Ousting Keir Starmer is harder than it looks – party rules mean he can choose to keep fighting

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nicholas Dickinson, Lecturer in Politics, University of Exeter

Between 2016 and 2024 the UK saw four changes of prime minister by way of a party leadership contest. In that time, even casual observers became familiar with the dramatic process that the Conservative Party uses to topple one leader and select another. Secret letters to the 1922 Committee, the dramatic confidence votes, and then two selected in a dog-eat-dog process to face the final vote by members.

What may be about to happen in the Labour Party will be different in important respects. If the Conservative Party is historically a body with its head in parliament and limbs extended into the country, Labour is more like a mountain with only its peak protruding into the parliamentary arena.

Even today, Labour has a deep institutional culture and a set of rules that anchor the legitimacy of the leader in the broader party membership as much as in parliament. In the past, Labour’s systems for selecting its leader were as complex as the structure of the party itself. Rules were repeatedly redrawn in factional conflicts between activists, trade unions and the party in parliament.

The modern process is simpler but still presents challenges to anyone tempted to climb the greasy pole. The Conservative process can be neatly separated into two phases: removing the current leader and then electing a new one. For Labour it is different, and depends crucially on what a sitting leader decides to do – resign or stand up to the challenge.

Both processes require a portion of the parliamentary party to demand new leadership – though the bar is higher for Labour at 20% of MPs versus 15% for the Tories. Labour raised this from 10% to 20% in 2021 – specifically to deter challenges.

But from there everything diverges. In the first place, the Labour process requires much more open coordination. The chair of the Conservatives’ 1922 Committee keeps a secret running tally of letters privately sent to express no confidence in the leader. Because of the secrecy, this might even trigger a surprise contest.

On the other hand, Labour challengers need to submit a full list of supporting MPs to the party’s general secretary. Currently this is 81 MPs.

The general secretary and the 1922 chair are also very different institutional figures. While the latter is an MP, seen informally as a sort of “shop steward” representing MPs’ interests in a variety of matters, the general secretary is a party official responsible to the NEC and usually aligned to the leadership.

Another difference is that the Labour process lacks a confidence vote stage. This means a leader cannot be deposed directly in favour of a fresh slate of candidates. Rather, as confirmed by a 2016 court case involving the abortive post-Brexit “coup” against Jeremy Corbyn, the leader is free to run in the contest without requiring their own list of supporters.

As such, if a leader opts not to resign, the fight will be longer and harder than the one Conservative MPs face in the same position. While some recent Conservative contests were more protracted, Liz Truss was replaced in just four days. Labour rules simply do not allow for this speed.

Moreover, while Corbyn survived as leader in the 2016 Labour contest precisely by winning over members in spite of MPs’ opposition, this left lasting scars on the party. It damaged Labour’s credibility, even in the face of an increasingly chaotic Conservative government.

Toppling a prime minister

Of course, whatever the party rules, the constitution also gets its say. Any leader who is also prime minister must have the support of a majority in the House of Commons and, in practical terms, of their cabinet colleagues.

Boris Johnson survived the party process but was brought down by the constitutional one, with a little help from Rishi Sunak. The then-chancellor set off a chain of resignations that ultimately made the PM’s position untenable. That may also be what happens to Starmer if the Labour internal process similarly fails to bring him down.

Even if Starmer resigns or opts not to run in a contest, the difficulties do not end there. While the Conservatives whittle down the candidates to only two through sequential MP-only votes, Labour allows any MP with the support of 20% of the parliamentary party to face the membership vote.

The higher threshold, not to mention greater desire for unity in the party right now, will probably lead to fewer candidates than the contests in 2015 or 2020. But it still points to a process that can play out as a protracted multi-faction fight rather than a clean and (relatively) brief succession.

The voting system is one member, one vote. So every eligible member’s vote carries the same weight – from a cabinet minister or a union baron to a local activist. It is also preferential, providing more overall legitimacy to the winner who must secure more than 50% of the vote after second preferences are taken into account.

It is also a complex process where the winner may not have won more first-preference votes than the other candidates combined. If this happens, the result could be a leader who commands broad acceptance – but little fierce loyalty.

The Conversation

Nicholas Dickinson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Ousting Keir Starmer is harder than it looks – party rules mean he can choose to keep fighting – https://theconversation.com/ousting-keir-starmer-is-harder-than-it-looks-party-rules-mean-he-can-choose-to-keep-fighting-282683

Amazon is making drone deliveries in the UK – here’s why nimbyism could hamper a wider rollout

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Cureton, Senior Lecturer in Design (People, Places, Products), Lancaster University

Amazon’s MK30 drone is now being used to deliver packages in Darlington, County Durham. Photograph: Amazon Prime Air

There is a new buzz around Darlington: the sound of delivery drones. This northern English town is now the only place outside the US where retail giant Amazon offers airborne delivery to people’s homes via its Prime Air company.

Customers living within 7.5 miles of Amazon’s Darlington fulfilment centre can select a drone delivery for everyday items (not including batteries) weighing less than 5lb. They also need a suitable dropping off point (literally) – a garden, terrace or yard into which parcels can be dropped safely from a height of around 12 feet.

Prior to dropping any parcel, Amazon’s MK30 drones sense for potential obstacles, from people to washing lines and pets. When the technology was first tested in the town in January, Prime Air’s vice-president David Carbon stressed that safety was a “top priority” for the company.

Darlington’s geography makes it an interesting site for Amazon’s new service. This large market town’s mix of residential areas, green spaces and major roads supports the gathering of valuable data on drone activity in a range of conditions.

Prime Air is expected to conduct up to ten delivery flights an hour during daylight, given favourable weather conditions. In the US, it has been running these services since 2022, and is currently in nine cities across five states.

The company has permission to conduct “beyond visual line of sight” (Bvlos) drone operations until June 18 – with an extension likely. The drones can fly autonomously but are not allowed in airspace near Teesside International Airport.

To date, the local authority has only permitted Amazon to build a temporary structure with one launchpad, while highlighting a lack of evidence about how drone noise will affect local residents. This caution is indicative of widespread public concerns that need addressing if airborne delivery is to become a regular part of modern life.

