The Conversation – Africa – Page 11

November 26, 2025

Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

The competition for global influence and control is shifting. One of the places where this dynamic is playing out is the Red Sea region, which encompasses Egypt, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Here, international rivalries, regional ambitions and local politics collide. Federico Donelli, who has studied these political dynamics and recently published Power Competition in the Red Sea, explains what’s driving the region’s geopolitical significance.

What defines the Red Sea as a region?

The region stretches from the Suez Canal to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, covering approximately 438,000km². The Red Sea borders some of the world’s most volatile regions: the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and the western shore of the Indo-Pacific area.

The Red Sea region

The Red Sea is rapidly becoming a highly contested zone, where traditional and emerging global powers are vying for influence and control. The decline of western geopolitical centrality, the rise of alternative powers and the increasing assertiveness of regional actors converge in the Red Sea.

This has created a complex and dynamic arena in which to test future global power hierarchies. The Red Sea region is challenging the liberal international order that emerged at the end of the cold war in 1989. That order is based on:

multilateralism – cooperation among multiple states
a free market – limited state intervention in the economy
liberal democracy – political pluralism and individual rights.

These tenets have been eroded by a combination of internal weaknesses and external challenges over the past 20 years.

While competition for global power between the United States and China tends to dominate the headlines, the true laboratories of the post-liberal world order are found in regions where international, regional and local dynamics collide.

The broader Red Sea region is one of them. Others are the Arctic, the South Indo-Pacific and the Balkans.

Why is the Red Sea region a stage for global power competition?

The region lacks a clear dominant power that is capable of imposing order. This makes it an open arena of competition among states with overlapping interests.

The Red Sea has great strategic value. It connects the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific, and is a maritime route for global trade and energy. It also borders several fragile states like Sudan, Eritrea and Yemen.

This combination – on the one hand, limited or contested authority that leaves the area exposed to external penetration, and on the other, its significant strategic value – has turned the region into a magnet for external involvement.

The United States and China both have military facilities in Djibouti. Russia has sought access to Port Sudan. Gulf powers, notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, have expanded their presence across the Horn of Africa. They’ve done this by investing in ports, infrastructure and military cooperation especially in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Turkey, Iran and Israel have also established political, economic and security ties. This links the Red Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

However, external powers are not the only drivers of change in the region.

Local actors, from Ethiopia to Sudan, Eritrea, Egypt and Somalia, are exploiting global rivalries to advance their strategic objectives. They are courting competing external powers by trading military access for security guarantees, or seeking investment in strategic infrastructure. They are also using diplomatic alignment with the US, China, Gulf states or Turkey to strengthen domestic and regional positions.

These actions create a complex web of overlapping interests. These blur the line between regional and global politics. Governments and non-state actors now have multiple external patrons to choose from. They can play one power against another.

This “multi-alignment” gives regional players leverage. It also increases volatility and uncertainty. For example, rival factions in the ongoing Sudanese civil war have sought support from external players, ranging from Saudi Arabia to the UAE. This has transformed an internal conflict into a proxy battlefield.

In Somalia, local and clan authorities negotiate security and economic deals directly with foreign powers like Turkey and Gulf states, often bypassing weak local institutions.

Meanwhile, landlocked Ethiopia’s search for sea access has drawn it into new diplomatic and security entanglements with Somaliland, Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt and Gulf countries.

These examples reveal how the Red Sea arena has become a microcosm of the post-liberal order: fragmented, transactional and deeply interconnected.

What are the main outcomes and lessons from this alignment?

The Red Sea region reflects the broader transformation of global politics.

Rather than producing a new balance, the decline of western influence has created a decentralised and competitive system.

In this environment, regional areas serve as testing grounds for new patterns of interaction between global and local powers, state and non-state actors, and formal alliances and informal partnerships.

While western-centric “universal” rules and institutions defined the liberal international order, the post-liberal order is characterised by selective engagement, bilateral bargains and flexible alignments.

The result is a world where order emerges from competition rather than consensus.

Competition among great powers now occurs less through international institutions and more through regional arenas. Military presence, infrastructure investment and political alliances now serve as instruments of influence.

What conclusions do you draw?

The Red Sea region is a reminder to scholars and policymakers that the future of international politics will not be defined solely in Washington, Beijing, Brussels or Moscow. It will also be defined in places like Port Sudan, Aden and Djibouti, where the new global order is being shaped.

Regions have become true laboratories of international change. They are places where global competition interacts with local conflicts, and new models of governance and influence emerge.

Local actors, state and non-state, are no longer passive recipients of external interference. They are active participants in shaping their own security environments.

Federico Donelli is affiliated with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), and the Orion Policy Institute (OPI)

– ref. Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing – https://theconversation.com/global-power-shifts-are-playing-out-in-the-red-sea-region-why-this-is-where-the-rules-are-changing-268895

November 26, 2025

An important wetland in Ghana is under siege. Researchers investigate the real issues

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Leonard Mensah, PhD Candidate, University of Memphis

Wetlands are vital ecological resources that provide several benefits in urban and peri-urban areas. They slow down flood waters, and act as a source of fishing and farming livelihoods. They also provide socio-cultural benefits for local communities. But some of these valuable ecosystems, due to their presence in prime locations, are at the centre of competing cultural, ecological and economic interests. Property development, especially, is a threat to wetlands.

The 2025 Global Wetland Outlook emphasises that the protection of wetlands is key to sustainable development. However, since 1970, about 411 million hectares of wetlands have been lost. In Africa, degradation is widespread and many are in poor condition.

We are a multidisciplinary team of researchers working in the area of resilience, sustainability and justice in urban transitions.

Our research highlights some of the local-level issues and conflicting interests that are shaping the rapid destruction of the Sakumono Ramsar Site in Tema, Ghana. Under the Ramsar Convention, a Ramsar site is a designated wetland with special natural significance.

We found institutional complicity and the lack of engagement with communities to be key drivers shaping current wetland conditions. Our study proposes a model for enforcing regulations and asserting the community’s right to nature for socio-cultural purposes.

