Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Romain Fathi, Senior Lecturer, School of History, ANU / Chercheur Associé at the Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po, Australian National University

Over the past year, French President Emmanuel Macron has emerged as one of the most influential leaders on the global stage.

His diplomatic activism has reshaped alliances, advanced European priorities and positioned France as a central player in addressing some of the world’s most pressing challenges.

In recent months alone, Macron has:

• cemented a coalition to offer Ukraine security guarantees and military support from 26 countries

• convinced many countries to follow France’s lead in recognising a state of Palestine

• secured a massive trade deal with Vietnam, strategic agreements with Indonesia, and cooperation deals with Brazil and Singapore

• pushed for a High Seas Treaty to protect the world’s oceans.

Domestically, however, his presidency is in crisis. His approval ratings have plummeted to as low as 15% as he has grappled with political paralysis, public discontent and a fragmented National Assembly.

The latest blow to Macron’s presidency occurred this week when his chosen prime minister was ousted by the assembly after serving just 270 days.

This domestic instability has raised questions about France’s – and Macron’s – political future. Some in France are calling for him to step aside before the end of his term in April 2027, triggering new elections.

Revolving door of prime ministers

Macron’s troubles began after his re-election in April 2022 against Marine Le Pen, a victory seen by many as a vote against the far right rather than an endorsement of his agenda.

Traditionally, a freshly elected president gains a strong parliamentary majority, but Macron’s coalition lost its majority in the June 2022 legislative elections.

The first prime minister of his second term, Élisabeth Borne, resigned after 19 months, amid a public and legislative backlash against Macron’s pension reforms. Her successor, Gabriel Attal, faced the same legislative deadlock and did not last six months.

In June 2024, Macron dissolved the National Assembly, hoping fresh elections would resolve the persistent political instability. It backfired. The elections produced an even more fragmented parliament, making governance nearly impossible.

It took Macron seven weeks to appoint a new prime minister, Michel Barnier, during which time France successfully hosted the 2024 Olympics under a caretaker government, a rare bright spot in the political chaos.

Barnier lasted just three months. His replacement, François Bayrou, resigned this week after a resounding no-confidence vote.

Macron has few good options

Macron wasted no time in appointing a successor this week, Sébastien Lecornu, whose key mission will be to pass the October budget.

The 39-year-old Lecornu is a Macron faithful and has been a member of every government since Macron become president in 2017. He has most recently served as a steady defence minister during the Russian war on Ukraine.

At this stage, however, the new government is not likely to last long, for the same reason the others have fallen: a politically fragmented National Assembly that has sought to oppose Macron at every opportunity. Key to Lecornu’s survival will be his ability to appoint well-known ministers from both the moderate left and moderate right, a difficult equation.

Macron has few options to address the bitter opposition he faces in the assembly. He could dissolve the body again, but this risks further empowering the far left and far right, who are pushing for new elections.

Or, he could buckle to the pressure to resign. However, there is no legal obligation for him to do so, and he remains committed to serving out his term.

Growing popular frustration

This decision risks making him even more unpopular in the short term.

Many citizens blame Macron for the current instability, dating back to his election in 2017. When he came into office, Macron revolutionised the French political landscape. The country had traditionally been ruled by either the moderate left (the Socialists) or the moderate right (the Republicans). But Macron delivered a majority at the centre, which had not been seen since 1974.

The issue, however, is that this weakened the moderate left and right. By siphoning supporters from both sides to build his coalition, he decimated the Socialists and Republicans. This in turn gave more power to the far left and far right to become a more vocal and destabilising opposition.

The public also widely views Macron’s decision to call snap elections last year as a reckless gamble that only deepened the country’s divisions.

And his pension reforms, economic policies and perceived favouritism towards the wealthy continue to fuel public anger.

In fact, Macron faces a new wave of nationwide protests on Wednesday called Bloquons Tout (Let’s Block Everything) over economic inequality, rising costs of living and his policies.

Where to from here?

Macron insists it’s his duty to uphold France’s institutions, even in turbulent times. He has signalled his intention to stay the course, using his constitutional powers to govern, despite the lack of a stable majority.

Yet, the French public is growing impatient. His optimism and resilience are being tested as never before.

