The Conversation – Africa – Page 21

October 30, 2025

Some animals are more equal than others: the dark side of researching popular species

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Laura Tensen, Assistant Professor, University of Greifswald

Biologists often form deep bonds with the species they study. For some, that relationship begins early in their careers and shapes decades of research. The connection can be personal, even affectionate, but it can also create tensions when others set their sights on the same species.

In biology, certain plants and animals are considered “charismatic species” by the general public. They capture the public imagination through beauty, uniqueness, or cultural significance. Think giant pandas, tigers, or orchids.

Many scientists are drawn to these charismatic species, but that does not always mean they have the opportunity to study them. Competition can be fierce in some academic fields.

We conducted research on these charismatic species, to understand how this field may exclude some academics and give the monopoly on research to others.

Research monopolisation can have several negative effects. For instance, samples may be less commonly shared between scientists. It may even impede an academic’s progress. This can be in the form of sabotaging a competitor’s work, stealing creative ideas and performing biased peer review of funding proposals and publications.

This behaviour doesn’t just harm individual researchers. It can weaken scientific integrity, stifle creativity and drive talented people out of academia. And while our study focused on biology, the patterns are likely echoed across competitive academic fields where prestige and resources are limited.

Charismatic species are easy to love and they’re also good for science. Research on these species attracts more funding, more media coverage, and more space in prestigious journals. But popularity comes with a cost. Our new study reveals that working on these species often fuels competition and, in some cases, fosters exclusionary behaviour.

Over 18 months, we examined academic exclusion in the biological sciences: where established researchers try to prevent potential competitors from studying their preferred animal or plant. We surveyed 826 academics across 90 countries and analysed 800 scientific papers.

The results were striking. We found a positive correlation between a species’ charisma and the impact and volume of scientific outputs. That highlights the benefits of studying such species for a researcher’s prestige and career prospects. But studying charismatic species also tended to increase the likelihood of negative workplace experiences. Younger colleagues, women and researchers based in the regions where the species actually live were the ones who suffered.

Competition and monopolies

Nearly half (46%) of survey participants said they had encountered some form of research monopolisation. Respondents linked charismatic species to greater difficulty obtaining permits or samples, strained relationships with colleagues, and cliquey work environments.

We also found a striking imbalance in participation. Researchers from universities in North America and Europe frequently studied species in Africa, South America and Asia – but the reverse was rarely true. For instance, the eastern barred bandicoot (Perameles gunnii) occurs and was only studied in Australia. The striped skunk (Mephitis mephitis) occurs in the US, where it was studied. But the Malayan culogo (Galeopterus variegatus) was commonly studied by institutions outside Malaysia, as was the aye aye (Paradoxurus hermaphroditus) from Madagascar. This pattern was less pronounced for non-charismatic species.

The result is a skewed scientific landscape. Non-charismatic species, despite their ecological importance, are often underfunded and overlooked.

Career advantages and disadvantages

For those who secure access to charismatic species, the career payoffs can be enormous. Working on them tends to result in more publications, higher citation rates and more opportunities for international collaboration.

The largest collaborative effort we found was for the charismatic cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus), with a total of 50 authors, 37 institutions and 21 countries on one paper. This effort was rewarded with a journal impact factor of 11.1 and 193 citations, showing the benefit to be gained from collaborating. These advantages feed into the academic reward system, where prestige and productivity often dictate career progression.

A journal with an impact factor of 2-3 is considered solid in most fields, 5-10 is highly regarded, and 15+ is exceptional, usually limited to big multidisciplinary journals like Nature or Science. Only a small fraction of academics (perhaps the top 5%-10%) regularly publish in those very high impact journals. Citations vary hugely by discipline and career stage. A typical early-career researcher might have 20-100 citations total, whereas established mid-career academics often have a few hundred to a few thousand.

Our study also highlights the darker side of this system. Early-career scientists and women reported higher rates of exclusion, including refusals to collaborate, appropriation of research ideas and even harassment.

Gender inequities are particularly stark, despite the biological sciences having a much more even gender balance than most other science fields. Women were less likely to participate in international collaborations, which are strongly linked to career advancement. And when women did lead studies, their papers received fewer citations than those with male first or last authors.

The first author is usually the person who did most of the hands-on work – designing the study, collecting and analysing data, and writing the first draft. The last author is typically the senior researcher or group leader who supervised the project, secured funding and guided the work conceptually. In total, of all first authors, 69% were men, and of all last authors, 81% were men. Male dominance differed depending on the study species, where charismatic mammal species scored relatively high.

Productivity in academia manifests itself in publication rates, publication visibility and citation patterns. These can have a cumulative advantage and lead to substantial inequality among researchers. In our survey, 51% of female respondents reported gender-based discrimination.

Editorial boards also play a role. Many biodiversity conservation journals have male-dominated boards and a bias towards publishing studies on charismatic species. Species preference intertwines with gender inequity. For instance, studies on large carnivores are known to be historically male-dominated, and this association may give men a head start in their careers.

Rethinking incentives

What can be done? One solution is to broaden how scientific success is measured. Instead of focusing so heavily on academic output – publications, citations and journal impact factors – institutions and funders could also value contributions such as community engagement, public communication and policy impact.

This may reduce cumulative advantage in science and increase a sense of fairness, hopefully reversing the subtle ways in which organisational logistics serve to perpetuate disparities in academic institutions.

Such measures are becoming increasingly important in biodiversity conservation, where connecting science with society is essential. By shifting incentives, we may reduce the negative side-effects that arise from competition.

Scientists themselves also have a role to play. Instead of racing to publish first, research groups could coordinate their work, share data and agree on joint publication strategies. Collaboration over competition could benefit everyone, not least the species that need protecting.

Charisma may help a species capture attention, but it shouldn’t determine who gets to study it, or who gets to succeed in science.

Laura Tensen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Some animals are more equal than others: the dark side of researching popular species – https://theconversation.com/some-animals-are-more-equal-than-others-the-dark-side-of-researching-popular-species-266306

October 30, 2025

Where did the first people come from? The case for a coastal migration from southern Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Alan Whitfield, Emeritus Chief Scientist, NRF-SAIAB, National Research Foundation

The origins and migrations of modern humans around the world are a hot topic of debate. Genetic analyses have pointed to Africa as the continent from which our ancestors dispersed in the Late Pleistocene epoch, which began about 126,000 years ago. Various dispersal routes have been suggested.

As a group of scientists who have been studying human evolution, we propose in a recently published review paper that the coast of southern Africa was likely where Homo sapiens began this worldwide journey. We suggest that some people started leaving this area about 70,000 years ago, took a route along the east coast and left the continent about 50,000 to 40,000 years ago.

We base this hypothesis on various kinds of evidence, including geography, climate and environment, marine food resources, genetics, trace fossils, and the technical and cultural abilities of people in that region at that time. The reasons for migration and the advantages of a coastal route out of Africa, compared to an inland route, are outlined in our review.

This proposed route is counter to the current belief among most scientists that the Out-of-Africa migration began in eastern Africa and not southern Africa.

A southern Cape origin?

In our review we accepted that modern humans arose in Africa during the Middle Stone Age about 200,000 years ago and then replaced populations of hominins outside the continent between 60,000 and 40,000 years ago.

