Category: English

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Joshua Thorburn, PhD Candidate, School of Social Sciences, Monash University

Louis Theroux’s recent documentary Inside the Manosphere, alongside Netflix’s 2025 hit drama Adolescence, has driven a spike in public discussion about the “manosphere”. The term refers to a loose ecosystem of anti-feminist online communities and influencers that promote male dominance and hostility toward women.

Much of the public conversation about the manosphere focuses on how boys and young men fall into these spaces. A new study by the Australian Institute of Criminology asks a different question: how do some men manage to leave?

Real-world dangers

Concern about this online culture has grown in recent years. Increasing attention has been paid to adolescent boys and young men going down toxic online rabbit holes, moving from the misogynistic worldview of manosphere influencers toward more extreme spaces.

This includes “incel” (involuntary celibate) forums. These frame women as enemies standing in the way of men’s perceived entitlement to sex. Violent revenge against women is sometimes openly encouraged.

These concerns are warranted. Earlier anxieties largely focused on incidents of lone-offender violence in North America perpetrated by men linked to the misogynistic incel movement. It’s a threat Australia’s security agency ASIO has also flagged.

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Read more:
How boys get sucked into the manosphere

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More recently, researchers and educators have raised alarms about the broader cultural impact of manosphere ideas. This includes their influence on young men’s attitudes toward women and relationships, resulting in growing rates of hostile sexism in Australian schools.

Understandably, much of the attention focuses on radicalisation into these communities. However, far less attention has been paid to what happens when some men begin to disengage from them.

‘An unhealthy loop of depression’

The Australian Institute of Criminology study provides rare insight into this process. Drawing on surveys and interviews with former participants in incel communities, the research explores how men become disillusioned with these spaces and eventually step away.

The findings add to a growing body of evidence suggesting many men first encounter these communities during periods of insecurity or loneliness.

Participants frequently described anxieties about their physical appearance, social status, sexual experience or financial success. Incel and manosphere forums claim to offer explanations and solidarity for these frustrations.

As one former incel in the institute’s study recalled, he initially felt “some togetherness with others” in the forums.

Yet the same environment often becomes corrosive. Another respondent described how the community functioned as an “echo chamber […] fulfilling their own prophecy”, fuelling what he called “an unhealthy loop of depression”.

Over time, some participants begin to notice the gap between the ideology promoted in these spaces and their everyday experiences. Positive interactions with women, supportive friendships, or simply observing that relationships in the real world do not follow the rigid rules promoted online can begin to undermine the worldview.

One participant in the study described the moment it “clicked that all of it was really wrong” when his peers, “regardless of gender”, treated him with kindness and respect.

In another study of people leaving the manosphere, a former participant reflected that the movement’s claims about women collapsed when he realised he still had a happy relationship with his wife despite being “unfit and definitely not wealthy”.

Research consistently shows leaving these spaces is a challenging experience. Disengagement is usually gradual and uneven. It often involves the slow rebuilding of identity, relationships and belonging outside the forums that once defined participants’ worldview.

Finding the pathways out

The perspectives of people who have left the manosphere deserve greater attention in public discussions. For people currently within the manosphere (and for those vulnerable to falling into it) amplifying such stories can reveal how these communities ultimately harm many of the people who believe in them.

These stories matter because public discussion about the manosphere often focuses almost exclusively on its harms. Those harms are real and serious.

But we need to be hopeful the scale of the problem can be arrested and that the men who fall into these spaces are not permanently lost to them.

Schools, policymakers and families all need these first-hand perspectives. They offer more than just insight into why boys and young men fall down the rabbit hole: they provide a crucial road map for how we might help pull them out. This is essential to violence prevention work focused on how to promote “positive masculinity”.

Maintaining that cautiously hopeful perspective is important. Without it, we risk treating radicalisation as inevitable and disengagement as impossible.

The growing body of research on men leaving these communities suggests something different. While the harms of the manosphere are real, understanding the pathways out may offer some of the most important clues for how to respond.

Joshua Thorburn completed his PhD with support from the Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

Steven Roberts receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Government. He is a Board Director at Respect Victoria, but this article is written wholly separately from that role.

– ref. Men can get out of the manosphere. Here’s what former incels say about why they left – https://theconversation.com/men-can-get-out-of-the-manosphere-heres-what-former-incels-say-about-why-they-left-278312

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amy McAuliffe, Visiting Distinguished Professor of the Practice, University of Notre Dame

Canadians are openly discussing the merits and risks of pursuing a nuclear weapon. Europeans are similarly considering a nuclear deterrent for the bloc. In South Korea, public support for a nuclear weapon is at its highest level on record, and even in Japan some politicians are talking about the once-taboo subject.

