DON’T PUB YET: How deliberative democracy can help solve the UK’s infrastructure problems

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Daniel Durrant, Lecturer in Infrastructure Planning, Bartlett School of Planning, UCL

Hinkley Point power station under construction in Somerset, UK. Chris Homer/Shutterstock

Infrastructure planning needs more democracy, not less.

The UK has wasted billions of pounds of public and private money through failed infrastructure projects recently. Our research suggests there is a better way.

The planning and infrastructure bill now in parliament is an example of how the government’s approach fails. The bill has been criticised for pitting the environment against economic growth. Less well reported is that it removes a cornerstone of our democracy; the opportunity for citizens to participate in decision-making about the infrastructure that affects them. The bill removes the duty for the developers of big infrastructure projects to consult with local communities and local authorities before the formal planning process.

There has been a democratic deficit in infrastructure planning since the 2008 Planning Act established a separate planning process for infrastructure projects deemed nationally significant. These are larger with the need for them established in national policy statements produced by the relevant government department. For example, the Department for Transport produces policy statements that establish the need for new road and rail projects, as does the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero for wind or nuclear projects.

This process was meant to be both faster and fairer but the emphasis was always on speed. Despite the belief among policymakers that planning slows down the delivery of infrastructure the evidence suggests that factors outside of planning are the biggest source of delay.

The problems of delays and rising costs that beset projects like the nuclear power station Hinkley Point C, London’s super sewer the Thames tideway tunnel and the high-speed rail line HS2 have little to do with planning. These simply exemplify the problem of so-called “megaprojects” that take longer, cost more and deliver less than is promised.

freight trains loading
Rail freight infrastructure is a crucial part of the UK transport network.
PrasitRodphan/Shutterstock

The planning and infrastructure bill will not make the process fairer. Communities and groups affected will only get to make their case in writing and in public hearings where time to speak is limited, often to 15 minutes. The process makes it harder for communities to have their voices heard. It may not even be faster as speed in the planning stages comes at the expense of passing on problems to the more costly construction phase.

Deliberation means better decisions

Yet, when citizens are involved in public deliberative forums with experts and planners, they can make well-reasoned, long-term decisions. When communities and experts work together infrastructure can be co-designed. This is why we were part of a group of planning academics that recently called for amendments to the Bill to establish an expert body to support innovative democratic participation in infrastructure planning.

There are precedents. Canada’s 1977 Berger inquiry into proposals to construct a gas pipeline on land along the Mackenzie Valley subject to claims by Aboriginal organisations. The inquiry became a benchmark for the use of public deliberation in the environmental and social assessment of complex infrastructure. Justice Thomas Berger’s approach saw experts and citizens testify on equal terms. The inquiry went to the communities that were affected. It travelled over 17,000 miles across Canada’s northwest hearing testimony from Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in eight different languages.

The use of public deliberation to inform decision-making has increased considerably since then. In 2020, a report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, an international policy advice forum, showed that infrastructure, urban and strategic planning are consistently the top policy areas where deliberative forums are used.

Following conflicts over high-speed rail lines in the 1990s, France pioneered deliberative discussion for all large infrastructure projects. These are subjected to early, non-binding scrutiny, conducted by an independent agency with years of experience in organising democratic discussion. They found it was more efficient and quicker to bring people into discussions early on.

France also organised national debates on climate change. This public deliberation on energy or transport policy builds political consensus for years so policy does not change with each change of government. In the UK, this could provide a basis for the new generation of National Policy Statements on infrastructure.

The previous UK government’s own Innovation in Democracy programme – an initiative that tests the use of deliberative assemblies in local government – showed how they can be designed to fit the geographies of infrastructure. This is important because the consequences often go beyond local authority boundaries through which representative democracy is organised.

Despite huge challenges like the transition to renewable energy or mitigating climate change that new infrastructure has to deal with, trust in planning is often low, mirroring a general decline in faith in politics. Deliberative democracy can restore trust between citizens and politicians and address the problems of climate change.

Infrastructure decisions are technically complex. New, large-scale infrastructure is disruptive, expensive and rarely aligns with electoral time frames. Yet the costs and consequences of poor decisions are with us for a long time. Rather than a delay, planning in this way is time well spent.


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The Conversation

I have received funding from the German Government’s Humboldt Foundation and the UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council to study the controversies surrounding big infrastructure projects.

Tim Marshall received funding from ESRC, a Research Fellowship 2010-2102.

ref. DON’T PUB YET: How deliberative democracy can help solve the UK’s infrastructure problems – https://theconversation.com/dont-pub-yet-how-deliberative-democracy-can-help-solve-the-uks-infrastructure-problems-261531

Plastics: all around us and inside us

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rosa Busquets, Associate Professor, School of Life Sciences, Pharmacy and Chemistry, Kingston University

MOHAMED ABDULRAHEEM/Shutterstock

Plastic is one of the most remarkable materials ever created. It’s cheap, lightweight and endlessly versatile. It can be shaped into anything from shopping bags to lifesaving tools in hospitals, and it’s clean, safe and can be sterilised. Depending on its purpose, it can be used just once – for example, in medical settings where hygiene is critical – or kept in service for years.

Perhaps surprisingly, plastic can even have environmental benefits thanks to its light weight, which reduces fuel use in transport. But we have become so dependent on plastic that global production reached around 414 million tonnes in 2023 – a figure that continues to rise every year.

Plastic is part of countless everyday objects. Take a toothbrush: the bristles are usually nylon, while the handle is often made from lightweight polyethylene or polypropylene. A manual toothbrush might have a volume of 8.5-19 cm³. Now imagine that over time, it breaks down into microplastics – fragments smaller than five millimetres – or even nanoplastics, which are a thousand times smaller.

If microplastics can be as small as 1 micrometre (about the size of a bacterium) – or even 0.1 micrometres (roughly the size of the SARS-CoV-2 virus) – a single toothbrush could theoretically break into 8.5-19 trillion microplastics. And these particles are small enough to be inhaled or ingested.

Plastics don’t simply “vanish” in the environment: they fragment. Sunlight, especially ultraviolet-B (UV-B) radiation, makes plastic brittle; physical stress – waves, wind, abrasion – breaks it into ever-smaller pieces. Even the state of the stratospheric ozone layer, which controls how much UV-B reaches Earth, can influence how quickly plastics degrade. Some bacteria and fungi can also contribute to breaking down certain plastics, but this is slow and often incomplete.

The result? Most plastic waste ends up as a soup of micro- and nanoplastics drifting through our environment.

While larger plastic debris can cause obvious harm, such as entangling wildlife or being swallowed by seabirds, microplastics are a quieter but potentially more insidious problem.

Plastic everywhere

Microplastics have now been found inside 1,300 species of invertebrates and are present at every level of the food chain. These particles are oil-like (hydrophobic), which helps them cross biological membranes and enter the cells of living organisms – unlike water-loving (hydrophilic) particles such as grains of sand, which follow a different biological path.

Their size matters, too. Smaller particles can travel more easily within the body, reaching organs far from where they first entered. Exposure can occur through swimming in polluted water or via food and drink – either because the food itself contains plastic particles (such as seafood from contaminated waters) or because it’s been contaminated during packaging or industrial processing.

Micro- and nanoplastics can also be inhaled in airborne dust, particularly in certain workplaces, such as textile manufacturing or sandblasting with plastic-based materials. In everyday life, we can breathe in synthetic fibres shed from our clothes or tiny particles released from tyre wear.

Once inside, microplastics have been found to move – a process called translocation – within animals, a phenomenon that has not been found in humans yet.

Evidence now shows that micro- and nanoplastics are present in human liver, kidney, lung, spleen, blood, heart and brain. In one study, nanoplastic shards of polyethylene were detected in human brains, at higher concentrations than in the liver and kidney. They have been found in the fat plaque in arteria which is related to cardiovascular problems. They have also been found in the placenta and breast milk, suggesting that these particles can be transferred across generations.

Given how common plastics are in food and drink, their presence in the human body isn’t surprising – but detecting them is technically challenging. Samples are often collected in hospital environments where plastics are everywhere, creating a high risk of contamination.

Are they harmful?

Researchers are beginning to investigate associations between plastic particles and human health conditions including cardiovascular disease, pulmonary fibrosis – a lung disease in which tissue becomes scarred and stiff, making it harder to breathe – as well as liver and bowel disease.




Read more:
Plastics threaten ecosystems and human health, but evidence-based solutions are under political fire


But the science is still young. Large-scale epidemiological studies, which could take years to complete, will be needed to determine whether plastics directly cause these illnesses.

