The Conversation – Africa – Page 11

September 29, 2025

Helen Zille: will competence, courage and a dose of arrogance be enough to get her elected as Johannesburg’s mayor?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

Love her or loathe her, it is hard to deny that Helen Zille is one of the most remarkable politicians South Africa’s democracy has yet seen. Remarkable because she has served in so many high-profile public roles – as mayor of Cape Town, premier of the Western Cape province, leader of the opposition, and leader of the Democratic Alliance before later becoming the party’s federal chair, and wielding power behind the scenes.

She has never steered clear of controversy, and indeed, revels in it in a way which discomforts her opponents.

She is both feared and respected for her intelligence, diligence, hard work, determination, competence, courage, integrity – and let’s face it, not a little dose of arrogance, which at times has led her unnecessarily into trouble, as with her infamous “colonialism” tweet, which caused widespread offence.

But this points to another quality she has as a politician: she has a thickness of skin which would make a bull elephant blush. Additional to all this, there has never been any taint of financial scandal about her throughout her long years in public life.

So you can see why her political opponents, and particularly the African National Congress (ANC), are running scared following the announcement by the Democratic Alliance that she will be their candidate for mayor of Johannesburg in the local elections in 2026. At age 74, she ain’t no spring chicken, but she can still do a respectable dance, and intends to waltz her way into the mayoral chair.

However, she may well become the best mayor Johannesburg has never had.

Why she might win

Zille has pitched her running for mayor as a “local gal returning to her roots”, where she grew up, where she worked as a journalist and where, she tells us, she fell in love in a city she has always loved and knows back to front.

And why?

Because she is coming to save it, descending from the clouds of Democratic Alliance heaven in Cape Town – a city it has run since 2009 – to rescue the good citizens of Johannesburg from ANC hell. An ANC, she tells us – and who can deny it? – which has manufactured political instability and municipal collapse. An ANC which has collapsed the most basic of services so that taps in many areas run dry, sewage swamps the pot-holed roads, household waste mounts up, and electricity supply has become erratic. An ANC which has allowed corruption to thrive.

Zille does not lack confidence and she talks a good talk. Local government is not rocket science, she says. It’s common sense, it’s getting down to basics, it’s about political will, it’s about proper management of resources. It’s about having the competence and determination to ensure that water flows through the pipes again, that electricity is restored, roads are repaired, and collection of waste is secured.

And how is this to be done? By streamlining the city’s administration, by rationalising its bureaucracy, cutting back the fat, and increasing the investment in maintenance and infrastructure which the ANC has so lamentably allowed to lapse. No community, no suburb will be ignored.

Nirvana is in prospect – but only if she is given the chance to restore the city to its former glory.

We should not doubt that Zille is propagating a gospel that appeals beyond the boundaries of traditional Democratic Alliance support. She has already received the vocal support of one-time prominent ANC praise-singers, such as former University of the Witwatersrand vice-chancellor Adam Habib and Ebrahim Harvey, biographer of former president Kgalema Motlanthe.

Both have pronounced a verdict that will justify defection from the ANC: Johannesburg is in a crisis brought on by ANC misrule and a vote for Zille will not be a vote for the Democratic Alliance, but a vote for the one person with the character, competence and drive to turn the city around.

Although their heresy may not be enough to convince traditional ANC supporters to break with the past, it may appeal to their children, who are not so bound by their grandparents’ and parents’ loyalties.

Zille had to climb over other Democratic Alliance bodies to win her nomination and has doubtless left some bruised egos in her wake. But this will not stop the DA uniting behind her.

The party smells blood, and it’s coloured the black, green and gold of the ANC. Win control of Joburg, hang on to Cape Town, and the Democratic Alliance will be running South Africa’s two major economic hubs. Turn Joburg around, provide a better life for all its citizens regardless of where they live, and the Democratic Alliance will hope to shed its reputation as the party for whites and the well-off, positioning itself nicely for the next general election. It’s a great scenario for the Democratic Alliance.

But there are obstacles in the way.

Why she might lose

To become mayor, Zille will need the backing of a majority of Johannesburg’s 270 seat council. At the last local election in 2021, the ANC emerged as the largest party with 33% of the vote and 91 seats. The Democratic Alliance came in second with 26% and 71. What followed initially was a Democratic Alliance minority government, before this was collapsed in September 2022 by the Economic Freedom Fighters (29 seats) throwing its lot in with the ANC, which took office as the major party in a coalition.

It all became a messy and disheartening story for Johannesburg’s voters, who saw the politicians scrabbling for power and perks while the city went into decline. But it demonstrates what the Democratic Alliance is up against.

And, as Zille has acknowledged, the mixed-member proportional electoral system used in local elections makes it enormously difficult for any single party to win an absolute majority. Even if the Democratic Alliance emerged as the largest party, it would have to fish for support among other parties to form a viable coalition.

Meanwhile, Zille has ruled out striking any deal with the Economic Freedom Fighters and is equally unlikely to strike any agreement with Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe Party. Perhaps she might be able to do a deal with the ANC in an echo of the government of national unity? Or will the ANC be so averse to joining a council led by Zille that it opts for what the DA terms a “doomsday coalition” with the EFF and/or MK?

Much will depend on the nature of the campaign, and whether Zille can avoid making the gaffes to which she is prone. In her speeches to black audiences she must avoid sounding like Madam condescending to Eve – the two characters in a popular South African cartoon strip.

Furthermore, however irrelevant they may be to local government, she may struggle to sidestep broader political issues, such as whether she is prepared to declare Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.

Yet Zille will count on voters wanting to have water in their taps.

The Iron Lady’s last stand?

The DA is risking much in putting Zille forward for mayor in Johannesburg. It knows she antagonises as many voters as she attracts and that she never fails to provoke controversy. But the party clearly sees her as well worth the gamble. She has name recognition far and wide. She will draw attention. She is guaranteed to provoke debate. She will ensure that the party’s existing voters turn out in droves while large swathes of the ANC’s supporters may stay at home.

The Democratic Alliance also knows that Zille’s nomination will ensure that the race in Johannesburg will attract national attention and is banking on it reverberating in its favour nationally. And it also knows that this is very possibly the Iron Lady’s last stand.

If she does become mayor, Zille will be 75 when she gets the job, and if she serves a full term, she will be 80 come the following local election. Many within the DA may be reckoning that, at that point, Zille will conclude that it is time to call it quits and exit the political arena gracefully to join the knitting circle in the retirement home in Cape Town where she lives. Even she will conclude by then that she will be too old to continue.

Surely she would, wouldn’t she? Don’t count on it.

Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Helen Zille: will competence, courage and a dose of arrogance be enough to get her elected as Johannesburg’s mayor? – https://theconversation.com/helen-zille-will-competence-courage-and-a-dose-of-arrogance-be-enough-to-get-her-elected-as-johannesburgs-mayor-266220

September 26, 2025

South Sudan is unstable: how a weak state benefits the ruling elite

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Steven C. Roach, Professor of Internatiional Relations, University of South Florida

Salva Kiir, the president of South Sudan, met with then US president Barack Obama at the White House in 2011 to discuss the future of the newly independent state.