Video: Mark 1333/BBC.

Public concerns

In Darlington, some residents have raised worries about noise, privacy and theft over the new drone delivery service.

Similarly, UK-wide research by the Future Flight Social Insight team has identified a range of public concerns around privacy (what data are drones gathering?), safety (risks of damage to people and property) and drone noise, which can be seen as high-pitched and “annoying”.

The team’s surveys show that people often regard drones as more beneficial in remote and rural areas than urban and suburban spaces.

Concerns have been raised during other trials around the world. In the Irish capital Dublin, Manna’s delivery drone operations have been live for nearly two years. However, they have faced considerable grassroots opposition from Drone Action D15, a community group that has labelled them “chaos in the skies”.

In Australia, Wing’s delivery drone trials in the capital, Canberra, were halted following pushback from the Bonython Against Drones community group.

The UK government has developed a roadmap for the introduction of routine delivery drone operations by 2027, supported by millions of pounds of investments. Such ambitious projects require coordinated planning by local authorities, including integration of physical infrastructure such as masts

One high-profile example is Project Skyway, a proposal for a drone superhighway connecting 165 miles of airspace above six English towns and cities – Reading, Oxford, Milton Keynes, Cambridge, Coventry and Rugby – to enable a range of drone-related applications.

The project’s future was put in doubt, however, when its lead company Altitude Angel went into administration in October 2025. The administrators still appear to be seeking a buyer for that company.

Drone nimbyism

Without careful consultation, the future of drones may be affected by “drone nimbyism”, whereby residents oppose drones in their local area while being open to their introduction in general.

As Daniel Slade, head of practice and research at the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), explained to us: “Experience tells us that if communities feel decisions are happening to them, rather than being made with them, the backlash could result in widely beneficial development not going ahead at all.”

Locations for drone launch and landing pads need to be carefully selected, considering environmental and wildlife factors as well as noise. The implications of where drones are routed and which residents will be most affected must be carefully assessed.

This comes at a time when local planning departments face consistent under-investment, while grappling with high housing delivery targets and the challenge of new AI technologies.

Some local authorities in England are already using drones for core service delivery, but experience varies considerably across the UK. Governments and local authorities need to get the planning right, or face the issue of drone nimbyism.

With this in mind, we’re working with the RTPI to develop guidance for planners on the introduction of drones for delivery and other purposes. Trials such as Amazon’s in Darlington prompt timely questions about the roles and responsibilities of local authorities amid the UK’s aspiration to scale up drone services.

“It’s startling how quickly drones will become a regular sight in UK skies,” Slade told us. “They could bring huge economic and social benefits – but there will also be costs. Planners have a unique role in maximising the former, minimising the latter, and distributing both fairly.”

The Conversation

Paul Cureton receives funding from the British Academy (Small Research Grants) for the project ‘Future drone skies: Planning in volume’ (SRG25/250332).

Anna Jackman receives funding from the British Academy (Small Research Grants) for the project ‘Future drone skies: Planning in volume’ (SRG25/250332).

ref. Amazon is making drone deliveries in the UK – here’s why nimbyism could hamper a wider rollout – https://theconversation.com/amazon-is-making-drone-deliveries-in-the-uk-heres-why-nimbyism-could-hamper-a-wider-rollout-282635

The Welsh Conservatives survived the Senedd election – now they must decide what they stand for

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lewis Norton, PhD Candidate at Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University

The 2026 Senedd (Welsh parliament) election has transformed Welsh politics. Much of the attention has focused on the rise of Plaid Cymru and Reform UK, and on Welsh Labour’s dramatic losses. But another political story has unfolded more quietly in the background.

The Welsh Conservatives achieved 10.7% of the vote, giving them seven seats in the expanded 96-member Senedd. In the 2021 Senedd election, the party won 16 seats out of a possible 60.

On paper, that is a poor result for a party that once aspired to lead the Welsh government. But given the political circumstances facing the Conservatives in Wales, there are reasons why the party may regard the outcome as better than many had feared – and why their attention may now turn to where they stand on Welsh devolution.

To understand this, it is important to view Conservative politics in Wales through a different lens from the rest of the UK. At Westminster level, the Conservatives have historically been one of the UK’s most successful electoral machines. In Wales, however, the party has long struggled to build broad national support.

The Conservatives have not won a general election in Wales since 1859. That was before most working-class men even had the right to vote. It has also never been the largest party in a Welsh election since devolution began in 1999.

The Conservatives have usually done best among voters who identify as British rather than Welsh. The party has also struggled to persuade many supporters to vote in Senedd elections.

A chart showing the differences between how different parties view devolution.
How the support for Welsh devolution varied between parties from a poll in 2024.
Dylan Difford/YouGov, CC BY-NC

Despite these long-term difficulties, the Welsh Conservatives have maintained a significant presence in Welsh politics for much of the devolution era. Since 2011, they have usually served as the largest opposition party in the Senedd. The 2021 election handed them their strongest result to date.

Those historical factors made the mood before this election particularly bleak for the party. After the Conservatives’ heavy defeats across Britain in recent years, many commentators expected the Welsh branch to suffer a heavy defeat of its own.

One poll projected the party to achieve a vote share of 7%, winning just one seat. That would have left leader Darren Millar as the Conservatives’ lone representative.




Read more:
Elections 2026: Experts react to the Reform surge and Labour losses


Reform UK’s rise intensified those fears. Reform appeals to many of the same voters as the Conservatives, particularly older, socially conservative and strongly unionist voters. Its rise to become the Senedd’s official opposition appears to have come largely at the Conservatives’ expense. Before the election, the party suffered numerous defections at both public-facing and backroom levels.

Reform performed especially strongly in areas that had traditionally been among the Conservatives’ better-performing parts of Wales, including north-east Wales, Monmouthshire and Newport.

Against that backdrop, seven seats was not the catastrophe many predicted. It is far from where the party wants to be, but it avoided the near-erasure that some had predicted.

