The Conversation – Africa – Page 22

July 24, 2025

What makes a person cool? Global study has some answers

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Todd Pezzuti, Associate Professor, Business School, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez

From Lagos to Cape Town, Santiago to Seoul, people want to be cool. “Cool” is a word we hear everywhere – in music, in fashion, on social media. We use it to describe certain types of people.

But what exactly makes someone cool? Is it just about being popular or trendy? Or is there something deeper going on?

In a recent study I conducted with other marketing professors, we set out to answer a simple but surprisingly unexplored question. What are the personality traits and values that make someone seem cool – and do they differ across cultures?

We asked nearly 6,000 people from 12 countries to think of someone they personally knew who was “cool”, “not cool”, “good”, or “not good”. Then we asked them to describe that person’s traits and values using validated psychological measures. We used this data to examine how coolness differs from general likeability or morality.

The countries ranged from Australia to Turkey, the US to Germany, India to China, Nigeria to South Africa.

Our data showed that coolness is uniquely associated with the same six traits around the world: cool people tend to be extroverted, hedonistic, adventurous, open, powerful, and autonomous.

These findings help settle a long debate about what it means to be cool today.

A brief history of cool

Early writing on coolness described it as emotional restraint: being calm, composed and unbothered. This view, rooted in the metaphor of temperature and emotion, saw coolness as a sign of self-control and mastery.

Some of these scholars trace this form of cool to slavery and segregation, where emotional restraint was a survival strategy among enslaved Africans and their descendants, symbolising autonomy and dignity in the face of oppression. Others propose “cool” restraint existed long before slavery.

Regardless, jazz musicians in the 1940s first helped popularise this cool persona – relaxed, emotionally contained, and stylish – an image later embraced by youth and various countercultures. Corporations like Nike, Apple and MTV commercialised cool, turning a countercultural attitude into a more commercially friendly global aesthetic.

This is what makes someone cool

Our findings suggest that the meaning of cool has changed. It’s a way to identify and label people with a specific psychological profile.

Cool people are outgoing and social (extroverted). They seek pleasure and enjoyment (hedonistic). They take risks and try new things (adventurous). They are curious and open to new experiences (open). They have influence or charisma (powerful). And perhaps most of all, they do things their own way (autonomous).

This finding held remarkably steady across countries. Whether you’re in the US, South Korea, Spain or South Africa, people tend to think that cool individuals have this same “cool profile”.

We also found that even though coolness overlaps with being good or favourable, being cool and being good are not the same. Being kind, calm, traditional, secure and conscientious were more associated with being good than cool. Some “cool” traits were not necessarily good at all, like extroversion and hedonism.

What about South Africa and Nigeria?

One of the most fascinating aspects of our study was seeing how consistent the meaning of coolness was across cultures – even in countries with very different traditions and values.

In South Africa, participants viewed cool people as extroverted, hedonistic, powerful, adventurous, open and autonomous – just like participants from Europe to Asia. In South Africa, however, coolness is especially distinct from being good. South Africa is one of the countries in which being hedonistic, powerful, adventurous and autonomous was much more cool than good.

Nigeria was the only country in which cool and uncool people were equally autonomous. So basically, individuality wasn’t seen as cool. That difference might reflect cultural values that place a greater emphasis on community, respect for elders, or collective identity. In places where tradition and hierarchy matter, doing your own thing might not be cool.

Social sciences, like all science, however, are not perfect. So, it’s reasonable to speculate that autonomy might still be cool in Nigeria, with the discrepancy resulting from methodological issues such as how the Nigerian participants interpreted and responded to the survey.

Nigeria was also unique because the distinction between cool and good wasn’t as notable as in other countries. So coolness was seen more as goodness than in the other countries.

Why does this matter?

The fact that so many cultures agree on what makes someone cool suggests that “coolness” may serve a shared social function. The traits that make people cool may make them more likely to try new things, innovate new styles and fashions, and influence others. These individuals often push boundaries and introduce new ideas – in fashion, art, politics, or technology. They inspire others and help shape what’s seen as modern, desirable, or forward-thinking.

Coolness, in this sense, might function as a kind of cultural status marker – a reward for being bold, open-minded and innovative. It’s not just about surface style. It’s about signalling that you’re ahead of the curve, and that others should pay attention.

So what can we learn from this?

For one, young people in South Africa, Nigeria, and around the world may have more in common than we often think. Despite vast cultural differences, they tend to admire the same traits. That opens up interesting possibilities for cross-cultural communication, collaboration and influence.

Second, if we want to connect with or inspire others – whether through education, branding, or leadership – it helps to understand what people see as cool. Coolness may not be a universal virtue, but it is a universal currency.

And finally, there’s something reassuring in all this: coolness is not about being famous or rich. It’s about how you live. Are you curious? Courageous? True to yourself? If so, chances are someone out there thinks you’re cool – no matter where you’re from.

Todd Pezzuti received funding from ANID Chile to conduct this research.

– ref. What makes a person cool? Global study has some answers – https://theconversation.com/what-makes-a-person-cool-global-study-has-some-answers-261266

July 24, 2025

Togo’s ‘Nana-Benz’: how cheap Chinese imports of African fabrics have hurt the famous women traders

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Fidele B. Ebia, Postdoctoral fellow, Duke Africa Initiative, Duke University

The manufacturing of African print textiles has shifted to China in the 21st century. While they are widely consumed in African countries – and symbolic of the continent – the rise of “made in China” has undermined the African women traders who have long shaped the retail and distribution of this cloth.

For many decades Vlisco, the Dutch textile group which traces its origins to 1846 and whose products had been supplied to west Africa by European trading houses since the late 19th century, dominated manufacture of the cloth. But in the last 25 years dozens of factories in China have begun to supply African print textiles to west African markets. Qingdao Phoenix Hitarget Ltd, Sanhe Linqing Textile Group and Waxhaux Ltd are among the best known.

We conducted research to establish how the rise of Chinese-made cloth has affected the African print textiles trade. We focused on Togo. Though it’s a tiny country with a population of only 9.7 million, the capital city, Lomé, is the trading hub in west Africa for the textiles.