The emerging picture is not reassuring. While scientists are still uncovering the full scope of risks, the precautionary principle suggests we should act now to reduce exposure. That means continuing to track how plastics break down, how they enter our bodies and what they might be doing once inside.

Microplastics are no longer “just” an environmental issue: they’re a public health concern. And because plastic production is still rising, the scale of the problem is likely to grow before it shrinks.

The Conversation

Rosa Busquets receives funding from UKRI/Horizons (CleanWater project 101131182) and DASA (UK). She is honorary academic at UCL and Al-Farabi Kazakh National University.

Marcel Jansen receives funding from EPA (Ireland) and DAFM (Ireland)

ref. Plastics: all around us and inside us – https://theconversation.com/plastics-all-around-us-and-inside-us-262882

Battling deepfakes: How AI threatens democracy and what we can do about it

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Abbas Yazdinejad, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Artificial Intelligence, University of Toronto

Imagine receiving a robocall, but instead of a real person, it’s the voice of a political leader telling you not to vote. You share it with your friends, your family — only to find out it was a hyper-realistic AI voice clone. This is not a hypothetical.

In January 2024, a fake Joe Biden robocall reached New Hampshire Democrats urging them to “stay home” ahead of the state primary. The voice may have been synthetic, but the panic was real — and it’s a preview of the threats facing democracies around the world as elections become the most valuable targets for AI‑driven disinformation.

AI‑generated content — whether deepfakes, synthetic voices or artificial images — is becoming shockingly simple to create and near‑impossible to detect.

Left unchecked, the harms posed by this new disinformation threat are myriad, with the potential to erode public trust in our political system, depress voter turnout and destabilize our democratic institutions. Canada is not immune.




Read more:
The use of deepfakes can sow doubt, creating confusion and distrust in viewers


The danger is already here

Deepfakes are artificially generated media — video, audio or images — that use AI to realistically impersonate real people. The benign applications (movies, education) are well understood, but the malicious applications are quickly catching up.

Open-source generative AI tools like ElevenLabs and OpenAI’s Voice Engine can produce high-quality cloned voices with just a few seconds of audio. Apps like Synthesia and DeepFaceLab put video manipulation in the hands of anyone with a laptop.

These tools have already been weaponized. Beyond the Biden robocall, Trump’s campaign shared an AI‑generated image of Taylor Swift endorsing him — an obvious hoax, but one that nonetheless circulated widely.

Meanwhile, state‑backed entities have deployed deepfakes in co-ordinated disinformation campaigns targeting democracies, according to the Knight First Amendment Institute, a free speech advocacy organization.

Why it matters for Canada

Canada recently concluded its 2025 federal election — conducted without robust legal safeguards against AI‑enabled disinformation.

Unlike the European Union, where the AI Act mandating clear labelling of AI‑generated text, images, and videos has been enacted, Canada has no binding regulations requiring transparency in political advertising or synthetic media.

Instead, it relies on voluntary codes of conduct and platform‑based moderation, both of which have proven inconsistent. This regulatory gap leaves the Canadian information ecosystem vulnerable to manipulation, particularly in a minority‑government situation where another election could be called at any time.

Alarm is mounting around the world. A September 2024 Pew Research Center survey found 57 per cent of Americans were “very” or “extremely” worried that AI would be used to generate fake election information; Canadian polls show a similar level of concern.

Closer to home, researchers recently discovered deepfake clips — some mimicking CBC and CTV bulletins — circulating in the run-up to Canada’s 2025 vote, including one purported news item that quoted Mark Carney, showing how fast AI‑powered scams can show up in our feeds.

What we can do

No single solution will be a panacea, but Canada could take the following key steps:

  1. Content-labelling laws: Emulate the European Union and mandate labels for AI-generated political media. The EU requires content creators to label manufactured content.

  2. Detection tools: Invest in Canadian deepfake detection research and development. Some Canadian researchers are already advancing this work, and the resulting tools should be integrated into platforms, newsrooms and fact-checking systems.

  3. Media literacy: Expand public programs to teach AI literacy and how to spot deepfakes.

  4. Election safeguards: Equip Elections Canada with rapid-response guidance for AI-driven disinformation.

  5. Platform accountability: Hold platforms responsible for failing to act on verified deepfakes and require transparent reporting on removals and detection methods for AI-generated content.

Empowering voters in the AI age

Democracies are built on trust in elected officials, in institutions and in the information voters consume. If they can’t trust what they read or hear, that trust erodes and the very fabric of civil society begins to unravel.

AI can also be part of the solution. Researchers are working on digital‑watermarking
schemes to trace manufactured content and media outlets are deploying real‑time, machine-learning‑powered fact checks. Staying ahead of AI‑powered disinformation will take both smart regulation and an alert public.

The political future of Canada’s minority government is uncertain. We cannot wait for a crisis to act. Taking action now by modernizing legislation and building proactive infrastructure will help ensure democracy isn’t another casualty of the AI era.

The Conversation

Abbas Yazdinejad is a postdoctoral research fellow in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity in the AIMML at the University of Toronto.

Jude Kong receives funding from NSERC, NFRF, IDRC, FCDO and SIDA. He is affiliated with Artificial Intelligence and Mathematical Modelling Lab (AIMMLab), Africa-Canada Artificial Intelligence and Data Innovation Consortium (ACADIC), Global South Artificial Intelligence for Pandemic and Epidemic Preparedness and Response Network (AI4PEP), Canadian Black Scientist Network (CBSN).

ref. Battling deepfakes: How AI threatens democracy and what we can do about it – https://theconversation.com/battling-deepfakes-how-ai-threatens-democracy-and-what-we-can-do-about-it-262262

Five of the most common injuries that can happen while climbing and bouldering

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Dan Baumgardt, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Bristol

Fingers, toes and everything in between may be at risk of injury. Maridav/ Shutterstock

Climbing and bouldering have become increasingly popular pastimes. In 2021, competitive climbing even become one of the official games at the Tokyo Olympics.

But while climbing is a great way to test the body to its extremes, it’s not risk free. It puts all sorts of stresses and strains on many parts of the body, which can lead a whole host of injuries if you’re not careful.

1. Rotator cuff tears

The main upper body muscles that are used when climbing are those which allow for pull ups and maintaining stability. Lots of these are found in the shoulders and on the back of the body.

Take latissimus dorsi, for instance. This broad sheet of muscle attaches the back to the arms, which enables us to perform a pullup when hanging from a handhold. These muscles (the “lats” as they’re often called) are particularly prized for their ability to give a broad strong back. It’s uncommon (but possible) to injure your lats since they’re large and powerful.

More vulnerable upper body muscles include the rotator cuff group and deltoids (or delts). These muscles can give you strong, defined shoulders (which some have nicknamed “boulder shoulders”) when trained.

Strength in the shoulder muscles is integral for climbing as it not only helps with reaching, but it importantly stabilises the arms – holding them in their sockets and preventing them from dislocating. When hanging from a rock face, shoulder strength is essential.

In climbing, slipping or catching a bad hold can strain these muscle groups, causing rotator cuff tears. This occurs when the tendon partially or fully tears away from where they attach at the shoulder. Rotator cuff tears will result in pain, weakness and limited movement.

This injury is becoming progressively more common in climbers. While in some cases rest can be enough to allow the tear to repair itself, in more severe cases surgery will be required to repair the tear. This can take months – and sometimes even a full year – to recover.

2. Finger pulley strain

The hand is a masterpiece of mechanical engineering which enables climbers to establish purchase on the smallest of handholds and prevents slipping. This is why having a strong grip is important for any climber. But the stress from gripping handholds can injure the muscles in the forearm, wrists and fingers.

Imagine going to grip the wall, only for your hand to slip. You’ll need to suddenly rush and grab another hold in order to avoid falling. In doing so, extreme stress is placed on the fingers and their tendons and ligaments.

This can sometimes lead to a finger pulley injury, where the bands of tissue holding the tendons in place either get strained or rupture – sometimes with a pop.

These are the most common injuries in climbers, affecting around 12% of people. Finger pulley injuries may require an operation to fix if the tear is large enough – and will require several months for recovery.

3. Trigger finger

Overuse of a certain muscle group can cause the tendons to become inflamed – leading to pain and problems in movement.

Take trigger finger, a climbing injury which usually develops over time as a result of prolonged stress. This results in inflammation and thickening of the muscle tendon, which then causes the finger to stick in a curled position – as if it were poised around the trigger of a gun.

