The Conversation – Africa – Page 25

July 7, 2025

Alcohol and colonialism: the curious story of the Bulawayo beer gardens

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maurice Hutton, Research Associate, School of Environment, Education and Development, University of Manchester

Kontuthu Ziyathunqa – Smoke Rising – was what they used to call Bulawayo when the city was the industrial powerhouse of Zimbabwe. Now, many of its factories lie dormant or derelict. The daily torrent of workers flowing eastward at dawn, and back out to the high-density western suburbs at dusk, has diminished to a trickle.

But there is an intriguing industrial-era institution that lives on in most of the older western suburbs (formerly called townships). It is the municipal beer hall or beer garden, built in the colonial days for the racially segregated African worker communities. There are dozens of these halls and garden complexes, still serving customers and emitting muffled sounds of merriment to this day.

Like other urban areas in Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe), Bulawayo was informally segregated from its inception, and more formally segregated after the second world war. Under British rule (1893-1965) and then independent white minority rule (1965-1980), municipal drinking amenities were built in the townships to maintain control of African drinking and sociality. At the same time, they raised much-needed revenue for township welfare and recreational services.

I researched the history of these beer halls and gardens as part of my PhD project on the development of the segregated African townships in late colonial Bulawayo. As my historical account shows, they played a key role in the contested township development process.

From beer halls to beer gardens

Bulawayo’s oldest and most famous beer hall, MaKhumalo, also known as Big Bhawa, was built more than a century ago. It still stands at the heart of the historic Makokoba neighbourhood. It’s enormous, but austere, and in the early days it was oppressively managed. Drinkers would describe feeling like prisoners there.

The more picturesque beer gardens began to emerge in the 1950s, reflecting the developmental idealism of Hugh Ashton. The Lesotho-born anthropologist was educated at the Universities of Oxford, London and Cape Town, and took up the new directorship of African administration in Bulawayo in 1949.

He was tuned into new anthropological ideas about social change, as well as developmental ideas spreading through postwar colonial administrations – about “stabilising” and “detribalising” African workers to create a more passive and productive urban working class. He saw a reformed municipal beer system as a key tool for achieving these goals.

Ashton wanted to make the beer system more legitimate and the venues more community-building. He proposed constructing beer garden complexes with trees, rocks, games facilities, food stalls and events like “traditional dancing”. So the atmosphere would be convivial and respectable, but also controllable, enticing all classes and boosting profits to fund better social services. As we shall see, this strategy was full of contradictions…

Industrial beer brewing

MaKhumalo, MaMkhwananzi, MaNdlovu, MaSilela. These beer garden names, emblazoned on the beer dispensaries that stick up above the ramparts of each garden complex, referenced the role that women traditionally played in beer brewing in southern Africa. This helped authenticate the council’s “home brew”.

But the reality was that the beer was now produced in a massive industrial brewery managed by a Polish man. It was piped down from steel tanks at the tops of the dispensary buildings into the plastic mugs of thirsty punters at small bar windows below. (It was also sold in plastic calabashes and cardboard cartons.)

And the beer garden bureaucracy, which offered a rare opportunity for African men to attain higher-grade public sector jobs, became increasingly complex and strictly audited.

As the townships rapidly expanded, with beer gardens dotted about them, sales of the council’s “traditional” beer – the quality of which Ashton and his staff obsessed over – went up and up.

Extensive beer advertising in the council’s free magazine mixed symbols of tradition (beer as food) with symbols of modern middle-classness.

Beer monopoly system

The system’s success relied on the Bulawayo council having a monopoly on the sale of so-called “native beer”. This traditional brew is typically made by malting, mashing, boiling and then fermenting sorghum, millet or maize grains. Racialised Rhodesian liquor laws restricted African access to “European” beers, wines and spirits.

So, the beer hall or garden was the only public venue where Africans could legally drink (apart from a tiny elite, for whom a few exclusive “cocktail lounges” were built). The council cracked down harshly on “liquor offences” like home brewing.

This beer monopoly system was quite prevalent in southern and eastern Africa, though rarely at the scale to which it grew in Bulawayo. Nearly everywhere, the system caused resentment among African townspeople, and so it became politically charged.

In several colonies, beer halls became sites of protest, or were boycotted (most famously in South Africa). And they usually faced stiff competition from illicit drinking dens known as shebeens.

In Bulawayo, the more the city council “improved” its beer system after the Second World War, the more contradictory the system became. It actively encouraged mass consumption of “traditional” beer, so that funds could be raised for “modern” health, housing and welfare services in the townships. Ashton himself was painfully aware of the contradictions.

In his guest introduction to a 1974 ethnographic monograph on Bulawayo’s beer gardens, he wrote:

The ambivalence of my position is obvious. How can one maintain a healthy community and a healthy profit at one and the same time? I can almost hear the critical reader questioning my morality and even my sanity. And why not? I have often done so myself.

Many citizen groups – both African and European – questioned the system too. They called it illogical, if not immoral; even some government ministers said it had gone too far. And when some beer gardens were constructed close to European residential areas, to cater for African domestic workers, many Europeans reacted with fear and fury.

As Zimbabweans’ struggle for independence took off in the 1960s, African residents increasingly associated the beer halls and gardens with state neglect, repression, or pacification. They periodically boycotted or vandalised them. Nevertheless, with few alternative options, attendance rates remained high: MaKhumalo recorded 50,000 visitors on one Sunday in 1970.

After independence

After Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the township beer gardens remained in municipal hands. They continued to be popular, even though racial desegregation had finally given township residents access to other social spaces across the city.

The colonial-era municipal beers continued to be produced, with Ngwebu (“The Royal Brew”) becoming a patriotic beverage for the Ndebele – the city’s majority ethnic group.

But with the deindustrialisation of Bulawayo since the late 1990s, tens of thousands of blue collar workers have moved to greener pastures, mostly South Africa. The old drinking rhythm of the city’s workforce has changed, and for the young, the beer gardens hold little allure. Increasingly, they have been leased out to private individuals to run.

Nevertheless, there is always a daily trickle of regulars to the beer gardens, where mugs and calabashes are passed around among friends or burial society members. Some punters play darts or pool. And there are always some who sit alone, ruminating – perhaps in the company of ghosts from the past.

The beer gardens of Bulawayo embody the moral and practical contradictions of late colonial development – and the ways in which such systems and infrastructures may live on, but change meaning, in the post-colony.

Maurice Hutton received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the University of Edinburgh’s College of Humanities and Social Sciences to conduct the research on which this article is based.

– ref. Alcohol and colonialism: the curious story of the Bulawayo beer gardens – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-and-colonialism-the-curious-story-of-the-bulawayo-beer-gardens-256511

July 7, 2025

Samora Machel’s vision for Mozambique didn’t survive: what has taken its place?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Luca Bussotti, Professor at the PhD Course in Peace, Democracy, Social Movements and Human Development, Universidade Técnica de Moçambique (UDM)

Samora Moisés Machel, the first president of independent Mozambique, was born in 1933 in Gaza province, in the south of the country. He died in an unexplained plane crash on 19 October 1986, in Mbuzini, South Africa.

