Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Farah N. Jan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Pennsylvania

The United States is seemingly moving toward a potential strike on Iran.

On Jan. 28, 2026, President Donald Trump sharply intensified his threats to the Islamic Republic, suggesting that if Tehran did not agree to a set of demands, he could mount an attack “with speed and violence.” To underline the threat, the Pentagon moved aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln – along with destroyers, bombers and fighter jets – to positions within striking distance of the country.

Foremost among the various demands the U.S. administration has put before Iran’s leader is a permanent end to the country’s uranium enrichment program. It has also called for limits to the development of ballistic missiles and a cutting off of Tehran’s support for proxy groups in the Middle East, including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.

Trump apparently sees in this moment an opportunity to squeeze an Iran weakened by a poor economy and massive protests that swept through the country in early January.

But as a scholar of Middle Eastern security politics and proliferation, I have concerns. Any U.S. military action now could have widespread unintended consequences later. And that includes the potential for accelerated global nuclear proliferation – regardless of whether the Iranian government is able to survive its current moment of crisis.

Iran’s threshold lesson

The fall of the Islamic Republic is far from certain, even if the U.S. uses military force. Iran is not a fragile state susceptible to quick collapse. With a population of 93 million and substantial state capacity, it has a layered coercive apparatus and security institutions built to survive crises. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the regime’s military wing, is commonly estimated in the low-to-high hundreds of thousands, and it commands or can mobilize auxiliary forces.

After 47 years of rule, the Islamic Republic’s institutions are deeply embedded in Iranian society. Moreover, any change in leadership would not likely produce a clean slate. Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged as much, telling lawmakers on Jan. 28 that there was “no simple answer” to what would happen if the government fell. “No one knows who would take over,” he said. The exiled opposition is fragmented, disconnected from domestic realities and lacks the organizational capacity to govern such a large and divided country.

And in this uncertainty lies the danger. Iran is a “threshold state” — a country with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons but that has not crossed the final line of production.

A destabilized threshold state poses three risks: loss of centralized command over nuclear material and scientists, incentives for factions to monetize or export expertise, and acceleration logic — actors racing to secure deterrence before collapse.

History offers warnings. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s produced near-misses and concern over the whereabouts of missing nuclear material. Meanwhile, the activities of the A.Q. Khan network, centered around the so-called father of Pakistan’s atomic program, proved that expertise travels – in Khan’s case to North Korea, Libya and Iran.

What strikes teach

Whether or not regime change might follow, any U.S. military action carries profound implications for global proliferation.

Iran’s status as a threshold state has been a choice of strategic restraint. But when, in June 2025, Israel and the U.S struck Iran’s nuclear facilities, that attack – and the latest Trump threats – sent a clear message that threshold status provides no reliable security.

The message to other nations with nuclear aspirations is stark and builds on a number of hard nonproliferation lessons over the past three decades. Libya abandoned its nuclear program in 2003 in exchange for normalized relations with the West. Yet just eight years later, NATO airstrikes in support of Libyan rebels led to the capture and killing of longtime strongman Moammar Gaddafi.

Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in 1994 for security assurances from Russia, the U.S. and Britain. Yet 20 years later, in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, before launching an outright invasion in 2022.

Now we can add Iran to the list: The country exercised restraint at the threshold level, and yet it was attacked by U.S. bombs in 2025 and now faces a potential follow-up strike.

The lesson is not lost on Mehdi Mohammadi, a senior Iranian adviser. Speaking on state TV on Jan. 27, he said Washington’s demands “translate into disarming yourself so we could strike you when we want.”

If abandoning a nuclear program leads to regime change, relinquishing weapons results in invasion, and remaining at the threshold invites military strikes, the logic goes, then security is only truly achieved through the possession of nuclear weapons – and not by negotiating them away or halting development before completion.

If Iranian leadership survives any U.S. attack, they will, I believe, almost certainly double down on Iran’s weapons program.

IAEA credibility

U.S. military threats or strikes in the pursuit of destroying a nation’s nuclear program also undermine the international architecture designed to prevent proliferation.

The International Atomic Energy Agency was, until the earlier Israel and U.S. strikes, functioning as designed – detecting, flagging and verifying. Its monitoring of Iran was proof that the inspection regime worked.

Military strikes – or the credible threat of them – remove inspectors, disrupt monitoring continuity and signal that compliance does not guarantee safety.

If following the rules offers no protection, why follow the rules? At stake is the credibility of the IAEA and faith in the whole system of international diplomacy and monitoring to tamp down nuclear concerns.

The domino effect

Every nation weighing its nuclear options is watching to see how this latest standoff between the U.S. and Iran plays out.

Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia, has made no secret of its own nuclear ambitions, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman publicly declaring that the kingdom would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran did.

Yet a U.S. strike on Iran would not reassure Washington’s Gulf allies. Rather, it could unsettle them. The June 2025 U.S. strikes on Iran were conducted to protect Israel, not Saudi Arabia or Iran. Gulf leaders may conclude that American military action flows to preferred partners, not necessarily to them. And if U.S. protection is selective rather than universal, a rational response could be to hedge independently.

Saudi Arabia’s deepening defense cooperation with nuclear power Pakistan, for example, represents a hedge against American unreliability and regional instability. The Gulf kingdom has invested heavily in Pakistani military capabilities and maintains what many analysts believe are understandings regarding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Turkey, meanwhile, has chafed under NATO’s nuclear arrangements and has periodically signaled interest in an independent capability. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan questioned in 2019 why Turkey should not possess nuclear weapons when others in the region do. An attack on Iran, particularly one that Turkey opposes, could well accelerate Turkish hedging and potentially trigger a serious indigenous weapons program.

And the nuclear cascade would not likely stop at the Middle East. South Korea and Japan have remained non-nuclear largely because of confidence in American extended deterrence. Regional proliferation and the risk of a destabilized Iran exporting its know-how, scientists and technology would raise questions in Seoul and Tokyo about whether American guarantees can be trusted.

An emerging counter-order?

Arab Gulf monarchies certainly understand these risks, which goes some way toward explaining why they have lobbied the Trump administration against military action against Iran – despite Tehran being a major antagonism in Gulf states’ desire to “de-risk” the region.

The American-led regional security architecture is already under strain. It risks fraying further if Gulf partners diversify their security ties and hedge against U.S. unpredictability.

As a result, the Trump administration’s threats and potential strikes against Iran may, conversely, result not in increased American influence, but in diminished relevance as the region divides into competing spheres of influence.

