Manchester United’s problems run deeper than another managerial sacking

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Dan Plumley, Principal Lecturer in Sport Finance, Sheffield Hallam University

Moomusician/Shutterstock

At its peak in the 1990s and 2000s, Manchester United was the reference point in professional club football around the globe. It set the commercial agenda, dominated the game domestically and projected power far beyond the pitch. That era now feels distant – not because ambition has faded, but because competence in execution has.

Manchester United’s latest chapter, the sacking of manager Ruben Amorim, has been framed as a necessary football decision. The team’s results were inconsistent and its performances uneven.

Yet focusing on Amorim alone risks missing the wider truth. Manchester United is stuck in a cycle of poor business decisions off the field. The arrival of petrochemical billionaire Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s Ineos to assist majority owners the Glazer family in 2023 has not broken it.

Ineos was brought in as a corrective force, promising modern governance, football expertise and significant investment in infrastructure. At the time, it stated that it wanted to see Manchester United back at the “very top” of English, European and world football.

Fast forward a couple of years and that aim already looks in jeopardy. Instead, the club continues to display the same damaging tendencies that have defined the era after Sir Alex Ferguson’s legendary management period between 1986 and 2013.

These tendencies include reacting to the performances on the pitch rather than prioritising the long-term vision and allowing managerial changes to disrupt wider restructuring projects. Staff redundancies, plans for a new stadium and the latest managerial sacking have all drawn criticisms from fans, analysts and journalists, who often take aim at the way Ineos has structured the hierarchy at the club.

Manchester United’s operating model has become predictable. First, the club appoints a “project” manager – someone with a clearly defined philosophy and a reputation for innovation. Expectations are set high, often publicly, with talk of culture change and long-term vision.

Next comes the structural failure. Recruitment and wage strategy are not aligned to the manager’s philosophy, creating a disconnect between the board, technical director and the manager. Players are inherited who do not fit the system, while new signings are compromises driven by availability, commercial logic or short-term pressure rather than long-term squad building. Power is split between executives, technical directors and owners, leaving the head coach as the scapegoat.

Under-performance then follows. This is not always catastrophic, but it is enough to trigger anxiety at board level and among supporters. The squad looks mismatched, results fluctuate and narratives of decline re-emerge.

Finally, the reset button is pressed. The manager is dismissed, the “culture” is blamed, and the cycle begins again. Reports since Amorim’s sacking have detailed tensions over control, recruitment and tactical direction.

Amorim publicly hinted at frustrations behind the scenes, while leadership including CEO Omar Berrada, director of football Jason Wilcox, and director of recruitment, Christopher Vivell, appeared unconvinced that his approach suited the club’s needs. What is striking is not that the relationship broke down, but how familiar the breakdown felt.

former manchester united manager ruben amorim shouting during a match.
Amorim’s exit followed a predictable pattern.
Cesar Ortiz Gonzalez/Shutterstock

The question should not be whether Amorim was perfect – few managers are. It is whether Manchester United ever created the ecosystem required for him to succeed. The evidence suggests they did not.

Amorim was hired for his clearly defined system and his personality as a modern, progressive coach. But he walked into a squad built for very different managers and ideas. Clear lines of responsibility never fully emerged, and football decisions – or a shared footballing philosophy – struggled to filter down through the club’s corporate structure.

Amorim himself openly questioned how he had been appointed as a “manager”, only to discover that in practice he was operating more as a head coach. The club still seems unsure as to whether it wants a powerful manager, a dominant sporting director or a committee-led model running its football operation.

This ambiguity leaves every coach vulnerable. When results dip, there is no shared accountability – only a convenient exit route.

Financial consequences beyond the pitch

Sacking managers is also a costly business. Amorim left the club with 18 months remaining on his contract, a decision estimated to cost around £12 million in compensation.

Since 2014, the cumulative cost of sacking managers and senior staff at Manchester United has been estimated at close to £100 million. The club also paid £8.3 million in October 2024 to appoint Amorim early. Even for a financial powerhouse, such inefficiency risks becoming a burden.

Externally, instability weakens Manchester United’s negotiating position. Elite players increasingly view the club as a risk rather than a destination, while rivals with coherent structures exploit the indecision.

This is where the financial reality may bite, particularly if the club continues to miss out on the Uefa Champions League, the biggest club football tournament in Europe. The revamped competition can deliver close to £100 million per season for clubs that progress deep into the tournament.

Manchester United has so far maintained revenues — ranking fourth globally – but rivals such as Real Madrid, Barcelona, Bayern Munich, Arsenal and Liverpool have moved ahead on and off the pitch. Missing the Champions League once or twice is manageable; missing repeatedly is not.

Ineos may still believe the club is mid-reform, but reform without coherence is merely motion. Until Manchester United decides who truly owns the football vision and protect that vision through recruitment, patience and structural alignment, no managerial appointment will succeed for long.

Sacking Amorim may feel decisive. History suggests it will change little. Manchester United’s biggest problem is not who stands on the touchline, but how the club makes decisions when the cameras are off.

Manchester United FC and Ineos were approached for comment.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Manchester United’s problems run deeper than another managerial sacking – https://theconversation.com/manchester-uniteds-problems-run-deeper-than-another-managerial-sacking-272955

Your body clock matters for brain health in later life – and could even be linked to dementia risk

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Eef Hogervorst, Professor of Biological Psychology, Loughborough University

Shakirov Albert/Shutterstock

Inside the body, a 24-hour rhythm, known as the circadian rhythm, quietly coordinates when we sleep, wake, eat and recover. This internal timing system helps keep organs and hormones working in sync. When it becomes disrupted, the effects may extend well beyond poor sleep, with growing evidence suggesting consequences for long-term brain health.

A large 2025 study of more than 2,000 people with an average age of 79 found that those with a strong circadian rhythm had an almost halved risk of developing dementia. Circadian rhythms regulate daily processes including sleep timing, hormone release, heart rate and body temperature.

Over three years of follow-up, dementia developed in 7% of participants with irregular body clocks, measured using heart rate monitors, compared with 10% of those whose rhythms remained more regular.

Disrupted circadian rhythms are often associated with poor sleep. For decades, poor sleep has been suspected to contribute to both dementia and heart disease, which share several underlying risk factors. In the 2025 study, worse heart health and high blood pressure, both commonly linked to sleep disruption, were accounted for in the analysis. Sleep apnoea, however, was not.

Sleep apnoea is a common condition in which breathing repeatedly stops and starts during sleep, reducing oxygen supply to the brain and raising blood pressure. Its relationship with dementia remains debated, largely because sleep apnoea is more common in people who already have established dementia risk factors such as obesity, diabetes, smoking and alcohol misuse. This overlap makes it difficult to determine whether sleep apnoea itself increases dementia risk or whether it reflects broader metabolic and cardiovascular vulnerability.