Tema: wetlands in an industrial city

Tema was developed from a small fishing community into an industrialised port city by independent Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah. Its purpose was to facilitate international trade and vibrant economic development. It is one of Ghana’s most important cities and has been experiencing urban expansion and land use changes. This has led to encroachment in environmentally sensitive areas, including the Ramsar site.

The Sakumono wetland was officially designated a Ramsar site in 1992 to protect its rich biodiversity. It covers about 1,400 hectares and is protected by several regulations, including the Wetland Management Regulations Act, 1999.

But the site has, over the years, witnessed rapid depletion and intense encroachment from property development. Approximately 80% of the Sakumono Ramsar Site has been encroached on, leaving only about 20% of the wetland intact.

Population in the wetland’s catchment area had grown from about 114,600 in 1984 to over 500,000 by 2000, indicating that large numbers of people live around and rely on the wetland. Although the exact number of people currently affected by the wetlands encroachment is unknown, the dense surrounding population suggests that many households, especially those engaged in farming and fishing, have likely experienced reduced access and livelihood displacement. Like other wetlands in Ghana, the Sakumomo Ramsar site risks eventual destruction if nothing is done to reverse current trends.

The president of Ghana has called for heavy punishment for individuals who encroach on Ramsar sites. Both community and institutional respondents in our research claimed, however, that it was the political elites who were behind unbridled property development in the first place.

Multiple and conflicting interests in wetlands management

The main objective of our study was to analyse stakeholders’ perspectives on the use, value and management of wetlands. We evaluated the impact of these views on the sustainable management of ecologically sensitive areas. We conducted in-depth interviews with community residents, community leaders and opinion leaders. We also interviewed officials from metropolitan and municipal assemblies. The research was conducted in the Sakumono community, where the Sakumono Ramsar site is located.

Conflicting views on wetlands value: while the value of the site lies in its economic and ecological benefits, community residents were more interested in its economic value. That is, how it provides livelihood opportunities through farming and fishing activities.

Residents wondered why developers were allowed to exploit portions of the wetlands for building purposes, while they were prevented from fishing and farming. One of the residents said:

See rich and influential people buying land in the wetland area and using it for building properties. But we are not permitted to fish there.

For state institutions, protecting the wetland meant restricting access for community members. They encouraged activities such as tree planting and periodic desilting.

Conflicting views on wetlands use: the views of stakeholders also showed the changing understanding of the use of wetlands. An official from the forestry commission revealed that the wetland was acquired by the state during the 1980s for conservation. But other institutional officials, such as those of the lands commission, revealed that it had become a prime area for property development. Powerful developers bypass the land registration process and build without a permit.

The size of the Ramsar site has reduced because people are acquiring the wetland, including the buffer area, for residential development. Even though the wetland area is demarcated as a protected area, many of the politically connected developers go behind us and build without a permit.

Conflicting views on wetlands management: our research revealed contradictions between state institutions and community stakeholders. For instance, traditional authorities were of the view that:

Since the management of the wetland is not under our control, we are not responsible for the current developments taking place in and around the demarcated area.

The traditional authorities said they were not consulted and did not benefit from the wetland. This perhaps explains why they watched on as destruction continued. A member of the traditional council said:

As leaders of the community, we are not consulted about how the wetland is managed. You always hear the forestry commission accusing community leaders that we are selling the land. We can’t sell land that does not belong to us.

Towards a community-based stewardship model

Communities should be at the centre of wetlands management. We propose a stewardship-based co-management model that enforces environmental and conservation regulations. It emphasises working with a range of stakeholders. This includes government agencies, traditional authorities and environmentally conscious community members. We call for an updated wetlands management plan that reflects recent changes, but that is also fair, responsible and protective for present and future generations. This is essential for building sustainable communities in Ghana and beyond.

Louis Kusi Frimpong receives funding from African Peacebuilding and Developmental Dynamics (APDD) through the Individual Research Fellowship (IRF).

Seth Asare Okyere and Stephen Leonard Mensah do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. An important wetland in Ghana is under siege. Researchers investigate the real issues – https://theconversation.com/an-important-wetland-in-ghana-is-under-siege-researchers-investigate-the-real-issues-269016

November 25, 2025

School violence doesn’t happen in isolation: what research from southern Africa is telling us

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gift Khumalo, Lecturer, Durban University of Technology

School violence is a global public health phenomenon. This is when learners and teachers are the victims of physical and psychological abuse, cyber threats and bullying, fights, gangsterism, and the use of weapons at school.

The consequences of school violence are dire. There are implications for learners, teachers, the school and the community. Violence undermines the learners’ and teachers’ safety. It causes stress, academic decline and behavioural problems. It can contribute to a broader cycle of violence in communities.

School violence is a problem across southern Africa. This includes South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia.

In 2008 the regional body, the Southern African Development Community adopted Care and Support for Teaching and Learning framework. It was to prevent violence, create safer schools and foster a positive school ethos.

But there has been limited research unpacking factors that contribute to school violence. We recently undertook a review project to identify and understand those contextual factors.

Our research stems from our shared scholarly interest in issues of violence in educational settings. Our professional backgrounds include school social work, health promotion, social services with children and adolescents, and teaching general education modules at a South African university.

The review of studies of violence suggests that a range of factors contribute to school violence. These include: exposure to domestic violence, socio-economic status, poor family communication, lack of appropriate disciplinary processes at school, intolerance of individual and social differences, and exposure to alcohol and substance use in the community.

What’s needed are clear school policies, teacher training and deployment of school social workers.

The scope

Our project reviewed 24 studies of violence in Southern African Development Community schools. Most of the studies were done in South Africa but some were in Eswatini, Zambia, Malawi and Angola.

We focused on this region for the following reasons.

The region comprises low- and low-middle-income countries. Learners experience various socio-economic challenges and structural disparities within their communities and schools.
Previous research suggests that communities in the region face crime and violence, gangsterism, high unemployment rates and poverty.

