information and GPS. It has ruled that the U.S. Constitution requires law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant to track a person using their cellphone location history data or GPS, barring exigent circumstances.

The government is arguing in the Chatrie case that users voluntarily consented to the collection of location history, so they have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data, and thus there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Some of the amicus briefs filed in support of the defendant assert that electronic location data is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and that the geofence warrant fails to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Some also argue that approving this warrant would open the door to a variety of reverse search warrants. And some contend that there is no meaningful consent or voluntariness around the data collection that underpins geofence technology.

Questions from the Supreme Court justices during oral arguments on April 27, 2026, indicate that at least some of them consider geofence warrants to be general warrants and thus unconstitutional. But for now, we wait.

Anne Toomey McKenna serves on the Advisory Board to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)-USA’s Artificial Intelligence Policy Committee (AIPC) and Chairs multiple AIPC subcommittees. The AIPC work involves subject matter and education-related interaction with U.S. Senate and House congressional staffers and the Congressional AI Caucus. McKenna has received funding from the National Security Agency for the development of legal educational materials about cyberlaw (a course which the government still makes available online for the public) and funding from The National Police Foundation together with the U.S. Department of Justice-COPS division for legal analysis regarding the use of drones in domestic policing.

– ref. Supreme Court considers whether police can use Big Tech data to capture info from all cellphone users in a place and time – https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-considers-whether-police-can-use-big-tech-data-to-capture-info-from-all-cellphone-users-in-a-place-and-time-281505

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Anne Toomey McKenna, Affiliated Faculty Member, Institute for Computational and Data Sciences, Penn State

Google tracks the vast majority of cellphones in the United States, collecting your location, usage and device data through installed software and apps. The tracking occurs by various autonomous processes you cannot see or stop, even when you turn off location history, and Google and other companies keep that data for years. Outside of your control and wherever you go, your cellphone continuously creates a durable and revealing digital trail, and law enforcement agencies can get warrants to obtain it.

But some of those warrants aren’t looking for data about a specific person. Instead, police are compelling tech companies to reveal every cellphone in a particular area during certain time periods. Called geofence warrants, their use is at the heart of a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that will determine what the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable search and seizure mean in the digital age.

The Supreme Court case Chatrie v. United States involves the hunt for a suspect in an armed bank robbery in busy Midlothian, Virginia, in May 2019, and how police settled on a man named Okello Chatrie as the perpetrator.

Detective Joshua Hylton was granted a geofence warrant that compelled Google to search its database and identify every cellphone in a 17½-acre area around the bank, including private residences and a church, for a period of two hours. Working closely with Google, police ultimately narrowed in on Chatrie. When the trial court denied Chatrie’s motion to suppress the geofence-derived evidence, Chatrie appealed.

The Supreme Court will decide if, when and how law enforcement can use geofences. It matters because all cellphone-carrying people can end up in tomorrow’s geofence, like all those who were unknowingly grabbed in the Chatrie search. And nearly all users are unaware of these fences. No one specifically consents to be included in them, but people have no choice. What happened in the Chatrie case is a feat otherwise impossible but for advances in location tracking technology and advanced AI systems.

As a privacy, electronic surveillance and tech law attorney, author and legal educator, I have spent years researching, writing, educating and advising about these kinds of privacy and legal issues, and my books on electronic surveillance and evidence are routinely cited and relied upon by courts grappling with these issues.

How geofences work

Geofences are part of modern life. By carrying your smartphone and other devices, you generate location and other device activity data. That data is collected, stored, analyzed, and bought and sold by multiple companies. The location history data being collected about you is what makes geofences possible, and it is comprehensive and precise.

Location history relies on a variety of sources of data that can include cell tower location, cellphone data such as connections to Wi-Fi networks and Bluetooth sources, and cellular data sent via cell tower. This means the communications you received and sent and the apps you used can be swept up in a geofence.