Authoritarian and popular, humble and arrogant, visionary and tactical. All these words have been used to describe Machel. Despite these contradictions, there was one quality that everyone recognised in him: his charisma. At the time this gift wasn’t lacking in many political leaders of emerging countries, especially those of Marxist-Leninist inspiration. Cuba’s revolutionary leader Fidel Castro above all.

Their common faith went beyond any personal or family interest. It was a faith for the progress of humanity, for the liberation of oppressed peoples from the colonial yoke, from the chains of capitalism and from traditional values and practices considered regressive.

Machel’s enlightenment programme was as fascinating as it was difficult to achieve in Mozambique in the mid-1970s. Small farmers, with all their “traditional” beliefs, made up the majority of the population. It was a political battle for social justice as well as a cultural crusade.

Machel’s speech on 25 June 1975, at the Machava Stadium in Maputo, proclaiming Mozambique’s independence from Portugal, highlighted the contradictions. The new head of state addressed the “workers”, who represented a small minority of the Mozambican people. At the same time, he called for freedom from colonial-capitalist oppression and the effective, total independence of the new country, already identifying its possible enemies: the unproductive and exploitative bourgeoisie.

The task of nation-building

Machel’s charisma recalled that of the proto-nationalist hero Gungunhana, who had tried to resist the Portuguese occupation at the end of the 19th century. Machel’s grandfather, Maguivelani, was related to the “terrible” Gungunhana, the last emperor of Gaza, who was defeated in 1895 by Mouzinho de Albuquerque after years of struggle. He was deported to Portugal, where he died in 1906.

Paradoxically, the anti-traditionalist Machel was the descendant of a great traditional chief. This heritage played a role in shaping his personality and political action.

Machel’s main task was to build a nation that only existed because of political unification under the Portuguese. The initial choices, embedded in the Cold War atmosphere, forced the nationalist Machel to opt for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Mozambique formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist doctrine at its Third Congress in 1977.

That approach meant political intolerance and the repression of “dissidents”, as well as the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, above all the Amakhuwa people, who did not sympathise with Machel’s party, Frelimo.

The forces opposed to the Marxist-Leninist solution expected democratic elections to be held after the proclamation of independence from Portugal. But this opportunity never came. Portugal handed over power to Frelimo (Lusaka Accords, 1974), ignoring the existence of other political groups.

The treatment of leaders who opposed Frelimo’s vision was harsh. On their return from abroad, many were imprisoned in concentration camps in the north of the country.

They included the resistance leader Joana Simeão, along with others such as Uria Simango, former vice-president of Frelimo, his wife, Celina Simango, and Lázaro Kavandame, the former Makonde leader who left Frelimo because he didn’t agree with its political line.

They were put on arbitrary trial and executed. The dates and the method of execution are still officially unknown, despite the former president Joaquim Chissano’s public apology, in 2014, for these deaths.

About a year after independence, an armed opposition, Renamo, was formed. It was financed first by Ian Smith’s Southern Rhodesian government, and then by the South African apartheid regime.

Renamo, contrary to Machel’s expectations, had a solid popular base in central and northern Mozambique, especially among peasant populations who had expressed opposition to the policies of collectivisation and cooperation imposed by the Marxist-Leninist government.

And it was war which led Machel to a controversial agreement with the South African apartheid enemy. The Nkomati Accords, signed in 1984, provided for the end of Mozambique’s logistical support to the exiled African National Congress in Mozambique and South Africa’s military and financial support to Renamo.

This agreement did not bring peace. On the contrary, the war intensified, as the South African regime continued to finance Renamo.

Machel died in 1986, with the war still raging, unable to see the end of a conflict that had devastated Mozambique and which defeated the socialist principles.

The General Peace Accords between the Mozambican government, represented by the president, Chissano, and Renamo, represented by its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, were only signed in Rome in 1992.

End of an era

Machel took the first, important steps towards a rapprochement with the west, as demonstrated by his visit to Ronald Reagan in Washington in September 1985.

It can be said that with his death the First Mozambican Republic ended, with all its positive and negative elements. The dream of building a fair Mozambique with an equitable distribution of national wealth came to an end.

Machel had worked hard to ensure that health, education, transport, water and energy were distributed equally among Mozambicans. A poor but fair welfare state was born. But it was quickly dismantled in the years following his death. The Mozambican state had very few resources to devote to the welfare state. The rest was done by the rapid abandonment of an ideology, the socialist ideology, which by then the Frelimo elite no longer believed in.

In addition, international financial institutions entered the country, with the notorious structural adjustment policies, as early as 1987.

Corruption, which Machel sought to combat with various measures, and which he addressed at many of his rallies, spread across the country and all its institutions. The Frelimo political elite soon became the richest slice of the nation.

Several observers began to speak of a kleptocracy. The country suffered from continuous corruption scandals. One of the biggest became known as “hidden debt,” in which the political elite, including one of ex-president Armando Guebuza’s sons and former intelligence chief, Gregório Leão, were convicted of a scheme that cost the public treasury more than US$2 billion.

However, the main defeat was the fall of an inapplicable socialism.

The adoption of a capitalist, liberal and democratic model, at least formally, put an end to the arbitrary violations of human rights as in the age of the socialist state, such as “Operation Production” of 1983. The programme aimed to move “unproductive” people living in cities to the countryside to promote agricultural production.

In reality, it turned into arbitrary detentions and displacement of entire families, increasing the systematic violation of human rights by the state.

At the same time, the end of socialism meant democratic openness. Since the 1990 constitution, Mozambique has had as its fundamental principles respect for civil and political freedoms based on the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. Still, socio-economic rights have been denied as a result of the dismantling of the welfare state.

How he’s remembered

Today, many people miss Machel’s rule. Those who were close to him, such as José Óscar Monteiro, the former interior minister, recall him as an ethical statesman, intolerant of corruption and abuses against “his” people. So do some of the international media.

Others, since the 1980s, such as Amnesty International, have denounced the serious violations of the most basic human rights by the Mozambican government and its leader.

What remains of Machel today is above all his ethical teaching. He died poor, committed to the cause of his nation, leaving his heirs moral prestige.

It is curious that his figure is associated, even in musical compositions by contemporary rappers from Mozambique, with his historical enemy, Dhlakama, who died in 2018.

This popular tribute is proof of the distance between the country’s current ruling class and a “people” who are looking to the charismatic figure of Venâncio Mondlane, the so-called “people’s president”. But that’s another story that won’t fit here.

Luca Bussotti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Samora Machel’s vision for Mozambique didn’t survive: what has taken its place? – https://theconversation.com/samora-machels-vision-for-mozambique-didnt-survive-what-has-taken-its-place-260110

July 7, 2025

West Africa terror: why attacks on military bases are rising – and four ways to respond

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

More than 40 Malian soldiers were killed and one of the country’s military bases was taken over in early June 2025 in a major attack by an al-Qaeda linked group, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), on the town of Boulikessi.

The same group launched an attack on the historic city of Timbuktu. The Malian army claimed it repelled the Timbuktu attack and killed 14 terrorists.

Terrorist groups have attacked Boulikessi in large numbers before. In October 2019, 25 Malian soldiers were killed. The target was a G5 Sahel force military camp.