A man wearing a blue helmet tightly grips a crack in the rock face he's climbing.
Trigger finger is the result of prolonged stress and inflammation.
LStockStudio/ Shutterstock

In order to get it back to a straightened position, the patient may need to take hold and pull it straight. Because the problem will usually recur many times, it may require splinting, an anti-inflammatory steroid injection or surgery to treat.

4. Claw toes

While we might think the upper body does most of the work while climbing, the lower body’s muscles still play a really important role – helping us push ourselves upwards. Strong quads and glutes are particularly important in climbing.

Falls, slips and sudden twists can cause all sorts of lower body injuries while climbing, including meniscal tears of the knees and sprained ankles.

Foot injuries can also occur – such as claw (or hammer) toes. This is where the toes take on a claw-shaped deformity, usually due to a muscular imbalance in the foot. In climbers, this may result from wearing tight-fitting climbing shoes, forcing the toes into cramped positions – or from overworking the foot muscles with prolonged gripping on to footholds.

5. Frostbite and Flappers

Skin and soft tissue injuries are very common in climbers – everything from cuts, abrasions and blisters. Some may even experience frostbite if they ever decide to climb outdoors at altitude.

In fact, blisters with hanging skin are commonly referred to as “flappers” within the climbing circle. Anyone who’s had a blister can understand how painful and irritating they are. Good grip technique and hand care are instrumental for preventing and treating them. Keeping wounds clean and moisturising the skin are good ideas. Also, to avoid infection, make sure you don’t pick at or pop any blisters, and ensure they can heal properly.




Read more:
How to treat a wound – without using superglue, grout or vodka, like some people


.

Hang in there

Climbing and bouldering are great whole body workouts, but in this lies a problem – the risk of overtraining syndrome, a condition which can result in widespread aches and pains, along with mental health issues such as depression. One study found that the majority of climbing injuries were associated with overuse, rather than traumatic causes – and the majority of these were in novices.

To avoid any sort of injury the next time you go climbing, treat your session like a gym workout. Do a proper warm up before starting and cool down after finishing, with some light cardio, stretches or lunges.

Proper kit, including climbing shoes and chalk for the hands also help with your grip. But fundamentally, instruction on technique and a responsible teacher or partner to keep you safe are worth their weight in gold.

The Conversation

Dan Baumgardt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Five of the most common injuries that can happen while climbing and bouldering – https://theconversation.com/five-of-the-most-common-injuries-that-can-happen-while-climbing-and-bouldering-262813

Ukraine war: what an ‘article 5-style’ security guarantee might look like

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mark Webber, Professor of International Politics, University of Birmingham

Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had good cause to be optimistic following his recent White House meetings with Donald Trump and the leaders of the European “coalition of the willing”. While a concrete peace plan has yet to emerge, Trump appears to have come around to the European position that security guarantees will be vital if any peace deal is to stick.

This is real progress. But what shape would security guarantees take in the case of Ukraine, and will they be enough to deter the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, from breaking the peace at some future date?

Talk of security guarantees is nothing new. Zelensky and his European allies have been stressing their importance for much of the conflict. But what does appear significant is the way in which the latest proposals have been framed.

It has been suggested that Ukraine should be offered security guarantees that resemble what Italy’s prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, called an “article 5 model”. This is a reference to the defence provision of Nato’s founding treaty, which specifies that an attack on one member is an attack on them all and requires a collective response.

Nato’s Article 5 is the gold standard of security guarantees. The wording is open to interpretation, but no one doubts that the principle of collective defence it embodies is the core purpose of the 32 nations which make up the alliance. Article 5 is backed by credible force that outclasses Russian military might.

Certainly, questions hang over article 5’s reliability. The provision has only ever been activated once – following the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001. But the unusual circumstances of that single invocation do not render the provision any less valuable.

The fact that European allies came to America’s assistance (rather than the US coming to the aid of Europe) means article 5 is a symbolic resource in transatlantic relations, which Nato’s European members can wield to remind the US president of his country’s commitment.

This is important. Trump has periodically suggested the US would not be prepared to defend perceived alliance “free-riders”. But the agreement at Nato’s Hague summit in June to raise defence spending among the allies went a long way to head off a transatlantic rupture by allaying Trump’s fears on that score.

Worries that the American military presence in Europe would be summarily withdrawn have so far proved unfounded. The US president now praises Nato as being engaged with America in what the White House has called a “new era of shared responsibility”.

Levels of commitment

The true effect of article 5 lies in the wars that have not occurred rather than those which have. Under Putin, Russia has attacked both Georgia and Ukraine. It has not invaded a Nato ally. This is why Ukraine has always been so keen to become a member of Nato, something that has been accepted in principle by most members of the alliance for some years.

But since the invasion of Ukraine, that route to an article 5 security guarantee has been expressly ruled out by the Trump administration, as well as by Nato itself. Instead, the alliance’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, has referred to “article 5-type of security guarantees for Ukraine”. What has still to be publicly discussed is precisely what this might entail.

Some of the parameters are, however, becoming clear. Trump suggested that he wants Europeans to be “the first line of defence”, with the US providing intelligence, weapons (paid for by Europe) and air support of some kind. He was quite clear there would be no US “boots on the ground”.

Ukraine’s European allies are now mulling over what their role as guarantors of security for a peace deal might look like. It has been reported the head of the UK’s armed forces, Tony Radakin, will tell a meeting of military commanders at the Pentagon that the UK is prepared to send troops to Ukraine – not as a frontline fighting force, but to provide security at ports and air bases. How many members of the coalition of the willing are prepared to do the same remains uncertain.

Patchwork of agreements

What went unmentioned at the White House meeting was the significant set of security and defence commitments Ukraine already enjoys with the Nato allies. Since the G7 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine of July 2023, Ukraine has signed bilateral security and defence agreements with 27 of Nato’s 32 members.

Typically, these provide for consultation within 24 hours if Ukraine is attacked, in order (as Ukraine’s agreements with the UK and France both put it) “to determine measures needed to counter or deter the aggression”.

There are also common provisions for military capacity building, recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and post-war reconstruction. Taken in the round, these agreements thus already provide the political basis for a comprehensive and effective set of security guarantees.

Two more things are needed. First, the bilateral US-Ukraine security agreement of June 2024, signed under the previous US president, Joe Biden, needs to be reaffirmed by the Trump administration. Second, the Europeans need to convert their latticework of agreements with Ukraine into an effective security and defence mechanism.

This can be done as the French president, Emmanuel Macron, has suggested, by continuing to arm the Ukrainian military. But if the article 5 parallel means anything, it will require – as Rose Gottemoeller, a former Nato deputy director general, pointed out on the BBC – an effective deterrent effect. And that means US participation.

With minimal involvement by the US, the question is whether the Franco-British-led “coalition of the willing” is up to the task – and whether there is the collective political will to organise and deploy a deterrent force in the face of Russian objections.

These are the debates playing out in Europe and across the Atlantic – and which become daily more urgent, as Russia’s advance in eastern Ukraine continues to gather momentum.

The Conversation

Mark Webber is Senior Non-resident fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome and a trustee of NATO Watch. He has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the British Academy to carry out research on NATO.

ref. Ukraine war: what an ‘article 5-style’ security guarantee might look like – https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-an-article-5-style-security-guarantee-might-look-like-263475

Vikings were captivated by silver – our new analysis of their precious loot reveals how far they travelled to get it

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jane Kershaw, Gad Rausing Associate Professor of Viking Age Archaeology, University of Oxford

In the archaeology galleries of the Yorkshire Museum, an incredible Viking silver neck-ring takes centre stage. The ring is made of four ropes of twisted rods hammer-welded together at each end, its terminals tapering into scrolled S-shaped hooks for fastening behind the neck. Weighing over half a kilo, it makes a less-than-subtle statement about the wealth and status of its Viking owner some 1,100 years ago.

The neck-ring was part of a large silver and gold hoard found in 2012 by metal detectorists Stuart Campbell and Steve Caswell near Bedale in North Yorkshire. As the first precious object out of the ground, it was initially mistaken by Campbell for a discarded power cable.

Six years later, I got the chance to analyse the Bedale hoard, as it is now known, for its isotopes and trace elements. Alongside the neck-ring and a gold Anglo-Saxon sword pommel (probably acquired in England by these Viking raiders), the hoard contained a spectrum of cast-silver artefacts spanning the Viking age: Irish-Scandinavian artefacts from Dublin, rings from southern Scandinavia, and many cigar-shaped bars or ingots that could have been cast anywhere.