Next steps

With the election over, and enough members returned to form an official Senedd group, the Conservatives now face a different question: what comes next?

There is, realistically, no immediate route into government. Reform, the Conservatives’ only realistic coalition partner, did not win enough seats to make such an arrangement viable.

Instead, it will need to settle for spending the coming years as a smaller opposition force, struggling to shape the direction of either a Plaid Cymru minority administration or a broader coalition government.

But there are historical parallels that may offer Conservatives some encouragement. Following the 1997 UK general election, the Conservatives were wiped out entirely in Wales at Westminster. The creation of the then National Assembly for Wales two years later, using a more proportional voting system, gave the party a political foothold from which it slowly rebuilt.

Under the leadership of Nick Bourne, the Welsh Conservatives spent much of the following decade trying to present themselves as a distinctly Welsh conservative party that accepted devolution rather than resisted it.

In some respects, the party finds itself in a similar position today. Since the 2024 general election, the Conservatives have again had no Welsh MPs at Westminster, while retaining only a relatively small but workable group in the Senedd.

Once again, the party faces difficult questions about its identity, purpose and relationship with Welsh devolution. This time, however, it must answer them while competing with a larger and more electorally threatening party to its right.




Read more:
After more than a century, Labour has lost Wales


That debate over devolution is unlikely to disappear any time soon. Before the election, the party had already been wrestling internally with arguments over whether it should continue supporting the Senedd in its current form.

Leader Darren Millar insisted that abolishing the Senedd was off the table. But many Conservative voters in Wales still want the institution abolished or its powers reduced. After such a disappointing election result, some within the party may conclude that adopting a more anti-devolution position is necessary if the Conservatives are to recover electoral support.

The danger, however, is that moving in that direction would reverse much of the “Welshification” strategy that previously helped the party establish itself as a credible force in Welsh politics.

Whichever path the Welsh Conservatives choose, the consequences are likely to shape not only the party’s future, but also the wider direction of Welsh politics in the years ahead.

The Conversation

Lewis Norton receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He is a member of the Conservative Party, and stood as the party’s sixth-place candidate in the Fflint Wrecsam constituency in the 2026 Senedd election.

ref. The Welsh Conservatives survived the Senedd election – now they must decide what they stand for – https://theconversation.com/the-welsh-conservatives-survived-the-senedd-election-now-they-must-decide-what-they-stand-for-281091

How big oil companies can slow the green transition by suing governments that ban fossil fuels

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Susan Ann Samuel, Postdoctoral Researcher, International Climate Politics, University of Leeds

Pakhnyushchy/Shutterstock

The UN’s climate summit in Brazil did not produce a fossil fuel roadmap last November, as had been expected. Now the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed the fragility of global dependence on fossil fuels.

The push and pull of nations with respect to coal, oil and gas was once again in the limelight during the first Conference for the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in Santa Marta, Colombia. Representatives from more than 50 countries gathered to explore possible ways to accelerate the fossil fuel phaseout.

In Santa Marta, one solution stood out — the need to eliminate a process known as the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).




Read more:
‘Much-needed fresh air’: 5 outcomes from the world’s first summit on ending fossil fuels


Simply put, this rule lets big oil companies sue sovereign states and demand exorbitant amounts of money if they are prohibited from digging up fossil fuels. In 2022, the UN’s climate science advisory group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, documented ISDS as one major challenge for fossil fuel phaseout.

In 2025, the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion clarified that states must phase out fossil fuels. Yet thousands of investment treaties still contain ISDS provisions that let fossil fuel industries sue governments for doing exactly that. For instance, one fossil fuel company sued the Dutch government for committing to phasing out coal by 2030. Another sued the Italian government for banning fossil fuel exploration.

As a result of tribunals, fossil fuel companies have been paid over US$87 billion (£64 billion) by countries since 1998. As of December 31 2025, a total of 1,463 ISDS cases had been initiated – of which more than 30% involve environmental issues.

Many of these cases challenge fossil fuel phaseouts. Despite this, transparency remains limited, with 54% of fossil fuel ISDS cases being kept confidential.




Read more:
How young people have taken climate justice to the world’s international courts


woman in green dress chats to other people sat in chairs in a circle
Environmental lawyer Mariana Campos Vega (centre) of World’s Youth for Climate Justice briefs legal nuances to colleagues at Santa Marta.
Mariana Campos Vega, CC BY-NC-ND

Young people have been particularly vocal about the need to stop ISDS. But although the call to go ISDS-free has resonated at annual climate conferences before, Santa Marta is the first diplomatic space that has sought a coordinated political agenda to abolish ISDS altogether.

During the conference, more than 340 organisations called for ISDS elimination. A ministerial meeting discussed binding treaty provisions that will discuss the legal risks of ISDS. Host country Colombia committed to exit the ISDS system. That decision is part of a growing trend — other countries to have withdrawn include Brazil, South Africa, India, Indonesia, Ecuador, Bolivia, the UK and several European countries.




Read more:
Here’s what to expect from the first Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels


The puzzle for international lawyers

For young international lawyers like us, this presents a challenging conundrum. While one body of international law requires governments to phase out fossil fuels (something we campaign for), another punishes governments for trying.

This instils fear about taking positive climate action – a so-called regulatory chill. With the priorities of governments and the fossil fuel industry constantly clashing, a political tug-of-war develops.

The UN’s Commission on International Trade Law (Uncitral) has been working to reform ISDS rather than dismantle it since 2017. In contrast, nations attending the conference at Santa Marta made a call for freeing states from ISDS rather than reforming it.

This dichotomy highlights the broken nature of the ISDS reforms still being pursued by nations at the Uncitral. Future discussions need to focus on finding common ground to avoid losing more than eight years of momentum built at Uncitral around ISDS reforms and to avoid compromising progress towards the green transition.

Big oil companies slow the green transition by suing governments that ban fossil fuels. But governments are partly responsible too. They decide whether treaties that permit ISDS mechanisms need to be reformed, eliminated or substituted by something better.

Political push and pull

When young lawyers, including us, pushed governments to take the climate cause to the International Court of Justice, we were calling for political action and legal clarity. Our resolve remains strong — states must act quickly.