Timbuktu has been in the sights of terrorist groups since 2012. JNIM laid siege to the city for several months in 2023. Timbuktu has a major airport and a key military base.

In neighbouring Burkina Faso, there have been running battles in recent months between the military and terrorist groups. About 40% of the country is under the control of groups linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Military bases in the country have also been targeted.

Mali and Burkina Faso are under military rule. Insecurity, especially increasing terrorist attacks, were key reasons the military juntas gave for seizing power in both countries.

I have been researching terrorism and the formation of insurgent groups in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. What I am observing is that the terrorist groups are becoming more daring and constantly changing tactics, with increased attacks on military camps across the region.

Military camps are attacked to lower the morale of the soldiers and steal ammunition. It also sends a message to locals that military forces are incapable of protecting civilians.

I believe there are four main reasons for an increase in large scale attacks on military bases in the region:

the loss of the US drone base in Niger, which has made surveillance difficult
an increase in human rights abuses carried out in the name of counter terrorism
a lack of a coordinated approach to counter terrorism
constant changes of tactics by the terrorists.

Identifying and addressing these issues are important to counter the trend.

Why are the attacks increasing?

First is the loss of the US drone base in Agadez, Republic of Niger, in 2024 after the military seized power in the country.

I was initially sceptical when the drone base was commissioned in 2019. But it has in fact acted as a deterrent to terrorist groups.

Terrorist organisations operating in the Sahel knew they were being watched by drones operating from the base. They were aware surveillance information was shared with member states. The loss of the base has reduced reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the region.

Second, an increase in human rights abuse in the fight against terrorism in the region is dividing communities and increasing recruitment into terrorist groups. A report by Human Rights Watch in May 2025 accused the Burkina Faso military and allied militias of killing more than 130 civilians during counter-terrorism operations.

The report argued that members of the Fulani ethnic group were targeted in the operations because they were perceived to have relationships with terrorist groups. Terrorist groups are known to use such incidents to win the hearts and minds of local populations.

Third, the lack of a coordinated approach to counter terrorism in the region is reversing the gains made in the last decade. Major developments have included the dissolving of the G5 Sahel. This grouping was created in 2014 to enhance security coordination between members. The members were Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Niger. The organisation launched joint counter-terrorism missions across member states but was dissolved in December 2023 after Niger and Burkina Faso withdrew.

The weakening of the Multinational Joint Task Force due to the military coup in Niger and the countries’ strategic repositioning is undermining counter-terrorism initiatives. Task force members were Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin.

The mandate of the task force is to combat Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating around the Lake Chad basin. After its establishment in 2015 the task force achieved significant progress. In January 2025, Niger suspended its membership, putting the fight against terrorism in the region in jeopardy.

Fourth, terrorist groups in the region are becoming more sophisticated in their approach. In April 2025, JNIM terrorists were suspected of launching a suicide drone attack on Togolese military positions.

For its part, the military in the Sahelian countries are struggling to adapt to the terrorists’ new tactics. In the last few years, there has been a proliferation of drones in Africa by states and non-state actors.

Halting the trend

To combat the increasing attacks by terrorist groups, especially large-scale attacks on military positions, four immediate steps are necessary.

First, nation states need to invest in surveillance capabilities. The loss of the drone base in Niger means Sahelian states must urgently find new ways of gathering and sharing intelligence. The topography of the region, which is mainly flat, with scattered vegetation, is an advantage as reconnaissance drones can easily detect suspicious movements, terrorist camps and travel routes.

There is also a need to regulate the use of drones in the region to prevent use by non-state actors.

In addition, countries fighting terrorism must find a way to improve the relationship between the military (and allied militias) and people affected by terrorism. My latest publication on the issue shows that vigilante groups engaged by the military forces are sometimes complicit in human rights abuse.

Training on human rights is essential for military forces and allied militias.

Terrorism funding avenues must be identified and blocked. Large scale terrorist attacks involve planning, training and resources. Funding from illegal mining, trafficking and kidnapping must be identified and eradicated. This will also include intelligence sharing between nation states.

Finally, the Sahelian countries must find a mechanism to work with the Economic Community of West African States.

As the numbers and intensity of terrorist activities are increasing across the Sahel, immediate action is necessary to combat this trend.

Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. West Africa terror: why attacks on military bases are rising – and four ways to respond – https://theconversation.com/west-africa-terror-why-attacks-on-military-bases-are-rising-and-four-ways-to-respond-258622

July 7, 2025

Cape Town’s sewage treatment isn’t coping: scientists are worried about what the city is telling the public

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lesley Green, Professor of Earth Politics and Director: Environmental Humanities South, University of Cape Town

Urban water bodies – rivers, lakes and oceans – are in trouble globally. Large sewage volumes damage the open environment, and new chemicals and pharmaceutical compounds don’t break down on their own. When they are released into the open environment, they build up in living tissues all along the food chain, bringing with them multiple health risks.

The city of Cape Town, South Africa, is no exception. It has 300km of coastline along two bays and a peninsula, as well as multiple rivers and wetlands. The city discharges more than 40 megalitres of raw sewage directly into the Atlantic Ocean every day. In addition, large volumes of poorly treated sewage and runoff from shack settlements enter rivers and from there into both the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans.

Over almost a decade, our multi-disciplinary team, and others, have studied contamination risks in Cape Town’s oceans, rivers, aquifers and lakes. Our goal has been to bring evidence of contaminants to the attention of officials responsible for a clean environment.

Monitoring sewage levels in the city’s water bodies is essential because of the health risks posed by contaminated water to all citizens – farmers, surfers, and everybody eating fish and vegetables. Monitoring needs to be done scientifically and in a way that produces data that is trustworthy and not driven by vested interests. This is a challenge in cities where scientific findings are expected to support marketing of tourism or excellence of the political administration.

Our research findings have been published in multiple peer-reviewed journals. We have also communicated with the public through articles in the media, a website and a documentary.

Cape Town’s official municipal responses to independent studies and reports, however, have been hostile. Our work has been unjustifiably denounced by top city officials and politicians. We have been subject to attacks by fake social media avatars. Laboratory studies have even received a demand for an apology from the political party in charge of the city.

These extraordinary responses – and many others – reflect the extent to which independent scientific inquiry has been under attack.

We set about tracking the different kinds of denial and attacks on independent contaminant science in Cape Town over 11 years. Our recently published study describes 18 different types of science communication that have minimised or denied the problem of contamination. It builds on similar studies elsewhere.

Our findings show the extent to which contaminant science in Cape Town is at risk of producing not public knowledge but public ignorance, reflecting similar patterns internationally where science communication sometimes obfuscates more than it informs. To address this risk, we argue that institutionalised conflicts of interest should be removed. There should also be changes to how city-funded testing is done and when data is released to citizens. After all, it is citizens’ rates and taxes that have paid for that testing, and the South African constitution guarantees the right to information.

We also propose that the city’s political leaders take the courageous step of accepting that the current water treatment infrastructure is unworkable for a city of over 5 million people. Accepting this would open the door to an overhaul of the city’s approach to wastewater treatment.

