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July 5, 2025

What keeps girls from school in Malawi? We asked them and it’s not just pregnancy

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Rachel Silver, Assistant Professor, York University, Canada

Coverage of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns on girls in Malawi emphasised the risks they faced as a result of not attending school. In particular, concerns about pregnancy garnered significant media attention.

The United Nations Children’s Fund, for example, published an article in March 2021 entitled “Schoolgirl shakes off COVID-19 regret: Lucy’s return to school”. Under a glossy photograph of a smiling girl, readers learn about 16-year-old Lucy, one of 13,000 Malawian students who became pregnant during COVID-19 school closures. The story went on to detail the dire consequences of sexual activity to Lucy’s well-being, and the redemptive power of an eventual return to school.

The Unicef piece echoed thousands of similar publications circulated after March 2020 that analysed COVID-19’s unique risk for girls in the global south and lamented lost returns to girls’ education.

In response to COVID-19 surges, Malawian schools closed for over seven months, during which the percentage of pregnancies to young women aged 10-19 did increase from 29% to 35% of total pregnancies.

Yet, our research has demonstrated that international development organisations and media outlets focused mostly on narrow, sexualised framings of risk to African girls and women rather than on the many intersecting and ongoing barriers to their well-being and school retention. These challenges both predate and extend beyond COVID-19.

As scholars of international development education who have conducted research in Malawi for over a decade, we decided to join Malawian educational activist and collaborator Stella Makhuva to research how girls themselves narrated their experiences of the COVID-19 years. What did they consider a risk to their schooling?

Together, we designed a longitudinal study from 2020 to 2023 that included multiple rounds of interviews and participatory journalling methods with 22 upper primary and secondary school girls in southern Malawi.

We found that for girls in our study, COVID-19 was less a rupture – an unusual event that threatened their education in unprecedented ways – than an added variable in the already complex calculations girls and their families made about whether and how to remain in school.

We argue that it was not pregnancy itself, but escalating resource constraints, that kept girls from school. And that interventions must do something about the real problem: inequitable systems.

The stories told by the girls illustrate this. (All the names are pseudonyms.)

Their stories

When Faith joined our study in 2020, she was attending a peri-urban
primary school near her home. She lived in a mud and grass-thatched house with her parents, both subsistence farmers who supported Faith’s and her siblings’ education. During school closures, she studied with friends to keep up with academic content when she was not helping with her parents’ farm.

Yet school costs threatened Faith’s return to school upon reopening. Despite primary school being officially “free” by government mandate, students at her school were required to contribute 800 Malawi kwacha (close to US$1 at the time) per term to a school fund for infrastructure projects and upkeep. Not paying into the fund resulted in exclusion from classes.

When Faith eventually passed the Primary School Leaving Certificate Exam and enrolled in secondary school, the costs to schooling rose from 5,000 kwacha (about US$6.50 in early 2021) to 20,000 kwacha (about US$19 in late 2022). Faith worried about whether her parents, whose maize and tomato yields suffered from poor rains, would be able to pay.

On top of this, Faith paid other costs, from exam fees and bicycle rental fees to supplemental lessons in which she learned material never covered during school hours. She said she and her family often sacrificed eating sufficiently to save money.

Still, Faith was repeatedly pushed out of school until her fee balance was met. Before, during, and after COVID-19 school closures, girls like her were pushed out of school for a lack of regular fee payments.

Faith’s school-going was also threatened by warming temperatures and new rain patterns that left her family with diminished food and income. Added to this were volatility in government agricultural subsidies to small farmers, inflated school fees, and the increasing privatisation of public education in Malawi.

Like Faith, all of the girls in our study worked to supplement their schooling with part time lessons, holiday classes, or by repeating grades given educational quality concerns. Based in under-resourced schools with low exam pass rates, girls knew that they were provided an incomplete education.

According to Brightness,

We do not learn fully what we are supposed to cover, and some teachers tend to be absent during their lessons. This makes us lag behind … As a result during exams they ask some questions which some of us … did not learn.

Empirical evidence has shown how teacher engagement has long been influenced by the region’s high disease burden, especially due to HIV/Aids. This has left teachers both ill and caring for ill relatives.

While teacher disengagement, therefore, reflected factors such as competing care responsibilities, professional dissatisfaction and stress, girls were deeply frustrated by what felt like abandonment.

Rethinking pregnancy and parenting

Mainstream discourses that missed key barriers to girls’ school retention and performance, such as privatisation and food insecurity, misrepresented student pregnancy as an emergent “crisis”.

Prior to the pandemic, sexuality and school-going already overlapped for many girls in Malawi, where adolescent pregnancy rates were threefold the global average. Still, girls in our study countered the idea that schooling and sex were incompatible. They also challenged the idea that school was inherently safe and that it was pregnancy that kept them from school.

Many of the girls’ stories emphasised continuity with what came before the pandemic.

We have found this in past research. Schooling and sexuality are not necessarily opposed; but parents and teachers try to protect girls from sexuality; and parenting and non-parenting girls alike face significant resource-related barriers to schooling.

Conclusion

If girls’ choices, particularly around sexuality, do not represent the greatest or only source of risk for girls’ schooling, interventions must respond to this reality. They should support well-being and address the broader conditions in which girls live and learn. The problem is inequity, not pregnant girls.

Rachel Silver has received funding from the National Academy of Education/Spencer Foundation and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Alyssa Morley has received funding for this work from the Spencer Foundation and Michigan State University’s Center for Gender in Global Context.

– ref. What keeps girls from school in Malawi? We asked them and it’s not just pregnancy – https://theconversation.com/what-keeps-girls-from-school-in-malawi-we-asked-them-and-its-not-just-pregnancy-258401

July 5, 2025

Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

The Nigerian economy grew at a robust rate of 3.4% in 2024, the highest it has been since 2019 (except 2021 when the COVID rebound occurred).

This should have been cheering news, worthy of firecrackers and champagne-popping. Rather it came with a catch: the country’s poverty profile worsened.

In its annual review of the country, the World Bank applauded Nigeria for its economic reforms. These include the removal of fuel subsidies, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and maintenance of a contractionary monetary policy. This is a policy of raising interest rates, reducing money supply and increasing borrowing costs to rein in inflation.

But the bank also drew attention to the fact that the country’s poverty profile has become grim. About 31% of Nigerians lived in poverty prior to the COVID-19 epidemic. Since then, an additional 42 million have become poor, increasing the poverty rate to about 46% in 2024.

Poverty is even worse in Nigeria’s rural communities: 75.5% live on US$2.15 or less per day (based on 2017 prices). The average poverty rate for sub-Saharan African countries was 36.5% in 2024 and 0.8% for East Asia and the Pacific.

Nigeria’s poverty rate would have been higher if the multidimensional poverty index had been used. In addition to income, the index considers access to education, health, decent housing, nutrition, sanitation, electricity and water. Access to these critical services has worsened for many Nigerians, despite improvements in macroeconomic stability.

