Charli XCX turned Wuthering Heights into a sonic gothic masterpiece

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lillian Hingley, Postdoctoral Researcher in English Literature, University of Oxford

When the album dropped at the stroke of midnight on February 13, I found myself lying in the dark listening to Charli XCX’s album, Wuthering Heights. As her second soundtrack album (after Bottoms in 2023), this record was made for Emerald Fennell’s 2026 film adaptation of Wuthering Heights. But this collection of songs also stands as a musical adaptation of Emily Brontë’s novel in its own right.

The opening track, House, struck me with its ability to succinctly get to the heart of what Wuthering Heights is. It is not just the title of Brontë’s book and Fennell’s film, but also the name of a house, the story’s main setting.

Rather than offering a typical three-act structure of beginning, middle and end, Brontë’s novel is an experimental, strange form. I conceive the novel as structured largely by the movement of the characters between the titular Wuthering Heights and neighbouring property Thrushcross Grange. There is a constant movement, a haunting, between poles rather than a clear linear progression from point A to point B.

I was pleased, therefore, to see that Charli’s part-film soundtrack, part-book adaptation has adopted this impetus towards formal experimentation – albeit in her own distinct way.

Brontë’s story utilises the technique of frame narrative – the layering of several stories within a wider narrative – in a complex web of flashbacks, unreliable narrators and perspective shifts. Charli’s fourth track, Always Everywhere reflects this narrative multiplicity on a sonic level, particularly by evoking the elemental setting of Heathcliff and Cathy’s story.

Always Everywhere by Charli XCX.

The grand scale and layers of the sound allow me to visualise and hear the Yorkshire moors. Just as Charli’s lyric “your laughter tearing through the rain” suggests, Always Everywhere has a wide, spatial quality. This song is a vast space through which the wind blows, or where a ghostly voice travels through the sound until it reaches the listener’s ears.

Boundaries of the self

This dispersed, abstracted narrative offered by Brontë and Charli reflect their shared interest in the boundaries of the self. Brontë fans are well-acquainted with Cathy’s famous line: “Nelly, I am Heathcliff.” The album is similarly concerned with interrogating the conception of the self as a sealed entity, instead seeing the individual as spilling out into something other than itself.

In the song Out of Myself, we are attacked by aggressive strings, in a way that feels romantic in the poetic sense. Here, we have the pain and the pleasure of the sublime (an overwhelming aesthetic experience of awe and even terror that writers such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge wished to capture in their poetry) – a quasi-religious experience. This is why the sado-masochistic imagery in the song’s lyrics – the imperatives to “put the rope between my teeth”, “push my cheek into the stone” and “please rub the salt into my wounds” – offer more than just shock value. The navigation and testing of boundaries contained in these images reflect the novel’s status as a gothic romance.

Chains of Love by Charli XCX.

The central metaphor of the track Chains of Love reflects the ambivalent character of love in the original text. Following Cathy’s declaration that she is Heathcliff, she adds: “He’s always, always in my mind: not as a pleasure […] but as my own being”. The “chains” in Charli’s song act like the star-crossed destiny of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, a symbol of an enduring yet tragic partnership – a partnership that the character of Isabella directly mentions in Fennell’s film.

This ambivalence is matched by the use of the strings on the album. In Always Everywhere, the strings represent a cinematic romanticism. In House, Charli uses creepy strings and screams of demonic possession, borrowed directly from the soundscape of horror films. The marriage of strings and electronic sounds represents a similarly complex relationship. At one point in Funny Mouth (specifically, at 1 minute 17), the strings sound like they could be an instrument setting on a keyboard. In My Reminder, choppy vocal effects and intermissions of discordant strings fight for their position on the track.

Sonic melancholia

Charli’s album does not shy from outlining the complexities and, indeed, the problems of Cathy and Heathcliff’s love. The psychoanalytic theorists Maria Torok and Nicolas Abraham have explained how the act of mourning can turn into its excessive and neurotic counterpart: melancholia, in which a person “incorporates” or preserves a beloved dead object instead of accepting the reality that the object has gone.

House by Charli XCX featuring John Cale.

Think of, for example, Heathcliff’s desire to dig up Cathy’s remains on two occasions in the book. Charli’s song Altars reflects the double meaning of Heathcliff’s obsession with Cathy. “Your altar” could be interpreted as a symbol of betrayal; for example, when Cathy stood at the wedding altar with the man she married, Edgar Linton, instead of with her true love, Heathcliff. This phrase could also be interpreted as Heathcliff worshipping at Cathy’s altar even, or perhaps especially, in death. In response to this excessive mourning, Eyes of the World, a feature with Sky Ferreira, offers a plea in its final line: “Set me free”.

Perhaps, then, this is a useful way to navigate what some see as the aberration of adapting English Literary classics into other forms, whether songs or films. Charli XCX’s Wuthering Heights is a reminder that adaptation need not be understood as a detraction of the original novel. To take Charli’s language of nature v nurture in her penultimate track My Reminder, while the album may have emerged from the “same four walls” of Wuthering Heights, it is “different”. This album is not a negation of Brontë’s novel, but a productive, imaginative, beautiful haunting.


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The Conversation

Lillian Hingley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Charli XCX turned Wuthering Heights into a sonic gothic masterpiece – https://theconversation.com/charli-xcx-turned-wuthering-heights-into-a-sonic-gothic-masterpiece-276218

Nancy Guthrie kidnapping: can Bitcoin ransom demand be used to track down the criminals?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Abdul Jabbar, Dean of Internationalisation, Associate Professor Data Strategy and Analytics, University of Leicester

Joseph Christanto / Shutterstock

The kidnapping of Nancy Guthrie – the mother of US news anchor Savannah Guthrie – is the latest in a string of crimes where ransoms have been demanded in Bitcoin.

The 84-year-old was kidnapped from her home in Tucson, Arizona, in the middle of the night. A ransom of US$6 million (£4.4 million) has been demanded by the kidnappers.

The scale of the ransom demand, combined with the use of cryptocurrency as the payment mechanism, raises a critical question: although Bitcoin is not inherently untraceable, can the perpetrators ultimately profit without being identified?

Bitcoin is a decentralised digital currency, commonly referred to as a cryptocurrency, and is often believed to be anonymous, private and untraceable.

This perception has made Bitcoin attractive to some criminals, who view it as a convenient mechanism for receiving, transferring and storing payments.

As a result, Bitcoin has become increasingly associated with criminal activity, including extortion, kidnapping, fraud, ransomware and even murder.

The Guthrie case has once again drawn attention to the darker associations surrounding Bitcoin and reinforced public anxiety about cryptocurrency and its use for nefarious purposes.

At the same time, a number of high profile kidnappings around the world in 2025, involving people known to hold cryptocurrency, has intensified these concerns.

A common perception is that, because Bitcoin is digital, tracking transactions is difficult. Bitcoin does not exist in a physical form; it is represented as entries on the Bitcoin blockchain – a decentralised ledger used to record transactions across a network of computers. So Bitcoin is not inherently untraceable; its blockchain is transparent and permanently recorded.

Transactions do not explicitly list names, but each transaction is publicly visible and traceable between wallet addresses. Ownership is controlled through private keys and managed via a “digital wallet”, which functions conceptually like a traditional wallet in that it stores and enables the transfer of value. Thus, Bitcoin is more accurately, pseudonymous, not anonymous.

Currency conversion

In the Guthrie case, the immediate practical challenge for the kidnappers would be converting US$6 million into Bitcoin and transferring the cryptocurrency to a digital wallet. From there, the funds would need to be sent to a wallet address specified by the perpetrators – assuming the kidnappers provide such an address.

Transactions conducted through regulated cryptocurrency exchanges that impose know-your-customer checks may expose participants. These checks are mandatory processes to confirm user identities with official IDs, proof of address, and facial recognition.

