Iran’s protests have spread across provinces, despite skepticism and concern among ethnic groups

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shukriya Bradost, Ph.D. Researcher, International Security and Foreign Policy, Virginia Tech

Protester in Punak, Tehran on Jan. 10, 2026. Author-obtained image., CC BY

When Iran’s ongoing protests began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar on Dec. 28 2025, the government initially treated them as manageable and temporary.

Bazaar merchants have historically been among the most conservative social groups in Iran, deeply embedded in the state’s economic structure and closely connected to political authority. Within the Iranian government itself, there was apparent confidence that their protests were not revolutionary in nature but transactional – a short-lived pressure campaign aimed at stabilizing the collapsing currency and curbing inflation that directly threatened merchants’ livelihoods.

This perception led to an unprecedented development. In his first public response, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei openly acknowledged the merchants’ protests – the first time he had ever accepted the legitimacy of any demonstration.

He characterized them as part of the traditional alliance between the state and the bazaar, indicating that the government still viewed the unrest as controllable.

But authorities did not anticipate what happened next: The protests spread to over 25 provinces and developed into a nationwide challenge to the government’s survival, met by a violent crackdown in which more than 6,000 protesters have reportedly been killed.

As an expert on Iran’s ethnic groups, I have watched as the unrest has expanded to include minority groups – despite skepticism among these communities over the possible outcome of the unrest and concerns over the plans of some central opposition figures.

As reports emerge of government forces killing thousands, the central question has now shifted from whether the state can suppress the protests to how different regions of Iran interpreted the concept of change – whether it is something achievable within the government or necessitates regime change itself.

Ethnic minorities join the protest

Iran is a country of about 93 million people whose modern state was built around a centralized national identity rather than ethnic pluralism.

But that masks a large and politically significant ethnic minority population. While 51% form the Persian majority, 24% of the country identify as Azeri. Kurds number some 7 million to 15 million, composing roughly 8% to 17% of the total population. And Arabs and Baluch minorities represent 3% and 2% of the population, respectively.

A map highlights different regions
A map of the distribution of Iran’s ethnic groups.
Wikimedia Commons

Since the Pahlavi monarchy’s nation-building project began in 1925, successive governments, both monarchical and then the Islamic Republic, have treated ethnic diversity as a security challenge and repeatedly suppressed demands for political inclusion, language rights and local governance.

The role of Iran’s ethnic minority groups in the current protests has evolved. Initially, minority regions were less prominent than in the last serious wave of protests: the 2022–23 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising sparked by the death of a Kurdish-Iranian woman named Jina Mahsa Amini.

The Kurdish involvement in the current protests began in the small city of Malekshahi in Ilam province on Jan. 3. A subsequent violent raid by security forces on wounded protesters inside Ilam hospital provoked outrage beyond the local community and attracted international attention.

Protests continued in Ilam, while in nearby Kermanshah province, particularly the impoverished area of Daradrezh, they erupted over economic deprivation and political discrimination.

A strategic approach to protest

Shiite Kurdish communities in Ilam and Kermanshah continue to experience exclusion rooted in their Kurdish identity. That’s despite sharing a Shiite identity with Iran’s ruling establishment in Tehran – a factor that has historically afforded greater access to government than for the Sunni Kurdish population.

Following the killing of protesters in Ilam and Kermanshah, Kurdish political parties issued a joint statement calling for a region-wide strike.

Notably, Kurdish leaders did not call for protests but for strikes alone. During the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, the government treated Kurdish cities as security zones – framing the protests as a threat to Iran’s territorial integrity and using that justification to carry out mass killings and executions.

By opting for strikes this time, Kurdish leaders sought to demonstrate solidarity while reducing the risk of large-scale violence and another massacre.

A protester in Tehran on Jan. 10, 2026.
Author-obtained image., CC BY

The result was decisive: Nearly all Kurdish cities shut down.

