The African activists who challenged colonial-era slavery in Lagos and the Gold Coast

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Michael E Odijie, Associate Professor, University of Oxford

When historians and the public think about the end of domestic slavery in west Africa, they often imagine colonial governors issuing decrees and missionaries working to end local traffic in enslaved people.

Two of my recent publications tell another part of the story. I am a historian of west Africa, and over the past five years, I have been researching anti-slavery ideas and networks in the region as part of a wider research project.

My research reveals that colonial administrations continued to allow domestic slavery in practice and that African activists fought this.

In one study I focused on Francis P. Fearon, a trader based in Accra, the Ghanaian capital. He exposed pro-slavery within the colonial government through numerous letters written in the 1890s (when the colony was known as the Gold Coast).

In another study I examined the Lagos Auxiliary, a coalition of lawyers, journalists and clergy in Nigeria. Their campaigning secured the repeal of Nigeria’s notorious Native House Rule Ordinance in 1914. That ordinance had been enacted by the colonial government to maintain local slavery in the Niger Delta region.

Considered together, the two studies demonstrate how local campaigners used letters, print culture, imperial pressure points and personal networks to oppose practices that had kept thousands of Africans in bondage.

The methods Fearon and the Lagos Auxiliary pioneered still matter because they show how marginalised communities can compel power‑holders to close the gap between laws and lived reality. They remind us that well‑documented local testimony, amplified trans-nationally, can still overturn official narratives, compel policy change, and keep institutions honest.

Colonial ‘abolition’ that wasn’t

West Africa was a major source of enslaved people during the transatlantic slave trade. The transatlantic trade was suppressed in the early 19th century, but this did not bring an end to domestic slavery.

One of the principal rationales for colonisation in west Africa was the eradication of domestic slavery.

Accordingly, when the Gold Coast was formally annexed as a British colony in 1874, the imperial government declared slave dealing illegal. And slave-dealing was criminalised across southern Nigeria in 1901. On paper these measures promised freedom, but in practice loopholes empowered slave-holders, chiefs and colonial officials who continued to demand coerced labour.

On the Gold Coast, the 1874 abolition law was never enforced. The British governor informed slave-owners that they might retain enslaved persons provided those individuals did not complain. By 1890, child slavery had become widespread in towns such as Accra. According to the local campaigners, it was even sanctioned by the colonial governor. This led to some Africans uniting to establish a network to oppose it.

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria had a similar experience. The colonial administration enacted the Native House Rule Ordinance to counteract the effects of the Slave-Dealing Proclamation of 1901 which criminalised slave dealing with a penalty of seven years’ imprisonment for offenders. The Native House Rule Ordinance required every African to belong to a “House” under a designated head. It went on to criminalise any person who attempted to leave their “House”. In the Niger Delta kingdoms such as Bonny, Kalabari and Okrika, the word “House” never referred to a single dwelling. Rather, it denoted a self-perpetuating, named corporation of relatives, dependants and slaves under a chief, which owned property and spoke with one voice. By the 1900s, “Houses” had become the primary units through which slave ownership was organised.

Therefore, the Native House Rule Ordinance compelled enslaved people in Houses to remain with their masters. The masters were empowered to use colonial authority to discipline them. District commissioners executed arrest warrants against runaways. In exchange, the House heads and local chiefs supplied the colonial administration with unpaid labour for public works.

African campaigners in Accra and Lagos organised to challenge what they perceived as the British colonial state’s support for slavery.

Fearon: an undercover abolitionist in Accra

Francis Fearon was an educated African, active in the Accra scene during the second half of the 19th century. He was highly literate and part of elite circles. He was closely associated with the journalist Edmund Bannerman. He regularly wrote to local newspapers, often expressing concerns about racism against Black people and moral decay.

On 24 June 1890, Fearon sent a 63-page letter, with ten appendices, to the Aborigines’ Protection Society in London. That dossier would form the basis of several further communications. He alleged that child trafficking continued.

As evidence, he transcribed the confidential court register of Accra and claimed that Governor W. B. Griffith had instructed convicted slave-owners to recover their “property”.

Fearon’s tactics were audacious. He remained anonymous, relied on court clerks for documents, and supplied the Aborigines’ Protection Society with evidence. He pleaded with the society to investigate the colonial administration in the Gold Coast.

Although the society publicised the scandal, subsequent narratives quietly effaced the African source.

Lagos elites organise – and name the problem

Like Fearon, Nigerian campaigners also wrote to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines’ Protection Society. They denounced the colonial government in Nigeria for promoting slavery, but they did not remain anonymous.

By this time, the Native House Rule Ordinance had prompted some enslaved people to flee the districts in which it was enforced. They sought refuge in Lagos. Through these arrivals, Lagosian elites learned of the ordinance. They unleashed a vigorous campaign against the colonial state.

The principal figures in this movement included Christopher Sapara Williams, a barrister, and James Bright Davies, editor of The Nigerian Times. Others included politician Herbert Macaulay, Herbert Pearse, a prominent merchant, Bishop James Johnson and the Reverend Mojola Agbebi. Unlike Fearon’s lone-wolf strategy, they mounted a coordinated assault on the colonial administration. They drafted petitions, briefed sympathetic European organisations, and inundated local newspapers with commentary.

Their arguments blended humanitarian indignation with constitutional acumen. They insisted that the ordinance contravened both British liberal ideals and African custom.

After years of pressure the law was amended and then quietly repealed in 1914.

Why these stories matter now

Contemporary scholarship on abolition is gradually shifting from asking “what Britain did for Africa” to examining the role Africans played in ending slavery.

Many African abolitionists who fought and lost their lives in the struggle against slavery have long gone unacknowledged. This is beginning to change.

The two articles discussed here highlight the creativity of Africans who, decades before radio or civil-rights NGOs, used transatlantic information circuits. They exposed colonial governments that continued to rely on forced-labour economies long after slavery was supposed to have ended.

They remind us that grassroots documentation can overturn official narratives. Evidence-based advocacy, coalition-building, and the strategic use of global media remain potent instruments.

The Conversation

Research for these articles was funded by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement No. 885418).

ref. The African activists who challenged colonial-era slavery in Lagos and the Gold Coast – https://theconversation.com/the-african-activists-who-challenged-colonial-era-slavery-in-lagos-and-the-gold-coast-261089

8 policies that would help fight poverty in South Africa’s economic hub Gauteng

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Adrino Mazenda, Senior Researcher, Associate Professor Economic Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

Poverty goes beyond income. It often arises when health, education and opportunities fall short of meeting people’s needs.

Individuals are classified as impoverished when they face deprivation in one-third or more of the indicators in a multidimensional poverty index. The index reflects the various influences on socioeconomic class. These include housing, sanitation, electricity, cooking fuel, nutrition and school attendance.

The index is one of the most comprehensive measures of poverty. The fact that the multidimentional index captures multiple dimensions enables it to reflect overlapping disadvantages. And provides a fuller picture of well-being. Other monetary measures such as income aren’t as comprehensive.