We suggested that their African origin was in the southern Cape region of what’s now South Africa, and that their migration along the eastern African coastline and onto the Arabian Peninsula may have happened over a period of less than 20,000 years.

In reviewing available evidence, we focused on the possibility that our ancestors in coastal South Africa were ideally placed to colonise the world. They had an enabling culture that allowed them to survive almost anywhere.

The Pinnacle Point cave complex and other sites in this area are a UNESCO World Heritage Site because they provide the most varied and best-preserved record known of the development of modern human behaviour, reaching back as far as 162,000 years.

Food from the sea, like shellfish, set southern Cape Homo sapiens on their evolutionary path to becoming advanced modern humans. They had an advantage over those who relied solely on hunting and food gathering inland, especially during cold and dry periods on the African subcontinent. The harnessing of bow and arrow technology was also key for their success when compared to other hominins during the same period.

Climate and culture

Episodes of global cooling, also known as ice ages, resulted in a global lowering of sea levels, and had two main effects in Africa. One was that the width of the Red Sea between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula narrowed. The other was that in the southern Cape, a vast coastal plain was exposed, providing extra habitat and plenty of food.

Increased cognitive capacity to interpret lunar cycles would have allowed ancestral humans to undertake timed excursions to the shore over spring tidal periods. The predictable coastal food sources might also, however, have led to inter-group conflict and territoriality, which could have played a role in the exodus of groups of people from the southern Cape.

In other parts of the world, there was a cold, dry period from 190,000 years to 130,000 years ago. And the dark, long “winter” after the Mount Toba (Indonesia) super-eruption 74,000 years ago would have reduced food resources in tropical regions. Hominins in the southern Cape appear to have survived these major global climate change events and continued to advance both culturally and technologically. We know something about these advances from research at cave sites such as Klasies River, Blombos and Pinnacle Point. Forms of ancient art have been found in these caves, indicating cognitively advanced humans.

Technical advances meant that the tools carried by these people on their journey were “state of the art” for 70,000 years ago – more advanced than those possessed by other humans encountered on their migration northwards.

Evidence mounts

In summary, the idea of a coastal migration out of Africa is based on:

the earliest evidence for humans consuming seafood and developing adaptations for living close to the sea shore about 162,000 years ago
the first evidence of dedicated coastal foraging for seafood, which may have enhanced our ancestors’ cognitive capacity
the first “recipes” in early human food preparation around 82,000 years ago
among the earliest reports of bone tool technology from around 100,000 years ago, which may have been used to make complex clothing and shoes
the regular use of pigments such as red ochre as early as 162,000 years ago
palaeoart in the form of engravings in ochre dated 100,000 to 85,000 years ago, and a drawing using an ochre crayon dated to 73,000 years ago

the earliest evidence for making small stone blades around 71,000 years ago
the earliest evidence for heat treatment of stone to produce advanced tools and weapons
use of jewellery for adornment
survival during a period of climate change following the Mount Toba eruption
complementary evidence from the trace fossil (ichnology) record from the same region and time period. This includes the oldest reported use of sticks by humans, and the oldest reported evidence of humans jogging or running.

When the era of global cooling ended about 18,000 years ago and sea levels rose again, almost all of this Pleistocene landscape would have been covered by water. So it’s remarkable that so much evidence still exists.

There is no equivalent evidence of an advanced modern human presence from eastern Africa or anywhere else in the world.

Why migrate?

Why would some people choose to move and migrate? It is likely that increasing pressure from successful, growing, competing bands of humans, combined with climatic and environmental changes and a limited number of suitable cave occupation sites, provided a trigger for an initial eastward and then north-eastward migration.

At the same time, advanced cognition skills would have permitted increasing intra-group co-operation, enabling these humans to make their remarkable journey.

We think a coastal migration up and out of Africa was more likely to succeed than an overland migration. The reasons include the availability of seafood, fresh water, level ground, warm temperatures and fewer big, dangerous animals along the intertidal coastline. It seems there weren’t other people in the way either: for example, there is no evidence of an equivalent culture associated with the sea on the eastern coast of Africa.

The lack of suitable coastal caves to live in north of South Africa may have encouraged human clans to keep moving up the coast.

Out of Africa

The exit from the Horn of Africa into the Arabian Peninsula was distinctly feasible from 60,000 years ago onwards. Records from the Red Sea indicate that sea levels in the region were about 100 metres below present levels 65,000 years ago.

Our examination of the available evidence points to the southern Cape coast as a cradle of modern human development. The people of this region were ideally placed 70,000 years ago to undertake a quick and effective migration out of Africa, and then around the world.

Francis Thackeray has received funding from the National Research Foundation.

Nothing to disclose.

Alan Whitfield, Charles Helm, and Renee Rust do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Where did the first people come from? The case for a coastal migration from southern Africa – https://theconversation.com/where-did-the-first-people-come-from-the-case-for-a-coastal-migration-from-southern-africa-267299

October 29, 2025

Paul Biya’s life presidency in Cameroon enters a fragile final phase

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of Nottingham

For the first time ever, the opposition parties in Cameroon have come “close” to unseating 92-year-old Paul Biya, who has run the country since 1982.

The stiffest competition for Biya in the 2025 election came from 76-year-old Tchiroma Bakary, a former ally and government spokesperson, who contested on the platform of Cameroon National Salvation Front. He won more than 35% of the vote – the second highest ever scored by an opposition candidate since Biya has been contesting. Though it was one of the best performances by opposition parties in Cameroon since 1992, the opposition suffered from its failure to present a united front and field a single candidate.

Biya once again triumphed, albeit with a reduced majority of 53.66%. Other candidates scored a combined 11%. His previous win in 2018 was at 71.28% against Maurice Kamto’s 14.23%.

This result is at variance with Bakary claiming overwhelming victory at the polls with 60%. His claims have been dismissed by the constitutional court and the electoral commission.

Biya’s controversial win has resulted in countrywide protests and a crackdown resulting in causalties.

I am a long time scholar of and political commentator on African politics, regime types and democratic governance with a keen interest in Cameroon.

I argue that Cameroon is at an inflection point, where Biya’s triumph might herald a “quiet” resignation to see through one of the world’s longest presidencies. For Biya, the to-do list couldn’t have got any longer. For Cameroon and the continent, democracy is yet again being asked hard questions with no obvious answers.

Divided opposition

Determined by a simple majority, the election meant that Biya – sometimes described as the absent landlord due to his prolonged stay outside Cameroon – only needed a sliver of support to triumph for a life term presidency. His new seven-year term of office ends in 2032, by which time he would be close to 100 years old.

Though his share of the vote fell by about 20 percentage points, he triumphed again because of the perennial challenges faced by the opposition.

Failure to coalesce around a single unifying candidate meant that the opposition with 11 candidates was still seen as divided.

With all state apparatus, especially the constitutional court, stacked against the opposition, it was not surprising that they were fighting a losing battle from the start.

The challenges ahead are monumental.

The road ahead

Biya has a full in-tray.

With dissatisfaction running high, one of the core priorities is to ensure the political stability of his regime. Recent forced regime changes in west Africa, and very recently in Madagascar, would perhaps give pause for thought about the vulnerability of the regime.