Advanced AI technologies analyze that data to discern increasing amounts of personal and behavioral data – insights about people, groups and activities – that can be used for a variety of purposes, including targeted advertising. Your rich location history and device data get snatched up regularly in such fences by private companies; your present and past self travels through them constantly.

A geofence can be in real time, for instance to identify and track who is at a protest, or any period in the past decade or so. It can be dynamically generated, like a circle around a specific location, or it could be a predefined set of boundaries, such as a specific address or area defined by streets or other geographical boundaries. One geofence warrant that Google received covered 2.5 square miles of San Francisco for a period of 2½ days.

There has been a significant increase in law enforcement’s use of geofence warrants over the past decade. Google revealed in court that it received a 1,500% percent increase in geofence requests from 2017 to 2018, a 500% percent increase from 2018 to 2019, and by 2020, it had 11,500 geofence warrants in a year. Between 2021 and 2023, geofence warrants made up over 25% of all warrants that Google received from law enforcement agencies in the United States.

Search warrants and the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment is the foundation on which all U.S. electronic privacy laws rest. When government agents want to search or seize a person, place or thing – absent consent or emergency – the Fourth Amendment requires agents to obtain a court-approved warrant based on probable cause. Agents do this by providing a judge with enough evidence to establish probable cause that the person, place or thing to be searched or seized is associated with a crime.

The resulting warrant must describe with “particularity” the specific person, place or thing to be searched or seized. If these requirements are not met, the search is unreasonable and therefore unlawful, and evidence obtained in that search cannot be used in court, barring a good-faith exception.

The Fourth Amendment’s “particularity” requirement strictly forbids general warrants, historically used by British troops against Colonists to engage in overly broad or all-encompassing searches.

Reverse warrants

The only “particularity” that police can specify in applying for a geofence warrant is that a crime occurred at a particular time and place. Hence, geofence warrants are often called reverse warrants because they literally reverse the traditional process of conducting an investigation to identify a suspect and then obtain a warrant to gather information on that suspect. Geofence warrants gather all devices in a time and place, and then, aided by technology, police sift through for potential suspects.

The execution of a geofence warrant is very different from that of a typical warrant. Litigation records reveal a collaborative effort between law enforcement and Google that follows a three-step process. First, law enforcement officials specify in the warrant a time and place to be searched. The data they’re seeking is not merely a list of cellphone devices in the area; it is usually more detailed. For instance, it could include data about whether a device accessed a particular email account or app or sent a text at the time it was in the area of the geofence.

Second, the company provides the officials with an anonymized list of users or devices matching the warrant’s criteria. At this point, things start to become more fluid, and the officials may seek additional information about specific users outside of the initial search parameters.

Third, law enforcement officials then analyze the information and request that the company “unmask” certain users. In complying, Google may tell police the account holder’s name, their address, their email address, and even whether they were communicating or using certain apps during the relevant time. The officials then decide whether any of the users may be connected to the crime.

This close work between the private entity – usually Google – and law enforcement throughout the geofence warrant process raises significant privacy and civil liberties concerns. It also does not appear that there is any court review or judicial oversight during this give-and-take between law enforcement officers and Google in the geofence warrant process.

A split among appeals courts

In the Chatrie case, the trial court took issue with the geofence warrant police used, finding that it lacked particularized probable cause. But the trial court also determined that the officers in question had relied on the defective warrant in good faith, and thus it ruled the geofence evidence could be used against the defendant.

On appeal to the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, a divided panel affirmed the trial court’s decision, and it concluded, over vigorous dissent, that obtaining the geofence data was not a search. The full 4th Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision.

But the 4th Circuit’s 2024 Chatrie decision stands at odds with the 5th Circuit’s 2024 decision in United States v. Smith. In the Smith case, the 5th Circuit ruled that “geofence warrants are modern-day general warrants and are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” This split among the federal appeals courts should be resolved by the Supreme Court in its Chatrie decision.

Chatrie and the Supreme Court

For decades, the court has grappled with law enforcement’s use of technologies to track the location of people or things, issuing decisions about cell site location information and GPS. It has ruled that the U.S. Constitution requires law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant to track a person using their cellphone location history data or GPS, barring exigent circumstances.