This review suggested that addressing physical inactivity linked to fatigue from disrupted sleep may be a promising approach. Increasing activity could reduce obesity, improve sleep quality and support brain cell health, potentially lowering dementia risk through several pathways at once.

Other explanations may also help clarify the link between disrupted circadian rhythms and dementia. One involves the immune system, which is influenced by circadian rhythms as well as sleep and plays a role in both heart disease and neurodegeneration. Another is the theory that sleep supports the removal of toxic proteins from the brain, including amyloid plaques that characterise Alzheimer’s disease, through a waste clearance system that appears to be more active during sleep.

While this clearance hypothesis is widely discussed, evidence remains mixed. Some animal studies, including those in mice, have shown reduced rather than increased toxin clearance during sleep. Animal findings must be interpreted cautiously, as sleep patterns in mice differ substantially from those in humans, particularly in later life.

The Lancet commission update on dementia prevention concluded that sleeping for longer or shorter durations is unlikely to be a true independent risk factor for dementia. One reason for this conclusion is that evidence from real-world sleep disruption does not clearly point to sleep duration as the main driver of risk. Although shift work is associated with increased dementia risks, studies do not consistently show higher risk in night shift workers compared with day shift workers. If sleep disruption alone were responsible, night shifts would be expected to carry a greater risk.

This suggests that circadian disruption may matter independently of sleep duration. However, shift work is also associated with unhealthy lifestyle patterns, including poorer diet, smoking, alcohol use and variable physical activity. Chronic stress, lack of routine, hormonal disruption, raised blood pressure, reduced opportunities for leisure and social isolation also cluster around shift work. Each of these factors is independently linked to dementia, heart disease and poor sleep, complicating attempts to isolate the effects of circadian disruption alone.

The Lancet authors also argued that if amyloid clearance does occur in humans, it likely happens during the first two hours of sleep, when deep sleep is most prominent. Deep sleep tends to be preserved even when total sleep duration falls below seven hours. They therefore suggested that fragmented sleep and disrupted biological rhythms may be early consequences of dementia-related brain changes, rather than causes. The toxic plaques may accumulate in brain regions that regulate sleep and wakefulness long before memory problems become apparent.

So should sleep be deprioritised in dementia prevention? The Lancet advice was not to restrict sleep. Evidence linking long sleep, defined as more than eight hours, to dementia risk was not supported when broader data were considered.

A recent trial tested a personalised programme combining several approaches, such as light exposure, sleep scheduling, daytime activity and caregiver support, to improve sleep in people with dementia. After eight months, sleep improved in the intervention group, although sleep also improved with usual care. The overall effect was small to moderate, and there was no improvement in dementia-related behaviours or overall health. These approaches may benefit carers by supporting routines, but their impact for people with dementia appears limited.

Both acute and chronic sleep deprivation, particularly loss of deep sleep and REM sleep, can impair memory. Whether long-term disruption of restorative sleep increases dementia risk later in life, and whether treating sleep problems can prevent dementia, remains uncertain.

Because improving sleep is often seen as a potential prevention strategy, medications used to treat insomnia also deserve scrutiny. Sedative drugs such as benzodiazepines have been linked to increased dementia risk, as well as daytime drowsiness, falls and accidents. Melatonin, while used by many, has not shown consistent benefits for improving sleep in adults.

That said, there are evidence-based ways to improve sleep and support healthy circadian rhythms. Regular moderate exercise, around 30 minutes a day, particularly outdoors and before midday, is one of the most effective. As a bonus, physical activity is also one of the strongest protective factors against heart disease and dementia. So wrap up warm and get walking.

The Conversation

Eef Hogervorst has received funding from governmental research grants to investigate lifestyles and dementia risk. She is affiliated with Loughborough University and acted as expert for NICE and ESHRE Guidelines on whether women going through menopause should be treated with hormones to prevent dementia

ref. Your body clock matters for brain health in later life – and could even be linked to dementia risk – https://theconversation.com/your-body-clock-matters-for-brain-health-in-later-life-and-could-even-be-linked-to-dementia-risk-272838

Will new rules for drivers in England prevent deaths on the road?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sally Kyd, Professor of Law, University of Leicester

Panumas Yanuthai/Shutterstock

Driving is the one activity carried out by three-quarters of adults in England which has a risk of killing or being killed. But society seems to accept the risks associated with car travel.

As transport secretary Heidi Alexander notes, we would never accept four people a day dying in train or plane crashes – yet that is the daily toll on roads in Britain.

This is why the government has announced a series of reforms – including lowering the drink-driving limit in England and requiring regular eye tests for over-70s – aimed at reducing deaths and serious injuries by 65% over the next decade. This is a welcome, if ambitious, target.

Any surviving driver involved in a fatal collision faces investigation and potential prosecution if found to be at fault. But the government’s proposed strategy rejects the idea that drivers alone bear responsibility for road safety. A number of proposals relate to designing roads and vehicles to reduce the chance and impact of collisions.

It also highlights that certain groups – particularly young male drivers are disproportionately involved in crashes, and proposes measures to address these risks.

As someone who researches motoring law, and how it is applied in practice, I argue this is a welcome shift to prevention, rather than punishment. Recent government policy has leaned heavily on punitive responses that attempt to close the stable door after the horse has bolted.

Over the past three decades, penalties for causing death on the roads have increased significantly. But while longer sentences are deserved in some cases, this approach has done little to punish the underlying offences – dangerous, careless or drink driving – that leads to fatalities.

There are now five specific criminal offences of causing death by driving under the Road Traffic Act 1988. The most serious – causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs – carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, equivalent to manslaughter.

Despite these tougher penalties, bereaved families report dissatisfaction with sentencing, concerned that drivers do not receive the penalty they deserve.

Punishing dangerous driving

Last year, I conducted a study analysing press reports of over 200 sentencing decisions in fatal crashes, mainly from 2024. The final report found that new sentencing guidelines, introduced in 2023, are largely being followed.

The worst cases now receive sentences exceeding the previous maximum of 14 years, aligning with manslaughter sentences. Eight cases resulted in sentences of 15 years or more, with the highest at 19 years.

Sentencing is complex, influenced by numerous factors, including the significant reduction applied when defendants plead guilty. A discount of up to one-third applies to all criminal offences. But given that 70.5% of offenders plead guilty in death-by-driving cases, this has a significant impact.

A road sign referring to a fatal collision in London
At least four people were killed on British roads per day in 2024.
Alex Segre/Shutterstock

The maximum penalty under the law is life imprisonment. But the sentencing guidelines do not consider a life sentence appropriate even in the worst cases – those involving extreme speed, alcohol or drugs and multiple aggravating factors. The current guidelines allow judges to take a nuanced approach, with variability in sentencing generally reflecting the unique circumstances of each case.