As an archaeologist investigating the historical secrets held by jewellery such as this, picking up these heavy objects and turning them over in my hands was a visceral experience. I felt connected with the desires, ambition and sheer force of these invaders from the north who had wreaked havoc on communities in northern England around AD900.

Indeed, the entire Viking age (circa 750-1050) is often described as an “age of silver”. This form of wealth was so desired that its acquisition was a primary driver of the expansion out of Scandinavia that the Vikings are most famed for. To acquire it, they were prepared to risk their own lives – and take those of many others.

The story of the Bedale hoard’s discovery. Video by the Yorkshire Museum.

Tens of thousands of silver objects and coins are known from hoards and settlements across the Scandinavian homelands of Norway, Denmark and Sweden, as well as far overseas – from England to Russia and beyond. The study of this silver’s origins opens a window on the vast web of connections these warrior-traders established – a study invigorated in recent years by scientific techniques drawn from geochemistry.

Now, our analysis of the Bedale hoard and other Viking valuables promises to change the story of when their fellow-Scandinavians began travelling thousands of miles to the east to secure the silver that so captivated them.

The origins of these ‘violent chancers’

The word “Viking” comes from the Old Norse víkingr, meaning someone who participated in a sea raid or military expedition. The seeds of the outburst of piracy and overseas expansion that characterised the Viking age were sown in the 5th and 6th centuries, following the demise of the Roman empire.

While Scandinavia was never actually part of the Roman empire, its fall severed important trade links and led to factional fighting. In addition, volcanic eruptions in the mid-6th century induced prolonged climatic cooling, leading to crop failure and famine. Together, these events fractured Scandinavian society: archaeologists can point to abandoned settlements and cultivation fields as evidence for community displacement and decline.


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There was also a striking absence of silver in the region at this time, despite Scandinavia possessing native silver ores. While Roman silver plate and coin had previously reached Scandinavia and been melted down to make huge, stunning “relief” brooches worn by women, this flow of silver had declined sharply by the 6th century. In the following century, most jewellery was made of copper alloy – silver wasn’t being mined, and in this overwhelmingly agrarian society, precious metal was an unnecessary luxury.

In Scandinavia, where farming was challenging due to short summers and long harsh winters, wealth and power lay in good farming land and cattle – with payments typically made in butter, cloth, horses, sheep, hides and iron. As archaeologist Dagfinn Skre explains:

In an economy in which the supply of necessities was threatened, a man who had his moveable wealth in cows … would survive, but one who had it invested in metal would die. His metal would be close to worthless – for who would exchange their cows, butter or grain for metal in times of famine?

Yet out of this period of domestic struggle, a new and ambitious elite emerged in Scandinavia, particularly around the fjords of Norway and in the central Mälaren valley in Sweden – fertile regions which afforded access to both inland resources and coastal waterways.

Dubbed “violent chancers” by historian Guy Halsall, they seized abandoned land and valuable resources such as tar, furs and iron for weapons. They developed multiple, competing chiefdoms which they defended through a martial culture propped up by lavish consumption, trade and violence.

Archaeologists can point to tangible survivals of this culture: luxury imports such as glass claw beakers, elaborately furnished burials under huge mounds, monumental halls and full-on military kits. These warriors had shields decorated with bird-of-prey figures, crested helmets covered with silver foils, and swords with pommels covered in gold and garnets. They were not to be messed with.

Their success, coupled with these coastal people’s refined tradition of boat-building, enabled them to build and kit out fleets of ships. Surviving examples indicate these were long and narrow, with hulls made of overlapping (clinker) planking and shallow keels suitable for use in creeks, estuaries and beach landings. At first propelled by oar, the later adoption of sails enabled these ships to undertake long sea crossings.

In the late-8th century, Scandinavians began launching violent seaborne attacks on centres of wealth in neighbouring countries – first the coastal towns, monasteries and churches of modern-day Britain, Ireland and France, then later expanding their raids into Germany and Spain, and as far south as the north coast of Morocco. These centres of population provided human capital for the Viking slave trade, while enriching the invaders with portable wealth in the form of liturgical plates and reliquaries (from monasteries), silver coin and other high-status artefacts.

A raid on the north-east England island monastery of Lindisfarne in 793 – the first documented attack in the west – was probably launched from Norway. Its precise targeting suggests the raiders were well-informed about their destination, and no doubt attracted by stories of the riches held there. Writing afterwards, York cleric Alcuin described how the church had been “spattered with the blood of the priests of God, stripped of all its furnishing, exposed to the plundering of pagans”.

Alcuin blamed the attacks on his community’s “fornications, adulteries and incest” which have “poured over the land … even against the handmaids dedicated to God” – that is, nuns. The Vikings had made off not just with church treasure, but had also led away youths “into captivity”.

The capture of slaves was a common tactic. Some, like the boys from Lindisfarne, might have ended their days in Scandinavia or have been sold on at slave markets. But often, they were ransomed back to their communities for cash. After Vikings captured the abbot of St Denis in 858, for example, church treasuries “were drained dry” in order to meet their ransom demands of nearly 700lb of gold and 3,250lb of silver. “But even all this was far from being enough,” lamented the period’s chronicler Prudentius, bishop of Troyes.

The Viking pattern of raiding, looting and slaving is a dominant theme of 9th-century annals from Ireland, England and the Carolingian continent (spanning much of modern-day western Europe). In 842, Vikings made a surprise early-morning attack on the trading port of Quentovic in modern-day France. “They plundered it and laid waste,” recorded Prudentius, leaving “nothing in it except those buildings which they had been paid to spare”.

Accounts such as these record massive sums of silver extracted by the Vikings or offered as protection money. The extent of Viking accumulation of silver is staggering: the annals suggest that over the 9th century, the total loot in Viking hands amounted to 30,000lb of silver – or 7 million Carolingian pennies.

This stock is likely to have provided a stimulus to the economic development of nascent towns such as York and Lincoln in Scandinavian-settled areas of England, which are thought to have been more economically buoyant than their counterparts in “English” England.

Why did the Vikings come to value silver so highly? While the ownership of land and livestock was determined by strict laws of inheritance, silver could be obtained independently and with little resource investment, bypassing these normal routes of advancement. In this sense, silver embodied a new kind of dynamism coinciding with a different mode of behaviour.

These “nouveau rich” Vikings could not necessarily buy land with silver, but it gave them status – enabling people without inherited assets to acquire, and pass on, wealth. While the division of farmland and cattle upon marriage or death could be tricky, silver was ideally suited to such payments.

To these new generations of Scandinavians, silver became a standard of value that could guarantee investments, settle disputes and underwrite inheritance claims. It could be used to cement relationships – acting, as archaeologist Soren Sindbaek puts it, as a “virtual social glue”.

Silver analysis leads to a staggering result

But as well as value, silver stores information in its chemical composition that can reveal where it came from – something I have investigated as head of a research team over the last five years. We have analysed hundreds of silver Viking-age objects including from the Bedale hoard, with its rich mixture of rings and ingots cast by Scandinavians.

To make the hoard’s massive twisted silver neck-ring, for example, Viking metalcasters would have melted down numerous silver coins or small pieces of deliberately cut “hacksilver”. Once melted, the silver was cast into ingots, then gently hammered into long rods which were heated and twisted together to form the neck-ring.

Silver and gold items from the Viking-era Bedale hoard.
The Viking hoard dating 850-950 found near Bedale, North Yorkshire, in October 2012.
York Museums Trust via Wikimedia, CC BY-NC-SA

However, this process masked the original sources of that silver. The only way to tell where it came from would require techniques from geochemistry – so I took the objects to the British Geological Survey’s laboratory in the suburbs of Nottingham, where isotope scientist Jane Evans drilled tiny samples from each silver object to measure them for lead isotopes.

Just like the isotopes (of oxygen, strontium and sulphur) that are laid down in bone and teeth – from which we can trace people’s childhood origins – isotopes of lead can be used to trace silver back to its source. Most silver ores contain trace amounts of lead, the four stable isotopes of which vary according to the ore’s geological age and composition. These lead isotopes give each ore a “fingerprint”, which carries over into silver coins and other artefacts made from it.

Given the location of the Bedale hoard in North Yorkshire, I was confident that much of the silver would have come from local Anglo-Saxon and also Carolingian sources in mainland western Europe. In England, the Vikings started to settle from around 865. How they did so – whether by seizing land, purchasing it, or settling previously uninhabited areas – isn’t entirely clear, but the loot seized during their raids must have helped the process.