The government is arguing in the Chatrie case that users voluntarily consented to the collection of location history, so they have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data, and thus there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Some of the amicus briefs filed in support of the defendant assert that electronic location data is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and that the geofence warrant fails to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Some also argue that approving this warrant would open the door to a variety of reverse search warrants. And some contend that there is no meaningful consent or voluntariness around the data collection that underpins geofence technology.

Questions from the Supreme Court justices during oral arguments on April 27, 2026, indicate that at least some of them consider geofence warrants to be general warrants and thus unconstitutional. But for now, we wait.

Anne Toomey McKenna serves on the Advisory Board to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)-USA’s Artificial Intelligence Policy Committee (AIPC) and Chairs multiple AIPC subcommittees. The AIPC work involves subject matter and education-related interaction with U.S. Senate and House congressional staffers and the Congressional AI Caucus. McKenna has received funding from the National Security Agency for the development of legal educational materials about cyberlaw (a course which the government still makes available online for the public) and funding from The National Police Foundation together with the U.S. Department of Justice-COPS division for legal analysis regarding the use of drones in domestic policing.

– ref. Supreme Court geofencing case weighs constitutionality of digital dragnets – and how far your rights go in the data Big Tech collects on you – https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-geofencing-case-weighs-constitutionality-of-digital-dragnets-and-how-far-your-rights-go-in-the-data-big-tech-collects-on-you-281505

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sam D. Hayes, Assistant professor of politics and policy, Simmons University

In a major ruling that would permit weakening the voting power of minorities in the United States, the Supreme Court on April 29, 2026, struck down a Black-majority district in Louisiana’s congressional map as “an unconstitutional gerrymander” and altered the court’s interpretation of the Voting Rights Act.

In a 6-3 decision, the court’s conservative majority argued that Louisiana had violated the law by drawing a second Black-majority district. Justice Samuel Alito wrote that the court was upholding a key part of the Voting Rights Act known as Section 2, which prohibits “voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or membership in one of the language minority groups identified” in the act.

But the conservative justices also devised a new interpretation for its application based on historical developments. By doing that, the court majority made it more difficult for plaintiffs to challenge redistricting plans under the act.

In a dissent, Justice Elena Kagan called the decision the “latest chapter in the majority’s now-completed demolition of the Voting Rights Act.”

Kagan, joined by the other two liberal justices, argued that the decision will make it effectively impossible to use race in redistricting – as has been done historically under the Voting Rights Act – and more difficult to prove discrimination under the act. She wrote, “The court’s decision will set back the foundational right Congress granted of racial equality in electoral opportunity.”

I’m a scholar of national political institutions, election law and democratic representation. The timing of the case carries major implications for the 2026 midterm elections. The decision, by weakening the Voting Rights Act, could make it easier for states to draw partisan gerrymanders of their congressional districts that reduce the power of minorities.

Long legal battle

The central question in the case was to what extent race can, or must, be used when congressional districts are redrawn.

Plaintiffs challenged whether the longstanding interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires protection of minority voting power in redistricting, violates the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees that individuals should be treated the same by the law.

In short, the plaintiffs argued that the state of Louisiana’s use of race to make a second Black-majority district was forbidden by the U.S. Constitution. From my perspective as a scholar of U.S. federal courts and electoral systems, this case represent the collision of decades of Supreme Court decisions on race, redistricting and the Voting Rights Act.

To understand the stakes of the current case, it’s important to know what the Voting Rights Act does. Initially passed in 1965, the act helped end decades of racially discriminatory voting laws by providing federal enforcement of voting rights.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids discrimination by states in relation to voting rights and has been used for decades to challenge redistricting plans.

Callais had its roots in the redistricting of Louisiana’s congressional districts following the 2020 Census. States are required to redraw districts each decade based on new population data. Louisiana lawmakers redrew the state’s six congressional districts without major changes in 2022.

