Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adi Imsirovic, Lecturer in Energy Systems, University of Oxford

The decision by the United Arab Emirates to leave the oil producers’ cartel Opec after 59 years is more than a symbolic break. It highlights a growing divide among major oil producers over how to respond to a changing energy landscape, and will weaken the group’s ability to manage global supply.

In the short term, the impact of the UAE’s exit will be limited. The world still needs every available barrel of oil, and the UAE accounts for some 3-4% of global production. But the forces behind the decision are more significant than the move itself. They are both economic and political – and the war in Iran helped the two align.

For years, the UAE has been investing heavily to expand its oil production capacity, spending around US$150 billion (£111 billion) to push its potential daily output close to 5 million barrels. But Opec quotas have prevented it from fully exploiting that capacity. Actual production has remained well below its potential at about 3.5 million barrels a day (mbd), with some 5 mbd capacity, constrained by the Opec quota system designed to restrict supply and support prices, generally shaped by the de facto leader, Saudi Arabia.

This has created a tension. Why invest to produce more oil if you are not allowed to sell it?

Abu Dhabi’s answer reflects a different economic model. The UAE can balance its budget at much lower oil prices than Saudi Arabia (just below $50 v Saudi $90 a barrel or more), giving it less incentive to restrict output. Instead, it has prioritised maximising its oil exports.

That strategy is also shaped by expectations about the future. As countries such as China accelerate the electrification of transport, the hitherto steady and reliable demand for oil is slowing and becoming less reliable. Over time, it is likely to plateau. UAE is also well ahead of the Saudis in energy transition – and maintain their net zero target as 2050, compared to the Saudi 2060.

From the UAE’s perspective, the bigger risk is not falling prices, but leaving oil in the ground that may never be sold.

Shifting geopolitics

The timing of the exit is not just about economics. It also reflects shifting political and security calculations, particularly after the UAE came under heavy, sustained attack during the war in Iran.

In Abu Dhabi, there is a growing sense that regional institutions and partnerships, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) offered limited support during that period. Anwar Gargash, a senior presidential adviser, told reporters that: “The GCC’s stance was the weakest historically, considering the nature of the attack and the threat it posed to everyone,” adding that he “expected such a weak stance from the Arab League … But I don’t expect it from the GCC, and I am surprised by it.”

That experience has reinforced a more independent foreign policy. The UAE has strengthened ties with the US and Israel, building on the agreement it signed as part of the 2020 Abraham accords. The relationship with Israel is seen not just an economic and security partnership, but as a channel for influence inside the White House.

At the same time, relations with Saudi Arabia have become more strained, with differences over regional conflicts in Somalia and Yemen and economic strategy increasingly visible. Leaving Opec is both an economic decision and a geopolitical signal.

The UAE’s departure also raises questions about the future of Opec itself. The group once controlled more than half of global oil production. Today, its share is much smaller (no more than 35%), and internal divisions over production quotas are more pronounced. Quotas, long the core of its strategy, are increasingly seen as uneven constraints rather than shared commitments.

Saudi Arabia remains the only member with significant spare capacity, giving it outsized influence. The result is an organisation that still matters, but is less cohesive than it once was.

Not necessarily a win for the US

Some have hailed the UAE’s exit as a victory for Donald Trump, who has repeatedly criticised Opec for keeping oil prices high. A weaker OPEC would indeed lead to higher output and lower prices at the pump.

But sustained lower prices would also put pressure on higher-cost producers, including the US oil patch, which has been one of Opec’s main competitors in recent years. It benefited from the cartel’s restraint when it came to capping oil production. So what now looks like a geopolitical win could, over time, become an economic challenge.

For now, I believe that the UAE’s exit will not dramatically reshape oil markets. Demand remains strong enough to absorb additional supply, particularly as countries rebuild their inventories when Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz. But the deeper significance lies in what the decision reveals.

Oil producers are no longer aligned around a single strategy. Some are trying to manage scarcity and keep prices high. Others are racing to monetise their resources before demand peaks and they end up with stranded assets. That divergence is likely to grow – and may ultimately prove more consequential than any single country leaving the cartel.

We may be entering a new age where oil is going to play a much lesser role in our lives.

Adi Imsirovic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. UAE’s departure from Opec tells a story about the limited future of oil production – https://theconversation.com/uaes-departure-from-opec-tells-a-story-about-the-limited-future-of-oil-production-281755

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Michael Woods, Professor of Human Geography, Aberystwyth University

In the last of our series on environmental issues and the Wales election campaign, we look particularly at countryside policies of two parties that are new contenders for seats in the Senedd.

The elections to Wales’s parliament, the Senedd, on May 7 are set to be the most unpredictable since the creation of the devolved government in 1999. With current polling indicating close contests in many constituencies, rural voters could make a critical difference to the final result.

