Thug culture in Nigerian politics: the links between state governors, funding and violent armed groups

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Maureen Fubara, PhD candidate, University of Amsterdam

Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, elections have consistently been marred by violence. The elections between 1999 and 2019 and in 2023 saw party clashes, physical attacks, assassinations and intimidation.

As Nigeria prepares for the 2027 elections, the threat of violence lurks again. Already, reports have emerged of clashes between supporters of the ruling All Progressives Congress and the opposition African Democratic Congress in northern states like Jigawa, Kogi and Kebbi.

The violence is largely carried out by hired thugs, party supporters and members, gangs and militias. But the issue is not only that politicians are willing to use violence, it is that they can afford to fund it.

My research across Lagos, Rivers, Plateau and Nasarawa States shows that the perpetrators are different across states. This difference is linked to how much funding governors control, in the form of resource rents or state fiscal allocations.

In a recently published paper based on my PhD research on the political economy of electoral violence in Nigeria, I argue that the distinction in electoral violence perpetrators is driven by governors’ financial capacity to “rent” violence. While those with access to more resource rents or state fiscal allocations hire armed groups, others rely on ordinary citizens.

In both cases, the implication is that democracy is undermined, but the organised violence of high-rent states is especially harmful because it embeds one-party dominance and long-term insecurity.

‘Rents’ and the political marketplace

At the heart of Nigeria’s political and economic system are natural “resource rents” – public funds allocated to states by the federal government under the Federation Account. They are mostly from oil revenues and value added tax. The allocations are based on a formula that includes factors like population size, landmass, and natural resource wealth. This sharing results in uneven distribution across states. Although intended to fund development, “rents” have become a tool for politicians to finance their aspiration to stay in power.

Where governors have high rents, they engage expensive organised groups like transport unions, who in some instances are illegally armed, and cult groups to manipulate elections in their favour.

Where rents are limited, they rely on ordinary citizens, offering cash, food, or alcohol in exchange for violence.

This creates two outcomes:

in high-rent states (Lagos and Rivers), incumbents can sustain long-term alliances with armed groups
in low-rent states (Nasarawa and Plateau), violence is carried out by ordinary citizens in the form of party and ethnic supporters.

Why this matters for democracy

Not all violence perpetrators are the same. Armed groups are organised, feared, and able to systematically intimidate and harm voters. Their alliances with ruling parties go beyond elections. They spill into extortion in the transport sector, oil bunkering, piracy and crime.

In Lagos, much of the election violence is linked to the National Union of Road Transport Workers. This is a powerful trade union with close ties to the ruling All Progressives Congress. During elections, street touts known as agberos, who are affiliated with the union, perpetrate violence on behalf of the ruling party. In return, they receive payments from commercial bus drivers and maintain control over parts of Lagos’s lucrative public transport system.

For instance, during Nigeria’s 2023 elections, some voters in Lagos, especially those from minority ethnic groups, reported being attacked or threatened by members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers. These incidents were allegedly aimed at pressuring them to vote for the All Progressives Congress. The group’s strong influence in the transport sector gives it unrivalled access to neighbourhoods, making violence both effective and difficult to resist.

Similarly, in Rivers, cult groups such as the Icelanders and Deewell have become political instruments.

Financed with millions of naira, sometimes even equipped with sophisticated weapons, armed groups are deployed to silence rivals and scare voters. Their reputations for violence mean that just the rumour of their presence can keep voters at home.

In “low-rent” states, perpetrators of violence look different. To recruit citizens for election violence in Nasarawa State, politicians often offer as little as ₦5,000 (about US$4), well below Nigeria’s minimum monthly wage of ₦70,000 ($47). They also compensate them with alcohol or hard drugs. Similarly, in Plateau State, north central Nigeria, unemployed young people are promised small cash rewards, sometimes alongside drugs, to disrupt rival rallies or attack opposition neighbourhoods.

‘Rents’ and one-party dominance

The risk of “renting” violence is that it becomes self-sustaining. Governors splurge resources on armed groups while granting them access to lucrative criminal markets such as oil bunkering (crude oil theft).

These alliances secure ruling parties’ dominance across elections. In Lagos and Rivers, violence has become a permanent feature of politics, not a temporary campaign strategy.

In Nasarawa and Plateau, violence is cheaper and ad hoc. Citizens involved in violence return to farming, hustling or unemployment once elections end. Competition remains more open, but insecurity at the polls still undermines elections.

Why 2027 may not be different

There are warning signs that the 2027 elections are likely to be violent. There have been incidents of attacks and intimidation in several states. Governors with high “rents” are likely to strengthen ties with armed groups, given the prevalent impunity in Nigeria’s political space.

In previous elections, Human Rights Watch flagged the lack of accountability for political violence. Politicians have no reason to stop when the risks are low and the rewards, such as political, economic and social power, are so high.

Since many Nigerians have low trust in the government and democratic institutions, another violent election risks pushing citizens further away from the polling units and closer to apathy. When voters expect violence, many will stay at home, leaving elections to be decided not by choice but by violence.

Next steps

Nigeria is not unique; other resource-rich countries like Tanzania also struggle with electoral violence.

Breaking the cycle requires more than election monitoring. It demands fiscal reforms that limit governors’ control over rents, and institutions strong enough to prosecute sponsors and perpetrators of violence.

Nigerians deserve elections where voters’ choices, not violence, decide winners.

Maureen Fubara receives funding from the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant #852439..

– ref. Thug culture in Nigerian politics: the links between state governors, funding and violent armed groups – https://theconversation.com/thug-culture-in-nigerian-politics-the-links-between-state-governors-funding-and-violent-armed-groups-265695

October 15, 2025

Fruit juices in South Africa are getting a free ride: why they should have the same health warning labels as fizzy drinks

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Siphiwe Dlamini, Lecturer, Department of Physiology, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa is facing a sharp rise in obesity-related diseases like type 2 diabetes. Between 2010 and 2019, the prevalence of diabetes nearly tripled from 4.5% to 12.7%. This increase is linked to lifestyle risk factors including drinking sugary beverages, eating unhealthy foods, and not getting enough physical activity.

To help tackle the problem, the government has introduced several public health measures targeting key risk factors, including unhealthy eating.

One of the most prominent measures was the introduction of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in 2018. The tax targets added sugars, encouraging manufacturers to reformulate products like soft drinks and energy drinks to reduce their sugar content. But beverages containing naturally occurring sugars, such as 100% fruit juices, are exempt.

Often, 100% fruit juices are seen as healthier alternatives to sugar-sweetened or artificially sweetened drinks. But growing research shows this may not be true. A 2023 meta-analysis of 72 published studies involving over 3 million people found that drinking fruit juice does not lower the risk of type 2 diabetes or high blood pressure. It was instead linked to a higher risk of dying from cardiovascular diseases.

The recommendation from that meta-analysis and other studies is that fruit juices should not be considered a healthier alternative to sugar-sweetened beverages. This could be because, although fruit juices contain more vitamins and minerals than soft drinks, they are also high in natural sugars and lack the fibre found in whole fruits, which helps control blood sugar and keeps you feeling full.