We conducted over 100 interviews with traders, street sellers, port agents or brokers, government officials and representatives of manufacturing companies to learn about how their activities have changed.

“Made in China” African print textiles are substantially cheaper and more accessible to a wider population than Vlisco fabric. Our market observations in Lomé’s famous Assigamé market found that Chinese African print textiles cost about 9,000 CFA (US$16) for six yards – one complete outfit. Wax Hollandais (50,000 CFA or US$87) cost over five times more.

Data is hard to come by, but our estimates suggest that 90% of imports of these textiles to Lomé port in 2019 came from China.

One Togolese trader summed up the attraction:

Who could resist a cloth that looked similar, but that cost much less than real Vlisco?

Our research shows how the rise of China manufactured cloth has undermined Vlisco’s once dominant market share as well as the monopoly on the trade of Dutch African print textiles that Togolese traders once enjoyed.

The traders, known as Nana-Benz because of the expensive cars they drove, once enjoyed an economic and political significance disproportionate to their small numbers. Their political influence was such that they were key backers of Togo’s first president, Sylvanus Olympio – himself a former director of the United Africa Company, which distributed Dutch cloth.

In turn, Olympio and long-term leader General Gnassingbé Eyadéma provided policy favours – such as low taxes – to support trading activity. In the 1970s, African print textile trade was considered as significant as the phosphate industry – the country’s primary export.

Nana-Benz have since been displaced – their numbers falling from 50 to about 20. Newer Togolese traders – known as Nanettes or “little Nanas” – have taken their place. While they have carved out a niche in mediating the textiles trade with China, they have lower economic and political stature. In turn, they too are increasingly threatened by Chinese competition, more recently within trading and distribution as well.

China displaces the Dutch

Dating back to the colonial period, African women traders have played essential roles in the wholesale and distribution of Dutch cloth in west African markets. As many countries in the region attained independence from the 1950s onwards, Grand Marché – or Assigamé – in Lomé became the hub for African print textile trade.

While neighbouring countries such as Ghana limited imports as part of efforts to promote domestic industrialisation, Togolese traders secured favourable conditions. These included low taxes and use of the port.

Togolese women traders knew the taste of predominantly female, west African customers better than their mostly male, Dutch designers. The Nana-Benz were brought into the African print textile production and design process, selecting patterns and giving names to designs they knew would sell.

They acquired such wealth from this trade that they earned the Nana-Benz nickname from the cars they purchased and which they used to collect and move merchandise.

Nana-Benz exclusivity of trading and retailing of African print textiles cloth in west African markets has been disrupted. As Vlisco has responded to falling revenues – over 30% in the first five years of the 21st century – due to its Chinese competition, Togolese traders’ role in the supply chain of Dutch cloth has been downgraded.

In response to the flood of Chinese imports, the Dutch manufacturer re-positioned itself as a luxury fashion brand and placed greater focus on the marketing and distribution of the textiles.

Vlisco has opened several boutique stores in west and central Africa, starting with Cotonou (2008), Lomé (2008) and Abidjan (2009). The surviving Nana-Benz – an estimated 20 of the original 50 – operate under contract as retailers rather than traders and must follow strict rules of sale and pricing.

While newer Togolese traders known as Nanettes are involved in the sourcing of textiles from China, they have lower economic and political stature. Up to 60 are involved in the trade.

Former street sellers of textiles and other petty commodities, Nanettes began travelling to China in the early to mid-2000s to source African print textiles. They are involved in commissioning and advising on the manufacturing of African print textiles in China and the distribution in Africa.

While many Nanettes order the common Chinese brands, some own and market their own. These include what are now well-known designs in Lomé and west Africa such as “Femme de Caractère”, “Binta”, “Prestige”, “Rebecca Wax”, “GMG” and “Homeland”.

Compared to their Nana-Benz predecessors, the Nanettes carve out their business from the smaller pie available from the sale of cheaper Chinese cloth. Though the volumes traded are large, the margins are smaller due to the much lower final retail price compared to Dutch cloth.

After procuring African print textiles from China, Nanettes sell wholesale to independent local traders or “sellers” as well as traders from neighbouring countries. These sellers in turn break down the bulk they have purchased and sell it in smaller quantities to independent street vendors.

All African print textiles from China arrive in west Africa as an incomplete product – as six-yard or 12-yard segments of cloth, not as finished garments. Local tailors and seamstresses then make clothes according to consumer taste. Some fashion designers have also opened shops where they sell prêt-à-porter (ready-to-wear) garments made from bolts of African print and tailored to local taste. Thus, even though the monopoly of the Nana-Benz has been eroded, value is still added and captured locally.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese actors have become more involved in trading activity – and not just manufacturing. The further evolution of Chinese presence risks an even greater marginalisation of locals, already excluded from manufacturing, from the trading and distribution end of the value chain. Maintaining their role – tailoring products to local culture and trends and linking the formal and informal economy – is vital not just for Togolese traders, but also the wider economy.

Rory Horner receives funding from the British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship. He is also a Research Associate at the Department of Geography, Environmental Management and Energy Studies at the University of Johannesburg.

Fidele B. Ebia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Togo’s ‘Nana-Benz’: how cheap Chinese imports of African fabrics have hurt the famous women traders – https://theconversation.com/togos-nana-benz-how-cheap-chinese-imports-of-african-fabrics-have-hurt-the-famous-women-traders-260924

July 23, 2025

Togo’s ‘Nana-Benz’: how cheap Chinese imports of African fabrics has hurt the famous women traders

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Fidele B. Ebia, Postdoctoral fellow, Duke Africa Initiative, Duke University

Data is hard to come by, but our estimates suggest that 90% of imports of these textiles to Lomé port in 2019 came from China.

One Togolese trader summed up the attraction:

Who could resist a cloth that looked similar, but that cost much less than real Vlisco?

China displaces the Dutch

They acquired such wealth from this trade that they earned the Nana-Benz nickname from the cars they purchased and which they used to collect and move merchandise.