Plotting the ratios of the lead isotopes in the Bedale hoard for the first time, many of the results were as expected: several silver objects matched the ratios of Anglo-Saxon and Carolingian coinage, and other objects had been refined to raise their silver content prior to casting, using local lead in the process of cupellation.

Geochemical analysis of Bedale hoard items

Charts comparing lead isotope ratios in the Bedale hoard with possible sources of these silver elements.
Charts comparing lead isotope ratios of items in the Bedale hoard ((black crosses)) with possible sources of these silver elements. The nine ingots plot closely with Islamic sources of silver (in blue).
Jane Kershaw, CC BY-NC-SA

But while many of the artefacts in the Bedale hoard yielded predictable results, a group of nine ingots stood out. Rather than matching western silver sources or local lead, they had the same isotope ratios as the Islamic currency of dirhams.

Dirhams minted between AD750 and 900 by the Umayyads and Abbasids, in what is today Iran and Iraq, were a particularly close match. Two of these ingots were marked with a cross, although whether this carried Christian meaning or was simply a way of marking out ownership is unclear. Either way, these massive ingots must have been cast in Scandinavia from Islamic silver dirhams and brought over to England in Viking hands, before being buried in North Yorkshire.

This result is staggering. The names of villages around Bedale like Snape and Newton-le-Willows sound very far from Mesopotamia – yet the Bedale hoard contained a substantial component of silver minted in Baghdad, Tehran and Isfahan.

These results have made us question the timing of the Viking age’s eastern expansion. While Islamic dirhams are plentiful in Scandinavia, they predominantly date to the 10th century. However, our analysis suggests that dirhams were already arriving in Scandinavia in the 9th century in much larger quantities than previously thought – with many being melted down as a raw material for casting.

To understand how this happened, we need to meet the Scandinavians who looked east rather than west in search of silver and other riches.

Who were the Scandinavians who went east?

While the Viking raids on western Europe are best-known thanks to the many surviving written accounts, some of their fellow-Scandinavians – largely drawn from modern-day Sweden – headed east, establishing riverine, trade-based settlements in what is now Russia and Ukraine.

The route led across the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Finland into northern Russia, transporting furs and slaves from northern Europe to the markets of the Islamic Caliphate. Finds of dirhams in Scandinavia represent the profit from this trade and show that it, too, had silver at its heart.

Over time, these Scandinavians adapted to life on the eastern waterways, adopting some cultural practices from local people such as the nomadic Khazars. The 10th-century diplomat, Ahmad ibn Fadlan, gave a frank description of this new community of traders – known as Rus rather than Vikings – who he met on the River Volga in northern Russia:

They are the filthiest of God’s creatures. They do not clean themselves after urinating or defecating, nor do they wash themselves after having sex …They are like wandering asses.

In 921, Ibn Fadlan had been sent by the Abbasid caliph, al-Muqtadir, as part of an embassy to the king of the Volga Bulgars, located near the modern town of Kazan in Tartastan, Russia. His travelogue-style account, or risāla, of that journey has become famous for the many eyewitness accounts of people he met along the way – including the Rus from northern Europe, whom he met as they traded with merchants from the Islamic empire at the market of Bulgar on the River Volga, roughly midway between Scandinavia and Baghdad.

The Rus people’s long and difficult journey from Scandinavia would have taken several months, involving multiple rivers and portages – when their boats had to be dragged across land. They traversed boreal forest and the Eurasia steppe, which was populated by various nomadic tribes. In this landscape, the only option was to travel by river – or, in winter, to use the river as an ice highway, substituting boats for sledges. But for the Rus, travelling this perilous eastern route, the Austrvegr, was worth the risk.

A 1909 painting of trade negotiations between Rus traders and Eastern Slav locals in the 10th century
Painting of trade negotiations between Rus traders and Eastern Slav locals in the 10th century, by Russian artist Sergey Ivanov (1909).
Wikimedia Commons

According to Ibn Fadlan, the Rus acted as middlemen, acquiring furs and slaves from hunter societies in forested areas and organising their shipment down river via trading posts that later developed into permanent settlements. The goods were sent to major markets such as Itil (on the Caspian Sea) and Bulgar, where they would be purchased by merchants from the caliphate.

What the Rus wanted in return for slaves and furs was dirhams: the fine silver coins, weighing roughly 3g each, which made up the currency of the Islamic Caliphate. The early 10th-century writer, Ahmad ibn Rustah, explained how the Rus “earn their living by trading in sable, grey squirrel and other furs. They sell them for silver coins which they set in belts and wear around their waist.”

Ibn Fadlan’s highly detailed travelogue explains that once a trader amassed 10,000 dirhams, he melted them down to create a neck-ring for his wife. After 20,000 dirhams, he made two. This was no doubt an exaggeration – such a neck-ring would weigh 65lb of silver – but the notion that a smallish group of traders acquired tens of thousands of silver dirhams is supported by archaeology.

For these Rus “traders”, just as important as the fur trade was the trade in enslaved people, who seem mainly to have been captured from the Slavic lands and what is now northern Russia, rather than western Europe. Scholars sometimes describe the Austrvegr as a trading route, but human trafficking can hardly be described as “trade” in the mercantile way that we understand it today. It was based on coercion and violence – the terrorising nature of Viking activity in the west was replicated in the east.

The Rus “treat their slaves well and dress them suitably”, Ibn Rusta wrote, “because for them they are an article of trade”. Yet it’s also clear that female slaves were exploited for sex. These reports underscore the grim reality of the Rus “trade” – that their insatiable quest for silver entailed human suffering.

Astonishingly, some 400,000 dirhams survive in Scandinavia and the Baltic, making the dirham the most common archaeological find type for the Viking age. However, most of these coins date to the first half of the 10th century.

Yet according to our analysis of the Bedale hoard, rather than the Viking age “starting” in the west, the eastern and western expansions may have happened in parallel from the end of the 8th century – with the wealth of the east a prime motivator of the Viking movement out of Scandinavia.

Today, in some of the place-names near Bedale in North Yorkshire, we see evidence of Scandinavian settlement: Aiskew is Old Norse for “Oak Wood”, and Firby means “Frith’s village”. But now we also have evidence of a connection between the Bedale hoard and Rus traders bringing silver back to Scandinavia from their exploits in the east – up to a century earlier than had been thought.

Laser analysis brings new discoveries

In our analysis of the Bedale hoard, lead isotopes alone weren’t enough to draw definitive conclusions. We needed additional data to confirm the Islamic origin of the nine ingots.

Not only do lead isotopes differ between source ores – so do trace elements. Gold and bismuth levels are especially helpful in evaluating the origin of silver, because, unlike other elements, they do not change when silver is melted down.

After digesting the results of the lead isotopes, I returned to the suburbs of Nottingham. With Simon Chenery, we put the Bedale hoard objects under an excimer laser (a type of ultraviolet laser), ablating tiny amounts of silver in order to record the levels of trace elements. This time, thrillingly, the results came through in real time.

They showed, for the Islamic-looking ingots, the telltale pattern of low gold that is characteristic of Abbasid silver. Abbasid dirhams of this date typically have gold levels below 0.4%, reflecting the low-gold character of nearby silver mines in the Taurus mountains, whereas gold levels in coins from western Europe are higher – around 1% in the late 9th century.

Five ingots from the Bedale hoard ready for analysis.
Ingots in the tray ready for laser ablation.
Jane Kershaw, CC BY-SA

We discovered, too, that other artefacts were probably made from a mix of both western and eastern silver sources. This was true of the massive silver neck-ring as well as a smaller neck-ring from the hoard. Indeed, these two items appear to have been made from the same silver stock, suggesting that they travelled from their source to Bedale together.

While both could have been made in Scandinavia, the contribution of western silver raises the possibility that they were produced locally in Yorkshire, by metal casters with access to both distant, Islamic dirhams and local, Anglo-Saxon silver.

Our analysis shows the Islamic contribution to the Bedale hoard is more significant than we would have expected for a Viking hoard from England. In all, the nine ingots weigh 715g, equivalent to around 240 dirhams. And taking into account the Islamic contribution to the “mixed” silver artefacts, Islamic silver comprises around a third of the total weight of silver from the hoard (weighing around 3,700g).

Clearly, the Vikings were not only extracting silver from areas they raided and conquered, they were also bringing it in via their long-distance trade networks in the east. This result reveals the unexpected connectedness of the Vikings’ eastern and western expansions. Far from being separate phenomena, the profits of one directly fed into the activities of the other. Gains made from the Austrvegr may have enabled a group of Scandinavians to launch raids to the west and acquire further wealth and land.