In a further move to curb sugar intake in beverages the government has proposed new food labelling regulations. These would require front-of-package warning labels for products high in added sugar, saturated fat, sodium, or artificial sweeteners. The regulations are still under review. But they align with international best practices adopted by countries like Chile, Mexico and Brazil.

If implemented effectively, they could help South African consumers make more informed dietary choices.

But, once again, fruit juices are getting a free ride. This is even though they have the highest energy (calories) and sugar content (8.4%) across a range of soft and energy drinks, according to our recent study.

As researchers in public health nutrition, we are concerned that the regulations had some important gaps. The proposed regulations introduce a simple package warning label system for prepacked foods that contain added sugar, saturated fat, or sodium and exceed specific nutrient thresholds. It also requires warning labels for products containing artificial sweeteners, reflecting growing concerns about their long-term health effects.

But the regulations exclude certain sugar-containing beverages from front-of-pack warning label requirements, particularly those with naturally occurring sugars. Many juices, such as 100% fruit juices, are exempt despite their high sugar content and significant contribution to overall sugar and energy intake. This raises concerns about the consistency of the policy and whether it adequately addresses the health risks associated with excessive sugar consumption across all types of beverages.

To test the scale of the problem, we analysed over 600 non-alcoholic beverages sold in major South African supermarkets. The study found that 21.4% of beverages would require a warning for high sugar, 49.8% for artificial sweeteners, and 58.7% for at least one of these criteria.

Juices were least likely to qualify for warning labels. Only 30% of juices met the criteria , versus 94.1% of soft drinks and 96.9% of energy drinks. Excluding 100% fruit juices from South Africa’s proposed warning label regulations could have serious public health consequences.

We recommend that the health department revise the criteria for warning labels to include beverages that are high in naturally occurring sugars.

Fruit juices

Fruit juices are often seen as a healthier choice because of their natural origin. In South Africa, regular consumption of 100% fruit juice is common, with many consumers perceiving it as beneficial despite its high sugar content.

This is a problem for a number of reasons.

Because of their high sugar content, fruit juices can cause sharp spikes in blood glucose. For more than 2.3 million South Africans living with diabetes regular consumption may interfere with blood glucose control. But this is not only a concern for people with diabetes. Research shows that even among non-diabetics, frequent intake of fruit juice increases weight gain, and the risk of developing type 2 diabetes over time.

Labelling policies that ignore naturally occurring sugars risks misleading consumers. In particular, it misleads those trying to make healthier choices into over-consuming these products. International examples, such as Chile’s approach to food labelling, show that including total sugar content in warning criteria can reduce purchases of high-sugar items and improve public awareness.

Exempting juices also creates an uneven playing field. While soft drink and energy drink manufacturers are pushed to reformulate products to avoid taxes and warning labels, juice producers face no such pressure, despite offering products with comparable health risks.

We also demonstrated that nearly half of the beverages analysed contained artificial sweeteners, which are increasingly used to lower sugar content and bypass the sugar tax. Emerging research suggests these additives may negatively affect gut health and contribute to nutrition-related diseases. Taken together, these factors highlight the need for comprehensive regulation that reflects the full spectrum of health risks posed by sugary beverages.

Next steps

South Africa’s efforts to regulate sugary beverages are commendable and reflect a growing commitment to tackling lifestyle-related diseases. But excluding fruit juices from key policies risks undermining these efforts.

By aligning regulations with scientific evidence and international best practices, the country can take a more comprehensive approach to sugar reduction. This approach will protect all consumers, especially the most vulnerable.

To ensure that South Africa’s food labelling regulations achieve their intended public health outcomes, we recommend the following steps.

Include naturally occurring sugars: Revise the criteria for warning labels to account for total sugar content, not just added sugars. This would ensure that high-sugar juices are appropriately labelled, and consumers are fully informed.
Extend the sugar tax: Consider applying the sugar tax to fruit juices with high sugar content. This would encourage manufacturers to explore lower-sugar formulations.
Public education campaigns: Launch targeted education initiatives to raise awareness about the health risks associated with all types of sugar, including those found in fruit juices.
Ongoing monitoring: Establish systems to monitor the impact of both labelling and taxation policies on consumer behaviour and health outcomes, allowing for evidence-based adjustments over time.

Siphiwe Dlamini receives funding from the National Research Foundation.

– ref. Fruit juices in South Africa are getting a free ride: why they should have the same health warning labels as fizzy drinks – https://theconversation.com/fruit-juices-in-south-africa-are-getting-a-free-ride-why-they-should-have-the-same-health-warning-labels-as-fizzy-drinks-266307

October 14, 2025

Rape within marriage is still silenced in South Africa – why women are being failed

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nyasha Karimakwenda, Associate Research Scientist, Wellesley College

Sexual violence in marriages is a very real issue in South Africa, but remains shrouded in silence and denial. It’s a subject that Nyasha Karimakwenda has researched for many years in various forms, from traditional practices to court judgments. We asked her to outline the issues.

What is marital rape and why should we pay more attention to it?

Though marriage rates in southern Africa have decreased over the past decades, marriage is still considered to be an ideal social tool for formalising relationships and building families.

But it’s also an environment where spouses can be exposed to different kinds of abuse. This includes sexual abuse by their partners.

Marital rape is the term commonly used to refer to sexual violence by a partner in a marriage or former marriage. It’s a significant problem globally and is mostly committed by husbands against wives.

It’s critical that we learn more about marital rape because it’s a feature of many women’s lives. And it’s not uncommon for it to happen alongside other kinds of violence in marriages. These can include emotional, verbal, economic and physical harms.

Why is there so much silence around marital rape?

Many cultures and legal systems around the world have supported the position that sexual violence committed by husbands against wives is not morally wrong. Or that it’s an issue that should remain within the family.

Historically, for example, Commonwealth countries inherited the marital rape exemption from England. This established that husbands could not be held criminally liable for raping their wives. Some African countries – such as Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria – still retain versions of this exemption and marital rape is not a criminal offence there.

Added to this are existing patriarchal cultural norms across the continent that reinforce the idea that husbands are entitled to sex with their wives, whether the wife says no or not.

It’s only in recent decades that countries around the world started to change their criminal laws to allow for rape in marriage to be prosecuted. But there is still a lot of progress needed to make sure that both laws and cultures fully recognise the existence and harm of marital rape.

In South Africa marital rape was made a crime in 1993. Even so, as my doctoral research shows, marital rape continues to be silenced because of social and cultural perspectives.

I learned that among some communities the belief that marriage gives husbands unlimited sexual access to their wives remains strong. Under this thinking, husbands cannot rape their wives, because they have ownership of their wives’ bodies.

My research, along with the work of other scholars, also captures how women are socialised to accept that their bodies are no longer their own once they marry. So they suffer the sexual abuse in silence.

What is ukuthwala and what’s its connection to marital rape?