And perhaps most alarming of all, I fear that it could teach every aspiring nuclear state that security is attainable only through the possession of the bomb.

Farah N. Jan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. US military action in Iran risks igniting a regional and global nuclear cascade – https://theconversation.com/us-military-action-in-iran-risks-igniting-a-regional-and-global-nuclear-cascade-274599

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, Australian National University; The University of Western Australia; Victoria University

The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran are once again on the brink of a major confrontation. This would have terrible ramifications for both countries, the region and the world.

All signs point in this direction, but the two sides also have an off-ramp: the possibility of reaching an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and other disputed issues.

The Iranian regime has never been so besieged both internally and externally. It has just faced yet another widespread protest movement demanding the government’s ouster, while dealing with the threat of military action by the US, supported by its ally, Israel.

Even so, the regime remains resilient and defiant. It brutally crushed the recent protests at the cost of thousands of lives and mass arrests and has warned the US of an all-out war if it attacks.

At the same time, it has signalled a willingness to reach a deal with the US over its nuclear program to avoid such an outcome.

So, what happens next, and can war be avoided?

A regime in survival mode

The regime’s tenacity is embedded in its unique theocratic nature, in which societal subordination and confrontation with outside enemies are the modus operandi.

Since its inception 47 years ago, the regime has learned how to ensure its longevity. This requires having a strong and defendable state, armed with all the necessary repressive instruments of state power, along with an ideology that mixes the concept of Shia Islamic martyrdom with fierce Iranian nationalism.

Given this, the regime has operated within a jihadi (combative) and ijtihadi (pragmatist) framework for its survival.

It has prepared for both war and making deals. This is not the first time Iran’s clerical leaders have been put in a tight corner by their own people and outside adversaries. They have always found a way to work through challenges and threats to their existence.

Still, the current challenge is bigger than any they’ve faced before. Over the past month, US President Donald Trump has vowed to punish the regime for its repression of the Iranian people, and now for its refusal to reach a deal on its nuclear program.

Some believe his ultimate goal, though, is to create the conditions for regime change.

Regime change not a given

Trump must know that regime change in Iran will not happen easily. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his fellow clerics are ready to fight to the very end. They know that if the Islamic system they created goes down, everyone in the regime is most likely to perish with it.

The regime has built sufficient fanatical forces (namely, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij paramilitary force) and advanced missiles and drones to defend itself. It also has the ability to block the Strait of Hormuz, though which 20% of the world’s oil and 25% of its liquefied natural gas flows every day.

The regime also has the backing of China, Russia and North Korea, which means any US assault could quickly escalate into a broader regional war.

Although Trump has not favoured regime change in the past, he now seems as if he’s not ruling it out. (His ally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long had this aim.)

But even though Trump now has a “massive armada” of ships and fighter jets in the region, the Iranian regime cannot be toppled by air and sea alone. And a ground invasion is not on Trump’s agenda, given the United States’ bitter experiences with ground offensives in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The regime could only crumble if a sizeable part of its security forces defected to the opposition. So far, they have remained quite loyal and solidly behind the leadership – as the brutal crackdown to the recent protests shows.

A possible destabilising future

Even if the regime were to crumble from within by some chance, what would come next?

Iran is a large and complex country, with an ethnically mixed population. While Persians form a slim majority of the population, the country has significant minority groups, such as the Kurds, Azeris, Arabs and Balochis. They all have a history of movements for secession and autonomy.

With the exception of two short periods of experimenting with democracy in the early and mid-20th century, Iran has been governed by authoritarian rulers. In the event of a power vacuum, it remains prone to chaos and disintegration.

It is doubtful that Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ruled from 1941–79, will command sufficient public support and organisational strength to ensure a smooth transition to democracy. He has lived most of his life in exile in the US and has been closely identified with Israeli and American interests.

Netanyahu would be pleased to see a disintegrated Iran, as he has always wanted to prevent the formation of a united Muslim front against Israel. But the fall-out from a destabilised Iran would be problematic for the region.

These considerations are probably weighing on Trump’s mind, delaying his promise to the Iranian protesters that “help is on its way”.

Diplomacy is the better way forward. The time has come for the Iranian and American leadership to compromise and resurrect their July 2015 nuclear deal, from which Trump withdrew in 2018.

This should be urgently followed by Iran’s clerical rulers opening their iron fist and allowing the Iranian people to determine their future and that of their country within a democratic framework.

Otherwise, the volatility that has long dominated this oil-rich country, where between 30–40% of the population lives in poverty, will eventually devour the regime.

Amin Saikal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. With Iran weakened, Trump’s end goal may now be regime change. It’s an incredibly risky gamble – https://theconversation.com/with-iran-weakened-trumps-end-goal-may-now-be-regime-change-its-an-incredibly-risky-gamble-274626

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Aline Soterroni, Pesquisadora associada do Departamento de Biologia, University of Oxford

In the first days of 2026, the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE), which represents the largest soybean traders in Brazil, announced its withdrawal from the Amazon soy moratorium.

Created in 2006, the moratorium is a voluntary commitment between companies, governments and civil society, establishing that signatory traders and industries will not purchase soy produced from areas deforested in the Amazon biome after July 2008.

The moratorium is widely recognised as one of the world’s most effective voluntary multisectoral agreements for decoupling direct deforestation from soy expansion in the Brazilian Amazon.

ABIOVE’s member companies account for a substantial share of Brazil’s soybean processing capacity and exports. As such, they play a central role both in the soy expansion and in the implementation of environmental commitments across the country.

Although the moratorium has not been formally terminated, its weakening by an actor as influential as ABIOVE may mark the beginning of the end of the most successful zero-deforestation agreement in history.

Fewer state tax benefits

A large body of research demonstrates unequivocally that the moratorium has not constrained soybean production in the Amazon biome. On the contrary, between 2009 and 2022, the area planted with soy increased by more than 300%, while deforestation fell by 69% in the municipalities monitored under the moratorium.

In addition, the agreement was responsible for establishing a sophisticated system for monitoring, traceability and independent auditing of the soybean supply chain in the Brazilian Amazon.

Despite all this evidence, some argue that the soy moratorium is no longer necessary. This view has recently gained political traction through manoeuvres by the government of the state of Mato Grosso, including the Decree 1,795, which seeks to regulate part of a state law (Law 12,709/2024) whose constitutionality is still being examined by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court.