Baluchestan, in Iran’s southeast, followed Kurdistan a day after. Beginning with Friday prayers on Jan. 9, protests erupted, also driven by long-standing ethnic and religious marginalization there.

Iranian Azerbaijan, an area in the country’s northwest, joined later and more cautiously. This delayed, small protest reflects Azerbaijanis’ current favorable position within Iran’s political, military and economic institutions.

Historically, from the 16th century to 1925, Shiite Azari-Turks dominated the Iranian state, with Azerbaijani functioning as a court language.

The Pahlavi monarchy marked a rupture, banning the Azerbaijani language and curtailing local autonomy. But since 1979, the Islamic Republic has partially restored Azerbaijani influence, allowing clerics to address constituents in their native language and reintegrating Azerbaijan into central government in Tehran. The current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, is of Azerbaijani descent.

A history of repression

Ethnically based political movements emerged across Iran immediately after the 1979 revolution, which many minority groups had supported in hopes of greater inclusion and rights.

But these movements were quickly suppressed as the Islamic Republic crushed uprisings across Iranian Azerbaijan, Baluchestan, Khuzestan and other peripheral regions.

Kurdistan was the exception, where resistance, military confrontation and state violence, including massacres, continued for several years.

This repression and the impact of the Iran–Iraq War, during which wartime mobilization overshadowed internal grievances, muted ethnic minority demands throughout the 1980s.

But these demands resurfaced in the 1990s, especially sparked by a sense of cultural revival and cross-border identity formation after the Soviet Union’s collapse. In Iranian Kurdistan, a large part of the armed struggle was transformed into a civil struggle, while Peshmerga forces maintained arms and military training across the border in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

The Iranian government has increasingly viewed this awakening as a strategic threat and has responded by decentralizing security and military authority to enable rapid crackdowns on protests without awaiting approval from Tehran.

Diverging protest demands

This history of repression explains why the protests in Iran now were at least initially more centralized than previous uprisings. Ethnic minority regions are not indifferent to change; they are skeptical of its outcome.

Many Persian-majority urban protesters seek social freedoms, economic recovery and normalization with the West, particularly the United States. But ethnic communities carry additional demands: decentralization of power, recognition of linguistic and cultural rights, and genuine power-sharing within the state.

For over four decades, ethnic minority demands have been labeled as separatist or “terrorist” and met with arrests and executions by the Islamic Republic.

This rhetoric has also influenced major Persian-dominated opposition groups – spanning the ideological spectrum from left to right and operating largely in exile – that perceive ethnic minority demands as a threat to Iran’s territorial integrity.

Fears of the shah’s return

Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last shah of Iran, is positioning himself as the leader of the opposition and a transitional figure. But ethnic communities have reason for concern.

Pahlavi’s office has published a road map for a transitional government that sharply contrasts with his public claims of not seeking to monopolize power. The document envisions Pahlavi as a leader with extraordinary authority. In practice, the concentration of power he proposes under his leadership closely resembles the authority currently exercised by Iran’s supreme leader.

A protester holds aloft a photo of a man with 'King Reza Pahlavi' written above.
Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s late ruler Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, has seen his support surge among protesters, such as those seen here in Germany on Jan. 12, 2026.
John MAcDougall/AFP via Getty Images

For ethnic communities, these implications are particularly troubling. The road map characterizes ethnic-based demands and parties as threats to national security, reinforcing long-standing state narratives rather than departing from them. This explicit stance has deepened skepticism in peripheral regions.

In contrast to Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, whose revolutionary vision was deliberately vague regarding the future status of ethnic groups, the current opposition leadership project articulates a centralized political order that excludes ethnic inclusion and power-sharing.

For communities whose languages were banned and whose regions were systematically underdeveloped during the Pahlavi monarchy, the resurgence of monarchist slogans in central cities only reinforces fears that any transition driven by centralized narratives will again marginalize Iran’s peripheral regions.