Even before the funds reach the kidnappers, the transaction through a cryptocurrency exchange may itself create identifiable records. However, there is no guarantee of this, as there are many unregulated exchanges that operate in jurisdictions with lenient legislation.

While Bitcoin transactions are traceable between wallet addresses, the kidnappers in this case may attempt to enhance anonymity through layered technical measures. These may include generating a new wallet address for each transaction, operating multiple wallets, and repeatedly transferring funds from a primary wallet through successive intermediary wallets to obscure transaction links.

Maintaining anonymity also requires avoiding any association between wallet addresses and personal information, refraining from interacting with other identifiable people, and using privacy-enhancing tools such as Tor/VPNs – software that masks a user’s location – and coin-mixing services, which enhance privacy by scrambling cryptocurrency funds with others to obscure links between senders and receivers.

Achieving this level of operational security demands significant technical knowledge and strict discipline from the kidnappers. Any human error, whether through identity exposure, exchange interaction, IP logging, or conversion into hard cash may compromise anonymity.

Ultimately, the critical issue is not merely tracing funds but determining how recipients convert or use the Bitcoin without triggering identification through regulatory checkpoints, forensic analysis, or operational mistakes.

Even if the US$6 million could be traced between wallet addresses, anonymity hinges on whether those addresses can be linked to real-world identities. Where wallet holders remain unidentified and operate outside regulated exchanges, investigative challenges increase.

Additional complications arise if the perpetrators operate outside the US. Cross-border enforcement faces limitations including variation in crypto-related legislation and regulation, uneven training in tracing and confiscation, and limited international coordination.

Whether perpetrators can ultimately be reached by law enforcement depends significantly on their jurisdiction and the degree of international cooperation.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Nancy Guthrie kidnapping: can Bitcoin ransom demand be used to track down the criminals? – https://theconversation.com/nancy-guthrie-kidnapping-can-bitcoin-ransom-demand-be-used-to-track-down-the-criminals-276213

The Secret Agent: gripping thriller reminds us why academic freedom needs protecting

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stephanie Dennison, Professor in Brazilian Studies, University of Leeds

Kleber Mendonça Filho’s The Secret Agent (O Agente Secreto, 2025) marks a moment of consolidation in one of contemporary Brazilian cinema’s most consistent careers.

Since his early short films such as Cold Tropics (Recife Frio, 2009), the filmmaker has developed a unique style packed with movie references that tantalisingly falls somewhere between arthouse and genre film. These traits reach new heights of self-awareness and formal freedom in The Secret Agent, which has been nominated for four Academy Awards, including best picture, and best actor for Wagner Moura.

The film belongs to a recent wave of Brazilian productions revisiting the military dictatorship (1964-1985), including Walter Salles’s Oscar-winning I’m Still Here (Ainda Estou Aqui, 2024), and actor/director Wagner Moura’s Marighella (2019). Yet these films do more than reconstruct historical episodes: they process, through cinema, an unresolved trauma whose reverberations continue to shape Brazil’s political present.

One of the features that makes The Secret Agent, set predominantly in 1977, particularly compelling in this regard is its treatment of universities, as battlegrounds where memory, power and democracy collide.

The film’s main character Armando, played by Oscar-nominated Moura, is not, in fact, a secret agent and has no obvious links to opposition movements. He is an academic forced into hiding after clashing with big business interests aligned with the authoritarian regime who want to get their hands on his research.

Brazilian philosopher Marilena Chauí has spoken of her personal experience of these dark days in Brazil portrayed in Mendonça Filho’s film. Chauí returned from France in 1969 with her PhD in hand, just after the Brazilian military suspended most civil rights in the country, leading to a state hunt for “communists” and the intensification of torture and censorship.

Chauí describes the presence on campus of mysterious military figures with the power to hire and fire and “disappear” staff and students who were hostile to the regime. The presence of secret agents disguised as students to monitor professors and students in classrooms in public universities was commonplace.

In The Secret Agent, Armando has recently returned from the University of Leeds in Britain. He and the international research team he has set up at the Federal University of Pernambuco in Brazil’s north-east fall under the scrutiny of Henrique Ghirotti, an industrialist from Sao Paulo.

Armando openly questions Ghirotti’s ethics and points to a conflict of interest: how can a wealthy industrialist justify taking government funding destined for universities for his own private interests? Armando’s bitter reaction to such an open show of corruption is enough for him to become a marked man. Much of the film portrays Armando’s attempt to hide from Ghirotti and the corrupt law enforcement and paid assassins he has at his disposal.

This dramatic situation illuminates not only the surveillance and repression universities endured under the dictatorship, but also broader patterns of corruption. The spider’s web connecting military interests with big business that drained Brazil’s economic momentum throughout the 1970s, is a history that is only now fully coming to light.

The film’s focus on academic freedom carries contemporary resonance. Mendonça Filho wrote The Secret Agent during the presidency of far-right Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022), whose long list of hostile measures included attacks on public education. Between 2019 and 2022, federal universities lost 14.4% of their budget, and by 2022 funding had fallen below 2013 levels.

Universities reported severe difficulties maintaining basic operations and scholarship programmes, with accumulated cuts exceeding R$100 billion (£14 billion) over four years. Bolsonaro and his followers encouraged the reporting (and “outing” on social media) of teaching staff deemed to be “ideological”. Following Lula’s victory in the 2022 elections, modest relief arrived and, with the renewal of funding lines, the reconstruction of this ravaged terrain is slowly getting underway.

Walter Salles’ I’m Still Here explores similar territory about Brazil’s military dictatorship.

Archives of repression

The Secret Agent also speaks to renewed global debates around the privatisation of research, intellectual property, and the political vulnerability of universities, increasingly viewed as hotbeds of leftist sedition. Mendonça Filho’s film suggests that authoritarianism attacks society not only through violence but through the destruction, privatisation, or silencing of knowledge production itself.

The industrialist Ghirotti takes delight in informing Armando that he’ll be recommending that his research team is shut down and the work transferred to the University of São Paulo, with whom Ghirotti has dubious links. Ghirotti questions the usefulness of any research being carried out in the north-east that speaks to national interests, particularly when Canadians are working on the same tech and Brazil can pay for foreign science and technology.

Mendonça Filho, who is from Recife, the capital of Pernambuco, has been very vocal about the ingrained prejudice of many from the wealthier and whiter southern states in relation to the north, which is dismissed as backward. It is telling that in The Secret Agent Armando’s international research team first took shape in Leeds, given similar prejudices are often held about the north of England.

In a subplot set in the present day, a group of students work on an oral history project involving tape recordings made by dissidents during the dictatorship, including Armando. One of them, Flávia, travels to Pernambuco to visit Armando’s now middle-aged son.

A young black mother with family in the north-east, living in the periphery of São Paulo, Flávia, typifies the new, more diverse university student body, made possible by hard-won affirmative action initiatives and the expansion of the public university network.

In The Secret Agent, it is Flávia and students like her who have inherited not only the archives of repression, but also the possibility of transforming knowledge into a form of democratic repair.

Anchored by Wagner Moura’s compelling performance, Mendonça Filho’s film connects the struggles of the past to the curiosity and courage of a new generation. In so doing, The Secret Agent powerfully underscores cinema’s ability not only to entertain, but also to illuminate, question and inspire.

The Conversation

Alfredo Luiz Paes de Oliveira Suppia receives funding from CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico) as a researcher level 1C.