In the west, these raids lasted for around 70 years from the late 8th century, spanning two or three generations. But eventually, the Vikings decided to settle. In northern England, where Bedale is located, they proceeded “to plough and to support themselves”, according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle entry for 876 AD. Finds of female Scandinavian dress items from England suggest that whole families, not just retired warriors, settled there.

Many questions remain about the nature of this settlement – including whether the raiders-turned-settlers lived separately from or with the native Anglo-Saxon population, and how the settlement process was brokered. But the former Vikings and their families appear to have integrated relatively quickly, adopting Christian forms of burial, developing craft industries in towns, and embracing coinage as a means of exchange. Among the settled Scandinavian population, the violence ceased.

Silver remained an important medium for displaying values and even identities. From around 900, new Anglo-Scandinavian rulers minted their own coinage – sometimes preserving traditional features familiar to Anglo-Saxons, but also adding new aspects that proclaimed a Scandinavian background. Coins minted by the new rulers of York, a focus of Scandinavian settlement in northern England, could have a Christian cross on one side and a Thor’s hammer – an overt pagan symbol – on the other.

These Anglo-Scandinavian coins were in use across Scandinavian-settled regions of England and are testimony to the continued importance of silver to the Viking economy – now channelled into a form that was more regulated and acceptable to the local Anglo-Saxon community. Geochemical analysis of the silver in these coins also reveals glimpses of this process of assimilation. Our investigation of a handful of examples, using the same techniques of lead isotope and trace element analysis, suggests they were made mainly with Anglo-Saxon silver – but again with a modest contribution from Islamic dirhams.

The end of the eastern adventure

The geochemical analysis of silver helps reveal the reasons for the extraordinary expansion of the Vikings and their fellow Scandinavians – including pointing to the wealth gained in eastern markets as a major (and hitherto neglected) “pull” factor. To a greater degree than has traditionally been acknowledged, eastern silver travelled across the Scandinavian world of the Viking age.

The huge number of Samanid dirhams found in Scandinavia point to the 930s-940s as the most fruitful decades for the Scandinavian travellers’ trade with the east. The Rus’s slave and fur trade continued until around 950 – and silver analysis again helps to explain why it came to a fairly sudden end. Analysis of the silver content of dirhams shows their fineness declined sharply from the 940s and 950s – a reflection, no doubt, of the drying up of silver mines in Central Asia.

It did not take long for Vikings to seek out silver sources closer to home. They turned to coins from the area of modern-day Germany, struck with silver from the newly-exploited Harz mountains, which they obtained mainly through trade. The decline in the silver content of dirhams thus led to a major reconfiguration of Scandinavian trade routes.

From this point on, long-distance trade with the east declined significantly. The Vikings instead turned again to the west, establishing trade links with England and Germany. In the late 10th century, increasingly powerful Scandinavian kings also launched new seaborne raids, exploiting the weakness of English kings such as Æthelred II “the Unready” (978–1016) and initiating what has become known as the “second Viking age” in England.

These raids, launched from around 980, were bigger, more centrally organised, and successful. The Vikings obtained significant quantities of “Danegeld”: protection payments made in coin. Ultimately, in 1016, the Danish king Cnut established himself on the English throne. The nature of the relationship between England and Scandinavia during this period is also being explored through silver, in a project on coinage from the recently-discovered Lenborough hoard.

If the pattern identified for the Bedale hoard plays out across other Viking hoards, it will prompt a major re-evaluation of the movements of the earliest Scandinavian warrior-traders. As part of the same project, we have been analysing Viking silver hoards of a similar 9th-century date from Sweden and Denmark, the Carolingian continent, southern Scotland and the west coast of England. Preliminary results suggest a regional pattern, but with Islamic silver appearing to be dominant in many cases.

What’s clear is that in the 9th century, the Vikings were already awash in Islamic silver. Meanwhile, more undiscovered treasures like that found in Bedale lie quietly underground, waiting to reveal their secrets.


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Jane Kershaw receives funding from the European Research Council.

ref. Vikings were captivated by silver – our new analysis of their precious loot reveals how far they travelled to get it – https://theconversation.com/vikings-were-captivated-by-silver-our-new-analysis-of-their-precious-loot-reveals-how-far-they-travelled-to-get-it-263222

Making Waves; Breaking Ground: a luminous show that reveals the interconnectedness of nature

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alistair Rider, Senior Lecturer in Art History, University of St Andrews

Numerous images exploring the blurry, textured thickness of light feature prominently in Making Waves; Breaking Ground, a group exhibition at the Bowhouse in St Monans, Fife. It is an apt theme for this coastal corner of Scotland, where, at this time of year, shadows are soft and the days frequently take on a dense, milky quality.

The exhibition is the initiative of curators Sophie Camu and Alexander Lindsay, who have collaborated with the Purdy Hicks Gallery in London to bring together the works of 11 contemporary Scottish and international artists. Spanning painting, photography and film, these often ethereal works explore the “natural environments of our modern world”.

Susan Derges’ image Full Moon Spawn from 2007 becomes increasingly absorbing the more attention you devote to it. On the surface, it is a depiction of the full moon. But, contrary to expectations, it is not surrounded by scudding clouds. Instead, it is framed by strange, jellied clumps and waterborne detritus.

This is an image, we gradually come to realise, that suggests a viewpoint from somewhere below the surface of the water, as though this were a trout’s-eye view of the night sky, and as if our atmosphere were not air, but a body of fresh water, teaming with frog spawn.

Derges came to prominence in the 1990s for her photograms of the River Taw close to her Devon home, which she created without the use of a camera. At night, she would submerge photographic paper within the flowing water, and would use the rippled, reflected light of the moon to leave its imprint on the immersed sheet.

To create Full Moon Spawn, Derges contrived a more elaborate setup in her studio. But it is nonetheless a continuation of a theme she has pursued ever since, which we might call her aqueous perspective: her fascination with the shape-shifting look of things through a liquid medium. For her, photography is a watery business.

Haar – the name used up and down Scotland and England’s east coast for the clammy sea fog that billows noiselessly inland from the sea – is the title of one of Samantha Clark’s large acrylic paintings. Painted in 2024 in Orkney, where she now lives, it depicts a thick, vaporous field, the image built up from a complex overlapping mesh of laboriously drawn lines.

Other works bear names such as This Salted Light, Submerge, or Salt Fog Light. The omnipresence of water is her guiding theme. For Clark, it is the interconnecting life-giving tissue that flows through both us and the land.

Among the other artists included are three Finnish photographers: Santeri Tuori, Jorma Puranen and Sandra Kantanen. In separate ways, both Kantanen and Tuori revisit the painterly theme that so preoccupied Claude Monet in his later years: the unsteadiness of light on foliage floating on the still surface of a pond.

Puranen is equally captivated by scattered, refracted light. In his images, and especially in his series, Icy Prospects, he maintains a fruitful ambiguity about the substantiality of the things he depicts. A frozen surface, for instance, thick with bubbles, mirrors a winter’s sky in a way that makes it appear wet and watery.

Camu and Lindsay present the works in this exhibition as upending the traditional concepts of landscape art. It is a bold claim, especially given that many of the artists are demonstrably familiar with this tradition (Samantha Clark, for instance, has written in detail of her interest in the watercolours of William Turner in her poignant memoir The Clearing).

But it also seems right to infer that few of the artists in this exhibition would identify with the values that the landscape genre has all too often embraced. So often the western landscape tradition has served as the preferred visual form for expressing possession of the land of others.

The artists in Making Waves; Breaking Ground share a commitment to pursuing a more compassionate way of looking and being in a place. They practise modes of attentiveness that do not reduce their surroundings to an easy-to-access spectacle, but acknowledge a physical interconnectedness with the world around them.

What links the works in this exhibition is a noticeable absence of horizon lines. Instead, the artists immerse themselves in an atmosphere, or enter a world filled with things which seem to loom up unpredictably. This approach reflects a refusal to prioritise between the infinitesimally small and cosmic immensity.

Most importantly, they don’t see themselves as separate from the worlds they depict. Our seeing eyes, they suggest, are made of the same physical substances as the things they see.

Making Waves Breaking Ground runs until August 31, at the Bowhouse, St Monans, Fife, free

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Alistair Rider does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Making Waves; Breaking Ground: a luminous show that reveals the interconnectedness of nature – https://theconversation.com/making-waves-breaking-ground-a-luminous-show-that-reveals-the-interconnectedness-of-nature-262676

Glass half empty? Nutrition studies shouldn’t just focus on what parents do wrong

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jennifer Black, Associate Professor of Food, Nutrition and Health, University of British Columbia

If it takes a village to raise a child, it also takes a village to care for children’s food needs.