Officials seated at the table were eager to hear about the vision for the political stability of the new country. But when Obama asked Kiir about his plan, Kiir turned to his chief advisor for an answer.

In my view, Kiir has never – then, or since – had a vision or plan to unify the country. This view is informed by my decades of research on the country and on-the-ground experience. I am a professor of international relations and the author of a book on South Sudan’s politics. I also served as a country expert for the United States Agency for International Development’s assessment team in South Sudan.

What’s happened since independence in 2011 is that Kiir has financed a patronage network and put his political rivals at arm’s length by keeping the country undeveloped and its institutions weak. Through the years, he has relied on the support of his cabinet and a tribal base of followers (he is from the Dinka community) to sow deep distrust of the opposition.

I researched this dynamic of governance in South Sudan in a recent study. I found that the country’s leaders have devised four fundamental strategies to exploit instability. These strategies are:

delaying elections to evade accountability
repressing any actors, such as civil society, that seek to unify the nation and modernise the state
playing up the threat of rebellion from political rivals to sustain violence and project fear
leaning on regional conflicts to hold on to power.

As a result, instability and division have shaped the country’s political system. This has been enabled by informal patronage networks, war and denial, but also through the behaviour and actions of a corrupt ruling elite.

Instability has allowed the elite to undermine the justice system and actively suppress efforts at reconciliation.

This highlights the need to place more power in regional and international actors to hold South Sudan’s leaders accountable, while empowering civil society to promote such accountability.

A troubled short history

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011.

Growing distrust among the country’s elites soon led to the outbreak of civil war between 2013 and 2015. The war resulted in nearly 400,000 deaths, with 2.3 million people fleeing to neighbouring countries.

Pressure from the UN and the United States saw warring parties agree to a peace deal in August 2015. However, tensions rose again in July 2016, leading to a fresh wave of violence.

In 2018, a new peace deal was signed, but it has yet to be fully implemented. Ensuing turmoil has led to implementation delays and exposed the country’s rampant corruption.

South Sudan is one of Africa’s poorest countries. Yet, it’s also ranked as the most corrupt country in the world, according to Transparency International. A recent report issued by the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found

The ensuing cycle of grand corruption aided by total impunity has produced a devastating humanitarian and human rights crisis.

The 2018 peace agreement led to the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity, and renewed hope that the country would work toward democracy, stability and the rule of law. Unlike the 2015 peace deal, which involved negotiations with a few parties, the 2018 agreement brought several more groups to the table.

But the country has yet to hold its first elections, adopt a permanent constitution, integrate the armed forces or establish a war crimes court. It remains a fragile country torn by violence and turmoil.

In March 2025, for instance, Kiir arrested his main rival and former vice-president Riek Machar. He accused Machar of planning a rebellion against the government. A few months later in September, Machar was accused of treason.

Relations between Kiir and Machar have been strained since 2013, derailing efforts to implement the peace deal that stopped a war pitting forces loyal to Kiir against those allied to Machar.

The strategies at play

Instability has become a favoured tool among elites for maintaining political power. The process of governing through instability relies on four political strategies.

First, Kiir has used instability to delay the implementation of key pillars of the 2018 peace agreement. In October 2024, Kiir announced the postponement of long-awaited elections to 2026. He warned that there was too much instability to hold peaceful elections. This delay did little to stem violence or instability. In fact, it simply afforded Kiir more time to stave off efforts to hold government elites accountable.

Second, the government has used the threat of political instability to downplay the need for justice and democracy. This threat became a tool for repressing civil society actors and justifying their exclusion from the peace process in 2018.

Third, instability fuels political uncertainty, giving the government space to stoke fears of rebellion whenever it suits its interests. Such fears have been repeatedly exploited in the power struggle between Kiir and Machar.

Lastly, an increase in regional instability has extended, and in some ways complicated, the state’s ability to govern through instability. On one hand, regional conflicts have forced Kiir to assume a diplomatic posture for managing conflicts in neighbouring countries, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. On the other hand, the spillover effects of war have hit South Sudan. Sudan’s civil war, for instance, has pushed South Sudan to the brink of renewed violence. A recent break in an oil pipeline linking the two countries has cut nearly 40% of South Sudan’s oil revenue.

The next steps

One way forward for South Sudan is to devise an effective strategy for succession in the country’s leadership.

Kiir, who has been in poor health, has taken steps toward a succession plan.

The president singlehandedly appointed Benjamin Bol Mel, his former advisor and money man, as an apparent successor in February 2025. He sacked two of his vice-presidents, Kuol Manyang Juuk and Daniel Awet Akot – the two main dissenting voices left in the government – in May 2025. Kiir then appointed his daughter, Adut Salva Kiir, to serve as a senior presidential envoy.

These decisions bypassed the ruling party’s procedures of appointing a successor, which require discussion and a vote on new appointees.

Kiir had argued that the 2018 peace agreement allowed him to appoint his own successor. However, allowing party procedure to determine the outcomes of a successor would be far more likely to calm tensions.

Moving beyond the dynamic of instability will also depend on the pressure placed on Kiir and other national elites by key international donors, and their continued support of civil society actors.

Neither option seems particularly possible at the moment. With civil war raging in Sudan and the US having dismantled the United States Agency for International Development (which provided nearly US$16 million in aid to civil society programmes in 2023), South Sudan’s fragility is unlikely to improve any time soon.

Steven C. Roach does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. South Sudan is unstable: how a weak state benefits the ruling elite – https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-is-unstable-how-a-weak-state-benefits-the-ruling-elite-265198

September 26, 2025

Mushrooms may have been part of early human diets: primate study explores who eats what and when

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Alexander Piel, Asso. Professor in Anthropology, University College London, UCL

Mushrooms may not be the first food that comes to mind when we imagine the diets of wild primates – or our early human ancestors. We tend to think of fruits and green leaves as the preferred foods for monkeys and apes.

But our new study from the Issa Valley in western Tanzania highlights a surprising, and potentially crucial, role for fungi in primate diets.

For nearly two decades, our work has centred on what it means to be a savanna-woodland primate in east Africa. Far from their forest-dwelling cousins, these populations are exposed to higher temperatures, as well as woodland and grassland vegetation where they can find food – or be in danger from predators like wild dogs and hyenas.

Broadly, we are interested in competition between species. For example, how do baboons and smaller monkeys avoid larger (and predatory) chimpanzees when looking for ripe fruits? Mushrooms may provide an answer.

We found that while all three primate species under study consumed mushrooms, their use and reliance differed throughout the year. Mushrooms were seasonally important for red-tailed monkeys and chimpanzees, becoming a fall-back food when ripe fruit was scarce, despite overall making up only 2% of their diet. For baboons, mushrooms were a preferred food, with fungi forming more than a tenth of their diet despite being available for only half the year.

Our findings not only shed light on the way that primates rely on and respond to their environment, but also hint at the evolutionary roots of human mycophagy (mushroom eating). Fungi have been overlooked in research into ancient diets because they don’t fossilise well and leave little trace in the archaeological record.

By examining which foods are consumed by primates, we can better reconstruct scenarios of how early human species may have competed with one another.