While drivers who kill on the roads are now generally receiving longer sentences, victims are still being let down in several ways. Many see delays in investigation, the right charge not always being selected for prosecution, some cases being dealt with in a magistrates’ court rather than the Crown Court, and the suspect being able to continue driving up until conviction and again soon after they are released from prison.

Furthermore, harsh sentences are unlikely to deter other deaths. Psychological biases mean drivers rarely believe they will be involved in a fatal crash. Increasing the maximum penalty for such offences appears to be an easy political win without actually addressing the underlying behaviour.

Can the law improve road safety?

If the law is to succeed in deterring deaths on the road, it needs to address drivers’ behaviour before they kill.

Some of the proposals in the road safety strategy correspond with recommendations made in my report, such as the suspension of licences for serious offenders awaiting trial, and measures to support novice drivers. These, however, fall short of the recommendations previously made by the RAC Foundation, a transport policy research charity.

Measures such as lowering the drink-drive limit for all drivers, introducing safeguards for new drivers and suspending licences for those suspected of drink or drug driving are positive steps towards using the law more effectively to reduce road violence.

However, passing new laws aimed at changing driver behaviour will not, on its own, save lives. The enforcement of such legislation depends on effective policing of the roads. As recommended by my report, investment in roads policing and collision investigation is essential.

Fundamentally, we as a society need to take all driving offences seriously, given the ultimate harm they can cause. We need to take a step back and understand that what is sometimes framed as a “war on motorists” is trying to prevent the carnage on our roads.

The Conversation

Sally Kyd received funding from the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Transport Safety (PACTS). She is a member of the Policy Research Committee of PACTS.

ref. Will new rules for drivers in England prevent deaths on the road? – https://theconversation.com/will-new-rules-for-drivers-in-england-prevent-deaths-on-the-road-272926

What Mark Carney’s China trip could mean for the future of Canadian-Chinese relations

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Ye Xue, Research Fellow, China Institute, University of Alberta

It has been more than three years since China’s Xi Jinping told Canada’s Justin Trudeau to “create the conditions first” before the two countries could work together constructively during their awkward private exchange at the 2022 G20 summit.

Despite occasional diplomatic engagement since then, the conditions for genuine co-operation between Canada and China failed to materialize, and the relationship remained overshadowed by the Meng Wanzhou affair, the ordeal of the “Two Michaels” and disputes over foreign interference.




Read more:
Meng and the two Michaels: Why China’s hostage diplomacy failed


Threats by United States President Donald Trump to make Canada a 51st state, combined with his disruptive trade policies, have forced Ottawa to re-examine the risks of excessive economic dependence on its closest ally and articulate an ambition to double Canada’s non-U.S. exports over the next decade.

As Prime Minister Mark Carney recently put it: “Never have all your eggs in one basket. We have too many eggs in the American basket.” At the same time, China has signalled a willingness to stabilize strained relations following Carney’s election win last year.

Canada-China tariffs

Foreign Minister Anita Anand’s visit to Beijing, together with Carney and Xi’s informal meeting on the margins of the APEC summit last October, suggests that the groundwork now exists for a serious stabilization of Canada–China relations.

Carney’s visit to China this week builds on this emerging momentum.

While the visit could be positive, Canadian expectations should be realistic, since the trip marks a stabilizing process rather than a symbol of stabilized relationship.

Trade will be at the top of Carney’s agenda, particularly the Canadian push for China to lift anti-dumping duties on Canadian canola oil. Yet few should expect an immediate breakthrough. Economic sanctions are rarely undone in a single high-level meeting; more often, such visits lay the groundwork for the harder, more technical negotiations that follow.

Australia’s experience offers a reality check. China did not lift restrictions on Australian coal and review anti-dumping duties on barley during high-level visits; those steps came months later, following sustained diplomatic engagement after Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s trip to Beijing in late 2022.

Nor did Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s state visit in November 2023 trigger the immediate removal of remaining tariffs on exports such as wine, red meat and live lobsters. Progress came gradually — through patience, process and persistent diplomacy.




Read more:
Vital Signs: Australian barley growers are the victims of weaponised trade rules


The canola dispute is different. China’s tariffs were a direct response to Ottawa’s duties on Chinese electric vehicles. In a relationship governed by reciprocity, China is unlikely to move first without a signal from Canada.

Rather than expecting immediate, tangible outcomes, this state visit is best understood as an ice-breaking moment to encourage governments at different levels and across sectors to resume or establish dialogue. Over time, such channels can normalize working relationships and foster bilateral co-operation.

More diplomacy, no security concessions

The high-profile shift in Ottawa’s China policy places the Carney government under closer domestic scrutiny. Canadians will want to know whether this approach can advance economic interests while safeguarding national security while remaining consistent with Canada’s identity as a liberal democracy.

China, for its part, will expect Ottawa to demonstrate a sustained commitment to stabilization. All of this will unfold under the continued pressure of the American China strategy, which will continue to shape the boundaries of Canada’s policy choices.

Maintaining a balance among competing national interests has become increasingly difficult for middle powers like Canada. Yet Australia’s China policy over the past three years, characterized by “pragmatic engagement without strategic concession,” suggests such a balance is possible.

But it will require Canada to invest more heavily in effective diplomacy, rather than relying on inflammatory or performative rhetoric for domestic political gain.

It means favouring neutral, precise language over emotive labelling when responding to Chinese actions. It also demands strong leadership from Carney: centralizing message discipline, enforcing cabinet coherence on China policy and reducing the risk that domestic political point-scoring spills into the diplomatic realm.

Ottawa should also use re-established communication channels as the primary venue for managing disagreements. These mechanisms can support incremental, negotiated solutions to specific disputes, rather than an over-reliance on public pressure and symbolic gestures.

‘Stabilization with continuity’

A shift in diplomatic approach does not imply a retreat from Canada’s core strategic commitments. The Carney government can and should reaffirm that stabilizing its relationship with China is compatible with maintaining robust national security and democratic values.

This requires embedding China policy within Canada’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy rather than treating it as a bilateral exception. It also involves deepening security co-operation with regional partners to help foster an environment where states are not forced to choose between either the United States or China.

At home, Canada should continue to strengthen institutional safeguards against foreign interference, pairing them with transparent public communication that demonstrates the government’s confidence in institutions and avoids doubling down on any public anxiety about China.

Ultimately, Canada’s China policy after Carney’s visit should be one of stabilization with continuity, making clear that engagement is being pursued from a position of institutional strength, not strategic accommodation.

The Conversation

Ye Xue does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. What Mark Carney’s China trip could mean for the future of Canadian-Chinese relations – https://theconversation.com/what-mark-carneys-china-trip-could-mean-for-the-future-of-canadian-chinese-relations-273202

Lessons from Palestine: Understanding the resistance of educators and students in times of crisis

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Emmanuelle Khoury, Associate professor, School of Social Work, Université de Montréal

Many educators and students living through war and displacement carry difficult emotions into classrooms, but they can also transform them into acts of care and resistance. To understand this, we need to understand their emotional states at a granular level.

