Fines alone won’t stop big tech behaving badly. Here’s what might work

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Lauren C. Hall, PhD Candidate in Psychology, University of Tasmania

The Conversation, CC BY-SA

As countries around the world look to follow Australia’s lead and implement a social media ban for kids, many are also considering fines as an enforcement mechanism.

This is part of the playbook when it comes to regulating big tech. For example, last month the United Kingdom’s data watchdog fined Reddit £14 million (A$26 million) for unlawfully using children’s data.

In April 2025, the European Commission fined Apple and Meta €500 million (A$820 million) and €200 million (A$329 million) respectively for breaching the Digital Markets Act. And in September, the commission fined Google nearly €3 billion (A$4.9 billion) for abusive practices in online advertising technology.

But fines don’t always work to encourage companies to follow the law. For some companies, “illegal with a fine” is interpreted as “legal for a price”. So what are some other, more effective methods to encourage good corporate behaviour?

Fines can backfire

If fines are not consistent, immediate, and severe, they can backfire. If they do, bad behaviour may increase.

For example, a 2000 study examined the effect of childcare centres in Israel introducing fines for parents who regularly picked their children up late. But instead, these fines actually increased late pick-ups by parents.

Even after fines were stopped, the number of late pick-ups stayed higher than before.

Why? Because when there were fines, they were small (not severe), and parents could wait a month to pay (not immediate). However, parents got the immediate benefit of longer childcare.

Similarly, technology companies may decide a fine is cheaper than the costs to make changes, or any loss in money from fewer users and ad sales. And this could lead to them continuing with business-as-usual.

Corporate fines often fail because it may be unclear who in the company is directly responsible. Fines can also sometimes be too small to stop bad behaviour by large companies.

For these reasons, corporate re-offending is frequent, even if companies have been fined in the past.

A fine equals forgiveness

After introducing fines, behaviours previously considered socially or morally unacceptable may also be seen as “forgiven” by payment. This can increase bad behaviour.

The importance of unwanted behaviours may also be judged by the size of the fine.

If fines are seen as “small”, violations may also be seen as small, and bad behaviours may rise. Corporations may also see “small” fines as just a cost-of-doing-business.

Importantly, fine size is closely linked to a company’s financial size. For a small company, a fine could seem huge. The same sized fine may seem tiny to a large company. If similarly sized fines are given to companies making different revenue amounts, the companies may respond differently.

Changing company practices can also cost more for some companies than others. This too may affect how they respond to fines.

Furthermore, companies outside a legislative jurisdiction, or that have refused regulators’ demands in the past, may ignore fines altogether.

For example, 4Chan refused to pay fines issued under the UK’s Online Safety Act, and X decided to legally challenge instead of pay a €120 million (A$197 million) fine issued by the European Commission.

Given the borderless nature of some digital harms such as child sexual exploitation and abuse, coordinated changes to corporate laws, and international cooperation are needed.

Pulling multiple levers at once

So if fines alone don’t stop big tech and other businesses behaving badly, what will?

Research shows monitoring companies, and better resourcing regulators, are more effective than fines alone. Consistent regulator inspections combined with education also work well.

A 2025 paper suggests making “stand-alone consumer tech safety research centres” focused on reducing digital harms. This may require technology companies making data and algorithms available to these centres for inspection.

Then, regulators can look at if companies are using important and best practice safety features. For example, checking the images on sites to make sure users do not see harmful content online.

Regulators can also share knowledge with companies about laws and digital safety measures to improve consumer protections.

This cooperative model has been shown to be more effective than fines alone.

A 2016 study about what works when it comes to corporate deterrence found using multiple levers at the same time, such as monitoring, accountability, auditing, and punitive action were the most effective at stopping bad corporate behaviour.

Unfortunately, understanding the scope of digital harms, and best responses, have been limited by not enough resources, or access to data.

A 2025 paper highlights that increased data transparency from corporations will also improve evidence-informed decisions, ensuring regulation is fit-for-purpose.

As companies continue to prioritise rapid rollouts, with problems found after launch, fines may continue to be ineffective.

To tackle this problem, online regulators must ensure fines are complemented with other policy levers – and that the punishment for bad corporate behaviour is consistent, immediate and severe.

The Conversation

Lauren C. Hall is a recipient of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship to support Higher Degree Research training.

James Sauer has received funding from the Australian Institute of Criminology and the Internet Watch Foundation for projects looking to mitigate online harms,

María Yanotti receives grant funding from Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI). She is a member of the tax gap advisory group for the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). She is the Tasmanian Chair for the Women in Economics Network (WEN) and a committee member for the Economic Society of Australia (ESA) Tasmanian Branch. Maria is an associate editor for the Australian Economic Papers.

Christine Padgett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Fines alone won’t stop big tech behaving badly. Here’s what might work – https://theconversation.com/fines-alone-wont-stop-big-tech-behaving-badly-heres-what-might-work-276969

Where did the ancient Greeks and Romans think lightning came from? Hint: not just the gods

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

Is it any wonder ancient people thought lightning came from the gods? Even today a close lightning strike feels like a terrifying brush with the supernatural.

Some ancient thinkers, however, suspected the gods had nothing to do with it.

They wondered, centuries ahead of their time, if lightning was related somehow to the movement of air and clouds.

A reminder of power and wrath

In the mythology of ancient Greece and Rome, thunder and lightning strikes were the prime weapon of Zeus (the king of the gods, known to the Romans as Jupiter). Reminders of his power and wrath via lightning strikes were everywhere.

The ancient Greek poet Hesiod (who was writing around 700 BCE, about the same time as Homer) described Zeus hurling bolts of lightning and thunder at his divine enemies. Zeus also struck humans such as the mythical King Salmoneus as punishment for demanding his subjects worship him as a god.

Surviving Greek and Roman statues depict Zeus hurling lightning bolts as his chief weapon of power.

For the Romans, Jupiter and the gods more generally intervened dramatically in human affairs via lightning strikes. They were often a clear indication of divine displeasure.

The father of Pompey, one of Rome’s most powerful Republican generals, was killed in 87 BCE by lightning (according to one version of the story). He was conducting a military campaign in the middle of a civil war. According to the Roman writer Plutarch, Pompey’s father was one of Rome’s most hated generals. For many at the time, the gods had dispensed justice.