Issa fungi foraging

Over four years, we observed three co-inhabiting species – chimpanzees, yellow baboons and red-tailed monkeys – regularly consuming mushrooms.

We used over 50,000 observations of feeding among the three species and found that mushroom consumption wasn’t just incidental. While chimpanzees and red-tailed monkeys ate mushrooms mostly during the wet season, when availability peaked, baboons consumed mushrooms far longer, even when they were relatively scarce.

In fact, for two months of the year, mushrooms made up over 35% of baboons’ diets, suggesting they are a preferred food, not just consumed during fruit-scarce periods, as we suggest for the chimpanzees and red-tailed monkeys.

Chimpanzees and red-tailed monkeys, in contrast, treated mushrooms as a seasonal supplement, valuable when fruits were less abundant. This nuanced difference suggests that mushrooms play different roles within this primate community, depending on ecological strategies and competition dynamics.

Avoiding conflict through fungi

One of the most intriguing ideas to emerge from our study is the concept of niche partitioning: how animals adapt their diets to minimise competition. This is a well-established phenomenon which can manifest in various ways, from bird species occupying different canopy heights, to carnivores targeting different prey.

In habitats where multiple species coexist, finding one’s own food niche can be the key to survival. At Issa, baboons, chimpanzees and guenons (monkeys) might all be using mushrooms in strategic ways to improve feeding efficiency and reduce tension with each other as they respond to periods when (preferred) ripe fruits are insufficient for all three species.

What does this mean for us?

The implications of these findings stretch far beyond western Tanzania. First, they highlight how mushrooms can serve as a rich, seasonal food source, even for large mammals, providing protein, micronutrients and potentially medicinal benefits. This lends support to theories that fungi may have played a significant role in the diets of early hominins.

In fact, the habitat of Issa is thought to resemble the kind of mosaic woodland landscape where human ancestors evolved. If our primate relatives today are exploiting fungi in this environment, it’s plausible that Australopithecus, Homo habilis and other early human species did too.

Despite this, fungi are often overlooked in reconstructions of ancient diets, largely because they don’t fossilise well and leave little trace. Yet ancient DNA from Neanderthal dental plaque from about 40,000 years ago has revealed traces of mushrooms, tantalising clues that fungi may have been more central to prehistoric life than previously believed.

A caution and a call

The study also raises important questions about human-wildlife coexistence. In many parts of Tanzania, mushrooms are harvested by people and sold in local markets. As climate change and human population growth put pressure on wild resources, competition between humans and wildlife over edible fungi may increase. Understanding who eats what and when could help in managing these shared resources sustainably.

At a time when biodiversity is under threat and food security is a growing global concern, this research reminds us that hidden treasures like wild mushrooms aren’t just tasty; they’re significant for ecology and evolution.

Fungi can add to our understanding of where we came from and how we might share our ecosystems going forward.

Alexander Piel receives funding from the Salk/UCSD Center for Academic Research and Training in Anthropogeny and the Department of Human Origins, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. He is an associate researcher with MPI-EVA.

Fiona Stewart receives funding from the Salk/UCSD Center for Academic Research and Training in Anthropogeny and the Department of Human Origins, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. He is an associate researcher with MPI-EVA.

– ref. Mushrooms may have been part of early human diets: primate study explores who eats what and when – https://theconversation.com/mushrooms-may-have-been-part-of-early-human-diets-primate-study-explores-who-eats-what-and-when-264089

September 25, 2025

Tanzania’s social media clampdown and the elections – what’s at risk

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Leah Mwainyekule, Lecturer, University of Westminster

Social media platforms like WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook and X have transformed political dialogue and activism in Tanzania. The democratisation of political expression has especially empowered young voters and activists to challenge government actions and champion causes such as human rights, the release of political prisoners, and electoral reforms.

This is significant in a country politically dominated by one ruling party since independence in 1961. The government has responded by frequently clamping down on social media through arrests, mass content removals and platform-specific shutdowns. This is in addition to direct controls over media outlets. Media and communication scholar Leah Mwainyekule examines Tanzania’s social media landscape ahead of elections in October 2025.

What is the history of Tanzania’s social media curbs?

Tanzania’s political system is dominated by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, which has held power continuously since independence in 1961. The ruling party has kept in place a political structure headed by a powerful president in a tightly controlled political space. Opposition parties have faced suppression marked by restrictions on rallies, arrests, violence and exclusion from electoral processes. This worsened under former president John Magufuli, who clamped down on political dissent, persecuted opposition figures and imposed legal curbs against media and civic debate.

While President Samia Suluhu Hassan has recently introduced moderate reforms – restoring some rights, easing bans and facilitating dialogue – opposition leaders still confront severe charges or incarceration. The main opposition party – Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) – still can’t contest major elections.

Tanzania’s social media curbs are embedded in this political environment. The government claims to be controlling digital content to maintain political and social stability. This strategy is often justified by concerns about national security, misinformation and public order.

Laws and regulations govern the digital space. The landmark legislation is the Cybercrimes Act of 2015, which introduced provisions about online activities.

It’s illegal to share or receive unauthorised information, even if truthful or publicly available.
Police have extensive powers to conduct searches and seizures.
Secret surveillance and interception of communications can happen without judicial authorisation or proper due process.

The law has been condemned for provisions which limit political expression through blogs, online media and mobile platforms like WhatsApp. People have been arrested for criticising government officials or the president on WhatsApp and Facebook.

Further controls relate to obligations for internet service providers, social media platform owners, and expanded categories of prohibited content. They are contained in another law which was amended in 2025.

Critics highlight provisions that undermine online anonymity. Internet service providers and online content service providers have to be able to identify the source of online content. Internet café operators are required to register users through recognised IDs, assign static IP addresses, and install cameras to monitor users’ activities.

The laws are vague about defining what’s not allowed. It might be:

content which “offends individuals or groups”
sharing “evil content”
promoting material “likely to mislead or deceive the public”.

The lack of clear guidelines enables officials to target critics or unwanted content as they please.

Finally, critics have pointed to unrealistic deadlines for content removal.
The 2018 regulations said platforms must remove prohibited content within 12 hours of notification. The 2020 update reduced this deadline to just two hours. This made it one of the most stringent requirements globally.

The two-hour removal window applies mainly to content flagged by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority. But it could also relate to complaints from affected users. Platforms must also suspend or terminate accounts of users who fail to remove prohibited content within this period. This short deadline makes it nearly impossible to check whether content is legal before removal.

These regulations are widely perceived as politically motivated. They appear designed to suppress government critics, media and opposition voices. They stifle legitimate public discourse.

What are the government’s most recent actions?

The most recent example is the government’s suspension of the country’s most popular online forum, Jamii Forums, for 90 days in September 2025. The government cited the publication of content that “misleads the public”, “defames” the president and undermines national unity.

The government has also resorted to blanket bans of platforms like X (formerly Twitter). The most recent followed the hacking of official police accounts in a cyber attack. Although some users access X through virtual private networks, the ban remains officially enforced by internet service providers across the country.

The timing of the shutdown echoes similar action in 2020 in the run-up to the previous general election.

Tools to bypass national network restrictions are illegal and punishable by law.