It is possible that sustained political upheaval could provoke a palace coup, as Gabon attests. That said, Biya’s effort to coup proof his regime with loyalist military co-ethnics, the Betis, appears to have bought him some comfort. Many of the senior officers’ fate would be intertwined with Biya’s.

The reality that his reported triumph comes with a much reduced mandate would mean re-asserting legitimacy will be another priority. Biya will have to work to establish or “enforce” his legitimacy both domestically and internationally.

The South West continues to be a place of concern. With the Anglophone crisis – caused by perceived marginalisation of the Anglophone south-west – still festering, the election result may galvanise the rebellion in the hope that renewed active hostilities may create conditions for willingness to settle the conflict before Biya bows out.

There is no question that Biya has entered into the last mile of his life presidency. It is inevitable that the political elite jostling for post Biya relevance will become more pronounced.

This infighting could destabilise the regime and make it a challenge to hold course. Ambitious elites may abandon Biya’s ship, as Bakary did.

On the campaign trail, Biya promised especially the young Cameroonians and women that their “best is yet to come”. He was acutely aware of the high level of dissatisfaction and his regime will be pressed to address their plight.

According to the World Bank, about 40% of Cameroonians live below the poverty line. Urban unemployment is running at 35% and many educated youths face challenges in obtaining formal employment.

A 2024 Afrobarometer survey says 51% of young Cameroonians have considered emigrating.

The perennial challenges of systemic corruption, service delivery, poverty and slow growth persist. Today, the average Cameroonian is no more wealthy than in 1986. How Biya’s new term attends to this will be crucial to temporarily assuaging pent up frustration.

As the 92-year-old Biya begins another term of office along with the president of the constitutional court, Clement Atangana (84), chief of staff Claude Meka (86), president of the senate Marcel Niat (90) and national assembly speaker Cavaye Yegue (85), Cameroon should confidently be looking at a generational shift after the Biya era.

David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Paul Biya’s life presidency in Cameroon enters a fragile final phase – https://theconversation.com/paul-biyas-life-presidency-in-cameroon-enters-a-fragile-final-phase-268429

October 28, 2025

Ecoball: how to turn picking up litter into a game for kids

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Solaja Mayowa Oludele, Lecturing, Olabisi Onabanjo University

Every year humanity produces nearly 300 million tonnes of plastic. Only a fraction ever gets recycled. Most ends up in rivers, oceans and soil, slowly breaking down into tiny, invisible microplastics that get into what we eat and drink.

Decades of recycling drives and policy bans have not altered the deep-rooted behaviours behind this crisis.
But what if the next big environmental solution isn’t a new law or technology – but a game?

I am an environmental sociologist and behaviour change researcher from Nigeria. I developed a game called EcoBall in 2023 as a social innovation that makes sport a tool for sustainability.

The concept is discussed in my peer-reviewed paper.

EcoBall reimagines football as a discipline of training for environmental stewardship. Instead of chasing goals alone, teams compete to collect, sort and creatively reuse plastic waste. Each match becomes a live demonstration of the circular economy – the idea that materials should be reused, not discarded.

Here I describe how the game works, why it influences people’s behaviour, and what we found when we tested it in Nigerian schools and youth clubs.

Three zones, one planet

An EcoBall match uses a real ball made from tightly woven recycled plastic bags – the “EcoBall” itself. Two or more teams compete across three timed “learning zones”, combining physical play with environmental tasks.

• Collection zone (10-15 minutes): To start play, the ball is placed at the centre of the field. Players pass and dribble it like they would in football or handball. The pitch or play area is scattered with lightweight, clean plastic litter. Teams race to gather the litter from the designated area and place it in a team bag or collection net along the sidelines before rejoining the game. Points are awarded for the amount and diversity of plastics collected.

• Sorting zone: Back on the pitch, players classify the plastics correctly (PET bottles, sachets, nylon wrappers and so on). Accurate sorting earns additional points and practical recycling knowledge. Teams earn points for goals and for the quantity or weight of litter collected.

• Creative zone: After each game, the collected plastics are sorted and delivered to recycling or upcycling partners. Using selected materials, teams craft new items – from art pieces to flower planters or even another EcoBall. Judges score on creativity, teamwork and utility.

Participants also engage in short reflective or educational sessions to discuss plastic pollution, sustainability habits, and collective responsibility.

The champion is not only the fastest but also the team with the most environmental impact.

What seems to be a game is really learning through doing. Participants learn sustainability not by being preached at but by doing it, competing and relishing their achievements together.

The psychology behind the game

EcoBall draws on two social-science ideas: the theory of planned behaviour and social capital theory. The first explains why people adopt sustainable habits. By making recycling fun, social and rewarding, EcoBall reshapes attitudes and perceived norms – the key drivers of behaviour.

The second highlights the power of trust and networks. EcoBall builds these bonds as teams collaborate and share victories, creating social momentum that keeps environmental action alive long after the game ends.

In designing and evaluating EcoBall, I combined these theories with research on sport-for-development and environmental education. Where I was both participant-observer and referee, the assessment compared data from questionnaires, focus groups and observation diaries. The design allowed for transparency, credibility, and contextual validity in interpretation of EcoBall’s impact on environmental attitudes and behaviours.

Tested on the field

Pilot sessions were conducted at several schools and youth clubs across Ogun State to ascertain the level to which EcoBall enhances environmental awareness, cooperation and pro-active participation in plastic litter removal.

The pilots were community-led and research-motivated and were supported by small donations from local NGOs and schools, and recycling businesses which provided gloves, collection bags and bins.

Instructors reported increased cooperation and leadership. Players described being more responsible for their surroundings, and some of them formed neighbourhood clean-up clubs which extended weeks beyond the games. While the long-term effect is yet to be studied, these early findings show that EcoBall is likely to induce actual behavioural change.

From waste to wealth

EcoBall also shows that environmental action can create livelihoods.
In one pilot, students built benches and flower planters from bottles gathered during matches. Others began selling up-cycled crafts, while the organisation of events – coaching, logistics and recycling partnerships – generated new work opportunities.

Such experiences echo the circular-economy principle of turning waste into worth.

Uniting generations and communities

Because EcoBall requires little equipment – just gloves, bags and open space – it thrives in low-resource communities.

The design was intentionally simple, ensuring accessibility and inclusion where conventional sports infrastructure is absent.

Although EcoBall is inexpensive to initiate, its long-term delivery as a structured sport-for-development and environmental education programme requires sustained funding. Investment is needed for facilitator training, community engagement, and monitoring activities. This is typical of community interventions: low-cost to launch but funding-dependent to sustain and scale.

Children, parents, and grandparents can play together, bridging generations and backgrounds. This shared passion generates a feeling of ownership of public spaces and renewed pride in keeping them clean.

Schools are able to incorporate EcoBall into extracurricular activities, municipalities can organise tournaments tied in with cleanup initiatives, and corporations can make it part of their corporate social responsibility initiatives.

Following early successes, two NGOs that work with youth development have begun using EcoBall in their environmental clubs, and discussions are underway with the National Youth Service Corps to introduce it into community services.

Challenges and opportunities

No innovation is challenge-free. EcoBall needs consistent funding, materials and cultural adaptation. Keeping players engaged may require creative incentives – such as mobile apps to track points or online leaderboards connecting communities globally.