In response to the flood of Chinese imports, the Dutch manufacturer re-positioned itself as a luxury fashion brand and placed greater focus on the marketing and distribution of the textiles.

While newer Togolese traders known as Nanettes are involved in the sourcing of textiles from China, they have lower economic and political stature. Up to 60 are involved in the trade.

– ref. Togo’s ‘Nana-Benz’: how cheap Chinese imports of African fabrics has hurt the famous women traders – https://theconversation.com/togos-nana-benz-how-cheap-chinese-imports-of-african-fabrics-has-hurt-the-famous-women-traders-260924

July 23, 2025

AI chatbots can boost public health in Africa – why language inclusion matters

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Songbo Hu, PhD Candidate, University of Cambridge

Language technologies like generative artificial intelligence (AI) hold significant potential for public health. From outbreak detection systems that scan global news in real time, to chatbots providing mental health support and conversational diagnostic tools improving access to primary care, these innovations are helping address health challenges.

At the heart of these developments is natural language processing, an interdisciplinary field within AI research. It enables computers to interpret, understand and generate human language, bridging the gap between humans and machines. Natural language processing can process and analyse enormous volumes of health data, far more than humans could ever handle manually. This is especially valuable in regions with a stretched healthcare workforce or limited public health surveillance infrastructure, because it enables faster, data-driven responses to public health needs.

Recently, our interdisciplinary team, combining expertise from computer science, human geography and health sciences, conducted a review of studies on how language AI is being used for public health in African countries. Almost a decade’s worth of academic research was analysed, to understand how this powerful technology is being applied to pressing human needs.

Out of 54 research publications, we found that evidence of real-world effects of the technology was still rare. Only 4% of these studies (two out of 54) showed measurable improvements in public health, such as boosting people’s mood or increasing vaccine intentions.

Most projects stop at technology development and publication. Very few advance to real-world use or impact. Opportunities to improve health and well-being across the continent could be missed as a result.

Current limitations

In recent years, AI language technologies for public health have increased rapidly. This wave of technology development really took off as the COVID-19 pandemic renewed attention to public health. Health chatbots and sentiment analysis tools were developed in Africa and beyond.

Health chatbots “talk” to people and provide reliable health information in a friendly, conversational way. Sentiment analysis tools scan social media posts to understand what people are feeling and talking about. Together they can identify misinformation or changes in public opinion and then provide accurate information.

Of course, new technologies come with imperfections. We found that most technologies for public health in Africa exist in just a few languages whose dominance can be traced to colonial times, namely English and French.

The consequences are clear: key health messages fail to reach many communities, leaving millions unable to access or act on essential information.

We also found that few projects have gone beyond the laboratory development stage. Our study found only one system in operation that had a measurable public health effect.

A successful model

This standout example comes from a team at the Center for Global Development and the University of Chicago, in partnership with the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics. Their chatbot, deployed on Facebook Messenger, was designed for people in Kenya and Nigeria who were hesitant about COVID-19 vaccines. It was only available in English.

More than 22,000 social media users used this app, sharing vaccine-related questions and concerns. The chatbot provided tailored, evidence-based responses to topics ranging from vaccine effectiveness and safety to misinformation. Its effect was notable. The intervention boosted users’ intention and willingness to get vaccinated by 4%-5%. The strongest effects were seen among those most hesitant to begin with.

Behind this success was the researchers’ commitment to understanding the local context. Before launching the chatbot, in-depth discussions were held with focus groups and social media users in Kenya and Nigeria. The aim was to learn about the specific worries and cultural factors shaping attitudes toward vaccination.

The chatbot was designed to address these concerns. This user-centred, locally adapted approach enabled the chatbot’s messages to address real barriers. As this example demonstrates, language technologies for public health are most effective when responding to the concerns and needs of the intended users.

From lab to life

These technologies take time and money to be put into practice. The COVID-19 pandemic jump-started development but public health language AI technologies are very new. It could be that a future survey would find a very different situation.

At the same time, advances in large language models such as GPT-4 are rapidly lowering the technical barriers to developing language technologies. These models can often be adapted to new applications with far less data and effort than previous methods. Recent advances could enable small teams of researchers or even individual developers to build tools tailored to the specific needs of their own communities. The path from lab to real-world effects may become much shorter and easier.

Investors, accelerators and state support could help make this transition from lab to life happen.

Technology developers can also contribute by rooting their work in community-driven, multi-disciplinary and cross-sector collaboration. Social science and public health research knowledge and skills can inform the design and development of new technologies.

To maximise the potential of language technologies for public health, the following needs to happen:

involving communities and health workers in natural language processing design
expanding provision in indigenous African languages
integrating language technologies into existing health systems.

Future research and development must move beyond technical prototypes and laboratory tests to rigorous real-world evaluations that measure health outcomes.

The other co-authors behind this research are: Abigail Oppong, Ebele Mogo, Charlotte Collins, and Giulia Occhini.

Songbo Hu currently receives funding from the Cambridge Trust.

Anna Barford currently receives funding from UKRI and the Mastercard Foundation. She has previously received funding from the the British Aacdemy, ESRC, Leverhulme Trust, CPEST, the University of Cambridge, Unilever (via a philanthropic donation to the University) and the Asian Development Bank. Anna is the Co-Director of the Business Fights Poverty Institute and a consultant to the International Labour Organization.

Anna Korhonen receives funding from UKRI, and has previously received funding from MRC, EPSRC, NERC, Royal Society, ERC, and philantrophic donations to the University of Cambridge.

– ref. AI chatbots can boost public health in Africa – why language inclusion matters – https://theconversation.com/ai-chatbots-can-boost-public-health-in-africa-why-language-inclusion-matters-260861

July 22, 2025

Learning statistics through story: students get creative with numbers

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Johan Ferreira, Professor, University of the Witwatersrand

Statistics professor Johan Ferreira was feeling overwhelmed by the amount of “screen time” involved in online learning in 2021. He imagined students must be feeling the same way, and wondered what he could do to inspire them and make his subject matter more appealing.