The term ukuthwala has various meanings in South Africa’s dominant Nguni languages. In the context of marriage, it describes particular customary practices used to make a marriage happen quickly, and often with less expense in poorer communities.

These practices exist across South Africa, but are mostly documented among the Xhosa and Zulu people. Historically, ukuthwala has also been practised in different forms. Some forms of ukuthwala are more like elopement. Other forms are extremely violent, where a girl is abducted by a group of men, beaten, raped and forced to marry a man typically much older than her and a stranger.

Examining violent ukuthwala is another way to understand how marital rape is condoned. A growing body of ukuthwala research, including my own, shows how, for generations, some families and communities have used the custom and rape to control unwilling brides and transform their social status from girl to wife.

Gradually, more research is showing how certain communities don’t view the sexual force in ukuthwala as rape, but see it as an acceptable means for creating and maintaining a marriage – a part of custom.

What happens when women turn to South Africa’s courts?

Because of the cultural misunderstandings of marital rape, wives face significant hurdles in getting their case moved along from police to prosecutors to trial before a judge. Participants in my marital rape research expressed how police sometimes mock wives seeking help. They believe it’s not possible for a husband to rape a wife and maintain that criminal punishment is not appropriate.

Prosecutors also have problematic views about marital rape. A 2017 rape attrition study by the South African Medical Research Council found that prosecutors were reluctant to refer intimate partner rapes, including marital rapes, for trial.

We need more research about how marital rape is treated by the courts. But there’s evidence of similar thinking held by judges. In a few appeals cases that I analysed, judges affirmed husbands’ rape convictions but handed down lesser sentences because of the marital relationships. This minimises a wife’s pain and the seriousness of marital rape.

How does South Africa best address the problem?

My research emphasises that marital rape survivors need specialised, empathic and personalised assistance. Society can start by listening and being kind to women who divulge their pain.

I’ve found that women’s community-based organisations like Masimanyane and Mosaic are critical for providing non-judgmental and culturally-aware spaces for women seeking support when facing violence.

Awareness raising and education at national and local levels is vital to dismantle the longstanding idea that husbands are entitled to sex in marriage. This is also critical for wives to understand their rights to wellbeing and sexual autonomy.

Lastly, civil servants that survivors engage with – medical professionals, police, prosecutors, judges – must be properly sensitised to the unique circumstances of marital rape survivors. There should be greater oversight of their professional conduct.

Nyasha Karimakwenda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Rape within marriage is still silenced in South Africa – why women are being failed – https://theconversation.com/rape-within-marriage-is-still-silenced-in-south-africa-why-women-are-being-failed-260856

October 14, 2025

Nigeria’s Boko Haram rehabilitation efforts ignore the emotional trauma of soldiers: why this matters

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Celestina Atom, Postgraduate Researcher and Part-time Lecturer in Politics and International Relations., Teesside University

Since 2009, Boko Haram has waged one of the deadliest insurgencies in Africa. Concentrated in north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, the group has killed more than 35,000 people and displaced at least 2.5 million.

Its attacks on schools, markets, religious centres, and entire villages have torn at the fabric of Nigerian society, creating not only a humanitarian emergency but also a profound crisis of trust and cohesion.

In 2016, Nigeria launched Operation Safe Corridor, a state-run initiative for low-risk former Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province members who have surrendered or been captured.

The programme involves various ministries, departments and agencies of the Nigerian government, alongside the armed forces and other security institutions. It is coordinated by the Office of the Chief of Defence Staff and receives both technical and partial financial support from non-state partners such as the Centre for Democracy and Development, a Nigerian NGO. Its core mandate is to help rehabilitate ex-combatants and reintegrate them into society.

Participants undergo a six to 12-month rehabilitation process. This includes psychological counselling, religious reorientation, civic education, literacy classes and vocational training. As of 2025, the programme has processed over 2,000 ex-combatants. Around 789 participants were still in rehabilitation in February.

The logic of the programme is simple: peace cannot be won by force alone. Nigeria must offer pathways out for those willing to abandon violence.

Despite its ambitious design, few studies have evaluated the outcomes of Operation Safe Corridor beyond community perceptions. There is limited evidence on long-term indicators such as employment stability, psychological recovery, family reintegration and reduced recidivism. Other measures such as economic independence, social cohesion and follow-up support also remain underexplored. This gap raises questions about the programme’s effectivenes and sustainability.

On paper, the programme looks promising. Public ceremonies, such as the mass oath-taking of nearly 600 former fighters in March and another 390 in April 2025, have been highly publicised. But Operation Safe Corridor remains deeply controversial.

Victims and affected communities accuse the government of prioritising perpetrators over survivors. Others doubt the sincerity of those passing through the programme. They cite the risk of ex-fighters rejoining the group if their needs are not met, or acting as spies.

The focus has been on public perception, victims and community members. The perspectives of the soldiers responsible for carrying out these initiatives have received far less attention in both research and policy discussions. My recent study drew on in-depth, face to face interviews with eight soldiers and other security personnel. It examines their perceptions and lived experiences of the Operation Safe Corridor programme.

These soldiers now find themselves responsible for rehabilitating the very people they have long fought against. Their perspectives expose an underappreciated dimension of peacebuilding: the emotional labour of those asked to facilitate reconciliation.

Betrayal on three fronts

The soldiers’ testimonies reveal recurring feelings of betrayal – by the state, by colleagues, and by the communities they are meant to protect.

They described how soldiers fighting the insurgents had been neglected by the state. Despite Nigeria’s rising defence budget, frontline troops reported poor welfare, inadequate equipment, and delayed salaries. Many saw the government as channelling resources into high-profile rehabilitation schemes while neglecting the needs of soldiers.

They also spoke of soldiers who, due to institutional neglect and financial strain, had leaked sensitive information to Boko Haram. Such betrayals are devastating in a conflict that depends on trust and cohesion.

Soldiers in our study also spoke of incidents where villagers shielded insurgents, misdirected patrols, or remained silent under coercion. While many civilians acted out of fear or kinship ties, soldiers interpreted such actions as complicity. For them, the distinction between victims and perpetrators often blurred, leaving them isolated in a morally ambiguous terrain.

Between scepticism and redemption

These experiences of betrayal fuel deep scepticism about Operation Safe Corridor’s effectiveness. Much like community members, many soldiers doubt the sincerity of ex-combatants’ repentance. They suspect that hunger, dwindling supplies, or factional infighting – not moral transformation – drive surrender. Some fear that the programme may serve as a way for insurgents to regroup before rejoining the fight.

Yet glimpses of hope emerge. Soldiers described moments when ex-combatants provided actionable intelligence that disrupted Boko Haram operations, saving lives and reducing violence. Others witnessed genuine remorse among participants.

This tension between betrayal and redemption captures the psychological complexity of implementing deradicalisation. For some soldiers, supporting reintegration becomes a way to reclaim a sense of moral purpose amid the chaos of war. For others, it remains a bitter pill.

Why soldiers’ perspectives matter

Soldiers are not neutral functionaries; they are emotionally invested actors whose wellbeing and outlook directly shape programme outcomes.