The way forward

We divided our study of contaminant communication events into four sub-categories:

non-disclosure of data
misinformation that gives a partial or misleading account of a scientific finding
using city-funded science to bolster political authority
relying on point data collected fortnightly to prove “the truth” of bodies of water as if it never moves or changes, when in reality, water bodies move every second of every day.

We found evidence of multiple instances of miscommunication. On the basis of these, we make specific recommendations.

First: municipalities should address conflicts of interest that are built into their organisational structure. These arise when the people responsible for ensuring that water bodies are healthy are simultaneously contracting consultants to conduct research on water contaminants. This is particularly important because over the last two decades large consultancies have established themselves as providers of scientific certification. But they are profit-making ventures, which calls into question the independence of their findings.

Second: the issue of data release needs to be addressed. Two particular problems stand out:

Real-time information. Water quality results for beaches are usually released a week or more after samples have been taken. But because water moves all the time every day, people living in the city need real-time information. Best-practice water contamination measures use water current models to predict where contaminated water will be, given each day’s different winds and temperatures.
Poor and incomplete data. When ocean contaminant data is released as a 12-month rolling average, all the very high values are smoothed out. The end result is a figure that does not communicate the reality of risks under different conditions.

Third: Politicians should be accountable for their public statements on science. Independent and authoritative scientific bodies, such as the Academy of Science of South Africa, should be empowered to audit municipal science communications.

Fourth: Reputational harm to the science community must stop. Government officials claiming that they alone know a scientific truth and denouncing independent scientists with other data closes down the culture of scientific inquiry. And it silences others.

Fifth: The integrity of scientific findings needs to be protected. Many cities, including Cape Town, rely on corporate brand management and political reputation management. Nevertheless, cities, by their very nature, have to deal with sewage, wastes and runoff. Public science communication that is based on marketing strategies prioritises advancing a brand (whether of a political party or a tourist destination). The risk is that city-funded science is turned into advertising and is presented as unquestionable.

Finally, Cape Town needs political leaders who are courageous enough to confront two evident realities. Current science communications in the city are not serving the public well, and wastewater treatment systems that use rivers and oceans as open sewers are a solution designed a century ago. Both urgently need to be reconfigured.

Next steps

As a team of independent contaminant researchers we have worked alongside communities where health, ecology, livestock and recreation have been profoundly harmed by ongoing contamination. We have documented these effects, only to hear the evidence denied by officials.

We recognise and value the beginnings of some new steps to data transparency in Cape Town’s mayoral office, like rescinding the 2021 by-law that banned independent scientific testing of open water bodies, almost all of which are classified as nature reserves.

We would welcome a dialogue on building strong and credible public science communications.

This study is dedicated to the memory of Mpharu Hloyi, head of Scientific Services in the City of Cape Town, in acknowledgement of her dedication to the health of urban bodies of water. Her untimely passing was a loss for all.

This article also drew on Masters theses written by Melissa Zackon and Amy Beukes.

Lesley Green has received funding from the Science for Africa Foundation; the Seed Box MISTRA Formas Environmental Humanities Collaboratory; and the Science For Africa Foundation’s DELTAS Africa II program (Del:22-010).

Cecilia Yejide Ojemaye receives funding from the University of Cape Town Carnegie DEAL Sustainable Development Goals Research Fellowship and the National Research Foundation for the SanOcean grant from the South Africa‐Norway Cooperation on Ocean Research (UID 118754).

Leslie Petrik received funding from National Research Foundation for the SanOcean grant from the South Africa‐Norway Cooperation on Ocean Research (UID 118754) for this study.

Nikiwe Solomon received funding at different stages for PhD research from the Water Research Commission (WRC) and National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS), in collaboration with the South African Humanities Deans Association (SAHUDA). Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the WRC, NIHSS and SAHUDA.

Jo Barnes and Vanessa Farr do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Cape Town’s sewage treatment isn’t coping: scientists are worried about what the city is telling the public – https://theconversation.com/cape-towns-sewage-treatment-isnt-coping-scientists-are-worried-about-what-the-city-is-telling-the-public-260317

July 6, 2025

Child labour numbers rise in homes where adults are jobless – South African study

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Derek Yu, Professor, Economics, University of the Western Cape

Child labour is a big concern across the world. It is particularly acute in countries in the global south, where it is estimated that about 160 million children are engaged in child labour, about 87 million of them in sub-Saharan Africa.

A range of countries have sought to outlaw child labour because it denies children their childhood as well as physical and mental development.

In South Africa data on the work activities of children aged between 7 and 17 years are collected in the Survey of Activities of Young People, conducted by Statistics South Africa. Despite the survey having taken place four times (1999, 2010, 2015 and 2019), the dataset has been seriously under-used. There has hardly been any comprehensive research done on the state of South Africa’s child labour and child work activities.

In a recently published study we looked at child labour activities in the country. We compared the 2010, 2015 and 2019 Survey of Activities of Young People.

We first looked at personal and geographical characteristics of children, such as their gender, ethnic group and province of residence. We went on to look at their work activities, as well as the relationship (if any) between adults’ employment status and the probability of children from the same households having to work.

The reason we chose to look at the relationship between child labour and work activities of adults is that South Africa has an extremely high level of unemployment. At the end of 2024 the unemployment rate was 31.8%.

The Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which was passed in 1997, bans the employment of children until the last school day of the year when they turn 15 years old. Nonetheless, as some adult household members struggle to find work successfully, it is possible that child members of households are exploited to help the households survive financially.

Two striking and alarming findings stand out from the study.

First, the fewer adults were employed in a household, the more likely it was that children in the household were working. Secondly, the presence of child labour in the household had a discouraging impact on the adult members’ job-seeking action.

The first key finding implies that if adults were employed, children might not be working. The second implies that jobless adult members most likely relied on the (illegal) income earned by the child labour, discouraging the adults from seeking work actively.

The number of children working in South Africa has dropped from 778,000 in 2010 to 577,000 in 2019. This downward trend implies the success of South African legislation in prohibiting child labour over the years. But, we conclude, laws and regulations are not enough. In South Africa, the enforcement as well as the public awareness and understanding of the child labour related legislation must be improved to safeguard children.

Thus, a coordinated programme of action by the government is important to bring all stakeholders into the fight against child labour and unemployment of the working-age population.

About the survey

The Survey of Activities of Young People was first introduced in 1999 by Statistics South Africa, two years after the 1997 legislation that banned child labour. However, since the 1999 survey was not linked to the Labour Force Survey and the 1999 survey questions were asked very differently from the 2010, 2015 and 2019 waves, we decided to exclude the 1999 survey wave from the analysis. Hence, we focus on examining the 2010, 2015 and 2019 results, notably because these three waves of data about young people are linked to the Labour Force Survey data taking place in the same year.

This makes it possible to investigate the relationship between the employment status of child and adult household members.

The 2019 survey findings show that, if a household had no employed adult members, the probability of the child from the same household ending up as child labour was 6.5%.

If the household had one employed adult member, child labour probability dropped to 4.7%. Lastly, if the household had at least two employed adult members, child labour likelihood decreased further to 2.7%.