One of the topics in statistics is time series analysis: statistical methods to understand trend behaviour in data which is measured over time. There are lots of examples in daily life, from rainfall records to changes in commodity prices, import or exports, or temperature.

Ferreira asked his students to write a short, fictional “bedtime” story using “characters” from time series analysis. The results were collected into a book that is freely available. He tells us more about it.

Why use storytelling to learn about statistics?

I’m fortunate to be something of a creative myself, being a professional oboe player with the Johannesburg Philharmonic Orchestra. It’s a valuable outlet for self-expression. I reflected on what other activity could inspire creativity without compromising the essence of statistical thinking that was required in this particular course I was teaching.

I invited my third-year science and commerce students at the University of Pretoria to take part in a voluntary storytelling exercise, using key concepts in time series analysis as characters. Students got some guidelines but were free to be creative. My colleague and co-editor, Dr Seite Makgai, and I then read, commented on and edited the stories and put them together into an anthology.

Students gave their consent that their stories could be used for research purposes and might be published. Out of a class of over 200 students, over 30 contributions were received; 23 students permitted their work to be included in this volume.

We curated submissions into two sections (Part I: Fables and Fairy Tales and Part II: Fantasy and Sci-Fi) based on the general style and gist of the work.

The project aimed to develop a new teaching resource, inspire students to take ownership of their learning in a creative way, and support them through informal, project-based peer learning.

This collection is written by students, for students. They used personal and cultural contexts relevant to their background and environment to create content that has a solid background in their direct academic interests. And the stories are available without a paywall!

What are some of the characters and stories?

Student Lebogang Malebati wrote Stationaryville and the Two Brothers, a tale about AR(1) and AR(2). In statistics, AR refers to processes in which numerical values are based on past values. The brothers “were both born with special powers, powers that could make them stationary…” and could trick an evil wizard.

David Dodkins wrote Zt and the Shadow-spawn. In this story, Zt (common notation in time series analysis) has a magic amulet that reveals his character growth through a sequence of models and shows the hero’s victory in the face of adversity. He is a function of those that came before him (through an AR process).

Then there’s Nelis Daniels’ story about a shepherd plagued by a wolf called Arma (autoregressive moving average) which kept making sheep disappear.

And Dikelede Rose Motseleng’s modern fable about the love-hate relationship between AR(1) (“more of a linear guy” with a bad habit of predicting the future based on the past) and MA(1), “the type of girl who would always provide you with stationarity (stability).”

What was the impact of the project?

It was a deeply enriching experience for us to see how students see statistics in a context beyond that of the classroom, especially in cases where students reformulated their stories within their own cultural identities or niche interests.

Three particular main impacts stand out for us:

students have a new additional reference and learning resource for the course content
new students can refer to the experiences and contextualisation of this content of former students, leading to informal peer learning
students engage in a cognitive skill (higher-order and creative thinking) that is not frequently considered and included in this field and at this level.

In 2024, shortly after the book was published, we asked students in the time series analysis course of that year to read any one of four stories (related to concepts that were already covered in the course material at that point in time). We asked them to complete a short and informal survey to gauge their experience and insights regarding the potential of this book as a learning resource for them.

The 53 responses we got indicated that most students saw the book as a useful contribution to their learning experience in time series analysis.

One positive comment from a student was:

I will always remember that the Random Walk is indeed not stationary but White Noise is. I already knew it, but now I won’t forget it.

Will you build on this in future?

It is definitely valuable to consider similar projects in other branches of statistics, but also, in other disciplines entirely, to develop content by students, for students.

At this stage, we’re having the stories and book translated into languages beyond English. In large classes that are essential to data science (such as statistics and mathematics), many different home languages may be spoken. Students often have to learn in their second, third, or even fourth language. So, this project is proving valuable in making advanced statistical concepts tactile and “at home” via translations.

Our publisher recently let us know that the Setswana translation is complete, with the Sepedi and Afrikaans translations following soon. To our knowledge, it’ll be the first such project not only in the discipline of statistics, but in four of the official languages in South Africa.

Johan Ferreira receives funding from the Centre of Excellence in Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, based at the University of the Witwatersrand, towards this Scholarship of Learning and Teaching project.

– ref. Learning statistics through story: students get creative with numbers – https://theconversation.com/learning-statistics-through-story-students-get-creative-with-numbers-261198

July 22, 2025

Livestock and lions make uneasy neighbours: how a fence upgrade helped protect domestic and wild animals in Tanzania

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jonathan Salerno, Associate Professor, Colorado State University, Colorado State University

Protecting livestock in areas where large carnivores (like lions) live is increasingly important as human land use expands, wildlife habitat shrinks, and climatic changes reshape the ways in which humans and wildlife interact. Protecting the carnivores from livestock owners is important too. Intact carnivore populations support more resilient food webs and the ecosystem services they provide.

It’s not easy for people, livestock, and carnivores to live together without conflict, though. One of the best ways to reduce conflict is to protect livestock like cattle and sheep from being attacked by predators.

There are various methods to do this, like guarding livestock or erecting fences. That’s all very well for the livestock inside the fences, but do predators simply turn to the nearest unprotected livestock for their meal instead? Are the neighbours’ cattle, sheep, and goats at greater risk? This question hasn’t been explored much by researchers.

We’re a group of conservation practitioners and scientists who have studied the interactions of carnivores, livestock, and people in Tanzania and elsewhere for decades to try and find solutions to conflict problems.

Our study area is next to a national park which protects important populations of lion, leopard, hyena, African wild dog, and cheetah. The people who live here have traditionally kept their livestock overnight in enclosures made of acacia-thorn branches. More recently, some of them have built pens, or corrals, from tall chain link fencing. We knew from years working with communities and from previous research that these fortified corrals were effective at keeping livestock safe from predators.

Our next step was to find out whether this made other nearby livestock less safe.

The results were intriguing. We found that the new enclosures made predation less likely in the nearby traditional enclosures too.

This type of beneficial spillover effect had yet to be documented in other systems where interventions aim to protect livestock from large carnivores.