Children’s health and nutrition outcomes are nurtured directly by family caregivers, but also by a broader “village” of policymakers and governments, health and education systems, social services and civil-society groups, as well as others working at both national and local levels.

Lessons learned from academic research studies help today’s multi-sector villages improve health policies, medical treatments and approaches for preventing children’s food- and eating-related problems.

Yet, medical research studies focus more on what parents are doing wrong than they do on the social conditions and resources that families and communities need to improve kids’ nutrition.

In our recent paper, we found that studies published in medical journals are stuck in a rut, repeating some outdated tropes and assumptions. The recipe to care well for school-aged children’s food needs is due for a refresh.

Food care

We are food and nutrition researchers and dietitians who have painstakingly reviewed a breadth of food and nutrition studies, including authoring rigorous reviews about childhood nutrition and family food practices.

Our team recently combed through two leading medical research databases to find out what questions, theories and measurements health researchers commonly use to study the processes involved in caring for school-aged children’s food and nutrition needs.

We couldn’t find a term that described exactly what we were looking for, so we proposed a concept and research framework called “food care.” We described the concept of food care as “the processes of feeling concern or interest about food, or taking action to provide food necessary for the health, welfare, maintenance, or protection of oneself or someone else.”

We found lots of valuable studies about what children eat, risk factors for sub-optimal diets and describing how parents feed their kids.

But overall, studies largely ignored the most important elements of our food care framework. This includes social and political factors and the emotional, cognitive and physical work that goes hand-in-hand with nourishing children.

These issues are well established in other fields of social science, but health research continues to largely overlook them.

Blaming parents

Health research about children’s food care largely centres on the family, including parents’ food practices and household conditions that shape what and how children eat. While this field is progressing, when (if at all) studies about school-aged children talked about food care, children’s eating and nutrition challenges were most often described as issues that stemmed from parents’ shortcomings.

Both the food care measures themselves and the child outcomes most commonly studied were more often than not described as harmful. Three-quarters of studies we analyzed focused on how parental actions increased children’s risks of feeding problems, disordered eating, excess weight or poor mental health.

The four main categories of food care that researchers focused on in the 20 studies analyzed included:

  • Caregivers’ feeding practices
  • Parents’ actions focused on children’s body size or weight
  • Ways that parents cultivate healthy eating
  • Mealtime interactions

In studies where many factors were measured, research conclusions often focused squarely on things parents were doing “wrong” or should improve.

Even when the size of the effects found were very small, or little meaningful impact of parental actions were identified, research conclusions were often still tinged with parent-blaming. Fingers were pointed at parents described as doing “too little” to foster healthy dietary choices, but also at those described as overzealous and trying too hard. Parents could seldom catch a break in these studies.

On the flip side, researchers rarely mentioned or tried to assess how parents’ food care efforts contributed to building healthy relationships, connections, trust or family traditions or bonds, psychological attachment, health benefits or mental well-being for children or other family members, or the benefits of food care for the wider community.

Assumptions baked into research

Researchers are currently working in an era in which “intensive parenting” is the cultural ideology and norm. Intensive mothering, as coined by sociologist Sharon Hayes, reflects ideas about “good” mothering that are child-centred, emotionally absorbing, labour-intensive and expert-guided.

While health studies seldom named their own assumptions about gender roles or parenting beliefs, intensive mothering approaches seeped into the types of recommendations found across many studies.

These ways of thinking sometimes lay beneath assumptions and recommendations that parents should always try harder, spend more time, money and labour. Or research language presumed that parents — and particularly mothers — are, or should be, the main party responsible for children’s health outcomes.

Such ideas also showed up in study recommendations that tended to blame parents for outcomes that may be out of their control, clinically irrelevant or benign, while overlooking the benefits of food care and the often invisible work of feeding a family.

Similar trends were called out in the field of psychology nearly 40 years ago when psychologist Paula Caplan suggested “blaming mothers for their children’s psychological problems has a long and, unfortunately, respected history.”

Parents, as children’s primary caregivers and first teachers, do influence children’s eating patterns, behaviours and habit development. But they do so in a broad and complex social context that is influenced by political, historical and community conditions. These conditions are under-examined in discussions of family food work in medical studies.

Recommendations from some of these studies suggested that medical professionals should provide parents with more guidance about healthy eating and food-related parenting strategies. But authors seldom mentioned structural supports such as policies, programs or tangible resources that would help parents succeed.

Yet parents contend with lots of conflicting factors and considerations when deciding what, when, where and how to feed their children. In many cases, it’s not as simple as just following available dietary advice.

What’s needed to provide quality food care

Evidence from medical research contributes to improved pediatric nutrition policies, programs and clinical practice. But research in leading medical journals about what and how to feed school-aged children remains largely disconnected from the complex realities of family life and the political forces that shape it.

The sample of studies we analyzed largely overlooked measuring and talking about the important ingredients needed to provide good quality food care for children. These include affording and accessing nutritious food, safe food storage and preparation facilities, resources, time, childcare and available school food programs, food literacy knowledge and skills, neighbourhood food environments and overarching institutional and social policies and conditions that foster food care.

These topics were occasionally mentioned on the fringes and have long been topics of study in some corners of sociology, political science and food studies research.

But it’s time that medical researchers and those who read and use nutrition studies take a closer look at the unnamed assumptions baked into research to make sure we’re not perpetuating one-size-fits all tropes about how parents — namely mothers — can “do better” while discounting the effort parents are already putting into feeding their children.

Health researchers can progress by more actively reflecting on their own assumptions about gender roles, good parenting, healthy eating and idealized family meals, and how these understandings are infused into scholarly work and the ways we measure and talk about how to feed children well.

In the 1980s, family food researcher Marjorie DeVault pointed out how important it is to name and study the valuable daily work of feeding families, but there remains much work to be done.

The Conversation

Jennifer Black has recently received research funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, and Michael Smith Health Research BC among other financial supports from the University of British Columbia.

Georgia Middleton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Glass half empty? Nutrition studies shouldn’t just focus on what parents do wrong – https://theconversation.com/glass-half-empty-nutrition-studies-shouldnt-just-focus-on-what-parents-do-wrong-262479

Elite schools in South Africa: how quiet gatekeeping keeps racial patterns in place

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Samantha Kriger, Lecturer, Cape Peninsula University of Technology

In South Africa, children’s admission to a particular public school is decided by province. Each provincial education department manages its own digital admissions system. The Western Cape province introduced an online admissions portal in 2018 which became fully operational in 2024. The aim was to make school placement more transparent. This is important because historically, under apartheid, South African education was racially segregated and unequally funded. White schools received the best resources.

Education researcher Samantha Kriger took a closer look at what actually happens in admissions to schools in the Western Cape that used to be exclusively white (known as Model C schools). She set out her findings in a book coauthored with education academic Jonathan Jansen. Though Who Gets In and Why was published in 2020, she says the circumstances remain the same in most of these schools. Here she answers some questions about what she found.

How is the admissions portal supposed to work?

Parents apply online to a minimum of three and maximum of ten schools, via the Western Cape education department admissions portal. The schools receive the applications via the portal and assess them based on provincial guidelines. That implies schools can discriminate between applications.

Schools submit a list of accepted, declined and waiting-list learners to the province via the portal.

Why and how did you research school admissions?

We wanted to know why formerly white schools still looked much as they had under apartheid (with high enrolment of white pupils).

The initial research included school data from the Centralised Education Management Information System, the official data management system used by the Western Cape Education Department. This digital database records and tracks all key information about learners, teachers and schools in the province. The data revealed that many former “Model C” schools continued to preserve their historically exclusive enrolment criteria.

Under apartheid Model C schools were whites-only public schools. In 1990 they were semi-privatised, giving their governing bodies greater control over finances, admissions and staffing.




Read more:
South Africa’s no-fee school system can’t undo inequality


We used a qualitative case study approach, focusing on 30 historically white primary schools in the wealthier southern suburbs of Cape Town. All the schools allowed us to visit and shared information about their admissions processes.

As researchers we visited sites and interviewed principals, admissions officers, staff and stakeholders (such as estate agents and provincial education officials). We also analysed school documents and enrolment data. The study used pseudonyms to protect participant anonymity.

We then analysed admissions practices in relation to broader political, policy and socio-economic contexts.