The Care and Support for Teaching and Learning framework, which is intended to support learners’ enrolment, retention, performance and progression, has not prevented school violence. The limited evidence suggests a need to better understand the specific contextual factors that contribute to this violence.

Our findings from the papers we reviewed indicate that factors contributing to school violence are present in learners’ home environments, communities and schools.

Family environment

Disrespect towards teachers and physical fights are linked to witnessing domestic violence. The family unit’s socio-economic standing is significant. Compared to better-off learners, those from less privileged environments are more likely to violate school rules, steal other learners’ belongings, and bully others for their lunch meals. Learners from food-insecure families enter into transactional relationships with teachers for financial support and “free” groceries.

Research shows that the inability of parents to support and talk to their children results in children succumbing to peer pressure and becoming involved in gangs and fights. Parents sometimes incite school violence by defending their children’s misconduct and blaming teachers for their children’s behaviour.

We also observed that in schools with children who have disabilities, some parents arrange intimate relationships for their children with other learners, to shield them from exploitation by community members. However, this exposes them to unintended sexual violence in those relationships, as sexual boundaries and consent are not adequately explained to the young couples.

Community environment

The studies we reviewed indicate that the surrounding community has a role in school violence. Learners’ exposure to alcohol and substance use can lead to violence. Specifically, community members sell substances to learners, who then return to school intoxicated, disrupting teaching and learning. In some instances, fights among the boys that start outside school continue in the school premises.

School environment

Different types of bullying occur among learners. Research shows that most of the perpetrators are boys, ridiculing girls for their achievements and using violence to “prove masculinity” and gain popularity. Boys are ridiculed for not having romantic partners, which often leads to aggression. Peer pressure also causes boys to verbally abuse girls who refuse their advances, and resort to behaviours such as taking pictures of their underwear in class or through toilet windows. Gangs are common and contribute to violence, serving as venues for violent interactions among boys.

Another factor fuelling school violence is lack of understanding and intolerance of demographic and individual diverse identities – like nationality, gender and sexual orientation, physical appearance, culture and religion. Migrant learners are subjected to xenophobic attitudes where they are body shamed and insulted. Learners are the target of homophobic statements because of their gender and sexual identities. Dark-skinned and slender learners are often targeted, with teasing guised as humour.

Way forward

The purpose of this review project was to map the literature on factors contributing to school violence in the Southern African Development Community region. It could be useful in other similar regions too.

We suggest education ministries and schools countries could consider:

implementing clear school policies on how to report and respond to incidents of school violence
training teachers and school administrators on national and school policies for addressing school violence and promoting professionalism
documenting incidents of school violence and developing strategies to create safe environments
collaboration among schools, parents and psychosocial support personnel, such as school social workers, to reduce violence in schools.

We argue that different intervention programmes and services need to be adopted to address the root causes of violence. Deploying more school social workers would be part of this effort.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. School violence doesn’t happen in isolation: what research from southern Africa is telling us – https://theconversation.com/school-violence-doesnt-happen-in-isolation-what-research-from-southern-africa-is-telling-us-269288

November 25, 2025

Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic backslide: elections leave even less space for freedom

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jesper Bjarnesen, Senior researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

Ivorians went to the polls on 25 October 2025 to choose between incumbent president Alassane Ouattara – seeking a fourth five-year term – and one of four candidates who didn’t have the backing of the largest opposition parties.

There was not much of a choice, as the three main opposition candidates were banned from standing. Ouattara claimed another first-round landslide victory with 89.77% of votes cast.

As a researcher, I have followed political developments in Côte d’Ivoire over the past 15 years, and I’m currently involved in a project on boycott movements which uses Côte d’Ivoire as a country case.

This informs my view of the 2025 presidential elections and the democratic outlook for Côte d’Ivoire.

While the country tends to be seen as a regional front runner in terms of its economic performance, the 2025 elections continue a worrying trend of democratic backsliding and political polarisation.

The 27 December legislative elections will be a test of the country’s democratic resilience.

The build-up

In the months leading up to the presidential elections, major opposition candidates were excluded and political apathy took hold in a shrinking space for democratic expression.

Ouattara announced his candidacy in August, despite the widespread objections to his third-term candidacy in 2020 at home and abroad.

As in 2020, critics insisted that Ouattara was overstepping his constitutional mandate of one presidential term, renewable once. He has argued that a 2016 revision gave him the right to run twice.

As election day approached, Côte d’Ivoire’s political landscape was marked by polarisation, repression and uncertainty.

Tensions deepened in early September when the Constitutional Council disqualified five prominent opposition candidates from the race. Former president Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé and Guillaume Soro were excluded due to prior criminal convictions. The two main challengers, Tidjane Thiam and Pascal Affi N’Guessan, were barred on procedural grounds.

Their exclusion more or less handed victory to Ouattara, and his campaign comfortably turned towards ensuring an absolute majority.

In early October, the National Security Council banned public gatherings, except those organised by official candidates, on the grounds of “maintaining public order”. It also imposed additional restrictions on civic mobilisation. It used the letter of the law to serve Ouattara’s interests in limiting protests against his candidacy.

Going against the ban, opposition parties called for daily protests, but the gatherings were generally small and promptly broken up by security forces.

Three days before the elections, Gbagbo denounced what he called a “civil coup” and expressed his support for those “protesting against this electoral robbery”.

On 11 October, protesters in Abidjan took to the streets. These acts of defiance led to some 700 arrests and 80 prison sentences for disturbing public order. Eleven people were killed in clashes between security forces and protesters.

Along with other domestic and international observers, Amnesty International denounced the repression of demonstrations. At the same time, the government deployed 40,000 security personnel across the country.

France, the regional grouping Ecowas and the EU have remained largely silent. They have generally prioritised stability and strategic relations with the Ivorian government over democratic accountability. This passivity risks further eroding the credibility of these international actors while reinforcing narratives of western double standards in the region.