Stephanie Dennison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The Secret Agent: gripping thriller reminds us why academic freedom needs protecting – https://theconversation.com/the-secret-agent-gripping-thriller-reminds-us-why-academic-freedom-needs-protecting-275598

Can a rhythm be owned? What a reggaeton lawsuit reveals about how copyright misunderstands music

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anna Monnereau, PhD Candidate in Music Copyright, Bangor University

A little-known American lawsuit could end up reshaping popular music. A US federal court is preparing to rule on a landmark copyright dispute. At its centre is an interesting question: can a short rhythmic pattern – one that appears in thousands of reggaeton tracks – be owned?

The case, known as the Fish Market dispute, asks whether a looping beat widely associated with reggaeton can be protected by copyright. More than 150 artists and producers have been named as defendants, and around 3,600 songs are implicated.

But the consequences stretch far beyond potential damages. If the claim succeeds, a rhythm that underpins an entire genre could become private property. The lawsuit exposes a long-standing weakness in copyright law, which is its inability to clearly define what makes a piece of music “original”.

Copyright is meant to be straightforward. Original musical works receive legal protection but copies do not. In practice though, music rarely fits this neat, binary logic.

Songs are built from shared elements like rhythms, chord progressions and harmonic patterns. Musicians can reuse, adapt and transform them. These building blocks are how music communicates. But copyright law offers little guidance on which musical elements can be protected, and which belong to everyone.

Unlike literature or visual art, music lacks clear legal definitions for its basic components. There is no settled guidance on whether courts should compare melody, rhythm, harmony, tempo, timbre or pitch, or indeed how much similarity is too much. As a result, judges and juries are left to decide these questions case by case, often without musical expertise.

That uncertainty has made music copyright litigation expensive and unpredictable. Jury trials are particularly risky, and damages can be eye-watering. Two recent American cases show just how inconsistent the system has become.

When courts can’t agree what counts as copying

In 2018, a US jury found that musicians Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams had infringed Marvin Gaye’s work with their song Blurred Lines, not because of a shared melody or lyrics, but because of a similar “feel” or “vibe”. The decision marked a dramatic expansion of copyright protection, suggesting that a musical mood could be owned. Critics warned this risked allowing artists to monopolise styles rather than specific creative expressions.

By contrast, a 2024 US court ruling in a case involving singer-songwriter Ed Sheeran took the opposite view. The court held that copyright does not protect the basic building blocks of music. Shared rhythms, chord sequences or stylistic elements, it ruled, are part of musical language itself. Protection applies only to concrete expressions such as specific melodies or lyrics.

The Fish Market case magnifies this contradiction and raises the stakes considerably.

The plaintiffs – Steely & Clevie Productions, which represent the musical catalogue of the influential Jamaican dancehall duo Wycliffe “Steely” Johnson and Cleveland Browne – claim that their 1989 instrumental track, Fish Market, introduced the so-called “dem bow” rhythm. This is a distinctive beat, they argue, which forms the backbone of reggaeton. They are seeking copyright protection for that rhythmic pattern.

Steely & Clevie – Fish Market.

If successful, the ruling would grant two rightsholders control over a core musical feature used across a global genre. Unsurprisingly, many musicians and scholars see this as an attempt to claim ownership of reggaeton itself.

They argue that the rhythm predates Fish Market, drawing on long-established Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Cuban traditions such as the habanera beat. Reggaeton, they say, emerged through cultural exchange: from Jamaican dancehall, through Puerto Rico and out into the world. According to this perspective, the plaintiffs are not protecting originality but attempting to privatise a shared cultural inheritance.

Why rhythm is so hard to copyright

Rhythm sits at the heart of the legal problem. It is abstract yet fundamental, short in duration but repeated across a song and deeply tied to cultural identity. Copyright law, designed to compare fixed and discrete works, struggles to evaluate such elements. When courts attempt to isolate rhythm from its musical and cultural context, they risk mistaking convention for originality.

Copyright once played a limited role in musical life. Over time, as recorded music became a major commercial industry, songs increasingly came to be treated as economic assets. Ownership and control moved to the foreground, often at the expense of recognising music as an intellectual and cultural practice rooted in borrowing, influence and exchange.

The dispute around the “dem bow” rhythm lays bare the clash between subjective creativity, economic regulation and the law’s demand for objective rules. That clash is becoming harder to ignore as AI-generated music floods the market, trained on existing works and capable of producing endless stylistic variations. If copyright cannot clearly define originality now, its limits will soon be tested even further.

The reggaeton rhythm on trial is not just a fight over a beat. It reveals a fundamental mismatch between copyright law’s rigid standards and the reality of how music is made.

The Fish Market case offers judges an opportunity to clarify where protection should end, and to recognise the dangers of stretching originality so far that creativity itself becomes collateral damage.

The Conversation

Anna Monnereau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Can a rhythm be owned? What a reggaeton lawsuit reveals about how copyright misunderstands music – https://theconversation.com/can-a-rhythm-be-owned-what-a-reggaeton-lawsuit-reveals-about-how-copyright-misunderstands-music-273624

Why is violence pathologized for trans people but individualized for cis men?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Kimberly A. Williams, Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies, Mount Royal University

When a trans person commits violence, their gender identity is often framed as evidence of the collective threat of transgender people, while the more prevalent pattern of cisgender male-perpetrated violence is attributed to individual factors.

This double standard redirects attention away from masculinity as a driver of violence.

Masculinity refers to the socially produced set of norms that define what being a man requires. In Canada’s settler-colonial culture, these traits include dominance, heterosexual prowess, independence, competitiveness and the suppression of vulnerability. Masculinity is a rules system cis boys encounter early and repeatedly, and that cis men are expected to enact and reinforce.

Far-right influencers, partisan media figures and some politicians routinely blame mass shootings on the transgender community long before any information about the suspect is released, even though fewer than one per cent of mass shooters are transgender.

In the rare cases when a transgender person does commit an act of violence, the perpetrator’s gender identity is treated as the cause of the violence, and trans people are framed as a threat. This dynamic surfaced recently after 18-year-old Jesse Van Rootselaar shot and killed eight people in Tumbler Ridge, B.C., before turning the gun on herself.

Why does one rare act of violence by a trans person quickly become a referendum on all trans people? Yet the well-documented, ongoing violence of cisgender boys and men — who commit the vast majority of violence against women, children, gender-diverse people and each other — prompts little scrutiny of men and masculinity.

Lone wolves and structural invisibility

If we consistently generalized from behaviour to gender, masculinity’s role in violence would be obvious. But it is not. We don’t ask what role cis men’s gender identity plays in their violence. Men’s violence is often explained by individual concepts like the “lone wolf,” personal grievance or mental illness. This holds true across recent history.

Canadian data offers repeated consistently missed opportunities to highlight masculinity as a driver of violence.

The 2019 National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, for example, documented ongoing violence against Indigenous women, girls and Two-Spirit people. The report identified cis men as the majority of perpetrators along with colonialism, racism and institutional failures as the cause of that violence. Yet this did not trigger a moral panic about white settler men.

When Alek Minassian invoked incel ideology before killing 10 people in Toronto in 2018, public debate focused on online radicalization and mental health. Far less attention was paid to the gendered entitlement at the core of that ideology: the belief that men are owed sexual access to women’s bodies. Even when masculinity was named by the perpetrator himself, scrutiny shifted to technology.

A 2022 CBC News Fifth Estate investigation found that since 1989, police have investigated at least 15 alleged group sexual assaults involving men’s junior hockey players. These revelations have sparked debate about consent and hockey culture but no blanket condemnation of men as a category.

Another CBC News analysis recently revealed that more than 600 RCMP officers have been disciplined for gender-based violence since 2014. Settlements have been paid and reforms promised, but the issue has been framed as workplace culture and accountability. Masculinity remains largely unexamined.

The pattern appears consistent: when a member of a marginalized community (such as transgender people) is violent, the entire group becomes suspect. But when members of dominant groups are violent, the violence is normalized or explained away as an exception.