The risk of ignoring provinces

Iran’s protests, therefore, reveal more than resistance to authoritarian rule. They expose a fundamental divide over what political change means – and for whom.

In a country as ethnically diverse as Iran, where millions belong to non-Persian ethnic communities, a durable political order cannot, I believe, be built on centralized power dominated by a single ethnic identity.

Any future transition, whether through reform within the current system or through regime change, will have a better chance of success if it incorporates a political framework that acknowledges and incorporates the demands of all regions and communities. Without such inclusion, trust in the process of change will remain elusive – and hopes for a better future dimmed.

The Conversation

Shukriya Bradost is affiliated with the Middle East Institute.

ref. Iran’s protests have spread across provinces, despite skepticism and concern among ethnic groups – https://theconversation.com/irans-protests-have-spread-across-provinces-despite-skepticism-and-concern-among-ethnic-groups-273276

Why unlocking Venezuelan oil won’t mean much for US energy prices

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Amy Myers Jaffe, Director, Energy, Climate Justice, and Sustainability Lab, and Research Professor, New York University; Tufts University

A sculpture of a hand holding an oil rig stands outside the headquarters of Venezuela’s national oil company. Pedro Mattey/AFP via Getty Images

In the wake of U.S. forces’ arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, U.S. President Donald Trump has said the U.S. is taking over Venezuelan oil production.

In addition, the U.S. has blockaded Venezuelan oil exports for a few weeks and seized tankers that reportedly escaped from the blockade.

To understand what’s happening and what it means for U.S. consumers and the American energy industry, The Conversation U.S. checked in with Amy Myers Jaffe, a research professor at New York University and senior fellow at Tufts University who studies global energy markets and the geopolitics of oil.

What is the state of Venezuela’s oil industry and how did it get to this point?

Venezuela’s oil industry has experienced profound turmoil over its history, including a steady downward spiral beginning in 1998. That’s when a worldwide economic downturn took global oil prices below $10 per barrel at the same time as the Venezuelan public’s growing interest in reasserting local control of the country’s oil industry ushered in populist President Hugo Chávez.

In April 2002, Venezuelans took to the streets to protest the appointment of Chávez loyalists to replace the top brass of the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela. The chaos culminated in an attempted coup against Chavez, who managed to retake power in a matter of days. Petróleos de Venezuela’s workers then went out on strike, prompting Chávez to purge close to 20,000 top management and oil workers. That began a brain drain that would last for years.

In 2007, Chávez, standing in front of a banner that read “Full Oil Sovereignty, The Road to Socialism,” took over ExxonMobil’s and ConocoPhillips’ oil-producing assets in Venezuela. The companies had declined to accept new oil contracts at radically less profitable terms than they had in previous years.

After Chávez’s death in 2013, national economic chaos accelerated. By 2018, reports began to surface that roving gangs, as well as some oil workers struggling to survive, were stripping the industry of its valuable materials – computers, copper wiring, and metals and machinery – to sell on the black market.

U.S. sanctions added to the mix over the years, culminating in a drop in Venezuelan oil production to 840,000 barrels a day in 2025, down from the 3.5 million barrels a day it was able to produce in 1997.

A handful of international oil companies remained in the country throughout the turmoil, including U.S.-based Chevron, French-Indonesian firm Maurel and Prom, Spanish firm Repsol, and Italian firm ENI. But the political chaos, sanctions and technical mismanagement of the oil industry have taken a heavy toll.

Some estimates say that the country wouldn’t need a lot of investment to increase production to about 1 million barrels a day by 2027. But other analysts say that immediate investment of as much as $20 billion could only raise Venezuela’s production to 1.5 million barrels a day.

Most of the oil in Venezuela is very heavy oil and requires expensive processing to be able to be refined into usable products. The country’s leaders have claimed to have 300 billion-plus barrels of reserves.