Yet these hurdles create opportunities. A “World EcoBall Cup” could one day unite cities or nations, rewarding those who divert the most plastic from the environment.

Instead of medals, winners would boast cleaner beaches and thriving circular economies.

Play for the planet

The global plastic crisis demands solutions that move people, not just policies.

EcoBall does exactly that – bringing sport together with green purpose and demonstrating that climate action has the power to be human, inclusive and fun.

It is not the sole responsibility of scientists or policymakers to fight pollution. It belongs to everyone willing to pick up a ball – or a bottle – and make a difference.

Solaja Mayowa Oludele does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ecoball: how to turn picking up litter into a game for kids – https://theconversation.com/ecoball-how-to-turn-picking-up-litter-into-a-game-for-kids-267888

October 28, 2025

Luxury tourism is a risky strategy for African economies – new study of Botswana, Mauritius, Rwanda

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Pritish Behuria, Reader in Politics, Governance and Development, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester

Mauritius led the luxury tourism trend in Africa with all-inclusive resorts. Heritage Awali/yourgolftravel.com, CC BY-NC-ND

How successful is luxury tourism in Africa? What happens if it fails to produce higher tourism revenues: can it be reversed? And does it depend on what kind of government is in place?

Pritish Behuria is a scholar of the political economy of development who has conducted a study in Botswana, Mauritius and Rwanda to find answers to questions like this. We asked him about his findings.

What is luxury tourism and how prevalent is it in Africa?

Luxury tourism aims to attract high-spending tourists to stay at premium resorts and lodges or visit exclusive attractions. It’s a strategy that’s being adopted widely by governments around the world and also in African countries.

It’s been promoted by multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the United Nations, as well as environmental and conservation organisations.

The logic underlying luxury tourism is that if fewer, high-spending tourists visit, this will result in less environmental impact. It’s often labelled as a “high-value, low-impact” approach.

However, studies have shown that luxury tourism does not lead to reduced environmental impact. Luxury tourists are more likely to use private jets. Private jets are more carbon intense than economy class travel. Supporters of luxury tourism also ignore that it reinforces economic inequalities, commercialises nature and restricts land access for indigenous populations.

In some ways, of course, the motives of African countries seem understandable. They remain starved of much-needed foreign exchange in the face of rising trade deficits. The allure of luxury tourism seems almost impossible to resist.

How did you go about your study?

I have been studying the political economy of Rwanda for nearly 15 years. The government there made tourism a central part of its national vision.

Over the years, many government officials and tourism stakeholders highlighted the challenges of luxury tourism strategies. Even so, there remains a single-mindedness to prioritise luxury tourism.

I found that, in Rwanda, luxury tourism resulted in a reliance on foreign-owned hotels and foreign travel agents, exposing potential leakages in tourism revenues. Crucially, tourism was not creating enough employment. There was also a skills lag in the sector. Employees were not being trained quickly enough to meet the surge of investments in hotels.

So I decided to investigate the effects of luxury tourism in other African countries. I wanted to know who benefits and how it is being reversed in countries that are turning away from it.

I interviewed government officials, hotel owners and other private sector representatives, aviation officials, consultants and journalists in all three countries. Added to this was a thorough review of economic data, industry reports and grey literature (including newspaper articles).

What are your take-aways from Mauritius?

Mauritius was the first of the three countries to explicitly adopt a luxury tourism strategy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the government began to encourage European visitors to the island’s “sun-sand-sea” attractions. Large domestic business houses became lead investors, building luxury hotels and buying coastal land.

Over the years, tourism has provided significant revenues for the Mauritian economy. By 2019, the economy was earning over US$2 billion from the sector (before dropping during the COVID pandemic).

However, tourism has also been symbolic of the inequality that has characterised Mauritius’ growth. The all-inclusive resort model – where luxury hotels take care of all of a visitor’s food and travel needs themselves – has meant that the money being spent by tourists doesn’t always enter the local economy. A large share of profits remains outside the country or with large hotels.

After the pandemic, the Mauritian government took steps to loosen its focus on luxury tourism. It opened its air space to attract a broader range of tourists and re-started direct flights to Asia. There’s growing agreement within government that the opening up of tourism will go some way towards sustaining revenues and employment in the sector. Especially as some other key sectors (like offshore finance) may face an uncertain future.

And from Botswana?

Botswana followed Mauritius by formally adopting a luxury tourism strategy in 1990. Its focus was on its wilderness areas (the Okavango Delta) and wildlife safari lodges. For decades, there were criticisms from scholars about the inequalities in the sector.

Most lodges and hotels were foreign owned. Most travel agencies that booked all-inclusive trips operated outside Botswana. There were very few domestic linkages. Very little domestic agricultural or industrial production was used within the sector.

An aerial photo of a vast land of water and rocky. Small boats cross the water. — Guides take tourists across Botswana’s Okavango delta in boats.
Diego Delso/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

However, I found that the direction of tourism policies had also become increasingly political. Certain politicians were aligned with conservation organisations and foreign investors in prioritising luxury tourism. Former president Ian Khama, for example, banned trophy hunting on ethical grounds in 2014. He pushed photographic tourism, where travellers visit destinations mainly to take photos. But critics allege he and his allies benefited from the push for photographic tourism.

Photographic tourism is closely linked with the problematic promotion of “unspoilt” wilderness areas that conform to foreign ideas about the “myth of wild Africa”.

President Mokgweetsi Masisi reversed the hunting ban once he took power. He argued it had adverse effects on rural communities and increased human-wildlife conflict. He believed that regulated hunting could be a tool for better wildlife management and could produce more benefits for communities.

Since the latter 2010s, Botswana’s government has loosened the emphasis on luxury tourism and tried to diversify tourism offerings. It has relaxed visa regulations for Asian countries, for example, to allow a wider range of tourists to visit more easily.

What about Rwanda?

Of the three cases, Rwanda was the most recent to adopt a luxury tourism strategy. However, it has remained the most committed to this strategy. Rwanda’s model is centred on mountain gorilla trekking and premium wildlife experiences. It’s augmented by Rwanda’s attempt to become a hub for business and sports tourism through high-profile conferences and events.

A statue in a breen-leafed area of a male, female, and baby gorilla. — Gorillas are a key attraction for luxury tourists in Rwanda.
Gatete Pacifique/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

Rwanda invited global hotel brands (like the Hyatt and Marriott) to build hotels and invested heavily in the country’s “nation brand” through sponsoring sports teams. The “luxury” element is managed through maintaining a high price to visit the country’s main tourist attraction: mountain gorillas. Rwanda is one of the few countries where mountain gorillas live.

After the pandemic, the government lowered prices to visit mountain gorillas but has also regularly stated its commitment to luxury tourism.

What did you learn by comparing the three?

I wanted to know why some countries reverse luxury tourism strategies once they fail while others don’t.

It is quite clear that luxury tourism strategies will always have disadvantages. As this study shows, luxury tourism repeatedly benefits only very few actors (often foreign investors or foreign-owned entities) and does not create sufficient employment or provide wider benefits for domestic populations. My research shows that the political pressure faced by democratic governments (like Botswana and Mauritius) forced them to loosen their luxury tourism strategies. This was not the case in more authoritarian Rwanda.

Rwanda’s position goes against a lot of recent literature on African political economy, which argues that parties with a stronger hold on power would be able to deliver better development outcomes.