A challenge for policy makers is how to translate impressive macroeconomic outcomes into high-paying jobs, lower poverty rates and access to health, good sanitation, education, electricity and affordable housing. The question is even more acute for people in rural areas.

As an economist who has studied the Nigerian economy for over four decades and lived in a rural community, I believe Nigeria needs a radical shift in its economic policy approach.

One major step should be a change in the country’s growth drivers. Oil, information and communications technology and finance are the major drivers of growth in Nigeria.

These sectors are not employment-intensive, and they require skills that most Nigerians don’t have. Because of the lack of employment opportunities in these sectors, most Nigerians gravitate towards the informal sector, which accounts for about 90% of employment in the country.

By continuing to urge Nigerians to be patient for economic reforms to have a positive impact on their living conditions, the Tinubu administration appears to assume that improvements in macroeconomic performance will eventually manifest in lower unemployment and poverty rates. This notion of “trickle-down economics” is misconceived and illusory.

The government needs to intentionally create transmission mechanisms through which economic growth and macroeconomic stability can raise living standards.

Fostering growth with development

Concerted efforts will be needed to target poverty in general, and rural poverty in particular.

Five key policies could get Nigeria closer to this goal:

Building productive capacities: People who live in rural areas in Nigeria are eager to work and full of creative ideas and entrepreneurial spirit. But they lack the resources and opportunity to fully unleash their potential.

Building their productive capacities would entail giving them access to basic education, technical and managerial skills, and other productive resources such as tools, equipment, finance and land. The government should identify the comparative advantage of different rural communities, and put in place policies that encourage those communities to use their comparative advantage and distinctive competencies.

Opportunity to diversify incomes: In developed countries, many people hold multiple jobs. Most rural dwellers in Nigeria, however, rely on agriculture as their only source of livelihood.

Because of limited access to inputs and modern technology, and outdated agricultural practices, their productivity is often very low. Their low income makes it difficult to save and invest in education, health and housing.

Non-agricultural activities, especially manufacturing, need to be located in rural communities, to give rural dwellers the opportunity to diversify their income sources.

Agriculture-led industrial strategy: This would involve the location of manufacturing plants close to the sources of agricultural raw materials.

Nigerian manufacturers locate their factories in urban areas. The result of urban-biased development strategy in Nigeria has been the lack of employment opportunities in rural communities, and a decline in the rural population, from about 85% in 1960 to 46% in 2023.

Moving manufacturing to rural areas would require massive investment in infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads and health services.

Ending patriarchy and male domination: Women disproportionately bear the burden of rural poverty in Nigeria. A study in rural south-east Nigeria found that the poverty rate among women was 98%, compared to 85% for men. Men are often given preference regarding access to land, education, skills acquisition and financial inclusion.

Women are also imbued with the responsibility of caring for children, the elderly and the sick, as well as household chores. This leaves them with little time for paid work or opportunities to acquire marketable skills.

Ability to absorb shocks and vulnerability: Rural poverty is often exacerbated by shocks and vulnerability such as extreme weather conditions, attacks by insurgents and other criminal groups, and illness. With no safety nets, and little or no saving, most rural dwellers are unable to withstand shocks.

The Tinubu administration plans to disburse N25,000 (about US$17) each to 60 million Nigerians. But these kinds of support are too small, non-pervasive, irregular and unpredictable.

What India and China have to teach

Nigeria could do well to borrow from the Indian model of an institutionalised safety net.

India issues “ration cards” to eligible households. The cards enable poor people to purchase essential food items such as grains, milk, eggs, cooking oil and bread at subsidised prices from designated stores.

Nigeria could finance this kind of programme with a special tax on oil companies and financial institutions, which frequently post huge after-tax profits.

China has had an impressive record of poverty reduction. Using the US$1.90 poverty line, China’s poverty rate decreased from 88.1% in 1981 to 0.3% in 2018.

The fall in rural poverty is even more dramatic, from 96% in 1980 to 1% in 2019.

This reduction was accomplished in stages, starting with an increase in agricultural productivity. It then shifted focus to the development of non-agricultural sectors of the economy, including manufacturing. These sectors were able to draw surplus labour from the agricultural sector, giving them skills that led to higher wages and poverty alleviation.

Next steps

The World Bank in its report noted that addressing pressing social and humanitarian challenges remains critical to ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth in Nigeria.

Cash transfers and social assistance programmes could provide temporary relief for the poor in rural communities. But a long-term solution is to build their productive capacities and transform rural communities in ways that provide opportunities for income diversification.

Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-economy-is-growing-but-rural-poverty-is-rising-5-key-policies-to-address-the-divide-257152

July 5, 2025

Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Yuezhou Yang, Research Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science

Media coverage of Chinese land investments in African agriculture often reinforces narratives of a “weak African state” and the “Chinese land grab”, highlighting power imbalances between the actors involved in these land deals.

Are Chinese actors grabbing land in Africa and jeopardising local people’s land rights and food security?

China’s “Agriculture Going Out” policy, launched in 2007 as part of its broader “Going Out” strategy, was reinforced by the Belt and Road Initiative from 2013. Backed by these policies, Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa rose from US$74.81 million in 2003 to US$4.99 billion in 2021. By 2020, US$1.67 billion was invested in African agriculture, with nearly two-thirds targeting cash crop cultivation. Zambia ranked among the top ten African countries receiving Chinese foreign direct investment and loans.

My research on Zambian agriculture finds that Chinese land grabbing is a myth. Instead, Chinese investors have preferred different investment models according to the specific rules of land access, transfer and control of three land tenure systems in Zambia.

What ties the three types of Chinese agricultural investments together is this: land institutions matter. Whether it’s central government rules or traditional authority, these systems shape how foreign investment happens and what impact it has.

Each of the three models raises new opportunities and challenges for rural development and land governance. These findings matter because they offer insights into the future of land rights, livelihoods and state-building in African countries.

Not all land is the same

After independence, all land in Zambia was vested in the president, held in trust for the people. Today, the country still operates under a dual land system, as outlined in the 1995 Lands Act. State land, managed by the central government, includes both private and government leaseholds. Customary land, on the other hand, remains under the authority of traditional chiefs. The exact proportion of state and customary land in Zambia is contested, with estimates of customary land ranging widely from 94% to 54%.

This tenure distinction is significant because each type of land is governed by different rules regarding foreign access and ownership, which shape how foreign investors choose their investment models.

Over four months of fieldwork in Zambia, I gathered data on 50 Chinese agricultural projects (41 remained active) through 96 qualitative interviews. These projects were spread across three types of land tenure: private leasehold (37), government leasehold (1), and customary land (3).

Model 1: Commercial farm on private land

My fieldwork data showed that the majority of Chinese agricultural investments in Zambia are located on private leasehold land, typically following the commercial farm model. This type of land functions much like private property, held under 99-year leases that can be bought, sold or transferred. Investors use it for large-scale farming operations, such as maize, soybean and wheat production.