Soon after the state redistricted, a group of Black voters challenged the map in federal court as a violation of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs argued that the new map was discriminatory because the voting power of Black citizens in the state was being illegally diluted. The state’s population was 31% Black, but only one of the six districts featured a majority-Black population.

Federal courts in 2022 sided with the plaintiffs’ claim that the plan did violate the Voting Rights Act and ordered the state legislature to redraw the congressional plan with a second Black-majority district.

The judges relied on an interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act from a 1986 Supreme Court decision in the case known as Thornburg v. Gingles. Under this interpretation, Section 2’s nondiscrimination requirement means that congressional districts must be drawn in a way that allows large, politically cohesive and compact racial minorities to be able to elect representatives of their choice.

In 2023, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in a similar racial gerrymandering case in Alabama.

Louisiana lawmakers redraw districts

Following the court order, the Louisiana state legislature passed Senate Bill 8 in January 2024, redrawing the congressional map and creating two districts where Black voters composed a substantial portion of the electorate in compliance with the Gingles ruling. This map was used in the 2024 congressional election and both Black-majority districts elected Democrats, while the other four districts elected Republicans.

These new congressional districts from Senate Bill 8 were challenged by a group of white voters in 2024 in a set of cases that became Louisiana v. Callais.

The plaintiffs argued that the Louisiana legislature’s drawing of districts based on race in Senate Bill 8 was in violation of the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause, which requires equal treatment of individuals by the government, and the 15th Amendment, which forbids denying the right to vote based on race.

Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed that the courts’ interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional and that the use of race to create a majority-minority district is itself discriminatory. Similar arguments about the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause were also the basis of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions striking down race-based affirmative action in college admissions.

In 2024, a three-judge district court sided with the white plaintiffs in Louisiana v. Callais, with a 2-1 decision. The Black plaintiffs from the original case and the state of Louisiana appealed the case to the Supreme Court. The court originally heard the case at the end of the 2024-2025 term before ordering the case reargued for 2025-2026.

Major implications

The court’s opinion reinterprets key precedent on the Voting Rights Act and the application of Section 2 to redistricting. It carries major consequences for the federal courts, gerrymandering and the voting rights of individuals.

For 39 years, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has required redistricting institutions to consider racial and ethnic minority representation when devising congressional districts. Majority-minority districting is required when a state has large, compact and cohesive minority communities. Historically, some states have redistricted minority communities in ways that dilute their voting power, such as “cracking” a community into multiple districts where they compose a small percentage of the electorate.

Section 2 also provided voters and residents with a legal tool that has been used to challenge districts as discriminatory. Many voters and groups have used Section 2 successfully to challenge redistricting plans.

Section 2 has been the main legal tool for challenging racial discrimination in redistricting for the past decade. In 2013, the Supreme Court effectively ended the other major component of the Voting Rights Act, the preclearance provision, which required certain states to have changes to their elections laws approved by the federal government, including redistricting.

In this case the court did not fully overrule the previous interpretation of Section 2, but it has altered its application. The effect is that it limits the legality of using race in redistricting and the most common way to challenge discriminatory redistricting.

Additionally, because of the strong relationship between many minority communities and the Democratic party, the court’s decision has major implications for partisan control of the House of Representatives.

By changing the interpretation of Section 2, Republicans could use the ruling to redraw congressional districts across the country to benefit their party. Politico reported that Democrats could lose as many as 19 House seats if the Supreme Court sided with the lower court.

This case builds directly on a recent case also authored by Alito. In 2024, the court overruled a lower court’s finding of racial vote dilution in South Carolina.

This is an updated version of a story that originally published on Oct. 13, 2025.

Sam D. Hayes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Act ruling makes it harder to protect minority voting power and alters the landscape of future elections – https://theconversation.com/supreme-courts-voting-rights-act-ruling-makes-it-harder-to-protect-minority-voting-power-and-alters-the-landscape-of-future-elections-281817