In about 125 CE, the well-travelled emperor Hadrian climbed Mount Casius in Syria to view the sunrise. When he offered a sacrifice to Zeus/Jupiter, to whom the mountain was sacred, a lightning bolt killed both the attendant and sacrificial victim. Hadrian himself was spared.

In 283 CE, the Roman emperor Carus wasn’t so lucky. He was struck and killed by lightning while on campaign against the Persians. One ancient account claimed Carus was killed because he campaigned further than the gods allowed.

In the fourth century CE, the Greek writer Libanius was struck by lightning while reading a play of Aristophanes. He would suffer from debilitating headaches and other afflictions for the rest of his life.

Complex rituals and a gift from the gods

Occasionally, lightning was sent by the gods to aid an emperor in battle. When Marcus Aurelius campaigned against a tribal group in the 160s CE, lightning bolts scattered the enemy.

According to the church historian, Eusebius, the legion accompanying him was, from then on, known as the thundering legion (Fulminata).

Roman religious practice ordered complex rituals surrounding the ground struck by lightning. In what was known as the Bidental Ritual, priests purified the affected spot. It was then sealed off and forbidden to be walked on or even looked at.

Even the emperor Constantine, a supporter of Christianity from early in his reign, ordered the performance of traditional pagan rites when public buildings were struck by lightning in 320 CE.

‘That’s not Zeus up there’

While many believed fervently that lightning was an instrument of angry gods, not all were convinced.

In The Clouds, an ancient Greek play by Aristophanes (who lived around 448 to 380 BCE), the philosopher Socrates exclaimed in the middle of a thunderstorm

That’s not Zeus up there – it’s a vortex of air.

The first century CE Roman philosopher Seneca believed

clouds that encounter each other with little force cause flashes of lightning; if impelled by greater violence, thunderbolts.

He didn’t see a role for the gods in producing either phenomenon.

One in a million

Of course, many other ancient cultures believed lightning (and thunder) had religious significance.

In Zoroastrianism, a key religion of ancient Persia, lightning produced the fastest fire of 16 different types of fire.

Fire was central to the worship of Ahura Mazda, the supreme god of Zoroastrianism.

For the Kunwinjku people of Arnhem Land in northern Australia, the ancestral being Namarrkon embodied lightning and thunder. He used stone axes to split the clouds and bolts of lightning as weapons.

The United States Centre for Disease Control estimates that around 40 million lightning strikes hit the ground in the US each year. But the chances of being struck in any one year are incredibly rare at less than one in a million.

Very few of us would still see lightning as a weapon of the gods. But when lightning strikes today, it might still evoke a sense of supernatural power and foreboding.

The Conversation

Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

ref. Where did the ancient Greeks and Romans think lightning came from? Hint: not just the gods – https://theconversation.com/where-did-the-ancient-greeks-and-romans-think-lightning-came-from-hint-not-just-the-gods-270797

How the law of naval warfare applies to the Strait of Hormuz

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Natalie Klein, Professor, Faculty of Law, UNSW Sydney

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow body of water adjacent to Iran and Oman, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman.

While it is a shared body of water between Iran and Oman, Iran functionally exercises a greater amount of control over it.

The strait is a vital conduit for the shipment of oil, gas and other exports (notably fertiliser) from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world. At its narrowest point, it is just 21 nautical miles (24 miles or 39 kilometres) wide.

With the ongoing conflict between Iran, Israel and the United States, Iran has restricted the movement of ships through this waterway, causing global repercussions for oil supply and trade in other important commodities.

Can Iran do this under international law? And can the US lawfully send military convoys through the strait to protect international shipping?




Read more:
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What is its legal status during times of peace?

The Strait of Hormuz is used for international navigation between two high seas areas. As such, it is defined as an international strait under international law.

Even though these waters are subject to the sovereignty of the adjacent states, all other states’ ships have navigational rights through the strait.

So as long as those ships pass through the strait continuously and expeditiously, the coastal states should not take any steps to prevent their passage.

What about during war?

Once there are armed hostilities between two (or more) states, the law of armed conflict – or international humanitarian law – applies.

The law of naval warfare is part of the law of armed conflict.

Some laws of naval warfare can be traced back to the Hague Conventions adopted at the start of the 20th century.

Most commonly, states will rely on the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.

Under the law of naval warfare, states are generally divided between belligerents (those engaged in armed hostilities) and neutrals (those not involved in the war).

The line between belligerents and neutrals is not always an easy one to draw. In the Middle East, at a minimum, Iran, Israel and the US could be classified as belligerents.

According to the San Remo Manual, ships flagged to neutral states, including their warships, may exercise their navigational rights under general international law through a belligerent’s strait.

It is recommended that neutral warships give notice of their passage as a precautionary measure. A belligerent must not target neutral ships – they are not considered military objectives and must not be fired upon.

During this conflict, Iran’s territorial sea (which includes the waters within the Strait of Hormuz) counts as an area of naval warfare. The belligerent states are legally required to have due regard for the legitimate rights and duties of neutral states in an international strait.

But legal protection for neutral commerce is weak. Many ships have avoided the strait – and will continue to do so – during this conflict.

Can Iran close the strait during times of war?

In line with the San Remo Manual, straits under the sovereignty of neutral states must remain open for transit passage for both neutral and belligerent shipping.

However, belligerent states are not similarly required to keep their straits open.

Can convoys lawfully be used to protect commercial shipping?

Convoys typically involve warships travelling with a fleet of merchant ships to deter and protect against attacks from belligerents during passage.

They have been used previously in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Persian Gulf.

But merchant vessels may become military objectives and subject to attack by belligerents if they travel in a convoy with belligerent warships. So any cargo vessel being escorted by a US warship places itself in danger, as it may be lawfully attacked by Iran.

If warships belonging to neutral states escort cargo ships that are also flagged to neutral countries, these merchant vessels are not military objectives, in accordance with the San Remo Manual.

A belligerent warship would, however, have a right to visit and search these ships to ensure they are not carrying contraband to the enemy.

To minimise this risk, neutral states would need to provide Iran with information as to what each ship is carrying.

What about Australian ships?

Iran may question Australia’s status as a neutral state in light of its offer to assist the United Arab Emirates as a measure of collective self-defence against Iranian attacks.