If prevention matters, the questions must change

If violence prevention is the goal, we need different questions. And the pattern, not the exceptions, must guide our analysis.

Just as living under a political system does not make every citizen equally responsible for its injustices, being socialized into masculinity does not make every man violent. But it does mean masculinity operates as a widespread framework that shapes boys’ and men’s responses to shame and rejection, their definitions of worth and the social meaning of power.

Since violence repeatedly comes from white cisgender men, we must ask what that pattern reveals.




Read more:
Let’s call the Nova Scotia mass shooting what it is: White male terrorism


How do boys learn anger, shame and power? What emotional skills are discouraged? How are dominance, aggression and sexual conquest rewarded in teams, fraternities, online spaces and workplaces? What counts as “weakness,” and what are boys taught to do with their vulnerability?

Institutional questions matter too. Who knew about past behaviour? How are complaints handled? What reputational or financial incentives protect insiders? What systems allow men to retain power after repeated misconduct?

These are structural questions, not ones of blame.

Some may contend that cis men’s violence is hardwired, a result of testosterone, evolution or sex-based brain differences. These arguments are not supported by research. And if they were accurate, there should be more consideration of men as a public health hazard.

The call to follow patterns, not exceptions

Cisgender men commit the overwhelming majority of violence, legitimating the examination of masculinity as a cause of that violence.

No comparable pattern exists for trans people. They do not commit violence at disproportionate rates. By contrast, because cis men do, masculinity is part of the pattern, so it must also be part of the analysis.

A call to examine masculinity as a structural factor in cis men’s violence is not an argument that we are facing a “crisis” of masculinity. The issue is that dominant, settler-colonial models of masculinity encourage violence by being organized around control, entitlement and hierarchy.

The Conversation

Kimberly A. Williams is a registered social worker and a member of the Social Workers Association of Alberta, the Ontario Association of Social Workers, and the Canadian Association of Social Workers. She has previously received SSHRC funding for her current project documenting the people, places, and politics of Calgary’s historic sex industry. Williams is a member of the NDP and the Board of Directors for Amethyst Centre in Ottawa.

ref. Why is violence pathologized for trans people but individualized for cis men? – https://theconversation.com/why-is-violence-pathologized-for-trans-people-but-individualized-for-cis-men-275882

Why people say they care about ethical shopping but often buy differently

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Mehak Bharti, Assistant Professor of Marketing, Toronto Metropolitan University

Many Canadians say they care about ethical products. They want coffee that supports farmers, chocolate made without child labour and everyday goods that are better for the environment.

Many also say they are willing to pay more for ethically produced goods. Yet those values often fade once people are standing in front of a shelf of seemingly identical products.

This gap between what consumers say they value and what they actually buy is often described as hypocrisy. That explanation is tempting, but it misses something important. In most shopping situations, people are not choosing between right and wrong — they are choosing between prices.

That tension has become harder to ignore as food prices in Canada have risen sharply, squeezing household budgets and making cost the dominant concern in everyday decisions.

At the same time, Canadians continue to express concern for sustainability and ethical production. Caring has not disappeared. Acting on it simply feels harder now.

When good intentions meet the checkout

Consumer research has long documented a gap between stated preferences and actual behaviour. In surveys, people tend to express stronger ethical intentions than they act on in real shopping situations. That does not mean those values are insincere, but that values are pushed aside when everyday constraints take over.

This gap shows up most clearly in routine purchases like groceries, coffee and chocolate. These are items people buy often, and even small price differences add up quickly. In those moments, price becomes the easiest decision shortcut, especially as food costs continue to rise in Canada.

Ethical products usually cost more because they support higher wages, safer working conditions and lower environmental harm. While those benefits matter socially, they don’t directly benefit the person paying at the checkout.

As household budgets tighten, choosing the ethical option can start to feel less like a moral decision and more like a financial burden.

Rethinking the ethical premium

Much of the debate around ethical consumption assumes that supporting better practices necessarily requires paying more. Ethical products are often framed as “premium” goods, with higher prices justified by their social or environmental benefits.

In our recent research study, we asked whether the ethical premium always had to be paid in money. Instead of focusing on higher prices, we examined whether consumers would respond differently if ethical products were offered at the same price as conventional ones, but in smaller quantities.

To explore this, we ran a series of experiments with more than 2,300 participants in Canada, the United States and Europe. Participants were asked to choose between ethical options (such as Fair Trade or sustainably produced goods) and conventional alternatives for everyday products like coffee and soap.

Participants were then randomly assigned to conditions that framed the ethical premium either through price or quantity. In the price-premium condition, participants chose between a higher-priced ethical option and a conventional alternative of the same quantity. In the quantity-premium condition, the ethical option was offered at the same price as the conventional alternative, but in a smaller quantity.

Across our experiments, consumers were consistently more likely to choose ethical products when the premium was framed as giving up quantity rather than paying a higher price.

Choosing less instead of paying more

Across our experiments, people reacted more strongly to price increases than to size changes. Consumers are more sensitive to price information than quantity information.

When ethical products cost the same as conventional ones, consumers no longer feel financially penalized for acting on their values. Rather, paying the premium with quantity makes the ethical product feels more affordable.

Importantly, this approach is not the same as shrinkflation, where companies quietly reduce package sizes over time without informing consumers. In our studies, the smaller size was explicitly visible, and consumers knew exactly what they were choosing.

Making ethical choices affordable

With grocery prices remaining high in Canada, expecting consumers to close the ethical gap by paying more money may be unrealistic. Ethical consumption does not fail because consumers are indifferent or hypocrites.

It fails because ethical choices are often presented in ways that make them feel financially out of reach.

Rethinking how the ethical premium is paid will not solve the problem overnight. Structural issues, such as supply chains, corporate practices and regulation, still matter deeply. But our findings suggest that design choices and pricing strategies can make a meaningful difference in whether consumers are able to act on their values.

If ethical consumption is to become more than an aspiration, it may need to be integrated into everyday affordability rather than positioned as an added cost. How we ask consumers to support ethical practices matters more than we often assume.

The Conversation

Jing Wan received funding from The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada.

Mehak Bharti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why people say they care about ethical shopping but often buy differently – https://theconversation.com/why-people-say-they-care-about-ethical-shopping-but-often-buy-differently-273893

Sixth year of drought in Texas and Oklahoma leaves ranchers facing wildfires and bracing for another tough year

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Joel Lisonbee, Senior Associate Scientist, Cooperative Institute for Research in the Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder

Cattle auctions aren’t often all-night affairs. But in Texas Lake Country in June 2022, ranchers facing dwindling water supplies and dried out pastures amid a worsening drought sold off more than 4,000 animals in an auction that lasted nearly 24 hours – about 200 cows an hour.

It was the height of a drought that has gripped the Southern Plains for the past six years – a drought that is still holding on in much of the region in 2026.

The drought cost the agriculture industry across Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas an estimated US$23.6 billion in lost crops, higher feed costs and selling off cattle from 2020 through 2024 alone. As rangeland dried out, it has also fueled wildfires, including several in Texas in early 2026.

Historically, droughts of this magnitude happen in the Southern Plains about once a decade, but the severe droughts of this century have been lasting longer, leaving water supplies, native rangelands and farms with little time to recover before the next one hits.

Many cattle producers and rangelands were still recovering from a severe 2010-2015 drought when a flash drought hit western Texas in spring 2020, marking the beginning of the current multibillion-dollar, multiyear and multistate drought. Ample spring rainfall in 2025 and severe flooding in central Texas that year weren’t enough to end the drought, and a powerful winter storm in late January 2026 missed the driest parts of the region.