Neglecting their perspectives risks undermining peacebuilding. When soldiers feel unsupported, cynicism festers. When they doubt the sincerity of reintegration, they may disengage or resist. Conversely, their fragile optimism can sustain long-term commitment to peace.

Deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in Sierra Leone, Colombia and Uganda have shown similar dynamics: practitioners carry heavy emotional burdens, often without adequate support. The United Nations has acknowledged this, urging that staff welfare and psychosocial needs be met. Nigeria’s experience reinforces this lesson.

Towards a more holistic peace

What does this mean for policy? My study suggests three key steps.

Support the supporters. Deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration staff, especially soldiers, need structured psychosocial support. This includes counselling, trauma debriefing, and safe spaces to reflect on moral dilemmas, with feedback mechanisms to share their experiences and perspectives.
Reform welfare and recognition systems. Timely salaries, leave policies, and acknowledgement of frontline sacrifices are not luxuries. They are essential for sustaining morale and countering perceptions of institutional betrayal.
Strengthen monitoring and community engagement. To address fears of recidivism and community resentment, reintegration must include follow-up and victim support.

An imperfect yet necessary step

Operation Safe Corridor has clear shortcomings, from weak transparency to limited attention to victims, but abandoning it would mean reverting to military solutions that have already failed. Soldiers’ testimonies show that reintegration is not hopeless, only incomplete.

Peace depends on rebuilding trust: between the state and soldiers, soldiers and communities, and communities and ex-combatants. Nigeria’s soldiers are guardians of peace, yet many feel betrayed. Acknowledging their experiences is essential, for reintegration is not only about transforming fighters but also supporting those guiding them back.

Celestina Atom does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s Boko Haram rehabilitation efforts ignore the emotional trauma of soldiers: why this matters – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-boko-haram-rehabilitation-efforts-ignore-the-emotional-trauma-of-soldiers-why-this-matters-267023

October 13, 2025

Trade is shaping new global power relations: what this means for Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Arno J. van Niekerk, Senior lecturer in Economics, University of the Free State

Over the past two decades, economic strength, trade flows, technological leadership and even consumer demand have been moving steadily from west to east. This transformation is redrawing economic maps. It is also raising urgent questions about co-operation, competition and inclusion in a multipolar world. Lecturer in economics and finance Arno van Niekerk answers questions about these issues, which he explores in a new book, West to East: A New Global Economy in the Making?

What indicates a shift from west to east?

Brics countries, largely driven by China and India, overtook the G7 countries in their share of global GDP in 2018. As Figure 1 shows, the Brics contribution has grown from 32.33% of global GDP to 35.43% in 2024 (after being at 21.37% in 2000).

Figure 1

The G7’s share decreased to 29.64%, from 43.28% in 2000.

This marks a historic turning point. Economic leadership that was long concentrated in the west has decisively shifted towards emerging economies.

Another strong indicator of the shift is the change in global shares of trade of the G7 and Brics countries. This is particularly true of exports. Data shows that Brics+ (11 countries, including new members) captured 28% of world exports in 2024, closing in on the G7’s 32%.

The rebalancing of global trade dynamics has wide-ranging consequences for international business. It means, especially in the case of China and India, that these economies are doing more than expanding in scale. They are also integrating effectively into global value chains, improving productivity and raising living standards.

As shown in Figure 2, the share of global merchandise exports of the G7 countries fell from 45.1% in 2000 to 28.9% in 2023. For their part, the Brics+ share rose from 10.7% (2000) to 23.3% (2023).

Figure 2

There are other indicators too:

Over two-thirds of global foreign exchange reserves are held in Asia. In particular, in China (US$3 trillion), Japan, India and South Korea. Large reserves indicate that a nation earns more from exports, investment inflows and remittances than it spends on imports and debt payments.
China has displaced western dominance in foreign direct investment in developing regions. Through its Belt and Road Initiative – involving over 150 countries – it has become the world’s largest source of outbound foreign direct investment.
Asia now accounts for more than half of the global middle class, driving demand growth. Asia is projected to represent over 50% of global consumer spending. This compares with less than 20% in 1990.
China, India, South Korea and Japan have become leaders in financial technology, artificial intelligence and 5G adoption. China now files more international patents annually than the US and European Union combined. Specifically, the tech rivalry between the US and China illustrates the change in technological leadership.

What does this shift tell us about economic co-operation?

Countries in both the east and the west need to make more intentional efforts. This is necessary, firstly, to address the growing geoeconomic tension. And secondly to move the world towards a shared vision for sustainable economic progress that benefits all countries.

Such co-operation needs to go beyond traditional trade and investment agreements. It should be deliberately structured to reduce inequalities, strengthen resilience and embed sustainability.

I identify five main areas for co-operative initiatives.

Co-ordinated policy frameworks: tax co-operation in the form of global minimum corporate taxes to ensure fair revenue for social investment. Harmonise labour and social protections through common standards to prevent exploitation. Align sustainable development by embedding the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement targets and human rights principles into trade and financial agreements.

Inclusive trade and investment: fair trade agreements to ensure that market access benefits small producers, women and marginalised communities. Establish regional value chains that support developing countries in upgrading within global value chains – so that they don’t just supply raw materials. Design co-operative frameworks for technology transfer, especially for sharing green and digital technologies at affordable costs.

Financial co-operation: innovative financing mechanisms, such as green and social bonds, blended finance and climate funds need to be made accessible to low-income countries. Implement co-operative mechanisms for debt relief and restructuring. This will help address unsustainable debt that crowds out social spending. Forge public-private partnerships for inclusion to co-finance social infrastructure. This includes education, health and digital access.

Knowledge and capacity building: joint research platforms are required to enable more collaborative work on climate adaptation, food security and inclusive digitalisation. South-south and triangular co-operation should be increased to share experiences and best practices among developing nations with support from multilateral institutions. Managed labour mobility schemes through skills partnerships will benefit both sending and receiving countries.

Governance and multilateral reform: reforming global institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization is essential to give developing economies stronger voices in these institutions.

What should African countries be doing?

China, India and other leading eastern countries have proven themselves formidable rivals to the west – economically, militarily and in global governance. Africa occupies a central position. It has the opportunity to become a key player in shaping the future of the global economy.

A number of recommendations should serve as priority areas – particularly over the next decade.

The first would include building a digital backbone, and enhancing technology and AI capabilities. These have become core drivers of competitiveness. Without infrastructure and skills, countries are relegated to raw-material suppliers.

Countries need:

a national broadband and data-centre strategy (public-private), and incentives to attract the building of regional data centres
more training in science, technology, engineering, maths and artificial intelligence. Examples include fast-track bootcamps, ICT in secondary schools and support for local AI startups.

Secondly, governments should continue to secure investment in digital infrastructure, such as fibre optics, 5G networks and data centres. They could potentially use China’s Digital Silk Road, which promotes affordable tech alternatives.

Secondly, South Africa and other African countries need to prioritise economic inclusion and sustainable development to fast-track broad-based inclusive economic development. This should be the core driver of their development strategy.