If Australia’s actions render it a “party to the conflict” under the law of armed conflict, it is no longer a neutral state – it is now a belligerent.

Its warships, along with any private vessels escorted in the strait, could then potentially be subject to lawful attack by Iran.

The Conversation

Natalie Klein has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for research on maritime security and international law.

ref. How the law of naval warfare applies to the Strait of Hormuz – https://theconversation.com/how-the-law-of-naval-warfare-applies-to-the-strait-of-hormuz-278653

Men can get out of the manosphere. Here’s what former incels say about why they left

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Joshua Thorburn, PhD Candidate, School of Social Sciences, Monash University

Elisabeta Dirjan/Canva, X.com, TikTok, Wikimedia, The Conversation, CC BY-NC

Louis Theroux’s recent documentary Inside the Manosphere, alongside Netflix’s 2025 hit drama Adolescence, has driven a spike in public discussion about the “manosphere”. The term refers to a loose ecosystem of anti-feminist online communities and influencers that promote male dominance and hostility toward women.

Much of the public conversation about the manosphere focuses on how boys and young men fall into these spaces. A new study by the Australian Institute of Criminology asks a different question: how do some men manage to leave?

Real-world dangers

Concern about this online culture has grown in recent years. Increasing attention has been paid to adolescent boys and young men going down toxic online rabbit holes, moving from the misogynistic worldview of manosphere influencers toward more extreme spaces.

This includes “incel” (involuntary celibate) forums. These frame women as enemies standing in the way of men’s perceived entitlement to sex. Violent revenge against women is sometimes openly encouraged.

These concerns are warranted. Earlier anxieties largely focused on incidents of lone-offender violence in North America perpetrated by men linked to the misogynistic incel movement. It’s a threat Australia’s security agency ASIO has also flagged.




Read more:
How boys get sucked into the manosphere


More recently, researchers and educators have raised alarms about the broader cultural impact of manosphere ideas. This includes their influence on young men’s attitudes toward women and relationships, resulting in growing rates of hostile sexism in Australian schools.

Understandably, much of the attention focuses on radicalisation into these communities. However, far less attention has been paid to what happens when some men begin to disengage from them.

‘An unhealthy loop of depression’

The Australian Institute of Criminology study provides rare insight into this process. Drawing on surveys and interviews with former participants in incel communities, the research explores how men become disillusioned with these spaces and eventually step away.

The findings add to a growing body of evidence suggesting many men first encounter these communities during periods of insecurity or loneliness.

Participants frequently described anxieties about their physical appearance, social status, sexual experience or financial success. Incel and manosphere forums claim to offer explanations and solidarity for these frustrations.

As one former incel in the institute’s study recalled, he initially felt “some togetherness with others” in the forums.

Yet the same environment often becomes corrosive. Another respondent described how the community functioned as an “echo chamber […] fulfilling their own prophecy”, fuelling what he called “an unhealthy loop of depression”.

Over time, some participants begin to notice the gap between the ideology promoted in these spaces and their everyday experiences. Positive interactions with women, supportive friendships, or simply observing that relationships in the real world do not follow the rigid rules promoted online can begin to undermine the worldview.

One participant in the study described the moment it “clicked that all of it was really wrong” when his peers, “regardless of gender”, treated him with kindness and respect.

In another study of people leaving the manosphere, a former participant reflected that the movement’s claims about women collapsed when he realised he still had a happy relationship with his wife despite being “unfit and definitely not wealthy”.

Research consistently shows leaving these spaces is a challenging experience. Disengagement is usually gradual and uneven. It often involves the slow rebuilding of identity, relationships and belonging outside the forums that once defined participants’ worldview.

Finding the pathways out

The perspectives of people who have left the manosphere deserve greater attention in public discussions. For people currently within the manosphere (and for those vulnerable to falling into it) amplifying such stories can reveal how these communities ultimately harm many of the people who believe in them.

These stories matter because public discussion about the manosphere often focuses almost exclusively on its harms. Those harms are real and serious.

But we need to be hopeful the scale of the problem can be arrested and that the men who fall into these spaces are not permanently lost to them.

Schools, policymakers and families all need these first-hand perspectives. They offer more than just insight into why boys and young men fall down the rabbit hole: they provide a crucial road map for how we might help pull them out. This is essential to violence prevention work focused on how to promote “positive masculinity”.

Maintaining that cautiously hopeful perspective is important. Without it, we risk treating radicalisation as inevitable and disengagement as impossible.

The growing body of research on men leaving these communities suggests something different. While the harms of the manosphere are real, understanding the pathways out may offer some of the most important clues for how to respond.

The Conversation

Joshua Thorburn completed his PhD with support from the Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

Steven Roberts receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Government. He is a Board Director at Respect Victoria, but this article is written wholly separately from that role.

ref. Men can get out of the manosphere. Here’s what former incels say about why they left – https://theconversation.com/men-can-get-out-of-the-manosphere-heres-what-former-incels-say-about-why-they-left-278312

Tourist visits to Madagascar help conserve some forests, but others suffer: study suggests what to do

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ranaivo Rasolofoson, Assistant Professor, School of the Environment, University of Toronto

Madagascar is one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots. The island country is well known for its diverse and endangered range of wildlife. This includes over 100 species of lemurs and six species of majestic baobab trees found nowhere else.

The country is also among the world’s poorest. About 80% of its population live below the international poverty line of US$2.15 a day.

Attracting tourist visits to protected areas, such as Analamazaotra-Mantadia National Park, has long been one of Madagascar’s policy priorities. The aim is to channel tourist income towards conserving these areas. Tourist revenue is also supposed to reduce poverty through foreign currency revenue, job creation, and infrastructure development.




Read more:
Madagascar’s ancient baobab forests are being restored by communities – with a little help from AI


Globally, tourism is a powerful way of generating income. In 2024, travel and tourism represented 10% of the global economy (US$10.9 trillion). In Madagascar, tourism revenue makes up nearly 16.6% of the country’s economy.

We are a group of socio-environmental researchers who investigated the effects of tourist visits on the forests of 40 protected areas across Madagascar. The country’s natural forests shelter its rich, unique and endangered terrestrial biodiversity. An estimated 88% of Madagascar’s biodiversity is dependent on forests. But after decades of high deforestation rates, only 10%-15% of Madagascar’s land is still covered with natural forests.