A map shows heavy precipitation across a large part of the country, but it mostly missed the areas facing the worse drought in the Southern Plains.
Precipitation from a severe winter storm in late January 2026, shown in blue and measured in inches, largely missed the areas with the worst drought conditions, indicated by red contour lines.
UC Merced, NDMC

In a recent study with colleagues at the Southern Regional Climate Center and the National Integrated Drought Information System, we assessed the causes and damage from the ongoing drought in the Southern Plains.

We found three key reasons for the enduring drought and its damage: rising temperatures and a La Niña climate pattern; water supply shortages; and lingering economic impacts from the previous drought.

Weather and climate helped drive the drought

The Southern Plains is known to be a hot spot for rapid drought development, and the ongoing drought that started in 2020 is no exception.

Documented “flash droughts” – defined as periods of rapid drought onset or intensification of existing droughts – occurred at least five times in the region from 2020 to 2025. As global temperatures rise and climates warm, research warns that the frequency and severity of flash drought events will increase.

Maps show how the current drought progressed and moved around the region. It was at its height in 2022.
The U.S. Drought Monitor’s monthly updates from January 2020 through January 2026 show how drought moved around in the Southern Plains over those years but never let go. Darker colors reflect the intensity of drought in each location.
Joel Lisonbee; compiled from U.S. Drought Monitor

For the southern part of the Southern Plains, winter precipitation is closely linked to the El Niño–Southern Oscillation, a climate pattern that affects weather around the world. Five of the past six years exhibited a La Niña pattern, which typically means the region sees winters that are warmer and drier than normal.

La Niña was likely the primary driver – although not the only driver – of the drought for Texas and southwest Oklahoma, and one of the reasons drought conditions have continued into 2026.

The Southern Plains have a long history with severe droughts. The Dust Bowl of the early 1930s may be the best-known example. But a history with drought doesn’t make it any easier to manage when crops and water supplies dry up.

Deeply rooted water shortages

The heat and dryness since 2020 have left many of the region’s rivers, reservoirs and even groundwater reserves well below average.

San Antonio’s reservoirs all reached record-low levels in 2024 and 2025, as did the Edwards Aquifer, which provides water for roughly 2.5 million people. They were still low as 2026 began. Surface water and groundwater resources across central and western Texas have been depleted to the point that even a few big storms can’t replenish them.

A few major rivers flow into the Southern Plains from other drought-affected regions. Consider the Rio Grande, which begins in Colorado and winds through New Mexico and along Texas’ southern border: Not only has the Lower Rio Grande valley in southern Texas missed out on needed precipitation this winter, so did the Rio Grande headwaters in southern Colorado.

Colorado is facing a snow drought in winter 2026, as is much of the western U.S. If it continues, there will be less snowmelt come summer to feed rivers, such as the Rio Grande, or fill reservoirs. In early February, the Elephant Butte, Amistad and Falcon reservoirs, along the Rio Grande, were only 11%, 34%, and 20% full, respectively.

Lingering economic impacts

Like water supplies, the economy doesn’t just recover when the rains return.

One of the reasons the current drought has been so costly is that parts of the region had not fully recovered from the 2010-2015 drought when the latest one began in 2020. With only a five-year break between droughts, the landscape behaved like someone with an already weakened immune system who caught a cold.

Severe droughts over time in the Southern Plains
The percentage of land in different levels of drought or wetness for each month based on the nine-month Standardized Precipitation Index leading up to the selected date. Reds indicate drier conditions; blues indicate wetter conditions.
National Integrated Drought Information System, NOAA Drought.gov

During the 2010-2015 drought, cattle producers in Texas sold off about 20% of the statewide herd as water became scarce and rangeland dried up. Rebuilding a herd after a drought is a slow process. Pasture recovery can take a year or more, and a newborn heifer will take two years to mature and produce her own first calf.

Cattle herds had still not returned to pre-2010 levels when the 2022 drought peak forced another mass sell-off. From 2020 through 2024, Texas’s herd size declined from 13.1 million to 12 million; Oklahoma’s declined from 5.3 million to 4.7 million; and Kansas’ declined from 6.5 million to 6.15 million.

Looking beyond livestock, a large percentage of the Southern Plains’ crops failed in 2022, the peak year of the drought. In Texas, 25% of the corn crop was planted but never harvested, and 45% of the soybean crop was similarly abandoned. A normal season would have yielded a $2.4 billion cotton crop in Texas, but 74% of that crop was abandoned, slashing its value to roughly $640 million.

Ending the Southern Plains drought

Is the end in sight? With La Niña fading in early 2026 and its opposite, El Niño, potentially on the horizon, there’s a chance for wetter conditions that could reduce the drought in the fall and winter months of 2026.

But the Southern Plains still have to get through spring and summer first. Ending a drought like this requires consistent precipitation over several months, and drought conditions are likely to get worse before they get better.

This article, originally published Feb. 9, 2026, has been updated with new wildfires in Texas.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Sixth year of drought in Texas and Oklahoma leaves ranchers facing wildfires and bracing for another tough year – https://theconversation.com/sixth-year-of-drought-in-texas-and-oklahoma-leaves-ranchers-facing-wildfires-and-bracing-for-another-tough-year-275219

How Putin turned Russia’s post-Soviet ‘national humiliation’ into military aggression in Ukraine

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Gemma Ware, Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The Conversation

As the 21st century dawned, a newly elected Vladmir Putin was making friends on the world stage. He smiled for photo ops at G8 meetings, and was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush after the attacks of 9/11, offering his support against terrorism.

So what changed? To understand Russia’s view of the world now – and its continued aggression towards Ukraine – it helps to know more about the psyche of the country and its leader.

In today’s episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast, we talk to James Rodgers, a reader in international journalism at City St George’s, University of London, about how a festering sense of national humiliation after the collapse of the Soviet Union hardened Putin’s tough man regime and led Russia to turn its back on the west.

In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, many in the west believed liberal democracy and free markets had won in Russia. The cold war was over and Russia would join the community of democratic nations. But that’s not what happened.  Instead, Russians experienced economic freefall, large-scale poverty and a sense of national humiliation.

“People felt this great loss of status,” says Rodgers, who has just written a new book called The Return of Russia about why it came into confrontation with the west.

“With the coming of new western ideas of the free market, a lot of people lost their jobs and the status that went with them,” says Rodgers. “Russia also lost the standing on the world stage that the Soviet Union had enjoyed.”

Putin became president on the eve of the new millennium. Rodgers says, Putin had not forgotten the economic pain and humiliation of the 1990s, and understood its importance to his constituency in Russia. “He understood the political potential of that humiliation in a way that I think some western policymakers did not understand the possible political consequences of it.”

Soon after, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 pushed the US to war in the Middle East. Whatever support Putin had pledged western governments began to crumble, particularly over the invasion of Iraq. Through interviews with former top western officials, Rodgers pinpoints that Russian foreign intelligence knew Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction, and they were certain that the CIA and other western intelligence agencies knew that.

“Russia determined that the west was acting in bad faith about the reason that they’d given for going to war in Iraq, and this was actually about regime change and not at all about weapons of mass destruction,” says Rodgers. He says the invasion made Putin deeply suspicious of western motives in foreign relations, who began to think: “If they can do this to Saddam Hussein, then maybe one day the west will try to decide to do it for me.”

Listen to the interview with James Rodgers on The Conversation Weekly podcast. This episode was written and produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware with editing help from Ashlynne McGhee. Mixing by Eleanor Brezzi and theme music by Neeta Sarl. Gemma Ware is the executive producer.

Newsclips in this episode from BBC News, AP Archive, ABC News, C-Span, CNN, The Phoenix ReNasCor, DW News and
Voice of America.

Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here. A transcript of this episode is available via the Apple Podcasts or Spotify apps.