In practice, the Mato Grosso government aims to restrict state tax benefits for companies that adopt environmental criteria beyond those required by law, as is the case with the Amazon soy moratorium.

The core argument is that Brazil’s Forest Code – the country’s main environmental law regulating land use on private properties – alone is sufficient to ensure high socio-environmental standards in agricultural production. But is this really the case?

Full implementation of Brazil’s Forest Code

There is a scientific tool capable of addressing this question: mathematical and economic land-use modelling. According to a study I led, published in Global Change Biology, even the rigorous implementation of the Forest Code would prevent only about half of the deforestation projected to accommodate the expansion of agriculture and livestock production in Brazil up to 2050.

These findings indicate that, while full implementation of the Code is essential and urgent, it is not sufficient to guarantee deforestation-free agricultural production that is truly sustainable and aligned with increasingly demanding markets, such as that of the European Union.

It is also worthwhile to remember that achieving zero deforestation is central to Brazil fulfilling the commitments it has voluntarily undertaken, including the Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Leader’s Declaration on Forests and Land Use.

Better futures are possible

One of the most motivating aspects of my research area is the opportunity to explore better futures. What if the Amazon Soy moratorium were expanded from the Amazon to the Cerrado? Around a decade ago, in 2017, this was precisely the debate.

That year, the Cerrado Working Group was created with the aim of discussing an agreement that would eliminate the direct conversion of native vegetation for soybean production in the most biodiverse and threatened tropical savanna on Earth.

In another modelling study that I led, published in Science Advances, we simulated this plausible future, in which the Soy moratorium is adopted simultaneously in the Amazon and the Cerrado biomes.

The results show that even with a moratorium of this scale, Brazilian soybean production would continue to grow in order to meet domestic and international demand. By 2050, the reduction in planted area would be only about 2% compared with a scenario without an expanded moratorium.

With strategic land-use planning, the impact on production would therefore be minimal, while the environmental and social benefits would be immense. This scenario highlights Brazil’s potential for environmental leadership, demonstrating that large-scale commodity production can be reconciled with the conservation of natural resources.

Brazil is one the most megadiverse nations in the world, home to around 20% of all known species. This extraordinary biodiversity – together with ecosystem services such as pollination, climate regulation and rainfall patterns – underpins the country’s position as a major global producer and exporter of food.

Yet prolonged droughts, intense rainfall events and more frequent heatwaves are already affecting agricultural productivity, confirming scientific warnings about the vulnerability of Brazilian agriculture in an increasingly warming planet.

In the face of the intertwined climate and biodiversity crises, the debate should focus on policies and initiatives that complement Brazil’s Forest Code, such as expanding the Amazon Soy moratorium to the Cerrado, rather than on dismantling it.

Protecting native vegetation is an essential condition for the long-term viability of Brazilian agriculture and the most effective insurance against the impacts of climate change.

Approving legislation that trades standing forests, irreplaceable biodiversity, water security and climate regulation – while also jeopardising the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities – for soybeans largely used as animal feed is not just short-sighted land-use governance. It is, quite literally, casting pearls before swine. Not to mention the unnecessary reputational risk generated for the Brazilian agricultural sector.

Rather than hastily weakening one of the most successful environmental agreements ever implemented, companies and trade associations should strengthen safeguards, resist legislation that undermines environmental protection, and work alongside governments and civil society to build supply chains that are genuinely sustainable and free from deforestation. The science is clear. The choice, however, is political.

Aline Soterroni não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.

– ref. Weakening the soy moratorium in Brazil: a political choice that ignores the science – https://theconversation.com/weakening-the-soy-moratorium-in-brazil-a-political-choice-that-ignores-the-science-274677

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Aline Soterroni, Pesquisadora associada do Departamento de Biologia, University of Oxford

In the first days of 2026, the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE), which represents the largest soybean traders in Brazil, announced its withdrawal from the Amazon soy moratorium.

Created in 2006, the moratorium is a voluntary commitment between companies, governments and civil society, establishing that signatory traders and industries will not purchase soy produced from areas deforested in the Amazon biome after July 2008.

The moratorium is widely recognised as one of the world’s most effective voluntary multisectoral agreements for decoupling direct deforestation from soy expansion in the Brazilian Amazon.

ABIOVE’s member companies account for a substantial share of Brazil’s soybean processing capacity and exports. As such, they play a central role both in the soy expansion and in the implementation of environmental commitments across the country.

Although the moratorium has not been formally terminated, its weakening by an actor as influential as ABIOVE may mark the beginning of the end of the most successful zero-deforestation agreement in history.

Fewer state tax benefits

A large body of research demonstrates unequivocally that the moratorium has not constrained soybean production in the Amazon biome. On the contrary, between 2009 and 2022, the area planted with soy increased by more than 300%, while deforestation fell by 69% in the municipalities monitored under the moratorium.

In addition, the agreement was responsible for establishing a sophisticated system for monitoring, traceability and independent auditing of the soybean supply chain in the Brazilian Amazon.

Despite all this evidence, some argue that the soy moratorium is no longer necessary. This view has recently gained political traction through manoeuvres by the government of the state of Mato Grosso, including the Decree 1,795, which seeks to regulate part of a state law (Law 12,709/2024) whose constitutionality is still being examined by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court.

In practice, the Mato Grosso government aims to restrict state tax benefits for companies that adopt environmental criteria beyond those required by law, as is the case with the Amazon soy moratorium.

The core argument is that Brazil’s Forest Code – the country’s main environmental law regulating land use on private properties – alone is sufficient to ensure high socio-environmental standards in agricultural production. But is this really the case?

Full implementation of Brazil’s Forest Code

There is a scientific tool capable of addressing this question: mathematical and economic land-use modelling. According to a study I led, published in Global Change Biology, even the rigorous implementation of the Forest Code would prevent only about half of the deforestation projected to accommodate the expansion of agriculture and livestock production in Brazil up to 2050.

These findings indicate that, while full implementation of the Code is essential and urgent, it is not sufficient to guarantee deforestation-free agricultural production that is truly sustainable and aligned with increasingly demanding markets, such as that of the European Union.

It is also worthwhile to remember that achieving zero deforestation is central to Brazil fulfilling the commitments it has voluntarily undertaken, including the Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Leader’s Declaration on Forests and Land Use.

Better futures are possible

One of the most motivating aspects of my research area is the opportunity to explore better futures. What if the Amazon Soy moratorium were expanded from the Amazon to the Cerrado? Around a decade ago, in 2017, this was precisely the debate.