Since January 2024, we have been collaborating on a project with the dean and professors at the School of Nursing and Midwifery at Ibn Sina College in Nablus, Palestine, with support from Université de Montréal International.

Our aim is to learn how professors and students talk about their emotions in a region marked by occupation, violence, forced displacement and chronic uncertainty.

From January 2024 to September 2025, we met every two months with five professors and the dean of nursing and midwifery at Ibn Sina College.

Palestinian university professors told us they need to be present and emotionally available for their students while grappling with the impacts of Israel’s military occupation and what many experts have labelled a genocide in Gaza, and they’re looking for tools to help them do that.

Our exchange with Palestinian educators and students led to the development of an intervention tool, CARE (Connection, Action, Resistance, Empowerment), co-designed to address two central emotional states: resistance fatigue and qahr.




Read more:
For Palestinian children living in Masafer Yatta, going to school is an act of resistance


What is qahr?

Resistance fatigue speaks to a pervasive loss of control over our days, choices and even our inner world. This emotional exhaustion is not only personal, but it is also shaped by political structures of exclusion and dispossession, which includes forced displacement, navigating checkpoints and restricted movement.

However, we witnessed another emotion salient in Arabic-speaking countries that we believe underpins resistance fatigue: qahr.

Qahr is a concept that is necessary to grasp in order to truly understand what Palestinians and others living through colonial violence in southwest Asia and north Africa are feeling.

In Arabic, the word qahr evokes an emotion that blends powerlessness, grief and an acute sense of injustice and being overwhelmed by forces larger than ourselves. More than anger and deeper than grief, qahr speaks to the suffocating weight of injustice, the pain of being silenced, muzzled, diminished, trivialized and made invisible.

Qahr is a complex emotion that also holds the potential for transformation — for naming, sharing and reimagining how to live and care for each other. It is a specific emotion shaped by oppression, perpetuated violence and historical trauma that non-Arabic languages often fail to capture.

What we have learned is that qahr is more than a feeling. It is also an action born of the Palestinian determination not to disappear. It is carried through stories, graffiti, songs and through everyday acts of resistance that push against military occupation and attempts at erasure.

Qahr might feel like rage and grief mixed into one, but it often looks like actions that serve as counter-narratives. These actions are deep forms of care, for ourselves, our communities and one’s history and ancestry. They are also political tools that reclaim space, time and dignity.

Hope and care

Our previous work with teachers in Lebanon has shown that educators and students alike carry the emotional trauma into the classroom from collective crises such as economic collapse, war and displacement. The Lebanese teachers we spoke to discussed losses, suffering, injustice, death, violence, unstable living conditions, but also feelings of hope and resistance.

Likewise, during the early days of the genocide in Gaza, many teachers expressed their profound sense of oppression and how they managed to transform it into hope and even moments of joy.

Their commitment to developing educational initiatives for their students stands as powerful evidence of this resistance. As Asma, a teacher from Gaza, explained: “People in the Gaza Strip have become experts in creating alternative life plans.”

In this way, spaces of suffering also become sites of hope and care. Our research on exploring emotion work, on valuing the role of emotions and on dialogue allowed us to turn toward specific emotions experienced by many of our project partners.

The CARE intervention

Inspired by our research findings about fathering amid political violence in occupied Palestine, we were interested in analyzing our discussions with colleagues at Ibn Sina College in terms of emotions and resilience.

Through our understanding of qahr, we created CARE (Connection, Action, Resistance, Empowerment), a culturally adapted intervention, with professors and students at Ibn Sina College. During a series of online dialogues, we reflected on the lived experience of teaching under occupation, talking about loss, and staying committed to teaching and training.

CARE builds on this insight, offering an adaptation of acceptance and commitment therapy with situated and culturally grounded strategies for educators and students to collectively hold space for their emotions and their actions.

What began as a project to support the psychosocial needs of health-care professionals in crisis turned into the co-creation of a training module on trauma and mental health. Our discussions revealed a common thread in our Ibn Sina colleagues’ objectives: a desire to share their own complex emotions to better support others, in particular their students.

As our collaborations evolve, we continue to explore how emotional concepts can inform pedagogical, political and relational practices. Qahr offers a lens through which to understand not only suffering and hope, but also the actions of resistance and reparation under conditions of war and displacement.

This is how our colleagues in Palestine began to share their complex, often opposing, feelings that arise in these circumstances, including resistance fatigue and qahr.

Together we identified key goals for the meetings, with a focus on developing psychosocial and mental health interventions and training sessions that recognize and validate these emotions. CARE emphasizes practical strategies for educators and students to individually and collectively hold space for strong emotions.

CARE was integrated into a guidebook and was first delivered to a cohort of nursing instructors and academics, who tested it with students and in professional circles in the fall of 2025. This initiative underscores the transformative strength of collaboration, and the importance of diving deep into learning about context and culturally specific emotion concepts for responsive care.

Qahr is a legitimate feeling. CARE offers a stepping stone to accompany teachers and professors in this experience, helping them to channel it in their own way, according to their resources and context. In this process, it is essential to mention that we also have much to learn from those who feel qahr. Their experiences invite us to question our own understandings and reflections of loss, anger and injustice.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Lessons from Palestine: Understanding the resistance of educators and students in times of crisis – https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-palestine-understanding-the-resistance-of-educators-and-students-in-times-of-crisis-269578

Bob Weir: the Grateful Dead co-founder reinvented rhythm guitar and the art of the jam

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Max Bowden, PhD Candidate, impact and influence of the Grateful Dead, University of Essex

Bob Weir, co-founder of the Grateful Dead, has died aged 78. His family announced the death on Instagram on Saturday, telling fans that he “transitioned peacefully, surrounded by loved ones, after courageously beating cancer as only Bobby could. Unfortunately, he succumbed to underlying lung issues”.

Weir was born in 1947 and grew up with adoptive parents, not knowing his birth parents until later in life. He found school challenging due to undiagnosed dyslexia and moved from school to school.

He met lifelong collaborator John Perry Barlow when attending a school for boys with behavioural problems, and together they wrote some of the band’s most famous lyrics.

Some of Bob Weir’s earliest musical memories came from playing traditional songs for cowboys when his family were vacationing on a cattle ranch. But his career really began on New Years Eve 1963 when he met Jerry Garcia while wandering the streets of Palo Alto looking for something to do.

The pair first formed a jug band, called Mother McRee’s Uptown Jug Champions, before transitioning to electric and calling themselves the Warlocks. This wasn’t to last as there was a New York band that were playing under the same name, who went on to change their name to the Velvet Underground.