Thirdly, African governments must strategically navigate geopolitical shifts and alliances. They are key spheres of influence in the digital competition between the US and China, and ought to use this position to their benefit. To do this, Africna governments should:

use Brics+ membership in a co-ordinated way to advance national interests
foster south-south co-operation by strengthening trade, technological transfer and financial alliances with other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. More emphasis should be placed on initiatives like the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation.
enhance trade diplomacy and diversify markets to be able to sell more goods and services in Asian, European and intra-African markets
maximise external investment by securing investments, infrastructure and digital partnerships from both the US and China. This will position African countries to benefit from the global technology competition.

Arno J. van Niekerk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trade is shaping new global power relations: what this means for Africa – https://theconversation.com/trade-is-shaping-new-global-power-relations-what-this-means-for-africa-266940

October 13, 2025

West Africa’s trade monitoring system has collapsed – why this is dangerous for food security

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of Florida

A decade ago countries in West Africa set up a unique trade monitoring mechanism. Its purpose was to track intra-regional trade in agricultural products and livestock in the region. But the system was closed down in 2022 due to a lack of funding by regional organisations.

The mechanism provided West African countries with data from more than 320 markets and along 10 corridors, enabling the tracking of not only trade patterns but livestock and zoonotic diseases.

The lack of up-to-date trade data has a number of knock-on effects. Detailed intra-trade data are essential to help assess the impact of external shocks that can significantly affect food security and economic development. These include political crises, extreme weather events, currency devaluation, or epidemics.

Good data is also essential for mapping trade networks. In turn, this can strengthen market information systems and disease surveillance efforts. These rely heavily on the movement of goods, people, livestock and capital across the region.

Using data collected by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel from 2013 to 2017, researchers show the importance of considering the social structure of trade networks, their geography and temporal changes.

The social structure of trade networks could better inform market information systems and disease surveillance, both of which rely heavily on the movement of goods, people, livestock and capital across the region

They conclude that regional bodies should support the resumption of trade data collection. They should also foster dialogue with national statistical offices and other national institutions that have experience in collecting data on informal regional food trade to work towards a coherent regional statistical approach.

A unique database on the regional economy

In West Africa, agricultural goods and livestock trade operates in well-established corridors. Animals, for example, flow from the Sahel to the major urban centres of the Atlantic Coast and of the Gulf of Guinea.

Our analysis of the trade data suggests that border markets play a key role in livestock trade and that a large proportion of movements are trans-boundary.

This high level of mobility facilitates the spread of livestock and zoonotic diseases. These include Rift Valley fever, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, Foot and Mouth disease, and Peste des petits ruminants. At the end of September 2025, for example, a new outbreak of Rift Valley fever was observed in Mauritania and Senegal. The two West African countries have very close ties when it comes to animal movements.

The transnational nature of trade in West Africa led to the creation of a regional database by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel in 2013. Data collected on more than 320 markets and along 10 corridors, from Guinea and Senegal in the west to Nigeria in the east, were unique on the African continent.

The data was particularly well suited for analysis of locally-produced food stuff and livestock at the regional level. This is because it incorporated both formal and informal trade. Both are prevalent throughout the region. Our recent work estimates informal activities could reach up to 85% of total trade, representing US$10 billion. This is six times higher than portrayed in official statistics

Filling the statistical gap

The experience of recent years and the transnational nature of trade flows suggest one key step. That being regional institutions, rather than bilateral donors, take over data collection.

Initially, the data were collected within the framework of the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel’s Regional Support Program of Market Access. This was developed to increase the volume and value of trade within the Economic Community of West African States and the West African Economic and Monetary Union .

From 2017 to 2019, the United States Agency for International Development provided funding to establish the database as part of its West Africa/Regional Agriculture Office. The data was eventually integrated to the ECOWAS Informal Cross Border Trade database. This was developed to monitor informal cross-border trade in the region in 2019.

The United States Agency for International Development programme ended in 2019. After this, data collection was transferred to the Family Farming, Regional Markets and Cross-Border Trade Corridors in the Sahel project. Launched in 2020, its aim was to develop a sustainable and self-financed means of collecting reliable data on agricultural and food trade in West Africa.

Funding for these activities was provided by the International Fund for Agricultural Development. It was locally managed by the West African Association for Cross-Border Trade in Agro-forestry-pastoral and Fisheries Products, based in Togo.

This initiative, covering 17 countries unfortunately came to an end in 2022 (agricultural products) and 2024 (livestock).

The cessation of this funding has had dire effects. It profoundly affected researchers’ ability to measure the impact of structural and political changes affecting the region. For example, it is still impossible to measure the extent to which the closure of certain borders following successive coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in recent years has affected the trade networks linking the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea.

Better data to monitor trade and animal diseases

Re-establishing a permanent data collection system by supporting local associations such as the West African Association for Cross-Border Trade in Agro-forestry-pastoral and Fisheries Products is one of the essential steps for policymakers wishing to strengthen the region’s resilience.

The World Animal Health Organisation’s International Animal Health Code has suggested centralising livestock mobility data. This could be a starting point. It is the most efficient way to prevent and respond to transnational disease spread through trade.

Accurate, timely and centralised data collection could help identify possible hotspots and reconstruct transmission patterns. It could also develop control measures and alert systems to protect unaffected areas.

Beyond disease control, resuming the collection of data on intra-regional trade would also contribute to design policies that support the adaptation of regional economy to new climate conditions and political unrest. Better trade data on West Africa’s informal sector could unlock climate adaptation finance by highlighting its real value.

For instance, in one of our latest reports, we estimate that regional livestock exports for Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are likely to be close to USD 1 billion when counting unrecorded trade, against USD 80 million in official statistics.

The research for this article was carried out in conjunction with Mr. Brahima Cissé who coordinates the Regional Markets program at the Economic Community of West African States in Togo; Dr. Alban Masaparisi, an economist specialising in food systems transformation and agricultural policy at the OECD Sahel and West Africa Club, France and Mr. Koffi Zougbede, an economist working on food systems at the OECD Sahel and West Africa Club, France.__

Olivier Walther receives funding from the OECD.

Andrea Apolloni and Lacey Harris-Coble do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. West Africa’s trade monitoring system has collapsed – why this is dangerous for food security – https://theconversation.com/west-africas-trade-monitoring-system-has-collapsed-why-this-is-dangerous-for-food-security-266405

October 13, 2025

Travel between African countries is still hard: fresh ideas to get movement flowing

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Senior Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

It remains too difficult for Africans to travel between African countries. Africa-wide reforms have failed. The keynote continental agreement, the African Union’s Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, adopted in 2018, still has only four country ratifications from 55 members.

A new report of the African Union bemoans the low (though slightly improved) level of human integration in Africa. It describes the main challenges as legal fragmentation, weak institutional frameworks, security concerns, and limited mutual recognition of documents and qualifications.

Nevertheless, some consolation can be drawn from the fact that African migration governance systems have been moving in the right direction.