That year, the Cerrado Working Group was created with the aim of discussing an agreement that would eliminate the direct conversion of native vegetation for soybean production in the most biodiverse and threatened tropical savanna on Earth.

In another modelling study that I led, published in Science Advances, we simulated this plausible future, in which the Soy moratorium is adopted simultaneously in the Amazon and the Cerrado biomes.

The results show that even with a moratorium of this scale, Brazilian soybean production would continue to grow in order to meet domestic and international demand. By 2050, the reduction in planted area would be only about 2% compared with a scenario without an expanded moratorium.

With strategic land-use planning, the impact on production would therefore be minimal, while the environmental and social benefits would be immense. This scenario highlights Brazil’s potential for environmental leadership, demonstrating that large-scale commodity production can be reconciled with the conservation of natural resources.

Brazil is one the most megadiverse nations in the world, home to around 20% of all known species. This extraordinary biodiversity – together with ecosystem services such as pollination, climate regulation and rainfall patterns – underpins the country’s position as a major global producer and exporter of food.

Yet prolonged droughts, intense rainfall events and more frequent heatwaves are already affecting agricultural productivity, confirming scientific warnings about the vulnerability of Brazilian agriculture in an increasingly warming planet.

In the face of the intertwined climate and biodiversity crises, the debate should focus on policies and initiatives that complement Brazil’s Forest Code, such as expanding the Amazon Soy moratorium to the Cerrado, rather than on dismantling it.

Protecting native vegetation is an essential condition for the long-term viability of Brazilian agriculture and the most effective insurance against the impacts of climate change.

Approving legislation that trades standing forests, irreplaceable biodiversity, water security and climate regulation – while also jeopardising the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities – for soybeans largely used as animal feed is not just short-sighted land-use governance. It is, quite literally, casting pearls before swine. Not to mention the unnecessary reputational risk generated for the Brazilian agricultural sector.

Rather than hastily weakening one of the most successful environmental agreements ever implemented, companies and trade associations should strengthen safeguards, resist legislation that undermines environmental protection, and work alongside governments and civil society to build supply chains that are genuinely sustainable and free from deforestation. The science is clear. The choice, however, is political.

Aline Soterroni não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.

– ref. Weakening the soy moratorium: a political choice that ignores the science – https://theconversation.com/weakening-the-soy-moratorium-a-political-choice-that-ignores-the-science-274677

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jessica Kolbusz, Research Fellow, School of Biological Sciences, The University of Western Australia

When most of us look out at the ocean, we see a mostly flat blue surface stretching to the horizon. It’s easy to imagine the sea beneath as calm and largely static – a massive, still abyss far removed from everyday experience.

But the ocean is layered, dynamic and constantly moving, from the surface down to the deepest seafloor. While waves, tides and currents near the coast are familiar and accessible, far less is known about what happens several kilometres below, where the ocean meets the seafloor.

Our new research, published in the journal Ocean Science, shows water near the the seafloor is in constant motion, even in the abyssal plains of the Pacific Ocean. This has important consequences for climate, ecosystems and how we understand the ocean as an interconnected system.

Enter the abyss

The central and eastern Pacific Ocean include some of Earth’s largest abyssal regions (places where the sea is more than 3,000 metres deep). Here, most of the seafloor lies four to six kilometres below the surface. It is shaped by vast abyssal plains, fracture zones and seamounts.

It is cold and dark, and the water and ecosystems here are under immense pressure from the ocean above.

Just above the seafloor, no matter the depth, sits a region known as the bottom mixed layer. This part of the ocean is relatively uniform in temperature, salinity and density because it is stirred through contact with the seafloor.

Rather than a thin boundary, this layer can extend from tens to hundreds of metres above the seabed. It plays a crucial role in the movement of heat, nutrients and sediments between the pelagic ocean and the seabed, including the beginning of the slow return of water from the bottom of the ocean toward the surface as part of global ocean circulation.

Observations focused on the bottom mixed layer are rare, but this is beginning to change. Most ocean measurements focus on the upper few kilometres, and deep observations are scarce, expensive and often decades apart.

In the Pacific especially, scientists have long known that cold Antarctic waters flow northward, along topographic features such as the Tonga-Kermadec Ridge and the Izu-Ogasawara and Japan Trenches.

But the finer details of how these waters interact with seafloor features in ways that intermittently stir and reshape the bottom layer of the ocean has remained largely unknown.

Investigating the abyss

To investigate the Pacific abyssal ocean, my colleagues and I combined new surface-to-seafloor measurements collected during a trans-Pacific expedition with high-quality repeat data about the physical features of the ocean gathered over the past two decades.

These observations allowed us to examine temperature and pressure all the way down to the seafloor over a wide range of latitudes and longitudes.

We then compared multiple scientific methods for identifying the bottom mixed layer and used machine learning techniques to understand what factors best explain the variations in its thickness.

Rather than being a uniform layer, we found the bottom mixed layer in the abyssal Pacific varies dramatically. In some regions it was less than 100m thick; in others it exceeded 700m.

This variability is not random; it’s controlled by the seafloor depth and the interactions between waves generated by surface tides and rough landscapes on the seabed.

In other words, the deepest ocean is not quietly stagnant as is often imagined. It is continually stirred by remote forces, shaped by seafloor features, and dynamically connected to the rest of the ocean above.

Just as coastal waters are shaped by waves, currents and sediment movement, the abyssal ocean is shaped by its own set of drivers. However, it is operating over larger distances and longer timescales.

Connected to the rest of the world

This matters for several reasons.

First, the bottom mixed layer influences how heat is stored and redistributed in the ocean, affecting long-term climate change. Some ocean and climate models still simplify seabed mixing, which can lead to errors in how future climate is projected.

Second, it plays a role in transporting sediment and seabed ecosystems. As interest grows in deep-sea mining and other activities on the high seas, understanding how the seafloor environment changes, and importantly how seafloor disturbances might spread, becomes increasingly important.

Our results highlight how little of the deep ocean we actually observe.

Large areas of the abyssal Pacific remain effectively unsampled, even as international agreements such as the new UN High Seas Treaty seek to manage and protect these regions.

The deep ocean is not a silent, static place. It is active, connected to the oceans above and changing. If we want to make informed decisions about the future of the high seas, we need to understand what’s happening at the very bottom in space and time.

Jessica Kolbusz receives funding from the marine research organisation Inkfish LLC. The funder was not involved in the study design, collection, analysis, interpretation of data, the writing of this article, or the decision to submit it for publication.