A wide view shows a group of large industrial buildings with a road and other buildings nearby.
The El Palito refinery in Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, is owned by the country’s national oil company.
Jesus Vargas/picture alliance via Getty Images

What effect does Venezuela’s production have on prices that U.S. consumers pay for gasoline, natural gas, gas-fired electricity and other petroleum products?

In general terms, U.S. gasoline prices are influenced by global crude oil market levels. Sudden changes in export rates from major oil-producing countries can alter the trajectory for oil prices.

However, Venezuela’s recent export levels have been relatively small. So the immediate effect of changes in Venezuelan oil export levels is likely to be limited. Overall, the global oil market is oversupplied at the moment, keeping prices relatively low and in danger of falling further, even though China is stockpiling large oil reserves.

Venezuela did not export any natural gas. In the long run, a fuller restoration of Venezuela’s oil and gas industry could mean oil prices will have difficulty rising as high as past peaks in times of volatility and could potentially fall if oil demand begins to peak. And Royal Dutch Shell and Trinidad and Tobago National Gas Company have plans to develop Venezuela’s offshore Dragon natural gas field, adding to an expected glut of liquefied natural gas, often called LNG, in global markets in the coming years.

How much oil is coming to the U.S. now, and how would more imports of Venezuelan oil affect U.S. refiners?

The U.S. Gulf Coast refining center is known for its capability to process heavy, low-quality oil like Venezuela’s into valuable products such as gasoline and diesel. Already, refineries owned by Chevron, Valero and Phillips 66 are bringing in Venezuelan oil.

Before the U.S. seized Maduro, most of Venezuela’s exports were going to China, though about 200,000 barrels a day were coming to the United States under Chevron’s special license.

Two figures watch a large ship move across the water.
An oil tanker approaches a dock in Maracaibo, Venezuela, on Jan. 10, 2026.
Margioni Bermúdez/AFP via Getty Images

Trump has said the U.S. will get between 30 million and 50 million barrels of oil from Venezuela, to be used “to benefit the people” of both countries. That’s about two or three days’ worth of U.S. oil production, and between one and two months’ worth of Venezuelan production. What effects could that have for the U.S. or Venezuela?

Some 20 million to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan crude oil is currently piled up in Venezuela’s storage tanks and ships in the aftermath of the U.S. blockade. Exports needed to resume quickly before storage ran out to prevent oil production facilities from needing to shut down, which could then require lengthy and expensive restart procedures.

The United States has been a major exporter of petroleum products in recent years, reaching 7.7 million barrels a day at the end of 2025.

Processing more Venezuelan oil might help make U.S. Gulf Coast refineries a bit more profitable by making more money on their refined products exports. But since there was no shortage of products in the U.S. market, I don’t expect consumers to see much savings.

But U.S. refineries only have so much capacity to refine heavy oil like Venezuela’s. And they have long-term contracts for oil from other suppliers. So they won’t be able to handle all of those 30 million to 50 million barrels. Some of it will either have to be sold abroad or put in the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve.

How does a potential increase in Venezuelan oil production affect U.S. domestic oil producers?

Over time, the impact of the restoration of Venezuelan oil production on oil prices is hard to predict. That’s because it will likely take a decade or more before Venezuela’s oil production levels could be fully restored. Long-term oil prices are notoriously tricky to forecast.

Generally speaking, U.S. shale production rates and profitability benefit when oil prices are above $50 a barrel, as they have been since 2021. U.S. oil production rose to 13.8 million barrels per day for the week ending Dec. 26, 2025, up slightly from the end of 2024. Forecasts suggest a slight increase in 2026 as well, if oil prices stay relatively flat.

Longer term, all bets are off, since the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC – a group of countries that coordinate global petroleum production and sales – has a history of telling members not to increase production when they add new oil fields, which sometimes leads to so much disagreement that a price war erupts.