While the excluded opposition parties tried, and largely failed, to mobilise their supporters in the streets, the remaining candidates (all representing small and newly formed political parties and coalitions) chose a different strategy.

Capable Generations Movement leader Simone Ehivet Gbagbo (the former first lady, who was divorced from ex-president Gbagbo in 2023) deplored the elimination of her ex-husband. But in the final weeks of campaigning she insisted that it was too late to call people to the streets. She called for people to vote instead.

Election day

Election day was mostly peaceful across the country, but violent clashes did break out in several towns. The president of the Independent Electoral Commission, Ibrahim Kuibiert Coulibaly, described these incidents as “marginal” and “quickly contained”.

While the election result was never in doubt, the participation rate was less predictable. The confirmed participation rate of 50.1% shows that many voters stayed at home; many out of apathy but also out of concerns over the risk of violent clashes around polling stations.

Provisional results announced on 27 October gave Outtara 89.77% of the votes. Along with other opposition members, Thiam lamented a rigged and divisive electoral process with inadequate participation, and urged nonviolent resistance. He called for the government to engage in dialogue towards reconciliation.

The ruling party and media supportive of Ouattara described the result as a “landslide victory”, particularly celebrating Ouattara’s victories in historical opposition strongholds.

Three days after election day, several leaders of the main opposition parties were summoned by police on the grounds that military-grade weapons had been found in the homes of individuals linked to the 11 October march.

So, while the elections may be said to have unfolded without major incidents, the lack of a genuine contest and the measures taken to restrict opposition cast a shadow over the poll, and over Outtara’s legacy.

What’s next, and what are the prospects for democracy?

In the short to medium term, the major opposition parties could salvage some of their influence in the parliamentary elections on 27 December. Or they may reignite protests.

In the long term, Ouattara would have to step towards outright authoritarianism to justify a fifth candidacy in 2030. It seems more likely that he will finally hand over to a successor from his inner circle.

Even if that happens, serious questions remain regarding the electoral framework. The opposition has long claimed that the independent electoral commission is biased in favour of the incumbent.

The Ouattara presidency is tainted by its record of one-sided electoral competitions, political violence and insecurity, and a shrinking space for public expression.

Given Côte d’Ivoire’s strategic importance to the global north, as a rare ally in the subregion, international actors won’t have much to say about its democratic performance.

Any prospects for reconciliation, political reform and a peaceful transition in 2030 will mainly be in the hands of the ruling party. It will have to encourage dialogue and political inclusion at municipal, provincial and regional levels.

The 27 December legislative elections will offer a better chance to understand the actual distribution of political leverage than the flawed presidential elections.

Amelie Stelter of the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden contributed to this article

Jesper Bjarnesen receives funding from the Swedish Research Council (VR) through grant number VR2024-00989.

– ref. Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic backslide: elections leave even less space for freedom – https://theconversation.com/cote-divoires-democratic-backslide-elections-leave-even-less-space-for-freedom-269469

November 24, 2025

South Africa’s G20 presidency: diplomatic victory, but a weak final declaration

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

US president Donald Trump’s efforts to derail a successful wrap-up of the G20 summit in Johannesburg failed. Trump boycotted the meeting and the US told other countries through diplomatic channels not to sign a communiqué. Nevertheless, the 19 remaining countries and regional organisations signed a 30-page declaration. This called for, among other things, increased funding for renewable energy projects, more equitable critical mineral supply chains and debt relief for poorer countries. Senior research fellow Danny Bradlow explains what was, and wasn’t, achieved.

In what ways was South Africa’s G20 presidency a success?

The G20 has been a great diplomatic success for South Africa in at least three ways.

First, it succeeded in leading all the other G20 countries and organisations to adopt by consensus a leaders’ declaration despite a boycott and bullying tactics by Washington.

The 120 paragraph Leaders’ Declaration covered all the issues embodied in the “Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability” theme that South Africa chose for the G20. They included:

debt and access to affordable, sustainable finance
financing for a just energy transition
critical minerals
inequality
a second phase for the Compact with Africa The first phase was launched in 2017 during Germany’s G20 presidency and provided a framework for Africa’s engagement with its development partners.
illicit financial flows
inclusive growth.

Second, South Africa succeeded in launching a number of initiatives over the course of the year.

Firstly, the G20 acknowledged South Africa’s five years of support for the establishment of an African Engagement Framework within the G20’s finance track. It is intended to support enhanced cooperation between Africa and the G20.

Secondly, leaders expressed support, in various ways, for the G20 working group initiatives on illicit financial flows, infrastructure, air quality, artificial intelligence, sustainable development and public health. The ministerial declaration on debt was also supported. This includes reforms around initiatives supporting low and middle income countries facing debt challenges.

Thirdly, the Ubuntu Legacy Initiative was launched. This is designed to fund cross-border infrastructure in Africa. It was also agreed that an Ubuntu Commission will be set up to encourage research and dialogue on dealing cooperatively with global challenges. Ubuntu can be explained with reference to the isiZulu saying ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ which means ‘a person is a person through other people.’ It entails an ethics of care, compassion and cooperation.

Lastly, South Africa succeeded in delivering an effective, efficient and constructive G20 year. This is no small feat. It required the country to organise more than 130 meetings of G20 working groups, task forces and ministerial meetings, in addition to the leaders’ summit.

Is this only a good news story?

It is inevitable that any complex, multifaceted and voluntary process involving participants with strong and contrasting views will not be an unqualified success.

This, without doubt, is the case with South Africa’s G20 year. The environment was complicated by a number of factors:

the wars in Gaza, Ukraine and Sudan
the actions of the US and some of its allies to undermine the international community’s efforts to address the intertwined challenges of climate, biodiversity, energy, poverty, inequality, food insecurity, debt, technology and development, and
trade wars initiated by Trump imposing tariffs on trading partners.

These factors meant that getting the diverse membership of the G20 to reach agreement on a broad range of complex issues would be extremely difficult. In fact, it would only be possible to do so at a high level of abstraction.