About 18% of the world’s population are poor by the definition of the multidimentional poverty index. Sub-Saharan Africa is especially affected, with a multidimensional poverty rate nearing 59%.

In South Africa, it is at around 40%. This means it experiences four in 10 of the dimensions of poverty.

The province of Gauteng is South Africa’s economic hub. Nevertheless it contains pockets of severe deprivation. About 4.6% of households are poor. In some wards up to 68% are severely deprived.

We are social scientists with research histories in food systems and livelihoods, public policy and economics of human capital. We recently conducted a study focused on Gauteng. We wanted to determine what could enable poor and vulnerable households to move out of those categories.

We used a modelling exercise that allowed us to isolate the most relevant factors for this transition.

The study found six factors: education, age, income, working time, medical aid and being a recipient of a low income municipal support grant. We concluded from this that attending to these six variables was the foundation for upward mobility.

Conversely, vulnerability to economic shocks, such as job loss or food insecurity, can trigger rapid downward mobility.

Based on our findings we make eight policy recommendations. These include boosting education and skills training, better healthcare and affordable, reliable transport.

Range of factors

Multidimensional poverty intersects with socioeconomic class structures. It reinforces inequality by placing individuals into hierarchical groups. These range from the affluent and middle class to the transient, vulnerable, and chronically poor.

These disparities shape access to resources, opportunities and upward mobility.

Lower-class households differ from middle-class and affluent (non-poor) households across multiple dimensions. These differences include income stability, consumption patterns, access to services, asset ownership, social capital and vulnerability to shocks.

In the light of this we adopted a multidimensional poverty approach to classify households. We used various dimensions and indicators of poverty to assess the extent of deprivation and associated poverty levels.

We calculated the deprivation score and classified households into three levels: not poor, moderate poverty (vulnerable), and severe poverty (chronically poor).

Working time had the strongest effect. Part- or full-time work greatly lowered odds of severe poverty (chronic poverty) and moderate poverty (transient poverty). Working time refers to the duration that a person is engaged in paid employment or work-related activities. This is usually between 35 and 45 hours per week for full-time employment. And fewer than 35 hours per week for part-time employment.

Some factors only influenced certain groups. For severe poverty, transport access, household health, food parcel reliance, household size, and skipping meals were significant. For moderate poverty, gender, food parcel reliance and skipping meals mattered. And for the vulnerable non-poor (middle class), distance from public transport was the only additional factor.

Social grants and being part of the black population group showed little influence. Transitions and the ability to transcend poverty classes were driven mainly by direct socio-economic factors.

These dynamics underscore the precariousness of low-income households. They also highlight the importance of targeted interventions to break cycles of poverty.

Higher education, stable income and access to full-time work, drastically reduce the odds of remaining in severe or moderate poverty or being vulnerable. Medical aid access and municipal assistance programmes that provide free or subsidised basic services, also serve as protective factors. These help households meet essential health and welfare needs.

However, several structural and socio-economic constraints hinder transitions out of poverty. For example, living a greater distance from public transport increases the likelihood of severe poverty and vulnerability.

Food insecurity, measured by skipping meals or dependence on food parcels, remains a persistent marker of entrenched deprivation.

Gender disparities suggest underlying labour market or social vulnerabilities that require targeted policy interventions. For example, male-headed households are more likely than female-headed households to be moderately poor.

What can be done

Escaping multidimensional poverty in Gauteng requires targeted, practical and complementary interventions. Examples include subsidised transport, decentralised clinics, or housing closer to jobs.

This will enable grants to be translated to improved well-being.

We suggest eight areas for improvement:

  • access to education, vocational training and digital skills. This will help to increase employment prospects

  • public works and youth entrepreneurship support. This will boost income generation

  • social protection like indigent benefits, food vouchers and subsidised medical aid

  • food security. This can be done through community gardens and nutrition programmes

  • support for female-headed households and young people

  • affordable, reliable public transport. Services also need to be decentralised

  • data-driven municipal planning to guide infrastructure and service investments

  • consistently tracking progress against defined objectives.

The province implements multiple poverty-reduction initiatives. These include expanded public works, township economy support, food gardens, free basic services, subsidised housing, and public transport projects.

These efforts address income, food security and mobility. But they have limited impact due to persistent barriers. This is because many, particularly young people, don’t have market-relevant skills. In addition, spatial inequality results in long, costly commutes. And housing shortages and rising food prices deepen vulnerability.

Fragmented funding, weak coordination and inadequate data tracking also undermine progress.

The Conversation

Massimiliano Tani receives funding from Australian Research Council (unrelated to this article).

Adrino Mazenda and Catherine Althaus do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. 8 policies that would help fight poverty in South Africa’s economic hub Gauteng – https://theconversation.com/8-policies-that-would-help-fight-poverty-in-south-africas-economic-hub-gauteng-261388

Modi’s visit to Ghana signals India’s broader Africa strategy. A researcher explains

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Veda Vaidyanathan, Associate, Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard Kennedy School

Ghana has historically been an anchor of Indian enterprise and diplomacy on the African continent.

New Delhi and Accra formalised ties in 1957. At the time, their partnership was grounded in shared anti-colonial ideals and a common vision for post-independence development. India offered counsel on building Ghana’s institutions, including its external intelligence agency. Meanwhile, Indian teachers, technicians, and traders regularly travelled to the west African country in search of opportunity.

The July 2025 visit of the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, to Ghana – the first by an Indian leader in over three decades – came at a critical moment for the continent. As the global order shifts towards multi-polarity, countries like Ghana are navigating a complex landscape, which includes western donors scaling back commitments. This has opened space to deepen cooperation through pragmatic, interest-driven collaborations with longstanding partners like India. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, Ghana’s President John Mahama captured the spirit of this global realignment, noting that

as bridges are burning, new bridges are being formed.

Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Modi’s visit offered an opportunity to both revive and recalibrate bilateral ties. The visit carried a strong economic and strategic orientation. Ghana positioned itself as a partner in areas where India holds comparative advantage, such as pharmaceuticals. Over 26% of Africa’s generic medicines are sourced from India. The Food and Drugs Authority’s (Ghana’s regulator of pharmaceutical standards) listing of foreign pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities is dominated by Indian firms.

Defence cooperation was also on the agenda. Ghana is looking to India for training, equipment and broader security engagement in response to rising threats from the Sahel and coastal piracy.

This emphasis on shared security interests is underscored by Ghana’s alignment with India on counter-terrorism. President Mahama for instance has condemned the Pahalgam terrorist attacks that occurred in April, 2025.

Reviving economic ties

Economic ties are at the heart of this renewed engagement between the two countries. Bilateral trade currently stands at around US$3 billion. Both leaders aim to double it to US$6 billion over the next five years. Currently, Ghana enjoys a trade surplus with India. This is mainly due to gold exports, which account for over 70% of its shipments. Cocoa, cashew nuts, and timber are also key exports, while imports from India include pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles, and various industrial goods.