The coming months will be crucial. If he can pass the budget and restore some stability, he may yet salvage his second term.

If not, France could face a prolonged period of political paralysis, with no clear resolution in sight, at least not until the next scheduled presidential election in April 2027.

Macron can’t run in 2027 – he is barred from serving for more than two consecutive terms. However, he may have ambitions to run again in 2032, despite how toxic his brand has become.

In the end, Macron’s legacy may hinge on how he navigates the current crisis. Paradoxically, although the French have lost confidence in his domestic political vision for France, the moderate majority still believes the potential alternatives (such as Le Pen) are far riskier, and Macron knows this.

Romain Fathi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Emmanuel Macron’s presidency is in survival mode. How did France’s political paralysis get so bad? – https://theconversation.com/emmanuel-macrons-presidency-is-in-survival-mode-how-did-frances-political-paralysis-get-so-bad-264870

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jeff Bachman, Associate Professor, Department of Peace, Human Rights & Cultural Relations, American University School of International Service

Is the conflict in Eastern Europe a “special military operation in Ukraine” or a “Russian invasion”? And when it comes to events in the Middle East, are we talking about the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” the “War on Gaza” or the “Israel-Hamas war”?

As scholars who study international security, we know that how people refer to a war matters. The name may, for example, signal the speaker’s perspective on who is responsible for the fighting and, therefore, to blame for the death and destruction that follows.

We explored this idea as part of a recent analysis of how scholars discussed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 compared with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The results of our research show that scholars used diametrically opposed language in describing and referring to the two wars. While the vast majority described the conflict between Iraq and the U.S. as the “Iraq war” – referencing just one of the participants – the most common ways of referring to the current conflict in Eastern Europe are variations of the “Russia-Ukraine War” – which includes both participants.

This sparked our interest into delving deeper into war-naming conventions. What we found is that the way wars are referred to in the U.S. – by politician, journalists and in public scholarship – tends to serve state interests and power rather than necessarily reflect the realities of conflicts.

War-naming conventions

There are a number of different ways in which wars are named, but they can be broadly grouped around place, participants or time.

In the first category, you have examples ranging from the “Vietnam War” to the “Falklands War.” Both examples, incidentally, highlight the fact that a war’s name may differ from place to place. The Vietnam War is the “American War” to the Vietnamese, and Argentinians talk of the “War of the Malvinas.”

In the second category are conflicts such as the “Spanish-American War,” the “Franco-Prussian War” and the “Sino-Japanese War” of 1894–1895. These are also subject to some variation, known in France and China as the “War of 1870” and the “Jiawu war,” respectively.

Wars are named after other conventions, too. They can be named after significant factors that make them stand out – examples include holidays in which the conflict took place in the case of the “Yom Kippur War” – or how long they last, such as the “Thirty Years’ War.”

At first look, naming wars after their location, participants, starting date or duration might appear to be an exercise in objective detachment. But examining why one naming convention is used over another can reveal a particular perspective or bias.

Historian Danny Keenan has demonstrated how decisions are made in naming wars that may imply culpability among the actors involved. He notes that what has come to be known as the “New Zealand Wars” was once referred to as “The Māori Wars.”

“It was generally acknowledged that Māori should not bear such responsibility” implied by the earlier name, writes Keenan.

The New Zealand/Māori Wars name change gets at a wider point that naming conflicts after one participant can be problematic, especially when there is a power imbalance.

Take the British naming of their colonial wars after the populations they were subjugating, such as the “Xhosa Wars” or the “Mahdist War.” Naming an interstate war based on the state in which the war is fought – while omitting the name of outside instigators – implies the culpability of that state.

And more powerful actors, such as colonial powers, have historically been able to make their chosen name stick, obscuring their role in the violence.

When apparent objectivity belies bias

While naming wars after both participants seemingly avoids these biases, what becomes evident is that the order in which participants are listed matters. For example, the “Philippine-American War” – fought between 1899-1902 – may imply that the U.S. engaged in that conflict only in response to the actions of an antagonist, even though it was the U.S. that was seeking to deny the Philippines independence.

The results of our research into the U.S.’s and Russia’s respective invasions of Iraq and Ukraine demonstrate how different naming conventions are used politically.