On May 20, the nation of Vanuatu is set to table a resolution to the upcoming UN general assembly, responding to last year’s climate advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The resolution seeks to turn that opinion into action — officially confirming that every country has a legal duty to protect the climate, and that failing to do so is a violation of international law, with real consequences.

Countries need to stop producing harmful greenhouse gas emissions, promise not to extract more fossil fuels, and pay compensation to those they’ve harmed.

Vanuatu’s resolution will ask the UN secretary-general to report back about how countries are progressing by the time of the 82nd UN general assembly, expected in September 2027. This encourages actionable measures for climate justice and is a rare, timely and important opportunity for countries to vote in favour of it.

While the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion set out legal guidance on transitioning away from fossil fuels, Santa Marta has provided political coordination efforts for such transition among willing nations.

Even as ISDS remains a challenge, Vanuatu’s resolution could lead to steps that free the green transition from the current global tug of war — by ensuring legal clarity and political action.

The Conversation

Susan Ann Samuel receives funding from Prof. Viktoria Spaiser’s UKRI FLF Grant MR/V021141/1 and is supported by the University of Leeds – School of Politics and International Studies

Gunjan Soni is affiliated with the World’s Youth for Climate Justice as the Co-lead of the Indian Front.

The Authors thank Mariana Campos Vega and Aditi Shetye of World’s Youth for Climate Justice for their collaboration and for sharing on-the-ground perspectives from the Santa Marta process.

ref. How big oil companies can slow the green transition by suing governments that ban fossil fuels – https://theconversation.com/how-big-oil-companies-can-slow-the-green-transition-by-suing-governments-that-ban-fossil-fuels-281972

Conserving 30% of the planet will only succeed if people are part of the plan

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Chris Sandbrook, Professor of Conservation and Society, University of Cambridge

Masai herders in Kenya. JWCohen/Shutterstock

What do you see when you imagine a conservation area? Perhaps a remote rainforest, a towering mountain range or a coral reef teeming with life. But do you expect to see any people?

It would be understandable if you answered no. Most media coverage of nature ignores people. Many protected and conserved areas to date are classified as “high and far” – in places with rich biodiversity and relatively few people. Many actively exclude human presence.

Yet, people are central to conservation. Humans live with and use biodiversity almost everywhere on Earth. This relationship is becoming more important, as we’ve demonstrated in a new paper.

In 2022, 196 countries agreed to an ambitious UN target to conserve 30% of the planet by 2030. This so-called “30×30 target” will nearly double the global coverage of protected and conserved areas. Conservation will extend into areas of land and sea that are more inhabited and used by people than ever before.

This raises important questions about the social context at new conservation sites: how many people live there, how well off they are and how they make a living from the land. This information is crucial for understanding how people might be affected by 30×30 and implementing it successfully. However, very little has been known about these social dimensions of 30×30. Until now.

Our new study, published in Nature Communications, analysed three different ways to reach the 30% coverage globally, reflecting different conservation priorities. Together with a diverse international group of practitioners and researchers from multiple disciplines (including conservation science and political ecology), we found big differences in the social conditions between 30×30 scenarios.

In terms of population, an approach targeting the areas with highest unprotected biodiversity would directly affect over 3.5 billion people who live in or within 10km (6 miles) of new conservation areas. This represents 46% of the global population.

In stark contrast, an approach targeting biodiverse lands managed by Indigenous peoples and local communities would directly affect only around 300 million people. That might sound preferable. However, many of these people live in areas with lower levels of development and rely on nature for their livelihoods, making them particularly vulnerable to changes in access to nature.

The 30×30 target also intersects with global food production. In some approaches we analysed, around half of the areas identified for conservation overlap with farmland used for crop production. In others, large areas overlap with livestock grazing areas, including where people practice traditional herding. This raises questions about how to balance conservation with growing demand for food.

lush green fields and mountains with clouds
Small-scale agriculture within the crater of Pululahua volcano in the Pululahua geobotanical reserve, Ecuador.
Javier Fajardo, CC BY-NC-ND

Our results demonstrate that wherever it happens, the 30×30 target will have profound social as well as ecological implications. Implementation will play a critical role in determining what these are for people and nature.

A whole menu of management and governance options is available, from strict government national parks (such as the iconic Serengeti or Yellowstone) to locally owned and managed areas where people live and use nature sustainably. The 30×30 target also includes places that are not formally protected areas but where existing ways of managing land and sea support conservation.

Choices at each site shape the social outcomes of conservation areas. These can be positive, negative or mixed. At the local level, these areas can support livelihoods and provide employment, while global benefits can include support for food systems and regulating Earth’s climate.

They may also be social costs, such as restricted access to land and resources, heightened conflict with wild animals or eviction from ancestral homelands. A critical challenge for 30×30 will be making sure that the choice of conservation area is appropriate for the social context in which it is being implemented – decisions that can be informed by the results of our study.

small traditional kayak on calm lake, grey sky
Children canoeing on Limoncocha lagoon, Limoncocha Biological Reserve, Ecuador.
Javier Fajardo, CC BY-NC-ND

The good news

The wording of the 30×30 target is not just about biodiversity and spatial coverage. It also includes important social elements. The target calls for the rights and territories of Indigenous peoples and local communities to be respected and supports sustainable use of biodiversity, where appropriate. If fully achieved, this target should deliver significant benefits for local people and nature.

The 30×30 target is not just about conserving biodiversity. Our results suggest it should also be recognised as a highly ambitious social development target. This requires a shift in thinking and significant new funding for social programmes alongside traditional conservation activity.

The 30×30 target could be a big step forward for both conservation and society, but only if people are part of the plan.

The Conversation

Chris Sandbrook received funding for the research on which this article is based from the Science for Nature and People Partnership.