While that may be case in some sectors, the findings of this study suggest that weaker political parties may actually be more responsive to changing policies that are creating inequality than countries with stronger political parties in power.

Pritish Behuria is a recipient of the British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship 2024-2025 (MFSS24/240043).

– ref. Luxury tourism is a risky strategy for African economies – new study of Botswana, Mauritius, Rwanda – https://theconversation.com/luxury-tourism-is-a-risky-strategy-for-african-economies-new-study-of-botswana-mauritius-rwanda-267877

October 28, 2025

Nigeria’s government is using digital technology to repress citizens. A researcher explains how

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Chibuzo Achinivu, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Vassar College

Digital authoritarianism is a new way governments are trying to control citizens using digital and information technology. It is a growing concern for advocacy groups and those interested in freedom and democracy. It is especially worrying for those who initially heralded digital and information technologies as liberating tools that would spread information more easily for citizens.

I have studied the rise of digital authoritarianism in Africa over the last two decades. My most recent study focused on Nigeria, and its turn to digital tools for control after the 2020 #EndSARS Movement protests.

I found that local conflict and development needs drive the Nigerian government’s demand for digital authoritarianism technologies. Foreign suppliers of these technologies are motivated by both economic gain and influence in the region.

The findings are important. Firstly, it signals that the trend of using digital spaces to control populations has reached the African continent. It also shows that the trend is facilitated by foreign actors that provide governments with the technology and expertise.

What is digital authoritarianism?

One way to understand the concept of digital authoritarianism is as a form of governance or set of actions aimed at undermining accountability. It is the use of digital technologies for this goal.

Technology is used to repress voices, keep people under surveillance, and manipulate populations for regime goals and survival.

It includes but is not limited to internet and social media shutdowns. It prioritises the use of spyware to hack and monitor people through their devices. There is mass surveillance using artificial intelligence for facial recognition, and misinformation and disinformation propaganda campaigns.

What drives it in Africa

In Africa these actions are popping up in democracies like Nigeria and in autocracies alike. Perhaps the noticeable difference between these two types of governments is the subtlety of their form of digital authoritarianism and the legal recourse when such actions are unearthed.

Both governance types make claims of national security and public safety to justify these tactics. For instance, former Nigerian information minister Lai Mohammed claimed the 2020 Twitter ban was due to “the persistent use of the platform for activities that are capable of undermining Nigeria’s corporate existence”.

Autocracies are often cruder with their use of blatant tactics. They employ internet and social media shutdowns. This is often due to their unsophisticated digital authoritarianism apparatuses. Democracies often rely on more subtle surveillance and misinformation campaigns to reach their goals.

This all begs the question: what are the drivers of this trend? There are four clear ones:

regime survival/political control
security and counterterrorism
electoral competition and information manipulation
modernisation agendas (development).

On the rise

In the African context digital authoritarianism is on the rise. There’s a cohesive relationship between the foreign suppliers of the hardware, expertise and domestic demand. This demand stems from authoritarian regimes as well as regimes accessing digital systems to consolidate and modernise. There are also hybrid regimes, which are countries with a mixture democratic and authoritarian institutions.

States like China, Russia, Israel, France and the US supply both the technology and instruction or best practices to African regimes. Reasons for supply include economic gain and regional influence.

On the demand side, African regimes seek out digital authoritarianism tools mainly for development needs and for conflict resolution. Some of the largest consumers are Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana.

The study

I found there was evidence that Nigeria’s development goals and efforts to quell conflicts drive the use of technology to repress its people. Using the example of the #EndSARS movement, social media platform shutdowns and efforts to build a firewall akin to China’s great firewall serve as evidence for this.

In the days following Twitter’s removal of a post by President Muhammadu Buhari, Twitter was banned in Nigeria. The administration cited its use to further unrest, instability, and secessionist movements. There were claims that this step was taken to maintain internet sovereignty.

However, the ban also undermined social movements that were successfully holding the government accountable. Following domestic and international outcry over the ban, there were reports that the Nigerian government had approached China. The purpose of the contact was to replicate their “Great Firewall” in Nigeria’s internet control apparatus. (The focus of China’s project is to monitor and censor what can and cannot be seen through an online network in China.) This would allow the state to manage access to certain cites and block unwanted content from reaching Nigerians.

On the supply side, China’s economic commitments to the country and concerted efforts to cultivate certain norms in the country and region offer insights into the motivations for supply in this case and the broader continent.

Again, regime type dictates just how these technologies will be used. Interviews conducted with permanent secretaries and ministers of Nigerian ministries were particularly revealing. They confirmed that repressive government practices in the real world are informing their activity in digital spaces.

For instance, they intimated that the repression that occurs during protests in the streets in order to manage “lawlessness” is being replicated online. Its purpose is to ensure peace and stability.

For development needs, countries like Nigeria initially seek out foreign suppliers to furnish them with state of the art technology systems. The objective is to establish or refurbish their information and communications technology apparatuses.

These include but are not limited to national broadband networks) such as fiber optic networks, mobile telecommunications networks and smart city governance systems. Though these are often not repressive in nature, they are capable of dual use. Thus, these development needs provide technologies that are then utilized in an authoritarian fashion for state building goals.

There is also evidence that some suppliers provide instruction on how to use these technologies for repression. In some instances, under the guise of development needs, regimes seek out more repressive tools such as spyware alongside these infrastructural development programs. At this stage, the boundary between development and security blurs, as modernization becomes a vehicle for national security, cyber defense, regime protection, and information control.

What can be done?

I propose a three-pronged approach to address the three drivers. First of all, more has to be done on the international front to curb the sale of repressive tools to states. There must be a conversation about the norms of these technologies and their use for repression in both democracies and autocracies.

On the demand side, it appears those practices that have plagued the hopes of freedom and democracy in the real world have to be addressed. Naturally, no movement on the digital front is complete without a real world manifestation. It seems logical that eradicating digital repression necessitates addressing repression in general.

Finally, regulatory legal and institutional oversight alongside human rights benchmarks must be achieved. These will accompany digital and privacy rights in cyberspace.

Chibuzo Achinivu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s government is using digital technology to repress citizens. A researcher explains how – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-government-is-using-digital-technology-to-repress-citizens-a-researcher-explains-how-267032

October 27, 2025

New discovery reveals chimpanzees in Uganda use flying insects to tend their wounds

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Kayla Kolff, Postdoctoral researcher, Osnabrück University

Animals respond to injury in many ways. So far, evidence for animals tending wounds with biologically active materials is rare. Yet, a recent study of an orangutan treating a wound with a medicinal plant provides a promising lead.

Chimpanzees, for example, are known to lick their wounds and sometimes press leaves onto them, but these behaviours are still only partly understood. We still do not know how often these actions occur, whether they are deliberate, or how inventive chimpanzees can be when responding to wounds.

Recent field observations in Uganda, east Africa, are now revealing intriguing insights into how these animals cope with wounds.

As a primatologist, I am fascinated by the cognitive and social lives of chimpanzees, and by what sickness-related behaviours can reveal about the evolutionary origins of care and empathy in people. Chimpanzees are among our closest living relatives, and we can learn so much about ourselves through understanding them.