Our results show that in conservation, it’s important to look closely at complex local dynamics. The findings may help explain why there’s so much uncertainty about the effectiveness of various human–wildlife conflict mitigation strategies.

Beneficial spillover effects

People who keep livestock in east Africa have long had strategies to keep their animals safe from large carnivores. Sometimes acacia-thorn night enclosures (known locally as bomas), intensive herding practices, and guarding dogs work well.

Other times, and especially in communities within and adjacent to large, protected carnivore populations, traditional strategies fall short.

This is the case in Tanzania’s Ruaha-Rungwa Landscape. In our study area adjacent to Ruaha National Park, any pastoralist or agropastoralist (herding and crop farming) household has about a 30% chance of losing one or more animals to predation each year. This is a serious economic loss on top of important cultural and emotional costs.

Lion Landscapes, an organisation that some of us have been running for over a decade, works to support human-carnivore coexistence. Adjacent to Ruaha, we have been partnering with households to build 1.8-metre chain-link corrals. We subsidise them. Households contribute 25% of the cost and some of the labour for construction.

We analysed about 25,000 monthly reports of livestock predation in fenced and traditional enclosures, using statistical models. There were 846 predation events over nearly four years. Unexpectedly, while we did detect spillover effects, these appeared to be beneficial. Rather than displacing conflicts, fortified enclosures actually conferred protective effects on their traditional-enclosure neighbours.

For example, households within 50 metres (the minimum observed distance) of a fortified enclosure were half as likely to experience predation compared with distant households 2 kilometres away. And these beneficial effects increased with the number of fortified enclosures in a neighbourhood. Finally, the effects appeared to be durable over time.

The fortified enclosures were extremely effective. We showed that households could break even after paying for the fence in just a few years through avoided livestock losses. And we know that when domestic animals aren’t being killed, their owners are more tolerant of predators. We didn’t record carnivore killings in this study but it has happened fairly frequently in the area in the past.

In a few of the world’s human-wildlife conflict systems, where data exist to assess spillover effects, there is evidence that detrimental spillovers do occur. For instance, beehive deterrents may redirect elephants to nearby crop fields, or lethal removal of individual wolves may redirect the surviving pack to prey on adjacent ranches. Nevertheless, these are very under-studied interactions.

Livestock management and carnivore coexistence

In systems where humans, livestock, and wildlife overlap and sometimes come into conflict, management strategies too often focus on wildlife. Another option is to reduce whatever attracts wildlife. In the case of large carnivores, this means managing livestock.

Our results support this approach by demonstrating that management and protection of livestock is fundamental for reducing conflict, and can benefit not only livestock owners but landscape-level coexistence.

Conservationists and policy-makers need to encourage these practices that benefit people, carnivores, and livestock in shared landscapes.

Amy Dickman works for Lion Landscapes as the Joint CEO

Jonathan Salerno, Kevin Crooks, Rekha Warrier, and Stewart Breck do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Livestock and lions make uneasy neighbours: how a fence upgrade helped protect domestic and wild animals in Tanzania – https://theconversation.com/livestock-and-lions-make-uneasy-neighbours-how-a-fence-upgrade-helped-protect-domestic-and-wild-animals-in-tanzania-258113

July 22, 2025

Ghana’s security strategy has kept terror attacks at bay: what other countries can learn from its approach

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah, Postdoctoral Fellow, Dublin City University

Ghana stands out in west Africa as a nation that has not experienced terrorist attacks, even though it’s geographically close to countries that have. In Burkina Faso, Mali and Nigeria, extremist groups such as Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) have wreaked havoc.

This resilience is not accidental. It is the result of deliberate counter-terrorism strategies employed by Ghana’s security institutions.

Ghana’s counter-terrorism framework was set out in 2020. It has four pillars: prevent, pre-empt, protect, and respond. The idea is to coordinate multiple agencies, including the Ghana Police Service, Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana Armed Forces and the National Intelligence Bureau.

These pillars guide strategies to address both immediate threats and underlying vulnerabilities. Poverty, religious radicalism and porous borders are common drivers of terrorism in west Africa.

I am an international security and global governance researcher. My co-author is a government and international studies scholar.

Four years ago we wrote a paper examining Ghana’s resilience against terrorist attacks. Our findings are still relevant given the increasing activities of terror groups in the west African region.

We wanted to identify what works as a potential model for other countries.

Using a qualitative methodology, we interviewed stakeholders — including police officers, members of the armed forces, Muslim community leaders, and immigration officials. We also analysed the national framework for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism.

Our findings showed that Ghana’s success is traceable to an approach that integrates community engagement with advanced border technology, inter-agency training, media collaboration and intelligence operations. And it addresses both immediate and underlying threats.

We argue that Ghana’s ability to balance prevention with security offers solutions for stability in a geopolitically volatile region.

Community engagement

One of the standout strategies is community engagement. This serves multiple purposes, from guiding people away from extremism to gathering intelligence.

The Ghana Police Service, for instance, engages Muslim-dominated communities, known as “Zongos”, to counter radical Islamic ideologies that could be exploited by terrorist groups.

By collaborating with local religious leaders, police make communities aware of the dangers of radicalisation. They foster trust and encourage residents to report suspicious activities. This approach also works in tackling illegal arms circulation.

Ghana has an estimated 2.3 million small arms in circulation – 1.1 million of them illegally possessed. The availability of so many weapons fuels terrorist activities across west Africa.

Community based de-radicalisation aligns with global best practices. In Norway, for instance, it was used to disengage youth from extremist groups.

Technology at borders

Ghana’s border control management is another part of its counter-terrorism strategy. Ghana Immigration Service uses advanced security software and integrated systems like the “Immigration 360” system, designed to fully automate passenger processing and data management.

The system manages records of fingerprints and other data to improve reporting and intelligence sharing between Ghana Immigration and other security agencies.

The technology makes it possible to quickly identity individuals on terrorist watchlists and detects concealed goods. This helps prevent illegal cross-border movements.

There are gaps in Ghana’s defences, however. The influx of migrants fleeing extremist violence in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2024 highlights the urgency of scaling up investments in the technology.