Javier received funding for the research on which this article is based from the Science for Nature and People Partnership, and ERC CONDJUST project.

ref. Conserving 30% of the planet will only succeed if people are part of the plan – https://theconversation.com/conserving-30-of-the-planet-will-only-succeed-if-people-are-part-of-the-plan-278629

Andy Burnham’s big challenge: the route to succeeding Starmer is littered with obstacles

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Eric Shaw, Honorary Research Fellow in Politics, University of Stirling

The polls indicate that of all the candidates vying to succeed Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the most popular is Andy Burnham. But before the current mayor of Greater Manchester can even throw his hat into the ring, there are a series of hurdles he has to overcome.

For a start, a leadership contender has to be an MP. Labour’s rules state that before a candidate can be selected, their candidature must be approved by the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC).

But only in January, a committee of the NEC voted to block Burnham from standing at the by-election for Gorton and Denton by eight votes to one. The reason given was that Burnham’s candidature would force a by-election for the mayoralty.

This, it was argued, would be both costly for the party and would run the risk of Labour losing to Reform or the Greens. But in truth, the key factor was the determination of the pro-Starmer majority to head off a Burnham challenge to the prime minister.

So could the NEC change its mind? Much depends, firstly, on left-wing trade union leaders, such as the heads of the two largest unions, Unite and Unison (Sharon Graham and Andrea Egan). Would they put enough pressure on NEC union representatives – a third of the total – to force a reversal of the earlier decision?

And second, a lot also rests on whether the NEC is prepared to provoke the wrath of many members by blocking Burnham. This could, after all, be considered a misuse of its powers.

Assuming that Burnham is approved, he then has to persuade an accommodating Labour MP to resign his or her seat so that he can run in a by-election. The MP realistically would have to hold a seat in Greater Manchester, Merseyside or south Lancashire.

Burnham is a popular mayor in Greater Manchester, and is also a Liverpool-born Everton fan. Not least, he has been a high-profile supporter of those who campaigned for justice for the 97 Liverpool FC fans who died after a crush at Hillsborough stadium in 1989.

Rumours have abounded that unnamed MPs are willing to resign their seats to make way – but nothing has been confirmed. Others have talked down the rumours.

If a vacancy arises, Burnham would have to be selected by Labour party members in the constituency. This can never be assured, but it seems like the easiest of the hurdles to jump since such data as exists suggests that he is popular among the rank and file.

A messy and unpleasant election

However, the original idea was that the seat made available for Burnham would be a safe Labour one. But are there any safe Labour seats left? The May elections revealed major encroachments by Reform and, to a lesser extent, the Greens into Labour territory.

In short, even if selected to contest the seat, Burnham will have a fight on his hands from both the left and the right.

But say he is elected, he would then have to win the nomination of 80 Labour MPs. Of his potential rivals, Angela Rayner and Ed Miliband share his position on the soft left of the party (as opposed to the Corbynite “hard left” and the right, or “centrists”).

It seems likely that they would prefer not to stand against each other. A solid guess is that Rayner and Miliband would give way and rally behind Burnham, in which case he would have no difficulty securing the 81 nominations required.

Let’s assume Burnham get this far, takes the plunge and with the nomination in hand precipitates a leadership contest. What will Starmer do then? As I and others have noted, he is a determined and stubborn man – and has said that he will fight any challenges.

Could Starmer be persuaded to go gracefully, perhaps because of cabinet threats of mass resignations or by the Labour equivalent of the Tory “men in grey suits”? Or will he be tempted to appeal to the natural loyalty of party members? Unlike the Tories, Labour has no taste for regicide and no Labour PM has ever been forced from office. If Starmer stands, it could be a messy and very unpleasant election.

Such are the hurdles, but Burnham has some factors working in his favour. In contrast to the PM, he has a friendly and convivial image. He also achieves higher approval ratings than any other Labour figure. He is widely seen as an effective mayor and has gained in stature and political weight after winning three successive terms. With his background as a cabinet minister, he could certainly claim to have the relevant experience.

The commentary has so far focused on the attitudes of Labour MPs. Though their nominations are required, the outcome of any contest will be decided not by them but by party members.

Labour’s “soft left”, the group with which Burnham is aligned, is almost certainly the largest in the current party. It is difficult to see either health secretary Wes Streeting or anyone else on the right of the party defeating Burnham: something that will certainly play on the minds of MPs wondering whether to back him – and with an eye on their own careers.

So Burnham’s route to Downing Street is strewn with obstacles. Even if he navigates them all, there is no guarantee he can revive Labour’s fortunes. But he has the credentials to give the party a fighting chance.

The Conversation

Eric Shaw is a member of the Labour party

ref. Andy Burnham’s big challenge: the route to succeeding Starmer is littered with obstacles – https://theconversation.com/andy-burnhams-big-challenge-the-route-to-succeeding-starmer-is-littered-with-obstacles-282664

What is driving Europe’s pro-Russian supporters and their stance on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict?

Source: The Conversation – France – By Filip Kostelka, Professor and Chair in Political and Social Change, European University Institute

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sparked the most significant military conflict in Europe’s post-Second World War history. While European public opinion is overwhelmingly pro-Ukrainian, significant segments of Europe’s population hold ambivalent or even outright pro-Russian positions. As public support is key to providing military and financial assistance to Ukraine, we wanted to understand why some Europeans are sympathetic to the aggressor.

Our study considers that pro-Kremlin positions could come from four main sources:

  • Economic interests

  • Ideology

  • Partisan alignment

  • Disinformation

We analysed data from two academic surveys from late 2023, spanning nearly 30,000 respondents and eighteen European countries.

The surveys asked respondents whom they considered responsible for the war and whom they wanted to win. In practice, answers to those two questions are strongly correlated, and vary substantially across countries. For example, support for a Russian victory is virtually absent in Poland, but approaches 20% in Slovakia.

Partisan alignment and disinformation

Our statistical analyses indicate that the strongest predictor of Europeans’ position on the war in Ukraine is the proximity of respondents’ preferred political party to the Kremlin.

The closer a party’s ties, as assessed by academic experts from the CHES project, the more likely its supporters are to favour Russia over Ukraine.

While the data does not allow us to fully determine the underlying mechanism, the results suggest that partisan alignment is the most likely explanation. Those who support Russia do not care too much about the war, but they align with their preferred party’s rhetoric.