We are migration researchers and, as we show in our recent report, there has been some progress. This is evident in improving scores in the annual African Visa Openness Index, which is published by the African Development Bank.

The visa openness index shows that for 28% of country‑to-country travel scenarios within Africa, African citizens do not need a visa to cross the border. This is an improvement from 20% in 2016.

But the pace of change is slow. Given this, and the fact that progress has been driven at bilateral and regional levels, is there still a role for continental initiatives?

Based on our research over the last decade, we argue that incremental reforms at all levels – unilateral, bilateral, regional and continental – can combine to move Africa forward towards free regular movement.

We recognise that the implementation of the African Union Protocol on Free Movement of Persons is still some way off. But there are opportunities to support its aims and intentions through incremental initiatives and reforms. This could include pilot programmes run under the auspices of the African Union and regional bodies that provide for categories of people to travel freely. These categories could include, for example, traders at borders or those with professional skills.

What’s standing in the way

There are many reasons a continental process to reform and align migration governance shouldn’t work.

Firstly, the African Union has an extraordinary number of members (55). The European Union has 27. The large number of countries makes any wholesale continental institutional intervention difficult.

Secondly, there are huge levels of inequality both within and between African countries. The richest country in Africa has an income per person on average – taking costs into account – around 53 times higher than the poorest. Large income differences between countries, sometimes coinciding with better judicial systems and social services, make it likely that, whatever the reality, vulnerable residents in the richer country are likely to fear an uncontrolled influx.

Thirdly, the level of institutional development varies hugely between countries. Population registration is very weak in many African countries. Unicef estimated that in 2022, more than half of the unregistered children in the world were African. The Lancet medical journal estimated that in 2021 only one in three deaths in Africa were registered. Systems for issuing identification documents and passports are imperfect. Confidence in other countries keeping good records of citizens and monitoring criminal and terrorist activity are key ingredients of a good migration partnership.

But Africans cannot afford to allow these and other obstacles to diminish the effort towards a fully integrated continent.

In a world of large, competing power blocs, Africa’s fragmentation puts it at a huge disadvantage. In any case, compared with much of the rest of the world, at least Africa is moving in the right direction. It is mostly opening borders, rather than closing them.

The efforts so far

African initiatives to facilitate easier border crossings have a long history.

In 1991, the Abuja Treaty committed Organisation of African Union member states to

establish a common market and gradually remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital and the right of residence and establishment.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights guarantees the right to free movement of persons. The Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2030) is a detailed plan for implementing the Free Movement of Persons Protocol.

The 2018 protocol itself explained why freer movement would be beneficial for Africa’s social and economic development. It set up a programme of three phases, from visa-free visits to (eventually) rights to settle, work and start a business.

We noted some evidence that citizens of African countries are often more open to freer movement than their governments are.

Unlike the Free Movement of Persons Protocol, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) has been widely ratified and is in the process of implementation. It provides for specific categories of travellers to be allowed free movement in the course of service delivery.

The free movement protocol is, in practice, driven by a few busy staffers in the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, with some kind external assistance. The AfCFTA is driven by a relatively large, dedicated secretariat with wide support within and beyond Africa.

A more practical way forward

One of the conclusions we have drawn from our research is that a varied approach might work better.

For example, migration expert Amanda Bisong has pointed out that the AfCFTA services protocol makes provision for the visa-free movement of certain categories of professional and business persons. If implemented, this would be a significant continental step towards broader reforms.

We noted previously that such “neo-liberal” or “elitist” reforms could pave the way to broader multilateral reforms, as was the case in South America. The term “neo-liberal migration reform” was coined in South America to refer to visa-free travel for elites, but not for lower-skilled people.

Secondly, informal cross-border traders could be included into the ambit of formality within a specific agreement. Or as an extension of the services protocol of the free trade agreement.

Thirdly, such initiatives could be initiated as pilot programmes under the auspices of the AU and some regional blocs. Their purpose would be to support the free trade agreement services protocol commitment and to formalise informal traders.

Such pilot programmes could include:

the implementation of regional agreements on mutual recognition of skills
special economic zones with freer movement provisions, or
harmonised visa policies for specific categories of persons.

If successful, these models could be scaled up to encourage broader adoption of the AU Free Movement of Persons Protocol.

Countries with weaker institutional capacities should not be left behind in integrating mobility into the implementation of the free trade agreement. Capacity-building programmes, including financial and technical assistance, should be provided to states that struggle with border management, migration governance or digital infrastructure.

We also noted that continental and regional forums to exchange views and experiences in migration policy and practice are important. We recommend more frequent and more focused forums to monitor the implementation of migration reform policies and discuss the systematic deepening of reforms.

Alan Hirsch is a Senior Research fellow at the New South Institute which funded the research on which this article is based.

Victor Amadi is an Affiliate Researcher at the New South Institute, which funded the research on which this article is based.

– ref. Travel between African countries is still hard: fresh ideas to get movement flowing – https://theconversation.com/travel-between-african-countries-is-still-hard-fresh-ideas-to-get-movement-flowing-266837

October 12, 2025

China and the US are in a race for critical minerals. African countries need to make the rules

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By James Boafo, Lecturer in Sustainability and Fellow of Indo Pacific Research Centre, Murdoch University

Critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, rare earth elements, and platinum group metals are essential for modern technologies. They are key to industries ranging from electronics and telecommunications to renewable energy, defence, and aerospace systems.

The global demand for these minerals has been growing, as has the competition for them.

The supply and production of these minerals is largely concentrated in the global South. Most of the world’s cobalt is produced in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It produces almost three-quarters of the global cobalt output. Australia produces nearly half of the world’s lithium. Chile accounts for another quarter of global lithium production, with China following at 18%.

China dominates the supply chain through massive investments in mining operations, particularly in Africa. It is responsible for refining 90% of rare earth elements and graphite, and 60-70% of lithium and cobalt. The United States and European Union — long-term trading partners with African nations — have also adopted policies to secure access to Africa’s resources.

The question is what African countries are doing to take advantage of this demand for these critical minerals, especially to drive their own development.

As development researchers we address this question in a special publication on the rising significance of critical minerals in Africa by the Indian Council of World Affairs. In another publication, we look at how emerging resource diplomacy may reinforce Africa’s position in the global economy as a mere source of raw materials.

We recommend that African countries determine for themselves how to benefit from this global competition. This includes developing national strategies that emphasise local value addition and benefits. Also, national strategies should begin positioning African countries to gain from their resources beyond value addition.

The competition for Africa’s critical minerals underscores the urgency of governance reforms and regional cooperation to transform mineral wealth into sustainable prosperity, avoiding another “resource curse.”

The emerging ‘New World Order’

A Chinese-led ‘New World Order’ is emerging to counter the US-led Western influence. Eastern and global South countries demonstrate this shift through groupings like BRICS and South-South cooperation in technology and development. China has strengthened its influence in the global South through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative.