India has invested more than US$2 billion in Ghana. These investments span private capital, concessional finance and grants across 900 projects. India now ranks among Ghana’s top investors. Indian firms and state-backed institutions play a key role in critical infrastructure development. Landmark projects include the 97km standard gauge Tema-Mpakadan Railway Line and the Ghana-India Kofi Annan ICT Centre, a hub for innovation and research.

In an earlier study, I documented the perspectives of Indian entrepreneurs in Ghana. The findings underscored the country’s appeal as a land of economic opportunity. In interviews, Indian businesses highlighted Ghana’s stable political environment. An expanding consumer base, and relatively transparent regulatory framework were also mentioned. Together, these factors continue to attract investor interest.

This economic momentum likely paved the way to pursue a closer bilateral relationship, marked by the elevation to a ‘Comprehensive Partnership’.

While delegates in the July visit addressed issues such as financial inclusion, healthcare and agriculture, the tangible outcomes were limited. Four memoranda of understanding were signed. They cover cooperation on traditional medicine, regulatory standards and cultural exchange. The creation of a joint commission to structure and advance bilateral collaboration across priority sectors was also signed.

Moving forward, Ghana offers India an entry point into west Africa’s resource landscape. With reserves of gold, bauxite, manganese and lithium, Ghana is well positioned to contribute to India’s needs for critical minerals. President Mahama’s invitation for investment in mineral extraction and processing aligns with India’s National Critical Mineral Mission, New Delhi is looking for supply chains for its energy transition. It creates an opportunity for Indian mining companies to expand into African markets.




Read more:
The world is rushing to Africa to mine critical minerals like lithium – how the continent should deal with the demand


Pragmatic diplomacy

With nearly US$100 billion in trade, cumulative investments of nearly US$75 billion, and a 3.5 million strong diaspora, the broader contours of India’s Africa policy is increasingly pragmatic and issue based.

New Delhi’s evolving relations with Accra reflects this. It comes as Ghana is making sweeping economic reforms domestically, particularly in fiscal management and debt restructuring.

This ambitious “economic reboot” hinges on attracting private sector investment. In this context, the Indian diaspora, already deeply embedded in Ghana’s commercial networks, is well positioned to foster stronger economic ties.

In his address to Ghana’s Parliament, The Indian Prime Minister spoke of development cooperation that is demand driven and focused on building local capacity and creating local opportunities. This approach “to not just invest, but empower”, signals India’s growing intent to anchor relationships in mutual agency, rather than dependency.

The Conversation

Veda Vaidyanathan is Fellow, Foreign Policy and Security Studies, at a leading Indian think tank.

ref. Modi’s visit to Ghana signals India’s broader Africa strategy. A researcher explains – https://theconversation.com/modis-visit-to-ghana-signals-indias-broader-africa-strategy-a-researcher-explains-261187

Smart cities start with people, not technology: lessons from Westbury, Johannesburg

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Rennie Naidoo, Professor of Information Systems, University of the Witwatersrand

Protesters blocking roads in Johannesburg, demanding a reliable water supply. Photo: Silver Sibiya GroundUp, CC BY-NC-ND

African cities are growing at an incredible pace. With this growth comes a mix of opportunity and challenge. How do we build cities that are not only smart but also fair, inclusive and resilient?

A smart city uses digital tools such as sensors, data networks and connected devices to run services more efficiently and respond to problems in real time. From traffic and electricity to public safety and waste removal, smart technologies aim to make life smoother, greener and more connected.

Ideally, they also help governments listen to and serve citizens better. But without community input, “smart” can end up ignoring the people it’s meant to help.

That’s why a different approach is gaining ground. One that starts not with tech companies or city officials, but with the residents themselves.

I’ve been exploring what this looks like in practice, in collaboration with Terence Fenn from the University of Johannesburg. We invited a group of Johannesburg residents to imagine their own future neighbourhoods, and how technology could support those changes.

Our research shows that when residents help shape the vision for a smart city, the outcomes are more relevant, inclusive and trusted.

Rethinking smart cities

Our research centred on Westbury, a dense, working-class neighbourhood west of central Johannesburg, South Africa. Originally designated for Coloured (multi-racial) residents under apartheid, Westbury remains shaped by spatial injustice, high unemployment and gang-related violence, challenges that continue to limit access to opportunity and basic services. Despite this, it is also a place of resilience, cultural pride and strong community ties.

We tested a method called Participatory Futures, which invites people to imagine and shape the future of their own communities. In Westbury, we worked with a group of 30 residents, selected through local networks to reflect a mix of ages, genders and life experiences. Participants took part in workshops where they mapped their neighbourhood, created stories and artefacts and discussed the kind of futures they wanted to see. This approach builds on similar methods used in cities like Helsinki, Singapore and Cape Town, where local imagination has been harnessed to inform urban planning in meaningful, grounded ways.

We invited residents to imagine their own future neighbourhoods. What kind of changes would they like to see? How could technology support those changes without overriding local values and priorities?

Through this process, it became clear that communities wanted a say in how technology shapes their world. They identified safety, culture and sustainability as priorities, but wanted technology that supports, not replaces, their values and everyday realities.

The workshops revealed that when people imagine their future neighbourhoods, technology isn’t about gadgets or buzzwords; it’s about solving real problems in ways that fit their lives.




Read more:
Africa’s cities are growing chaotically fast, but there’s still time to get things right — insights from experts


Safety was a top concern. Residents imagined smart surveillance systems that could help reduce crime, but they were clear: these systems needed to be locally controlled. Cameras and sensors were fine, as long as they were managed within the community by people they trusted, not some distant authority. The goal was safer streets, not more control from afar.

Safety is a deeply rooted concern in Westbury, where residents live with the daily reality of gang violence, drug-related crime and strained relations with law enforcement. Trust in official structures is eroded. The desire for smart safety technologies is not about surveillance but about reclaiming a sense of control and protection.

Energy came up constantly. Power cuts are a regular part of life in Westbury. People wanted solar panels, not as a green luxury but as basic infrastructure. They imagined solar hubs that powered homes, schools and local businesses even during blackouts. Sustainability wasn’t an abstract goal; it was about self-sufficiency and dignity.

Technology also opened the door to cultural expression. Residents dreamed up tools that could make their stories visible, literally. One idea was using augmented reality, a technology that adds digital images or information to the real world through a phone or tablet, to overlay neighbourhood landmarks with local history, art and personal memories. It’s tech not as a spectacle, but as a way to connect past and future.

And then there were ideas about skills and education: digital centres where young people could learn to code, produce music or connect globally. These were spaces to build the future, not just survive the present. People imagined smart tools that could showcase local art, amplify community voices, or support small businesses.

In short, the technology imagined in Westbury wasn’t about creating a futuristic cityscape. It was about building tools that reflect the community’s values: safety, creativity, shared power and resilience.

Lessons for the future

If we want African smart cities to succeed, they need to be designed with, not just for, the people who live in them. Top-down models can miss the nuances of everyday life.