Issues such as farming support, windfarms, pylons and changes to rural healthcare services are contentious, but they form part of a larger question about the future of rural Wales. Interestingly, the two parties projected to win seats in the Senedd through election for the first time – Reform UK and the Green party (Reform UK has two seats in the outgoing Senedd through defections) – represent contrasting visions of the Welsh countryside.

Reform’s rural vision

Reform UK has directly targeted discontented rural voters. With a cover image showing daffodil-covered green hills, Reform’s manifesto says it will “back Welsh farmers”. It promises “agriculture will be treated as a strategic national asset”.

Specific policies include: reforming the new post-Brexit Sustainable Farming Scheme to emphasise food production, funding for young farmers’ clubs, scrapping net zero targets and banning new onshore wind farms and solar arrays, reducing environmental regulations and protecting lawful game bird release. It also plans to “streamline planning regulations” and cut back on “red tape”.

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Read more:
Why windfarms and electricity pylons have become a major issue in the Welsh election

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Reform is competing with the Conservatives for the voters that this version of rural Wales appeals to. Although the Conservative manifesto is less dramatic in tone, especially on net zero, it also plans to scrap the Sustainable Farming Scheme and introduce a moratorium on industrial scale wind and solar power stations.

A Green vision

The strongest prospects for the Green party are in urban constituencies. However, their platform contains policies that would have significant implications for rural Wales. They include a Land Reform Act, making it easier for communities to buy land, a “Welsh Right to Roam” offering “responsible access to the countryside”, a national rewilding strategy and commitments to a Sustainable Farming Scheme that rewards “nature-friendly farming” and renewable energy targets.

These represent a very different vision for the Welsh countryside to Reform. But they also reflect an alternative, almost counter culture, strand of Welsh rural society that has welcomed people who moved to rural areas in search of a new way of life since the 1960s and pioneered organic farming and low impact development.

There are currently Green councillors in rural Monmouthshire and Powys. Some projections suggest the party could win two or three Senedd seats in significantly rural constituencies.

If the Greens achieve more than 10% of the vote nationally, they are likely to do so by taking votes from Plaid Cymru, including in rural areas.

Plaid Cymru needs both rural and urban seats to become the biggest party. Its manifesto contains a significant section on rural policies, but with less prominence than Reform UK’s. Plaid’s rural policies broadly share the pro-environmental approach of the Greens, but the influence of conservative rural voters in its heartlands is evident in careful positioning on farming, windfarms and pylons, as well as the absence of mentions of rewilding.

On rural and environmental issues the Greens are more aligned with Labour, while Plaid Cymru are closer to the Liberal Democrats.

Politics in rural Wales

Wales is sometimes described as predominantly rural, but while 80% of the land is countryside, most people live in the towns and cities. Nevertheless, around a third of Wales’s population lives close to the countryside, in largely rural local authorities.

Over the last 25 years rural Wales has experienced substantial social and economic restructuring, including declining work in farming and manufacturing, along with many young people leaving to find jobs. These areas face challenges from low wages, sparse infrastructure, precarious public services and competing visions for land use.

Three issues in particular have attracted attention. First, plans for the Sustainable Farming Scheme (the Welsh government plans for agriculture subsidies to replace EU funding) provoked protests by Welsh farmers in 2024, especially over proposed requirements for 10% of farmland to be planted with trees. The later was subsequently withdrawn.

Second, there’s been opposition to new windfarm developments and pylon lines. Rewilding projects have also been controversial. Third, downgrading of services at hospitals serving rural areas and closure of village schools, have sparked local campaigns.

Public anger over these and other issues has often been directed at Welsh Labour, the governing party in Wales since 1999, with other parties trying to cast it as urban focused.

Labour did win rural constituencies in the 2024 UK general election, and current First Minister Eluned Morgan has a long-standing interest in rural affairs, outlining a plan for rural Wales in 2017. The Labour manifesto promises to “increase rural Wales’ skills and productivity” and to promote “food, farming and forestry”.

The traditional stronghold of nationalist Plaid Cymru is in the rural north and west Wales. While the Conservatives’ strongest support is in rural districts close to the English border and in parts of south Wales. The most enduring areas of support for the Welsh Liberal Democrats are in rural mid Wales.

Results to watch for

A few key results will provide an indication of the political temperature in rural Wales:

• Whether Plaid Cymru or Reform UK get most votes in Brycheiniog Tawe Nedd, Gwynedd Maldwyn and Sir Gaerfyrddin

• Whether the Greens win a seat in Ceredigion Penfro, Gwynedd Maldwyn, or Sir Fynwy Torfaen

• Whether the Conservatives get seats in Bangor Conwy Môn, Brycheiniog Tawe Nedd and Ceredigion Penfro, and the Liberal Democrats retain their seat in Brychceiniog Tawe

• Whether Labour’s Eluned Morgan can hold on to her seat in Ceredigion Penfro.

If, as seems likely, no party has a majority, rural issues will play an important role in coalition discussions. A shared rural vision could assist agreement between Reform UK and the Conservatives; while negotiations between Plaid Cymru, Labour or the Greens will need to resolve differences in rural and environmental policies. This may have profound consequences for the future of rural Wales.