Unfortunately, this proved to be the case. The result is that the G20 Leaders’ Declaration largely boils down to a set of general statements that are almost totally devoid of commitments for which states can be held accountable. Such general statements are not uncommon in the diplomatic statements issued at the end of high-level multilateral meetings. However, this is an extreme example.

The leaders expressed their support for a number of voluntary principles on issues such as disaster relief, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and debt. They also expressed support for the work of organisations like the multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund, and for some specific South African led initiatives like the review of the G20 itself.

However, there are no time frames or deliverables attached to these expressions of support.

What needs to be done to make the declaration effective?

The G20 is a voluntary association with no binding authority. The declaration’s efficacy therefore ultimately depends on all the G20’s stakeholders both taking – and advocating – for action on the issues raised in it.

These stakeholders include states and non-state actors like international organisations, businesses and civil society organisations.

The value of the declaration is how both the state and non-state actors use it to advocate for action. That can be in future G20 meetings as well as other regional and international forums.

How can the declaration be used to lead to action?

One of the biggest challenges facing African countries is debt. Over 20 are either in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress. Many African countries are being forced to choose between servicing their debts and investing in the development and climate resilience of their own populations.

The challenge that this creates for African states is exacerbated by their limited access to affordable, predictable and sustainable sources of development finance.

This means that African countries are unlikely to gain a sustainable path to reaching their development and climate goals without substantial action on debt and development finance. The Leaders’ Declaration, in paragraphs 14-22, clearly recognises the challenge. Key elements include:

the endorsement of the statement their finance minister and central bank governors made on debt sustainability
a reiteration of the support for the Common Framework for dealing with low-income countries in debt distress. The framework establishes a process for dealing with the official and commercial debt. But the process has proven to be too slow and cumbersome.
a commitment to working with the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable to explore better ways to meet the needs of debtor countries in distress and their creditors. This roundtable establishes an informal mechanism that brings together creditors and debtors and other stakeholders in sovereign debt to discuss ways to improve restructuring processes.

But these will be just empty words unless the endorsements are turned into action.

There are three actions that stakeholders can take.

First, African leaders can form a regional borrowers’ forum to discuss the debt issue and share information on their experiences dealing with creditors and on developing common African positions on development finance and debt. This would build on the work done by:

the African Expert Panel appointed by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, and
the African finance ministers under the auspices of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission on Africa.

They can also use this forum to engage in open discussions with African non-state actors.

Second, African non-state actors can develop strategies for holding the leaders accountable if they fail to follow up on the declaration. And they can hold creditors accountable for their actions in their negotiations with African debtors in distress.

Third, African non-state actors should initiate a review of how the IMF needs to reform its operational policies and practices. Africa has eloquently advocated for greater African voice and vote in IMF governance. The next step should be to explore how the substantial changes that have taken place in the scope of IMF operations can be translated into operational practices. These include the macroeconomic impacts of climate, gender and inequality –

Danny Bradlow in addition to his position with the University of Pretoria is a senior G20 advisor with the South African Institute of International Affairs; a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and a Compliance Officer with the Social and Environmental Compliance Unit, UNDP.

– ref. South Africa’s G20 presidency: diplomatic victory, but a weak final declaration – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-g20-presidency-diplomatic-victory-but-a-weak-final-declaration-270476

November 23, 2025

Global inequality is as urgent as climate change: the world needs a panel of experts to steer solutions

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia Business School, Columbia University

Given the escalating scale of inequality in the world, shouldn’t countries be banding together to set up an international panel on the issue, along the same lines as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations body set up to assess the science related to climate change? The idea of setting up an international panel on inequality has been recommended by the G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality.

The thinking behind the panel is set out in a report delivered to the G20 by the experts on the inequality committee. They argue that the proposed inequality panel would “support governments and multilateral agencies with authoritative assessments and analyses of inequality”. It wouldn’t make any recommendations for countries. Rather it would offer a menu of policies that could be used to address inequality. Panel leader and Nobel laureaute Joseph E. Stiglitz explains what’s behind the idea.

What are the report’s main findings on inequality?

Our report looked at the research on the state of inequality – and the conclusion should alarm us all. Wealth inequality is far worse than income inequality and has intensified in most countries over the last 40 years.

The global increase in income and wealth at the upper end of the scale is particularly worrying. The very richest people are amassing fortunes while ordinary people’s lives stagnate. For every dollar of wealth created since the year 2000, 41 cents have gone to the richest 1% of people, while just one cent has gone to the bottom 50%.

This wealth brings huge influence over economies and politics, threatening economic performance and the very foundations of democracy.

What does the report recommend the G20 countries do to deal with inequality?

Inequality is a choice. There are policies that can reduce it. These include more progressive taxation, debt relief, rewriting global trade rules and curbing monopolies.

Our committee found that there has been significant progress in tracking inequality’s scale, drivers and policy solutions. Nevertheless, policymakers still lack sufficient, dependable or accessible information on inequality.

There is a great institutional need for strong inequality analysis.

In 1988, governments set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assess the data and provide rigorous analyses to help governments tackle the climate emergency. Today, we are in an inequality emergency and need a similar global effort.

That is why our primary recommendation is to establish an International Panel on Inequality.

Drawing from the report, what do you recommend South Africa should do to reduce inequality?

South Africa has shown extraordinary leadership in focusing its G20 presidency on solidarity, equality and sustainability. This report is testament to that. We hope that South Africa will continue to champion our recommendations, particularly the establishment of an International Panel on Inequality.

Our committee chose not to comment on specific policies in specific countries. But our report contains a menu of policies which can tackle inequality. These include national measures like stronger competition laws, pro-worker regulation, investing in public services, and more progressive tax and expenditure policies.

Joseph E. Stiglitz is chair of the G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality.