Read more:
Grateful Dead at 60: three folklore tales that inspired the band’s music


The Grateful Dead formed in 1965 and for the next 30 years, Weir supported Jerry Garcia’s melodic lead lines with his own idiosyncratic style of rhythm guitar playing. He sought to base his approach to rhythm guitar on McCoy Tyner’s piano, who played with John Coltrane.

This, combined with 60 years of improvisational experience, gave Weir’s guitar playing an inimitable feel that was constantly in a state of flux. Weir had freedom to explore complex rhythmic arrangements and chord inversions due to the robust rhythmic foundation of the band provided by Phil Lesh’s bass and the use of two drummers (Bill Kreutzmann and Mickey Hart) for much of their existence.

Bob Weir performs a Tiny Desk concert with his band, Wolf Bros.

John Mayer, lead guitarist in Dead & Company, described Weir’s playing as “almost too original to be fully appreciated”.

Don Was, a member of Weir’s later band, Wolf Brothers, and a storied musician and producer in his own right said: “There is not another guitarist in the world who plays like him. He never plays the same thing remotely the same way twice in a row and will alternate between being as raw as John Lee Hooker to as sophisticated as Andres Segovia from one phrase to another.”

Weir’s unique approach to playing also manifested in his compositions, many of which rely on strange time signatures or intricate playing styles. Whether it’s the 10/4 time of Playing in the Band or the finger-picked introduction to Weather Report Suite, Weir’s songwriting always sought to push the boundaries of what the band could do.

His 1972 solo album Ace featured many tracks that would go on to become Grateful Dead staples. His work with Barlow on songs like The Music Never Stopped, Hell in a Bucket and Lost Sailor helped define the band’s sound across its 30-year duration.

Following the death of Garcia in 1995, Weir has participated constantly in elaborations and continuations of the band’s legacy. His solo band Ratdog even performed on the day Garcia died, ending with a powerful rendition of Knockin’ on Heavens Door. Weir’s commitment to music carried on until his last days, performing three shows for the band’s 60th anniversary in August, just weeks after starting treatment for cancer.

One of the band’s most successful post-Jerry Garcia iterations, Dead & Company, toured from 2015 to 2023 and were one of the first in the world to play the Las Vegas Sphere. This band brought the Dead’s music to a new generation, playing huge stadium shows led by Mayer, with their final tour playing for nearly a million fans.

When he wasn’t touring with iterations of the band like Dead & Company or Furthur and The Dead, Weir was still pushing his solo projects. From 2018 he has performed under Bob Weir and the Wolf Brothers, a more minimalist outfit without a lead guitarist.

This band’s accomplishments include a number of shows with orchestras across America and more recently at the Royal Albert Hall.

Weir hoped that his musical legacy would last 300 years with the Grateful Dead’s songs becoming their own kind of standard. The band can be credited for founding the jam band genre of music, which focuses on improvisation and the live experience, and includes bands like Phish, Widespread Panic and Billy Strings.

This is before mentioning the hundreds of cover bands, some of which are hugely successful in their own right, and have at this point played more shows than the Dead ever did.

Tributes from Guns n’ Roses guitarist Slash to US secretary of health Robert F Kennedy Jr, suggest the loss of Weir is being felt across America – and the world.


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The Conversation

Max Bowden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Bob Weir: the Grateful Dead co-founder reinvented rhythm guitar and the art of the jam – https://theconversation.com/bob-weir-the-grateful-dead-co-founder-reinvented-rhythm-guitar-and-the-art-of-the-jam-273265

Why Greenland’s vast natural resources won’t necessarily translate into huge profits

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lukas Slothuus, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, School of Global Studies, University of Sussex

watcharapas kumsuk/Shutterstock

The US is sabre-rattling over Greenland once again. The vast island’s natural resources are back on the agenda, a year after then-US national security advisor Michael Waltz announced: “This is about critical minerals. This is about natural resources.”

Greenland is endowed with both fossil fuels and critical raw materials. It possesses at least 25 of the 34 raw materials considered critical by the European Union.

The EU’s 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act seeks to improve European supply security of these, and both Trump and the EU want to weaken Chinese dominance in the trade. Meanwhile, vast reserves of oil are found offshore across eastern and western Greenland.

The value of these resources is hard to estimate as the prices of oil and critical raw materials fluctuate wildly. Like with Venezuela’s oil, it will take an enormous amount of money to build the infrastructure needed to mine the natural resources in Greenland. Mining and fossil fuel projects are capital-intensive, requiring large upfront investments with long lead times before projects yield profits.

Outside its capital Nuuk, there is almost no road infrastructure in Greenland and limited deep-water ports for large tankers and container ships.

Around the world, private mining and fossil fuel corporations can exploit public infrastructure such as roads, ports, power generation, housing and specialist workers to make their operations profitable. In Greenland, huge capital investment would be required to extract the first truckload of minerals and the first barrel of oil.

As such, the government faces a classic dilemma. Let private multinationals extract but lose the lion’s share of revenues? Or insist on state ownership but struggle to find the capital and state capacity to enable extraction.

Mining, past and present

Greenland’s mineral riches have been known about for some time. In April 2025, Danish state broadcaster DR aired a documentary about how Denmark had historically siphoned off profits from a cryolite mine in Greenland.

The programme led to a major political and media crisis, with some believing it challenged perceptions of Greenland being financially dependent on Denmark. Minerals are a prominent but sensitive topic in Greenland’s relationship to the rest of the world.

Foreign companies have tried to set up viable mining industries in Greenland for decades, with little to show for it. Indeed, contrary to US President Donald Trump’s assertions, American corporations have long had the opportunity to enter Greenland’s mining sector. The capital intensity twinned with extremely harsh climactic conditions mean that, so far, no firm has begun commercial mining activities.

Greenland’s natural resources minister, Naaja Nathanielsen, said in 2025 that she wanted mining to become a “very good, stable supplement” to the country’s overwhelming dependence on the fisheries industry.

Yet in 2021 Greenland’s new socialist Inuit Ataqatigiit government banned uranium mining on pollution grounds. Australian company Energy Transitions Minerals (ETM) sued Greenland and Denmark in 2023 for 76 billion kroner (£8.9 billion), equivalent to almost four times Greenland’s GDP.

The mining company claimed to have been robbed of future profits after its uranium project at Kuannersuit/Kvanefjeld was terminated.

Danish courts have struck down most of ETM’s claims as baseless and there has been a report of concerns ETM could declare bankruptcy and thereby potentially avoid paying the large legal fees. In a statement, ETM said its subsidiary GM “worked in good faith for over a decade, in close cooperation with the Greenlandic and Danish governments”. It added that both governments had used GM to promote Greenland as a safe destination for mining investors.

But research in 2025 labelled similar behaviour “feigned victimisation”. Generally, this is where corporations perceive or position themselves victims of unfair processes rather than powerful participants concerned with profits.