There are growing examples of participatory approaches reshaping urban futures around the world. In Cape Town, the “Play Khayelitsha” initiative used interactive roleplay and games to engage residents in imagining and co-planning future neighbourhoods. This helped surface priorities such as safety, mobility and dignity.

In Medellín, Colombia, a history of top-down planning was transformed by including local voices in decisions about transport, public space and education.

These cases, like Westbury, show that when communities are treated as co-creators rather than passive recipients, the outcomes are more inclusive, sustainable and grounded in real-life experience.

This shift is especially important in African cities, where the effects of colonial history and structural inequality still shape urban development. Technology isn’t neutral. It carries the assumptions of its designers. That’s why it matters who’s in the room when decisions are made. The smartest cities are those built with the people who live in them.

The Conversation

Rennie Naidoo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Smart cities start with people, not technology: lessons from Westbury, Johannesburg – https://theconversation.com/smart-cities-start-with-people-not-technology-lessons-from-westbury-johannesburg-260346

Armed banditry is becoming a crisis in Nigeria: why fixing the police is key

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Onyedikachi Madueke, PhD Candidate in Nigerian Security, University of Aberdeen

Armed banditry in Nigeria has escalated into a full-blown security crisis, particularly in the north-west and north-central regions. What began as sporadic attacks has now morphed into coordinated campaigns of terror affecting entire communities.

In March 2022, bandits attacked an Abuja-bound train with over 900 passengers, killing several and abducting an unknown number. Earlier, in January 2022, around 200 people were killed and 10,000 displaced in Zamfara after over 300 gunmen on motorcycles stormed eight villages, shooting indiscriminately and burning homes.

Between 2023 and May 2025, at least 10,217 were killed by armed groups, including bandits, in northern Nigeria. Most of the victims were women and children.

States like Zamfara, Sokoto and Katsina in the North-West and Niger, Kogi and Benue in the north-central region are especially hard hit. Farmers are abducted en route to their fields, travellers are kidnapped on major highways, and whole villages have been displaced. In many rural areas, residents are now forced to pay “taxes” to bandits before they can even harvest their crops.

Insecurity is now reshaping daily life in rural Nigeria. Families are abandoning their homes. Food supply chains are being disrupted. School attendance is falling. The rise in banditry is fuelling poverty, eroding trust in the state, and contributing to emigration in Nigeria.




Read more:
Nigeria can defeat banditry by reconstructing the police system – criminologist


While existing studies on armed banditry in Nigeria have largely focused on causes like ungoverned spaces, poverty and marginalisation, they often under-emphasise the fact that, since banditry is a law enforcement issue, the capacity of the police to address the crisis is paramount. Effective policing is the bedrock of internal security.

I’m a PhD researcher and have just completed my thesis on the link between institutional weakness and insecurity in Nigeria. A recent paper draws on my thesis.

This study examines how factors such as police manpower, funding, welfare conditions and structural organisation shape the ability of the Nigeria Police Force to respond effectively.

I found that the Nigeria Police Force has too few officers, is chronically underfunded, works under poor conditions, and is over-centralised, resulting in a lack of local ownership and initiative. These shortcomings aren’t just bureaucratic – they create an environment where organised violence thrives.

Tackling armed banditry in Nigeria requires addressing the institutional weaknesses of the police: expanding recruitment; improving salaries and welfare infrastructure; decentralising the force to enable state and community policing; and ensuring transparent, accountable use of security funds.




Read more:
Nigeria’s new police chief faces structural challenges – 5 key issues to tackle


Four main challenges

Between 2022 and 2023, I conducted virtual interviews with 17 respondents including police and civil defence personnel serving in north-central Nigeria. I also conducted informal focus group discussions with police personnel and individuals affected by banditry in Abuja. Additionally, I analysed security reports and public documents from civil society organisations and media sources related to banditry and the Nigerian police.

What emerged was a troubling yet consistent story: the Nigerian Police Force wants to do more and has some dedicated officers, but is constrained by deep structural and institutional challenges. These challenges fall into four interlinked areas:

Manpower crisis: too few officers, spread too thin

Nigeria has over 220 million citizens but only about 370,000 police officers. The impact is most severe in regions where insecurity is rampant. In some local governments in northern Nigeria, only 32 officers are tasked with protecting hundreds of thousands of residents.

Worse still, up to 80% of officers are assigned to protect VIPs, politicians, traditional rulers and business elites, leaving about 20% available for regular policing. Officers are routinely deployed as drivers, bodyguards and domestic aides to VIPs.

Rural areas where banditry is most active remain dangerously under-policed, while safer cities in the south have a visible police presence. This imbalance has left vast regions vulnerable to bandit attacks.

Chronic under-funding and operational paralysis

Nigeria’s 2024 police budget stands at about US$808 million, a fraction of what countries like South Africa and Egypt spend. The result is that most police stations lack basic items like paper, computers, or internet access. Officers use personal mobile phones for official work. Some stations can’t even fuel their patrol vehicles without financial help from the public. Specialised equipment like bulletproof vests, tracking devices and functional armoured vehicles is either outdated or unavailable.

Even the Nigeria Police Trust Fund, established in 2019 to address these gaps, has been plagued by corruption and mismanagement. The result is a force that improvises its way through crises with minimal tools.

Poor welfare and working conditions

Morale within the police force is alarmingly low. Junior officers earn as little as US$44 per month – barely enough to live on in today’s Nigeria. Officers buy their own uniforms, pay for basic medical needs, and often live in rundown barracks that lack water, toilets, or electricity. In one barracks in Lagos, several families share a single bathroom.

Healthcare is patchy at best. Insurance schemes don’t cover critical conditions. Officers injured on duty have been abandoned in hospitals, while families of fallen officers sometimes wait years to receive death benefits. With no sense of protection or career dignity, many officers are demoralised and disengaged. This isn’t just a labour rights issue, it’s a national security issue.

Over-centralised structure and lack of local ownership

Nigeria’s police is centrally controlled from Abuja, leaving state governors, who are legally responsible for security, without real authority over officers in their states. This top-down structure causes delays, confusion and weak accountability.

In banditry-prone rural areas, officers often lack local knowledge, language skills and community trust. As a result, the response to attacks is slow, and the security presence feels distant. Bandits exploit this disconnect, operating freely in areas where the state appears absent or ineffective.




Read more:
What can be done to fight rural banditry in northern Nigeria


What to do

To stop armed banditry in Nigeria, the institutional challenges confronting the police must be dealt with. The country must:

  • increase police recruitment, especially in rural areas

  • raise police salaries and invest in welfare infrastructure

  • decentralise the police structure, allowing for state and community policing

  • ensure transparent use of security funds, particularly the Police Trust Fund.