Even in these seemingly privatised spaces, however, state power remains influential. When Zambia proposed a draft National Land Policy in 2017 aimed at tightening rules for foreign land ownership, Chinese investors responded strategically. Many began aligning their projects with Zambia’s development priorities, emphasising contributions to local food security, donating to charities, and promoting themselves as responsible corporate actors.

Model 2: Farm block on government land

In northern Zambia, for example, a Chinese company partnered with the government to develop a farm block on state-owned land that had been converted from customary tenure for national development. Unlike the commercial farm model, the government played a central role, selecting the investor, managing the land and negotiating the deal. The project promised infrastructure and jobs, enhancing the political standing of local officials.

But this kind of state-led development works only when the promises are delivered. In other areas where farm blocks failed to materialise, traditional chiefs reclaimed the land. In the northern case, actual physical infrastructure investment helped reinforce state authority.

Model 3: Contract farming on customary land

The third model is very different. For instance, a Chinese agribusiness company arranged contract farming deals with over 50,000 smallholders in Zambia’s Eastern Province. Instead of buying or leasing land, the company provided seeds and bought cotton from farmers after harvest. This let the company access land informally, without triggering the legal and political risks of converting customary land to leasehold.

Operating on customary land posed challenges for investors. When farmers defaulted on loans or engaged in side-selling, companies had limited legal recourse and often had to negotiate with chiefs and local communities rather than the state. In such contexts, traditional authorities – not the central government – wielded the decisive power over land and its governance.

Why this matters

In a world where land deals are often controversial, understanding how local rules shape global investment is crucial. It’s not just about who buys the land, but under what terms, and how those terms are enforced. African governments are not just passive bystanders; they’re active players who use land institutions to negotiate power and development.

This research urges us to look beyond the headlines about “land grabs” and instead focus on the everyday politics of land. If African states want to steer rural development on their own terms, understanding and strengthening land institutions – both statutory and customary – is key.

This research is developed from Yuezhou Yang’s MRes/PhD project, which is supported by funding from the China Scholarship Council 201708040015.

– ref. Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth – https://theconversation.com/are-chinese-investors-grabbing-zambian-land-study-finds-thats-a-myth-257644

July 5, 2025

African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

Eurobonds, debts owed in a foreign currency, have become a quick and attractive way for African countries to borrow money. They are behind a sharp rise in commercial borrowing as a percentage of total external debt: it has nearly doubled from 27% in 2011 to 52% in 2020. This has increased the debt vulnerability of most African countries.

Recent developments, however, show that most of the bonds have not been structured properly. As a result, African countries are paying way over the odds relative to their sovereign risks.

Based on my bond price modelling expertise, it is my view that there are two major drivers of the mispricing of African government bonds. They are interlinked.

Firstly, a lack of expertise in debt management offices, whose job it is to negotiate the terms of any debt deals and to oversee their execution. This is a topic I explored in a recent article.

The second factor, which I address here, is that in many African countries, finance ministers have assumed primary responsibility for Eurobond issuance. They engage directly with investment bankers, legal advisors and credit rating agencies.

In my view they shouldn’t.

Finance ministers should stay away from debt negotiations because they are political appointees. They operate under incentives tied to electoral cycles, not fiscal sustainability. Their short tenures and desire to fund visible projects often conflict with the long-term nature of sovereign debt obligations.

They don’t have the necessary expertise to handle the technical complexity required to get the best possible deal, either.

Simply calling for ministers to step aside would ignore the institutional realities in most African countries. In particular, debt management offices have severe capacity constraints.

Nevertheless, as global financial conditions tighten and African countries seek to refinance maturing Eurobonds or issue new instruments, the risks of politicised borrowing must be minimised. Ministers should spend their energies on ensuring their debt management offices are well staffed with top quality teams. They should then leave it up to these technical staff to prepare and arrange the financing.

This would leave room for ministers to manage any disagreements between technical staff and the banks when necessary. And to close the final deal.

Ministers versus the experts

Eurobond issuance involves advanced financial engineering – pricing models, investor engagement, covenant structuring and legal compliance across jurisdictions. It takes a deep understanding of capital markets.

When debt management offices are operating at their best, they are filled with people who have this knowledge. They have a combination of financial market and public policy skills, including debt portfolio management, risk analysis and debt transaction processing.

In discussions with debt managers at the African Sovereign Debt Conference it’s become clear to me that debt managers are sidelined in the international bond issuance negotiations. They are also sidelined in the execution process, except for administrative support.

What happens instead is that finance ministers are usually key contacts of the investment bankers. By approaching a minister directly, investment bankers get to close their mandates faster.

But this minimises due diligence and bypasses internal safeguards. Ministers may not pay attention to complex legal clauses under foreign jurisdictions, details of investor negotiations and fee structures. They may accept unfavourable terms, ignore sustainability assessments and obscure fiscal vulnerabilities in pursuit of political wins and quick disbursements.

For example, in 2018, Ghana’s then finance minister was internationally lauded for financial stewardship. Ghana was the first African issuer of a longest tenure and a zero-coupon bond. A year later, the country defaulted, suggesting the bond terms weren’t great for the country. The minister nevertheless received several awards as the best and most prudent in Africa.

There is also the issue of conflicts of interest. When the same actor – in this case the finance minister – proposes, negotiates and approves a debt instrument, the system lacks accountability.

In many African countries, parliaments, audit institutions and civil society have limited understanding about the technical details of bond agreements. Ministers can easily sideline procurement rules and transparency mechanisms, resulting in non-competitive contracts and opaque fees paid to underwriters and advisors.

Investment bankers prefer this arrangement as it works in their favour.

Reforms that are needed

Before finance ministers can hand over control, debt management offices must be equipped. This requires targeted reforms, including:

Capacity building through strategic partnerships: African debt management offices should work with international issuing syndicates and development partners to gain first-hand exposure to structuring, pricing and marketing global bonds.
Human capital reforms: Governments must attract and retain highly skilled debt managers by offering competitive pay, professional development opportunities and protection from political interference.
Debt management offices must be staffed by dedicated quantitative analysts. They must also be equipped to use real-time market intelligence systems and formal investor relations programmes.
Gradual delegation: Authority can be shifted, starting with less complex debt instruments.

The role of the finance minister must evolve. Ministers should provide strategic leadership: approving borrowing strategies, ensuring alignment with macroeconomic goals, and engaging parliament and the public.

Their function should shift from operational to institutional oversight and accountability.

Structural reforms must embed the capacity, autonomy and transparency required for debt management offices to lead effectively.

In South Africa, for example, the assets and liabilities management division of the National Treasury department manages government’s annual funding programme.

Professionalising the debt issuance process is not just about avoiding technical mistakes. It’s also about creating resilient institutions that can withstand political turnover. That fosters credibility and long-term access to capital.

Ministers should remain accountable to the public, and debt management offices must do their work based on technical merit.