For our research, we used 20 years of satellite data to study changes in the forests. We combined this with tourism visit counts from each protected area.

We ran statistical tests to see whether tourist numbers had any effect on deforestation in and outside protected areas. We also took into account other factors that could influence forest loss and tourism, like rainfall and population growth.

Before our study, no research had measured across the whole country how tourism in protected areas affects deforestation.




Read more:
Climate change is threatening Madagascar’s famous forests – our study shows how serious it is


Madagascar’s protected areas have a three kilometre buffer around them. Our research found that increased tourist visitors have not reduced forests within the protected areas, but have resulted in deforestation in the buffer zones.

There could be two reasons for this. Firstly, some agricultural and pastoral activities, fishing, and other types of activities are allowed within the buffer zone forest. Local people who used to harvest wood or clear forest for agricultural land from the protected area could be shifting this activity to the buffer zone outside. (Firewood and charcoal remain the primary energy source for most communities in Madagascar.)




Read more:
Forest conservation approaches must recognise the rights of local people


Secondly, villages outside protected areas might be clearing forests to accommodate tourists and tourism workers. Maps of forest cover showed that when tourism increased, deforestation increased in the buffer zones and near the entrances to the protected areas (where hotels and restaurants are set up).

We therefore recommend that buffer zones of protected areas be prioritised in Madagascar’s national reforestation programme.

Tourism only shifts deforestation

Madagascar currently has 127 protected areas – about 10% of the country’s land area. The majority were established after the 2003 International Union for Conservation of Nature World Parks Congress. There, the government of Madagascar pledged to increase its protected areas to 10% of the country’s land area.

Major threats to protected areas include land clearing for agriculture, mining, illegal logging, and production of firewood and charcoal. Our study focused on 40 protected areas established before 2003 and managed by Madagascar National Parks. This is because these are the only protected areas for which annual visitor numbers are available.




Read more:
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In protected areas, a portion of tourist entrance fees are shared with local communities. But it is difficult to know if this is enough money for communities to pay for their needs instead of relying on the forest. Tourist fee income is also not necessarily distributed to people most reliant on forest extraction.

Shifting deforestation to the buffer zone of protected areas is not necessarily a negative outcome for conservation, because it still leaves the protected area intact. Forests within buffer zones are also often intended to support local livelihoods. They are sometimes even of lower conservation value (less biodiverse) than protected forests.




Read more:
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However, increased deforestation there must be considered in conservation planning. This is because if the buffer area forests are gone, local people may enter the protected area to extract resources. This would endanger biodiversity and the critical ecological services they provide to local people.

What needs to happen next

Madagascar has a national reforestation programme. The country should also restore the forest in the buffer zone areas so that local communities’ needs for forest products can still be met.

We recommend that sustainable management of buffer zone forests include:

  • reforestation

  • planning where and when specific activities like wood extraction and farming can be done

  • sustainable agricultural practices and regenerative agriculture

  • promotion of alternative livelihoods

  • developing and enforcing environmental sustainability regulations for hotels and restaurants.

Strategies to protect buffer zone forests must include local communities in the designing, planning, setting up and monitoring stages. The aim should be to make sure that the plans are suitable for the local area, that they empower local people and that they’ll be sustainable for the future.




Read more:
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Tourism entrance fees should continue to be shared between protected areas. This will support the operating costs of protected areas with few tourists.

If Madagascar wants to keep the forests in its protected areas, it must sustainably manage forests in buffer areas to provide for local communities’ needs.

The Conversation

Camille DeSisto has received funding from Duke University, Rice University, Phipps Conservatory, Explorers Club, Primate Conservation Inc., P.E.O. Foundation, and Garden Club of America.

Tristan Frappier-Brinton has received funding from Duke University, Re:wild, Primate Conservation Inc, and the National Science Foundation.

Ranaivo Rasolofoson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Tourist visits to Madagascar help conserve some forests, but others suffer: study suggests what to do – https://theconversation.com/tourist-visits-to-madagascar-help-conserve-some-forests-but-others-suffer-study-suggests-what-to-do-275824

As Israel invades again, Lebanon faces more turmoil and possible civil war. Here are 3 ways this could go

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Mariam Farida, Lecturer in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, Macquarie University

Just two days after the US and Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in late February, Hezbollah opened a second front in the war by launching six rockets into Israel from Lebanon.

The rockets came as a surprise to many. Hezbollah, once one of Iran’s most powerful proxy fighting forces, had been severely weakened by Israel during 13 months of fighting from late 2023–24.

The militant group had also stopped firing rockets into Israel since signing a ceasefire agreement in November 2024.

According to the ceasefire, the Lebanese army was to take control of the territory south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its infrastructure. Hezbollah was also expected to move its fighters north of the river, about 30 kilometres from the border with Israel.

The Lebanese government and the Lebanese army then launched an enthusiastic public campaign to show their commitment to the systematic disarmament of Hezbollah’s fighters and dismantling of its missile launches.

But this has proved to be a monumentally difficult task for both the government and army.

The Israeli army has continued to carry out airstrikes on Hezbollah military sites and targeted assassinations of Hezbollah fighters on a near-daily basis since the ceasefire.

Hezbollah has repeatedly refused to disarm and withdraw north of the Litani River if these strikes continue.

So, the ceasefire deal was already shaky. And when fighting resumed earlier this month, Israel decided it was time to “finish the job” in Lebanon.

This week, it launched another ground invasion to completely destroy Hezbollah’s remaining military infrastructure, “just as was done against Hamas in Rafah, Beit Hanoun and the terror tunnels in Gaza”, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, said.

More than 1 million Lebanese people have already been displaced, leading to fears Israel will reoccupy southern Lebanon, as it did for 18 years from 1982 to 2000.




Read more:
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There are three possible scenarios for what could happen next.

1. A short-term or “limited” ground operation

Israel does not want a return to its 18-year occupation, when it was dragged into a guerrilla war with Hezbollah and other groups, and by some estimates lost hundreds of soldiers.

A limited ground operation lasting a few weeks would therefore be the most desirable scenario to minimise troop casualties on the ground.