The Conversation

Onyedikachi Madueke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Armed banditry is becoming a crisis in Nigeria: why fixing the police is key – https://theconversation.com/armed-banditry-is-becoming-a-crisis-in-nigeria-why-fixing-the-police-is-key-261302

3D printed food: yuck or yes? Researchers ask South African consumers

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Oluwafemi Adebo, Professor of Food Technology and Director of the Centre for Innovative Food Research (CIFR), University of Johannesburg

Would you eat food that was printed by a machine? 3D printed food is built up by equipment (a 3D food printer), layer after layer, using edible pastes, dough and food slurries in three-dimensional forms. These machines use digital models to produce precise, often personalised food items. Most 3D printed foods are made from nutrient-dense sources (plant and animal), which means they can offer health benefits.

The global market for 3D printed food is growing. It’s been estimated as worth US$437 million in 2024 and projected to reach US$7.1 billion in 2034. But the concept is still emerging in Africa.

Food science and technology researcher Oluwafemi Ayodeji Adebo and marketing academic Nicole Cunningham share what they learnt from a survey about South African consumers’ feelings on the subject.


How is food 3D printed and why?

In 3D food printing, edible food materials are formulated into printable materials (food ink). These inks can be made from pureed vegetables, doughs, or nutrient-rich mixes. The food ink is loaded into a 3D printer and extruded in layers until the selected shape is complete.

After printing, some products are ready to eat, while others need further processing such as baking or freeze-drying. The most common method is extrusion-based printing, valued for its simplicity and versatility.

The technique enables the customisation of food. Meals can be highly personalised in texture, appearance and nutritional content.

It can also transform food waste into food products. For example it can turn imperfect broccoli and carrots into healthy snacks and make noodles from potato peels.

It’s also useful in texture-modified diets for people with swallowing difficulties (dysphagia), especially the elderly. The products available for these patients tend to be bland and unappealing meals such as mashed potato, pumpkin and soft porridge. 3D food printing can produce nutritionally dense meals that are easier to eat and more appetising.




Read more:
How 3D food printers could improve mealtimes for people with swallowing disorders


Food ink can combine various sources with different nutrients to boost the health benefits. Not having to process the product with heat can also result in higher nutritional content.

In South Africa, what sorts of foods might be 3D printed?

Virtually any edible material could be transformed into food inks, although some might require additives to make them printable. The abundance of nutrient-dense and health-promoting food crops in South Africa presents an excellent opportunity for 3D food printing to create novel food.

Sorghum, cowpea and quinoa have been used to make 3D printed biscuits, for example. They are more nutritious than wheat and don’t contain gluten.




Read more:
Africa’s superfood heroes – from teff to insects – deserve more attention


Research at the Centre for Innovative Food Research at the University of Johannesburg has already demonstrated the feasibility of obtaining 3D printed products from different sources (for example whole-grain sourdough and malt biscuits, biscuits from wholegrain and multigrain flours and nutritious and appetising meals for dysphagia patients).




Read more:
3D printing offers African countries an advantage in manufacturing


3D food printing is still in its infancy in South Africa, compared to developed countries such as China, Japan, the US and some European countries. The best-known companies that have adopted this technology include BluRhapsody, based in Italy, which makes 3D-printed pasta, and Open Meals based in Japan, which specialises in personalised sushi.

We carried out a study to understand South African consumers’ attitudes toward 3D-printed foods. Although the technology is not yet in wide use, we found some consumers were fairly knowledgeable about these foods and the associated benefits. These findings lay the foundation for business opportunities to commercialise and market 3D printed products in the region.

Who did you ask about it in your study?

The study surveyed South African consumers aged 18-65 who were familiar with the concept of 3D-printed food. We collected 355 responses, mostly females aged 24 to 44. They provided information and opinions on several aspects, including:

  • their awareness of 3D-printed food

  • their familiarity with 3D-printed food

  • their food neophobia (fear of new foods)

  • the convenience that 3D-printed food offers

  • their perspective on their health needs

  • the perceived benefits that 3D-printed food offers

  • attitudes towards 3D-printed food.

What did they say?

Positive attitudes were strongest among those who recognised the convenience and health-related benefits of this new technology. The potential to reduce waste, customise nutrition, and simplify meal preparation stood out as key motivators.

Interestingly, food familiarity didn’t play a significant role in people’s responses. This means they aren’t necessarily clinging to traditional or childhood meals when forming attitudes about 3D-printed food.

In short, novelty alone isn’t a deal-breaker, it’s more about perceived safety, usefulness, and understanding the benefits.

What does this tell us?

The findings highlight the crucial role of consumer education and awareness in shaping attitudes toward 3D-printed food. While unfamiliarity with the technology can create some hesitation, the research shows that consumers are not necessarily resistant to innovation. They just need to understand it better and be educated about the benefits it offers.

If food manufacturers and marketers invest in increasing public knowledge and offering hands-on experiences such as tastings, demonstrations, or transparent production processes, then consumer attitudes could shift positively.

This approach has shown promise in other markets. For example, educational campaigns in Europe and the US around lab-grown meat and plant-based proteins have improved public perception over time.




Read more:
Nigeria isn’t big on 3D printing. Teaching students how to use it could change this


Marketers should talk about safety, health and sustainability, and demystify the technology through clear, engaging messaging. In countries where such strategies have been used, consumers have shown increased willingness to try novel food technologies. This is significant because of predicted growth in the industry.

If South African consumers see 3D-printed food more positively, this innovation could unlock opportunities to enhance food security, address malnutrition, and support personalised dietary solutions.

The Conversation

Oluwafemi Adebo received funding for this project from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa Support for Rated and Unrated Researchers (grant number: SRUG2204285188), the University of Johannesburg and Faculty of Science Research Committee Grant, and the South African Medica lResearch Council (SAMRC) Self-Initiated Research (SIR) Grant.

Nicole Cunningham receives funding from the DHET in order to conduct academic research.

ref. 3D printed food: yuck or yes? Researchers ask South African consumers – https://theconversation.com/3d-printed-food-yuck-or-yes-researchers-ask-south-african-consumers-255887

Young Nigerians learn about democracy at school: how it’s shaping future voters

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Leila Demarest, Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

Democratic consolidation is a continuing struggle, in Africa as elsewhere. The turn to democracy gained momentum in Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s but has petered out since. Can new generations turn the tide?

The need to prepare young people to become democratically minded is well established. In western societies, school-based civic education has been considered the means to do it since as early as the 1960s. The assumption is that better knowledge about the democratic functioning of the state promotes stronger democratic values and norms. It is also thought to increase trust in institutions and a willingness to participate in politics in the future.

Research in western settings indeed shows that classroom instruction strengthens political attitudes and behaviour. Yet can we expect civic education to work in the same way in newer democracies? In weak democracies studies have found that civic education could actually lead young people away from political participation. Young people may become more aware of the flaws of their own system and turn away from politics.

Nigeria made the move from military rule to multiparty democracy in 1999 but remains a flawed democracy struggling with political corruption, vote buying and episodic violence. Individual liberties are only weakly protected.