Using the same 2019 data, we found that if a household had no child involved in labour, the probability of an adult member from the same household seeking work in the labour market was 60%. Adult members’ labour force participation rate from households where at least once child worked as child labour was much lower at 44%.

Looking at other child labour statistics, we found that the majority (90%) of working children were Africans; above 60% were in the illegal age cohort of 7-14 years; and most were living in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Eastern Cape.

In addition, 98% of them were still attending school while working as child labour.

Lastly, most child labour worked 1-5 hours per week in elementary occupations in the wholesale and retail industry. The top three reasons for children working were “to obtain pocket money”, “to assist family with money” and “duty to help family”.

The road ahead

Some children spent many hours on household chores (which is not classified as child labour, strictly speaking). Parents, employers and the community must be educated about the dangers of long hours on domestic chores and even child labour.

The government should consolidate its infrastructure development programmes, especially the delivery of electricity, water and sanitation in areas where children spend time on domestic chores. These actions will shorten the duration of child household chores and allow children more time for school activities. The surveys used for the study did not include questions about specific activities children were involved in. They only asked if the child was involved in chores such as cleaning, cooking and looking after elderly members.

It is also worthwhile if questions relating to child labour are included in the child questionnaire of the National Income Dynamics Study (the only national panel data survey in South Africa) to more thoroughly investigate whether child labour is a short-term or long-term phenomenon, and whether there is any relationship between poverty (and receipt of social grants) and child labour incidence.

Lastly, it has been six years since the Survey of Activities of Young People was last conducted. It is time for Statistics South Africa to collect the latest data on the state of child labour in the country.

This article is based on a journal article which the writers co-authored with Clinton Herwel (Economics Masters student at the University of the Western Cape).

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Child labour numbers rise in homes where adults are jobless – South African study – https://theconversation.com/child-labour-numbers-rise-in-homes-where-adults-are-jobless-south-african-study-259398

July 6, 2025

Coups in west Africa have five things in common: knowing what they are is key to defending democracy

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Salah Ben Hammou, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Rice University

August 2025 makes it five years since Malian soldiers ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in a coup d’état. While the event reshaped Mali’s domestic politics, it also marked the beginning of a broader wave of military takeovers that swept parts of Africa between 2020 and 2023.

Soldiers have toppled governments in Niger, Burkina Faso (twice), Sudan, Chad, Guinea and Gabon.

The return of military coups shocked many observers. Once thought to be relics of the cold war, an “extinct” form of regime change, coups appeared to be making a comeback.

No new coups have taken place since Gabon’s in 2023, but the ripple effects are far from over. Gabon’s coup leader, Gen. Brice Oligui Nguema, formally assumed the presidency in May 2025. In doing so he broke promises that the military would step aside from politics. In Mali, the ruling junta dissolved all political parties to tighten its grip on power.

Across the affected countries, military rulers remain entrenched. Sudan, for its part, has descended into a devastating civil war following its coup in 2021.

Analysts often cite weak institutions, rising insecurity, and popular frustration with civilian governments to explain coups. While these factors play a role, they don’t capture the patterns we have observed.

I have studied and written on military coups for nearly a decade, especially this coup wave.

After a close analysis of the coup cascade, I conclude that the international community must move beyond the view of coups as isolated events.

Patterns suggest that the Sahelian coups are not isolated. Coup leaders are not only seizing power, they are learning from one another how to entrench authority, sidestep international pressure and craft narratives that legitimise their rule.

To help preserve democratic rule, the international community must confront five lessons revealed by the recent military takeovers.

Key lessons

Contagion: Just a month after Guinea’s military ousted President Alpha Condé, Sudan’s army disrupted its democratic transition. Three months later, Burkina Faso’s officers toppled President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré amid rising insecurity.

Each case had unique triggers, but the timing suggests more than coincidence.

Potential coup leaders watch closely, not just to see if a coup succeeds but what kinds of challenges arise as the event unfolds. When coups fail and plotters face harsh consequences, others are less likely to follow.

Whether coups spread depends on the perceived risks as much as on opportunity. But when coups succeed – especially if new leaders quickly take control and avoid immediate instability – they send a signal that can encourage others to act.

Civilian support matters: Civilian support for coups is real and observed.

Since the start of Africa’s recent coup wave, many commentators have highlighted the cheering crowds that often welcome soldiers, celebrating the fall of unpopular regimes. Civilian support is a common and often underestimated aspect of coup politics. It signals to potential coup plotters that military rule can win legitimacy and public backing.

This popular support also helps coup leaders strengthen their grip on power, shielding their regimes from both domestic opposition and international pressure. For example, following Niger’s 2023 coup, the putschists faced international condemnation and the threat of military intervention. In response, thousands of supporters gathered in the capital, Niamey, to rally around the coup leaders.

In Mali, protesters flooded the streets in 2020 to welcome the military’s ousting of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. In Guinea, crowds rallied behind the junta after Alpha Condé was removed in 2021. And in Burkina Faso, both 2022 coups were met with widespread approval.

International responses: The international community’s response sends equally powerful signals. When those responses are weak, delayed, or inconsistent – such as the absence of meaningful sanctions, token aid suspensions, or symbolic suspensions from regional bodies – they can send the message that the illegal seizure of power carries few legitimate consequences.

International responses to recent coups have been mixed. Some, like Niger’s, triggered strong initial reactions, including sanctions and threats of military intervention.

But in Chad, Mahamat Déby’s 2021 takeover was effectively legitimised by key international actors, which portrayed it as a necessary step for stability following the battlefield death of his father, President Idriss Déby, at the hands of rebel forces.

In Guinea and Gabon, regional suspensions were largely symbolic, with little pressure to restore civilian rule. In Mali and Burkina Faso, transitional timelines have been extended repeatedly without much pushback.

The inconsistency signals to coup leaders that seizing power may provoke outrage, but rarely lasting consequences.

Coup leaders learn from one another: Contagion isn’t limited to the moment of takeover. Coup leaders also draw lessons from how others entrench themselves afterwards. They watch to see which tactics succeed in defusing opposition and extending their grip on power.

Entrenched military rule has become the norm across recent coup countries. On average, military rulers have remained in power for nearly 1,000 days since the start of the current wave. Before this wave, military leaders had retained power on average for 22 days since the year 2000.

In Chad, Mahamat Déby secured his grip through a contested 2024 election. Gabon’s Nguema followed in 2025, winning nearly 90% of the vote after constitutional changes cleared the path. In both cases, elections were used to re-brand military regimes as democratic, even as the role of the armed forces remains unchanged.

Connecting the dots

Coup governments across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have shifted away from western alliances and towards Russia, deepening military and economic ties. All three exited the Economic Community of West African States and formed the Alliance of Sahel States, denouncing regional pressure.

Aligning with Russia offers these regimes external support and a veneer of sovereignty, while legitimising authoritarianism as independence.

The final lesson is clear: when coups are treated as isolated rather than interconnected, it’s likely that more will follow. Would-be plotters are watching how citizens react, how the world responds, and how other coup leaders consolidate power.

When the message they receive is that coups are tolerable, survivable and even rewarded, the deterrent effect weakens.