Until just a few years ago, few experts would have predicted that these nations – all allies of Washington – might one day join the nuclear club. Since 2006, that club has consisted of just nine countries: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, with its undeclared program.

The hope of nonproliferation advocates was that nine would be the maximum. But over the past few years, more and more nations are seriously exploring “going nuclear.”

As an expert on weapons technology and former assistant director of the CIA for weapons and counterproliferation, I have watched these developments with alarm.

Perceived national security threats still shape U.S. allies’ views of developing nuclear weapons – with North Korea a key driver for South Korea, China paramount for Japan, and Iran key for Saudi Arabia.

But what has changed demonstrably for many U.S. allies is a newfound skepticism over the credibility of the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella, which for decades has offered allies an easy way of declining to pursue nuclear weapons. Concerned about the Trump administration’s foreign policy, some nations are considering developing domestic nuclear weapons programs or seeking new deterrence assurances.

New nuclear aspirants across the Atlantic

The U.S. deployed the first atomic bombs in Japan in 1945, with the Soviet Union conducting its own successful nuclear test four years later. The U.K. was next to get the bomb in 1952, followed by France in 1960 and China in 1964. Experts believe that Israel first tested a bomb in the late 1960s, while the last entrants into the nuclear club were India in 1972, Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006.

Experts have long wondered which country might be next. Often, speculation has included U.S. allies such as Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Turkey.

For years, such nations were assumed to be under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a tacit understanding that Washington will defend its nonnuclear allies, including by using U.S. nuclear weapons. Doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella have existed for years and precede the Trump administration. However, current U.S. officials’ criticisms of NATO, focus on burden sharing, and policy positions on Ukraine have brought into stark relief for allies the need to consider other nuclear options. And with allies now focused on the limits of U.S. security guarantees, the list of possible nuclear aspirants has suddenly grown.

European leaders have crafted their public comments on the issue carefully, focusing on concerns about U.S. reliability in general versus the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Rasmus Jarlov, the chair of the Danish parliament’s defense committee, perhaps best reflected the views of many U.S allies in Europe, telling The Associated Press: “If things got really serious, I very much doubt that Trump would risk American cities to protect European cities. We don’t know, but it seems very risky to rely on the American protection.”

In Europe, most public discussion has focused on the concept of a common nuclear deterrent for the bloc under the protection of French nuclear forces. In a major speech in March, French President Emmanuel Macron called for “forward deterrence” involving the temporary deployment of French nuclear-armed aircraft to nine other European countries, including Germany and Poland.

Meanwhile, the Swedish prime minister has had talks with Britain and France about deploying the two countries’ nuclear forces to Sweden during wartime.

But the French pledge does not extend a guarantee to defend allies with French nuclear weapons. Instead, France will use nuclear deterrence to defend French “vital interests,” a purposefully vague phrase. Only time will tell whether Macron’s offer will satisfy European partners – or prevent them from deciding to take matters into their own hands.

There has been growing speculation over whether Poland and Germany might be considering developing their own nuclear weapons. While German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has explicitly ruled it out, Polish leaders’ comments leave the option open.

In early March, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Polish parliament that Poland “must reach for the most modern solutions related to nuclear weapons,” seeming to reflect personal support for Warsaw’s long-term pursuit of a weapon and near-term conversations with the French about a nuclear umbrella.

In Canada, meanwhile, the former chief of the country’s defense staff said in February that Canada should not rule out acquiring nuclear weapons. While the comments drew opposition from the current Canadian defense minister, the discussion of whether Canada would consider “going nuclear” did not seem out of line in today’s global security environment.

Heightened discussions in Asia

Similar discussions among current and former government officials have been percolating across Asia.

For Japan, such talks mark a significant development. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, largely drafted by U.S. occupation authorities after World War II, renounces war. And in 1967 Japan further pledged not to produce, possess or host nuclear weapons in its territory — the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.”

But the issue is no longer taboo. In late 2025, an unnamed official in the new administration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi expressed his personal opinion that Japan should begin discussions about developing nuclear weapons.

These remarks drew an official rebuke from Takaichi. Moreover, Japanese nuclear weapons are unlikely to be in the cards anytime soon, particularly given the sensitivity surrounding Japan’s status as the only nation to directly experience the consequences of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, Takaichi’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party is reconsidering its position on Tokyo’s nonnuclear principles to discuss allowing U.S. nuclear weapons to enter Japanese territory.

South Korea is a different story. Last year, the foreign minister in the former conservative Yoon administration argued that an independent nuclear deterrent for Seoul “was not off the table,” given the unpredictability of the Trump administration. Left unsaid, but clearly in the background, were concerns about the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

South Korea’s previous nuclear weapons program and public support for reviving it could make a future South Korean nuclear weapon a real possibility, even though the current center-left administration stresses Seoul’s nonnuclear stance.