Training for preparedness

Ghana combats new and varying forms of terrorism by uncovering trends and training personnel to deal with them.

A notable example was the six-day joint training in 2022 involving the Ghana Immigration Service, Police Service, Customs, Economic and Organised Crime Office, and the National Intelligence Bureau.

The country also works with regional neighbours like Burkina Faso, Togo and Benin, and partners such as the United States, through initiatives like “Operation Epic Guardian”.

Media as a strategic partner

Terrorists rely on media to amplify fear and publicise their causes. Ghana’s security agencies counter this tactic by actively engaging media houses to report accurately.

The Ghana Armed Forces, for instance, works with media to debunk false reports, which can cause public panic and inadvertently aid terrorists.

The Ghana Police Service emphasises regular dialogue with media to ensure sensitive information is verified before publication, reducing the risk of tipping off suspects. However, media competition for viewers poses a challenge.

Surveillance and intelligence gathering

Surveillance and intelligence gathering is critical. Plainclothes armed forces and immigration personnel blend into communities to monitor potential threats. The approach has worked but is constrained by resources.

It can also risk human rights violations, such as wrongful profiling, and is less effective against multiple targets compared to technological solutions like facial recognition or CCTV.

Challenges and regional implications

Despite its successes, Ghana’s counter-terrorism framework faces challenges that could undermine its long-term efficacy:

logistical and financial constraints
the influx of migrants fleeing regional violence
a lack of harmonised security cultures within the regional body, Ecowas.

In all, Ghana’s strategies offer lessons for west Africa, where terrorism is a growing threat.

Its community engagement model could be followed in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to counter radicalisation and arms proliferation, provided it avoids religious stereotyping.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ghana’s security strategy has kept terror attacks at bay: what other countries can learn from its approach – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-security-strategy-has-kept-terror-attacks-at-bay-what-other-countries-can-learn-from-its-approach-260333

July 22, 2025

South Africa’s police serve the ANC insiders, not the people: here’s how it happened

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Ivor Chipkin, Professional Professor, GIBS, University of Pretoria

After South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, there was significant optimism about police reform in the country. Impressive steps were taken to bring the South African Police Service under civilian control and to create a service responsive to calls for assistance from the public.

During the apartheid period, South Africa’s police worked to preserve the political order and pursue political opponents. It did not focus on dealing with crime. This is why the achievements of the 1990s are so important. For the first time, black South Africans could call upon officers to respond to personal emergencies. This period also saw a drop in crime levels.

However, this promising early transformation was interrupted. The appointment of Jackie Selebi as national police commissioner in 2000 heralded a new era. Selebi was an African National Congress (ANC) insider. The ANC originated as a liberation movement and has governed the country since 1994.

Selebi had served as the head of the ANC’s Youth League in the 1980s, when it was banned. In 1987 he was appointed to the organisation’s national executive committee, its highest decision-making organ.

His appointment as police commissioner was the start of significant change in the purpose of policing. It marked the end of the focus on civilian control of the police force and prosecuting authorities. As an ANC insider, Selebi led efforts to establish party control over the police.

This politicisation gained momentum over the next two decades. In the early years it was exemplified by the suspension of the head of the National Prosecuting Authority, Advocate Vusi Pikoli,, by then president Thabo Mbeki, amid corruption allegations against Selebi himself.

Other telling developments ensued. The Scorpions were disbanded in 2009 by acting president Kgalema Motlanthe. The unit’s job was to pursue high-profile cases against senior ANC politicians (among others).

The police became increasingly entangled in the ANC’s internal political conflicts. At the same time the office of the national police commissioner experienced high turnover due to intense political manoeuvring. Between 2009 and 2022, there were seven national commissioners.

Recent developments have once again brought the intermingling of police work and power battles in the ANC to the fore. In early July 2025, Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, the commissioner of police in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, made some startling claims. He called a press conference and, wearing camouflage uniform, he implicated the minister of police, Senzo Mchunu, together with the deputy national commissioner for crime detection, in a scheme to close down investigations into political assassinations in the province.

President Cyril Ramaphosa rushed back from a meeting of the Brics countries in Brazil to attend to the matter. He announced that the police minister had been placed on leave with immediate effect. He also announced a judicial inquiry into the allegations.

I have conducted research into South Africa’s security apparatus over the last decade. Based on this work, and new research forthcoming in the Journal of Southern African Studies done with Jelena Vidojevic, co-founder of the New South Institute, it is clear that elite contestation in the ANC is intensifying.

In other words, the ability of internal party structures to manage gatekeeping is declining. Many of the people involved are indifferent or even hostile to South Africa’s democratic and constitutional order.

As the ability of some political elites to access state resources through the party declines, some are linked with organised criminal networks. Organised crime has been on the edges of South African politics. It now risks taking a more central role.

In this environment, the police service will often be the thin (blue) line between multiparty contestation according to constitutional rules and the criminalisation of politics in South Africa.

The shift

Large organisational changes within the police vividly illustrate this shift away from its core function.

The Visible Policing programme was meant to meant to deter crime through patrols, checkpoints and roadblocks. But, instead, there was a steady decline in resource allocation. Employee numbers dropped between 2015 and 2021.

Detective services and crime intelligence also experienced such declines.

Conversely, employee numbers in the Protection and Security Services programme, responsible for providing bodyguards to politicians, increased sharply between 2014 and 2016.

Evidence heard by the commission of inquiry into state capture suggested that some officers and budgets in the service were even used to supply President Jacob Zuma and other politicians with what amounted to a private militia.

This reorientation of resources coincided with a rise in crime across the country, a decline in arrests by 24.5%, and a drop in the police’s efficacy in solving crimes.

Furthermore, a politicised police leadership effectively stopped policing various categories of crime. This was particularly true of offences like fraud, corruption, and certain types of theft, and particularly when politically connected persons were involved.

The state capture commission heard extensive evidence about the failure of the police to pursue politically sensitive investigations. Investigations into senior officials were frequently frustrated or impeded, and cases at state-owned enterprises were abandoned.

This shows how police resources were actively redirected as weapons of elite competition, pursuing political enemies and protecting allies within the ruling party.