Poema Sumrow, a Baker Institute researcher, contributed to this article

Salah Ben Hammou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Coups in west Africa have five things in common: knowing what they are is key to defending democracy – https://theconversation.com/coups-in-west-africa-have-five-things-in-common-knowing-what-they-are-is-key-to-defending-democracy-258890

July 5, 2025

Climate change is making it harder for people to get the care they need

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maria S. Floro, Professor Emerita of Economics, American University

The world is witnessing the consequences of climate change: long-lasting changes in temperature and rainfall, and more intense and frequent extreme weather events such as heat waves, hurricanes, typhoons, flooding and drought. All make it harder for families and communities to meet their care needs.

Climate change affects care systems in various ways. First, sudden illnesses and unexpected disabilities heighten the need for care. Second, it reduces access to important inputs for care such as water, food and safe shelter. Third, it can damage physical and social care infrastructures.

It can also lead to breakdowns of traditional units of caregiving such as households and communities. And it creates new situations of need with the increase in displaced person settlements and refugee camps.

Climate change creates sudden spikes in the demand for care, and serious challenges to meeting the growing need for care. All this has immediate and long lasting effects on human well-being.

The size of the current unmet care needs throughout the world is substantial. In childcare alone, about 23% of children worldwide – nearly 350 million – need childcare but do not have it. Families in low- and lower-middle-income countries are the most in need.

Similarly, as the world’s population ages rapidly, only a small proportion of the elderly who need assistance are able to use formal care (in an institution or paid homecare). Most are cared for by family members or other unpaid caregivers. Much of this unpaid care and formal care work is provided by women and girls.

Hundreds of millions of people around the world struggle to get healthcare. Expansion of access to essential health services has slowed compared to pre-2015 . And healthcare costs still create financial hardship.

Without comprehensive public and global support for care provision and the integration of care in the climate agenda, unmet care needs will only grow and inequalities will widen.

Impact

Climate change interacts with human health in complex ways. Its impact is highly uneven across populations. It depends on geographical region, income, education, gender roles, social norms, level of development, and the institutional capacity and accessibility of health systems.

In 2018-22, Africa experienced the biggest increase in the
heat-related mortality rate since 2000-05. This is not surprising as the continent has more frequent health-threatening temperatures than ever before and a growing population of people older than 65.

Africa is also the region most affected by droughts in 2013-22, with 64% of its land area affected by at least one month of extreme drought per year on average. It was followed by Oceania (55% of its land area) and South and Central America (53%).

Scientific evidence also points to increases in health inequalities caused by climate change. The health effects of climate change are not uniformly felt by different population groups.

Exposure, severity of impact, and ability of individuals to recover depend on a variety of factors. Physiological characteristics, income, education, type of occupation, location, social norms and health systems are some of them.

For example, older people and young children face the greatest health risks from high temperatures.

There is also evidence of the disproportionate effect of climate change on the health of people living in poverty and those who belong to disadvantaged groups.

Women of lower social and economic status and with less education are more vulnerable to heat stress compared to women in wealthier households and with higher education or social status. They are exposed to pollution in the absence of clean cooking fuel, and to extreme heat as they walk to gather water and fuel, or do other work outdoors.

Bad sanitation in poor urban areas increases the incidence of water-borne diseases after heavy rains and floods.

Lack of access to healthcare services and the means to pay for medicines make it difficult for women and men in low-income households to recover from illness, heat strokes, and air pollution-related ailments.

Mental health problems are being attributed to climate change as well. Studies show that the loss of family or kin member, home, livelihood and a safe environment can bring about direct emotional impacts.

These adverse impacts increase the demand for caregiving and the care workload. Climate-induced health problems force family and community caregivers, particularly women, to spend more time looking after the sick and disabled, particularly frail elderly people and children.

Effect on food and water

Climate change threatens the availability of food, clean water and safe shelter. It erodes households’ and communities’ care capacity and hence societies’ ability to thrive.

Fluctuations in food supply and rising food prices as a result of environmental disasters, along with the inadequacy of government policies, underscore the mounting challenge of meeting food needs.

The threat of chronic shortage of safe drinking water has also risen. Water scarcity is an area where structural inequalities and gender disparities are laid bare.

Care for the sick and disabled, the young and the elderly is compromised when water is scarce.

Effects on providing care

Extreme weather events disrupt physical care infrastructures. It may be hard to reach hospitals, clinics, daycare centres, nursery schools and nursing homes. Some facilities may be damaged and have to close.

Another type of care system that can break down is family networks and support provided by friends and neighbours. These informal care sharing arrangements are illustrated in a study of the three large informal settlements in Nairobi.

About half (50.5%) of the sampled households reported having had a sick member in the two weeks before the survey. The majority relied on close friends and family members living nearby for care and support.

Studies have shown that climate change eventually leads to livelihood loss and resource scarcity, which can weaken social cohesion and local safety nets in affected communities.

Heightened risks and uncertainty and imminent changes in socio-economic and political conditions can also compel individuals or entire households to migrate. Migration is caused by a host of factors, but it has increasingly been a climate-related response.

The World Bank’s Groundswell Report released in 2018, for example, projected that climate change could force 216 million people to move within their countries by 2050 to avoid the slow-onset impacts of climate change.

A possible consequence of migration is the withdrawal of care support provided by the migrating extended kin, neighbours or friends, increasing the caregiving load of people left behind.

In the case of forced displacements, the traditional social networks existing in communities are disrupted entirely.

What’s needed

There are compelling reasons to believe that meeting care needs can also help mitigate the effects of climate change. And actions to meet carbon-zero goals, prevent biodiversity loss and regenerate ecosystems can reduce the care work burden that falls heavily on families, communities and women.

Any effort to tackle these grave problems should be comprehensive in scope and must be based on principles of equality, universality, and responsibility shared by all.

This article is part of a series of articles initiated through a project led by the Southern Centre for Inequality studies, in collaboration with the International Development Research Centre and a group of feminist economists and climate scientists across the world.

Maria S. Floro does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Climate change is making it harder for people to get the care they need – https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-making-it-harder-for-people-to-get-the-care-they-need-240557

July 5, 2025

Post-flood recovery: lessons from Germany and Nigeria on how to help people cope with loss and build resilience

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola, Senior Research Associate, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations University

Extreme climate events — floods, droughts and heatwaves — are not just becoming more frequent; they are also more severe.

It’s important to understand how communities can recover from these events in ways that also build resilience to future events.

In a recent study, we analysed how communities affected by the extreme flood events of 2021 in Germany’s Ahr Valley and in Lagos, Nigeria, grappled with recovery from floods.

Our aim was to identify the factors – and combinations of factors – that served as barriers (or enablers) to recovery from disasters.

We found that financial limitations, political interests and administrative hurdles led to prioritising immediate relief and reconstruction over long-term sustainable recovery.

In both cases immediate and long-term recovery efforts were siloed, underfunded and focused on reconstruction to pre-disaster conditions.

We concluded from our findings that the success of recovery efforts lies in balancing short-term relief and a long-term vision. While immediate aid is essential after a disaster, true resilience hinges on proactive measures that address systemic challenges and empower communities to build a better future.

Recovery should not be merely action-oriented and building back infrastructure (engineering). It should also include insights in other areas, like governance and psychology, helping people to deal with losses and to heal.