Yet the public mood has also shifted. A total of 76% of respondents now support an indigenous nuclear weapon, according to a March 2025 poll by the Asian Institute for Policy Studies. That was an increase of 5 percentage points since 2024 and the highest level of public support for Seoul pursuing a nuclear weapons capability since the poll originated in 2010.

Saudi Arabia’s focus on the fuel cycle

In the Middle East, the Washington ally most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon remains Saudi Arabia. In Sept. 2023, de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reiterated his public stance that Riyadh would acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran did.

Perhaps more likely is Ryadh’s pursuit of a “latent” nuclear weapons capability, meaning that Saudi Arabia would develop relevant technology and expertise to be able to produce a weapon quickly if it made the political decision to do so. An indigenous capability to enrich uranium would be key.

Indeed, the crown prince has demonstrated an enduring interest in developing a Saudi nuclear fuel cycle. He continues to pursue domestic uranium enrichment, regardless of the state of Iran’s nuclear program.

In November 2025, members of the U.S. Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressing concern that “the administration has revived talks with Saudi Arabia to give it access to U.S. technology and to potentially allow it to enrich uranium.”

The willingness of the Biden and Trump administrations to pursue nuclear deals for civilian power reactors with allies that permit uranium enrichment could assist Saudi Arabia and South Korea in pursuing nuclear weapons. The “gold standard” U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, called a 123 agreement, prohibits enrichment and reprocessing.

In September 2025, the Pakistani defense minister announced that Pakistan would extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, if needed, perhaps reducing Riyadh’s focus on obtaining formal U.S. security assurances. If genuine, this commitment provides Prince Mohammed the time and protection to develop Saudi nuclear weapons or a latent nuclear capability.

All of these developments suggest that despite decades of nonproliferation experts warning about the expansion of the nuclear club, new entrants are a very real possibility for the first time in decades.

The article solely reflects the views of the author and not those of the United States Government.

– ref. Going nuclear? Why a growing number of Washington’s allies are eyeing an alternative to US umbrella – https://theconversation.com/going-nuclear-why-a-growing-number-of-washingtons-allies-are-eyeing-an-alternative-to-us-umbrella-275389

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ranaivo Rasolofoson, Assistant Professor, School of the Environment, University of Toronto

Madagascar is one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots. The island country is well known for its diverse and endangered range of wildlife. This includes over 100 species of lemurs and six species of majestic baobab trees found nowhere else.

The country is also among the world’s poorest. About 80% of its population live below the international poverty line of US$2.15 a day.

Attracting tourist visits to protected areas, such as Analamazaotra-Mantadia National Park, has long been one of Madagascar’s policy priorities. The aim is to channel tourist income towards conserving these areas. Tourist revenue is also supposed to reduce poverty through foreign currency revenue, job creation, and infrastructure development.

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Read more:
Madagascar’s ancient baobab forests are being restored by communities – with a little help from AI

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Globally, tourism is a powerful way of generating income. In 2024, travel and tourism represented 10% of the global economy (US$10.9 trillion). In Madagascar, tourism revenue makes up nearly 16.6% of the country’s economy.

We are a group of socio-environmental researchers who investigated the effects of tourist visits on the forests of 40 protected areas across Madagascar. The country’s natural forests shelter its rich, unique and endangered terrestrial biodiversity. An estimated 88% of Madagascar’s biodiversity is dependent on forests. But after decades of high deforestation rates, only 10%-15% of Madagascar’s land is still covered with natural forests.

For our research, we used 20 years of satellite data to study changes in the forests. We combined this with tourism visit counts from each protected area.

We ran statistical tests to see whether tourist numbers had any effect on deforestation in and outside protected areas. We also took into account other factors that could influence forest loss and tourism, like rainfall and population growth.

Before our study, no research had measured across the whole country how tourism in protected areas affects deforestation.

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Read more:
Climate change is threatening Madagascar’s famous forests – our study shows how serious it is

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Madagascar’s protected areas have a three kilometre buffer around them. Our research found that increased tourist visitors have not reduced forests within the protected areas, but have resulted in deforestation in the buffer zones.

There could be two reasons for this. Firstly, some agricultural and pastoral activities, fishing, and other types of activities are allowed within the buffer zone forest. Local people who used to harvest wood or clear forest for agricultural land from the protected area could be shifting this activity to the buffer zone outside. (Firewood and charcoal remain the primary energy source for most communities in Madagascar.)