The Conversation

James Rodgers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How Putin turned Russia’s post-Soviet ‘national humiliation’ into military aggression in Ukraine – https://theconversation.com/how-putin-turned-russias-post-soviet-national-humiliation-into-military-aggression-in-ukraine-276292

La Cour suprême des États-Unis est-elle « trumpiste » ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Michael Nafi, Enseignant-chercheur, philosophie, droit, science politique, Université Paris Cité

La Cour suprême, dont le jugement sur la légalité des tarifs douaniers imposés par l’actuel président des États-Unis est très attendu, est souvent vue comme étant pleinement acquise au trumpisme (parce que six des neuf juges nommés à vie qui la composent sont conservateurs et parce que trois d’entre eux ont été personnellement nommés par Trump durant son premier mandat). Pourtant, cette lecture largement politique fait abstraction des contraintes institutionnelles et procédurales qui encadrent les décisions de la Cour – des contraintes fondées sur des arguments et des doctrines juridiques bien éloignés des controverses.


Depuis le début du second mandat de Trump, l’administration américaine a déposé des requêtes d’urgence auprès de la Cour suprême bien plus fréquemment que celles qui l’ont précédée. Selon un décompte effectué en juin dernier, l’administration Trump 2 avait alors, en quelques mois, déjà déposé autant de requêtes (19) que l’administration Biden en quatre ans et largement dépassé les chiffres cumulés des administrations Obama et George W. Bush sur seize ans (8 au total).

L’urgence devant la Cour suprême : un problème structurel, pas un biais trumpiste

Contrairement aux affaires jugées au fond, les requêtes d’urgence ne nécessitent généralement ni dossiers exhaustifs ni plaidoiries. Lorsqu’elles portent sur la suspension d’une décision d’une juridiction inférieure, elles sont adressées au juge chargé du circuit fédéral concerné (région relevant d’une cour d’appel donnée), qui peut statuer seul ou saisir la formation collégiale. La Cour n’accompagne généralement pas ses décisions d’une opinion motivée ; lorsqu’elle le fait, les motivations sont brèves et les positions dissidentes rarement explicitées, même si certains juges signalent parfois leur désaccord.

Ainsi, lors de la paralysie du gouvernement fédéral entre le 1er octobre et le 12 novembre 2025, une cour du district de Rhode Island avait enjoint à l’administration de verser les subventions promises au programme d’aide alimentaire fédéral Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), destiné aux ménages à faibles revenus. C’est la juge « progressiste » Ketanji Brown Jackson, en charge du district, qui a accordé une suspension administrative temporaire à cette décision, donc favorable à l’administration Trump, en attendant l’avis de la cour d’appel. Cet exemple montre bien que les réponses de la Cour aux requêtes d’urgence traduisent moins une orientation idéologique qu’une logique conservatoire conforme aux règles de procédure.

Cependant, ces requêtes suscitent des inquiétudes légitimes. En 2015, l’éminent constitutionnaliste William Baude a forgé l’expression « rôle de l’ombre » (shadow docket) pour désigner collectivement ces dossiers, même s’ils ne sont pas consignés dans un rôle ou registre distinct. Il mettait ainsi en lumière une part occultée mais structurante de l’activité de la Cour, indispensable pour comprendre sa pratique réelle au-delà des seuls arrêts au fond. Depuis 2020, Stephen Vladeck a prolongé cette critique. Selon lui, à travers ces requêtes, la Cour n’agirait plus comme une juridiction de dernier ressort statuant après maturation des litiges, mais souvent comme un arbitre d’urgence. Plus récemment, Erwin Chemerinsky a souligné qu’un contrôle insuffisamment exigeant des critères du sursis fait courir le risque de transformer des décisions provisoires en précédents.

Mais ce phénomène n’est pas nouveau. En 2006, dans l’affaire Purcell vs Gonzalez, par un arrêt de suspension à l’unanimité – incluant la juge progressiste Ruth Bader Ginsburg – dans le cadre d’une procédure d’urgence, la Cour a posé un principe contre la modification des règles électorales à l’approche d’un scrutin. Ce principe, dit « de Purcell », fait jurisprudence auprès des cours inférieures. À titre d’exemple, il a été récemment appliqué au Texas au bénéfice des républicains, mais également, en août 2020, pour refuser la suspension de l’assouplissement des conditions du vote par correspondance dans le Rhode Island, au détriment du Parti républicain.

De nombreuses requêtes en urgence sont aujourd’hui traitées par le biais de la règle 22 des règles et procédures de la Cour suprême. Cette règle, remontant aux réformes de 1925, comporte deux zones de fragilité : d’une part, une appréciation élastique des « chances de succès au fond », souvent réduites à la simple existence d’une question juridique « non dénuée de sérieux » ; d’autre part, une tendance à confondre l’intérêt public avec l’intérêt de l’exécutif lorsque celui-ci est partie au litige, ce qui incline structurellement la balance en sa faveur.




À lire aussi :
Vers la fin du droit à l’avortement aux États-Unis ?


Dernièrement, la Cour suprême a peut-être réagi aux critiques visant le contentieux d’urgence en ajustant ses pratiques. Dans Trump vs Wilcox (2025), elle a autorisé provisoirement la mise à l’écart de responsables d’agences indépendantes (Conseil national des relations du travail, NLRB ; Conseil de protection du système de mérite, MSPB), tout en prenant soin de préciser, dans l’opinion accompagnant cette décision, que la Réserve fédérale constitue un cas institutionnel distinct.

Une telle pratique est inhabituelle en procédure d’urgence. Elle a été lue comme un indice destiné à borner l’extension de la logique présidentielle de révocation, au-delà des seules agences en cause dans le litige. La Cour a également franchi un pas supplémentaire en organisant des audiences publiques dans des affaires relevant de la procédure d’urgence (notamment affaire Trump vs Cook, gouverneure de la Réserve fédérale), ou en faisant basculer une demande de sursis vers un examen au fond accéléré (affaire Trump vs Slaughter, commissaire au sein de la Commission fédérale du commerce, FTC).

Une Cour conservatrice : une convergence morale avec le trumpisme ?

La Cour suprême est aujourd’hui dominée, à six contre trois, par des juges qualifiés de conservateurs. Pour autant, est-elle acquise au président actuel du pays et le soutient-elles dans toutes ses initiatives ?

Rien ne permet de l’affirmer. Certes, les effets sociaux de Dobbs vs Jackson (2022), qui a renversé Roe vs Wade en jugeant que la Constitution fédérale ne protégeait pas un droit à l’avortement, sont considérables. Cependant, comme l’a rappelé le sociologue Éric Fassin, l’histoire de l’avortement aux États-Unis est complexe et ne saurait se réduire à un récit de progrès brutalement interrompu.

Même Ruth Bader Ginsburg, pourtant défenseure du droit à l’avortement, jugeait Roe juridiquement fragile, car la décision rattachait la protection de l’avortement à un droit implicite à la vie privée, faiblement ancré dans le texte constitutionnel. Elle regrettait que la Cour n’ait pas plutôt été conduite à se prononcer dans l’affaire Struck vs Secretary of Defense – Susan Struck était une militaire contrainte en 1970 de choisir entre sa grossesse et sa carrière – qui aurait permis de poser la question en termes d’égalité constitutionnelle et de contraintes disproportionnées pesant sur les femmes.

Inversement, la Cour n’a pas remis en cause le mariage homosexuel, protégé constitutionnellement depuis le cas Obergefell vs Hodges, 2015, malgré les attentes de certains milieux conservateurs du mouvement MAGA (Miller vs Davis du district de l’est du Kentucky, rejeté en appel). Il est plausible que le principe de reliance interest – la protection d’attentes durablement et contractuellement établies – ait joué ici un rôle déterminant.

Ces exemples rappellent que la Cour ne tranche pas des débats de société, mais des questions de compétence et de normes constitutionnelles encadrant l’action publique.