But this carries risk, too. A limited operation would make it difficult for the Israeli army to successfully destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure. Israel has attempted these types of limited operations in the past and so far failed to stop Hezbollah rockets. Hezbollah, too, is unlikely to want to de-escalate quickly.

As such, a limited ground operation seems unlikely.

2. A war of attrition that lasts for months

This is a more possible scenario since the Hezbollah–Israel conflict is closely linked to the US–Israel war on Iran.

It has become obvious that Iran is engaged in a war of attrition with its adversaries. The regime doesn’t need to “win” the war; it just needs to hold on long enough for the US and Israel to feel enough global and domestic pressure to stop. Then, the regime can claim “victory”.

In this scenario, Hezbollah is fully capable of mirroring this strategy. If it can withstand Israeli airstrikes, it can retaliate with the type of guerilla warfare it has successfully used in the past to drag Israel into a longer conflict.

There are already signs Hezbollah fighters are adopting these strategies.

3. Another major war that will lead to reoccupation

This is the most likely scenario with highest chance of regional ripple effects.

If Israel launches a much larger ground operation, it would be aimed at fundamentally reshaping the balance of power with Hezbollah and putting more pressure on the Lebanese government before engaging in any negotiations or diplomatic settlements.

This is typical of negotiating processes: one side uses excessive violence to try to establish “new facts on the ground” and gain more leverage before entering into talks.

However, this could result in major losses for the Israeli army, similar to those suffered during its 1982 invasion and subsequent occupation.

Another possible outcome is a power vacuum in Lebanon and the outbreak of another civil war.

A Lebanese civil war would have serious implications for the region, much as the last one did from 1975 to 1990. Then, Lebanon was torn apart by multiple armed militias with different (and often competing) agendas. Hezbollah emerged from the chaos, giving Iran a powerful proxy group to threaten Israel for decades to come.

A Palestinian refugee camp near Tyre, Lebanon, during the civil war in 1982.
Wikimedia Commons

There would most likely be a major surge of refugees across Lebanon’s borders, as well.

Lebanon is already a fragile and weak country, struggling to sustain some 250,000 Palestinian and 1.3 million Syrian refugees. Now, there are 1 million displaced Lebanese from the recent fighting.

This kind of disruption would no doubt spill over into Europe, with displaced people trying to seek refuge there, similar to the height of the Syrian civil war.

An Israeli reoccupation of southern Lebanon could also give Hezbollah a much-needed boost in legitimacy among the Lebanese people, if it is able to survive the war and targeted killings of its leaders.

Hezbollah will easily be able to frame its operations as a form of resistance or muqawama, much as it did in its early years. This could be viewed in several ways: resistance against occupation, resistance against oppressive regimes and resistance against the US and Israel.

Wherever this conflict goes, the Lebanese people – and beleaguered Lebanese state – will pay the highest price, trapped again in a geopolitical contest they didn’t start and feel powerless to stop.

The Conversation

Mariam Farida does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. As Israel invades again, Lebanon faces more turmoil and possible civil war. Here are 3 ways this could go – https://theconversation.com/as-israel-invades-again-lebanon-faces-more-turmoil-and-possible-civil-war-here-are-3-ways-this-could-go-278408

Going nuclear? Why a growing number of Washington’s allies are eyeing an alternative to US umbrella

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amy McAuliffe, Visiting Distinguished Professor of the Practice, University of Notre Dame

American allies contemplate a post-U.S. nuclear umbrella future. AP Photo/Alex Brandon

Canadians are openly discussing the merits and risks of pursuing a nuclear weapon. Europeans are similarly considering a nuclear deterrent for the bloc. In South Korea, public support for a nuclear weapon is at its highest level on record, and even in Japan some politicians are talking about the once-taboo subject.

Until just a few years ago, few experts would have predicted that these nations – all allies of Washington – might one day join the nuclear club. Since 2006, that club has consisted of just nine countries: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, with its undeclared program.

The hope of nonproliferation advocates was that nine would be the maximum. But over the past few years, more and more nations are seriously exploring “going nuclear.”

As an expert on weapons technology and former assistant director of the CIA for weapons and counterproliferation, I have watched these developments with alarm.

Perceived national security threats still shape U.S. allies’ views of developing nuclear weapons – with North Korea a key driver for South Korea, China paramount for Japan, and Iran key for Saudi Arabia.

But what has changed demonstrably for many U.S. allies is a newfound skepticism over the credibility of the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella, which for decades has offered allies an easy way of declining to pursue nuclear weapons. Concerned about the Trump administration’s foreign policy, some nations are considering developing domestic nuclear weapons programs or seeking new deterrence assurances.

New nuclear aspirants across the Atlantic

The U.S. deployed the first atomic bombs in Japan in 1945, with the Soviet Union conducting its own successful nuclear test four years later. The U.K. was next to get the bomb in 1952, followed by France in 1960 and China in 1964. Experts believe that Israel first tested a bomb in the late 1960s, while the last entrants into the nuclear club were India in 1972, Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006.

Experts have long wondered which country might be next. Often, speculation has included U.S. allies such as Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Turkey.

For years, such nations were assumed to be under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a tacit understanding that Washington will defend its nonnuclear allies, including by using U.S. nuclear weapons. Doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella have existed for years and precede the Trump administration. However, current U.S. officials’ criticisms of NATO, focus on burden sharing, and policy positions on Ukraine have brought into stark relief for allies the need to consider other nuclear options. And with allies now focused on the limits of U.S. security guarantees, the list of possible nuclear aspirants has suddenly grown.

European leaders have crafted their public comments on the issue carefully, focusing on concerns about U.S. reliability in general versus the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

A suited man gives a speech at a lectern in front of a submarine.
French President Emmanuel Macron delivers a speech at a French nuclear submarine base in Crozon, France, on March 2, 2026.
Yoan Valat/Pool Photo via AP

Rasmus Jarlov, the chair of the Danish parliament’s defense committee, perhaps best reflected the views of many U.S allies in Europe, telling The Associated Press: “If things got really serious, I very much doubt that Trump would risk American cities to protect European cities. We don’t know, but it seems very risky to rely on the American protection.”

In Europe, most public discussion has focused on the concept of a common nuclear deterrent for the bloc under the protection of French nuclear forces. In a major speech in March, French President Emmanuel Macron called for “forward deterrence” involving the temporary deployment of French nuclear-armed aircraft to nine other European countries, including Germany and Poland.