In our research based in Kibale National Park, Uganda, chimpanzees have been seen applying insects to their own open wounds on five occasions, and in one case to another individual.

Behaviours like insect application show that chimpanzees are not passive when wounded. They experiment with their environment, sometimes alone and occasionally with others. While we should not jump too quickly to call this “medicine”, it does show that they are capable of responding to wounds in inventive and sometimes cooperative ways.

Each new insight adds reveals more about chimpanzees, offering glimpses into the shared evolutionary roots of our own responses to injury and caregiving instincts.

First catch your insect

We saw the insect applications by chance while observing and recording their behaviour in the forest, but paid special attention to chimpanzees with open wounds.

Insect application by subadult Damien.

In all observed cases, the sequence of actions seemed deliberate. A chimpanzee caught an unidentified flying insect, immobilised it between lips or fingers, and pressed it directly onto an open wound. The same insect was sometimes reapplied several times, occasionally after being held briefly in the mouth, before being discarded. Other chimpanzees occasionally watched the process closely, seemingly with curiosity.

Most often the behaviour was directed at the chimpanzee’s own open wound. However, in one rare instance, an adolescent female applied an insect to her brother’s wound. A study on the same community has shown that chimpanzees also dab the wounds of unrelated members with leaves, prompting the question of whether insect application of these chimpanzees, too, might extend beyond family members. Acts of care, whether directed towards family or others, can reveal the early foundations of empathy and cooperation.

The observed sequence closely resembles the insect applications seen in Central chimpanzees in Gabon, Africa. The similarity suggests that insect application may represent a more widespread behaviour performed by chimpanzee than previously recognised.

The finding from Kibale National Park broadens our view of how chimpanzees respond to wounds. Rather than leaving wounds unattended, they sometimes act in ways that appear deliberate and targeted.

Chimpanzee first aid?

The obvious question is what function this behaviour might serve. We know that chimpanzees deliberately use plants in ways that can improve their health: swallowing rough leaves that help expel intestinal parasites or chewing bitter shoots with possible anti-parasitic effects.

Insects, however, are a different matter. Pressing insects onto wounds has not yet been shown to speed up healing or reduce infection. Many insects do produce antimicrobial or anti-inflammatory substances, so the possibility is there, but scientific testing is still needed.

For now, what we can say is that the behaviour appears to be targeted, patterned and deliberate. The single case of an insect being applied to another individual is especially intriguing. Chimpanzees are highly social animals, but active helping is relatively rare. Alongside well-known behaviours such as grooming, food sharing, and support in fights, applying an insect to a sibling’s wound hints at another form of care, one that goes beyond maintaining relationships to possibly improving the other’s physical condition.

Big questions

This behaviour leaves us with some big questions. If insect application proves medicative, it could explain why chimpanzees do it. This in turn raises the question of how the behaviour arises in the first place: do chimpanzees learn it by observing others, or does it emerge more spontaneously? From there arises the question of selectivity – are they choosing particular flying insects, and if so, do others in the group learn to select the same ones?

In human traditional medicine (entomotherapy), flying insects such as honeybees and blowflies are valued for their antimicrobial or anti-inflammatory effects. Whether the insects applied by chimpanzees provide similar benefits is still to be investigated.

Finally, if chimpanzees are indeed applying insects with medicinal value and sometimes placing them on the wounds of others, this could represent active helping and even prosocial behaviour. (The term is used to describe behaviours that benefit others rather than the individual performing them.)

Watching chimpanzees in Kibale National Park immobilise a flying insect and gently press it onto an open wound reminds us how much there is still to learn about their abilities. It also adds to the growing evidence that the roots of care and healing behaviours extend much further back in evolutionary time.

If insect applications prove to be medicinal, this adds to the importance of safeguarding chimpanzees and their habitats. In turn, these habitats protect the insects that can contribute to chimpanzee well-being.

Kayla Kolff received funding from the German Research Foundation (DFG), project number 274877981 (GRK-2185/1: DFG Research Training Group Situated Cognition).

– ref. New discovery reveals chimpanzees in Uganda use flying insects to tend their wounds – https://theconversation.com/new-discovery-reveals-chimpanzees-in-uganda-use-flying-insects-to-tend-their-wounds-267301

October 27, 2025

Raila Odinga mastered the art of political compromise for the good of Kenya

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Westen K Shilaho, International Relations Scholar, University of the Witwatersrand

One of the markers of Kenyan statesman Raila Odinga was not just his courage in challenging the establishment but his ability to fortify it when circumstances demanded. An example was his willingness in 2007 to set aside his ambition at having been robbed of the presidency in a rigged election by agreeing to a coalition government with his opponent, President Mwai Kibaki.

Odinga espoused compromise and never squandered the political moment. Thus he ceded political ground for the greater national good and stability. This is how he helped to quell violence following disputed presidential elections in 2007. To his admirers this showed political maturity and astuteness.

This was not always interpreted as courageous, however. Some detractors labelled it as political weakness and betrayal. Despite numerous compromises, his detractors hardly ceded ground.

Just before his death, some of his detractors had labelled him the ultimate betrayer for solidifying his relationship with President William Ruto. Odinga worked with Ruto under what they termed broad-based government, formed at the height of mass protests to oust Ruto. Odinga propped up the embattled government under pressure over a controversial taxation bill and other problems. The nomination and sebsequent appointment of party members to the beleaguered government immediately deflated the protests. This demonstrated Odinga’s unmatched influence in Kenya’s politics.

I am a scholar of politics who has studied Kenya’s transition from authoritarianism to more democratic forms of politics. My 2018 book Political Power and Tribalism in Kenya examined the salience of ethnicity in the country’s multiparty politics.

It’s my view that Odinga employed compromise to integrate Kenya and hopefully live to fight another day. He had either official or informal working arrangements with all of Kenya’s five presidents bar one. He was therefore party to top decision making in the country without the benefit of executive power.

Had he thrown his weight behind the protest movement in 2024, it is highly likely that Kenya would have dissolved into chaos, as witnessed after disputed elections in 2007. He held that the mass protests in 2025 could have resulted in state collapse and bloodletting had he not intervened.

Through chutzpah and guile, Odinga escaped all attempts by his detractors to reduce him to an ethnic leader. Instead, he built alliances and connected with the working-class and rural poor, especially young Kenyans, who identified with his courage in Kenya’s human rights and democracy struggle.

Odinga: The bogeyman of Kenya’s establishment

A former Kenyan vice president, Michael Wamalwa Kijana, once described Odinga’s relationship with Kenyans as either Railamania or Railaphobia – people either passionately liked or irrationally feared him.

He commanded fanatical support among his co-ethnics and across Kenya, especially in his strongholds. But a section of Kenyan society opposed him, especially the clique that has controlled executive power and economic privileges since 1963.

Although Odinga was part of the establishment and rose to the position of prime minister (2008-2013), the only second Kenyan to occupy the post, he was treated with suspicion and disdain especially over the male circumcision rite that his community did not traditionally practise. His father, the founding vice president of Kenya who became the doyen of opposition politics, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, suffered the same fate.

Raila Odinga’s detractors, among the elite and populace, mocked him while he was sick and irreverently celebrated his death.