Traditional media such as radio, television and newspapers face growing government censorship and surveillance pressure.

What is the effect on social and political debates?

Tanzania is set for general elections on 29 October 2025. The restrictions on social media will doubtless be felt. The restrictions reduce the platforms available for open discussion of government policies, political ideas and election choices. This shrinking digital space undermines public participation and limits access to diverse viewpoints critical for democratic debate.

Social media also play another important role. Social media users are known to expose electoral fraud, misinformation and government misconduct.

The scales are tilted against dissent, opposition narratives and minority voices.

At the same time, misinformation and hate speech may grow. This can increase the risks of polarisation and identity-based tensions.

What is the effect of governance?

The expanding restrictions reflect a governance model favouring information control over transparency and accountability. This can normalise censorship, arbitrary detentions and media suppression.

In essence, Tanzania’s social media curbs are likely to weaken governance. They undermine transparency, increase tension, and erode public trust, limiting democratic accountability.

Leah Mwainyekule does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Tanzania’s social media clampdown and the elections – what’s at risk – https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-social-media-clampdown-and-the-elections-whats-at-risk-265215

September 25, 2025

AI in Africa: 5 issues that must be tackled for digital equality

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rachel Adams, Honorary Research Fellow of The Ethics Lab, University of Cape Town

The AI revolution risks deepening inequality between the global north and south. Clarote & AI4Media/betterimagesofai.org, CC BY-SA

If it’s steered correctly, artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to accelerate development. It can drive breakthroughs in agriculture. It can expand access to healthcare and education. It can boost financial inclusion and strengthen democratic participation.

But without deliberate action, the AI “revolution” risks deepening inequality more than it will expand opportunity.

As a scholar of the history and future of AI, I’ve written about the dangers of AI widening global inequality. There’s an urgent need to develop governance mechanisms that will try to redistribute the benefits of this technology.

The scale of the AI gap is stark. Africa holds less than 1% of global data centre capacity. Data centres are the engines that drive AI. This means the continent has minimal infrastructure for hosting the computing power necessary to build and run AI models.

While only 32 countries worldwide host specialised AI data centres, the US and China account for over 90% of them.

And only about 5% of Africa’s AI talent (innovators with AI skills) have sufficient access to the resources needed for advanced research and innovation.

Leaders and policy-makers from around the world must grapple with an uncomfortable truth: AI is not equally distributed, and without deliberate action it will magnify global divides.

But they also still have the chance to set a new trajectory – one where Africa and the global majority shape the rules of the game. One that ensures AI becomes a force for shared prosperity rather than exclusion.

To achieve this, five critical policy areas most be addressed. These are data; computing capacity; AI for local languages; skills and AI literacy; and AI safety, ethics and governance. These are not just African priorities; they’re global imperatives.

1. Compute and infrastructure

Access to computational power has become the defining chokepoint in today’s AI ecosystem. African researchers and innovators will remain on the margins of the AI economy unless there is investment in regional data centres, GPU clusters (a group of computers working together on large-scale AI processing) and secure cloud infrastructure.

Europe, by contrast, has pooled over US$8 billion in establishing the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking to ensure the continent has computing capacity for local innovations.

African countries should press for funding and partnerships to expand local capacity. They will also need to insist on transparency from global providers about who controls access, and ensure regional cooperation to pool resources across borders.

2. Data governance

AI systems are only as good as the data they’re trained on. Much of the continent’s data is fragmented, poorly governed, or extracted without fairly compensating those it’s collected from. Large, diverse and machine-readable datasets are used to teach AI models about the contexts and realities the data reflect.

Where ethical stewardship frameworks exist, locally managed datasets have already driven innovation that has impact. For example, the Lacuna Fund has helped researchers across Africa build over 75 open-machine-learning datasets in areas like agriculture, health, climate and low-resource languages. These have filled critical data gaps, allowing for tools that better reflect African realities. Realities like high-accuracy crop yield datasets for farming. Or voice/text resources for under-served languages.

Robust national data protection and governance laws are needed. So are regional data commons, a shared resource where data is collected, stored, and made accessible to a community under common standards and governance. This would enable collaboration, reuse, and equitable benefits. Standards for quality, openness, interoperability and ethics developed by multilateral organisations must be designed with African priorities at their centre.

3. AI for local languages

Inclusive AI depends on the languages it speaks. Current large models overwhelmingly privilege English and other dominant languages. African languages are all but invisible in the digital sphere. This not only entrenches existing biases and inequalities, it also risks excluding millions from access to AI-enabled services.

Take the example of the Cape Town-based non-profit organisation Gender Rights in Tech. It has developed a trauma-informed chatbot called Zuzi that supports survivors of gender-based violence by providing anonymous, accessible guidance in diverse South African languages on their rights, available legal services, and sexual and reproductive health. It helps overcome stigma and bridge gaps in access. Zuzi demonstrates the power of AI technologies in local languages.

Dedicated investment in datasets, benchmarks, and models for African languages is urgently needed, as well as in tools for speech recognition, text-to-speech, and literacy.

4. AI skills and literacy

African infrastructure and data will mean little without human capacity to use them. At present, AI skills supply falls far short of demand, and public understanding of AI’s benefits and risks remains low.

To increase skills, AI and data science will need to be integrated into school and university curricula, and vocational training will need to be expanded. Supporting lifelong learning programmes is essential.

Public awareness campaigns can ensure citizens understand both the promise and perils of AI. This will support deeper public debate on these issues. It can also target support for women, rural communities, and African language speakers to help prevent new divides from forming.

5. Safety, ethics, and governance

Finally, stronger governance frameworks are urgently needed. African countries face unique risks from AI. Among them are electoral interference, disinformation, job disruption, and environmental costs. These risks are shaped by Africa’s structural realities: fragile information ecosystems, large informal labour markets, weak social safety nets, and resource-strained infrastructure. National strategies are emerging, but enforcement capacity and oversight remain limited.

African governments should push for the creation of an African AI safety institute. Safety and ethical audits must be mandated for high-risk systems. Regulations and AI governance instruments must be aligned with rights-based African principles that emphasise equity, justice, transparency, and accountability. Participation in global standard-setting bodies is also crucial to ensure that African perspectives help shape the rules being written elsewhere.

All eyes on the G20

Taken together, these priorities are not defensive measures but a blueprint for empowerment. If pursued, they would reduce the risk of inequality. They would position Africa and other regions across the majority world to shape AI in ways that serve their people and economies.

Digital and technology ministers from the world’s biggest economies will be attending the G20’s digital economy working group ministerial meeting at the end of September.

On paper, it’s a routine meeting. In practice, it may be the most consequential gathering on AI policy Africa has ever hosted.

This is the first time the G20’s digital ministers are meeting on African soil. It’s happening at the very moment AI is being hailed as the technology that will redefine the global economy.

This meeting will not stand alone. It will be followed by the AI for Africa conference, co-hosted by South Africa’s G20 presidency, Unesco and the African Union. Here the AI in Africa Initiative will be launched. It is designed as a practical mechanism to carry forward the G20’s commitments and advance implementation of the African Union’s Continental AI Strategy.