Misheck Mutize is affiliated with the African Union – African Peer Review Mechanism as a Lead Expert on credit ratings

– ref. African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts – https://theconversation.com/african-finance-ministers-shouldnt-be-making-bond-deals-how-to-hand-over-the-job-to-experts-259017

July 5, 2025

Migrants in South Africa’s economic powerhouse often go hungry: the drivers and what can be done about it

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Adrino Mazenda, Senior Researcher, Associate Professor Economic Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

About 281 million people globally have migrated from their country of origin to another country. This movement can be temporary or permanent and can occur for various reasons, including economic opportunities, family reunification and education. Then there are also millions who are escaping conflict and seeking refuge in another country.

Countries at different stages of development also experience large volumes of internal migration. Migration within a country can be temporary or permanent too, and reflect economic reasons or insecurity.

Both types of migrants sometimes experience food insecurity: the physical and financial inability to access nutritious, safe and sufficient food to fulfil a person’s dietary requirements.

There are an estimated 2.89 million documented foreign migrants in South Africa, accounting for about 5% of the country’s population. Most immigrants in South Africa come from the Southern African Development Community countries. South Africa also experiences a high annual internal migration rate. About 850,0000 people temporarily and permanently relocate from rural to urban areas.

Gauteng, the province which contributes more than a third of South Africa’s economic output, attracts a disproportionate share of internal and international migration.

As social scientists who have been studying migration and food security, we conducted research to explore the food security status of migrant households (international and internal) and native Gauteng households, and to understand their differences, if any.

The study used data from the 2020/21 Quality of Life survey. This is one of the largest social surveys in South Africa, and respondents include both internal and international migrants. It is conducted every two years by the Gauteng City Region Observatory. Quantitative research methods and statistical analysis were then applied to identify patterns and relationships between food insecurity and migration variables.

Food insecurity remains a pressing concern in South Africa’s major cities, particularly among migrant populations. Not all migrants experience food insecurity the same way, however. Internal and international migrants differ not only from native Gauteng residents but also from one another. There are different factors influencing their vulnerability.

The differences

One differentiating factor between the internal and foreign migrants is government social support services. They seem to play a key role in determining the well-being of internal migrants. International migrants don’t qualify for such services. But they sometimes fared better than internal migrants or natives, likely due to age, education, or resourcefulness (social support networks).

Internal migrants experienced their own set of challenges. For example, poor health service provision and lack of medical aid were strong predictors of food insecurity. This suggests that addressing food access requires improvements in health services, insurance, and broader social infrastructure.

Improved access to healthcare reduces the financial burden on households dealing with medical expenses, so they can spend more on food. Access to maternal and child health services enhances nutritional knowledge and practices. That in turn improves the way households use food. Health insurance and unemployment insurance protect households from income shocks that could otherwise lead to food insecurity.

A stronger social infrastructure improves food access by enhancing education, healthcare, and social protection systems. Education boosts income and nutritional knowledge. Preventive healthcare reduces illness and medical expenses, freeing up resources for food. Social protection measures help households withstand financial shocks, ensuring consistent access to food.

Of course all this support has a cost that needs to be funded from the public purse, but its benefits may well outweigh the cost.

Gender disparities

Immigrants contribute significantly to South Africa’s economy. Migration enhances labour market flexibility, promotes economic dynamism, and supports livelihoods in both urban and rural areas, making it essential for inclusive economic growth.
Internal migrants provide labour in sectors such as mining, construction and services, while also supporting rural households through remittances. They help stimulate urban informal economies.

International migrants bring valuable skills and resilience to various sectors, including agriculture, healthcare, manufacturing and construction. They contribute local income taxes. Some operate small and large formal businesses, which adds to job creation.

However, employment data reveals a pronounced gender disparity among international migrants and internal migrants.

In all population groups (native residents, internal migrants and international migrants), men are more likely to be employed than women. Among international migrants, over 1 million men were employed compared to 400,000 women. More women (281,553) than men (88,598) were classified as economically inactive – not available for work.

The primary reason for internal migration among both men and women was the search for paid employment. For men, the second most common reason was job transfers or accepting new employment.

In contrast, female migrants cited moving to live with or be closer to a spouse, family, or friends, often due to marriage, as their main motivation.

Way forward

Our study highlights the determinants of food insecurity among migrant populations. It also challenges harmful stereotypes and invites more inclusive thinking about social support and job creation.

The study’s findings can help inform the public about who needs more support and why. It shows that food aid and government support systems aren’t working as intended.

The main conclusions we reached from the study were that:

Rural health infrastructure is in dire need of public support.
Increased inequities in healthcare access are unjustified.
The medical and health bills of foreign citizens can be shared between home and host countries to reduce the strain on the host’s infrastructure through a combination of policy reforms, bilateral agreements and global cooperation mechanisms. Key to this is an inter-government billing system where host countries track migrants’ healthcare use and send bills to their home country governments or insurers.
It is desirable for migrants to hold valid health insurance as a condition of entry or residency.
Policies to promote agriculture and rural areas, particularly developing new rural housing schemes, appear to be a promising way to abate food insecurity.
Revitalising special economic zones, the designated areas offering incentives to attract investment, boost trade and create jobs, can help limit the concentration of migrants in Gauteng.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Migrants in South Africa’s economic powerhouse often go hungry: the drivers and what can be done about it – https://theconversation.com/migrants-in-south-africas-economic-powerhouse-often-go-hungry-the-drivers-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-256907

July 5, 2025

Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors are pressing them to default on loans to two African multilateral financial institutions: the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the Trade and Development Bank (TDB).

These creditors, in effect, are demanding that the two countries prioritise repayments to themselves over payments to these two banks.

As academics who have worked on the challenges of financing sustainable development in Africa, we believe this action is short-sighted.

The action by Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors has two significant implications.

First, they are demanding that the two countries treat Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank as commercial creditors. This would undermine the banks’ credit ratings and increase their borrowing costs. It would also reduce their capacity to finance sustainable development in Africa.

Second, pressing Ghana and Zambia to default, rather than supporting pragmatic restructuring aligned with their strong growth prospects, exacerbates Ghana and Zambia’s financial vulnerability. Either they would have to use scarce resources to pay these debts or default on their obligations, in which case, the banks might well sue them.

Quotes from Ghana and Zambia’s ministries of finance suggest the decision to default is their own. However, they faced intense pressure from their official creditors to treat the two African multilateral financial institutions differently from all their other multilateral creditors.

Why does this differential treatment matter?

Preferred creditor status

Multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank and African Development Bank, have a preferred creditor status. This is in recognition of the special role they play. They are expected to provide relatively low-cost funding for public investment, economic stability and long-term sustainable development in low- and middle-income countries.

Their preferred creditor status ensures that, when countries experience debt distress, their development mandate is prioritised over the concerns of commercial creditors. Commercial creditors normally only fund commercially viable transactions. They charge high interest rates to compensate for the risk of default on these transactions.