“Iraq war,” we argue, suggests full culpability on Iraq for the war being fought on its territory, despite Iraq having not attacked the U.S. or its allies. It also entirely omits the U.S., even though it was the invading force.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, is referred to by public scholars and media in a variety of ways that emphasize Russia or President Vladimir Putin as an aggressive antagonist. Examples include Russia’s “murderous war on Ukraine”; “Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine”; and “Russian war against Ukraine.”

The New York Times and Foreign Policy Magazine include articles about the war under the topic heading “Russia-Ukraine War,” and The Washington Post and the magazine Foreign Affairs do so under “War in Ukraine.”

Although “War in Ukraine” employs the location naming convention, the other headlines and topic headings use the participants convention, leading with Russia as the antagonist. Noticeably absent is any reference to the “Ukraine War.”

What to call the Middle East conflict?

The naming of the current conflict in the Middle East presents its own issues.

The New York Times and Foreign Affairs, both of which we analyzed for our research, as well as other U.S.-based popular news media such as USA Today and Detroit Free Press, all headline their coverage of Gaza and Israel with the “Israel-Hamas War.”

Based on what research tells us regarding naming conventions, what might this tell us?

First, consider the placement of Israel first. This could identify Israel as the aggressor. However, the use of “Hamas” over “Gaza” is noteworthy. Hamas is recognized by the U.S. and most of the Western world as a terrorist organization. As such, placing Israel first actually can be understood as a legitimation of Israel’s violence.

Also, their is no mention of Palestine, Palestinians, Gaza or Gazans.

This is despite Israeli actions long superseding the targeting of Hamas. Israel’s plans now include the full occupation of, at least, large parts of Gaza and the potential displacement of Gaza’s people.

The move away from the use of “Palestinian” cannot, we argue, be assumed to be incidental. Since October 2023, mentions of the “Israeli-Palestinian” conflict have seemingly become rarer, despite the growing, and related, violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Finally, the use of the term “war” in referring to the “Israeli-Hamas war” can itself be problematic as it indicates a certain level of symmetry.

In the current conflict in Gaza, that is not the case: Israel possesses a far superior and advanced military. And since the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, in which 1,200 Israelis were killed, those killed have nearly entirely been Palestinians – over 63,000 as of September 2025.

The difference in size and capability between Israel’s military and Hamas is such that using the term “war” is, we believe, misleading.

It may be more accurate to describe it as an “occupation” or “a noninternational armed conflict.” A growing number of international bodies are calling it a “genocide.”

Challenging war narratives

How media, scholars and politicians refer to specific wars says a lot about how they would like them to be perceived. It is not coincidence, we argue, that wars and violence perpetrated by the U.S. and its allies are typically named in ways that contribute to a beneficial narrative, while the opposite is true when those deemed U.S. enemies are involved.

Repetition of such names for war and violence can reinforce narratives that serve state interests – it makes sense, therefore, for state officials to propagate names that potentially misinform. When news media and experts do the same, however, it undermines society’s ability to substantially challenge dominant framings in times of war.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. When it comes to wars − from the Middle East to Ukraine − what we call them matters – https://theconversation.com/when-it-comes-to-wars-from-the-middle-east-to-ukraine-what-we-call-them-matters-263388

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By David Mednicoff, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Public Policy, UMass Amherst

The oil-rich states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have a lot going for them: wealth, domestic stability and growing global influence. In recent months, these Gulf kingdoms also appear closer to something they have long sought: reliable U.S. support that has become stronger and more uncritical than ever, just as Iranian power in the region has significantly degraded.

In Donald Trump, the nonelected Gulf Arab monarchs have an ally in Washington who has largely shed previous American concerns for democracy and human rights. That the American president made his first scheduled international trip of his second term to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE only underscores their international clout.

Additionally, the popular overthrow of the Assad government in Syria and Israel’s war against Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Yemen have served to greatly weaken Tehran’s perceived threat to Gulf Arab interests.

Yet, as an expert on Middle Eastern politics, I believe Gulf Arab countries must still navigate a regional political tightrope. And as the Israeli targeting of senior Hamas leaders in Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, shows, events by other Middle Eastern actors have a nasty habit of derailing Gulf leaders’ plans.