The last time Venezuela moved to increase its production significantly, in the 1990s, oil prices sank below $10 a barrel. Major OPEC members like the United Arab Emirates have been expanding capacity in recent years, and others with large reserves like Libya and Iraq aspire to do the same in the coming decade as well. The UAE has been asking the group for permission to increase its production, causing difficulties in the group’s efforts to agree on what their total production and target oil price should be. That could be good news for consumers, if OPEC disunity leads to higher supplies and falling prices.

Some commentators have suggested China could be the biggest loser if shipments of Venezuelan oil shift West and away from discounted sales to China. How does the current situation affect China’s energy security and geostrategic considerations?

China’s oil imports have been averaging about 11 million barrels per day, with about 500,000 to 600,000 of that coming from Venezuela. Iran and Russia are among China’s largest oil suppliers, and both countries’ industries face tightening U.S. sanctions. There is enough oil available on the global market to provide China with what it wants, even if it doesn’t come from Venezuela.

The real question is about China’s overall response to the U.S. intervention in Venezuela. Beijing’s initial reaction to Maduro’s removal was fairly muted. In a Dec. 31, 2025, speech, however, China’s President Xi Jinping said China’s defense capabilities and national strength had “reached new heights” and called for the “reunification of our motherland.” In light of the U.S. intervention in the Americas, China may see a justification to move more aggressively toward Taiwan.

The Conversation

Amy Myers Jaffe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why unlocking Venezuelan oil won’t mean much for US energy prices – https://theconversation.com/why-unlocking-venezuelan-oil-wont-mean-much-for-us-energy-prices-273194

Will Japan build nuclear weapons? Why China’s concerns are unfounded, for now

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lewis Eves, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham

Tensions are growing in east Asia. The threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan persists and, in recent weeks, North Korea has been testing its long-range missile capabilities. Russia’s reorientation of ties from Europe towards Asia is also accelerating and the America First rhetoric of Donald Trump is raising questions about the commitment of the US president to his country’s east Asian allies.

In navigating this context, Japan has returned to one of its recurring national debates: whether it should possess nuclear weapons. This debate was reignited in December following comments from an unnamed government security adviser that they believe Japan should have nuclear weapons given the severity of the surrounding security environment.

The Japanese government swiftly reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. This response was probably, at least in part, intended to prevent relations with China from deteriorating further. China had already condemned any talk of a Japanese nuclear weapons programme, labelling Japan a “troublemaker” that was ignorant of its militaristic history.

Japan doesn’t seem likely to develop nuclear weapons in the short-term. However, the tensions that triggered this episode are not likely to end soon. This raises questions about the feasibility of a Japanese nuclear programme and the sustainability of Japan’s non-nuclear position.

Japan’s nuclear programme

The development of nuclear weapons is a lengthy process that requires years of research and infrastructure development. However, Japan’s extensive nuclear energy programme would shorten the timeline of nuclear weapons development significantly. This is because the infrastructure and expertise required to produce energy-grade nuclear material contributes to the development of more refined weapons-grade material.

In fact, Japan’s energy programme is already producing weapons-grade uranium and plutonium (the primary materials used in nuclear weapons) in its fuel production cycles. It is producing so much that, in 2014, Japan agreed to ship excess material to the US over fears that its storage sites would be targeted by terrorist groups seeking nuclear weapon capabilities.

So a Japanese nuclear arsenal is certainly feasible, with analysts in China predicting that such an arsenal could be developed within just three years.

The Mihama nuclear power station situated next to the sea.
The Mihama nuclear power station in Fukui, central Japan.
Mkaz328 / Shutterstock

However, there are several reasons why Japan is unlikely to develop its own nuclear weapons. First, developing nuclear weapons does not serve Japan’s immediate interests. Maintaining a nuclear weapons programme is expensive, with even the UK’s relatively small nuclear deterrent costing tens of billions of pounds annually. Given Japan’s vast public debt and its other economic challenges, this is money that could be put to use elsewhere.