Meanwhile, the Swedish prime minister has had talks with Britain and France about deploying the two countries’ nuclear forces to Sweden during wartime.

But the French pledge does not extend a guarantee to defend allies with French nuclear weapons. Instead, France will use nuclear deterrence to defend French “vital interests,” a purposefully vague phrase. Only time will tell whether Macron’s offer will satisfy European partners – or prevent them from deciding to take matters into their own hands.

There has been growing speculation over whether Poland and Germany might be considering developing their own nuclear weapons. While German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has explicitly ruled it out, Polish leaders’ comments leave the option open.

In early March, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Polish parliament that Poland “must reach for the most modern solutions related to nuclear weapons,” seeming to reflect personal support for Warsaw’s long-term pursuit of a weapon and near-term conversations with the French about a nuclear umbrella.

In Canada, meanwhile, the former chief of the country’s defense staff said in February that Canada should not rule out acquiring nuclear weapons. While the comments drew opposition from the current Canadian defense minister, the discussion of whether Canada would consider “going nuclear” did not seem out of line in today’s global security environment.

Heightened discussions in Asia

Similar discussions among current and former government officials have been percolating across Asia.

For Japan, such talks mark a significant development. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, largely drafted by U.S. occupation authorities after World War II, renounces war. And in 1967 Japan further pledged not to produce, possess or host nuclear weapons in its territory — the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.”

A city lies in ruins after a nuclear bomb detonation.
A pall of smoke lingers over a scene of nuclear destruction in Hiroshima, Japan, on Aug. 7, 1945.
AP Photo

But the issue is no longer taboo. In late 2025, an unnamed official in the new administration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi expressed his personal opinion that Japan should begin discussions about developing nuclear weapons.

These remarks drew an official rebuke from Takaichi. Moreover, Japanese nuclear weapons are unlikely to be in the cards anytime soon, particularly given the sensitivity surrounding Japan’s status as the only nation to directly experience the consequences of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, Takaichi’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party is reconsidering its position on Tokyo’s nonnuclear principles to discuss allowing U.S. nuclear weapons to enter Japanese territory.

South Korea is a different story. Last year, the foreign minister in the former conservative Yoon administration argued that an independent nuclear deterrent for Seoul “was not off the table,” given the unpredictability of the Trump administration. Left unsaid, but clearly in the background, were concerns about the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

South Korea’s previous nuclear weapons program and public support for reviving it could make a future South Korean nuclear weapon a real possibility, even though the current center-left administration stresses Seoul’s nonnuclear stance.

Yet the public mood has also shifted. A total of 76% of respondents now support an indigenous nuclear weapon, according to a March 2025 poll by the Asian Institute for Policy Studies. That was an increase of 5 percentage points since 2024 and the highest level of public support for Seoul pursuing a nuclear weapons capability since the poll originated in 2010.

Saudi Arabia’s focus on the fuel cycle

In the Middle East, the Washington ally most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon remains Saudi Arabia. In Sept. 2023, de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reiterated his public stance that Riyadh would acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran did.

Perhaps more likely is Ryadh’s pursuit of a “latent” nuclear weapons capability, meaning that Saudi Arabia would develop relevant technology and expertise to be able to produce a weapon quickly if it made the political decision to do so. An indigenous capability to enrich uranium would be key.

Two political leaders stand side by side in a photo op.
President Donald Trump stands with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on his visit to the White House on Nov. 18, 2025.
AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, File

Indeed, the crown prince has demonstrated an enduring interest in developing a Saudi nuclear fuel cycle. He continues to pursue domestic uranium enrichment, regardless of the state of Iran’s nuclear program.

In November 2025, members of the U.S. Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressing concern that “the administration has revived talks with Saudi Arabia to give it access to U.S. technology and to potentially allow it to enrich uranium.”

The willingness of the Biden and Trump administrations to pursue nuclear deals for civilian power reactors with allies that permit uranium enrichment could assist Saudi Arabia and South Korea in pursuing nuclear weapons. The “gold standard” U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, called a 123 agreement, prohibits enrichment and reprocessing.

In September 2025, the Pakistani defense minister announced that Pakistan would extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, if needed, perhaps reducing Riyadh’s focus on obtaining formal U.S. security assurances. If genuine, this commitment provides Prince Mohammed the time and protection to develop Saudi nuclear weapons or a latent nuclear capability.

All of these developments suggest that despite decades of nonproliferation experts warning about the expansion of the nuclear club, new entrants are a very real possibility for the first time in decades.

The Conversation

The article solely reflects the views of the author and not those of the United States Government.

ref. Going nuclear? Why a growing number of Washington’s allies are eyeing an alternative to US umbrella – https://theconversation.com/going-nuclear-why-a-growing-number-of-washingtons-allies-are-eyeing-an-alternative-to-us-umbrella-275389

Can’t stop endlessly scrolling? Tips to help you take back control

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sharon Horwood, Senior Lecturer in Psychology, Deakin University

It’s called the infinite scroll – a design feature on social media, shopping, video and many other apps that continuously loads content as you reach the bottom of the page. Handy? Yes. Clever? Also yes. Devious? Very much so. The infinite scroll is likely the main reason you find it so hard to stop scrolling once you begin.

To understand why this design feature is so devious, we need to understand the psychology and behaviours it taps into.

First, the infinite scroll takes away a natural stopping point – where you might decide that’s enough social media for today. For example, Instagram feeds once stopped after all chronologically new posts from followed accounts had been viewed, and even told us we were “all caught up” for the day. Now, algorithmic feeds combined with the infinite scroll mean there’s no way to ever be caught up with it all.

The second reason you find it so hard to stop scrolling is the promise of something good that might be just about to pop up in your feed. The algorithm “knows” what you like. So, hand-in-hand with the infinite scroll, it keeps feeding you all those tasty tid-bits.

Putting it bluntly, these features help create an addiction of sorts. The promise of a little hit of dopamine when we see content we love. And addictions are hard to beat – but not impossible.

Here are some quick wins and longer-term solutions if you want to break free from the grip of the scroll.