À titre d’illustration récente, la Cour a entendu, en janvier 2026, deux affaires distinctes relatives à la participation d’athlètes transgenres dans les équipes féminines (fondées sur le Titre IX, la loi fédérale relative à la non-discrimination dans l’éducation, et sur la clause constitutionnelle d’égalité de protection du 14ᵉ amendement) – des litiges dont l’issue devra être lue, là encore, non comme un arbitrage moral, mais comme une interprétation de normes constitutionnelles et législatives.

Pouvoir présidentiel : le test décisif des affaires en cours

La décision de juillet 2024 sur l’immunité dont peut jouir un président des États-Unis (Trump vs United States) a souvent été lue comme ayant consacré un privilège personnel. En réalité, elle formalise surtout une architecture déjà admise : distinction entre actes officiels (protégés par une immunité fonctionnelle) et actes privés (justiciables) ; poursuites possibles après le mandat ; centralité de l’impeachment. Comparée à d’autres systèmes constitutionnels, cette protection n’a rien d’exorbitant.

D’autres dossiers encore pendants, examinés seulement en audiences au fond, offrent toutefois un terrain d’observation plus révélateur.

Le plus emblématique concerne les droits de douane fondés sur l’International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), loi sur les pouvoirs économiques d’urgence internationale) (audience du 5 novembre 2025). L’enjeu n’est pas l’opportunité économique de ces droits de douane, mais la nature exacte de la délégation consentie par le Congrès : peut-on lire cette loi comme autorisant, sans mandat explicite, des mesures assimilables à des prélèvements fiscaux, domaine traditionnellement réservé au législateur ?

Une telle lecture entrerait en tension avec la lettre et l’histoire du texte, mais aussi avec des doctrines et méthodes revendiquées par la majorité conservatrice elle-même – major questions doctrine, textualisme, originalisme – qui constituent autant de contraintes que de leviers. La Cour devra ainsi arbitrer un équilibre classique entre pouvoirs exécutif et législatif, tel qu’il découle de la répartition constitutionnelle des compétences (article I et article II). Un rejet de cette interprétation n’épuiserait d’ailleurs pas les moyens juridiques du président en matière tarifaire.

Les échanges ont enfin porté sur le sort des droits déjà perçus : des solutions pragmatiques sont envisageables, mais sans pouvoir s’appuyer sur un reliance interest, inapplicable à l’État. Une option intermédiaire consisterait à limiter d’éventuels remboursements aux seules parties au litige.

Le second dossier porte sur la question de savoir si le président peut révoquer librement les dirigeants d’agences indépendantes (audience du 8 décembre 2025) ou si le Congrès peut subordonner de telles révocations à un motif valable. Lors des débats, les juges ont exprimé une inquiétude structurelle : la multiplication d’agences indépendantes dotées de pouvoirs normatifs, exécutifs et quasi juridictionnels pourrait permettre au Congrès de contourner l’exécutif, au risque d’une fragmentation administrative de l’exécutif fédéral.

Si, dans ces deux affaires, la Cour devait retenir l’argumentation du gouvernement, la question d’un renforcement excessif de l’exécutif se poserait. À défaut, l’image demeurerait celle d’une Cour conservatrice, mais encore arrimée à ses contraintes doctrinales et institutionnelles.

The Conversation

Michael Nafi ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. La Cour suprême des États-Unis est-elle « trumpiste » ? – https://theconversation.com/la-cour-supreme-des-etats-unis-est-elle-trumpiste-273840

Quand la commémoration entre en piste : la neutralité olympique à l’épreuve

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Carine Duteil, Maître de Conférences en linguistique et sciences de l’information & de la communication, Université de Limoges

La libre expression est normalement garantie à chaque individu, mais le Comité international olympique (CIO) limite les manifestations d’idéologie politique par les sportifs durant les compétitions. Mais représenter des compatriotes tués durant une guerre en cours, comme l’a fait durant les Jeux olympiques actuels l’Ukrainien Vladyslav Heraskevych, ce qui lui a valu d’être disqualifié, relève-t-il d’une « démonstration ou propagande politique, religieuse ou raciale », comme l’a décidé le CIO ? Derrière ces questionnements casuistiques, il y a une interrogation constante, qui revient régulièrement dans le monde du sport : qu’est-ce que la neutralité dont se prévalent les institutions sportives internationales ?


Aux Jeux olympiques de Milan-Cortina 2026, l’un des épisodes les plus commentés n’a pas eu lieu sur la glace, mais autour d’un casque.

Le skeletoneur ukrainien Vladyslav Heraskevych, 27 ans, a été disqualifié après avoir refusé de concourir avec un autre équipement que son « helmet of remembrance », un casque portant les visages et noms de quelques-uns des nombreux sportifs et entraîneurs ukrainiens morts depuis l’invasion russe. Le Comité international olympique (CIO) a considéré que ce casque constituait une violation de la règle 50 de la Charte olympique, qui interdit toute « démonstration ou propagande politique, religieuse ou raciale » sur les lieux de compétition.

Le 11 février, le CIO propose un compromis : l’athlète peut montrer le casque avant ou après la course et porter un brassard noir pendant l’épreuve. Heraskevych refuse, déclarant qu’« une médaille ne vaut rien comparée aux vies et à la mémoire de ces athlètes ».

Le 12 février, la Fédération internationale de bobsleigh et skeleton (IBSF) le retire de la liste de départ.

Le 13 février, sa requête devant la chambre ad hoc du Tribunal arbitral du sport (CAS) est rejetée.

Le communiqué du CAS est central : il reconnaît la légitimité de l’hommage, mais rappelle que la liberté d’expression, bien que protégée, est limitée sur le field of play. D’autres espaces – zone mixte, conférences de presse, réseaux sociaux – restent davantage ouverts à l’expression des opinions personnelles des sportifs.

Cette phrase du porte-parole du CIO, Mark Adams résume la doctrine : « It’s not the message, it’s the place that counts. » : ce n’est pas le message qui est en cause, mais l’endroit où il apparaît.

Une neutralité territoriale

La version 2026 de la règle 50 consolide la logique interprétative issue des Athlete Expression Guidelines adoptées après les controverses de 2020–2021. La règle 50.2 avait déjà été assouplie avant les JO de Tokyo 2020 (organisés en 2021 pour cause de Covid), ouvrant une porte encadrée à l’expression hors podium.

Comme nous l’indiquions alors à FrancsJeux : « Nous ne sommes plus au temps de Pierre de Coubertin, où les athlètes devaient s’exprimer par leurs gestes sportifs. »

Cette territorialisation ne surgit pas ex nihilo. Aux Jeux de Tokyo 2020, le CIO avait déjà assoupli la règle 50, autorisant certaines formes d’expression sur le terrain, tout en maintenant l’interdiction stricte sur les podiums et lors des cérémonies protocolaires. Des genoux posés à terre, des gestes symboliques ou des signes portés par des athlètes avaient alors suscité un débat mondial.

Ce moment a marqué un tournant : la neutralité olympique n’apparaît plus comme une interdiction absolue, mais comme un équilibre délicat entre liberté d’expression et protection de la scène cérémonielle. La règle 50 s’est progressivement transformée, passant d’un régime disciplinaire à une logique d’encadrement différencié selon les espaces.

L’affaire Heraskevych s’inscrit dans cette évolution. Elle ne signale pas un retour à l’interdit total, mais révèle la persistance d’une frontière : celle qui sépare l’expression tolérée de la visibilité prohibée sur l’aire de compétition.

Le cœur normatif est désormais spatial : l’expression est possible, mais pas sur l’aire de compétition. La neutralité olympique ne se définit plus comme absence de politique, mais comme gestion organisée de la visibilité, reposant sur une distinction nette entre la scène compétitive et les espaces périphériques.