– ref. Submarine mountains and long-distance waves stir the deepest parts of the ocean – https://theconversation.com/submarine-mountains-and-long-distance-waves-stir-the-deepest-parts-of-the-ocean-274124

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Draper, Professor, and Executive Director: Institute for International Trade, and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Trade and Environment, Adelaide University

The “mother of all deals”: that’s how European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the new free trade agreement between the European Union and India, announced on Tuesday after about two decades of negotiations.

The deal will affect a combined population of 2 billion people across economies representing about a quarter of global GDP.

Speaking in New Delhi, von der Leyen characterised the agreement as a “tale of two giants” who “choose partnership, in a true win-win fashion”.

So, what have both sides agreed to – and why does it matter so much for global trade?

What has been agreed

Under this agreement, tariffs on 96.6% of EU goods exported to India will be eliminated or reduced. This will reportedly mean savings of approximately €4 billion (about A$6.8 billion) annually in customs duties on European products.

The automotive sector is the big winner. European carmakers – including Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes-Benz and Renault – will see tariffs on their vehicles gradually reduced from the current punitive rate of 110% to as little as 10%.

The reduced tariffs will apply to an annual quota of 250,000 vehicles, which is six times larger than the quota the UK received in its deal with India.

To protect India’s domestic manufacturers, European cars priced below €15,000 (A$25,500) will face higher tariffs, while electric vehicles get a five-year grace period.

India will almost entirely eliminate tariffs on machinery (which previously faced rates up to 44%), chemicals (22%) and pharmaceuticals (11%).

Wine is particularly notable – tariffs are being slashed from 150% to between 20–30% for medium and premium varieties. Spirits face cuts from 150% to 40%.

In return, the EU is also opening up its market. It will reduce tariffs on 99.5% of goods imported from India. EU tariffs on Indian marine products (such as shrimp), leather goods, textiles, handicrafts, gems and jewellery, plastics and toys will be eliminated.

These are labour-intensive sectors where India has genuine competitive advantage. Indian exporters in marine products, textiles and gems have faced tough conditions in recent years, partly due to US tariff pressures. That makes this EU access particularly valuable.

What’s been left out

This deal, while ambitious by India standards, has limits. It explicitly excludes deeper policy harmonisation on several fronts. Perhaps most significantly, the deal doesn’t include comprehensive provisions on labour rights, environmental standards or climate commitments.

While there are references to carbon border adjustment mechanisms (by which the EU imposes its domestic carbon price on imports into their common market), these likely fall short of enforceable environmental standards increasingly common in EU deals.

And the deal keeps protections for sensitive sectors in Europe: the EU maintains tariffs on beef, chicken, dairy, rice and sugar. Consumers in Delhi might enjoy cheaper European cars, while Europe’s farmers are protected from competition.

Why now?

Three forces converged to make this deal happen. First, a growing need to diversify from traditional partners amid economic uncertainty.

Second, the Donald Trump factor. Both the EU and India currently face significant US tariffs: India faces a 50% tariff on goods, while the EU faces headline tariffs of 15% (and recently avoided more in Trump’s threats over Greenland). This deal provides an alternative market for both sides.

And third, there’s what economists call “trade diversion” – notably, when Chinese products are diverted to other markets after the US closes its doors to them.

Both the EU and India want to avoid becoming dumping grounds for products that would normally go to the American market.

A dealmaking spree

The EU has been on something of a dealmaking spree recently. Earlier this month, it signed an agreement with Mercosur, a South American trade bloc.

That deal, however, has hit complications. On January 21, the European Parliament voted to refer it to the EU Court of Justice for legal review, which could delay ratification.

This creates a cautionary tale for the India deal. The legal uncertainty around Mercosur shows how well-intentioned trade deals can face obstacles.

The EU also finalised negotiations with Indonesia in September; EU–Indonesia trade was valued at €27 billion in 2024 (about A$46 billion).

For India, this deal with the EU is considerably bigger than recent agreements with New Zealand, Oman and the UK. It positions India as a diversified trading nation pursuing multiple partnerships.

However, the EU–India trade deal should be understood not as a purely commercial breakthrough, but also as a strategic signal — aimed primarily at the US.

In effect, it communicates that even close allies will actively seek alternative economic partners when faced with the threat of economic coercion or politicised trade pressure.

This interpretation is reinforced by both the deal’s timing and how it was announced. The announcement came even though key details still need to be negotiated and there remains some distance to go before final ratification.

That suggests the immediate objective was to deliver a message: the EU has options, and it will use them.

What does this mean for Australia and India?

For Australians, this deal matters more than you might think. Australia already has the Australia-India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement, which came into force in late 2022.

Australia has eliminated tariffs on all Indian exports, while India has removed duties on 90% of Australian goods by value, rising from an original commitment of 85%.

This EU-India deal should provide impetus for Australia and India to finalise their more comprehensive Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, under negotiation since 2023.

The 11th round of negotiations took place in August, covering goods, services, digital trade, rules of origin, and – importantly – labour and environmental standards.

The EU deal suggests India is willing to engage seriously on tariff liberalisation. However, it remains to be seen whether that appetite will transfer to the newer issues increasingly central to global trade, notably those Australia is now trying to secure with Indian negotiators.

Chasing an Australia-EU deal

Australia should take heart from the EU’s success in building alternative trading relationships.

This should encourage negotiators still pursuing an EU–Australia free trade agreement, negotiations for which were renewed last June after collapsing in 2023.

These deals signal something important about the global trading system: countries are adapting to American protectionism not by becoming protectionist themselves, but by deepening partnerships with each other.

The world’s democracies are saying they want to trade, invest, and cooperate on rules-based terms.

Nathan Howard Gray receives funding from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Mandar Oak and Peter Draper do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What the ‘mother of all deals’ between India and the EU means for global trade – https://theconversation.com/what-the-mother-of-all-deals-between-india-and-the-eu-means-for-global-trade-274515

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Garritt C. Van Dyk, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Waikato

Donald Trump took time out this week from dramatic events at home and abroad to reveal three new design concepts for his proposed “Independence Arch” in Washington DC.

All three renderings resemble the famous Arc de Triomphe in Paris, although one features gilded livery not unlike Trump’s chosen adornments to the Oval Office in the White House.

Commissioned in preparation for the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, the triumphal arch draws on a long history of celebrating military conquest, from Roman emperors to Napoleon Bonaparte.