As Africa’s most populous democracy, with a big young population, Nigeria needs young people to participate in democratic politics. And they have done so, as can be seen from events like the #EndSARS protests. Nevertheless many youths also show voter apathy. Or they engage in the country’s well-known cycles of election violence.

As scholars, we have conducted extensive research on how young people in African countries can overcome some dark legacies, like violent conflict, ethnic tensions and authoritarianism. In a recent study, we focused on democratic engagement among young Nigerians and how formal education could strengthen it.

Our research among secondary school students in Lagos state shows promising results. A survey of over 3,000 final year students found that those with greater political knowledge and stronger democratic values were more likely to express intent to vote, contact officials, or protest in the future.

However, these same students rejected party membership and campaigning, which are commonly associated with corruption and violence in Nigeria. In contrast, students with lower levels of knowledge and democratic values remained inclined to participate in party activities. This might be to gain economic benefits.

These findings show that the core objectives of civic education are not likely to lead youth to abandon democratic politics. Fostering knowledge about how the system (ideally) works and strengthening democratic attitudes remains a valuable approach to achieving democracy.

Our findings

Ten years after the transition from military to democratic rule, the Nigerian government made civic education mandatory in primary and secondary schools. The curriculum covers issues such as Nigeria’s independence, the structures of the state, civic rights, political parties and national unity. It also covers corruption and clientelism (the exchange of political support for economic benefits).

After learning how the government works and gaining awareness of civic rights and responsibilities, would young Nigerians remain committed to political participation with all the country’s democratic flaws?

We conducted a survey among final year secondary school students in Lagos state in 2019. About 3,000 students across 36 randomly selected schools answered our questions. The results revealed three political participation profiles:

  • disengaged youth – those who do not wish to take part in any type of political activity

  • non-party activists – intent on voting, contacting politicians or officials and protesting, but they reject party membership and campaigning

  • party activists – interested in joining a political party and campaigning as well as voting, contacting politicians or officials and protesting.

Disengaged youths tended to come from richer socio-economic backgrounds. They showed low trust in institutions. Non-party activists were more informed and held stronger democratic values than party activists. This is likely because they saw political parties as corrupt or violent.

In a democracy where party politics are often tainted by corruption, the youths’ selective engagement may be a sign not of apathy but of a thoughtful and principled rejection of flawed party politics.

Despite a growing distrust in political parties, civic education does not appear to discourage pro-democratic political behaviour overall.

A ‘reverse’ participation gap

Schools are not the only shapers of youths’ political behaviour. Caregivers and peers play a role. In a large number of countries, youth from richer socio-economic backgrounds are more politically informed, more trusting of institutions, and active. This results in a so-called participation gap between richer and poorer citizens.

Where democracy is yet to take root, research shows that middle- and higher-middle class citizens also have higher levels of knowledge and stronger democratic norms. But they have lower levels of institutional trust and are less likely to participate in institutional politics. This presents a “reverse” participation gap, so to speak.

In our research, we found partial evidence of this “reverse participation gap”. Students from wealthier backgrounds were less likely to participate, but not necessarily because they had stronger democratic norms. One possible explanation is that these students were less economically dependent on the state. With no need to rely on public institutions for jobs or welfare, they might feel less of a need to engage with them.

Retreat from political participation

In non-established democracies, research shows that more educated citizens often are more critical of their governments. In Ghana and Zimbabwe, these citizens were less likely to participate in elections.

Concerning civic education programmes specifically, an intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo showed that these programmes might increase political knowledge and commitment to democratic values, but also decrease satisfaction with democracy in their country.

School-based research from the continent is lacking. But studies examining school-based civic education in electoral democracies elsewhere also show a retreat from institutionalised political participation. This spans voting, party membership, campaigning, and contacting politicians.

Our study finds more optimistic results for civic education programmes in Africa. Youths with high knowledge and values – the core objectives of civic education – remain committed to democratic political behaviour.

The Conversation

Leila Demarest receives funding from Leiden University Fund (grant reference W19304-5-01).

Line Kuppens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Young Nigerians learn about democracy at school: how it’s shaping future voters – https://theconversation.com/young-nigerians-learn-about-democracy-at-school-how-its-shaping-future-voters-261030

Uganda’s land eviction crisis: do populist state measures actually fix problems?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Rose Nakayi, Senior Lecturer of Law, Makerere University

Populism is rife in various African countries. This political ideology responds to and takes advantage of a situation where a large section of people feels exploited, marginalised or disempowered. It sets up “the people” against “the other”. It promises solidarity with the excluded by addressing their grievances. Populism targets broad social groups, operating across ethnicity and class.

But how does populism fare when it informs state interventions to address long-standing societal issues under capitalism? Do populist state measures – especially when launched by a politically powerful leader – deliver improvements for the stated beneficiaries?

As academics who have researched populism for years, we were interested in the implementation and outcomes of such policies and programmes. To answer these questions, we analysed a populist intervention by President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda to address rampant land conflicts. In 2013 he set out to halt land evictions.

What good came of this? Did it help the poor?

We analysed land laws, court cases, government statements and media reports and found that, for the most part, the intervention offered short-term relief. Some people returned to the land, but the underlying land conflict was unresolved.

This created problems that continue to be felt today, including land disputes and land tenure insecurity. The intervention also increased the involvement of the president and his agents personally in providing justice.

It didn’t make pro-poor structural changes to address the root of the problem.

Yet, the intervention had several political benefits:

  • it enhanced the political legitimacy of the president and state

  • it offered a politically useful response to a land-related crisis and conflict

  • it addressed broader criticisms over injustice and poverty by sections of the public and opposition leaders, some of whom (like Robert Kyagulanyi) also relied on populist rhetoric.

The promise to deal with land evictions “once and for all” has yet to be realised over a decade later. During Heroes Day celebrations on 9 June 2024, Museveni’s speech repeated his promise to stop evictions.

Such promises of getting a grip on and ending evictions via decisive state actions, including proposed new legal guidelines, were also made more recently, for example during Heroes Day 2025. This indicates that evictions – and state responses to them – remain a top issue on the political agenda ahead of Uganda’s 2026 election.

Persistent evictions

Evictions were rampant in the 2010s, especially in central Uganda’s Buganda region. They were driven by increased demand for land amid a growing population and legal reforms that seemed to protect tenants over landlords. Some landlords, desperate to free their land of tenants, were carrying out the evictions themselves.

The president condemned the evictions, but they continued. Soon, the number of evictees was in the thousands.

In response, Museveni set up a land committee within the presidency. He announced at a press conference in early 2013 that:

all evictions are halted. There will be no more evictions, especially in the rural areas. All evictions involving peasants are halted.

The dynamics of populism-in-practice

Museveni’s attempts to personally deal with evictions illustrate a continued power shift in Uganda, from institutions to the president’s executive units.

Despite its shortcomings, such as case backlogs, the judicial system offers an opportunity to present cases in a more neutral environment. It also allows parties to appeal decisions. This way, higher courts can correct errors where necessary.

The presidential land committee, we found, tended to be biased in favour of tenants, paying less attention to the landlords’ cases.