Michael Woods receives funding from UKRI. He is a member of the Liberal Democrats.

– ref. Welsh countryside: what Greens and Reform are promising they would change after election – https://theconversation.com/welsh-countryside-what-greens-and-reform-are-promising-they-would-change-after-election-281451

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Julie Wharton, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Education, University of Winchester

Sencos – special educational needs coordinators – play a vital role in maintained mainstream English schools, nursery schools and sixth forms. If you are a parent, you may encounter them if you have concerns about your child’s progress or the support available, or during review meetings. Children may meet them through assessments, pupil interviews or informal check-ins.

They are teachers who take on additional leadership responsibility for special educational needs and disabilities across the school. In many cases, they continue to teach classes, but in larger schools the role is increasingly non-class based due to its scale and demands.

Despite its importance, the Senco role is often hampered by excessive workload, inconsistent status – many Sencos are still not part of school leadership teams as this is not a requirement in legislation – and a limited understanding of its scope. These factors affect both effectiveness and retention.

The government’s recent policy proposals for special educational needs and disabilities support make frequent mention of Sencos and the role they play in schools. As a former Senco, and as someone who has worked in Senco professional development for almost twenty years, I have scoured the proposals to understand what they mean for the profession.

Statutory support

The reforms – still under consultation and not yet law – formalise much of what Sencos already do. However, they also signal a profound shift. The role is set to become more data-driven and more central to whole-school development than before.

Sencos oversee Sen Support – internal school provision for learners with special educational needs. They also oversee support for children with education, health and care plans (EHCPs). EHCPs are legal documents issued and funded by local authorities for children with more complex needs. They outline a child’s needs, required provision and targeted outcomes across education, health and care.

The recent policy proposal sets out a system of school-based individual support plans for every child and young person identified with special educational needs. These digital plans would be statutory, monitored and reviewed annually at minimum.

Sencos would therefore be responsible for ensuring that each individual support plan accurately identifies any barriers to learning (such as sensory needs or a specific learning difference), and records support and reasonable adjustments (such as adapted materials or additional processing time). While the terminology may be new, this practice is not. Individual support plans largely formalise what Sencos already do for learners at Sen Support.

However, the statutory nature of individual support plans represents an expansion of legal accountability, borrowing from policy implemented in recent years in Wales. Whereas EHCPs apply to a small proportion of pupils in schools, statutory individual support plans could apply to a greater percentage of the school population.

This risks creating a compliance-heavy model of inclusion. Sencos may spend increasing amounts of time on producing evidence rather than working directly with teachers and families.

EHCPs will remain for a smaller number of children – those with the most complex needs – who will receive specialist support packages. The definition of complex needs has not yet been defined in the policy proposals, which may be an area for contention.

By tightening access to EHCPs while expanding individual support plans, the reforms shift the pressure point from local authorities to schools. Sencos may become the public face of a rationed system. They will need to mediate between school resources, parental expectations and local authorities, as well as colleagues working in health and care.

There is the risk that trust in Sencos may decline unless schools are given the capacity to deliver the promised support. At the same time, Sencos will have to navigate families’ worries about tighter access to EHCPs.

Overseeing mainstream support

A central message of the policy proposals is that mainstream education must be strengthened in terms of its ability to include pupils with special educational needs and disabilities. This is a laudable aim, but it requires significant investment in teacher expertise, curriculum flexibility and environmental adaptation.

For Sencos, it will mean leading whole-school early identification and targeted support. They will need to build teacher confidence in adaptive and inclusive education and provide more robust evidence when specialist placements are requested. They will lead in helping families school provision. This shift may increase contested decisions and appeals, with Sencos becoming the key point of contact for families navigating changing legal boundaries.

One of the government’s most ambitious proposals is the Experts at Hand service. This is designed to give schools quicker access to educational psychologists, speech and language therapists and other specialists. It’s likely to place the Senco at the centre of multi-agency work, coordinating referrals, implementing specialist advice and contributing to wider planning.

What’s more, every member of school staff will complete a national special educational needs training programme. It’s likely that Sencos will take a lead in delivering much of this professional development. This will elevate the Senco as a driver of whole-school pedagogy.

The proposals amount to a significant widening of the Senco remit. Their success hinges on whether the Senco role is finally given the leadership status, time and support it requires. Without structural changes such as protected leadership time, a place on leadership teams, administrative support and clear career pathways, the reforms risk accelerating burnout. However, with the right support and sufficient resourcing, Sencos can be leaders shaping the cultures, systems and partnerships that help every child to learn and flourish.

With sincere thanks to Christopher Robertson, the Co-ordinator of the SENCo Forum, who shared his insights with me as I was writing this article.

– ref. Sencos: the government’s plans for Send reform in England hinge on these overworked school staff – https://theconversation.com/sencos-the-governments-plans-for-send-reform-in-england-hinge-on-these-overworked-school-staff-279773