As such, it aligns seamlessly with Trump’s foreign policy and his stated mission for the United States to control the western hemisphere – as he has dubbed it, the “Donroe Doctrine”.

But as many have been asking, while the design is a copy of an iconic monument, is a personal tribute necessarily the best way to mark the anniversary of America’s break with absolute rule and the British monarchy?

The ‘Arc de Trump’

When Trump first displayed models of the proposed arch last October, a reporter asked him who it was for. Trump replied “Me. It’s going to be beautiful.”

In a December update, the president said the new arch “will be like the one in Paris, but to be honest with you, it blows it away. It blows it away in every way.”

There was one exception, he noted: “The only thing they have is history […] I always say [it’s] the one thing you can’t compete with, but eventually we’ll have that history too.”

The president clearly believes his arch will be part of creating that history. “It’s the only city in the world that’s of great importance that doesn’t have a triumphal arch,” he said of Washington DC.

Set to be located near Arlington National Cemetery and the Lincoln Memorial, the site would put the new structure in a visual conversation with many of the most famous landmarks in the national capital.

This also aligns with other projects that will leave Trump’s mark on the physical fabric of Washington: changes to the White House last year that included paving over the famous Rose Garden, decorating the Oval Office in rococo gold, and demolishing the East Wing for a US$400 million ballroom extension.

The “Arc de Trump” (as it has been branded) is now the “top priority” for Vince Haley, the director of the Domestic Policy Council for the White House.

Triumph and design

The Arc de Triomphe in Paris, located at the top of the Champs-Élysées, was commissioned by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1806 to honour the French imperial army following his victory at the Battle of Austerlitz. It was not finished until 1836, under the reign of King Louis Philippe I.

Architects for the project, Jean-François Thérèse Chalgrin and Jean-Arnaud Raymond, drew on classical arches for inspiration, with Rome’s Arch of Titus (circa 85 CE) as the main source. It was built by Emperor Domitian (51–96 CE), a cruel and ostentatious tyrant who was popular with the people but battled with the Senate and limited its power to make laws.

Domitian commissioned the arch to commemorate the deification of his brother Titus, and his military victory crushing the rebellion in Judea.

Given its inspiration, Trump’s proposed arch doesn’t reference any uniquely American design features. But the neoclassical style recalls earlier monuments that also reference antiquity.

The Washington Monument, for example, is built in the form of an Egyptian obelisk. A four-sided pillar, it tapers as it rises and is topped with a pyramid, a tribute to the sun god Ra.

But it also incorporated an element that was meant to symbolise American technological advancement and innovation – a pyramid cap made of aluminium.

When the obelisk was completed in 1884, aluminium was rare because the process for refining it had not been perfected. The top of the monument was the largest piece of cast aluminium on the planet at that time.

‘Truth and sanity’

Trump’s triumphal arch is likely destined to join a long debate about the merits of public monuments and what they represent.

During the Black Lives Matter movement, many statues of historical figures were removed from public display because they were seen as celebrations of racism and imperialism.

Trump has since restored at least one Confederate statue toppled during that time, and his desire to add a new monument to himself should come as little surprise.

During the Jim Crow era of racial segregation and throughout the civil rights movement, there was a sharp spike in the number of monuments erected to Confederate soldiers and generals.

Just as tearing down those statues was a statement, so is the creation of a new memorial to promote Trump’s positive interpretation of the nation’s past. It is also consistent with his administration’s declared mission of “restoring truth and sanity to American history”.

Maybe the more immediate question is whether the Independence Arch can even be built by Independence Day on July 4, a tall order even for this president. As for its reception, history will have to be the judge.

Garritt C. Van Dyk has received funding from the Getty Research Institute.

– ref. Monumental ambitions: the history behind Trump’s triumphal arch – https://theconversation.com/monumental-ambitions-the-history-behind-trumps-triumphal-arch-273567

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amy McAuliffe, Visiting Distinguished Professor of the Practice, University of Notre Dame

With Russian ground troops bogged down in a grinding war of attrition, Moscow is striving to press home its advantage in the skies – through an ever-evolving army of drones, courtesy of Iran.

In early January, wreckage of a drone found in Ukraine hinted at a new high-speed model of drone being deployed by Russia in the conflict. It prompted Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to air fears over failing to keep pace. “We produce (drones) at about 1,000 a day. We really produce them, but it’s not enough. It’s still not enough,” he told an audience of political business leaders at the World Economic Forum on Jan. 22, 2026.

Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Moscow, too, will also soon be pumping out 1,000 drone units a day, in large part thanks to the support and technical assistance of Iran. A central concern for Ukraine is Russia’s increasing production of long-range attack drones that it has used in mass attacks to strike targets in Ukraine.

Tehran’s role in supplying Russia with hundreds of long-range, kamikaze-style drones is long known. But what has gone largely unnoticed outside Ukraine is Iran’s central role in teaching Russia to produce these drones itself.

As an expert on weapons technology and former assistant director of the CIA for weapons and counterproliferation, I believe use of Iranian technology has helped Russia develop a fleet of sophisticated drones able to erode Ukrainian air defenses and strain the country’s resolve. By doing so, Moscow is able to preserve more expensive missiles for long-range precision strikes.

Designed in Iran, produced in Russia

Both Ukraine and Russia have ramped up drone production since the beginning of the current conflict in February 2022.

Russia was initially unable to produce large numbers of kamikaze drones, and the country’s military seemingly did not at first understand the decisive role long-range strike drones could play. Instead, Moscow invested in traditional battlefield weapons, such as missiles. It mainly thought of drones as carrying out the roles of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance.

Tehran had the expertise Russia needed. It also had an existing defense relationship with Russia. Moreover, faced with a cash-strapped economy due to yearslong sanctions, Iran needed money.

Since probably about early 2022, Tehran has been providing drones and drone technology to Russia for use in Ukraine. Later that year, Russia and Iran signed the agreement to set up a production plant in Russia for Iranian-designed attack drones.

With Iranian blueprints and technology, a production plant in Tatarstan in western Russia now produces large numbers of drones originally designed by Iran. At this factory, Russia manufactures the Geran-2, Moscow’s name for the Iranian Shahed-136 strike drone.

Easily identifiable by its delta-wing shape, the drone has optimized certain design features, such as range, endurance and weight capacity. It can carry an estimated 90 to 110 pounds of explosives hundreds of miles.

Meanwhile, the delta-wing design optimizes precision diving, helps prevent stalling at low speeds, and increases the drone’s stability during the attack phase.