How these countries manage four particular uncertainties will have a significant effect on their hopes for stability and growth.

1. Managing a post-civil war Syria

In Syria, years of civil war that had exacerbated splits among ethnic and religious groups finally ended in December 2024. Since then, Arab Gulf countries, which once opposed the Iranian-allied government of Bashar Assad, have been pivotal in supporting new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. They successfully lobbied the U.S. to drop sanctions.

In addition to sharing mutual regional interests with Sharaa, the leaders of Gulf Arab states want a Syrian state that is free from internal war and can absorb the millions of refugees that fled the conflict to other countries in the Middle East.

Gulf states can support postwar Syria diplomatically and financially. However, they can’t wish away the legacy of long war and sectarian strife. Israeli attacks on Syrian soil since Assad’s fall, as well as recent outbreaks of fighting in the Sweida region of southern Syria, underscore the ongoing fragility of the Syrian government and concerns over its ability to contain violence and migration outside of its borders.

2. The challenge of regional politics

Syria illustrates a broader policy challenge for Gulf states. As their wealth, military strength and influence have grown, these countries have become dominant in the Arab world.

As a result, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested billions of dollars in efforts to influence governments and groups across the world. This includes the mostly authoritarian governments in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Egypt’s.

But here, Gulf states are torn politically. If democratic systems form elsewhere in the Arab world, this could encourage Gulf citizens to push for elected government at home. Yet overly coercive Arab governments outside of the Gulf can be prone to popular unrest and even civil war.

Propping up unpopular regional governments risks backfiring on Gulf Arab leaders in one of two ways.

First, it can entice Gulf states into protracted and damaging wars, such as was the case with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s failed military intervention in Yemen against the Houthis. Second, it can drive a wedge between Gulf states, as is seen with the current conflict in Sudan, in which the Saudis and Emiratis are backing rival factions.

3. Watching which way Iran will turn

Always looming behind complicated Middle Eastern politics is Iran, the historically powerful, populous, non-Arab country whose governing Shiite Islam ideology has been the chief antagonist to the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Opposing Gulf Arab and American strategic interests, Iran has for years intervened aggressively in Middle Eastern politics by funding and encouraging militant Shiite groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.

An assertive Iran has been especially a thorn in the side of Saudi Arabia, which strives to be the dominant Muslim majority power in the region. Dealing with Iran has required careful balancing from Qatar and the UAE, which are more directly exposed to Tehran geographically and have maintained relatively stronger relations.

Given this, Gulf countries may silently welcome the decrease in Iran’s military power in the wake of Israel’s recent war against Iran and its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, while also fearing further Iranian-Israeli conflict.

At the same time, a less powerful Iran runs two types of new potential dangers for Gulf states. Should Iran become more unstable, the resulting turmoil could be felt across the region.

In addition, should Iran’s military, policy and economic turmoil lead to a new political system, it could disturb Gulf countries. Neither a Muslim majority democratic government nor a more hard-line nationalist variant in Iran would sit well with nearby Gulf monarchs.

Conversely, concerns that the Israeli and U.S. bombing of Iran may actually lead to increased Iranian determination to pursue a nuclear program also worry Gulf leaders.

4. Living with Israel’s military assertiveness

Israel, the unquestioned military power and sole nuclear weapons state in the region, has long posed particularly deep political dilemmas to Gulf Arab states. The current challenge is how to balance the immense global unpopularity of the Israeli government’s war in Gaza – including among Gulf Arab citizens – with common strategic interests the Gulf states hold with Israel.

Gulf Arab leaders face domestic and regional pressure to show solidarity for Palestinians and their aspirations for statehood.

Yet Gulf rulers also share strategic goals with Israel. Along with opposition to Iranian influence, Gulf states maintain strong military links to the U.S, like Israel. They also appreciate the economic and other security value of Israel’s high-tech products, including software used for espionage and cybersecurity.

This helps explain the UAE’s 2019 decision to join the short list of Arab states with full diplomatic relations with Israel. Hamas attacked Israel in 2023 in part to stop Saudi Arabia from following suit – something that might have further sidelined Palestinians’ bargaining power.

Indeed, moves toward open Saudi diplomatic recognition of Israel were stopped by Hamas’ attack and the global backlash that followed Israel’s ongoing devastation of Gaza.