This grouping, opposed to a capable welfare state based on inclusivity and egalitarianism, showed almost irrational antipathy towards Odinga. The establishment consistently schemed against him. His mass appeal, socialist orientation and populist politics posed a threat to the most reactionary cohort of the Kenyan political elite. Odinga’s uncompromising stance against the one-party dictatorship which earned him nine years of detention without trial, and implicated him in an abortive coup in 1982, did not endear him to all.

Odinga’s capacity to reinvent himself politically was astounding. Despite losing presidential elections five times, on several occasions because of state instigated fraud, he was undiminished. He was widely known in diplomatic circuits across Africa and globally. Memorably he mediated the Ivorian conflict following violently disputed elections in 2010. Thus, Odinga was among the pantheon of Kenya’s greats, a pan-Africanist and an internationalist.

Kenya’s moment of introspection

His death affords Kenyans an opportunity to reflect on the state of the Kenyan nation. He personified Kenya’s contradictions. Odinga’s long political career exhibited hope and despair for his supporters. In a country hamstrung by the ideology of ethnicised politics, there could not have been a more opportune moment for introspection.

Some of Odinga’s political moves turned out to be miscalculations. For instance, the grand coalition government formed in the wake of the 2007-2008 post-election maelstrom stabilised Kenya but did not address long term historical injustices.

Although it was the most inclusive since independence, it was bloated and mired in corruption, and perpetrated human rights violations. This rapprochement sealed his fate because it gave his opponents room to regroup. They regained the political initiative and eventually locked him out of the presidency forever.

His relationship with Ruto appeared to be more trusting than earlier ones, but Odinga still seemed to be the outsider in Kenya’s political matrix. Odinga’s shortcomings humanised him. Giants can have feet of clay.

Odinga bows out as the people’s president; the president that Kenya never had.

Westen K Shilaho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Raila Odinga mastered the art of political compromise for the good of Kenya – https://theconversation.com/raila-odinga-mastered-the-art-of-political-compromise-for-the-good-of-kenya-268022

October 26, 2025

Ethiopian quarter: how migrants have shaped a thriving shopping district in South Africa’s city of gold

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tanya Zack, Visiting senior lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand

Since its founding in 1886, Johannesburg, has been a city of migrants, internal and international. But the economic capital of South Africa has undergone big changes since 1994 when South Africa became a democracy. One such change involves migration into the city by people from other African countries.

A new book, The Chaos Precinct: Johannesburg as a port city, by Tanya Zack traces how migrant Ethiopians have shaped a trading post in Johannesburg’s inner city. Zack, a planner who specialises in urban policy, regeneration, informality and sustainable development, explains how the Ethiopians did it.

What space have Ethiopian migrants carved out in the centre of Johannesburg?

The book is set in the shopping centres of the so-called Ethiopian Quarter, in high-rise, formerly commercial buildings in the inner city of Johannesburg. It is a cross-border shopping hub of thousands of cupboard-sized shops crammed into buildings. It defies the categories of formal or informal, of wholesale or retail. And it is where people from all of southern Africa come to shop for fast fashion.

While migrants from several countries trade here, the trading post was pioneered by and remains dominated by Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants. It is an extraordinary shopping district in what were high-rise medical buildings. These office towers centre on Rahima Moosa (previously Jeppe) Street, where medical practitioners and pharmaceutical companies once agglomerated.

Buildings that had been underutilised or abandoned became the canvas for an entrepreneurial transformation. Ethiopian migrants led the repurposing of these structures into over 3,000 tiny shops. Shopfronts are linked to storerooms located higher up in the buildings or nearby spaces. This new retail footprint wasn’t known in Johannesburg three decades ago. And the scale of trading has attracted many infrastructure uses that support the transnational movement of goods and people.

It was not supported by formal planning or pension funds, but developed by migrant entrepreneurs, one shop at a time.

They draw on global supply chains, particularly Chinese wholesalers operating in warehouse-style malls west of the inner city, to access a steady stream of fast fashion, cosmetics and household items. Inner-city-based Ethiopian traders then retail these goods in individual or smaller quantities. Their clientele is composed largely of cross-border traders who on-sell the products throughout southern Africa.

This model has effectively turned the inner city into an inland port. It’s a logistics hub where goods circulate rapidly, and where shoppers are embedded in an informal yet highly organised distribution network.

The inner-city street grid, first surveyed in 1886 during Johannesburg’s mining camp era, consists of very short blocks, which amplify pedestrian and vehicular congestion. It’s a frenzied shopping environment.

Shopkeepers and stallholders have maximised their display areas through creative lightweight architectures. Small shopfronts are linked to storerooms higher up in buildings or nearby. Sidewalks are lined with street vendors, forming mini corridors.

Internal arcades in the buildings further maximise the retail footprint. This hybrid, vertically integrated structuring has generated a real estate boom in previously underutilised buildings in a flagging property market.

The success of this enclave is also tied to the migrants’ ability to craft both social and commercial networks. Migrant traders and cross-border shoppers have relationships based on trading through information sharing, mutual assistance, and informal credit mechanisms. Traders are necessarily adaptive. They adjust to the pace of demand, shifting product lines quickly. They also coordinate closely with suppliers and resellers throughout Southern Africa. The spaces they use and adapt are similarly flexible.

This combination of adaptive reuse, dense retail specialisation and networked entrepreneurship has allowed Ethiopian migrants to carve out a commercial territory that is at once highly visible and deeply embedded in regional trade flows.

South Africa has been harsh towards informal economic activity. How has this been managed?

The Ethiopian Quarter exists in a context of often-hostile municipal and national governance.

South Africa has historically oscillated between tolerance and repression of informal economic activity, particularly when driven by foreign migrants. Law enforcement campaigns have regularly targeted street traders and migrant shopkeepers. Traders and shoppers alike face the constant threat of violent policing, corruption, theft, and harassment. Uniformed police or wardens regularly confront them, demanding that they prove their migrant status. There’s talk of being detained in vehicles until a bribe is paid.

Ethiopian migrant traders have developed a range of strategies to navigate the challenges of hostility. They co-locate with other Ethiopian traders, and rely on ethnic and commercial networks to absorb shocks and share information about law enforcement activities.

Ethiopian traders have also innovatively adapted their physical and commercial operations to reduce vulnerability. Shops are designed to control stock and display goods while concealing cash and high-value items. The light architectures and arcade designs of Jeppe also make it possible to conceal the shop in the event of raids.

Shoppers spend as little time as possible inside the crime-ridden Johannesburg CBD. On the day they choose goods, they often carry no money. They return later with cash to purchase goods as swiftly as possible so that cash is not carried unnecessarily. Many hide cash on their bodies.

The infrastructures that have developed to service the port-like functions of this massive cross border trading hub offer storage, package, information exchange and distribution services. Hotels, buses and storage facilities provide relative safety for cross-border shoppers who must navigate a city known for crime. A 2017 survey, funded by the Johannesburg Inner City Partnership,
found that over 60% of retailers had experienced physical assault. 38% reported regularly giving police officers something to mitigate harassment.

What lessons do you draw about how cities should govern migration?

The cross-border shopping hub demonstrates that migrant-driven informal economies are engines of economic activity. Estimates based on the 2017 cross border shopping survey showed that shoppers in the Jeppe district alone spent close to US$600 million annually. This was twice the turnover of Sandton City, at that time Africa’s richest mall.