Read more:
Greenland is rich in natural resources – a geologist explains why


Drilling in the Greenlandic crust would reverberate in Copenhagen as Greenland has a mining profit-sharing agreement with Denmark. As part of the gradual transfer of autonomy from Denmark, Greenland now retains ownership over its natural resources.

However, Denmark provides an annual block grant of 3.9 billion kroner (around half of Greenland’s state budget) to support the domestic economy, which is overwhelmingly comprised of fisheries. Denmark will cut its block grant by 50% of mining profits, meaning essentially mining profits are shared 50-50 between the two up to the value of the block grant.

Recently, the Australian-American corporation Critical Metals received construction approval for a permanent office for its Tanbreez project to supply rare earth minerals, including heavy rare earth elements, in southern Greenland.

The following day, mining company Amaroq declared that the US is considering investing in its mining projects in southern Greenland through EXIM, the US Export-Import Bank. If the state loan is approved, it will be Trump’s first to an overseas mining project.

A recent executive order from Trump earmarked US$5 billion (£3.7 billion) to support mining projects critical for national security. This demonstrates the close relationship between the extractive industries and military activity.

Fossil fuel production is less likely to happen any time soon. In 2021, for environmental reasons Greenland’s government banned fossil fuel exploration and extraction. A parliamentary majority still favours the ban.

With volatile oil and gas prices and the same climactic and infrastructural challenges as for other natural resources, fossil fuel production in Greenland is implausible even in the event of a full US takeover.

There are many reasons why the Trump administration might want to dominate the Arctic, not least to gain relative power over Russia and China. But natural resource extraction is unlikely to feature centrally.

What’s more, the US already has military bases in Greenland, following a defence agreement with Denmark. As such, it’s more likely that recent US moves are yet another chapter in the return of the country’s imperialist ambitions.

The Conversation

Lukas Slothuus receives funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.

ref. Why Greenland’s vast natural resources won’t necessarily translate into huge profits – https://theconversation.com/why-greenlands-vast-natural-resources-wont-necessarily-translate-into-huge-profits-273137

Saudi-UAE bust-up over Yemen was only a matter of time − and reflects wider rift over vision for the region

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

Supporters of the UAE-backed and recently disbanded Southern Transitional Council hold flags of the former state of South Yemen during a rally in Aden, Yemen, on Jan. 2, 2026. AP Photo

Years of simmering tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates exploded into the open on Dec. 30, 2025.

That’s when Saudi officials accused the UAE of backing separatist groups in Yemen and carried out an airstrike in the southern Yemeni city of Mukalla targeting an alleged shipment of weapons from the UAE to the Southern Transitional Council, one such separatist group.

Amid a rapidly rising war of words, Saudi-backed forces in Yemen recaptured two provinces that the STC had previously taken. Continued Saudi pressure resulted in the expulsion of the STC leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, from the Presidential Leadership Council – an eight-strong executive body that represents Yemen’s internationally recognized government. On Jan. 7, 2026, al-Zubaidi fled Yemen. That, plus the reported disbanding of the STC, brings a dramatic end to years of UAE influence in the south and dramatically fractures the coalition against the Houthis, a rebel group that currently controls most of northern and central Yemen.

For observers of Yemen it should come as little surprise that the country is now splitting apart along the two-country axis that has defined so much of the geopolitics of the Middle East since the 2011 Arab uprisings. It continues a long-term trend away from initial alignment between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen that risks not only reigniting conflict there but exposing a deeper power struggle that could fracture the entire region.

An uneasy alignment

The Saudis and Emiratis entered the Yemen conflict in alignment, forming an Arab coalition in March 2015 to push back the advance of Houthi rebels and forces loyal to the government of ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Almost from the start, though, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi pursued different aims and objectives on the ground.

The Saudis viewed the conflict as a direct cross-border threat from the Houthis – a rebel force backed, in their view, by Iran. For the Emiratis, meanwhile, the priority was acting assertively against Islamist groups in southern Yemen.

Two men in Gulf Arab attire walk side by side.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan walk side by side in 2021, when their countries had warmer relations.
Hamad Al Kaabi/Emirati Ministry of Presidential Affairs via AP

Initially, decision-making at the highest level of the intervening coalition in Yemen reflected a close alignment between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh and then-Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi.

The two were seen as acting in lockstep in the mid-2010s across the region, including the blockade of Qatar in 2017 over the smaller Gulf state’s alleged links to terrorist groups.

From 2015 to 2018, UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed played a key role in facilitating Mohammed bin Salman’s rapid rise to authority in Saudi Arabia.

A mentor-mentee relationship was seen by many analysts of Gulf affairs to have developed between the two as Mohammed bin Zayed, 24 years the senior, became almost a father figure to the hitherto little-known Mohammed bin Salman while singing his praises in Western capitals, including Washington, D.C.

The coalition frays

But the cozy relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UAE didn’t last.

A range of factors contributed to the cooling between the two states. These included the abrupt Emirati decision in July 2019 to withdraw its troops from the front line in the anti-Houthi struggle and refocus UAE support for local groups in southern Yemen, including the STC, which had been established in 2017 with visible Emirati backing.

Saudi officials expressed surprise at the UAE decision. From the Saudi perspective, UAE objectives in Yemen had been fulfilled after the recapture of critical southern cities, including Aden and Mukalla in 2015 and 2016.

In their reading, it was the Saudis, not the Emiratis, who were bogged down in an unwinnable campaign against the Houthis. The subsequent fraying of a power-sharing agreement between the STC and Saudi-backed government forces caused additional friction between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Elsewhere, signs emerged that the Emirati leadership did not share the Saudi openness to healing the rift with Qatar – even as U.S. officials signaled frustration at a stalemate that damaged U.S. partnerships in the region and gave succor to adversaries such as Iran.

Clashing visions

As the potency of the turbulent post-Arab Spring decade ebbed, the glue that had brought Riyadh and Abu Dhabi closer together in their desire to reassert control over the post-2011 regional order weakened.

On two occasions, in November 2020 and July 2021, Emirati and Saudi officials sparred at OPEC+ meetings over preferred oil price and output levels, and in the summer of 2021 the Saudis tightened rules on what passed for tariff-free status in a move that appeared to target goods that passed through the many economic free zones in the UAE.

Also that year, Saudi officials decreed that companies wishing to do business with government agencies in the kingdom would have to locate their regional headquarters in the kingdom by 2024 – a move seemingly aimed at Dubai’s long-standing leadership in regional business circles. The launch of a new Saudi airline, Riyadh Air, and the emphasis placed in Riyadh on developing travel, tourism, entertainment and hospitality as part of its Vision 2030 plan also took aim at sectors in which the UAE has long enjoyed first-mover advantage.

However, the real significance of the Yemen bust-up is that it demonstrates the degree of divergence in Saudi and Emirati visions of regional order. The Saudi preference is for “de-risking” – that is, making the region appear safe and stable for would-be outside investors.