Gulf leaders may still believe that normalized ties with Israel would be good for the long-term economic prospects of the region. And Bahrain and the UAE – the two Gulf Arab states with diplomatic relations with Israel – have not backed away from their official relationship.

Yet expanding open relations with Israel further, and taking in other Gulf states, is unlikely without a real reversal in Israel’s policy toward Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank.

All this is more true in the immediate aftermath of Israel’s attack in Qatar – the first time Israel has launched a direct strike within a Gulf Arab state. That action, even if ostensibly directed at Hamas, is likely to exacerbate tensions not only with Qatar but place increasing stress on the calculus allied Gulf Arab countries make in their dealings with Israel.

Tricky way forward for Gulf Arab states

These challenges underscore an inescapable truth for Gulf leaders: They are hostage to events beyond their control.

Insulating them from that reality takes regional unity.

The Gulf Cooperation Council, nearly 45 years old, was established precisely for this purpose. While it remains the most successful regional organization in the Middle East, the GCC has not always prevented major rifts, such as in 2017 when a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia cut ties with and blockaded Qatar.

The conflict was resolved in 2021. Since then, the six members of the GCC have worked together more closely.

No doubt, rivalries and disagreements still exist. Yet Arab Gulf leaders have learned that cooperation is useful in the face of major challenges. This can be seen in the recent collaborative diplomatic approaches toward Syria and the U.S.

A second lesson comes from the broader Middle East. Key issues are often interdependent, particularly the status of Palestinians. Hamas’ attack on Israel, and the resulting destruction of much of Gaza, resurfaced the deep popularity across the region of addressing Palestinian needs and rights.

The monarchs of the Arab Gulf would like to maintain their unchallenged domestic political status while expanding their influence in the Middle East and beyond. However, even when Gulf leaders wish to be done with the region’s challenges, those challenges are not always done with them.

Isabella Ishanyan, a UMass Amherst undergraduate, provided research assistance for this article.

David Mednicoff held a research grant from the Qatar National Recent Fund from 2013-2016 which has no connection to anything discussed in this article.

– ref. Israel’s attack in Doha underscores a stark reality for Gulf states looking for stability and growth: They remain hostage to events – https://theconversation.com/israels-attack-in-doha-underscores-a-stark-reality-for-gulf-states-looking-for-stability-and-growth-they-remain-hostage-to-events-261146

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

Israel launched an unprecedented airstrike on the Qatari capital of Doha on September 9, the first time it has directly attacked a Gulf state. The “precision strike”, as Israel has called it, targeted a building in which Hamas officials were reportedly discussing a peace proposal brokered by the US.

Al Jazeera has reported that it had been told by a Hamas official that none of its leadership weree killed in the strike.

The Qatari government said it “strongly condemns the cowardly Israeli attack”, which it described as “a blatant violation of international law”. Other Middle East states including Saudi Arabia condemned the Israeli strike, as did the secretary general of the United Nations, António Guterres, who said it was a “flagrant violation” of Qatari sovereignty.

It has also been reported that Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, informed the White House of Israel’s intentions before carrying out the attack. An Israeli official told local media that the US president, Donald Trump, had given the strike the “green light” but this has not been confirmed.

A statement released by Netanyahu’s office appeared to suggest the strike was at least partly in retaliation for the killing of six Israeli civilians at a bus stop in Jerusalem, for which Hamas has claimed responsibility.

Scott Lucas, a Middle East expert at Dublin City University, spoke to Jonathan Este, The Conversation’s senior international affairs editor, shortly after the attack. He addressed several key questions.

What’s the thinking behind Israel’s strike on Qatar? Why now?

The Israeli government is going for the kill with Hamas. Having staked his political and legal future on the “absolute destruction” of the organisation, Netanyahu cannot agree to a settlement in which it retains any place in Gaza, let alone power.

So he and some of his ministers have not engaged in negotiations for a ceasefire since the start of March. At that point, they pulled out of any discussion of a phase two, resumed the military assault on Gaza, and cut off humanitarian aid. They have only turned it back on in dribs and drabs. Aid distribution has been sporadic and all too often deadly for the people who queue for food. And it’s not enough to prevent widespread famine in Gaza.