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Read more:
Forest conservation approaches must recognise the rights of local people

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Secondly, villages outside protected areas might be clearing forests to accommodate tourists and tourism workers. Maps of forest cover showed that when tourism increased, deforestation increased in the buffer zones and near the entrances to the protected areas (where hotels and restaurants are set up).

We therefore recommend that buffer zones of protected areas be prioritised in Madagascar’s national reforestation programme.

Tourism only shifts deforestation

Madagascar currently has 127 protected areas – about 10% of the country’s land area. The majority were established after the 2003 International Union for Conservation of Nature World Parks Congress. There, the government of Madagascar pledged to increase its protected areas to 10% of the country’s land area.

Major threats to protected areas include land clearing for agriculture, mining, illegal logging, and production of firewood and charcoal. Our study focused on 40 protected areas established before 2003 and managed by Madagascar National Parks. This is because these are the only protected areas for which annual visitor numbers are available.

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The loss of Madagascar’s unique palm trees will devastate ecosystems

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In protected areas, a portion of tourist entrance fees are shared with local communities. But it is difficult to know if this is enough money for communities to pay for their needs instead of relying on the forest. Tourist fee income is also not necessarily distributed to people most reliant on forest extraction.

Shifting deforestation to the buffer zone of protected areas is not necessarily a negative outcome for conservation, because it still leaves the protected area intact. Forests within buffer zones are also often intended to support local livelihoods. They are sometimes even of lower conservation value (less biodiverse) than protected forests.

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Read more:
What Cameroon can teach others about managing community forests

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However, increased deforestation there must be considered in conservation planning. This is because if the buffer area forests are gone, local people may enter the protected area to extract resources. This would endanger biodiversity and the critical ecological services they provide to local people.

What needs to happen next

Madagascar has a national reforestation programme. The country should also restore the forest in the buffer zone areas so that local communities’ needs for forest products can still be met.

We recommend that sustainable management of buffer zone forests include:

• reforestation

• planning where and when specific activities like wood extraction and farming can be done

• sustainable agricultural practices and regenerative agriculture

• promotion of alternative livelihoods

• developing and enforcing environmental sustainability regulations for hotels and restaurants.

Strategies to protect buffer zone forests must include local communities in the designing, planning, setting up and monitoring stages. The aim should be to make sure that the plans are suitable for the local area, that they empower local people and that they’ll be sustainable for the future.

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Read more:
Burkina Faso’s nature reserves are worth protecting – but people have to be part of the plan

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Tourism entrance fees should continue to be shared between protected areas. This will support the operating costs of protected areas with few tourists.

If Madagascar wants to keep the forests in its protected areas, it must sustainably manage forests in buffer areas to provide for local communities’ needs.

Camille DeSisto has received funding from Duke University, Rice University, Phipps Conservatory, Explorers Club, Primate Conservation Inc., P.E.O. Foundation, and Garden Club of America.

Tristan Frappier-Brinton has received funding from Duke University, Re:wild, Primate Conservation Inc, and the National Science Foundation.

Ranaivo Rasolofoson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Tourist visits to Madagascar help conserve some forests, but others suffer: study suggests what to do – https://theconversation.com/tourist-visits-to-madagascar-help-conserve-some-forests-but-others-suffer-study-suggests-what-to-do-275824

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Mariam Farida, Lecturer in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, Macquarie University

Just two days after the US and Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in late February, Hezbollah opened a second front in the war by launching six rockets into Israel from Lebanon.

The rockets came as a surprise to many. Hezbollah, once one of Iran’s most powerful proxy fighting forces, had been severely weakened by Israel during 13 months of fighting from late 2023–24.

The militant group had also stopped firing rockets into Israel since signing a ceasefire agreement in November 2024.

According to the ceasefire, the Lebanese army was to take control of the territory south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its infrastructure. Hezbollah was also expected to move its fighters north of the river, about 30 kilometres from the border with Israel.

The Lebanese government and the Lebanese army then launched an enthusiastic public campaign to show their commitment to the systematic disarmament of Hezbollah’s fighters and dismantling of its missile launches.

But this has proved to be a monumentally difficult task for both the government and army.

The Israeli army has continued to carry out airstrikes on Hezbollah military sites and targeted assassinations of Hezbollah fighters on a near-daily basis since the ceasefire.

Hezbollah has repeatedly refused to disarm and withdraw north of the Litani River if these strikes continue.

So, the ceasefire deal was already shaky. And when fighting resumed earlier this month, Israel decided it was time to “finish the job” in Lebanon.

This week, it launched another ground invasion to completely destroy Hezbollah’s remaining military infrastructure, “just as was done against Hamas in Rafah, Beit Hanoun and the terror tunnels in Gaza”, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, said.

More than 1 million Lebanese people have already been displaced, leading to fears Israel will reoccupy southern Lebanon, as it did for 18 years from 1982 to 2000.