The second strongest correlate of Kremlin-aligned narratives is exposure and vulnerability to disinformation.

Pro-Russian views are over-represented among those who consume alternative channels for political news and believe in conspiracy theories. For example, those who mainly consume political news from social media and messaging applications and subscribe to the view that the Covid-19 pandemic was orchestrated by national governments, are 40% less likely to wish for Ukraine’s victory compared to those who consume traditional media and do not believe in conspiracy theories.

The third, though weaker, source of pro-Russian attitudes is ideology: cultural conservatism and authoritarianism.

Respondents who favour strong leaders and question minority rights are more likely to sympathise with the Kremlin. By contrast, economic interests exert little to no effect. Despite fears among analysts that rising energy costs in the aftermath of the invasion could sway public opinion against Ukraine, those who report having suffered during the energy crisis are not more likely to support the Kremlin.

The need to moderate public discourse and combat disinformation

Our results highlight the importance of top-down processes, whereby pro-Russian attitudes primarily reflect signals shared by pro-Kremlin politicians and disinformation spread by alternative sources of political news.

Much of the surprising support for the aggressor does not seem to stem from some ideological affinity or economic interests, but from the information and interpretation that circulates within political systems.

Countering Russia’s influence thus requires assertive moderation of public discourse and robust efforts to combat disinformation. These imperatives contrast with governments’ attitudes in many EU member states.

For example, the current Andrej Babiš’s cabinet in the Czech Republic has renounced any anti-disinformation measures.

In Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico has echoed pro-Russian narratives himself.

These examples highlight a central challenge: efforts to counter disinformation are ultimately constrained by domestic political incentives.

Where political elites amplify or tolerate pro-Kremlin narratives, public attitudes are likely to follow. Strengthening resilience to disinformation ultimately depends on political leadership that is committed to defending the integrity of the information environment.

This article is published on behalf of all the authors of the original study: Filip Kostelka, Martín Alberdi, Max Bradley, Toine Fiselier, Alexandra Jabbour, Nahla Mansour, Eleonora Minaeva, Silvia Porciuleanu, and Diana Rafailova.

The Conversation

Filip Kostelka ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. What is driving Europe’s pro-Russian supporters and their stance on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-driving-europes-pro-russian-supporters-and-their-stance-on-the-russo-ukrainian-conflict-281598

Hantavirus is very different to COVID. Here’s why the ‘Andes virus’ won’t cause the next pandemic

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Rhys Parry, Research Fellow, Virology, The University of Queensland

For many people, news of a virus outbreak on a cruise ship immediately brings back memories of COVID spreading when the Ruby Princess docked in Sydney in March 2020. Of the passengers and crew who disembarked, 575 had COVID. The virus then spread to the community.

So it’s understandable people are concerned that passengers from the MV Hondius need to be quarantined after potential exposure to Andes virus, a rodent-borne hantavirus.

However, the comparison with COVID only goes so far. Andes virus is serious and authorities are right to respond cautiously. But experts, including from the World Health Organization, note it doesn’t have the characteristics needed to become “the next COVID”.

As of May 11, European health authorities have reported nine cases linked to the cruise ship, including seven confirmed and two probable cases. Three deaths have been reported.

Five Australians and one New Zealander are being repatriated to Australia for quarantine and monitoring. The passengers will initially quarantine at the Centre for National Resilience near RAAF Base Pearce in Western Australia.

Here’s what you need to know about Andes virus, the risk of transmission, and how it’s different to the virus that caused COVID.

How do hantaviruses spread?

Hantaviruses are a group of viruses usually carried by mice, rats and other rodents. People are most commonly infected after inhaling tiny particles of contaminated rodent urine, droppings or saliva.

Most hantaviruses are not known to spread between people. Andes virus is the exception. After the initial spillover from infected rodents, it is the only hantavirus with well-documented person-to-person transmission.

But that doesn’t mean it spreads easily between people. Further human-to-human spread is uncommon, but it can occur in close-contact settings such as households, among caregivers, during intimate contact, or after prolonged exposure in crowded or poorly ventilated indoor areas.

That is very different from SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently through the air. People could infect others before they even realised they were sick.

Early estimates suggested each person infected with SARS-CoV-2 passed the virus to roughly two or more others, on average, in populations who had never encountered it before.

Andes virus can cause onward human-to-human transmission, but requires a perfect storm of conditions: symptomatic people in crowded, poorly ventilated spaces with close contact over time. This was the case on the MV Hondius.

This difference in transmission potential is why SARS-CoV-2 caused a pandemic and Andes virus has only produced contained outbreaks.

What are the symptoms of Andes virus?

Early symptoms of Andes virus infection can look like many other illnesses, including fever, headache, muscle aches, nausea and fatigue.

In some people, infection can progress to hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, a life-threatening condition in which breathing becomes difficult.

How long after contact can you get symptoms?

The WHO recommends people exposed to Andes virus monitor for symptoms for 42 days after their last potential exposure.

This reflects the outer limit of the time between infection and symptom onset. It doesn’t mean people are infectious for 42 days.

Australian authorities have announced the returning passengers will initially spend three weeks in quarantine, with further monitoring arrangements to follow.

Melbourne’s Doherty Institute will undertake the testing using polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which detects the virus’s genetic material and blood-based antibody testing, known as serology.

A negative test early after exposure is useful, but not always definitive. If the virus is still incubating, there may not yet be enough viral genetic material or antibody response to detect.

How does the virus progress?

The long incubation period reflects how Andes virus progresses, compared to SARS-CoV-2.

COVID symptoms typically appear within days because the virus replicates rapidly in the respiratory system.

Andes virus progresses differently. Severe disease is linked to blood-vessel dysfunction and inflammatory responses. The breathing problems associated with the complication hantavirus pulmonary syndrome aren’t caused by the virus directly destroying lung tissue, but by the immune system’s delayed response. This causes fluid to leak into the lungs and makes breathing difficult.

How deadly is it?

Fatality rates vary significantly between hantavirus species.