Both Afreximbank and Trade and Development Bank were created to fill a gap in Africa’s access to critical development finance. They provide financing for projects and transactions that commercial institutions and other multilateral financial institutions cannot – or will not – provide, because of capital limits, regulations or perceptions of risk.

For example, Afreximbank’s charter notes that

the decline in African exports has impacted adversely on the economies of African states and hindered their ability to achieve a self-reliant development.

It further recognises that stimulating economic development

can best be achieved through the creation of a trade financing international institution whose principal purpose is to provide and mobilise the requisite financial resources.

Historically, it has enjoyed preferred creditor status to support its role in meeting this purpose.

Why preferred creditor status is being challenged

The two countries’ official creditor committees, the rating agency Fitch and other commentators are challenging the preferred creditor status of the two African institutions. They argue that the two banks are different from multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and the African Development Bank that only have states as shareholders. They suggest that the private shareholders in the two African banks should not benefit from preferred creditor status. Instead, they should receive the same status as commercial creditors.

This view ignores the reason that Afreximbank’s and the Trade and Development Bank’s member states authorised them to have private shareholders. It was a deliberate, pragmatic measure designed to fill a gap in Africa’s access to affordable development finance.

The idea was to create new multilateral institutions that could raise capital flexibly and quickly on terms that the individual African states could not match on their own. Several other regional development banks have this hybrid model, including CAF, a highly rated development bank in Latin America.

It is perverse that this creative and pragmatic approach to filling a gap in the global financial system is now being used against the two African banks.

The consequences

The cost of capital for the two African financial institutions will increase if they are treated like commercial creditors. This will reduce their capacity to lend and their financing will become more expensive. It will also deepen inequality in the global financial system. Lastly, it will increase the risk of future African sovereign debt defaults.

In other words, downgrading their status risks undermining the very stability that official creditors claim to safeguard. It will also create another obstacle to Africa’s efforts to access stable, predictable and affordable flows of development finance.

The eventual outcome of the official creditors’ action will ultimately depend on negotiations between Ghana and Zambia and their creditors. This will include the two African institutions. It will also be influenced by how these different groups of creditors behave in other African sovereign debt restructurings.

However, the international community can seek to influence the outcome by taking actions in appropriate international settings.

Global leaders are searching for ways to scale up and strengthen the capacity of regional and subregional development banks like Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank. This requires respecting their preferred creditor status and increasing their access to affordable capital.

This is precisely the opposite of what is unfolding.

There is still time for the creditor governments to change course by demonstrating their support for African multilateral financial institutions.

Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at University of Pretoria, is Senior G20 Advisor to the South African Institute of International Affairs and co-chair of the T20 sask force on sustainable financing.

Lisa Sachs does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price – https://theconversation.com/africas-development-banks-are-being-undermined-the-continent-will-pay-the-price-259404

July 5, 2025

Detty December started as a Nigerian cultural moment. Now it’s spreading across the continent – and minting money

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Nnamdi O. Madichie, Professor of Marketing & Entrepreneurship, Unizik Business School, Nnamdi Azikiwe University

Festivals like Carnival Calabar in Nigeria abound throughout the year-end parties across west Africa and beyond. Akintomiwaao/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

Every December in Nigeria and Ghana a giant party takes place, unfolding in a whirlwind of concerts, festivals, weddings, art shows, dress-ups, meet-ups and travel. Locals and diaspora west Africans returning from overseas come together to create Detty December, a festive event stretching from mid-December to the new year.

Detty is a playful term for “dirty” in the regional Pidgin language and “Detty December” is a term commonly believed to have been coined by Afropop star Mr Eazi in 2016. It means letting loose and indulging in some fun and revelry.

Major events headlined by local and international music stars punctuate Detty December. In Nigeria events range from Flytime Fest in Lagos to Carnival Calabar, which showcases cultural heritage. In Ghana, festivals like AfroFuture and Afro Nation attract global celebrities and influencers as well as returning citizens.

But this isn’t just a holiday fling. Propelled by youthful energy and cultural innovation, it’s an economic phenomenon. And it represents a shift in Africa’s urban landscape and its relationship with the rest of the world.

Detty December now stands as a pillar of Africa’s creative economy, which has built on the global popularity of music from the continent, from Afrobeats to amapiano.

As marketing and entrepreneurship lecturers with an eye on the creative industries, we’ve researched Detty December and believe it’s a cultural tourism phenomenon with the potential to spread across the continent. In fact, it’s already begun to do so.

Nigeria: the economic power of Detty December

Despite infrastructure challenges, places like Lagos are new cultural epicentres. During Detty December the city becomes a carnival of reunions and celebrations. “I Just Got Backs” (IJGBs) return, music spills from every bar and events pop up daily.

Once simply a cultural moment, Detty December has rapidly become a powerful economic engine. It makes a big impact on hospitality, entertainment, tourism and local businesses.

In Lagos alone, the 2024 festivities generated an estimated US$71.6 million in state revenue. Hotels contributed US$44 million and short-term rentals added US$30 million.

Nationally, the impact is even more staggering. Detty December injected over US$220 million into Nigeria’s economy in 2023.

A major driver of this growth is tourism. An estimated 1.2 million visitors flocked to Lagos in December 2024. Nearly 90% of these were diaspora Nigerians.

Afrobeats star Wizkid’s Made in Lagos concert alone pulled in nearly US$650,000 in ticket sales. New song releases on Fridays have become features of the season.

Beyond direct spending, Detty December creates temporary and permanent jobs and bolsters small businesses.

Ghana: December in GH

The government of neighbouring Ghana has recognised this potential, strategically branding its festive season December in GH. This initiative leverages cultural tourism for substantial economic gain. The country even takes measures like visa-on-arrival in December to encourage visitors.

This builds on cultural tourism successes like the 2019 Year of Return campaign. In 2023, December in GH reportedly attracted about 115,000 participants.

Even in a challenging economic climate, Detty December continues to thrive. This indicates a desire for cultural connection and a much-needed escape, especially among the continent’s youth and its global diaspora communities.

South Africa: Ke Dezemba

From Flytime in Lagos and AfroNation in Accra to Alte Sounds in Kigali and the vibrant December nightlife in Mombasa or Johannesburg’s rooftop party events, African cities have become seasonal epicentres for cultural consumption.

“Ke Dezemba” is a term used in South Africa to describe the festive season. It’s a vibrant and celebratory term that’s often associated with summer holidays, braaiing (barbecuing) and social gatherings. It could become the branding of the country’s own Detty December.

South Africa’s global profile has been raised during its 2025 presidency of the G20. Adopting its own version of Detty December could continue to amplify Brand South Africa. It could show off the country’s vibrancy, creativity, hospitality and potential for investment.

Aligning cultural celebration with global visibility could reframe a season of revelry into a strategic cultural and economic asset. For South Africa, this could inject capital into the tourism sector, boosting hospitality, transport and ancillary services.