This fits the Saudi’s resolute focus on economic development and delivering Vision 2030.

But it clashes directly with the perceived Emirati tolerance for risk-taking in regional affairs. Abu Dhabi is widely believed to have backed armed nonstate groups in Libya and supports Sudan’s rebel Rapid Support Forces, in addition to its known links with the STC in Yemen.

Libya and Sudan were less central to Saudi security concerns, but the STC’s capture of the southeastern Yemeni provinces of Hadramout and Mahra in early December crossed Saudi red lines.

The fact that the STC advance began on Dec. 3, the day Gulf Cooperation Council leaders met for their annual summit, was also seen by Saudi policymakers as a major provocation. They assumed that the offensive must have received a green light from Abu Dhabi.

An off-ramp to tensions?

While ties are unlikely to rupture between Saudis and Emiratis in the same way they both did with Qatar in 2017, the current trajectory between these two key U.S. allies in the Middle East is not good.

There is no desire within the Gulf Cooperation Council for another such rift, and the Emirati decision to withdraw its remaining forces from Yemen and leave the STC to its own fate suggests there are still off-ramps to defuse tensions.

Yet the headstrong leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are all but certain to continue on a divergent pathway, I believe. And this could manifest in multiple ways, including growing economic competition in areas such as AI investments, where the Saudis, once again, are playing catch-up to the UAE. These are areas of competition that could only intensify as both Gulf states try to gain an advantage with a transactional Trump administration.

Given the challenges that the wide region faces – not only in Yemen but also in war-torn Gaza and Lebanon, a Syria emerging from civil conflict, and now, potentially, an Iran embroiled in protest – a fractured vision of regional order between the Gulf’s two biggest players does not bode well for the future.

The Conversation

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Saudi-UAE bust-up over Yemen was only a matter of time − and reflects wider rift over vision for the region – https://theconversation.com/saudi-uae-bust-up-over-yemen-was-only-a-matter-of-time-and-reflects-wider-rift-over-vision-for-the-region-273083

Ukraine is under pressure to trade land for peace − if it does, history shows it might not ever get it back

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Harris, Associate Professor of Political Science, Colorado State University

An elderly Ukrainian walks through the rubble following a Russian aerial bomb strike in Donetsk Oblast. Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu via Getty Images

Asked in December 2025 what the biggest sticking point was in negotiating peace in Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump got straight to the point: land. “Some of that land has been taken. Some of that land is maybe up for grabs,” he added.

From the very beginning of the full-scale war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ruled out ceding territory to the invading Russians.

Yet, when the war in Ukraine finally grinds to a halt, it seems likely that Russia will, indeed, control vast portions of Ukrainian land in the south and the east – about 20% of Ukraine’s pre-2014 landmass, if today’s line of actual control is any guide.

Ukrainians have spent years trying to eject Russian forces from occupied areas in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson administrative regions. Captured and fortified by Russia in 2014, Crimea has been mostly out of reach. But despite Kyiv’s best efforts, Russia is now poised to seize even more Ukrainian territory if the war does not end soon.

The pressure on Zelenskyy to accept some sort of territorial loss only increases with each new peace plan presented – all of which include some degree of map redrawing in Russia’s favor. And although a majority of the Ukrainian public is against the idea of exchanging land for peace, pragmatists in the West, and even some within Ukraine, accept that this will almost certainly be part of any peace deal.

But then what? If Ukraine accepts the de facto loss of its eastern oblasts as the price of peace, should this be understood by Ukrainians as a permanent or a temporary concession? If the latter, what measures – if any – exist for Ukraine to eventually restore its territorial integrity?

As an international security expert, I would argue that it’s essential that Ukrainians and their international backers have clear-eyed answers to these questions now, before a peace agreement is put in place.

Land lost forever?

History can provide a useful, if imperfect, guide to what happens when states are forced to cede territory to invaders.

Past precedent suggests Ukraine must be prepared for the worst: Occupied territories, once lost, often remain so indefinitely. This is what happened when the Soviet Union conquered the province of Karelia from Finland following the Winter War in 1939-1940. Finland tried to reclaim Karelia from Moscow via military means in the Continuation War of 1941-1944. But Finnish forces were ultimately beaten back.

A man in an army helmet stands in a trench
Finnish troops during the Continuation War.
Ullstein bild via Getty Images

In the aftermath, Moscow ordered the mass expulsion of ethnic Finns and implemented a program of political and cultural assimilation. Today, ethnic Russians make up more than 80% of Karelia’s population.

Support for reabsorbing Karelia into Finland is low. When surveyed about the idea 20 years ago, most Finns balked at the cost of integrating poor, Russian-speaking communities into their thriving nation-state.

The same could happen to the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine. Over time, Russian-controlled areas might become “Russified” to the point of no longer being recognizably Ukrainian. In Crimea since 2014, for example, Russia is thought to have moved more than 200,000 Russian citizens into the territory, in addition to expelling ethnic Ukrainians.

Even if they are not forcibly expelled, civilians in the occupied areas who are loyal to Kyiv might choose to leave, and already millions have. But doing so means abandoning property to ethnic Russians – and once property is ceded, it makes the chances of a permanent return that much harder. Ukrainians who remain will face almost certain repression.

As occupation wears on, the social and economic differences between the ceded territories and the free areas of Ukraine will likely become ever starker. And this will be especially true if Ukraine joins the European Union – something that Kyiv has long coveted and could be a sweetener to any peace deal involving land loss.

With fewer pro-European Ukrainians living there and a wider cultural divide, the prospect of reclaiming the Russian-controlled oblasts could become markedly less attractive to Ukrainians than it appears today.

Diplomacy and war: Dead ends

Still, Ukrainians might hope that they can avoid this outcome by moving swiftly to undo the occupation before it becomes irreversible. In theory, they could accomplish this one of two ways: through deal-making or through fighting. But in practice, neither is likely to work.

Examples of a negotiated, voluntary return of land are few and far between. In 1979, Egypt managed to negotiate the return of its Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had captured during the Six-Day War in 1967. Although some in Israel wanted to keep hold of the Sinai for security reasons, Israeli leaders instead decided to swap the territory in exchange for a durable peace with Egypt, a leading Arab nation, in the hope that others would follow.

The problem for Ukraine is that Kyiv has very little to offer Russia in exchange for its lost territories. If and when the present war ends, it will likely be on terms favorable to Moscow, which is why territorial concessions are on the table to begin with.

Two men in suits shake hands
President Donald Trump greets Russian President Vladimir Putin on Aug. 15, 2025, in Anchorage, Alaska.
Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

If Ukraine cannot negotiate the return of the occupied territories as part of a peace arrangement, it probably means that it will not be able to negotiate their return in the post-peace phase, either.

What about the potential to regain the occupied territories by force? Finland tried that in Karelia and failed. But other countries have been more fortunate: France regained Alsace-Lorraine from Germany after World War I, for example. But it was a reversal that took nearly 50 years to bring about – Germany had annexed the territory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871.