The quick wins

Create a break

Your device might be the problem, but it can also be part of the solution. Start by using your phone’s screen time features – such as Android’s Digital Wellbeing or Apple’s Screen Time.

You can also install a more sophisticated third-party app that forces you to break the patterns of mindless scrolling behaviour.

Apps such as One Sec, ScreenZen, Opal and Freedom can short-circuit the automatic habits associated with scrolling in various ways. These include putting mandatory pauses before social media apps open, or applying colour filters (like grayscale) to make apps less appealing.

They can even hard-block apps for specific periods of time if you really need a tough love approach.

Remove social media apps

This one’s usually met with an audible gasp when I suggest it, but you might find you adapt to not having social media at your fingertips faster than you’d imagine. You’re not deleting your accounts – just making it harder to open them and scroll.

Schedule some scrolling time

If you can’t imagine life without scrolling, schedule time each day for just that activity. It could be in your lunch break or when you get home from work: give yourself the freedom to scroll for the amount of time you set (say, 15 minutes) and don’t feel guilty about it. Just remember you still have to close the apps and get on with your life as soon as the time is up.

The hard work

The above might limit your scrolling in the short term, but long-term benefits (and emotional freedom) will likely take a bit more work.

The “easy” tips often work for a little while, when you’re motivated to change and feeling optimistic. But time and the pressures of life can start to erode your convictions.

So, to gain true freedom from scrolling, think about social media and whether it’s a relationship that serves you well. If you feel like it’s controlling you far more than you are controlling it, here are some things to consider. Be warned, they might not be easy.

What’s the deeper reason?

Think deeply about why you’re scrolling so much in the first place. Is it a lack of willpower? Are you avoiding something or someone? Are you suppressing feelings that you would prefer not to acknowledge?

All of these things can be reasons why we seek distraction. You might be avoiding a big thing (the state of a relationship) or a small thing (cooking dinner), but either way, scrolling is the symptom, not the disease. So, consider if scrolling might be part of a bigger problem you need to deal with instead.

Who’s benefiting whom?

Consider how much you really “need” social media. Do you actively use it in a way that benefits you (for example, as a business platform) or did you sign up out of curiosity years ago and have never really questioned why you’re still using it?

If it’s the latter, apply a critical lens to the platforms you use and how they serve you. On average, Australians use six to seven different social media platforms regularly. Think about what you might gain from spending less time scrolling, but also think about whether your life would be worse without some of them.

If you can’t think of a really compelling reason as to why it would be worse, it might be time to say goodbye to a few.

These “hard” options will take time and effort, and require you to reflect on your habits. But, like with most things, the reward for effort is likely to be greater, and last longer.

The Conversation

Sharon Horwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Can’t stop endlessly scrolling? Tips to help you take back control – https://theconversation.com/cant-stop-endlessly-scrolling-tips-to-help-you-take-back-control-278418

Babies learn a lot in their first year. But their behaviour doesn’t always tell the full story

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Eylem Altuntas, Researcher, Speech & Language Development, The MARCS Institute for Brain, Behaviour and Development, Western Sydney University

RDNE Stock Project/Pexels

Anyone who has spent time with a baby knows how unpredictable the first year can feel. One week a baby suddenly seems to “get” something new. The next week, that same response may disappear.

Parents often describe this as progress coming in bursts rather than in a straight line. These changes can be exciting to watch, but they can also raise questions. Did my baby forget? Did something go wrong?

Our new research, published in Language Learning and Development, suggests early language learning unfolds in much the same way. We found babies can pick up how speech sounds are made as early as four months old.

But this early ability does not simply grow stronger month by month. Instead, as babies move through the first year, the way they show what they know can change, even while learning continues quietly in the background.

Learning about speech

In earlier research, we showed babies as young as four months can learn patterns about how speech sounds are made.

After a short game involving two made-up “mini-languages”, four-month-olds could link what they had heard with what they later saw, even when the test was completely silent.

This told us babies were not just remembering individual sounds. They were picking up something more general about speech, such as whether sounds were made with the lips or with the tongue tip.

For many researchers, and for parents following this work, that raised a natural question: if babies can do this so early, what happens next?

Watching learning change over time

To find out, we followed the same babies over time and tested them again at seven and ten months. We also tested a separate group of ten-month-olds who had never seen the task before.

This allowed us to watch how learning changed within the same children, while also seeing how babies at the same age responded when everything was new.

The task itself was designed to be simple and engaging. Babies first learned links between made-up words and cartoon animals. For example, a word like “buviwa”, made using the lips, might always appear with a kangaroo, while a word like “dazolu”, made using the tongue tip, appeared with a kookaburra. Each “language” followed a clear pattern based on how its sounds were made.

Later, babies watched silent videos of a person speaking new words and then saw an animal image. Because the videos were silent, babies had to rely on what they had learned earlier, rather than matching sound and sight in the moment.

At four months, babies showed a clear response, paying closer attention when the talking face matched the animal they had learned. At seven months, this clear response was no longer there, which at first surprised us.

But at ten months, a different pattern emerged. Babies paid more attention when something did not match what they had learned. This response was especially clear in babies who were seeing the task for the first time, and became stronger when results from both ten-month-old groups were considered together.

Reorganising language systems

When we look at these findings together, the pattern starts to make sense.

Younger babies often prefer what feels familiar, while older babies tend to focus more on what is new or unexpected. Seven months appears to be a transitional period. Learning is still happening, but it is not expressed as a clear preference in either direction. Rather than signalling a loss of ability, the shift we see reflects a change in how babies respond as they mature.

This period of change fits with what is happening more broadly in babies’ lives. Between about seven and ten months, babies are becoming increasingly tuned to the sounds of the language they hear every day. They are also beginning to recognise common words and link sounds to meaning.

During this time, their language system is not just growing, it is reorganising. When that happens, learning can look uneven from the outside.

Many parents notice similar moments at home. A baby who once turned immediately toward a familiar voice may suddenly seem less responsive, only to show new signs of understanding weeks later.

These moments can be worrying, especially when progress is expected to be steady. Our findings suggest some of these changes may reflect learning in motion rather than learning lost.

Behaviour doesn’t always tell the full story

For parents, this work is a reminder that behaviour does not always tell the full story. If a baby doesn’t show a clear response at a particular age, it does not necessarily mean they have stopped learning or missed an important step.