Launched in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative is an ambitious infrastructure project that connects continents by land and sea. Since then, over 200 agreements have been signed with over 150 countries and 30 international organisations. The initiative has expanded China’s access to resources. This is often in exchange for infrastructure development that links mining regions to ports.

In Africa, China has invested heavily in mining and infrastructure. Its firms have spent about US$4.5 billion in lithium projects in Zimbabwe, the DRC, Mali, and Namibia. China’s strategic focus includes resource-rich countries such as the DRC, Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa and Ghana.

China recently marked the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II with a military parade. The parade projected China’s military strength with President Xi warning that China is “unstoppable.”

China is emboldened by its influence and access to critical minerals. This has strengthened its ability to acquire military hardware and other advanced technologies.

Competition for Africa’s critical minerals

Africa holds about 30% of the world’s critical mineral deposits, making it central to geopolitical contest. The US and EU have sought agreements to secure supplies and reduce reliance on China.

The EU has strategic partnerships on minerals with the DRC, Rwanda, Namibia and Zambia. China has bilateral agreements with eleven African countries in the mining sector. The US also has a trilateral agreement with the DRC and Zambia. Its purpose is to support an integrated value chain for electric vehicle (EV) batteries. It also recently signed a ‘Minerals for Peace’ deal with the DRC and Rwanda to help end decades of conflict in eastern Congo.

Although African countries need support to turn their resources into prosperity, our research found that these partnerships risk reinforcing Africa’s marginal position in the global value chain. They often reproduce conditions reminiscent of colonialism: dependency, resource extraction, and power imbalances.

The way forward

Our research argues that the struggle between the US-led and Chinese-led world orders will hinge on a few things. One is control over emerging technologies. These include renewable energy, defence, aerospace, and AI — all of which depend on critical minerals. Expanded access to, and control of, these minerals and their supply chains will be a key determinant of global power.

Competition between the US and China for critical minerals will intensify. Yet it is crucial that African countries remain neutral. They must engage only in meaningful, mutually beneficial partnerships that genuinely advance their countries and its economies.

African countries must explicitly define their priorities in the extractives sector. Without clear strategies, external powers will continue to dictate Africa’s future. The continent will be locked into dependency rather than enabling it to capture real value from its mineral wealth.

Finally, rather than just competing for Africa’s critical minerals, China, the US, and the EU should equitably engage with African countries in the extractives sector to ensure just development across the continent.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. China and the US are in a race for critical minerals. African countries need to make the rules – https://theconversation.com/china-and-the-us-are-in-a-race-for-critical-minerals-african-countries-need-to-make-the-rules-265318

October 9, 2025

Gauteng’s ‘Coloured’ community feels unsafe: who they are and why they’re discouraged

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Rashid Seedat, Executive Director, Gauteng City-Region Observatory

The “Coloured” community in Gauteng, South Africa’s economic heartland, continues to face barriers to full economic and social inclusion. Despite progress in post-apartheid South Africa, this historically oppressed community continues to experience significant socio-economic challenges.

The term “Coloured” is initially placed in quotation marks to acknowledge its contested nature. Historically, the formation of Coloured identity in South Africa emerged from a complex colonial encounter involving Dutch and British settlers, slaves from south and east Asia and east Africa, and the indigenous Khoi and San peoples. This produced a distinct, mixed group that did not neatly fit into colonial racial categories. During apartheid, Coloured people were legally defined by the 1950 Population Registration Act as those who were neither white nor Black African.

Today, it remains an official racial classification in South Africa. It is also used in everyday discourse. But it is not a universally accepted label.

Quotation marks signal critical distance and sensitivity to the complex debates surrounding the term.

The Coloured population is concentrated mainly in the Western Cape (42.1%) and the Northern Cape (41.6%). There are smaller proportions in the Eastern Cape (7.6%), Gauteng (2.9%), Free-State (2.6%), North-West (1.6%), KwaZulu-Natal (1.5%), Mpumalanga (0.6%) and Limpopo (0.3%).

Current, albeit limited, research on the Coloured community is usually focused on the Western Cape province. This means that there is no new substantial scholarship providing a deeper and more nuanced understanding of this community in Gauteng.

In a bid to fill this gap, the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) initiated a research project that delves into the issues in greater detail. This follows findings from a GCRO Quality of Life Survey released in 2024 which revealed concerning data on the Coloured community in Gauteng. This included the fact that a larger proportion of Coloured people within Gauteng felt unsafe, discouraged, apathetic and dissatisfied compared to the provincial average.

The concerns highlighted in the survey are not separate from questions of Coloured identity. There is a link between an enduring perception of marginalisation within Coloured communities and real material struggles.

Biggest concerns

Safety: The survey indicated that safety remains a concern for the Coloured community in Gauteng. When asked about the main problems in their community, 2.3% indicated gangs as a problem. This compared with 0.2% of the general Gauteng population.

Additionally, 61% of Coloured people believed that the crime situation had worsened in their neighbourhoods over the past year. The provincial average was 48%.

South Africa is often regarded as “the protest capital of the world”. Over 680 protests were recorded in the country from August 2024 to August 2025, an average of nearly two a day. In September 2025, Johannesburg’s majority-Coloured suburbs, Westbury, Coronationville, Newclare and Claremont, erupted in violent protests following prolonged water shortages. These protests reflected broader frustrations over basic service delivery failures.

When Coloured respondents were asked about reasons for protests in the neighbourhood in the survey, 17% indicated that it was a result of crime and safety issues, compared to the provincial average of 4%.

Joblessness and financial stresses: The survey highlighted that 5% of Coloured residents are discouraged work seekers. This is double the average in Gauteng. A total of 26% of Coloured people felt that saving money was impossible, compared to 17% of the general population.

The highest proportion of households experiencing severe food insecurity in Gauteng belong to the Coloured (12%) and Black African (13%) population groups.

Food insecurity refers to individuals who do not have access to sufficient food to lead an active, healthy life. The GCRO developed a food security index based on four indicators: whether households could afford enough groceries, whether there was a place nearby to buy food, and whether adults or children had skipped a meal due to financial constraints.

Political apathy: Among Coloured people who stated that they intended not to vote or were unsure if they would vote, 40% indicated that they do not like politics, broken promises or believed that voting is a waste of time. This is nearly double the provincial average of 26%.

The Coloured community had the highest proportion of people who were dissatisfied with their local municipalities. This dissatisfaction extended to provincial and national government:

72% of Coloured people expressed dissatisfaction with provincial government, compared to 63% across Gauteng, and
78% were dissatisfied with the national government, compared to 67% for the province.

Over a quarter of Coloured people believed that politics was a waste of time (26%) and that South Africa was a failed state (29%). This was much higher than the provincial average.

The survey also shed light on the ongoing racial tensions within Gauteng. Eighteen percent of Coloured residents reported experiencing racial discrimination either always or often. This compares with 13% of the general population.

Unpacking Coloured identity

A range of South African scholars and authors are engaged in debates on the Coloured identity. In developing our own understanding of Coloured identity, we draw on a three-part framework for thinking about its formation developed by professor of anthropology Zimitri Erasmus and set out in the introduction of the book Coloured by history, shaped by place: New perspectives on Coloured identity in Cape Town.