What worked

To understand the recovery pathways of the two regions, we reviewed relevant literature, newspaper articles and government documents. We also interviewed government agencies, NGO representatives, volunteers and local residents in the communities where these floods occurred.

We found that in the Ahr Valley, recovery wasn’t just about rebuilding structures, it was about empowering individuals.

Through initiatives like mental health and first aid courses, residents learned to support one another. This fostered a sense of community and resilience that was essential for meeting the emotional challenges posed by the disaster.

The focus on rebuilding with a sustainable vision also included environmental initiatives. For example, a type of heating system was put in place that didn’t rely on fossil fuels.

Not only did this reduce carbon emissions, it also served as a symbol of hope. It showed there was an opportunity to create a more sustainable and environmentally friendly community.

In Lagos, too, residents found strength in community and innovation. Grassroots efforts using sustainable materials like bamboo and palm wood highlighted the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the people. Faith-based organisations provided material aid as well as emotional and spiritual support. This reinforced the bonds that held the community together.

Each community faced unique challenges. But they shared a common thread: the importance of adaptive governance – flexible decision-making and strong community ties.

For example, established building codes in the Ahr Valley provided a framework for reconstruction, ensuring that new structures were resilient and safe.

In Lagos, the absence of strong government support highlighted the critical role of community organisations in providing services and fostering a sense of shared responsibility.

What needs improvment

In both the Ahr Valley and Lagos, the journey towards recovery has been fraught with obstacles as well.

In the Ahr Valley, bureaucratic red tape has become a formidable barrier. Residents, eager to rebuild their lives, find themselves entangled in a complex web of regulations and lengthy approval processes. This has delayed their access to insurance and recovery funds. Waiting for months or even years has eroded hope and fuelled a sense of abandonment.

Meanwhile, in Lagos, insufficient government support has left communities to fend for themselves, creating a breeding ground for uncertainty and conflict.

Land tenure disputes, fuelled by a lack of clear property rights, sow seeds of distrust and hinder resettlement efforts. Political disagreements complicate the picture, as competing interests divert attention and resources away from those who need them most.

In Lagos, none of the respondents reported having insurance to help them to recover from disaster-related losses.

While some residents in the Ahr Valley did have insurance, many were under-insured.

The Ahr Valley’s building codes offer a framework for reconstruction. But it’s clear that processes should be streamlined so communities can take ownership of their recovery.

In Lagos, the importance of robust social safety nets is clear. Partnerships between communities and authorities are also needed.

A different approach

Recovery isn’t a separate process that occurs after disasters only. It should be seen as an essential part of managing risks. It’s important to understand what recovery involves and what resources are needed.

This will help reduce future risks and increase resilience after extreme events.

Governments should encourage flexible governance structures that value community voices and local knowledge to enable recovery. A good example is the New Orleans Recovery Authority, established after Hurricane Katrina. It involved local residents and city officials in planning and rebuilding efforts.

Grassroots efforts in Lagos demonstrated the power of sustainable materials and community-led initiatives. Seeing things from the community’s point of view can help tailor solutions that fit the situation and adapt to evolving challenges.

Training and capacity-building programmes empower communities to be active in their own recovery.

Mental health and first aid courses were successful in the Ahr Valley. Equipping individuals with skills in sustainable practices and disaster preparedness helps weave a social fabric capable of weathering future storms.

Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola is a Visiting Scientist at, the United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)

Saskia E. Werners works with United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). She is grateful to have received research grants in support of her research on climate change adaptation and recovery.

– ref. Post-flood recovery: lessons from Germany and Nigeria on how to help people cope with loss and build resilience – https://theconversation.com/post-flood-recovery-lessons-from-germany-and-nigeria-on-how-to-help-people-cope-with-loss-and-build-resilience-240260

July 5, 2025

South Africa’s 36.1% electricity price hike for 2025: why the power utility Eskom’s request is unrealistic

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Steven Matome Mathetsa, Senior Lecturer at the African Energy Leadership Centre, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa’s state-owned electricity company, Eskom, has applied to the National Energy Regulator of South Africa to approve a 36.1% electricity price hike from April 2025, a 11.8% price increase in 2026 and an 9.1% increase in 2027. Steven Mathetsa teaches and researches sustainable energy systems at the University of the Witwatersrand’s African Energy Leadership Centre. He explains some of the problems with the planned tariff increase.

Why such a big hike?

Eskom says the multi-year price increase is because of the need to move closer a cost-reflective tariff that reflects the actual costs of supplying electricity.

However, Eskom’s electricity tariff increases have been exorbitant for several years – an 18% increase in 2023 and a 13% increase in 2024. This is a price increase far above inflation, which is currently at 4.4%.

Some companies have installed their own generation capacity, and individuals have moved to rooftop solar systems. As a result electricity sales have fallen by about 2% , resulting in a drop in revenue.

There’s a knock on effect for municipalities, the biggest distributors of electricity, which have also been forced to hike tariffs in line with Eskom’s increases.

All these costs are passed onto the consumers.

What will the impact be on South Africans?

If the hike is approved it will certainly worsen the economic difficulties facing
South Africa. One of the most unequal countries in the world, South Africa has an extremely high unemployment rate – 33.5%at the last count.

Economic growth is also very slow, at a mere 0.6% in 2023. The cost of living is high.

Exorbitant increases in electricity costs aggravate these problems.

South Africans and businesses in the country have little choice about where they source their energy. Eskom is still the sole supplier for nearly all the country’s electricity needs. This means that ordinary citizens are likely to continue relying on electricity supplied by Eskom, irrespective of the costs.

The high costs affect businesses negatively. Large industrial and small, medium, and micro enterprises have all highlighted that costs associated with utilities, mainly electricity, are affecting their sustainability.

The Electricity Regulation Amendment Act implementation will make major changes to Eskom. The reforms establish an independent Transmission Systems Operator tasked with connecting renewable energy providers to the grid. This will allow the creation of a competitive market where renewable energy providers can sell power to the grid.

But it’s not yet clear if these changes will address the issue of exorbitant electricity price rises.

What are the problems?

The country’s energy frameworks are drafted on the basis of the World Energy Trilemma Index. The index promotes a balanced approach between energy security, affordability, and sustainability. In other words, countries must be able to provide environmentally friendly and reliable electricity that their residents can afford.

South Africa is currently unable to meet these goals because of different energy policies that do not align, a lack of investment in electricity and dependency on coal-fired power. Electricity is increasingly becoming unaffordable in the country. Although there’s been a recent reprieve from power cuts, security of supply is still uncertain.

Furthermore, over 78% of the country’s electricity is produced by burning coal. This means South Africa is also far from attaining its 2015 Paris Agreement greenhouse gas reduction goals.

Compounding this problem is that Eskom is financially unstable – it needed R78 billion from the government in debt relief in 2024. For years, there was a lack of effective maintenance on the aging infrastructure.

The country has made some inroads into improving security of supply. To date, recent interventions have resulted in over 200 days without power cuts. This should be commended. The same focus must be placed on ensuring that electricity remains affordable while giving attention to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.

What needs to change?