Imraan Valodia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Global inequality is as urgent as climate change: the world needs a panel of experts to steer solutions – https://theconversation.com/global-inequality-is-as-urgent-as-climate-change-the-world-needs-a-panel-of-experts-to-steer-solutions-270102

November 23, 2025

High-rise living in Nairobi’s Pipeline estate is stressful – how men and women cope

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mario Schmidt, Associate Researcher, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology

Within sight of Kenya’s main international airport in Nairobi’s east, Pipeline residential estate stands out like a sore thumb. Composed almost entirely of tightly packed high-rise tenement flats, the estate has been described by the media as an urban planning nightmare. They point to its garbage problem, its waterlogged and frequently impassable streets, and the effect of dense living conditions on children’s health.

Pipeline’s transformation started roughly two decades ago. High-rise apartment blocks were a response to demand for low-cost rental housing in the rapidly urbanising capital. Individual private developers gradually converted the area, roughly 2km², into a dense, high-rise residential district. On average each block of flats hosts 200 or 300 tenants.

Pipeline is an example of how private sector developers can contribute to solving Nairobi’s housing crisis. But it’s also an example of how unregulated and poorly planned housing construction can have a negative impact on the social, economic and psychological well-being of households.

Pipeline is not the only tenement district in Nairobi. But it is one of the densest neighbourhoods in the city of over 4 million. The quality of buildings varies, but there are similarities:

rental flats mainly comprise single rooms with shared ablutions
unit design gives little attention to lighting, air circulation, or open space
tenants are forced into unfavourable rental relationships, where delays or default in payments can lead to water or electricity cuts.

The flats in Pipeline are almost exclusively inhabited by rural-urban migrants. They are attracted here by cheap accommodation and the promise of modernity. The flats have running water, tiled floors, individual electric meters and formal rental agreements.

We are researchers who study urban development, urban migration, and urban communities. Our fieldwork research sought to understand how the physical and social spaces created in neighbourhoods like Pipeline shape the experience of stress and pressure among men and women. We also looked at the strategies they apply to cope or reduce social, economic and romantic pressure.

Pipeline is a marked improvement from the options provided in Nairobi’s traditional informal settlements. Still, most basic services in the area are intermittent, or privatised. This is because the unplanned densification has outpaced the capacity of public infrastructure and services. This forces residents to pay for education, health, water, recreation and other services.

Many of these tenants are unemployed, or employed in low-wage industrial work, precarious gig work, or domestic work.

We found that men and women experience and try to cope with stress in diverse ways. Both men and women located the cause of their distress within their marital home. But the meanings and reactions to that stress diverged sharply in the migrant household.

We found that migrant men tend to experience stress in the form of pressure and migrant women in the form of tiredness.

Previous evidence points to the different ways in which stress is experienced based on biological differences between men and women. However, we propose that the tight coupling between men and pressure and between women and tiredness is the result of the expectation that men will be breadwinners. This drives men towards action and prevents women from expressing a will towards action.

Fieldwork and findings

We discovered our shared interest in studying Nairobi’s high-rise estates during a workshop on urban Nairobi.

Mario had carried out longitudinal ethnographic work with rural–urban migrants in Pipeline. His two-year-long fieldwork mostly took place in near-exclusively male spaces, such as gyms, barber shops and bars. Roughly 50 in-depth qualitative interviews revealed how men navigated urban lives that were increasingly defined by stress, pressure and exhaustion.

Miriam’s research focused on how Nairobi’s privately developed low-cost tenement precincts created environments of everyday urban dysfunction.

After the first meeting, we concluded that it would be beneficial to get a deeper understanding of women’s experiences of stress. This would help us to understand men’s and women’s experiences of stress and pressure. It would also enable us to compare how these different groups managed and coped with stress.

We designed a semi-structured questionnaire and conducted interviews with a dozen female residents. The interviewees spanned single and married women, members of a financial self-help group (chama), female neighbours who usually spent time together on balconies, a sex worker, and an entrepreneur who owned a hair salon.

Comparing the two sets of interviews provides ethnographic support for our hypothesis, which is that men and women tend to experience different types of stress: masculine “pressure” and feminine “tiredness”.

Masculine pressure is defined as an experience that provokes action. The pressure is intrinsically attached to the cause of stress and driven by the hope that overcoming it will promise social validation linked to the male provider model.

The male interviewees tended to engage in outward-oriented strategies to overcome this pressure. These include social drinking, extramarital affairs, or violent reaffirmations of gender identity. In this way, the form and design of Pipeline offered plentiful avenues for commercialised, stress-reducing activities.

In contrast, feminine tiredness emerged as an experience that inhibited action. Female respondents were constrained from aggressive responses, lest they risk being branded immoral or losing vital male financial support.

Married women, or single parents, found themselves largely confined to the small apartments. Their inward-oriented coping strategies were sometimes identified as “doing nothing” or watching TV, or performing household tasks. This passive endurance of stress was also seen as a means to “persevere” (Kiswahili: kuvumulia). In some cases, women used intermediate semi-private spaces, such as balconies, chamas or church, to connect with neighbours.

Taken together, these responses and expectations structure the modes by which male and female migrants react to or attempt to mitigate or relieve stress. This stress is not only caused by poverty but by expectations of middle-class success, ideals of romantic family life and economic progression.

Conclusions

As yet, there are no policies or programmes that seek to reverse the complex challenges created through neighbourhoods like Pipeline. Kenya’s national affordable housing programme is focused on home-ownership solutions. However, with over 90% of the city’s population renting their dwellings, and 87% renting from private individuals, Nairobi needs a better solution for rental housing.

This could be through redevelopment and area-based upgrading, expansion of basic social and community services, incentives for private developers to incrementally upgrade their housing stock, rental and tenant protection legislation, and support for sustainable, communal, and cooperative housing alternatives spearheaded by citizens themselves.

Mario Schmidt received funding from the German Research Foundation and the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. He currently works for Busara, Nairobi (Kenya).

Miriam Maina undertook this research as part of her Postdoctoral research work at the African Cities Research Consortium (ACRC) in the University of Manchester. The ACRC is a a six-year investment by FCDO to fund new, operationally-relevant research to address intractable development challenges in African cities.