Cape Town could mark a turning point: the moment when African leadership, working in concert with the G20, starts to close the AI divide and harness this technology for shared prosperity.

Rachel Adams receives funding from the International Development Research Centre of Canada, under the AI4Development funding programme, co-led with the Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office of the UK.

– ref. AI in Africa: 5 issues that must be tackled for digital equality – https://theconversation.com/ai-in-africa-5-issues-that-must-be-tackled-for-digital-equality-265611

September 24, 2025

Graduated, now what? Survey of young Africans shows degrees don’t always land them a job

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrea Juan, Chief Research Specialist, Human Sciences Research Council

Graduates aren’t guaranteed a job. Nqobile Vundla/Unsplash

Study hard, get your degree, and then step confidently into a stable, well-paid job. That’s long been the assumption about how to secure a livelihood: in neat, predictable stages. But it is increasingly out of touch with reality. Secure jobs are no longer guaranteed after obtaining a tertiary qualification.

Up-to-date and reliable data on graduate unemployment in Africa is hard to come by. A 2014 British Council study estimated that nearly one in four Nigerian graduates (23.1%) were unemployed. In Kenya, the study said, it took graduates an average of five years to secure their first job. In South Africa, graduate unemployment stood at just 5.8% in 2008. By 2023, this had more than doubled to 11.8%. When looking specifically at young graduates aged 20–29 – a useful proxy for those newly entering the job market – the figure is even starker: nearly one in three (30.3%) were unemployed in 2023.

These figures signal a crisis. The mismatch between graduates and opportunities makes it clear that it’s essential to find diverse ways of making a living.

So what do graduates do to generate livelihoods? We recently conducted research tracking more than 500 African tertiary graduates across 21 universities (nine in African countries and 12 in other countries) over five years to provide some answers.

The findings showed that graduates were piecing together livelihoods from multiple sources rather than walking the straight road of a career. Their paths were complex. Only 16% of the total sample moved smoothly from tertiary education into a job and remained in employment over the period of the survey.

Knowing this, universities can help provide graduates with the skills and resources they will need for the real world.

Graduates build portfolios of income

The study showed that African graduates are resourceful in generating livelihoods. From their responses we identified some trends.

First, they do more than one thing. Almost half of the respondents were engaged in more than one activity – for example, working while running a side business or pursuing further studies. A Ugandan graduate explained how he juggled salaried work, family farming projects and continued education.

Second, they make education itself a livelihood. Scholarships, postgraduate degrees and research opportunities provided both income and stability. Others use underemployment (jobs that don’t match their qualification, skills or ambitions) as stepping stones, gaining experience while waiting for better opportunities.

Third, entrepreneurship or self-employment has a role. While only a small minority relied solely on their own businesses, about a fifth of graduates supplemented their income in this way. Some sold goods, others started NGOs or social enterprises, and many saw entrepreneurship as a safety net in an unpredictable labour market.

But this isn’t just about necessity. Graduates are motivated by opportunity, passion projects, and the chance to build something of their own, often with family members. This challenges the common view that entrepreneurship in Africa is driven only by desperation. In reality, necessity and opportunity overlap, and both are part of how graduates make a living.

Beyond ‘waiting’ for an opportunity

The pathways described by graduates don’t fit the conventional picture of being “stuck” or “unemployed”. Instead, they are marked by movement, improvisation and continuous reinvention.

Even when underemployed, graduates often describe their jobs as dignified or at least as stepping stones. They are investing in their futures, sharpening skills and building networks.

This kind of agency (the capacity to navigate uncertainty and imagine alternative futures) is a crucial resource. It allows young Africans to find dignity and purpose in contexts where institutional support and job opportunities are limited.

What universities can do differently to prepare graduates

These findings raise tough questions for universities. If the education-to-employment pipeline is so complex, what role should higher education play in preparing graduates? Our research points to some answers:

First, universities must stop clinging to outdated concepts like “employability”. Degrees are not tickets to stable jobs. Instead, education should prepare students for diversified, non-linear livelihoods. This means teaching not just technical skills but also resilience, adaptability and entrepreneurial thinking.

Entrepreneurship education is one starting point. Courses on business planning, financial management and networking can help graduates who want to start or sustain ventures.

But skills alone are not enough. Without supportive ecosystems, such as incubators, access to finance and mentorship, many small businesses fail. Universities could act as hubs, linking students and graduates to government programmes, private sector partners and alumni networks. Partnerships between universities and government agencies, like South Africa’s National Youth Development Agency which funds business ventures, need to be forged.

Career services also need to evolve. Rather than focusing narrowly on job placements, universities should help students explore multiple career paths, build social capital and access opportunities for income diversification. Practical resources, like co-working spaces, short courses or “micro-credentials” that allow graduates to quickly pick up new skills, and seed funding could give graduates a head start.

Finally, alumni networks are a powerful but underused asset. Showcasing graduates who have successfully diversified their income can inspire others and change the prevailing narrative.

Education should no longer be seen simply as a bridge to wage employment, but as a platform for building flexible, multi-dimensional livelihoods.

A new story of graduate life

The African youth population is still growing, and the labour market will not suddenly expand to meet demand. That reality can sound daunting. But the stories of young graduates also show resilience, creativity and determination. They are not passively “waiting” for jobs – they are actively constructing futures, often against the odds.

Universities and other tertiary education institutions must catch up. By supporting entrepreneurship, fostering networks and recognising the reality of non-linear transitions, they can help graduates navigate uncertainty with confidence.

The future of work in Africa will not be defined by smooth transitions, but by complex entanglements. Recognising and supporting these entanglements may be one of the most important tasks of higher education in the decades ahead.

This article was produced in the context of The Imprint of Education study that was conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa between August 2019 and July 2025, in partnership with and funded by the Mastercard Foundation. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Mastercard Foundation, its staff, or its Board of Directors. Andrea Juan holds an honorary research fellowship at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Law.

This article was produced in the context of The Imprint of Education study that was conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa between August 2019 and July 2025, in partnership with and funded by the Mastercard Foundation. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Mastercard Foundation, its staff, or its Board of Directors. Adam Cooper holds an honorary research associateship at Nelson Mandela University, Chair in Youth Unemployment, Empowerment and Employability.

– ref. Graduated, now what? Survey of young Africans shows degrees don’t always land them a job – https://theconversation.com/graduated-now-what-survey-of-young-africans-shows-degrees-dont-always-land-them-a-job-264999

September 22, 2025

Economic sanctions need a rethink: evidence shows they raise food prices and hurt the poor most

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sylvanus Kwaku Afesorgbor, Associate Professor of Agri-Food Trade and Policy, University of Guelph

Economic sanctions are widely viewed by academics and policymakers as a better alternative to military interventions to pressure governments to change objectionable policies. The idea is simple: instead of using weapons, squeeze the ruling elite economically until they change their behaviour.

The use of economic sanctions has been rising steadily. According to recent data from the Global Sanctions Database, the number of active sanctions grew by 31% in 2021 compared to 2020, and this upward trend continued through 2022 and 2023.

In Africa, several countries are currently subject to sanctions imposed by the United States, the United Nations or the European Union. These African states include the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. It’s not mere coincidence that most of these countries are listed in the World Food Programme’s hunger hotspots.