The activities of Jeppe mimic international entrepots like Singapore and Hong Kong. They offer information exchange, repackaging and distribution services for goods flowing from China to international destinations. This Johannesburg entrepot has regional significance, distributing goods throughout southern Africa. But it’s under-recognised by municipal authorities.

A law and order approach must at least be coupled with a developmental approach. Cities that aim to govern migration must integrate migrant economic activity rather than suppress it.

Support through infrastructure improvements and security provision would amplify Jeppe’s economic impact.

This includes recognising the legitimacy of informal trading spaces, investing in basic infrastructure and safety, and developing regulations that protect safety while accommodating new building uses.

Partnership approaches that involve traders’ associations, building managers and community intermediaries to co-manage spaces would be valuable.

What does your work tell us about a city that’s been in decline. And solutions?

The burgeoning economy in Jeppe needs to be recognised alongside the private investments in Johannesburg that are celebrated for their regenerative capacity. This migrant enclave demonstrates how urban regeneration can evolve out of the actions of thousands of actors.

The challenge is to direct, support and harness this energy.

If we were to think of Johannesburg as a port, how would we understand and use the ecosystems of trade, movement and distribution that this networked economy has created? What other services could flow through these ecosystems? And what safety, mobility and public infrastructure services are required to enhance these entrepot functions and claim this role for the city, an African urban hub tied to multiple cities and small towns across the continent?

The cross-border shopping hub of Jeppe offers hope for an inland entrepot to be recognised, supported and expanded to offer the global services that Johannesburg’s infrastructure can provide.

Tanya Zack does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ethiopian quarter: how migrants have shaped a thriving shopping district in South Africa’s city of gold – https://theconversation.com/ethiopian-quarter-how-migrants-have-shaped-a-thriving-shopping-district-in-south-africas-city-of-gold-266494

October 26, 2025

Ghana’s banks are not lending enough to sectors where it matters most, like agriculture and manufacturing

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abotebuno Akolgo, Postdoctoral Fellow, Bard College Berlin; Bayreuth University

Bank lending is a major source of funding for businesses in Ghana. It helps pay for operational expenditure and investment in expansion of productive capacity. Therefore, it is important that there is substantial, affordable, and accessible financial credit for all businesses in the medium to long term. More than this, it matters which sectors of the country’s economy receive most of its bank credit.

In a recent study of the sectoral distribution of bank lending in Ghana, I found that for two and a half decades, bank lending to the agricultural and manufacturing enterprises has been in sharp decline.

In the 25 years from 1999 to 2023, the share of total bank credit that went to the agricultural and manufacturing sector fell by about 65% and 56% respectively. For instance, in 1999, about 25% of total bank lending went to manufacturing businesses. By 2023 however, that figure had fallen to about 11%.

I am an economist with expertise in the political economy of money, finance, and development in Africa. My research on Ghana has attempted to explain the financial constraints to the country’s economic transformation since independence in 1957. I have previously written on Ghana’s sovereign indebtedness and its banking and monetary policies.

The findings in the current study matter because in Ghana, agriculture and manufacturing are crucial to creating substantial, sustainable, and shared economic growth. Agriculture is the second largest employer in Ghana’s economy after the services sector. It is also crucial for creating the raw materials that can fuel manufacturing sector growth.

The role of banks & finance in economic development

There is no single perspective among economists on how banks operate or should operate in an economy. There are those economists within neoclassical economics circles who hold the conventional, largely discredited view that banks act merely as intermediaries who take money from savers and lend to borrowers.

In contrast, there are those, particularly post-Keynesian economists, who assert, rightly, that modern banks do not merely receive deposits and turn them into loans. They insist that banks create credit for borrowers but not necessarily from savers’ deposits.

Still, most economists agree on some things. First of all, that finance is crucial to economic development. Secondly, that the banking system has a role in the flow of finance to individuals, households and businesses.

Not all forms of financial flows are healthy for economic transformation, however. The key then for successful financial policy is to distinguish between productive and unproductive credit.

Productive credit flows support the entrepreneurial innovation that is central to creating new products or expanding production levels. This kind of credit will for instance support agricultural production and expand manufacturing capacity and outputs.

Unproductive credit does not increase the level of output. For instance, lending to support household consumption or financial speculation is unproductive.

The Ghanaian banking system does not generate enough credit for the private sector. However, that was hardly the concern for this study. Of particular interest is the question: where does the credit go to?

Bank credit to agriculture and manufacturing has declined

My study set out to disaggregate the data on financial credit to the various sectors of the Ghanaian economy. These sectors included agriculture, manufacturing and services. The evidence shows that bank lending has not significantly supported real productive sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.

As indicated in Figures 1 and 2, the shares of financial credit to the agricultural and manufacturing have been in decline. On average, over the last 25 years, 14.6% and 5.8% of total bank credit was allocated to manufacturing and agriculture respectively. In contrast, the services sector averaged 20.7% of bank credit. Commerce and finance sector received an average of 17.3% over the same period.

As productive sectors are denied sufficient credit, well-paid and sustainable jobs cannot be created in agriculture or manufacturing as most Ghanaians are reduced to informal petty trading of foreign goods.

Two main reasons have accounted for this dysfunction of the financial system. First, the foreign domination of Ghana’s banking sector, and second the failure of monetary policy. About 50% of banks in Ghana are foreign owned. Foreign banks tend to be more risk averse. They are less likely to lend to small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs).

Second, the Bank of Ghana’s excessive focus on monetary stability through inflation-targeting is problematic. It often results in raising interest rates and, consequently, borrowing costs. This discourages private sector borrowing while attracting bank investments into government securities. Ghana’s inflation is largely driven by structural factors and not money supply problems. These factors include production and transport costs. Monetary stability through inflation-targeting is therefore a misplaced priority.

Besides, by focusing solely on monetary stability, the central bank is neglecting its role to support the overall development of the economy through credit policy. This developmental role is clearly set out in The Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 918). This revised the 2002 Act to take account of the central bank’s role to support government economic policy and ensure an efficient operation of the banking and credit system.

Before the IMF-led financial reforms of the 1980s and 1990s which were necessitated by the 1980s financial crisis, the Bank of Ghana intervened, effectively and efficiently, to direct credit to priority sectors. For instance, in the early 1980s when the liberal financial reforms had not taken root in Ghana, the Bank of Ghana used a combination of credit ceilings, interest rates, reserve requirements, and mandatory lending ratios to direct credit to agriculture and industry. Credit ceilings ensured that banks could not lend beyond a certain limit to sectors other than agriculture and manufacturing. Lower interest rates were also offered to agricultural loans and in other instances, mandatory lending ratios ensured banks were forced to lend a certain share of loans to agriculture and manufacturing.

Drawing lessons from the present moment and past, I recommend a serious rethink of financial policy. A return to some level of credit policies, a deliberate support for indigenous participation in the banking system and a revitalisation of development banks such as the Agricultural Development Bank and the National Investment Bank.

This article is the outcome of research conducted within the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence at the University of Bayreuth, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy – EXC 2052/1 – 390713894

– ref. Ghana’s banks are not lending enough to sectors where it matters most, like agriculture and manufacturing – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-banks-are-not-lending-enough-to-sectors-where-it-matters-most-like-agriculture-and-manufacturing-265433