European and Asian hantaviruses typically cause death in less than 1–15% of cases, while hantavirus pulmonary syndrome from American strains, including Andes virus, can reach up to 50%.

For context, in 2025, eight countries across the Americas reported 229 hantavirus cases and 59 deaths. These are severe infections, but they remain rare events.

A virus doesn’t become a pandemic simply because it’s deadly.




Read more:
Hantavirus: here’s what you need to know about the infection that killed Gene Hackman’s wife, Betsy Arakawa


Can Andes virus be treated?

There is no specific antiviral drug for Andes virus. Health care for infected people focuses on close monitoring, supporting their breathing and managing complications to the heart and kidneys.

There is no licensed vaccine to prevent Andes virus.

However, there is also good news in how quickly the scientific response has come together after this outbreak started. Swiss laboratories collaborated quickly to sequence the complete genetic code of the virus from one patient and made it publicly available within days.

This gave researchers around the world a reference to compare other cases against. This can support faster confirmation of suspected cases, while helping public health teams identify which cases are linked to the outbreak and who needs monitoring or isolation.

Bottom line

The instinct to see another COVID in every viral outbreak is understandable but, in this case, misleading.

The Andes virus is dangerous to those infected, but it isn’t a good candidate for pandemic spread. It incubates slowly, typically spreads through close contact, and transmission appears most efficient when people are symptomatic.

It’s important to get the Andes virus under control but it’s not a pandemic threat like COVID.

The Conversation

Rhys Parry receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC).

ref. Hantavirus is very different to COVID. Here’s why the ‘Andes virus’ won’t cause the next pandemic – https://theconversation.com/hantavirus-is-very-different-to-covid-heres-why-the-andes-virus-wont-cause-the-next-pandemic-282595

Conspiracy theories: do 300,000 Kiwis really believe Canada is building an army of mutant super-raccoons?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By John Kerr, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Public Health, University of Otago

Enn Li Photography/Getty Images

Four percent of Americans – roughly 12 million people – believe that “lizard people” secretly control the Earth. At least, that was the finding of an infamous 2013 public opinion survey.

Do so many people really believe such outlandish claims? Or do results like these partly reflect people giving silly answers or deliberately skewing surveys for fun?

US psychiatrist Alexander Scott believes the latter plays a significant role.

Using the survey as an example, he coined the term “the Lizardman constant” to describe the idea that a certain amount of noise and trolling will always exist in surveys about unusual beliefs.

As Scott warned: “Any possible source of noise – jokesters, cognitive biases, or deliberate misbehaviour – can easily overwhelm the signal.”

As researchers who study uncommon beliefs such as conspiracy theories, we wanted to investigate how this kind of cheeky trolling can muddy the waters.

Trolls and true believers

Building on earlier Australian research, we surveyed New Zealanders to test how common dishonest or joking responses were in conspiracy theory surveys.

We did this in two ways. First, we directly asked people a yes/no question at the end of the survey:

“Did you respond insincerely at any earlier point in this survey? In other words, did you give any responses that were actually just joking, trolling, or otherwise not indicating what you really think?”

Second, we included in the survey a “conspiracy theory” so ridiculous we could assume most, if not all, people who said they believed it were taking the mickey.

We asked them if they believed:

The Canadian Armed Forces have been secretly developing an elite army of genetically engineered, super intelligent, giant raccoons to invade nearby countries.

In our representative online sample of 810 New Zealanders, 8.3% of respondents confessed to being insincere in the survey.

Another 7.2% said they thought the Canadian raccoon army theory was probably or definitely true. That proportion – similar to findings from Australia – would equate to more than 300,000 adult New Zealanders.

To complicate things slightly, there was some overlap between those admitting to insincere answers and those claiming to believe the raccoon conspiracy. Combined, 13.3% of respondents fell into one or both groups – roughly one in eight people not appearing to take the survey seriously.

Importantly, these respondents were also much more likely to endorse other conspiracy theories, inflating estimates of how widespread those beliefs really are.

For instance, 6.5% of the full sample endorsed the claim that governments around the world are covering up the fact that 5G mobile networks spread coronavirus.

But once we removed the insincere responders, that figure dropped by more than half to 2.7%.

Across 13 different conspiracy theories, the estimated proportion of believers fell substantially once those respondents were excluded.



Another interesting insight from our study was that people endorsing contradictory conspiracy theories were much more likely to show signs of responding insincerely.

Previous studies have found some people appear to believe conspiracy theories that directly contradict each other. In our survey, for example, some participants agreed both that COVID-19 is a myth and that governments are covering up the fact that 5G networks spread the virus.

But nearly three-quarters of those respondents also showed signs of joking or dishonest answers.

This suggests genuinely believing contradictory conspiracy theories may be less common than previously thought.

Not every conspiracy believer is joking

Our findings add further weight to the idea that surveys may overestimate how many people truly believe some conspiracy theories – thanks, in part, to trolls.

But does that mean all conspiracy theory research is bunk?

Fortunately not. Most research in this area is not focused on counting conspiracy believers, but on understanding why people hold these beliefs and what effects they can have.

We tested several well-established findings from earlier conspiracy theory research to see whether they still held up once insincere respondents were removed from the data.

For example, previous studies have found that people who endorse conspiracy theories are more likely to see the world as a dangerous and threatening place.

We found the same pattern. In fact, removing insincere respondents made little difference to the broader relationships identified in earlier research.

Nevertheless, we recommend that future surveys include ways to gauge whether respondents are answering sincerely and account for this in the analysis. At the very least, researchers should acknowledge that trolls and joking responses can distort their results.

While our research suggests some people are taking the mickey in surveys, it also shows a significant minority genuinely appear to believe some of these claims.

In some cases – such as believing authorities are covering up the fact that the Earth is flat – this may be relatively harmless. But other conspiracy beliefs can lead to real-world harm.

Good-quality research is essential for understanding how sincere believers end up down these rabbit holes, and how those beliefs influence real-world behaviour.

Research into why people embrace conspiracy theories – and the real-world consequences of those beliefs – remains important.