Sanctions could have unintended consequences for citizens and they are usually the ones who pay the price. When sanctions hit food systems, the impact can be devastating.

I study economic sanctions and their unintended adverse effects on developing countries. In a recent study conducted with my colleagues, we looked at how economic sanctions affected food security across 90 developing countries between 2000 and 2022. We wanted to explore potential links between sanctions and starvation amid growing global concerns about food insecurity .

We focused on two key indicators: food prices and undernourishment (meaning the share of people who don’t get enough calories to live a healthy life).

We measured food prices using the Food and Agriculture Organization’s food consumer price index. This index captures changes in the overall cost of food and non-alcoholic beverages typically purchased by households.

We also used the organisation’s prevalence of undernourishment computation. This is a key indicator under Sustainable Development Goal 2.1, which tracks progress toward ending hunger by 2030.

Our results are sobering. When sanctions are in place, food prices rise by about 1.2 percentage points compared to periods without sanctions. That might sound small, but in low-income countries where families spend half their income on food, even tiny increases make life harder. This is outside other external factors that may lead to price hikes, such as demand and supply patterns.

We also found that undernourishment goes up by 2 percentage points during sanction periods. For countries with millions already living on the edge of hunger, that’s a huge additional burden.

Why sanctions raise food insecurity

Sanctions ripple through economies in several ways, and food is often caught in the middle.

First, sanctions disrupt food imports. This is a critical concern for many developing countries that rely heavily on international markets to feed their populations. Between 2021 and 2023, Africa’s food imports totalled about US$97 billion. At the country level, for example, Ethiopia and Libya imported food worth US$3 billion, Sudan US$2.3 billion and the Democratic Republic of Congo US$1.2 billion. Sanctions can further restrict trade or increase transportation costs, making food both scarcer and more expensive.

Second, sanctions restrict access to essential agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers, pesticides and machinery. They also impede technology transfers. For instance, farmers in sub-Saharan Africa apply on average only 9kg of fertiliser per hectare of arable land, compared with 73kg in Latin America and 100kg in South Asia. These constraints reduce yields, increase production costs and make it harder for farmers to sustain output.

Third, sanctions shake financial systems, reduce people’s incomes and encourage hoarding. Households already on tight budgets are forced to cut back or switch to cheaper, less nutritious food.

Finally, sanctions often result in cuts to food assistance, as targeted countries lose access to international aid. For example, the recent suspension of US humanitarian assistance to Sudan forced the closure of 80% of the country’s emergency food kitchens. This impact is particularly severe given that some of the largest food donors, such as the United States and the European Union, are also among the most frequent users of sanctions.

The end result is simple: higher food prices, less food on the table and more hunger.

Not all sanctions are equal

We also found that the type of sanction matters.

Trade sanctions that block imports and exports push food prices up the most. Financial sanctions that freeze assets or cut off banking access also hurt because they disrupt agricultural trade indirectly.
When countries face trade, financial and travel sanctions together, the damage is severe: food prices jump by more than 3.5 percentage points and hunger rises sharply.
Who imposes the sanctions also makes a difference. Sanctions from the European Union raised food prices the most, while sanctions from the UN had the biggest effect on hunger – increasing undernourishment by nearly 6 percentage points.

Food as a weapon of warfare

The UN has warned for years against using food as a weapon. In 2018, Resolution 2417 explicitly condemned starvation as a tool of war or political pressure. Yet in practice, sanctions often restrict food, medicine and agricultural inputs even when “humanitarian exemptions” exist on paper.

Food insecurity in Africa is worsening. According to the World Health Organization, one in five people on the continent faces hunger, and the number of undernourished continues to grow. Sanctions add to this crisis.

And the moral dilemma is clear. The people most harmed – poor families, small farmers and children – are the ones least responsible for the behaviour that triggers sanctions.

While sanctions aim to punish regimes, they often punish ordinary people instead.

What needs to change

Sanctions are unlikely to disappear from global politics. But their design and humanitarian fallout need rethinking. There are three steps that could reduce the damage.

First, stronger humanitarian exemptions: make sure food, fertilisers and aid can move freely, without being blocked.
Second, track the impact of sanctions: international agencies like the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme should monitor how sanctions affect food systems and sound the alarm quickly.
Third, rethink the strategy: if sanctions end up fuelling hunger, instability and migration, they may do more harm than good in the long run.

If the world is serious about ending hunger by 2030, then the unintended consequences of sanctions cannot be ignored. Sanctions must be redesigned to protect the most vulnerable, otherwise they risk becoming not just a diplomatic tool, but a driver of food crises.

Sylvanus Kwaku Afesorgbor receives funding from the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agribusiness (OMAFA). Kwaku also consults occasionally for the African Development Bank and the African Economic Research Consortium. He is the Executive Founder of the international think tank, Centre for Trade Analysis and Development (CeTAD Africa), based in Accra, Ghana.

– ref. Economic sanctions need a rethink: evidence shows they raise food prices and hurt the poor most – https://theconversation.com/economic-sanctions-need-a-rethink-evidence-shows-they-raise-food-prices-and-hurt-the-poor-most-265296

September 21, 2025

Deepfakes and South African law: remedies on paper, gaps in practice

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Nomalanga Mashinini, Senior Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand

Deepfakes are forgeries of people’s faces, voices and likeness generated through artificial intelligence (AI). They create a serious digital deception. Deepfakes undermine constitutional rights, reduce trust in media and distort fairness in elections. While many countries have laws that address the risks caused by deepfakes, enforcement remains a challenge.

Deepfakes began to be widely created in 2017 after they’d first appeared on Reddit, a discussion website of forums where people exchange information. A Reddit user called Deepfakes shared an AI software tool that could superimpose celebrities’ faces on pornographic videos. AI-generated media became widely accessible through software apps that enable people to freely create deepfakes.

There are several types of deepfakes:

text deepfakes in the form of fake receipts and identification documents
photo deepfakes, often swapping faces and bodies using apps to create memes
audio deepfakes, where text-to-speech apps are used for voice cloning, often targeting politicians
video deepfakes, where face and movement are transferred onto someone else’s video, commonly used to create “revenge pornography”.

Deepfakes pose three main dangers:

They deceive audiences into believing fabricated media.
They enable cybercrimes, reputational harm and misrepresentation.
They can be published by anyone, including anonymous social media users.

The key issue is how law can protect people from the illegal use of their images, voices, and likenesses in deepfakes.

Since 2020, I have looked at laws that regulate deepfakes in South Africa and their implementation. My findings show that the biggest problem with deepfakes is law enforcement, rather than any lack of laws that prohibit the unlawful creation and distribution of deepfakes.

Deepfake threats

South Africa has seen notable cases that highlight the growing impact of deepfakes. In 2024, Leanne Manas, an award-winning South African broadcast anchor, was a victim when her image was used in fake endorsement of weight loss products and online trading on Facebook and TikTok.

South African-born businessman Elon Musk also appeared in a deepfake video that induced many South Africans to invest in a financial scam that promised high returns.