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Read more:
Israel has invaded Lebanon six times in the past 50 years – a timeline of events

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There are three possible scenarios for what could happen next.

1. A short-term or “limited” ground operation

Israel does not want a return to its 18-year occupation, when it was dragged into a guerrilla war with Hezbollah and other groups, and by some estimates lost hundreds of soldiers.

A limited ground operation lasting a few weeks would therefore be the most desirable scenario to minimise troop casualties on the ground.

But this carries risk, too. A limited operation would make it difficult for the Israeli army to successfully destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure. Israel has attempted these types of limited operations in the past and so far failed to stop Hezbollah rockets. Hezbollah, too, is unlikely to want to de-escalate quickly.

As such, a limited ground operation seems unlikely.

2. A war of attrition that lasts for months

This is a more possible scenario since the Hezbollah–Israel conflict is closely linked to the US–Israel war on Iran.

It has become obvious that Iran is engaged in a war of attrition with its adversaries. The regime doesn’t need to “win” the war; it just needs to hold on long enough for the US and Israel to feel enough global and domestic pressure to stop. Then, the regime can claim “victory”.

In this scenario, Hezbollah is fully capable of mirroring this strategy. If it can withstand Israeli airstrikes, it can retaliate with the type of guerilla warfare it has successfully used in the past to drag Israel into a longer conflict.

There are already signs Hezbollah fighters are adopting these strategies.

3. Another major war that will lead to reoccupation

This is the most likely scenario with highest chance of regional ripple effects.

If Israel launches a much larger ground operation, it would be aimed at fundamentally reshaping the balance of power with Hezbollah and putting more pressure on the Lebanese government before engaging in any negotiations or diplomatic settlements.

This is typical of negotiating processes: one side uses excessive violence to try to establish “new facts on the ground” and gain more leverage before entering into talks.

However, this could result in major losses for the Israeli army, similar to those suffered during its 1982 invasion and subsequent occupation.

Another possible outcome is a power vacuum in Lebanon and the outbreak of another civil war.

A Lebanese civil war would have serious implications for the region, much as the last one did from 1975 to 1990. Then, Lebanon was torn apart by multiple armed militias with different (and often competing) agendas. Hezbollah emerged from the chaos, giving Iran a powerful proxy group to threaten Israel for decades to come.

There would most likely be a major surge of refugees across Lebanon’s borders, as well.

Lebanon is already a fragile and weak country, struggling to sustain some 250,000 Palestinian and 1.3 million Syrian refugees. Now, there are 1 million displaced Lebanese from the recent fighting.

This kind of disruption would no doubt spill over into Europe, with displaced people trying to seek refuge there, similar to the height of the Syrian civil war.

An Israeli reoccupation of southern Lebanon could also give Hezbollah a much-needed boost in legitimacy among the Lebanese people, if it is able to survive the war and targeted killings of its leaders.

Hezbollah will easily be able to frame its operations as a form of resistance or muqawama, much as it did in its early years. This could be viewed in several ways: resistance against occupation, resistance against oppressive regimes and resistance against the US and Israel.

Wherever this conflict goes, the Lebanese people – and beleaguered Lebanese state – will pay the highest price, trapped again in a geopolitical contest they didn’t start and feel powerless to stop.

Mariam Farida does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. As Israel invades again, Lebanon faces more turmoil and possible civil war. Here are 3 ways this could go – https://theconversation.com/as-israel-invades-again-lebanon-faces-more-turmoil-and-possible-civil-war-here-are-3-ways-this-could-go-278408

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sharon Horwood, Senior Lecturer in Psychology, Deakin University

It’s called the infinite scroll – a design feature on social media, shopping, video and many other apps that continuously loads content as you reach the bottom of the page. Handy? Yes. Clever? Also yes. Devious? Very much so. The infinite scroll is likely the main reason you find it so hard to stop scrolling once you begin.

To understand why this design feature is so devious, we need to understand the psychology and behaviours it taps into.

First, the infinite scroll takes away a natural stopping point – where you might decide that’s enough social media for today. For example, Instagram feeds once stopped after all chronologically new posts from followed accounts had been viewed, and even told us we were “all caught up” for the day. Now, algorithmic feeds combined with the infinite scroll mean there’s no way to ever be caught up with it all.

The second reason you find it so hard to stop scrolling is the promise of something good that might be just about to pop up in your feed. The algorithm “knows” what you like. So, hand-in-hand with the infinite scroll, it keeps feeding you all those tasty tid-bits.

Putting it bluntly, these features help create an addiction of sorts. The promise of a little hit of dopamine when we see content we love. And addictions are hard to beat – but not impossible.