But the problem for Netanyahu and his allies is that others continued to push for a resolution – both inside Israel, where citizens are beginning to get sick of endless war, and among Israel’s international allies, who are sickened by the images emerging from the Strip and under pressure from their own populations.

On more than one occasion, Hamas agreed – or at least came close to agreeing – terms put to them by mediators. In August, the Palestinian organisation did so again. At that point, the Israel government had a choice: accept the settlement, get the hostages back and pull back on the plan for a long-term occupation of Gaza. Or try to push aside the settlement while blaming Hamas, then expand its military operations to take over Gaza City.

Netanyahu’s commanders, including the head of the Israel Defense Forces, Eyal Zamir, warned against the assault on Gaza City. Other advisers noted the risk of further international condemnation and the isolation of Israel.

But Netanyahu and hard-right ministers in his government have persisted, urging the prime minister to go for broke. Within minutes of the strike on Doha, finance minister Bezalel Smotrich was on social media praising the attack, writing: “Terrorists have no immunity and will never have immunity from Israel’s long arm anywhere in the world.”

So how to accomplish “absolute” victory? For Israeli hardliners, this means levelling parts of Gaza City while taking out Hamas’s leadership – both to break up the organisation and to ensure that there is no more talk of ceasefire, only capitulation.

What does this mean for the normalisation of relations between Israel and the Gulf States?

There is no normalisation. There probably was none before this attack. The Netanyahu government has decided on a course in Gaza that involves the mass killing of at least 65,000 people, most of them civilians, to displace up to 90% of the population of 2.2 million and to threaten all of them with starvation.

Not even the most cynical Arab government could risk the domestic backlash of continuing with “normalisation” in those circumstances.

So the Netanyahu government is not losing any possibilities with the brazen bombing in a sovereign Arab state. It is trying to set the terms for the future, perhaps a distant one: we’ll come back to normalisation from the position of imposing our will on Gaza, even if you might not have liked it.

Israel said the US president gave the attack the ‘green light’. Where does this leave Washington?

It leaves the Trump administration where it has always been: supporting Israeli actions that have led to the mass killing of people in Gaza. The US president was reportedly briefed on Israel’s intention to strike at Doha – a US ally – before the attack went ahead. Trump’s ally, the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, is now talking about Israel having to contend with “enemies encamped around them and they’re trying to bring peace”.

Yes, Trump has pursued the chimera of a deal which would win him the Nobel peace prize. But when Israel effectively ended the deal at the start of March, the US president provided not only an excuse – Hamas was to blame – but also a rationale. Palestinians could be moved out of Gaza to allow Trump to create his “riviera of the Middle East” – a detailed prospectus for which was obtained and published last week by the Washington Post.

Each time the Netanyahu government has walked away from a peace proposal, Trump and his senior officials have provided them with cover. So, as the Israelis approach their long-term occupation, we are at the same point as we were in March – Trump officials talking about the removal of the civilians.

I doubt this attack will shake that position.

What does this tell us about negotiations over Gaza?

There are no negotiations over Gaza. There is a demand by the Netanyahu government for Hamas’s capitulation. If it does not capitulate, Hamas will be destroyed – no matter how many civilians pay the cost.

This is not just about the approach to Gaza. The Netanyahu government has now decided that its regional objectives will be pursued through “decapitation”.

It has not only tried to destroy the leadership of Hamas, with attacks in Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and now Qatar. It has killed most of the leadership of Lebanon’s Hezbollah. It laid waste to Iran’s political and military commanders in its 12-day war in June. On August 24, it assassinated Ahmed Ghaleb Nasser al-Rahawi, recognised by the Houthi people as their prime minister, and other senior Houthi officials in Yemen.

The deadly message of the Netanyahu government is clear: no one whom they consider an “enemy” is immune, wherever they are. Negotiations are peripheral, perhaps even irrelevant, to that commitment.

Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Middle East leaders condemn Israel’s attack on Qatar as Netanyahu ends all talk of Gaza ceasefire – expert Q&A – https://theconversation.com/middle-east-leaders-condemn-israels-attack-on-qatar-as-netanyahu-ends-all-talk-of-gaza-ceasefire-expert-qanda-264945