In 2025, Professor Salim Abdool Karim, the director of the Centre for the AIDS Programme of Research in South Africa, appeared in a deepfake video showing him making anti-vaccination statements while endorsing counterfeit heart medicine.

Legal protection in South Africa

South Africa has a mixed legal system that combines constitutional rights, legislation and common law rules to provide deepfake victims with remedies.

There are laws that provide remedies in both civil and criminal cases. For example:

Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020: criminalises electronic publication of intimate private images without consent.
Electoral Act 73 of 1998: bans publishing false information to influence elections.
Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996: prohibits online distribution of private sexual photographs and films to cause harm.
Protection of Personal Information Act: prohibits misuse of personal information that infringes privacy.

Common law remedies

Anyone can claim violation of privacy if their private images are used without permission. They can also enforce their right to identity if a deepfake misrepresents them or gives a perpetrator commercial advantage.

I investigated these principles in an article about the impact of deepfakes on the right to identity in South Africa. Using South African cases, I found that the unauthorised use of a person’s identity attributes in a deepfake deserves protection.

The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed, in Grütter v Lombard, that South African law protects a person’s identity from being exploited without permission. And this protection is supported by the constitutional guarantee of human dignity. Grütter and Lombard once practised on the same premises under the name “Grütter and Lombard”, but Grütter later left. Lombard kept using Grütter’s name without consent. The court ordered him to stop as it falsely implied an ongoing professional association and infringed Grütter’s right to identity.

In another case, a surfer’s magazine called ZigZag published a photo of a 12-year-old girl as a pin-up cover image. The court stressed that the key issue was whether an image was exploited for another’s benefit without consent. The defendants were ordered to pay compensation and costs.

Another case is that of South African television personality, beauty pageant titleholder, businesswoman and philanthropist Basetsana Kumalo. She sued a business that took photos of her while she was shopping in their store and used those images in an advertisement for their products without her permission. The court ruled that using someone’s likeness for false endorsements infringes identity and privacy, because it creates the misleading impression of support for the product, service or business.

These cases fit squarely into the deepfakes misuses, showing that false endorsement, election disinformation and non-consensual pornography on social media can trigger liability.

Enforcement challenges

While South African law provides remedies against deepfakes, four hurdles frustrate enforcement:

South African courts have capacity constraints and struggle to resolve backlogs.
Litigation remains a “rich man’s” option. The poor struggle to access justice or wait too long for pro bono help.
While South African courts can assert jurisdiction over global platforms like Meta and TikTok, serving court orders abroad and compelling compliance is still costly, and takedown notices are often enforced too late.
Perpetrators hide behind fake profiles and are hard to trace through the South African Police Service. Social media companies delay revealing the perpetrators’ true identities upon request.

These enforcement challenges can be addressed through capacity building and legal reform. AI research centres should work with law enforcement to train personnel and provide practical skills and tools for tracing and authenticating deepfakes. Parliament must update social media laws so that platforms are directly accountable for fast and fair action when people’s identities are misused in deepfakes.

Legal rules should set minimum standards that deepfake apps and platforms must follow. Rather than relying on age restrictions or consent alone, the law should require these tools to embed watermarking to signal that content is a deepfake, enable tracing of where it comes from, and make sure takedown systems actually work.

Justice on paper

South African law clearly prohibits the misuse of identity through deepfakes, but enforcement gaps leave victims exposed. Without affordable legal access, faster platform accountability, and effective international cooperation, illegal deepfakes will continue to increase.

Nomalanga Mashinini receives funding from the National Research Foundation Thuthuka Grant.

– ref. Deepfakes and South African law: remedies on paper, gaps in practice – https://theconversation.com/deepfakes-and-south-african-law-remedies-on-paper-gaps-in-practice-263850

September 21, 2025

Ethiopia’s two bids at democracy have failed: what it will take to succeed

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Terefe Gebreyesus, Lecturer, Griffith University

Ethiopia has attempted to transition to democracy twice. First in 1991, when a new government overthrew a dictatorial military regime. Second in 2018, when Abiy Ahmed took over as prime minister after protests against a repressive government.

In both attempts, there was optimism and excitement. But both failed.

Can Ethiopia still get it right? In a recent article, I tried to answer this question. I examined four preconditions that scholars of democratic transition identify. These are:

economic growth over a considerable period
political elites committed to tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic rules and practices
independent political institutions
international organisations, such as the African Union and the UN, being willing to force the country’s political elites to uphold democratic values.

In my view, based on my research, Ethiopia does not meet any of the preconditions.

Instead, democratic governance is made almost impossible by its poverty, culture of solving political differences with conflict and violence, absence of strong political institutions, and polarisation.

A democratic government in Ethiopia would help ensure people live in a country that respects human rights and dignity. It would help unlock accountability, stability and economic growth.

Failed attempts

In 1991, the country had endured a 17-year civil war that began in 1974. The winners of the war, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, established control over the country by forming a coalition political party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.

The new government made radical reforms. It allowed political parties, radio and media communications to be free. It encouraged private publications and permitted public demonstrations.

But it didn’t take long for the new government to become authoritarian. It persecuted political competitors. Elections were held regularly, but they were not free and fair. Human rights and political freedoms were violated. Freedom of political communication was restricted.

As a result, protests started in 2015. They led to the appointment of Abiy as prime minister in 2018.

He began a second attempt at moving Ethiopia towards democracy. As The Guardian newspaper in the UK described it:

Something extraordinary is happening in Ethiopia … authoritarianism and state brutality appear to be giving way to something resembling democracy.

Again, this didn’t last. Instead, political order has worsened. The country went through a two-year civil war from 2020 to 2022 between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Another guerrilla war started between the federal government and an Amhara youth group named the Fano shortly afterwards.

What democratic transition takes

No country has become democratic without at least some of the four preconditions in place. And they are not equally important. For instance, Ghana may not have a strong economy, but it has political elites who play by the rules of democratic governance.

Economic growth: if a society is economically advanced, generally, the people want democracy. This is because an undemocratic and unstable government threatens their economic security. As a result, citizens won’t take part in activities that go against democratic consolidation.

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. While there is no magic number for this, one study found that a country with US$10,000 per capita income generally has a higher chance of adopting competitive elections. Ethiopia’s per capita income is US$1,011.

Economic growth is the foundation of strong political and civic institutions. These are important for transiting to and consolidating democracy.

But economic growth needs time. Ethiopia’s constant political instability has hurt its potential for economic development. In the two decades before 2018, its economy grew strongly, reducing the national poverty rate from 39% to 24%. Political instability and other factors since then had increased poverty rates to 32% by 2021.

Political elites: if political elites are committed to deliberating, compromising and cooperating, a country can successfully transit to democracy. One study found that when political elites are divided, the country will be authoritarian. The current civil war in Sudan offers an example of what can happen when political elites battle for power.

In Ethiopia, political disagreements often lead to violence or a government effort to silence and destroy the opposition. In 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front and other political groups couldn’t find common ground, the ruling elite eliminated dissenters. This allowed it to rule the country alone for 28 years. Similarly, when political elites couldn’t deliberate, compromise and cooperate in the second attempt, war broke out.