Mkhwanazi’s claims, if substantiated, suggest that this political policing remains entrenched.

What now?

Ramaphosa has announced the appointment of Firoz Cachalia as the acting minister of police. Cachalia, a well regarded legal academic, served as ANC minister for community safety. Between 2019 and 2022 he was part of the ANC’s national executive committee.

His appointment raises serious questions.

If the core problem with the police is that it has become embroiled in ANC internal politics, having an ANC insider head the ministry of police (even if only on an acting basis) threatens only to compound the problem.

Moreover, South Africans have already witnessed a long and expensive judicial inquiry into state capture. And despite extensive evidence of police failure to pursue politically sensitive investigations, nothing concrete has come of it.

How likely is it that this new initiative will be any different, especially if those investigating it and presiding over key institutions are themselves ANC insiders?

To depoliticise the police service and redirect its attention and activities towards crime and emergencies, a crucial first step is to reconsider the appointment processes for the national police commissioner and other top managers.

Under the current system the president has sole discretion. This bakes party-political considerations into the decision-making process.

Without structural changes, genuine democratic policing will remain an elusive ideal.

In 2024/25 the murder rate in South Africa stood at 42 per 100,000, among the highest in the world and close to levels not seen since the early 2000s.

At the very least, the minister of police must not be an ANC insider. Democratic renewal in South Africa requires bringing the police firmly under parliamentary control.

Ivor Chipkin teaches public policy at the Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) at the University of Pretoria. He is the director of the New South Institute.

– ref. South Africa’s police serve the ANC insiders, not the people: here’s how it happened – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-police-serve-the-anc-insiders-not-the-people-heres-how-it-happened-261301

July 21, 2025

Ghana has a rare treasure, a crater made when a meteor hit Earth: why it needs to be protected

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marian Selorm Sapah, Senior lecturer, University of Ghana

Impact craters are formed when an object from space such as a meteoroid, asteroid or comet strikes the Earth at a very high velocity. This leaves an excavated circular hole on the Earth’s surface.

It is a basic geological process that has shaped the planets from their formation to today. It creates landscapes and surface materials across our solar system. The moon is covered with them, as are planets like Mercury, Mars and Venus. On Earth, impacts have influenced the evolution of life and even provided valuable mineral and energy resources. However, very few of the impact craters on Earth are visible because of various processes that obscure or erase them.

Most of the recognised impact craters on Earth are buried under sediments or have been deeply eroded. That means they no longer preserve their initial forms.

The Bosumtwi impact crater in Ghana is different, however. It is well preserved (not deeply eroded or buried under sediments). Its well-defined, near-circular basin, filled by a lake, is surrounded by a prominent crater rim that rises above the surface of the lake and an outer circular plateau. This makes it a target for several research questions.

As an Earth scientist, I joined a research team from 2019 to better understand the morphology of the crater. We carried out a morphological analysis of the crater (a study of its form, structure and geological features).

This study concluded that the activities of illegal miners are a threat to the sustainability of the crater. We also discovered that the features of the Bosumtwi impact crater can be considered as a terrestrial representation for a special type of impact crater known as rampart craters. These are common on the planets Mars and Venus and are found on icy bodies of the outer solar system (like Ganymede, Europa, Dione, Tethys and Charon).

For future studies, the Bosumtwi impact crater can be used to help understand how rampart craters form on Mars and Venus. So the Bosumtwi impact crater should be protected and preserved.

The crater

The Bosumtwi impact crater is in Ghana’s mineral-rich Ashanti gold belt. It is the location of the only natural inland lake in Ghana. As one of the world’s best-preserved young meteorite impact craters it is designated as an International Union of Geological Sciences geoheritage site.

It is one of only 190 confirmed impact crater sites worldwide, one of only 20 on the African continent. Its lake is one of six meteoritic lakes in the world, recognised for their outstanding scientific value.

At almost 1.07 million years old, the crater offers unparalleled opportunities for studying impact processes, climate history and planetary evolution. It’s an irreplaceable natural laboratory for researchers and educators.

Beyond its scientific importance, the crater holds cultural significance for the Ashanti people of Ghana. The lake at its centre serves as a sacred site and spiritual landmark. The crater’s breathtaking landscape also supports eco-tourism and local livelihoods, contributing to Ghana’s economic development while maintaining exceptional aesthetic value.

The research

As part of further research work on the 2019 study, in 2025 we have discovered through field work and satellite data analysis that illegal artisanal mining is prevalent in the area and threatening the crater. This refers to informal, labour-intensive extraction of minerals, primarily gold. It is conducted by individuals or small groups using basic tools and rudimentary machinery. The use of toxic chemicals such as mercury and cyanide, and practices such as river dredging, cause severe environmental harm.

Illegal miners are encroaching on and around the crater rim, posing severe threats to its environment and sustainability. Their activities have become more prevalent over the course of less than 10 years, indicating a growing problem. If unchecked, it could lead to irreversible damage to the crater.

These mining operations risk contaminating the lake with toxic heavy metals. The consequences of these are grave. They include destroying critical geological evidence, accelerating deforestation, and degrading the land. All this damages the crater’s scientific, cultural and economic value.

The International Union of Geological Sciences geoheritage designation of the crater underscores the urgent need for protection measures. The loss of this rare geological wonder would represent not just a national tragedy for Ghana, but a blow to global scientific heritage.

Immediate action is required. This includes enhanced satellite monitoring (tracking illegal mining, deforestation and environmental changes) using optical imagery (such as Sentinel-2, Landsat, PlanetScope). These tools can detect forest loss, identify mining pits and sediment runoff, and analyse changes over time.

Stricter enforcement of mining bans, and community engagement programmes, will help preserve the Bosumtwi impact crater’s unique attributes for future generations of scientists, students, tourists and local communities who depend on its resources.