Here are some quick wins and longer-term solutions if you want to break free from the grip of the scroll.

The quick wins

Create a break

Your device might be the problem, but it can also be part of the solution. Start by using your phone’s screen time features – such as Android’s Digital Wellbeing or Apple’s Screen Time.

You can also install a more sophisticated third-party app that forces you to break the patterns of mindless scrolling behaviour.

Apps such as One Sec, ScreenZen, Opal and Freedom can short-circuit the automatic habits associated with scrolling in various ways. These include putting mandatory pauses before social media apps open, or applying colour filters (like grayscale) to make apps less appealing.

They can even hard-block apps for specific periods of time if you really need a tough love approach.

Remove social media apps

This one’s usually met with an audible gasp when I suggest it, but you might find you adapt to not having social media at your fingertips faster than you’d imagine. You’re not deleting your accounts – just making it harder to open them and scroll.

Schedule some scrolling time

If you can’t imagine life without scrolling, schedule time each day for just that activity. It could be in your lunch break or when you get home from work: give yourself the freedom to scroll for the amount of time you set (say, 15 minutes) and don’t feel guilty about it. Just remember you still have to close the apps and get on with your life as soon as the time is up.

The hard work

The above might limit your scrolling in the short term, but long-term benefits (and emotional freedom) will likely take a bit more work.

The “easy” tips often work for a little while, when you’re motivated to change and feeling optimistic. But time and the pressures of life can start to erode your convictions.

So, to gain true freedom from scrolling, think about social media and whether it’s a relationship that serves you well. If you feel like it’s controlling you far more than you are controlling it, here are some things to consider. Be warned, they might not be easy.

What’s the deeper reason?

Think deeply about why you’re scrolling so much in the first place. Is it a lack of willpower? Are you avoiding something or someone? Are you suppressing feelings that you would prefer not to acknowledge?

All of these things can be reasons why we seek distraction. You might be avoiding a big thing (the state of a relationship) or a small thing (cooking dinner), but either way, scrolling is the symptom, not the disease. So, consider if scrolling might be part of a bigger problem you need to deal with instead.

Who’s benefiting whom?

Consider how much you really “need” social media. Do you actively use it in a way that benefits you (for example, as a business platform) or did you sign up out of curiosity years ago and have never really questioned why you’re still using it?

If it’s the latter, apply a critical lens to the platforms you use and how they serve you. On average, Australians use six to seven different social media platforms regularly. Think about what you might gain from spending less time scrolling, but also think about whether your life would be worse without some of them.

If you can’t think of a really compelling reason as to why it would be worse, it might be time to say goodbye to a few.

These “hard” options will take time and effort, and require you to reflect on your habits. But, like with most things, the reward for effort is likely to be greater, and last longer.

Sharon Horwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Can’t stop endlessly scrolling? Tips to help you take back control – https://theconversation.com/cant-stop-endlessly-scrolling-tips-to-help-you-take-back-control-278418

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, Australian National University; The University of Western Australia; Victoria University

As the Middle East war enters its third week, there is no sign from either Iran or the United States and Israel that they will stop the fighting any time soon. It is getting more violent and nasty by the day.

The Iranian Islamic regime is fighting for its survival, while the US and Israel want to substantially degrade or destroy it.

The Iranian side lacks the US and Israeli firepower, yet it has proved to be more resilient than its adversaries may have expected. It has resolved to fight for as long as possible and inflict as much economic pain regionally and globally as is necessary.

So where do things go from here? What do the US and Israel want to achieve in the war, and how might it end?

Trump’s incoherent objectives

The US and Israel launched this “war of choice” against Iran on February 28. Trump evidently expected the formidable US air and naval power, as well as Israeli air power, would rapidly prevail.

At a minimum, Trump was anticipating the Iranian regime would then accept his demand for a favourable nuclear deal. But he was also suggesting broader aims aligned with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives – to force Iran to forfeit its long-range ballistic missiles and sever its ties with regional proxies.

This would then open the way for Iran’s restless population to resume their protests, aiming to topple the regime and replace it with one acceptable to Washington and Jerusalem.

But this has not happened.

It is now abundantly clear the US and Israel started a war without a clear goal, strategy, timeline, end game or justification. There was also no adherence to international law.

The Trump administrations’s objectives have been confusing and contradictory, with different narratives being spun by the president and his main advisers.

They have included everything from freeing the oppressed Iranian people to removing a direct threat to America and destroying Iran’s nuclear program and missile capability. (Never mind Trump previously claimed he had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program in last year’s bombing campaign.)

Trump has also called for regime change, or as he put it, “a little excursion” to get rid of “some evil” leaders.