Given the massive disparity in size, population and troop numbers between Russia and Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine could reclaim the territories through war – not least of all because its international backers would very likely refuse to support Kyiv in a war of choice against nuclear-armed Russia. The task would be made harder still should Russia succeed in getting some form of Ukrainian disarmament, or a downsizing of its military, into any peace deal.

A black swan event

There is only one other set of circumstances under which territorial conquests tend to be undone in world politics: When the international system is convulsed by a major, system-level change or crisis. This might include a regional or world war, or the implosion of a great power – in this case, Russia.

This is how Czechoslovakia reclaimed the Sudetenland from Germany in 1945, China restored its control over Manchuria from Japan at the end of World War II, and the Baltic states regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 – not because they fought and won a narrow war of reconquest, but because their occupiers collapsed under the pressure of an external or internal crisis.

Could Russia collapse from within in the event of the death or ouster of Putin, an economic catastrophe, or some other critical development in the decades to come?

It is impossible to predict. But in the final analysis, should Ukraine be forced to accept land loss as part of any peace deal, it may require a seismic event in Russia for the territorial changes to be reversed.

The Conversation

Peter Harris is a Non-Resident Fellow with Defense Priorities.

ref. Ukraine is under pressure to trade land for peace − if it does, history shows it might not ever get it back – https://theconversation.com/ukraine-is-under-pressure-to-trade-land-for-peace-if-it-does-history-shows-it-might-not-ever-get-it-back-271609

Mangrove loss is making the Niger Delta more vulnerable: we built a model that can track how the forests are doing

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Chinomnso Onwubiko, Consultant, University of Cape Coast

Rivers State on Nigeria’s coastline has some of Africa’s largest mangrove ecosystems. The Niger Delta itself contains the third-largest mangrove forest in the world. These trees support fisheries, biodiversity and the livelihoods of thousands of people.

The Niger Delta region is also the heart of the country’s oil and gas industry. Decades of oil exploration and production have altered its landscape. Pipeline construction, dredging (when sand is dug out of the ground), oil spills and gas flaring (burning) have degraded mangrove habitats. In addition, local communities use mangrove wood for fuel, construction and income generation.

The resulting damage to the environment – including mangrove forests – has weakened the natural coastal defences that once protected communities from flooding, erosion and storms.

Mangroves grow in shallow water. They act as biophysical barriers that dissipate wave energy, trap sediments and reduce the intensity of storm surges.

I am an environmental scientist working in coastal zone management, flood risk assessment and nature-based solutions for climate adaptation. My research focuses on how ecosystems help reduce coastal flood risk. In particular, I have looked at how natural ecosystems, particularly mangroves, contribute to coastal resilience and community protection in vulnerable coastal regions.

In my research I used ecosystem modelling tools to evaluate how changes in habitat condition influence exposure to flooding and erosion in coastal communities. The model scored and compared areas of healthy, continuous mangrove cover with areas where mangroves were degraded or cleared.

It showed that mangrove ecosystems provide a significant natural defence against flooding in the coastal communities of Rivers State. Areas with good mangrove cover scored lower for vulnerability.

This comparison confirms what local residents have long observed: that the loss of mangrove forests has led to more frequent and severe flooding events.

The study underscores the urgency of integrating nature-based solutions into local and national flood management policies.

Mangroves provide significant cover

The Niger Delta has recorded varying amounts of oil spill incidents since the 1970s. These have affected land, water and mangrove forests.

My study applied the InVEST Coastal Vulnerability model developed by the Natural Capital Project. The model uses information about a range of variables to generate exposure scores for places along the shoreline. The variables include shoreline type, wind and wave exposure, and the distribution of populations and infrastructure along the coast.

The score shows how vulnerable a place is to flooding. This allows direct comparisons between areas with intact mangroves and those that have lost mangroves.

A key insight from the modelling exercise was that the relationship between mangrove extent and flood protection is not simple. Narrow, fragmented mangrove belts offer limited protection. Wider and denser belts of mangroves have a disproportionately powerful effect. They substantially reduce wave energy and flood inundation.

This finding aligns with similar studies from south-east Asia and the Caribbean. These report that wider mangrove zones provide exponentially greater flood mitigation benefits.

The study further highlights the socio-ecological implications of mangrove degradation. The decline of mangrove cover driven by fuelwood harvesting, land conversion, oil infrastructure and pollution has eroded biodiversity and fisheries productivity. It has also reduced the resilience of human communities.

In places where mangroves have been lost, residents rely on infrastructure like sandbags or embankments. But these provide limited and temporary relief. Communities are becoming dependent on costly engineering measures rather than sustainable, ecosystem-based solutions.

What needs to be done

Restoring and protecting mangroves is a cost-effective way of reducing disaster risk. Natural coastal buffers reduce exposure to flooding and erosion. They also support livelihoods through fisheries, fuelwood and ecotourism. Mangroves also store carbon.

All these functions make them a cornerstone of climate adaptation in environments like the Niger Delta.

Urgent action is required to protect and restore mangrove ecosystems.

Rivers State could be a model for other coastal regions facing similar challenges. The model produces scenarios of “with mangroves” and “without mangroves”. This enables:

  • consequences of the presence or absence of mangroves to be seen

  • the production of maps. These can show areas where mangroves provide the most – and the least – support. So in real time, it shows areas where reforestation or afforestation efforts can be focused on.

These can be replicated in other coastal areas.

Mangrove conservation must be part of formal coastal zone management and spatial planning policies. This means recognising what mangroves can contribute to disaster risk reduction, urban development and climate adaptation strategies at state and national levels.

Large-scale mangrove restoration programmes must begin in degraded areas, especially those that have already experienced severe flooding. Restoration efforts should focus on reestablishing wide belts of trees with dense coverage, using native species and community-led approaches that ensure local participation and ownership.

Government and oil companies operating in the Niger Delta must do more to stop pollution, dredging and land-use practices that destroy mangroves. Aquaculture, eco-tourism and mangrove-friendly fisheries should be promoted to reduce dependence on unsustainable wood harvesting.

Capacity building and public awareness campaigns are essential to empower communities to manage mangrove ecosystems sustainably. By combining local knowledge with scientific evidence, policymakers, researchers and communities can develop effective, nature-based solutions that reduce flood risk while enhancing ecological and socio-economic resilience.

The Conversation

Chinomnso Onwubiko’s study is affiliated to the World Bank Centre of Excellence in Coastal Resilience, University of Cape Coast. She received funding from the World Bank.

ref. Mangrove loss is making the Niger Delta more vulnerable: we built a model that can track how the forests are doing – https://theconversation.com/mangrove-loss-is-making-the-niger-delta-more-vulnerable-we-built-a-model-that-can-track-how-the-forests-are-doing-267384