Beyond direct tourism, the spotlight on South African art and culture during this period could make a lasting impact on the creative economy, fostering growth and job creation.

Physical celebration could be digitally amplified to make a lasting impression.

A notable example is Spotify’s unveiling of its Detty December hub. The music streaming service intends celebrating the festive season across west Africa and South Africa with playlists of party tracks.

Spotify’s Phiona Okumu explains:

Detty December is a special time for our users in west Africa, and Ke Dezemba symbolises South Africa’s spirit of celebration.

How to make it work

The lessons from west African cities suggest that cultural economies thrive with:

flexible governance
inclusive participation
engaged diasporas
innovative business models.

For Nigeria’s Detty December model to be sustainable it would require strategic policy support, urban planning integration and investment in creative infrastructure.

Five young African women in bright clothing pose for a photograph in a decorated area with colourful prints, a man standing off to the side in the distance. — A group of diasporans in Ghana at the AfroFuture festival.
Fquasie/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

Funding models such as memberships and sponsorships are crucial for the longevity of music festivals. Policy support and infrastructure investment are necessary to unlock the full potential of the creative sector.

Cultural tourism, powerfully embodied by Detty December, is emerging as a viable economic strategy for African cities. This signals a broader recognition of culture’s economic power. It offers a compelling canvas for economic development and nation branding.

– ref. Detty December started as a Nigerian cultural moment. Now it’s spreading across the continent – and minting money – https://theconversation.com/detty-december-started-as-a-nigerian-cultural-moment-now-its-spreading-across-the-continent-and-minting-money-258949

July 5, 2025

5 indie art spaces in African cities worth knowing more about

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kim Gurney, Senior Researcher, Centre for Humanities Research — Platform: SA-UK Bilateral Digital Humanities Chair in Culture & Technics, University of the Western Cape

Independent art spaces are collectives of artists (and others) who club together to set up a communal space – often in former industrial sites and more affordable parts of the city – to further their practice. These spaces are DIY art institutions, if you like, that operate largely under the radar. In art world lingo, “offspaces”.

Designed for purpose over profit, they encourage experimental work and creative risk-taking. They also favour art in public space, which provides an intriguing lens on the city.

My Africa-wide research took me to five such spaces, each at least 10 years old, so that I could learn their secret sauce of sustainability. I found it’s largely about shapeshifting, a capacity for constant reinvention. The key ingredient is artistic thinking, made up of five key principles highlighted in the examples below.

Offspaces are found everywhere but have notably grown across Africa over the past couple of decades, along with fast-changing cities and a resurgent art scene. One big picture point is crucial, and that’s about urbanisation. Globally, more and more people are moving to cities and most of them are young – by 2050, one in three young people in the world will be of African origin and the continent will be largely urban.

There can be a lack of imagination about what all this means and that’s where artists come in. They offer new ideas to help build the world we want to live in, rather than reinforce the one we already have.

Offspaces in Africa have to navigate prevailing uncertainty, which is a daily reality for most people living in cities. In response, artists band together to build their own pseudo institutions, bit by bit. These self-made pathways offer useful navigational tactics for others – or “panya routes”, as Kenyans call the trails that motorbike taxis invent.

The spaces I visited were all moving away from reliance on foreign donor funding (given little or no state support) towards a hybrid model that blends with local philanthropy, collaborative economies and self-generated income schemes. They also want to own their own land and hold assets so that they can think about the future.

1. The GoDown Arts Centre – Nairobi, Kenya

An urban structure with a circular building in front of it. This has been spray painted with the word — Murals at the former GoDown (2010), currently being rebuilt.
Katy Fentress/Flickr, CC BY-NC-SA

The GoDown Arts Centre was established in 2003. Previously a large compound of repurposed warehouses (“godowns”) in Nairobi’s industrial area, right now it’s a construction site as it morphs into an iconic cultural hub. GoDown 2.0 is a multipurpose vision that works at different scales, like a fractal. There will be a large, welcoming facade leading into a semi-public section for music and dance, with artist studios at the heart. Plus galleries, library, museum, auditorium, offices, hotel, a restaurant, conference facilities and parking.

Its rebuild is a great example of how artists create public space: in phases. It follows a radical “design-with-people” approach, starting with years of input from all directions to reconsider the building and its relationship to the city.

This ground-up ethos of horizontality, the first key principle, also shapes its signature event, an annual public arts festival called Nai Ni Who? (Who is Nairobi?). Local residents are the curators, and the everyday city is the artwork. Participants are taken around neighbourhoods on foot to experience the good, the bad, and the possibilities. These grounded insights also inform ongoing engagements GoDown has with policymakers about the shape of a future Nairobi.

2. ANO Institute – Accra, Ghana

ANO, established in 2002, repurposed a former workshop for car repairs into a gallery, after starting life in a public park. On the other side of the road, opposite the gallery, stood its office, residency space and growing library.

Most intriguingly, a striking rectilinear structure was positioned alongside. This Mobile Museum mimics the trading kiosks that line every street. Many are also shapeshifters: kindergarten by day, church by night, for example.

ANO’s empty museum, collapsible and see-through, went on a countrywide adventure in 2018 and 2019, asking people to imagine its contents, and later revisited with the results. It signalled a larger and ongoing effort, Future Museum, to find a more relevant exhibition form that’s alive to the fluid way culture is threaded here into everyday life.

ANO demonstrates the second principle of performativity – that is, not only saying things with art but doing things too. More recently, it rebuilt on a new site in central Accra, designed by 87-year-old Ophelia Akiwumi, entirely from raffia palm in a focus on indigenous knowledge systems.

3. Townhouse Gallery – Cairo, Egypt

I visited Townhouse just after it reclaimed its inner-city premises following a partial physical collapse. But this turned out to be a false restart. It closed for good not long after, citing a complex brew of factors that ended 21 years of various battles and resurrections. That it survived so long – from 1998 until 2019 – is remarkable for an offspace.

Part of the reason was its solidarity networks, including with neighbourhood communities – mostly mechanic shops and other artisanal trades who even helped Townhouse rebuild. In its heyday, Townhouse comprised an art gallery, library, theatre and performance venue, and notably hatched other spaces.

The latest rose like a phoenix from its ashes – Access Art Space, which reanimates the same physical space with visual art exhibitions. The legacy of Townhouse is the third principle of elasticity – responding nimbly to constant flux but also being able to refuse impossible conditions with “the right no” (a necessary response in certain situations).

4. ZOMA Museum – Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

ZOMA Museum has also lived many lives. Starting small, its roots were in a three-day public arts festival called Giziawi #1 (Temporary). It comprised performances and exhibitions across the city but focused on Meskel Square, a key public space.

Zoma Contemporary Art Centre grew out of that in 2002, followed in 2019 by Zoma Museum when its co-founders bought a plot of polluted land. Its rehabilitation into an ecological haven has become a case study in sustainable architecture.