Marian Selorm Sapah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ghana has a rare treasure, a crater made when a meteor hit Earth: why it needs to be protected – https://theconversation.com/ghana-has-a-rare-treasure-a-crater-made-when-a-meteor-hit-earth-why-it-needs-to-be-protected-260600

July 21, 2025

Africa’s minerals are being bartered for security: why it’s a bad idea

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Hanri Mostert, SARChI Chair for Mineral Law in Africa, University of Cape Town

A US-brokered peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda binds the two African nations to a worrying arrangement: one where a country signs away its mineral resources to a superpower in return for opaque assurances of security.

The peace deal, signed in June 2025, aims to end three decades of conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.

A key part of the agreement binds both nations to developing a regional economic integration framework. This arrangement would expand cooperation between the two states, the US government and American investors on “transparent, formalized end-to-end mineral chains”.

Despite its immense mineral wealth, the DRC is among the five poorest countries in the world. It has been seeking US investment in its mineral sector.

The US has in turn touted a potential multi-billion-dollar investment programme to anchor its mineral supply chains in the traumatised and poor territory.

The peace that the June 2025 deal promises, therefore, hinges on chaining mineral supply to the US in exchange for Washington’s powerful – but vaguely formulated – military oversight.

The peace agreement further establishes a joint oversight committee – with representatives from the African Union, Qatar and the US – to receive complaints and resolve disputes between the DRC and Rwanda.

But beyond the joint oversight committee, the peace deal creates no specific security obligations for the US.

The relationship between the DRC and Rwanda has been marred by war and tension since the bloody First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo wars. At the heart of much of this conflict is the DRC’s mineral wealth. It has fuelled competition, exploitation and armed violence.

This latest peace deal introduces a resources-for-security arrangement. Such deals aren’t new in Africa. They first emerged in the early 2000s as resources-for-infrastructure transactions. Here, a foreign state would agree to build economic and social infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, hospitals) in an African state. In exchange, it would get a major stake in a government-owned mining company. Or gain preferential access to the host country’s minerals.

We have studied mineral law and governance in Africa for more than 20 years. The question that emerges now is whether a US-brokered resources-for-security agreement will help the DRC benefit from its resources.

Based on our research on mining, development and sustainability, we believe this is unlikely.

This is because resources-for-security is the latest version of a resource-bartering approach that China and Russia pioneered in countries such as Angola, the Central African Republic and the DRC.

Resource bartering in Africa has eroded the sovereignty and bargaining power of mineral-rich nations such as the DRC and Angola.

Further, resources-for-security deals are less transparent and more complicated than prior resource bartering agreements.

DRC’s security gaps

The DRC is endowed with major deposits of critical minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese and tantalum. These are the building blocks for 21st century technologies: artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, wind energy and military security hardware. Rwanda has less mineral wealth than its neighbour, but is the world’s third-largest producer of tantalum, used in electronics, aerospace and medical devices.

For almost 30 years, minerals have fuelled conflict and severe violence, especially in eastern DRC. Tungsten, tantalum and gold (referred to as 3TG) finance and drive conflict as government forces and an estimated 130 armed groups vie for control over lucrative mining sites. Several reports and studies have implicated the DRC’s neighbours – Rwanda and Uganda – in supporting the illegal extraction of 3TG in this region.

The DRC government has failed to extend security over its vast (2.3 million square kilometres) and diverse territory (109 million people, representing 250 ethnic groups). Limited resources, logistical challenges and corruption have weakened its armed forces.

This context makes the United States’ military backing enormously attractive. But our research shows there are traps.

What states risk losing

Resources-for-infrastructure and resources-for-security deals generally offer African nations short-term stability, financing or global goodwill. However, the costs are often long-term because of an erosion of sovereign control.

Here’s how this happens:

certain clauses in such contracts can freeze future regulatory reforms, limiting legislative autonomy
other clauses may lock in low prices for years, leaving resource-selling states unable to benefit when commodity prices surge
arbitration clauses often shift disputes to international forums, bypassing local courts
infrastructure loans are often secured via resource revenues used as loan security. This effectively ringfences exports and undermines sovereign fiscal control.

Examples of loss or near-loss of sovereignty from these sorts of deals abound in Africa.

For instance, Angola’s US$2 billion oil-backed loan from China Eximbank in 2004. This was repayable in monthly deliveries of oil, with revenues directed to Chinese-controlled accounts. The loan’s design deprived Angolan authorities of decision-making power over that income stream even before the oil was extracted.

These deals also fragment accountability. They often span multiple ministries (such as defence, mining and trade), avoiding robust oversight or accountability. Fragmentation makes resource sectors vulnerable to elite capture. Powerful insiders can manipulate agreements for private gain.

In the DRC, this has created a violent kleptocracy, where resource wealth is systematically diverted away from popular benefit.

Finally, there is the risk of re-entrenching extractive trauma. Communities displaced for mining and environmental degradation in many countries across Africa illustrate the long-standing harm to livelihoods, health and social cohesion.

These are not new problems. But where extraction is tied to security or infrastructure, such damage risks becoming permanent features, not temporary costs.

What needs to change

Critical minerals are “critical” because they’re hard to mine or substitute. Additionally, their supply chains are strategically vulnerable and politically exposed. Whoever controls these minerals controls the future. Africa must make sure it doesn’t trade that future away.

In a world being reshaped by global interests in critical minerals, African states must not underestimate the strategic value of their mineral resources. They hold considerable leverage.

But leverage only works if it is wielded strategically. This means:

investing in institutional strength and legal capacity to negotiate better deals
demanding local value creation and addition
requiring transparency and parliamentary oversight for minerals-related agreements
refusing deals that bypass human rights, environmental or sovereignty standards.

Africa has the resources. It must hold on to the power they wield.

Hanri Mostert receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa. She is a member of the Expropriation Expert Group and a steering committee member of the International Bar Association’s (IBA) Academic Advisory Group (AAG) in the Sector for Energy, Environmental, Resources and Infrastructure Law (SEERIL).

Tracy-Lynn Field receives funding from the Claude Leon Foundation. She is a non-executive director of the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa.

– ref. Africa’s minerals are being bartered for security: why it’s a bad idea – https://theconversation.com/africas-minerals-are-being-bartered-for-security-why-its-a-bad-idea-260594