Some of the schools were wealthy institutions, as measured by the school location and facilities, tuition fees and the range of extramural activities that they offered. Others were not wealthy.

What did you find?

The majority of the schools maintained their white enrolment. This was not simply the result of lingering residential segregation, but was often tied to school-level practices and socio-economic gatekeeping.

These schools frequently employ subtle, yet effective, admissions strategies that indirectly exclude lower-income, predominantly Black families. For example they choose applicants from specific feeder areas with high property prices, emphasise English or Afrikaans proficiency tests, or charge high school fees. Strong alumni networks and parent bodies, historically dominated by white families, also play a role in sustaining existing demographics by influencing school governance and admissions decisions.

South Africa’s public education policy promotes equal access. Yet we found that, in practice, these schools filter who gets in.

In South Africa, prior to 1994, the racially segregated education system privileged white learners while systematically underfunding schools for Black African, Coloured and Indian communities. More than 30 years later, deep inequalities persist because race and class remain closely linked.

High-fee former white schools often exclude, in practice, many Black, Indian and Coloured families who cannot afford the costs or meet other socio-economic entry barriers.




Read more:
What young people have to say about race and inequality in South Africa


Admissions criteria such as language preference, application deadlines, early registration practices and school proximity can function as indirect mechanisms of exclusion.

For example, many parents are unaware that certain schools “lock in” preferred candidates years before formal Grade R or Grade 1 enrolment. This often occurs through unofficial feeder systems, where pre-primary schools enrol children as young as two years old, typically at a substantial financial cost. By the time applications open to the general public, most places have already been informally allocated.

This dynamic is evident in high school admissions too. Preference is frequently given to learners from designated primary schools. Candidates without prior affiliation may stand a chance only if they bring added value, such as athletic excellence, or musical or artistic abilities that align with the school’s interests.

These practices can unintentionally disadvantage families from lower socio-economic backgrounds who engage the system later or lack access to early-stage enrolment opportunities.

Language requirements are often framed as necessary for ensuring that learners can cope with the school’s curriculum. But they may indirectly exclude applicants from homes that mostly use African languages. For many black African families, especially those from lower-income or rural backgrounds, limited exposure to English or Afrikaans before school entry can disadvantage their children in admissions assessments or interviews.

The emphasis on early “lock in” and complex documentation also benefits families who are digitally literate, well-resourced and socially networked.

Another troubling finding was the role of parental profiling in admissions. Some schools assess the social standing of families, including their income, occupation, and perceived “fit” with the school’s culture.

Why does it matter that school admissions work this way?

The implications are serious. While the constitution and education policy mandate non-discrimination and the right to basic education, the reality is that access to elite public schools remains stratified. This is not only by geography or academic ability but by social capital. The effect is to reinforce existing race and class divides.




Read more:
South Africa can’t crack the inequality curse. Why, and what can be done


If transformation in education is to be more than cosmetic, policies must be matched with oversight, transparency, and a commitment to dismantling the quiet mechanisms of exclusion.

The Conversation

Samantha Kriger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Elite schools in South Africa: how quiet gatekeeping keeps racial patterns in place – https://theconversation.com/elite-schools-in-south-africa-how-quiet-gatekeeping-keeps-racial-patterns-in-place-258720

2 in 3 Africans will live in cities by 2050: how planners can put this to good use

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Astrid R.N. Haas, Research associate at African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town

Africa’s population is projected to nearly double by 2050, with 80% of that growth being concentrated in urban areas, leaving two out of three Africans living in cities. This expansion of cities at an unprecedented rate will bring both challenges and opportunities for African countries. In this edited extract from a discussion with the OECD’s Women Leading Change podcast series, feminist urban economist Astrid R.N. Haas explores three pillars for inclusive and sustainable growth: governance, planning and financing.

What can policymakers do to plan effectively for this rapid growth?

Policymakers must be more proactive. They need to anticipate future needs for infrastructure, services and housing. And they need to plan and invest in those spaces.

To do this, national policymakers must treat urbanisation not just as a city issue, but as a national priority. If they work properly, cities are engines of growth for the whole country. National strategies must support cities with appropriate policies, financing mechanisms and investments.

So African institutions must fit the purpose and context. Institutions must have clear responsibilities to avoid fragmented decision making. Administrative structures must underpin this, not only from a sectoral but also from a geographic perspective.

One challenge is that local governments are often positioned under the authority of national governments, and in many contexts, working at the local level may not carry the same level of recognition or prestige as national roles, despite the critical responsibilities they shoulder.

The one place that is working to overcome this is South Africa, where the municipal government is a separate sphere of government but equal to the other levels. Here the national treasury is working towards developing a single remuneration framework so that employees performing the same tasks in different spheres of government are compensated equitably.

More thought needs to go into how to support other cities across the continent in a similar way, ensuring they are adequately staffed in terms of numbers and skills. It is about making local government a more attractive place for talent to work and grow.

Most importantly, effort needs to go into making sure governance structures are both legitimate and responsive to citizens. Local government, as the level of government closest to the people, plays a critical role in this. Local authorities must be equipped to engage with residents and incorporate their priorities into decision-making.

What steps can governments take to create long term financing strategies?

African governments must plan beyond the typical two-, three- or five-year horizons. Long-term planning is often challenging because it doesn’t align with shorter political cycles. But infrastructure and service delivery require sustained, long-term investment and commitment.

We also need to think carefully about which services and investments should be the responsibility of government, and which can be delivered by the private sector. Policymakers play a crucial role in prioritising interventions that offer the greatest public benefit, whether by boosting productivity, advancing key social goals like livability through expanded social housing and services, or, ideally, both. Once priorities are set, investments must be appropriately balanced between public and private actors to ensure impact and equity.

How can policymakers guide sustainable and economically productive urban growth?

By making investments in the places people are moving to. This can be done through projections and then urban expansion planning. And here the OECD is at the forefront of some innovative work on data production for African cities.

Together with the United Cities and Local Governments, an association of local and regional governments, they’ve also produced what is probably the most comparable data on subnational financing: the World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment.

Used well, data like this can help more equitable decisions to be made. These tools can show us where populations are expanding, where services are lagging, and how people move and work across urban areas. Policymakers can then respond with targeted investments that improve livelihoods and expand opportunity. Therefore, for people like me who work with cities, data is an invaluable resource.

A note of caution is also in order. It’s not just about what the data shows, it’s also about what it leaves out. Who’s missing from the numbers? Who isn’t represented? What don’t we see? And why?

If people are underrepresented in official data sets, they risk being forgotten in policymaking too. That is why it is so important that institutions like the OECD not only produce data, but also help identify and fill these gaps. Governments also need to find ways to complement official statistics to “see the unseen” and build a fuller picture of urban life.

An example is the role of women in the informal food economy, urban agriculture, and service sectors. Their contributions are immense, yet often invisible in the data. That invisibility poses a major challenge for urban planning.

Can municipal financing be reimagined to prioritise gender equity and inclusivity?

Most cities around the world have been designed predominantly by men, and, more specifically, by white men from privileged backgrounds. As a result, even today, in cities across Europe and the US, urban spaces continue to reflect patriarchal notions of livability. They often fail to account for the different ways that women and other marginalised groups experience life in cities.

In Africa most urban spaces are yet to be built as most countries have yet to fully urbanise. So there is this unique opportunity to design cities from the outset that are truly inclusive. And here, municipal financing is key. Where we get the money from, and how we spend it, will ultimately shape the urban outcomes that define our cities for generations.

On the revenue side, African countries must carefully examine how both formal taxes and informal fees affect different groups, men, women, and other marginalised communities, and consider who is bearing the greatest burden.

The expenditure side is, in some ways, deemed to be more straightforward. However, it involves trade-offs as African countries need to invest in infrastructure and services that expand not only economic but also social opportunity, such as accessible public transport, affordable childcare, and adequate public spaces.

Borrowing is another critical component of the municipal finance equation. If you look at the OECD-UCLG data, you’ll see that very few African cities currently have access to capital markets. This severely limits their ability to finance the infrastructure they need.

Even where borrowing becomes possible, it carries long-term responsibilities. Borrowing is not just a short-term financial tool; it’s an intergenerational contract. The funds borrowed today will be repaid not only by current taxpayers but by future generations as well.

The full discussion is available via this link.

The Conversation

Astrid R.N. Haas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. 2 in 3 Africans will live in cities by 2050: how planners can put this to good use – https://theconversation.com/2-in-3-africans-will-live-in-cities-by-2050-how-planners-can-put-this-to-good-use-251414