Zoma is built by local artisans from mud and straw using indigenous technologies going back centuries. Yet its elegant buildings look futuristic. Zoma is all about the fourth principle of convergence – the past, present and future all happening at once. It’s also about doing multiple things, like running Zoma School, an inherited kindergarten. The land is part of the curriculum.

Just a year after it opened, Zoma spawned yet another life, an offshoot in a newly opened park blending nature with culture and recreation.

5. Nafasi Art Space – Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Nafasi is Swahili for opportunity or chance, which fittingly describes the workings of Nafasi Art Space, established in 2008 – that is, second chance. This fifth and final principle of artistic thinking means giving materials, people and situations another go.

A good example of this is Nafasi’s new art school, built using repurposed shipping containers, like the rest of its premises – artist studios, a spacious gallery and performance arena. In the 2022 academy cohort, a general practice lawyer and an accountant were learning alongside artists, with a biologist at the helm.

Nafasi Art Academy cites the city’s biggest local market, Kariakoo, as design reference, particularly its distinctive elevated canopy and swirling stairwell. The curriculum also takes local context as a starting point, structured in themes to answer community-led questions. Its key function, like all the other offspaces, is storytelling. And the story it tells best is about institution-building as art.

The research behind this article was supported by the South African Research Chair in Urban Policy at UCT’s African Centre for Cities, where the author was previously affiliated.

– ref. 5 indie art spaces in African cities worth knowing more about – https://theconversation.com/5-indie-art-spaces-in-african-cities-worth-knowing-more-about-258009

July 5, 2025

Kwame Akoto-Bamfo: the Ghanaian artist using work about slavery to find justice and healing

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Rachel Ama Asaa Engmann, Associate Professor and Director of Christiansborg Archaeological Heritage Project, Associate Graduate Faculty, Rutgers University

Thousands of sculpted heads – captive African men, women, and children – meticulously created by the artist Kwame Akoto-Bamfo, emerge from the soil at the Nkyinkyim Museum, as a sacred gathering of ancestors. Together, they form a powerful monument to the horror, violence, and resistance to enslavement, as well as the ongoing work of remembrance and healing.

Kwame Akoto-Bamfo is a Ghanaian multidisciplinary artist who engages with the histories and legacies of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism at home and, increasingly, internationally, on both sides of the Atlantic.

As an archaeologist who works in the field of critical heritage studies, Akoto-Bamfo’s work is important for its powerful engagement with memory, material culture and restorative justice. I feature it in a chapter of a new book that I co-edited called Architectures of Slavery: Ruins and Reconstructions.

Who is Kwame Akoto-Bamfo?

Akoto-Bamfo studied at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi. He obtained his bachelor’s and master of fine arts degrees, both in sculpture. After graduating, the artist worked as a school teacher and a university lecturer.

In 2015, Akoto-Bamfo rose to international fame through a series of large-scale installations. He called it ‘Nkyinkyim’ (“twisting” in the Ghanaian Twi language, as in the proverb, “Life’s journey is twisted”).

Four years later, he established the ‘Nkyinkyim Museum’, a non-profit organisation known as the ‘Ancestor Project’. This open-air museum is located in Nuhalenya-Ada, a two-hour drive from Accra. It has become a space for people of African descent to engage in restorative healing through art and education.

Nkyinkyim Museum

At the site’s entrance, three twenty-five-foot monuments are displayed. They are made of stone, concrete and wood. The first is inspired by North and Eastern Africa, and the second by Sudano-Sahelian architecture. The third is inspired by the Forest regions in Central and West Africa.

The collection includes multiple installations in collaboration with the local community. They illustrate “the diversity in our narratives surrounding history, philosophy, and religious beliefs”. The artist himself, demonstrates a mastery of multimedia art forms, working in cement, terracotta, brass, copper, and wood, noting “one can reach different heights with different technologies.”

Today, the museum features a sacred healing space with a compelling display of thousands of unique concrete life size heads and 7,000 terracotta miniature sculpted heads. They include captive Africans abducted, sold and forcibly trafficked during the transatlantic slave trade.

His sculptures capture captives’ shock, horror, anger, distress and fear—emotions. This is communicated through their facial expressions in an installation that is disturbingly evocative and profoundly haunting. It is inspired by ‘nsodie’, an Akan funerary sculpture tradition, that dates back to approximately the twelfth century. Akoto-Bamfo explains during our conversations relating to the research for book:

I wanted to draw upon Akan belief in commemoration and remembrance after death in order to honour the young, old, men and women, who originated from various ethnic groups and who died in the Atlantic Ocean during the Middle Passage and did not get that chance.

Each year, the annual ‘Ancestor Veneration’ ceremony takes place under the guidance of chiefs, priests, and priestess from various ethnic groups.

Visitors are invited to participate in certain Akan rites and ceremonies – free from photography and selfies that undermine or commercialise sacred funerary art practices. Says Akoto-Bamfo:

I am Akan, so initially I began with Akan traditional rites, but now our ceremonies welcome other African ethnic groups including the Ga-Dangme, Ewe, and Yoruba, from Ghana and Nigeria, as well as African descendant people in the African diaspora.

In contrast, the ‘Freedom Parade Festival’ allows participants to creatively express and contribute to an evolving heritage tradition, without the specified observances. For example, painted bodily adornment applied directly onto the skin, yet without the necessary spiritual rites.

A protest monument

Akoto-Bamfo’s sculptures have also gained recognition beyond Ghana’s borders. For instance, the permanent installation at the Legacy Museum and National Museum for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, Alabama in the US.

More recently, in 2021, his Blank Slate Project Monument toured throughout the United States. This included stops at Times Square in New York and the King Center in Atlanta. It depicts an enslaved ancestor, bent forward with his hands behind his back, head turned sideways, face on the ground, with a booted foot on his head.

Akoto-Bamfo describes this work as “a noisy one — a protest piece that speaks against racist Civil War monuments.” The work was completed prior to the police killing of George Floyd that led to widespread protests in the US in 2020. It was first unveiled in a private viewing in Ghana, prior to its shipment to the United States.

He says:

We had a lot of discussions among those involved in the project: some feared it might incite violence, others said that it was a prediction.

The work is interactive. It holds a removable placard that invites viewers to inscribe their reactions to the statue, which are then exhibited. Akoto-Bamfo emphasises:

I wanted ordinary people, both individuals and communities, to relate, and to contribute to, not only towards my artwork but also to the wider ongoing discussions. As an artist, I believe that I do not have the sole right to speak. I wanted ordinary Americans to add their voices because I am already contributing.

In Europe too, his work is featured at the 169 Museum in Germany.

In Ghana, Akoto-Bamfo’s work was initially seen as too controversial. The artist shares:

At first, I had to be extremely resilient because my work was concerned with the slave trade, slavery, colonialism, racism, and human rights. I embraced uncomfortable dialogue. Yet these were difficult topics for galleries and the art world at that time in Ghana.