Lors de ces mêmes Jeux, le skieur Gus Kenworthy a publié sur Instagram une image formant le slogan « FUCK ICE », visant la politique migratoire des États-Unis. Aucun rappel à l’ordre n’a suivi, ni par son comité olympique britannique, ni par le CIO. Le message, clairement politique, et pourtant provocateur sur sa mise en forme, circulait hors de l’aire de compétition et avant le début des épreuves.

Cette territorialisation a été justifiée par le CIO au nom d’un possible « effet domino » : « Avec 130 conflits dans le monde, nous ne pouvons pas permettre à chaque athlète d’envoyer des messages politiques pendant leurs épreuves » (Mark Adams, cité dans FrancsJeux, 12 février 2026). La neutralité devient ainsi un dispositif de gouvernement des surfaces.

Mémoire, commémoration ou propagande ?

La controverse tient à la qualification même du geste. Un slogan revendicatif entre sans ambiguïté dans la catégorie de la protestation. Mais un hommage aux morts relève-t-il d’une propagande ?

Le casque d’Heraskevych ne formulait pas de demande politique explicite. Il présentait des visages, des noms. Il matérialisait une mémoire dans un espace conçu pour n’accueillir que la performance.

Or la règle 50 ne distingue pas entre revendication et commémoration. Toute inscription visible susceptible d’être interprétée comme politique relève de l’interdit. La neutralité protège la cohérence formelle du spectacle. Mais elle se heurte ici à l’irruption d’une vulnérabilité historique.

Une controverse internationale

L’épisode a suscité une vive polémique. La présidente du CIO, Kirsty Coventry, a tenté personnellement de convaincre l’athlète de changer de casque, s’expliquant ensuite devant les médias les larmes aux yeux.

Le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky a publiquement soutenu Heraskevych, dénonçant une décision incompréhensible dans un contexte de guerre. Des voix critiques se sont fait entendre, soulignant que les Jeux excluent ou encadrent strictement la participation russe et biélorusse – décisions déjà éminemment politiques – tout en qualifiant un hommage mémoriel de geste politique interdit, mesure jugée incohérente.

Sur les réseaux sociaux, l’image du casque a massivement circulé, accompagnée de hashtags comme #RemembranceIsNotAViolation (#LaCommémorationN’EstPasUneViolation) ou #HelmetOfDignity (#CasqueDeLaDignité). Des athlètes ukrainiens ont réagi par des micro-gestes de solidarité : Olena Smaha (luge) montrant un gant portant l’inscription « remembrance is not a violation », Dmytro Shepiuk brandissant un message « UKR heroes with us ».

Olena Smaha montrant le message inscrit sur son gant.
Compte X de Unitedmedia24

Ces gestes épousent précisément la frontière tracée par le CIO : expression hors du field of play, sans inscription directe sur l’équipement en course. La neutralité est contournée, sans être frontalement violée.

L’illusion d’équivalence

Au-delà du cas individuel, la controverse met en lumière une asymétrie plus profonde. Les Jeux reposent sur une fiction d’équivalence : tous les athlètes entrent dans l’arène sous les mêmes règles. Mais la guerre introduit une dissymétrie radicale : certains concourent pendant que d’autres meurent.

Exiger que cette dissymétrie reste invisible revient à préserver l’eurythmie du spectacle – cette harmonie réglée des corps, des signes et des surfaces qui garantit la lisibilité de l’événement – au prix d’un lissage de la vulnérabilité. La neutralité olympique protège la continuité narrative de l’événement. Mais lorsque la mémoire entre sur la piste, elle révèle un angle mort normatif : l’olympisme sait encadrer la propagande ; il peine à penser le deuil.

En 2024, lors des Jeux olympiques de Paris 2024, deux athlètes afghanes ont connu des sorts différents après avoir exprimé leur soutien aux droits des femmes en référence à leur pays. Le 2 août, la sprinteuse Kimia Yousofi retourne son dossard pour laisser apparaître un message manuscrit : « Education, Sports, Our rights ». Aucune sanction n’est prononcée. Le 9 août, la danseuse Manizha Talash dévoile un tissu, une cape, portant l’inscription « Free Afghan Women » lors de la compétition de breaking : elle est disqualifiée le lendemain.

Comme dans l’affaire Heraskevych, la question ne porte pas tant sur la cause défendue que sur la visibilité qu’elle prend sur la scène compétitive.

La différence ne tient pas uniquement au contenu des messages, mais à leur intensité et à leur scène d’apparition. Dans le cas des deux sportives afghanes, le premier message énonce des valeurs ; le second formule une injonction explicite. Dans les deux cas, la cause défendue est la même. Mais sur la scène compétitive, l’expression directe d’une revendication est considérée comme une rupture de la grammaire symbolique des Jeux.

La neutralité olympique ne supprime pas le politique. Elle en régule les formes, les degrés et les lieux d’apparition.

Une question qui dépasse le skeleton

L’affaire Heraskevych ne remet pas seulement en cause l’interprétation d’une règle. Elle interroge la capacité du modèle olympique à intégrer des vulnérabilités historiques dans un espace conçu comme harmonisé.

L’olympisme ne s’est pas seulement construit par des textes normatifs, mais aussi par des énoncés performatifs. Le serment olympique, dont la formulation a évolué au fil du XXe siècle, engage les athlètes dans une scène ritualisée où l’honneur, la loyauté et désormais l’inclusion sont proclamés collectivement. L’olympisme ne se contente pas d’interdire : il met en forme une parole et une visibilité communes.

La règle 50 participe de cette même logique. Elle ne vise pas uniquement à empêcher des messages politiques ; elle protège une cohérence symbolique, une continuité des signes sur l’aire de compétition. Elle contribue à préserver une scène centrée sur la performance, où les corps sont censés se rencontrer dans une forme d’équivalence symbolique.

L’apparition d’un « casque de la mémoire » ne rompt donc pas seulement une règle. Elle introduit un signe qui n’appartient pas à la grammaire cérémonielle habituelle des Jeux.

La règle 50 interdit toute « propagande » politique. Or le terme n’est pas neutre dans l’histoire olympique. Dans ses écrits fondateurs, Pierre de Coubertin revendiquait explicitement une « propagande pour l’idée de la paix » et concevait la diffusion du néo-olympisme comme une entreprise pédagogique destinée à transformer les mentalités. L’olympisme n’a jamais été indifférent : il a toujours été porteur d’un projet normatif.

La neutralité contemporaine ne correspond donc pas à une absence d’idéologie. Elle constitue une modalité particulière de cette ambition. Elle organise la visibilité afin de préserver une scène commune.

Mais cette équivalence est fragile. Lorsque des athlètes sont directement affectés par une guerre en cours, lorsque des noms et des visages de disparus entrent sur la piste, la séparation entre le sport et le monde devient plus difficile à maintenir.

L’affaire du casque de Milan-Cortina ne contredit pas l’idéal olympique ; elle en révèle la tension constitutive. L’olympisme cherche à produire une unité symbolique. Reste à savoir comment cette unité peut coexister avec la visibilité de fractures qui ne relèvent pas d’une opinion, mais d’une expérience vécue.

La question n’est plus simplement de savoir si le sport est politique.

Elle consiste à déterminer jusqu’où peut aller la neutralité lorsque la mémoire est rendue visible – et si l’eurythmie des surfaces peut intégrer la vulnérabilité des corps qui les traversent.

The Conversation

Carine Duteil est membre élue de l’Académie Nationale Olympique Française (ANOF) et du Comité Français Pierre de Coubertin.

Arnaud Richard est président de l’Association francophone des académies olympiques.

ref. Quand la commémoration entre en piste : la neutralité olympique à l’épreuve – https://theconversation.com/quand-la-commemoration-entre-en-piste-la-neutralite-olympique-a-lepreuve-276203