First, Coloured identity cannot be reduced to a “race mixture”. It is a cultural formation shaped by the conditions of appropriation and dispossession under slavery, colonialism and apartheid.

Second, Coloured identity was developed through creolisation, the blending of subaltern and ruling cultures, and is continually, and creatively, remade by Coloured people across time and space in ways that help them make sense of their lives.

Third, the apartheid racial hierarchy placed Coloured between Black African and White. This gave rise to the common refrain, “not black enough to be Black and not white enough to be White”. This position is twofold. On the one hand researchers must recognise the intra-Black racism of Coloured people under apartheid. On the other hand, they need to recognise the community’s enduring sense of marginalisation.

Next steps

The GRCO‘s project, “The Coloured community in post-apartheid Gauteng” aims to understand and explore dimensions of the Coloured experience in Gauteng.

The research initiative includes these areas of focus: a political and historical overview; a demographic and geographic profile; an examination of social and economic conditions; subjective well-being; political attitudes; and the role of religion.

Shamsunisaa Miles-Timotheus and Shannon Whitaker, junior researchers at the GCRO, are co-authors of this article.

Rashid Seedat receives funding from Gauteng Provincial Government for the Gauteng City-Region Observatory. He is affiliated with the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation as a member of the Board of Trustees.

– ref. Gauteng’s ‘Coloured’ community feels unsafe: who they are and why they’re discouraged – https://theconversation.com/gautengs-coloured-community-feels-unsafe-who-they-are-and-why-theyre-discouraged-264716

October 9, 2025

Southern right whales are having fewer calves: what this says about ocean health

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Matthew Germishuizen, Postdoctoral research fellow, Mammal Research Institute Whale Unit, Department of Zoology and Entomology, University of Pretoria

Most people are lucky to simply get a glimpse of some fragment of a whale. A subtle puff of mist over the horizon, the curve of a dark smooth back sliding beneath the surface, or for the fortunate, the flash of a tail or the explosive splash of 40 tons of flesh pounding the surface of the water when they breach. The immense satisfaction experienced during these brief appearances is a testimony to the whales’ elusiveness, and the immense difficulty of studying them.

For scientists, the challenge is even greater: whales spend most of their lives far offshore, hidden beneath the waves, or even well within the ice pack in some of the most remote and inhospitable oceans on Earth.

This difficulty has driven researchers to creative extremes – like using crossbows to gather skin samples, flying helicopters to count them, and sticking cameras with suction cups on their backs. I faced the challenge myself during my doctoral research at the University of Pretoria, which set out to unravel how southern right whales are responding to the combined pressures of climate change and shifting ocean ecosystems.

Southern rights are the species that draws thousands of visitors to Hermanus, a town on South Africa’s southern Cape coast, each spring when they reach peak numbers at their calving grounds. They generally start arriving here in June after feeding for a couple of years in the Antarctic, and generally all leave by November back into the Southern Ocean.

Southern right whales are one of the three species of right whales worldwide. All belong to the baleen whale group – the filter-feeding giants that include the blue, humpback and fin whales. Reaching up to 17 metres in length, they are among the larger whale species. The southern right is the only right whale found in the southern hemisphere, with populations off South America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.

My research shows that the South African population of southern right whales is being squeezed by climate change in the Southern Ocean. Their reproductive slowdown is a clear biological signal of environmental disruption: fewer calves in Hermanus most likely means there is less food under the ice thousands of kilometres away.

This has two important implications. First, it highlights the vulnerability of whale populations. These animals face an uncertain future in a warming ocean. Second, it demonstrates the remarkable role whales can play as sentinels. By monitoring their health and behaviour, we gain insight into vast, remote ecosystems that are otherwise costly and difficult to study.

Why southern right whales matter

Southern right whales were named by whalers who considered them the “right” whales to hunt: slow, predictable, and buoyant when killed. Those same traits almost drove them to extinction. Today, with international protection, many populations are recovering. But recovery is no guarantee of security. The very qualities that made them easy targets now make them excellent sentinels of environmental change.

These whales are what biologists call capital breeders. Mothers must accumulate enormous energy reserves during their foraging season in the Southern Ocean, then draw down on these stores through pregnancy, birth and nursing. If food is scarce, reproduction falters. This tight link between feeding and breeding makes them a living barometer of ocean health.

What I set out to investigate

For decades, South Africa has been at the forefront of southern right whale research. Since 1969, annual aerial surveys along the Cape coast have tracked mothers and calves, building one of the world’s most detailed datasets on any whale species.

In recent years, however, worrying trends have emerged. After 2009, calving intervals, the time between births, lengthened dramatically. Instead of a calf every three years, many mothers were only giving birth every four or five years. Female body condition declined, and stable isotope studies, which analyse molecules in the skin to indicate what whales have been feeding on, suggested whales were feeding further north than before. This indicates that mothers are potentially taking longer to meet the energy requirements of reproduction.

These red flags raised an urgent question: was climate change disrupting the whales’ food supply in their distant Southern Ocean feeding grounds?

Peering into the whales’ world

To answer this, I combined multiple approaches. I analysed 40 years of environmental data: sea ice cover, chlorophyll (a measure of ocean productivity), and historical whaling records. I deployed satellite tags on living whales to follow their migrations offshore. And I worked with international colleagues to use instruments attached directly to whales, tags that measure conductivity, temperature and depth, to understand the physical and biological features of their foraging habitats.

Together, these methods painted a clear picture. The traditional high-latitude feeding grounds, once rich in one of their preferred prey, Antarctic krill, have experienced dramatic environmental shifts driven by changes in the Earth’s climate. Sea ice, critical for krill survival and reproduction, has declined by 15%-30% in key regions. The marginal ice zone, once a reliable nursery for krill, has retreated southward. In parallel, whale mothers showed signs of poorer body condition, consistent with struggling to find sufficient food.

At mid-latitudes, meanwhile, whales were often found foraging near ocean fronts, dynamic boundaries where warm and cold waters meet, concentrating nutrients and prey. This suggests that when their polar larder fails, whales are forced to adapt by exploiting less predictable feeding zones further north.

Why it matters to all of us

Southern right whales are more than just a tourist attraction. They are indicators of the health of the Southern Ocean, a region that regulates Earth’s climate by absorbing heat and carbon dioxide. Changes in this system ripple far beyond Antarctica, shaping weather, fisheries, and biodiversity across the globe.

When fewer whale calves appear along South Africa’s coast, it is not only a local conservation concern. It is a message carried on the backs of these giants: our oceans are changing faster than they can adapt.

As we celebrate their return each spring, we should also reflect on the bigger story they tell. Protecting whales, and the oceans they depend on, is inseparable from protecting our own future.

Matthew Germishuizen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Southern right whales are having fewer calves: what this says about ocean health – https://theconversation.com/southern-right-whales-are-having-fewer-calves-what-this-says-about-ocean-health-266375