Trump has further claimed the human and economic cost of the war – including oil and gas shortages worldwide – will be temporary. But when the fighting will stop is anyone’s guess. Trump has insisted the war is already won, then said it will only end when he feels it in his “bones”.

In the meantime, the US has intensified its air bombardment of Iran, claiming to have hit 15,000 targets and destroyed every military site on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, the main terminal for exporting 90% of the country’s oil.

Trump is now reportedly considering sending US forces to occupy the island, while inviting US allies, as well as China, to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz to oil shipments.

Inviting China to such a coalition is a fanciful idea – it has good relations with Iran. Most other countries have thus far refused to commit.

Israel’s one clear goal

While Trump’s goals seem to change by the minute, Netanyahu has a more clear war objective. He wants to destroy not only the Islamic regime but also diminish the Iranian state, no matter the consequences for the Iranian people and territorial integrity.

He has also lately been vocal about his ambition for a Biblical notion of “greater Israel”, based on the Book of Genesis, spanning from the Euphrates River to the Nile River. The US ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, backed him on this in a recent interview with Tucker Carlson.

Although Netanyahu has been widely condemned for voicing these ambitions, he has not backed away from them.

Meanwhile, Israel has also just sent troops into southern Lebanon for what it calls “limited and targeted ground operations” against Hezbollah, though many fear this could lead to a prolonged occupation. Israel’s defence minister says residents will not be permitted to return until the safety of northern Israel is secured.

Iran’s strategy: hold on

Whatever one’s view of the Iranian regime, it has been more goal-oriented and strategic than its adversaries. It has also displayed a remarkable degree of entrenchment and durability.

The regime rapidly replaced the slain supreme leader with his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, though he has not yet been seen in public.

Despite all the internal and external pressure the regime is facing, the members of its heavily armed and well-structured security and bureaucratic apparatus have remained solidly loyal.

And though thousands joined street protests against the regime before they were quashed in January, other Iranians have united behind the regime. Many Iranians have historically been motivated to support the regime against external aggression, due to civilisational pride, a Shia tradition of martyrdom and a strong sense of nationalism.

On the battlefield, the regime is pursuing a strategy of asymmetrical warfare, with the aim of outlasting the US and Israel and inflicting as much damage as possible. This entails turning the war into a regional conflict to pressure the Arab states in the Persian Gulf to push the Trump administration for an end to the war – and perhaps reconsider their reliance on the US as a security provider.

The regime has managed to hold out so far, and rejected any negotiations.

Two possible outcomes

As the situation stands now, the scene is set for a long, bloody and destructive war. Each of the protagonists has painted itself into a corner and doesn’t know how to get out.

There are two possible ways the war could end.

The first is centred on hardware. Whichever side depletes its stocks of missiles and interceptors first could signal a desire to end the fighting.

The second possibility is that Trump claims he has degraded the regime sufficiently and declares a kind of victory. He has hinted at this already given the domestic opposition to the war (including some of his influential MAGA supporters), the growing economic costs of the war, and the impending midterm elections.

If this happens, the Islamic regime will also claim victory, given it has held on and remains intact.

Whatever the outcome, the Iranian and Lebanese civilians would have borne the brunt of this war, and the region will transition to another historical phase of uncertainty and instability in a highly polarised world.

Amin Saikal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. As the war drags on, what does victory look like for the US, Israel and Iran? – https://theconversation.com/as-the-war-drags-on-what-does-victory-look-like-for-the-us-israel-and-iran-278520

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shannon Bosch, Associate Professor (Law), Edith Cowan University

Afghanistan says at least 400 people have been killed in a Pakistani airstrike on a drug rehabilitation hospital in Kabul on Monday night, with potentially hundreds more wounded.

Pakistan has denied deliberately targeting the health-care facility. In a statement on X, the Pakistani Information and Broadcasting Ministry said the strikes “precisely targeted military installations and terrorist support infrastructure including technical equipment storage and ammunition storage of Afghan Taliban”.

Attacks on health-care facilities are surging worldwide.

On March 14, an Israeli airstrike hit a health-care facility in Lebanon, killing 12 doctors, nurses and paramedics. The strike brought the number of health-care workers killed in Lebanon in recent days to 31.

Since early March, the World Health Organization (WHO) has verified 27 attacks on health-care facilities in Lebanon alone, as Israeli strikes in Lebanon and joint US–Israeli operations in Iran have intensified.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the WHO condemned these attacks as violations of international law.

So, what laws protect medical facilities, staff and patients during conflict? And do they lose this protection if facilities are used to shelter combatants?

What the ‘laws of war’ say about protecting hospitals

International humanitarian law contains detailed rules to protect medical personnel, facilities and the sick and wounded during armed conflict.