Political institutions: strong political institutions – such as an independent judiciary, police and electoral agency – support democratic transition. They also help sustain it. Political institutions prevent authoritarian leaders from persecuting political competition, and help solve any conflicts between competing elites.

External pressure: the best example of this was seen in 2022. The civil war between Tigray and the Ethiopian government ended when an African Union-led effort in South Africa forced the two sides to agree. It’s difficult, however, to transition to democracy by relying on external pressure, which would need to be constant and consistent. No country in Africa has been able to become and stay democratic based on external pressure.

What next

Democratic transition can only succeed in Ethiopia when at least one of three things occurs.

First, the country’s economy needs to grow for a substantial amount of time. Second, its diverse ethnic and religious identities must be integrated through policies that encourage the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. Third, society and, more specifically, the political elite need to commit to tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic principles.

All that will take a long time to achieve. Meanwhile, the country has two unfavourable choices: support a non-democratic government to consolidate political order and then gradually help it achieve democratic goals. Or attempt another transition, which may lead to anarchy and widespread inter-community violence. An untimely democratic transition would destroy political order.

With this in mind, Ethiopia’s political elites need to embrace discussion, debate and compromise. External forces can be a support by getting the political elite to move in this direction.

Terefe Gebreyesus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ethiopia’s two bids at democracy have failed: what it will take to succeed – https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-two-bids-at-democracy-have-failed-what-it-will-take-to-succeed-263817

September 18, 2025

Uganda has signed a deal with the US to take asylum seekers – what’s behind it and what’s at stake

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Franzisca Zanker, Senior researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute

A new deal to deport asylum seekers from the US to Uganda was announced in August 2025. The full agreement, already signed by the ambassadors of the two countries at the end of July, set out the terms of the arrangements. Franzisca Zanker and Ronald Kalyango Sebba, who have studied refugee and migration policy in Uganda, unpack its significance.

What deal has Uganda signed with Washington on taking refugees?

Uganda has agreed to take on an unspecified number of third-country nationals who have a pending asylum claim in the US but cannot return home due to safety concerns. In other words, these are people who should likely be protected as refugees, but are no longer wanted in Donald Trump’s America.

Uganda is set to receive development funds in return. It also retains discretion on a case-by-case basis.

According to the official Ugandan statement, the deal, which entered into force with its signing on 29 July 2025, does not include people with a criminal background or unaccompanied minors. The written agreement, however, only mentions minors.

Once in Uganda, each person will go through individual refugee status determination processes.

How does this deal compare with others the US has reached on the continent?

It follows similar bilateral agreements with other African countries from recent weeks. For instance, eight people with a criminal background were deported in July to South Sudan. Five similar cases were deported to Eswatini. In mid-September, Ghana became the latest African country to crumble, taking in 14 deported migrants from the US.

A final example, Rwanda, has a long history of similar agreements. These agreements have usually been accompanied by much fanfare and followed by little in the way of receiving of actual refugees. Most recently Rwanda agreed to take in 250 people from the US. The first seven arrived in late August.

What are the issues with these arrangements?

The US is not alone in its attempts to send asylum seekers to countries in Africa.

Plans – with varying levels of concreteness – have been thrown around by politicians from the UK, Denmark and Germany.

Migration is being demonised by politicians all over the world. So externalising, which basically means moving the location of the problem, may seem like a solution.

But African countries have not always received such offers with open arms. While global asymmetries and aid dependencies mean that African officials may not overtly reject such deal attempts, countries are not keen to take on any deportees, let alone from third countries.

In fact, there is no international convention that provides a legal instrument for deporting people from another nationality to a different country. International agreements, most recently the Samoa Agreement between the European Union and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states, have removed the potential to deport third nationals.

Deporting nationals from other countries to African countries is, therefore, legally questionable – and diplomatically unpopular. The African Union has condemned such arrangements as “xenophobic and completely unacceptable”.

What’s in it for Uganda?

The deal provides the groundwork for much-needed improvements in bilateral US-Ugandan relationship.

In response to the globally condemned 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act, the Joe Biden administration terminated Uganda’s eligibility for US trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. This policy gave Uganda duty-free access to the American market for a variety of goods.

More recently under the Trump administration, Uganda has suffered the effect of US funding cuts. This includes the loss of an estimated 66% of funding following cuts to the USAID development assistance programme. Uganda also faces a higher tariff of 15%, up from the previously announced 10% that will affect the cost of its agricultural products in the US market. This could potentially lower its sales in a key export market.

While the details of the US-Uganda asylum deal are shrouded in secrecy, as is common with such agreements it could provide Uganda with much needed development funds and lead to better tariff conditions.

Domestically, opposition politicians have criticised the new bilateral deal. However, Museveni has not shown much concern for these misgivings. Uganda is one of the few countries where refugees have not become a major political issue.

However, this may change. Attitudes towards migrants are slowly changing at a societal and political level.

As refugee numbers rise, conflicts between them and host communities over land and environmental damage are increasing. There is growing public apprehension about the government’s open-door policy.

What is Uganda’s history when it comes to refugees?

Uganda has a long history of refugee protection. It currently hosts 1.8 million refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The country has a reputation as one of the most generous places towards refugees. Most people entering Uganda are given automatic refugee status. This was set up in the 1969 refugee convention from the then Organisation of African Unity.

The government provides refugees with a plot of land to farm. They have free access to schools and healthcare, and can work. As refugee numbers grow, however, the plots of land are getting smaller.

In practice, refugees are confined to dusty so-called refugee settlements, with few working and educational possibilities. Many refugees – just like the Ugandan host community – live under very high levels of poverty.

Some refugees have to go through individual refugee status determination processes where they face huge backlogs and access to justice issues.

Will the refugees from Washington get the same treatment?

We do not know at this stage. However, in August 2021, Uganda agreed to take on up to 2,000 refugees from Afghanistan on behalf of the US. While this was deemed only a temporary move before they were resettled elsewhere, many remain in Uganda to this day.

At the time, the Ugandan foreign minister wrote in an op-ed

our friend, partner and longstanding ally – the US – asked for our support …. when the US asks for our help and we are able to give it, we do.

In the same piece he also noted

Ugandans say refugees are our brothers and sisters. That is why our door will always be open to them.

What this means for the US deportees is unknown.

The agreement reveals no details about their temporary housing or refugee status determination process. Whether they will be sent to the remote settlements where most refugees in Uganda access free housing and humanitarian assistance, or stay in urban Kampala, remains to be determined.

With elections in Uganda scheduled for January 2026, such a deal certainly helps President Yoweri Museveni preempt any US criticism regarding electoral freedom. But it also raises deeper questions about the long-term effects of open-door policies.

Franzisca Zanker receives funding from the European Research Council for the project “The Political Lives of Migrants: Perspectives from Africa” (Grant no: 101161856).

Ronald Kalyango Sebba is affiliated with Kyambogo University, Kampala Uganda.

– ref. Uganda has signed a deal with the US to take asylum seekers – what’s behind it and what’s at stake – https://theconversation.com/uganda-has-signed-a-deal-with-the-us-to-take-asylum-seekers-whats-behind-it-and-whats-at-stake-265545