These features enable targeting of strategic infrastructure at much less cost than long-range missiles.

Russia can now produce hundreds of one-way Geran-2 attack drones a day. It may soon be able to launch thousands in salvos.

Russia is also modifying and enhancing the drones with features such as precise navigation, heavier warheads and new engines.

Some reports claim Russia is testing telemetry and video links to fly drones remotely, a significant improvement over its current preprogrammed design that would improve accuracy and range. Iran also supplied Russia with technology to build a jet-powered drone variant based on the Shahed-238 that can fly faster.

Called the Geran-3, Russia has produced and used fewer of these drones, whose jet power makes them more challenging for Ukrainian air defense to detect and intercept. New generations of the drone – Geran-4s and Geran-5s – have since been rolled out and apparently deployed in the war with Ukraine.

Sanctions-busting procurement

Even with the blueprints and Iranian assistance, Russia is still reliant on Western and Chinese suppliers for some drone components, many of them commercial, off-the-shelf technology. These include the engine, fuel pump, GPS and navigation systems, semiconductors and components for antennas.

To assist Russia, Iran exploits its networks of brokers and companies in acquiring Western components to evade international sanctions.

A procurement network headed by the Iranian company Sahara Thunder used shipping firms in the UAE and India to sell Russia the original Iranian drones and components and to negotiate the deal for the production plant.

The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned this firm and others involved in the drone sales, but Iran set up new companies to help Moscow acquire components. Multiple studies and reports documenting the inclusion of foreign components in downed Geran-2s show Moscow’s continued acquisition of these parts, almost certainly with Iranian assistance.

A weapon of terror

Russia uses the Geran and other longer-range Iranian and Russian models to purposefully target civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, including residential housing in Ukrainian cities. Russia has even targeted first responders and humanitarian distribution points, according to a United Nations account.

In fact, the U.N. concluded in October 2025 that Russia’s use of short-range, unmanned aerial vehicles against civilians in southern Ukraine constituted a crime against humanity and a war crime.

A two-day attack in May 2025 on the Ukrainian cities of Kharkiv in the northeast and Odessa in the south highlights the destructive power and human cost of the drone attacks. According to accounts in the Kyiv Post, Russia launched over 100 drones. In Kharkiv, three blocks were burned down, including 90 shops, and two people were injured. In Odessa, the drones killed one person and damaged residential buildings.

Beyond psychologically tormenting the Ukrainian population, these drones have a profound effect on the battlefield.

Ukraine has responded to Russia’s battlefield success with the Iranian-designed drones by diversifying the types of drones it manufactures, attacking Russian infrastructure for manufacturing drones and developing counter-drone technologies.

A mutually beneficial arrangement

Iran also benefits from this terror campaign. Reeling from the economic impact of sanctions, Iran will make an estimated US$1 billion to $1.75 billion from the deal for drones and the production facility. Russia is reportedly paying Iran a portion of the bill in gold.

Iran is unlikely to stop its assistance anytime soon, given its own economic problems. Helping Moscow obtain drone components and even modify new versions of the Geran-2 will also benefit Iran militarily as it, too, learns to make the new drones and use them itself.

But the main beneficiary of this relationship is Moscow. Without Iranian support, Russia would face more difficult trade-offs on the battlefield. The lower-cost drones allow Russia to preserve its expensive advanced missiles for the most significant targets in Ukraine and to employ large swarms of drones to target Ukrainian infrastructure.

And with the ground offensive yielding little progress of late for Moscow, that could be crucial as the war enters its fifth year.

Amy McAuliffe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Russia’s drone pipeline: How Iran helps Moscow produce an ever-evolving unmanned fleet – https://theconversation.com/russias-drone-pipeline-how-iran-helps-moscow-produce-an-ever-evolving-unmanned-fleet-272016

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By David S G Goodman, Director, China Studies Centre, Professor of Chinese Politics, University of Sydney

Last weekend, China’s Ministry of National Defence announced that the country’s two most senior generals – Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli – would be removed from office and placed under investigation for serious disciplinary violations.

Zhang had been the People’s Liberation Army’s most senior general since October 2022. He was the highest ranking military member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CCP), the party-state’s 24-member executive policy-making body.

Zhang was also the senior vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which controls the armed forces.

Liu was the former commander of the PLA’s Ground Force and had most recently been in charge of the Central Military Commission’s Joint Staff Department.

The reaction to these developments outside China has led to dramatic headlines. A BBC headline initially focused on a “military in crisis”, while the Australian Broadcasting Corporation called it an “astonishing” purge that leaves Chinese leader Xi Jinping almost alone at the top of the world’s biggest army.

Certainly, the moves were surprising. But so little is known about the internal workings of the CCP’s leadership, including Xi’s relations with his colleagues in the Politburo, that interpreting these developments is difficult, if not impossible.

What we know

For historical and political reasons, the PLA is an organisation of the CCP. Both fall under the direct purview of Xi, who is chair of the Central Military Commission, general secretary of the CCP and president of the country.

The removal of Zhang and Liu at least temporarily leaves military leadership under just Xi and General Zhang Shengmin. Three other members of the Central Military Commission have lost their positions since 2024 and not been replaced.

Though the Chinese leadership is notoriously opaque, it is clear there have been disciplinary problems within the military in the last few years, particularly related to corruption and procurement in the more technically advanced departments of the PLA. Some two dozen senior military figures have been dismissed or investigated since 2022.

Zhang and Liu were fairly recent appointments to even more senior positions. Both were also seen as personal supporters of Xi. The fathers of Xi and Zhang had a close relationship dating back to the early days of the CCP in the 1930s before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

Moreover, the removals of Zhang and Liu happened more quickly than other senior military dismissals of recent years – and there were fewer warning signs. Both men had appeared in public as recently as a month ago.

Perhaps of even greater surprise, the Wall Street Journal reported that Zhang is accused of providing the United States with information about China’s nuclear weapons program, alongside allegations of accepting bribes and forming “political cliques”.

So, how to read the tea leaves?

Past practice suggests without a doubt that once a senior figure loses their status or is dismissed – for whatever reason – their downfall results in accusations of a litany of crimes.

The Politburo has also seen its share of intense internal politics in the past, though the precise circumstances of such conflicts usually take years to surface. A good example is the mysterious death of Lin Biao in 1971, another former PLA commander who at the time was Mao Zedong’s designated successor.