He adds:

Today, however, some even view me as a spiritual leader… but I have always had an innate antipathy towards injustice. My work is not only about the past but what is unfolding now.

Akoto-Bamfo offers a closing reflection on why this kind of memory work matters:

I just want to use the little knowledge that I have to contribute towards the work of restorative and transformative justice.

Rachel Ama Asaa Engmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Kwame Akoto-Bamfo: the Ghanaian artist using work about slavery to find justice and healing – https://theconversation.com/kwame-akoto-bamfo-the-ghanaian-artist-using-work-about-slavery-to-find-justice-and-healing-259184

July 5, 2025

Which African countries are flourishing? Scientists have a new way of measuring well-being

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Victor Counted, Associate Professor of Psychology, Regent University

What does it mean to live a good life? Psychologists and social scientists have been focusing on a new idea called flourishing – a sense of well-being that goes beyond just happiness or success. It’s about your whole life being good, including how you interact with other people and your community. So then, how do Africans fare when it comes to flourishing?

Victor Counted is a psychological scientist whose research across 40 African countries offers a data-rich rethinking of flourishing on the continent. His findings challenge the dominant narrative that Africa is “lagging behind” in development by showing a more nuanced picture of what it means to live a good life. We asked him more.

What is flourishing?

Flourishing is more than economic growth or individual happiness. It’s a multidimensional state of being that reflects how people feel about their lives and how well their lives are actually going. So it also measures people’s values within their community.

The idea of well-being often carries a Eurocentric emphasis on the individual – personal satisfaction, autonomy, achievement. Flourishing accounts for how whole a person is in relation to their environment.

It includes the social, spiritual and ecological contexts in which one lives. So, it’s not just about how one feels, but how one lives – fully, meaningfully and in a satisfying relationship with the world around us.

What’s the Global Flourishing Study?

The Global Flourishing Study tries to measure global patterns of human flourishing. It’s an ongoing five-year longitudinal study in over 200,000 participants across 22 countries.

I was one of the team of global scholars brought together to examine the trends on what it means to live well across cultures and life circumstances.

The study identifies six key dimensions of flourishing:

Happiness and life satisfaction
Mental and physical health
Meaning and purpose
Character and virtue
Close social relationships
Financial and material stability

Participants rate how they’re doing in each of these areas on a scale from 0 to 10. Further questions capture experiences related to trust, loneliness, hope, resilience, and other related well-being variables.

Of the 22 nations, five were African: Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Egypt.

While these countries didn’t top the global rankings (Indonesia and Mexico did), Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt all reported relatively high flourishing scores, especially when well-being was considered apart from financial status.

Nigeria, for example, ranked 5th globally in flourishing scores that excluded financial indicators – ahead of many wealthier nations. Nigerians indicated strengths in social relationships, character and virtues (like forgiveness or helping others). But potential areas of growth included financial well-being, housing, ethnic discrimination and education.

Overall, this suggests that while material resources matter, they’re not the only thing that determines well-being. Kenya ranked 7th, Egypt 10th, Tanzania 11th and South Africa 13th. Each showed unique strengths in areas like meaning, social connection or mental health.

You did a separate study on flourishing in Africa. What did you find?

In a 2024 study we analysed data from the Gallup World Poll (2020–2022) to explore 38 indicators of well-being across 40 African countries.

This study offered a more detailed and culture-sensitive picture of how Africans experience and prioritise flourishing. The dimensions explored were derived from both local and universal sources, allowing for regionally relevant insights.

We found that African populations often score high in meaning, character and social relationships – despite economic hardship. This offers an important corrective to western assumptions about well-being.

Some of our key findings were:

● There is significant diversity between and within African countries. Mauritius consistently ranked highest in life evaluations (overall satisfaction with their lives), while countries like Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe scored lowest.

● East African countries such as Rwanda and Ethiopia showed strong performance in social well-being indicators (like feeling respected or learning new things daily) even when economic indicators were low.

● Countries in West Africa, such as Senegal and Ghana, scored high in emotional well-being, with many people reporting positive daily emotions like enjoyment and laughter.

● Southern African nations, despite challenges like income inequality, displayed resilience through strong community ties and cultural practices rooted in the philosophy of ubuntu.

The results reinforced that flourishing in Africa cannot only be reduced to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (a measure of the average economic output per person in a country) – nor to western norms of success.

What can African countries focus on to flourish?

In my view, the path to greater flourishing lies in embracing local knowledge and investing in culturally relevant development priorities. Instead of following western pathways – centred on individual advancement – Africa can model alternative flourishing pathways that reflect what matters most to African people.

1. Prioritise local knowledge systems

African ideas about a connected society – like ubuntu (southern Africa), ujamaa (east Africa), teranga or wazobia (west Africa), and al-musawat wal tarahum (north Africa) teach people to care for each other and live in peace. These values help people live meaningful lives and can inform leadership and legislation.

2. Redefine development metrics

Western development models focus on individual achievement, economic output and material consumption. GDP per capita fails to capture the everyday realities and aspirations of African communities. We should also measure things like how happy people are, how hopeful they feel about the future, how strong and resilient their communities are, and how clean, safe and dignifying their living environments are.

This is not a new idea – for years development scholars have called for a shift away from narrow economic indicators toward a focus on human dignity, agency, and the real opportunities people have to pursue the lives they value. What’s new is the growing availability of data and the momentum to take these alternative metrics seriously in shaping national policies and priorities.

3. Invest in education for character development

Quality education is essential to unlocking the continent’s potential to flourish. But Africa needs more than just academic skills and workforce readiness – it needs a strategy for intentional development of values and habits that shape how a person thinks, feels, and acts with integrity.

Part of the problem lies in how the humanities – fields like history, literature, philosophy, and religious studies – are often undervalued or underfunded in education systems. But it is precisely these disciplines that nurture moral imagination, critical reflection, and civic responsibility. We need educational models that form not just workers, but whole persons – people who can think ethically, act responsibly, and lead with character in their communities.

What does Africa offer the world in terms of flourishing?

Africa is not waiting to be saved. Across the continent, people are building communities of care, cultivating joy amid hardship, and passing on values of unity, faith, and compassion. This is what development looks like when rooted in human dignity.

Africa flourishing goals offer an alternative vision for development – one that starts with what Africa already has, not what it lacks. These are locally emic aspirations for well-being. They are shaped by Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems, cultural values, and religious/spiritual traditions. Pursuing these goals means prioritising wholeness over wealth, community over consumption, and resilience over rescue.

The continent has so much to offer the world: wisdom, strong community values, and ways of staying resilient and living fully even in hard times. But many of these local insights are missing in the global science of well-being.

Victor Counted consults for Africa Flourishing Initiative

– ref. Which African countries are flourishing? Scientists have a new way of measuring well-being – https://theconversation.com/which-african-countries-are-flourishing-scientists-have-a-new-way-of-measuring-well-being-257458