For researchers and clinicians, the findings highlight the limits of relying on single tests at single ages. Early language learning is flexible and changing. To understand it properly, we need to look at how babies develop over time, not just how they perform at one moment.

Importantly, the results show babies don’t learn in a straight line, and quiet moments are not empty ones. Even when progress is hard to see, learning may still be unfolding, preparing the ground for what comes next.

The Conversation

Eylem Altuntas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Babies learn a lot in their first year. But their behaviour doesn’t always tell the full story – https://theconversation.com/babies-learn-a-lot-in-their-first-year-but-their-behaviour-doesnt-always-tell-the-full-story-274032

Trump’s war language is aggressive and extreme. It also offers some insight into his thinking

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Rodrigo Praino, Professor & Director, Jeff Bleich Centre for Democracy and Disruptive Technologies, Flinders University

US President Donald Trump speaks in a way unlike any of his predecessors. His distinctive and highly recognisable style may even play a role in his appeal to his political base. Since the infamous Access Hollywood tapes, he has got away with saying things none of his predecessors would have ever dreamed of saying in public. This is particularly striking in a country that was shocked to learn in the 1970s that Richard Nixon used dirty words in the Oval Office.

Scholars have described Trump’s rhetorical style as “unbalanced vituperation”, stressing his constant use of demeaning language, false equivalences and exclusion.

Even more strikingly, a recent study found Trump’s use of violent vocabulary, especially language linked to war and crime, represents a radical departure from US political tradition.

Since the beginning of the war with Iran, Trump’s rhetoric has become even more combative and outrageous, marking an even sharper shift from the language used by his predecessors in similar occasions.

What effect does this have and what does it tell us about the commander-in-chief’s state of mind?

Demeaning opponents

Trump announced the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by calling him a “wretched and vile man”. Later, in a Truth Social post, he called him “one of the most evil people in history” and referred to “his gang of bloodthirsty thugs”.

A few days later, he continued denigrating leaders of the Iranian regime, describing them as “deranged scumbags” whose killing was for him a “great honor”. He has also insulted Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father as Iran’s Supreme Leader, describing him as “unacceptable” and a “lightweight”. He also stated during an interview that he believes Mojtaba is alive but “damaged”.

Americans are no strangers to their presidents using strong language to describe adversaries. Ronald Reagan famously referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire”, and George W. Bush warned of an “Axis of Evil”.

Yet such rhetoric rarely extended to personal insults against individual foreign leaders. Leaders generally bring a mood to these speeches that recognises their words will be frightening for many people. It also acknowledges that in a war situation, lives will inevitably be lost.

George W. Bush, for example, simply stated that US forces “captured Saddam Hussein alive”. Barack Obama announced to the nation Osama bin Laden’s killing by addressing the mastermind of the worst terrorist attack on US soil simply as “Osama bin Laden, leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist”.

Constant threats

Trump has also shown little restraint in issuing threats. At the beginning of the conflict he stated in an interview that they had not even started hitting Iran hard and that the “big wave” was coming soon. He later posted on Truth Social that he was ready to hit Iran “twenty times harder” and threatened to “make it virtually impossible for Iran to ever be built back, as a Nation, again”, adding that “death, fire and fury will reign [sic] upon them”. At one point, he even suggested that he might strike Iran’s Kharg Island oil export hub again “just for fun”.

This language is not only vitriolic. It also is in sharp contrast with the rhetoric of past US presidents who often emphasised restraint in the use of force and showed willingness to de-escalate military conflicts.

Previous presidents have been very clear about the strength of the US military, but they have also tried to focus on diplomacy and negotiation.

Obama, talking about Syria, famously remarked that “the United States military doesn’t do pinpricks”. Yet, moments later, he asked Congress to postpone a vote authorising the use of force while his administration pursued diplomatic options.

Nixon stated during the Vietnam war that “The peace we seek to win is not victory over any other people, but the peace that comes ‘with healing in its wings’; with compassion for those who have suffered; with understanding for those who have opposed us; with the opportunity for all the peoples of this Earth to choose their own destiny”.

Trump’s threats of escalation also raise concerns about the safety of civilians and the protection of critical infrastructure. He recently stated he “didn’t do anything to do with the energy lines, because having to rebuild that would take years”. This remark suggests some awareness of the consequences of such actions.

Even so, earlier presidents often distinguished explicitly between military targets and civilian populations. George H. W. Bush, during the Gulf War, declared “our quarrel is not with the people of Iraq. We do not wish for them to suffer”.

In 2023, George W. Bush warned Iraqi military and civilian personnel: “do not destroy oils wells, a source of wealth that belongs to the Iraqi people. Do not obey any command to use weapons of mass destruction against anyone, including the Iraqi people”.

Words matter

It is still unclear why Trump’s rhetoric is so violent and so far removed from the language of virtually every US president before him. A 2020 study found Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric often aims to create a sense of crisis to mobilise his domestic base – or distract from political troubles at home.

Some observers argue Trump has used, or even manufactured, national crises as a mechanism to expand executive power through emergency declarations. Whether this is the case in the current war with Iran remains to be seen.

But words certainly matter.

On December 19 1945, US President Harry S. Truman issued a special message to Congress recommending the Department of War and the Department of the Navy be merged into a single “Department of National Defense”. Between 1947 and 1949, Congress and the executive branch implemented this proposal. Many other countries went through a similar process in the postwar period, replacing the language of “war” from the name of their departments and ministries with the more restrained term “defence”.

Seventy-six years later, in 2025, Trump reversed that tradition with an executive order renaming the Department of Defense as the US Department of War.

This same executive order clearly states that the new name demonstrates a willingness to fight wars at a moment’s notice. And the reason is not only to defend, but to “secure what is ours”.

Viewed in light of the current war with Iran, those words provide some insight into the administration’s thinking. They also invite reflection on other words coming out of the administration and its supporters, including the “Gulf of America”, the idea of Canada as the “51st state”, and even the far-fetched “Trump 2028” chant.

The Conversation

Rodrigo Praino receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Department of Defence.

ref. Trump’s war language is aggressive and extreme. It also offers some insight into his thinking – https://theconversation.com/trumps-war-language-is-aggressive-and-extreme-it-also-offers-some-insight-into-his-thinking-278427