– ref. High-rise living in Nairobi’s Pipeline estate is stressful – how men and women cope – https://theconversation.com/high-rise-living-in-nairobis-pipeline-estate-is-stressful-how-men-and-women-cope-265499

November 23, 2025

Africa’s hidden stillbirth crisis: new report exposes major policy and data gaps

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Mary Kinney, Senior Lecturer with the Global Surgery Division, University of Cape Town

Nearly one million babies are stillborn in Africa every year. Behind every stillbirth is a mother, a family and a story left untold. Most of these are preventable, many unrecorded, and too often invisible. Each number hides a moment of heartbreak, and every uncounted loss represents a missed opportunity to learn and to act.

As a public health researcher specialising in maternal and newborn health, I have spent the past two decades working on strengthening health systems and quality of care across Africa. My research has focused on understanding how health systems can prevent stillbirths and provide respectful, people-centred care for women and newborns. Most recently, I was part of the team that led a new report called Improving Stillbirth Data Recording, Collection and Reporting in Africa. It is the first continent-wide assessment of how African countries record and use stillbirth data.

The study, conducted jointly by the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, the University of Cape Town, the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and the United Nations Children’s Fund, surveyed all 55 African Union member states between 2022 and 2024, with 33 countries responding.

The burden of stillbirths in Africa is staggering. Africa accounts for half of all stillbirths globally, with nearly eight times higher rates than in Europe. Even stillbirths that happen in health facilities may never make it into official statistics despite every maternity registry documenting this birth outcome.

Part of the challenge is that there are multiple data systems for capturing births and deaths, including stillbirths, like routine health information systems, civil registration and other surveillance systems. But these systems often don’t speak to each other either within countries or between countries. This data gap hides both the true burden and the preventable causes.

Despite advances in several countries to prevent stillbirths, large gaps remain, especially on data systems. Only a handful of African countries routinely report stillbirth data to the UN, and many rely on outdated or incomplete records. Without reliable, comparable data, countries cannot fully understand where and why stillbirths occur or which interventions save lives.

Strengthening stillbirth data is not just about numbers; it is about visibility, accountability and change. When countries count every stillbirth and use the data for health system improvement, they can strengthen care at birth for mothers and newborns and give every child a fair start in life.

Findings

The report was based on a regional survey of ministries of health. This was followed by document reviews and expert consultations to assess national systems, policies and practices for stillbirth reporting and review.

The report reveals that 60% of African countries have national and sub-national committees responsible for collecting and using stillbirth data, which produce national reports to respective health ministries. But data use remains limited. Capacity gaps, fragmented systems and insufficient funding prevents many countries from translating information into action.

To guide investment and accountability, the report categorises countries into three readiness levels:

Mature systems needing strengthening, such as Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. These countries have consistent data flows but need more analysis and use.
Partial systems requiring support, where reporting mechanisms exist but are not systematically implemented, like Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania.
Foundational systems still being built, including fragile or conflict-affected countries like South Sudan and Somalia. Here, policies and structures for data collection and use remain absent.

The findings show both progress and persistent gaps. Two-thirds of African countries now include stillbirths in their national health strategies, and more than half have set reduction targets. Nearly all countries report that they routinely record stillbirths through their health sectors using standard forms and definitions, yet these definitions vary widely. Most systems depend on data reported from health facilities. But the lack of integration between health, civil registration and other data systems means that countless losses never enter national statistics.

For example, if a woman delivers at home alone in Mozambique and the baby is stillborn, the loss is only known to the family and community. Without a facility register entry or civil registration notification, the death never reaches district or national statistics. Even when a stillbirth occurs in a health centre, the health worker may log it in a facility register but not report it to the civil registration system. This means the loss of the baby remains invisible in official data.

What this means

Stillbirths are a sensitive measure of how health systems are performing. They reflect whether women can access timely, quality care during pregnancy and at birth. But unlike maternal deaths, which are often a benchmark for health system strength, stillbirths remain largely absent from accountability frameworks.

Their causes, like untreated infections, complications during labour, or delays in accessing emergency caesarean sections, are often preventable. The same interventions that prevent a stillbirth also reduce maternal deaths. These improve newborn survival, and lay the foundation for better health and development outcomes in early childhood.

Accurate data on stillbirths can guide clinical care and direct scarce resources to where they are needed most. When data systems are strong, leaders can identify where and why stillbirths occur, track progress and make informed decisions to prevent future tragedies.

The analysis also highlights promising signs of momentum. Over two-thirds of countries now reference stillbirths in national health plans, an important marker of growing political attention. Several countries are moving from isolated data collection to more coordinated, system-wide approaches. This progress shows that change is possible when stillbirths are integrated into national health information systems and supported by investment in workforce capacity, supervision and data quality.

What’s needed

Africa has the knowledge, evidence and experience to make change happen.

The report calls for harmonised definitions, national targets and stronger connections and data use between the different data sources within and across African countries. Above all, it calls for collective leadership and investment to turn information into impact, so that every stillbirth is counted, every death review leads to learning and no parent grieves alone.

The author acknowledges and appreciates the partners involved in developing the report and the support from the Global Surgery Division at UCT.

Mary Kinney and the team at UCT receive funding from UNICEF, Laerdal Foundation, and the South African Medical Research Council.

– ref. Africa’s hidden stillbirth crisis: new report exposes major policy and data gaps – https://theconversation.com/africas-hidden-stillbirth-crisis-new-report-exposes-major-policy-and-data-gaps-268901

November 21, 2025

G20 in a changing world: is it still useful? Four scholars weigh in

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

US president Donald Trump’s address to the annual gathering of the United Nations general assembly in late September 2025 set a new low in international relations. Trump delivered a broadside attack on multilateralism – the effort to solve the world’s problems through collective endeavour – as well as issues that have found common cause among rich and poor countries alike, such as climate change.