Under these “laws of war”:

• medical personnel, including doctors, nurses and paramedics, must be respected and protected while performing their duties

• there are special protections for ambulances and transport used exclusively for medical purposes

• these protections extend to the wounded and sick in their care. This includes enemy fighters who require treatment and are no longer taking part in hostilities

• impartial humanitarian organisations must be allowed to provide medical assistance. Consent to their work cannot be refused arbitrarily

• medical facilities must display the distinctive protective emblems of the Red Cross, Red Crescent or Red Crystal. Medical personnel must carry identification and armlets displaying these emblems

• misusing these symbols to shield military operations is prohibited. Doing so may amount to perfidy, a type of deliberate deception which is a war crime under international law

• deliberately attacking medical personnel or facilities displaying these emblems can also constitute a war crime.

Where did these rules come from?

The laws protecting medical services in war emerged in response to the enormous suffering witnessed in 19th and 20th-century conflicts.

The first treaty protecting wounded soldiers and medical personnel dates back to 1864, when states adopted the original Geneva Convention.

Today, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols, together with a body of customary international law, form a near-universal legal framework binding all parties to conflict. This includes non-state armed groups.

These rules require warring parties to respect and protect medical personnel, facilities and the wounded and sick in all circumstances.

Why are attacks on health care increasing?

In January, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported attacks on medical facilities and personnel had reached unprecedented levels around the world. In 2025 alone, there were 1,348 attacks on health-care facilities, double the number reported in 2024.

The law itself has not changed. But warfare has. Recent conflicts in South Sudan, Ukraine, Gaza, Iran and Lebanon are taking place in densely populated urban environments. Armed groups operate within complex civilian settings, often near hospitals and clinics.

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Read more:
Attacks on health care during war are becoming more common, creating devastating ripple effects

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This has shifted the narrative used by some warring parties. What were once described as “mistaken attacks” are now frequently justified on grounds of military necessity. States often claim insurgents are exploiting hospitals or ambulances to gain military advantage.

Israel, for example, has accused Hezbollah and Hamas of using medical infrastructure for military purposes.

Can hospitals lose their protection if fighters are hiding inside?

Yes. Hospitals can lose their special protection if they are used, outside their humanitarian role, to harm the enemy.

However, the law sets a very high threshold for this.

Medical personnel may carry light weapons for self-defence. Armed guards may be present to protect the facility. The presence of wounded fighters receiving treatment does not change this – protections still apply.

Protection may be lost only if hospitals are used for activities such as:

• launching attacks

• serving as an observation post

• storing weapons

• acting as a command or liaison centre

• sheltering able-bodied combatants.

Even then, in cases of doubt hospitals must be presumed protected.

Importantly, verifying a hospital is being misused does not give parties a free licence to attack.

Before launching an attack on a compromised medical facility, international humanitarian law requires a warning to be issued, and reasonable time allowed for the misuse to stop.

If the warning is ignored, the attacking party must still comply with the core principles of international humanitarian law:

Proportionality

The expected military advantage must be weighed against the humanitarian consequences of the attack. This includes long-term impacts on health-care services. If the expected civilian harm would be excessive, the attack must be cancelled.

Precautions

All feasible precautions must be taken to minimise harm to patients and medical staff. This may include facilitating evacuations, planning for disruption to medical services, and helping restore health-care capacity after the attack.

Even when a facility loses protection, the wounded and sick must still be respected and protected.

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Read more:
Health-care workers should not be a target. In Gaza, their detention and death affect the entire population

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Are attacks on health care becoming normalised?

The UN Security Council, WHO, MSF and the OHCHR have expressed concern attacks on medical personnel and facilities – and the lack of accountability for them – are becoming dangerously normalised.

The legal framework protecting hospitals and health-care workers already exists.

States and armed groups must disseminate the law and train their military forces.

National legal systems are expected to investigate and prosecute those perpetrating war crimes against the wounded and sick, medical personnel and their facilities, or misusing protective emblems for military advantage.

In practice, however, investigating attacks during active conflict is extremely challenging. Territorial states are often unwilling or unable to pursue prosecutions.

Can we reverse this trend?

Open-source investigative groups such as Forensic Architecture, Bellingcat, Mnemonics and Airwars now play a growing role in preserving satellite imagery, geo-location data, and videos uploaded to social media. These allow independent fact-finding missions to conduct credible investigations. They may pursue accountability even when territorial states are unwilling or unable to do so.

Without such accountability, places meant to save lives during conflict may increasingly become targets themselves.

Shannon Bosch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Attacks on hospitals are surging in war zones. What do the laws of war say about protecting them? – https://theconversation.com/attacks-on-hospitals-are-surging-in-war-zones-what-do-the-laws-of-war-say-about-protecting-them-278414