The president’s intervention wasn’t adequate to address the immediate causes and effects of the evictions, nor the root causes.

Those included land tenure insecurities. Due to legal reforms, land-rich landlords were unable to get rent at market value from tenants. Neither could they evict them lawfully where rent was in arrears.

In some cases, legal options such as land sales between landlords and tenants were applied. This was often to the detriment of tenants, especially where there was no neutral actor to oversee negotiations.

Land reforms need to be institutionalised and funded to deliver the intended outcomes. Otherwise, unlawful sales and evictions become a quick option for landlords.

Museveni’s populist initiative also unleashed new problems for beneficiaries. Some secured land occupancy in the interim but lived in fear of a relapse of conflict. Mistrust and scarred interpersonal relationships hampered cohesion in some communities. Disputes over land put political actors who would ideally be working together to restore calm at loggerheads.

Populism as power

The creation of populist presidential units has become routine in Uganda. More recently, Museveni created a unit to protect investors, which has resolved some investment-related land disputes. Another one was established to fight corruption. Both units remain very active.

Our research finds that the government needs these units and interventions for a number of reasons. It uses them to govern the country’s conflict-ridden economy and society. They allow the government to assemble a politically useful response to crises and to address some on-the-ground problems. They make the state look concerned and responsive to people’s needs. And they allow ruling party political actors to increase their popularity locally.

Museveni and his ruling party, the National Resistance Movement, therefore, benefit from a key aspect of populism. It allows the merging of disparate, competing and contradictory views, interests and demands of members of various societal classes and groups into a significantly simplified and uniform narrative that (potentially) speaks to all. This could mean: end corruption, end evictions, wealth for all, and so on.

A general election is due in early 2026. The steps Museveni has taken on evictions, and the units set up to fight corruption or protect investors, need to be seen with this political context in mind.

Museveni has put protecting people from evictions high on his government’s agenda. Speaking to party members in August 2024, he emphasised

the importance of adhering to the mass line, which prioritises the needs and rights of the masses over those of the elite.

In our view, this pre-election narrative signifies the continued political and social relevance of populism in today’s Uganda. This could result in heightened populist state activity in the run-up to and after the election.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Uganda’s land eviction crisis: do populist state measures actually fix problems? – https://theconversation.com/ugandas-land-eviction-crisis-do-populist-state-measures-actually-fix-problems-260512

Long-COVID, viruses and ‘zombie’ cells: new research looks for links to chronic fatigue and brain fog

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Burtram C. Fielding, Dean Faculty of Sciences and Professor in the Department of Microbiology, Stellenbosch University

Millions of people who recover from infections like COVID-19, influenza and glandular fever are affected by long-lasting symptoms. These include chronic fatigue, brain fog, exercise intolerance, dizziness, muscle or joint pain and gut problems. And many of these symptoms worsen after exercise, a phenomenon known as post-exertional malaise.

Medically the symptoms are known as myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS). The World Health Organization classifies this as a post viral fatigue syndrome, and it is recognised by both the WHO and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as a brain disorder.

Experiencing illness long after contracting an infection is not new, as patients have reported these symptoms for decades. But COVID-19 has amplified the problem worldwide. Nearly half of people with ongoing post-COVID symptoms – a condition known as long-COVID – now meet the criteria for ME/CFS. Since the start of the pandemic in 2020, it is estimated that more than 400 million people have developed long-COVID.

To date, no widely accepted and testable mechanism has fully explained the biological processes underlying long-COVID and ME/CFS. Our work offers a new perspective that may help close this gap.

Our research group studies blood and the cardiovascular system in inflammatory diseases, as well as post-viral conditions. We focus on coagulation, inflammation and endothelial cells. Endothelial cells make up the inner layer of blood vessels and serve many important functions, like regulating blood clotting, blood vessel dilation and constriction, and inflammation.

Our latest review aims to explain how ME/CFS and long-COVID start and progress, and how symptoms show up in the body and its systems. By pinpointing and explaining the underlying disease mechanisms, we can pave the way for better clinical tools to diagnose and treat people living with ME/CFS and long-COVID.

What is endothelial senescence?

In our review, our international team proposes that certain viruses drive endothelial cells into a half-alive, “zombie-like” state called cellular senescence. Senescent endothelial cells stop dividing, but continue to release molecules that awaken and confuse the immune system. This prompts the blood to form clots and, at the same time, prevent clot breakdown, which could lead to the constriction of blood vessels and limited blood flow.

By placing “zombie” blood-vessel cells at the centre of these post-viral diseases, our hypothesis weaves together microclots, oxygen debt (the extra oxygen your body needs after strenuous exercise to restore balance), brain-fog, dizziness, gut leakiness (a digestive condition where the intestinal lining allows toxins into the bloodstream) and immune dysfunction into a single, testable narrative.

From acute viral infection to ‘zombie’ vessels

Viruses like SARS-CoV-2, Epstein–Barr virus, HHV-6, influenza A, and enteroviruses (a group of viruses that cause a number of infectious illnesses which are usually mild) can all infect endothelial cells. They enable a direct attack on the cells that line the inside of blood vessels. Some of these viruses have been shown to trigger endothelial senescence.

Multiple studies show that SARS-CoV-2 (the virus which causes COVID-19 disease) has the ability to induce senescence in a variety of cell types, including endothelial cells. Viral proteins from SARS-CoV-2, for example, sabotage DNA-repair pathways and push the host cell towards a senescent state, while senescent cells in turn become even more susceptible to viral entry. This reciprocity helps explain why different pathogens can result in the same chronic illness. Influenza A, too, has shown the ability to drive endothelial cells into a senescent, zombie-like state.

What we think is happening

We propose that when blood-vessel cells turn into “zombies”, they pump out substances that make blood thicker and prone to forming tiny clots. These clots slow down circulation, so less oxygen reaches muscles and organs. This is one reason people feel drained.

During exercise, the problem worsens. Instead of the vessels relaxing to allow adequate bloodflow, they tighten further. This means that muscles are starved of oxygen and patients experience a crash the day after exercise. In the brain, the same faulty cells let blood flow drop and leak, bringing on brain fog and dizziness.

In the gut, they weaken the lining, allowing bits of bacteria to slip into the bloodstream and trigger more inflammation. Because blood vessels reach every corner of the body, even scattered patches of these “zombie” cells found in the blood vessels can create the mix of symptoms seen in long-COVID and ME/CFS.

Immune exhaustion locks in the damage

Some parts of the immune system kill senescent cells. They are natural-killer cells, macrophages and complement proteins, which are immune molecules capable of tagging and killing pathogens. But long-COVID and ME/CFS frequently have impaired natural-killer cell function, sluggish macrophages and complement dysfunction.

Senescent endothelial cells may also send out a chemical signal to repel immune attack. So the “zombie cells” actively evade the immune system. This creates a self-sustaining loop of vascular and immune dysfunction, where senescent endothelial cells persist.