So where does this leave the work of organisations such as the G20? The body was set up by the G7 in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. The purpose was to create a bigger grouping of countries to help manage the governance of the global economy.

The group now represents about 67% of the global population and about 85% of the global economy. But it’s a strange beast: it is a self-selected group, which raises questions about its legitimacy. And it doesn’t have a permanent secretariat, which makes its work cumbersome.

We asked four leading scholars for their answers. Given the changing global context, is the G20 still useful?

Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at the University of Pretoria, is Senior G20 Advisor to the South African Institute of International Affairs, a Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and co-chair of the T20 task force on sustainable finance.

My research is funded by the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment.

Sandy Africa is the Research Director of the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) and a Research Associate at the University of Pretoria and writes here in her personal capacity. MISTRA is providing technical support to the RSA government during its G20 Presidency.

Ana Saggioro Garcia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. G20 in a changing world: is it still useful? Four scholars weigh in – https://theconversation.com/g20-in-a-changing-world-is-it-still-useful-four-scholars-weigh-in-266221

November 21, 2025

Climate change and inequality are connected – policies need to reflect this

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anda David, Senior researcher, Agence Française de Développement (AFD)

An increasingly strong case is being made to bring inequality into discussions about climate change. The logic behind this has been set out by leading international institutions such as the International Labour Organisation, the UN Environmental Programme and the Network for Greening the Financial System.

All have begun to highlight the connection between climate outcomes and inequality. They are stressing that inequality should be viewed as posing systemic and macroeconomic risk. Inequality has been found to undermine democracy, social and political cohesion and economic stability. Inequality also undermines our ability to deal with climate and environmental challenges.

In a recent summary paper we analysed how environmental policies can be designed and implemented with an inequality-reduction lens. We used examples from South Africa, Colombia, Indonesia and Mexico.

As researchers in the research department of the French development agency the AFD, specialising in the analysis of inequality and the social implications of energy and economic transitions, we have seen how climate action can either narrow or deepen existing divides, depending on how policies are designed.

The core of the case we make is that reducing inequality should be a guiding principle in decisions on climate change. There are numerous cases we studied in which it’s clear that countries often simply opt for compensating those who stand to lose from environmental transitions rather than seeking more equitable solutions. This needs to change. But a shift requires focusing on a meaningful reduction of inequality as well as understanding who wins from the transition.

The green transition and the absence of equity

We take the just transition as a starting point as it is increasingly cited as the accepted framework for building sustainable economies. This approach focuses on the social dimension of the ecological and energy transition and highlights the need to secure the livelihood of those negatively affected by the green transition. It highlights an inclusive transition to a low-carbon and sustainable economy, leaving no one behind.

Countries are progressively incorporating just transition principles into their national climate strategies. Examples include South Africa’s 2022 just transition framework and Mexico’s upcoming NDC 3.0. But when it comes to the actual design and implementation of policies, equity is rarely treated as the central concern. This becomes obvious when we look at some of the characteristics of the current green transitions.

Green jobs: The promise often is that these jobs are better, more stable and more sustainable. But the research we coordinated in Colombia with the University of Los Andes shows that these opportunities benefit groups that already have advantages. Examples include university-educated urban men. Women, youth and rural populations remain largely excluded.

Green infrastructures: We looked at who owns green infrastructures, such as solar parks, wind farms, smart grids, and storage systems. We often saw it remained largely in the hands of large private and multinational companies. In South Africa, for instance, the union Numsa has pushed back against a profit-driven renewable energy programme that transferred risks to the state and kept electricity tariffs high. The main beneficiaries of the programme are financial actors and multinational corporations. This is a good illustration of how ownership determines who controls energy as well as who truly gains from the transition.

Environmental protection policies. These include:

protected areas – defined spaces with the goal of nature conservation and the preservation of ecosystems
biodiversity offsets – intended to compensate for environmental damage caused by development projects.

These policies and plans for environmental protection can generate inequalities as they are often designed top-down. As a result, local communities can lose out.

What needs to shift

Putting inequality reduction at the centre means more than adding a social component to existing programmes.

In Colombia, the findings point to the need for early and targeted public policies to address labour market disparities. Examples include:

integrating training in renewable energy, energy efficiency and other sustainability-related skills into technical and vocational training
using approaches tailored to local needs and that are sensitive to gender differences.

Another thing that needs to change is the level of support for businesses and particularly small enterprises so that they can contribute to job creation. Most of them operate informally and rely on survivalist strategies. Evidence from South Africa showed that they’re excluded from just energy transition plans.

We also identified areas that need improvement around taxation. A fair climate policy should start with recognising that carbon taxes are not neutral: their burden falls differently across income groups.

In Indonesia, the study we led with our partners using microsimulation found that a €30-per-ton carbon tax would slightly increase costs for lower-middle income households. But when revenues were recycled through targeted cash transfers to low-income and energy-poor households, the policy had positive outcomes.

This example shows that equity depends less on the tax itself than on how its proceeds are used.

Finally, democratising ownership of the energy transition process is key to ensuring that it’s just. Our evidence shows that community and user-owned models can make renewable infrastructure inclusive as well as viable. Examples include community-owned solar installations, worker share ownership schemes and multistakeholder cooperatives.

In Mexico’s Río Lagartos, for example, a local fishing cooperative invested in a solar-powered ice machine. This led to costs being cut and local incomes being boosted.

Next steps

Inequalities threaten the commitment to existing efforts in the climate domain. Embedding the reduction of inequality into climate action is an opportunity for a meaningful transformation.

The examples we found of best practice as well as the weaknesses in initiatives can help guide policymakers. The needle is moving in discussions on inequality. The suggestion by the G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality is a case in point. It has recommended the creation of a global panel to provide guidance to countries on how they can ensure that reducing inequality sits at the heart of their development trajectories.

– ref. Climate change and inequality are connected – policies need to reflect this – https://theconversation.com/climate-change-and-inequality-are-connected-policies-need-to-reflect-this-269657