South Africa’s 1998 Energy Policy White Paper and the new Electricity Regulation Amendment Act promote access to affordable electricity. However, they’ve been implemented very slowly. Affordable electricity needs to be taken seriously.

The question is whether the country’s electricity tariff methodology is flexible enough to accommodate poor South Africans, especially during these challenging economic times.

In my view, it is not. In its current form, vulnerable communities continue to foot the bill for various challenges confronting Eskom, including financial mismanagement, operational inefficiencies, municipal non-payment, and corruption.

I believe the following steps should be taken.

Firstly, South Africa should revise its tariff application methodologies so that consumers, especially unemployed and impoverished people, are protected against exorbitant increases.

Secondly, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa should strengthen its regulations to ensure its compliance and enforcement systems are effective. For example, Eskom should be held accountable when it does not deliver efficient services or mismanages funds, and be transparent about costs associated with its processes. Municipalities should also be held accountable for non-payment and other technical issues they regularly struggle with. Both affect the revenue of the power utility.

Thirdly, the government must make sure that price increases are affordable and don’t hurt the broader economy. It can do this by adjusting its policies to make sure that increases in electricity tariffs are in line with the rate of inflation.

Fourthly, communities can play a vital role in saving electricity at a household level. This will reduce the country’s overall energy consumption. Furthermore, both small and large businesses should continue to consider alternative energy technologies while implementing energy saving technologies.

Lastly, the level of free-basic electricity is not sufficient for poor households. Subsidy policies should also be reviewed to allow users access to affordable electricity as their financial situation changes negatively.

Steven Matome Mathetsa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. South Africa’s 36.1% electricity price hike for 2025: why the power utility Eskom’s request is unrealistic – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-36-1-electricity-price-hike-for-2025-why-the-power-utility-eskoms-request-is-unrealistic-240941

July 5, 2025

Industrial scale farming is flawed: what ecologically-friendly farming practices could look like in Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rachel Wynberg, Professor and DST/NRF Bio-economy Research Chair, University of Cape Town

African Perspectives on Agroecology is a new book with 33 contributions from academics, non-governmental organisations, farmer organisations and policy makers. It is free to download, and reviewers have described it as a “must read for all who care about the future of Africa and its people”. The book outlines how agroecology, which brings ecological principles into farming practices and food systems, can solve food shortages and environmental damage caused by mass, commercial farming. We asked the book’s editor and the South African Research Chair on Environmental and Social Dimensions of the Bio-economy, Rachel Wynberg, to set out why this book is so important.

What’s wrong with the current system of food production?

The dominant model of modern agriculture in the world is based on monoculture, where one crop is grown across large areas using chemical fertilisers and pesticides. It relies on seeds that are owned by big corporations and are often subsidised by governments at a high cost.

The book outlines how this approach to growing food is flawed. Firstly, it carries major costs. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s State of Food and Agriculture 2024 report, the costs of diet-related disease, hunger and malnutrition and other costs amount to about US$8 trillion a year. Countries in the global south carry much of the burden.

Secondly, the current approach is a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. This happens through deforestation and land degradation, livestock and fertiliser emissions, energy use, and the globalised nature of agriculture. Food is often produced far from where it is consumed.

Huge farmlands also wipe out biodiversity and degrade one third of all soils, globally. Industrial agriculture has many negative impacts on ecosystem health, livestock and human wellbeing.

What’s the alternative?

Agroecology is a good alternative. It uses natural processes such as fixing nitrogen in the soil by planting legumes, and conserving natural habitat to encourage beneficial predators that keep pests in check. It includes planting a diversity of crops, rather than just one, to prevent pest outbreaks, and avoiding synthetic pesticides and herbicides.

Agroecology places importance on building natural, local, economically viable and socially just food systems. It aims to support farmers and rural communities.

As a result, it fosters more equal social relations and improves food and nutritional security.

Agroecology also recognises local ways of knowing and doing things, and respects the rights of Indigenous people to seeds and plants that they have planted for many generations. Transforming research and education are an important part of agroecology.

What are the advantages?

Agroecology increases the capacity of farming systems to adapt to climate change. Studies show how agroecology increases crop yields, regulates water and nutrients, increases agricultural diversity and reduces pests.

It gives farmers more choice about what to grow and eat. This enables them to produce a wider variety of healthy food.

Can agroecology grow enough food for everyone?

Agroecology can be scaled up through:

farmer-to-farmer knowledge exchanges
creating professional networks of agroecology practitioners
local seed-saving networks or groups that share different seeds that are adapted to local conditions

solidarity networks: community-based groups or movements that aim to support each other, cooperate and take collective action.
the revival and use of indigenous and under-utilised crops and livestock breeds such as pearl and finger millet, sorghum and Nguni cattle
linking producers with consumers and markets.

What needs to be done?

Urgent actions are needed, especially in the climate “hotspot” of sub-Saharan Africa. Agroecology needs supportive policies and funding. South Africa has had a draft agroecology strategy for more than 10 years but this has not yet been adopted.

Development aid for farmers often undermines agroecology. It typically promotes a “new” African Green Revolution that uses hybrid seeds, agrochemicals, new technologies, and links to markets. However, hybrid seed, especially genetically modified seed, can contaminate local seed systems that are better adapted to local conditions.

The book illustrates what can go wrong. Maize is said to have “modernised” development and promoted foreign investment in Africa. But it has displaced indigenous crops such as sorghum and millet which are more nutritious and drought-resistant.

Subsidy programmes and state support for hybrid maize also back multinational agrochemical and seed companies.

Governments, industry and those funding research, innovation and consumer marketing must actively move away from a maize culture and invest in a bigger range of crops.

For millions of smallholder African farmers, there is a deep understanding of how animals, plants, soil, people and weather patterns are connected to and affect one another. Agricultural development programmes, chemical fertilisers, pesticides, and herbicides, and genetically modified seeds disrupt these relationships. They can devalue local knowledge and skills in favour of “expert”-led innovations. This means that farmers lose their capacity to understand their environment and their ability to react appropriately.

Lastly, agriculture research and training needs to be rethought. Research and development is now mostly shaped by market-led approaches that favour crops grown by large-scale commercial farmers. A public sector research and development agenda for agroecology needs to be developed. It should be based both on scientific knowledge as well as traditional and local knowledge.

What would help?

Agricultural research should be co-created by everyone involved. Farmer-led research and innovation can support food system transformations.

New ways of seeing and doing research are evolving. Western scientific and traditional knowledges are mixing in ways that can transform farming. Our book points out that social movements are emerging as a powerful force for change.

We hope to support these efforts through a new, four year, European Union supported initiative to establish a research and training network: the Research for Agroecology Network in Southern Africa. New agroecology knowledge networks in South Africa and Zimbabwe have also been started to coordinate research and develop curricula.

Rachel Wynberg’s research is supported by a grant from the Seed and Knowledge Initiative and South Africa’s National Research Foundation. She is a Board member of the NGO Biowatch South Africa.

– ref. Industrial scale farming is flawed: what ecologically-friendly farming practices could look like in Africa – https://theconversation.com/industrial-scale-farming-is-flawed-what-ecologically-friendly-farming-practices-could-look-like-in-africa-245579