In a healthy person with an optimally functioning immune system, these senescent endothelial cells will normally be cleared. But there is significant immune dysfunction in ME/CFS and long-COVID, and this may enable the “zombie cells” to survive and the disease to progress.

Where the research goes next

There is a registered clinical trial in the US that is investigating senescence in long-COVID. Our consortium is testing new ways to spot signs of ageing in the cells that line our blood vessels. First, we expose healthy endothelial cells in the lab to blood from patients to see whether it pushes the cells into a senescent, or “zombie,” state.

At the same time, we are trialling non‑invasive imaging and fluorescent probes that could one day reveal these ageing cells inside the body. In selected cases, tissue biopsies may later confirm what the scans show. Together, these approaches aim to pinpoint how substances circulating in the blood drive cellular ageing and how that, in turn, fuels disease.

Our aim is simple: find these ageing endothelial cells in real patients. Pinpointing them will inform the next round of clinical trials and open the door to therapies that target senescent cells directly, offering a route to healthier blood vessels and, ultimately, lighter disease loads.

The Conversation

Burtram C. Fielding works for Stellenbosch University. He has received funding from the National Research Foundation, South Africa and the Technology Innovation Agency.

Resia Pretorius is a Distinguished Research Professor at Stellenbosch University and receives funding from Balvi Research Foundation and Kanro Research Foundation. She is also affiliated with University of Liverpool as a Honorary Professor. Resia is a founding director of the Stellenbosch University start-up company, Biocode Technologies and has various patents related to microclot formation in Long COVID.

Massimo Nunes receives funding from Kanro Research Foundation.

ref. Long-COVID, viruses and ‘zombie’ cells: new research looks for links to chronic fatigue and brain fog – https://theconversation.com/long-covid-viruses-and-zombie-cells-new-research-looks-for-links-to-chronic-fatigue-and-brain-fog-261108

What makes a person cool? Global study has some answers

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Todd Pezzuti, Associate Professor, Business School, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez

From Lagos to Cape Town, Santiago to Seoul, people want to be cool. “Cool” is a word we hear everywhere – in music, in fashion, on social media. We use it to describe certain types of people.

But what exactly makes someone cool? Is it just about being popular or trendy? Or is there something deeper going on?

In a recent study I conducted with other marketing professors, we set out to answer a simple but surprisingly unexplored question. What are the personality traits and values that make someone seem cool – and do they differ across cultures?

We asked nearly 6,000 people from 12 countries to think of someone they personally knew who was “cool”, “not cool”, “good”, or “not good”. Then we asked them to describe that person’s traits and values using validated psychological measures. We used this data to examine how coolness differs from general likeability or morality.




Read more:
What makes a person seem wise? Global study finds that cultures do differ – but not as much as you’d think


The countries ranged from Australia to Turkey, the US to Germany, India to China, Nigeria to South Africa.

Our data showed that coolness is uniquely associated with the same six traits around the world: cool people tend to be extroverted, hedonistic, adventurous, open, powerful, and autonomous.

These findings help settle a long debate about what it means to be cool today.

A brief history of cool

Early writing on coolness described it as emotional restraint: being calm, composed and unbothered. This view, rooted in the metaphor of temperature and emotion, saw coolness as a sign of self-control and mastery.

Some of these scholars trace this form of cool to slavery and segregation, where emotional restraint was a survival strategy among enslaved Africans and their descendants, symbolising autonomy and dignity in the face of oppression. Others propose “cool” restraint existed long before slavery.

Regardless, jazz musicians in the 1940s first helped popularise this cool persona – relaxed, emotionally contained, and stylish – an image later embraced by youth and various countercultures. Corporations like Nike, Apple and MTV commercialised cool, turning a countercultural attitude into a more commercially friendly global aesthetic.

This is what makes someone cool

Our findings suggest that the meaning of cool has changed. It’s a way to identify and label people with a specific psychological profile.

Cool people are outgoing and social (extroverted). They seek pleasure and enjoyment (hedonistic). They take risks and try new things (adventurous). They are curious and open to new experiences (open). They have influence or charisma (powerful). And perhaps most of all, they do things their own way (autonomous).

This finding held remarkably steady across countries. Whether you’re in the US, South Korea, Spain or South Africa, people tend to think that cool individuals have this same “cool profile”.

We also found that even though coolness overlaps with being good or favourable, being cool and being good are not the same. Being kind, calm, traditional, secure and conscientious were more associated with being good than cool. Some “cool” traits were not necessarily good at all, like extroversion and hedonism.

What about South Africa and Nigeria?

One of the most fascinating aspects of our study was seeing how consistent the meaning of coolness was across cultures – even in countries with very different traditions and values.

In South Africa, participants viewed cool people as extroverted, hedonistic, powerful, adventurous, open and autonomous – just like participants from Europe to Asia. In South Africa, however, coolness is especially distinct from being good. South Africa is one of the countries in which being hedonistic, powerful, adventurous and autonomous was much more cool than good.




Read more:
Which African countries are flourishing? Scientists have a new way of measuring well-being


Nigeria was the only country in which cool and uncool people were equally autonomous. So basically, individuality wasn’t seen as cool. That difference might reflect cultural values that place a greater emphasis on community, respect for elders, or collective identity. In places where tradition and hierarchy matter, doing your own thing might not be cool.

Social sciences, like all science, however, are not perfect. So, it’s reasonable to speculate that autonomy might still be cool in Nigeria, with the discrepancy resulting from methodological issues such as how the Nigerian participants interpreted and responded to the survey.

Nigeria was also unique because the distinction between cool and good wasn’t as notable as in other countries. So coolness was seen more as goodness than in the other countries.

Why does this matter?

The fact that so many cultures agree on what makes someone cool suggests that “coolness” may serve a shared social function. The traits that make people cool may make them more likely to try new things, innovate new styles and fashions, and influence others. These individuals often push boundaries and introduce new ideas – in fashion, art, politics, or technology. They inspire others and help shape what’s seen as modern, desirable, or forward-thinking.

Coolness, in this sense, might function as a kind of cultural status marker – a reward for being bold, open-minded and innovative. It’s not just about surface style. It’s about signalling that you’re ahead of the curve, and that others should pay attention.

So what can we learn from this?

For one, young people in South Africa, Nigeria, and around the world may have more in common than we often think. Despite vast cultural differences, they tend to admire the same traits. That opens up interesting possibilities for cross-cultural communication, collaboration and influence.

Second, if we want to connect with or inspire others – whether through education, branding, or leadership – it helps to understand what people see as cool. Coolness may not be a universal virtue, but it is a universal currency.

And finally, there’s something reassuring in all this: coolness is not about being famous or rich. It’s about how you live. Are you curious? Courageous? True to yourself? If so, chances are someone out there thinks you’re cool – no matter where you’re from.

The Conversation

Todd Pezzuti received funding from ANID Chile to conduct this research.

ref. What makes a person cool? Global study has some answers – https://theconversation.com/what-makes-a-person-cool-global-study-has-some-answers-261266