Given the broader context at play here with the management of the military and the development of government programs in recent years, as well as the claims Zhang and Liu violated “discipline and the law”, there are two possible explanations for their dismissals.

Both may have had direct involvement in corruption, taking bribes to appoint officials or ensure contracts for suppliers. It is equally likely they are being held responsible for corruption that has undoubtedly occurred in military procurement under their watch.

Then there is the possibility of a difference of opinion within the Central Military Commission and the Politburo on how to deal with corruption, particularly within the military.

Xi has repeatedly stressed the importance of the fight against corruption since he became general secretary of the CCP in 2012.

In recent weeks, he has made this an even more important crusade in the context of the about-to-be-announced 15th Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development. On January 12, he designated the issue of corruption as a “major struggle” in a speech to China’s top anti-corruption agency:

Currently, the situation in the fight against corruption remains grave and complex […] We must maintain a high-pressure stance without wavering, resolutely punishing corruption wherever it exists, eliminating all forms of graft, and leaving no place for corrupt elements to hide.

To meet China’s developmental goals, he added, the CCP “must deploy cadres who are truly loyal, reliable, consistent and responsible”.

It is difficult to see Zhang and Liu or indeed anyone else currently willing or able to challenge Xi. Or, indeed, that Xi might feel immediately threatened by Zhang, Liu or others.

To that extent, Xi’s personal position is neither strengthened nor weakened by these dismissals.

Other analysts have suggested that the disruptions caused by the dismissals could lower Xi’s confidence in his military. Some have even said the potential for an invasion of Taiwan has now been lowered.

The removal of so many leaders may indicate the PLA is now expected to undergo culture change. At the same time, it would be drawing a very long bow to suggest its military capacity generally or in relation to Taiwan has either been strengthened or weakened.

David S G Goodman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Xi Jinping has dismissed two of China’s most senior generals. What does this mean? – https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-has-dismissed-two-of-chinas-most-senior-generals-what-does-this-mean-274425

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Renewed fighting in Syria in recent weeks between government-aligned forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) isn’t just a local issue. It has serious implications for the stability of the rest of the Middle East.

Syrian government forces launched an offensive in early January into areas of northeastern Syria controlled by Kurdish forces. The operation enabled the government to gain control of key oil and gas fields and major border crossings with Iraq and Turkey.

Of particular concern to Syria’s neighbours, though, is the thousands of former Islamic State (IS) fighters who have been held in prisons run by the SDF in the region. One camp, al-Hol, reportedly held about 24,000 detainees, primarily women and children. There were also diehard IS supporters from around the world at the camp.

Amid concerns the prisoners would escape with the SDF retreat, the US military began moving detainees from Syria to other facilities in Iraq last week. Some prisoners, however, were able to escape.

Though both sides agreed to a ceasefire that would see the SDF forces incorporated into the Syrian armed forces, it remains shaky.

The government’s offensive has also resulted in mass displacement, mistreatment of civilians and what the SDF claims are Islamic State-style killings of its forces and civilians.

And there are concerns the Islamic State will take advantage of the chaos to regroup and try to destabilise the region once again.

A pattern of violence

The fighting has followed a pattern disturbingly similar to other violent episodes following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government to forces led by now-President Ahmed al-Sharaa in late 2024.

Al-Sharaa has pledged to protect minorities in the new Syria he is building, but religious and ethnic minorities have specifically been targeted. This includes the Druze in southern Syria and Alawite communities in the west.

There have been credible reports of summary executions, arbitrary killings and kidnappings.

When the Islamic State controlled large portions of Syria around 2014, its violent actions against civilians – in particular, minorities such as the Yazidis and Kurds – were widely condemned as potential war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In al-Sharaa’s Syria, the violence has allegedly been carried out by government security forces, as well as armed factions affiliated with the government, including foreign fighters.

And al-Sharaa’s government has been supported – or at least tolerated – by international actors, most notably the United States. US President Donald Trump praised al-Sharaa earlier this month for his “tremendous progress”, adding, “I think he’s going to put it all together.”

Trump even met al-Sharaa during a visit to Saudi Arabia in May at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

As a result, violent actions that once triggered airstrikes and global outrage are now met largely with silence, caution or political justification.

This shift is most stark in the treatment of Kurdish forces, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces. These forces have been among the US government’s most effective local partners in the fight against Islamic State for years.

Despite this record, violence against Kurdish civilians has elicited little meaningful reaction. Instead, US policy has focused on supporting the Syrian government structure and urging Kurdish leaders to accept the new political order and fully integrate into state institutions.

For Kurdish communities, this demand carries profound risks. The experiences of the Druze and Alawites offer little assurance that disarmament and territorial concessions will be met with protection or political inclusion.

Many Kurds fear laying down arms without security guarantees could expose them to similar attacks.

A return of Islamic State

Another destabilising consequence of the fighting in eastern Syria has been the collapse of the detention network built to prevent the return of IS.

The US has said up to 7,000 detainees could be transferred from Syria to detention facilities in Iraq in its operations.

While framed as a logistical and security necessity, the announcement immediately triggered alarm across Iraq, where memories of the 2014 Islamic State invasion remain vivid. That was fuelled, in part, by prison breaks from poorly secured detention facilities in Iraq and Syria.

In response to these concerns, Iraqi security forces have deployed in large numbers along the Syrian border to prevent escaped IS detainees from infiltrating the country.

US and Turkish agendas

At the centre of this unfolding crisis is the US, which favours a centralised Syrian state under a single trusted authority. This is easier to manage diplomatically and militarily than a fragmented country with competing armed factions.

This approach also aligns with Trump’s broader regional ambitions, including expanding the Abraham Accords by persuading more regional countries to normalise ties with Israel.

Turkey, a NATO member and key US ally, also has a vested interest in the future of Syria. Ankara, a key backer of al-Sharaa, has long viewed any form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria as an existential threat, fearing it would embolden Kurdish demands inside Turkey.

Together, these overlapping agendas reveal why the international response to the fighting in eastern Syria has been so muted. Concerns over civilian protection or the potential regrouping of the Islamic State have been trumped by the strategic realignment taking place with a post-Assad Syria.

Kurdish forces, once indispensable partners, now find themselves caught between shifting alliances and competing regional interests — another casualty of a new international order defined by convenience rather than principle.

Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. As Syria’s new government consolidates its power, the Kurdish minority fears for its future – https://theconversation.com/as-syrias-new-government-consolidates-its-power-the-kurdish-minority-fears-for-its-future-274110