But when surveys suggest millions may believe in lizard overlords or genetically engineered raccoon armies, it is also worth remembering the “Lizardman constant”: some respondents may simply be having us on.


The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Ross, Mathew Ling and Stephen Hill to this article.


The Conversation

John Kerr is supported by a Royal Society Te Apārangi Mana Tūānuku Research Leader Fellowship.

This research was supported by the Marsden Fund Council from Government funding, managed by Royal Society Te Apārangi.

Mathew Marques does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Conspiracy theories: do 300,000 Kiwis really believe Canada is building an army of mutant super-raccoons? – https://theconversation.com/conspiracy-theories-do-300-000-kiwis-really-believe-canada-is-building-an-army-of-mutant-super-raccoons-282478

We found hundreds of huge ancient mass graves hidden in the Sahara desert

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Julien Cooper, Lecturer, Department of History and Archaeology, Macquarie University

We have been on a years-long campaign of satellite remote sensing of the vast desert landscapes in Eastern Sudan.

This involved using satellite aerial imagery to systematically and painstakingly search for archaeological features in Atbai Desert of Eastern Sudan, a small part of the much larger Sahara.

Our team – which includes archaeologists from Macquarie University, France’s HiSoMA research unit, and the Polish Academy of Sciences – wanted to tell the story of this desert region between the Nile and the Red Sea, without having to excavate.

One mysterious archaeological feature stood out. We kept finding large, circular mass graves filled with the bones of people and animals, often carefully arranged around a key person at the centre.

Likely built around the fourth and third millennia BCE, all these “enclosure burial” monuments have a large round enclosure wall, some up to 80 metres in diameter, with humans and their cattle, sheep and goats buried inside.

Our new research, published in the journal African Archaeological Review, reveals how we found 260 previously unknown enclosure burials east of the Nile River, across almost 1,000km of desert.

Who built them?

Already known from a few excavated examples in the Egyptian and Sudanese deserts, these large circular burial monuments have long puzzled scholars.

What seemed once isolated examples emerge now as a consistent pattern. It is suggestive of a common nomadic culture stretching across a vast stretch of desert.

Most are within the borders of modern Sudan on the slopes of the Red Sea Hills. Unfortunately, satellite imagery alone cannot communicate the whole story of these enclosure burial builders.

The carbon dates and pottery from the few excavated monuments tell us these people lived roughly 4000–3000 BCE, just before Egyptians formed a territorial kingdom we know of as Pharaonic Egypt.

But these “enclosure burial” nomads had little to do with urbane and farming Egyptians.

Living in the desert and raising herds, these were Saharan desert nomads through and through.

A new elite?

Some enclosures show “secondary” burials arranged around a “primary” burial of a person at the centre – perhaps a chief or other important member of the community.

For archaeologists, this is important data for discerning class and hierarchy in prehistoric societies.

The question of when Saharan nomads became less egalitarian has plagued archaeologists for decades, but most agree it was around this time of the fourth millennium BCE that a distinctive “elite” class emerged.

This is still a far cry from the sort of huge divisions between ruler and ruled as seen in societies such as Egypt, with its pharaohs and farmers. However, it ushers in the first traces of inequality.

Animals held in high esteem

Cattle seem very important to these prehistoric nomads (a theory also supported by ancient local rock art in the area).

Burying themselves alongside their herd, these nomads show they held their animals in esteem.

Thousands of years later, local nomads chose to reuse these now “ancient” enclosures for their burial plots – sometimes almost 4,000 years after they were first built.

In other words, the prehistoric nomads created cemetery spaces that lasted for millennia.

What happened to these people?

No one can say for sure.

The few dates we have for these monuments cluster between 4000–3000 BCE, nearing the end of a period when the once-greener Sahara was drying, a phase scientists call the “African Humid Period”.

From north to south, the summer monsoon gradually retreated, reducing rainfall and shrinking pastures. This led nomads to abandon thirsty cattle, increase the mobility of their herds, migrate to the south or flee to the Nile.

The monuments are overwhelmingly located near what were then favourable watering spots; near rocky pools in valley floors, lakebeds and ephemeral rivers.

This tells us that when the monuments were being built, the desert was already quite challenging and dry.

At some point, as grass and bush made way for sand and rocks, keeping their prized cattle became unsustainable.

Having large herds of cattle in this desert, at this period, may have been a way of showing off an expensive and rare possession – a prehistoric nomad’s equivalent to having a Ferrari. This may help explain why cattle were frequently buried alongside their owners in enclosure burial monuments.

A bigger story

These enclosure burials are only one part of the greater story of human adaptation to climate change across North Africa.

From the Central Sahara, to Kenya and Arabia, keeping cattle, goats and sheep transformed societies. It changed the food they ate, the way they moved around, and community hierarchies.

It’s no coincidence communities changed how they buried their dead at the same time as they adopted herding lifestyles.

These burial enclosures tell us even scattered nomads were extremely well-organised people, and expert adapters.

Our discovery reshapes the story of the Sahara deserts and the prehistory of the Nile.

They provide a prologue for the monumentalism of the kingdoms of Egypt and Nubia, and an image of this region as more than pharaohs, pyramids and temples.

Sadly, many of these enclosure monuments are currently being destroyed or vandalised as a result of unregulated mining in the region. These unique burials have survived for millennia, but can disappear in less than a week.

Maria Gatto (Polish Academy of Sciences) was an author on our paper. We also want to acknowledge Alexander Carter, Tung Cheung, Kahn Emerson, Jessica Larkin, Stuart Hamilton and Ethan Simpson from Macquarie University for their contribution. We are also grateful to the National Corporation of Antiquities and Museums (Sudan).

The Conversation

Julien Cooper receives funding from the Australian Research Council, (Future Fellowship, FT230100067).

Maël Crépy receives funding from the CNRS (HiSoMA) and the Ifao (NOMADES research program).

Marie Bourgeois receives funding from Ifao (NOMADES research program).

ref. We found hundreds of huge ancient mass graves hidden in the Sahara desert – https://theconversation.com/we-found-hundreds-of-huge-ancient-mass-graves-hidden-in-the-sahara-desert-281978