Second, Japan’s current approach to foreign and security policy is well established and generally effective. This includes a so-called human security approach, through which Japan provides aid to address the underlying humanitarian causes of crises before they can escalate. The approach includes funding global healthcare initiatives to prevent the spread of diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, while fostering positive relations with developing countries.

Meanwhile, Japan has long managed relations with major international powers through economic and diplomatic dialogue and engagement. For its relationship with China, this takes the form of what some researchers have called “hot economics, cold politics”. This approach, which involves using intensive economic cooperation to avoid confrontation over contentious political issues, has been in place for decades and would almost certainly end should Japan pursue a nuclear weapon.

Third, there are constitutional barriers to a Japanese nuclear weapons programme. The “pacifist clause” of Japan’s constitution, Article 9, renounces aggression as a tool of foreign policy.

This does not strictly outlaw a defensive nuclear deterrent. But the act of launching a nuclear weapon, even in retaliation, is itself an offensive action incompatible with international law and human rights. Thus, even if Article 9 is interpreted in such a way that technically allows for nuclear weapons, their use would probably be restricted to a point of redundancy.

Japan’s parliament also passed a national policy known as the three non-nuclear principles in the 1970s. These commit Japan to not possessing, producing or permitting the presence of nuclear weapons in its territory. These principles would need to be overturned by parliament to allow for a nuclear weapons programme. However, this is unlikely given that recent polling indicates around 70% of the Japanese public oppose nuclear weapons.

And fourth, Japan’s nuclear programme would face international legal barriers. In 1970, Japan signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty alongside 190 other countries. In signing, Japan agreed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and work towards nuclear disarmament. Failing to comply with this treaty could result in significant economic and diplomatic sanctions that would probably offset any security gain from a weapons programme.

A big, book-shaped dummy titled 'Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons' left by peace activists outside a dutch military air base.
A total of 191 countries are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Milos Ruzicka / Shutterstock

These factors make imminent Japanese nuclear weapons very unlikely. But the longer-term prospects are different. Japanese pacifism is slowly eroding, with repeated reinterpretations of Article 9 in recent years to permit more military autonomy.

In 2022, Japan adopted counterstrike capabilities into its defence policy, giving Japanese forces the capacity to launch offensive acts as part of a larger defensive strategy. This could, for example, involve launching missiles at an enemy port that is supplying a hostile fleet. These capabilities set a precedent that might eventually permit nuclear counterstrikes as part of a defensive deterrence programme.

This would still require legal change. However, young Japanese people are less opposed to nuclear weapons than their older counterparts. A 2025 survey found that around a third of Japanese teenagers support the development of a nuclear deterrent, coinciding with an increase in far-right and nationalistic views domestically. This opens the door for the eventual revocation of the non-nuclear principles.

Meanwhile, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is increasingly struggling to control the global spread of nuclear weapons, raising questions of whether it could deter states like Japan from pursuing nuclear weapons in the future. Should attitudes in Japan continue to shift and nuclear non-proliferation continue to struggle, a nuclear-armed Japan is a serious possibility over coming decades.

The Conversation

Lewis Eves does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Will Japan build nuclear weapons? Why China’s concerns are unfounded, for now – https://theconversation.com/will-japan-build-nuclear-weapons-why-chinas-concerns-are-unfounded-for-now-272849

AI could be your next line manager

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kirk Chang, Professor of Management and Technology, University of East London

Andrey_Popov/Shutterstock

AI is already doing a pretty good job at taking on some of the world’s workload. It has produced academic papers, enhanced space exploration and developed medical treatments.

And AI could soon be used in a managerial role too, making decisions that effect the working lives of human colleagues.

In some ways, this is an expected development. After all, AI is capable of learning, analysing, integrating and producing information.

It outperforms human intelligence in cognition (AI thinks more deeply and more quickly), reasoning (it has a wider scope of analysis and better accuracy) and coordination (it can handle highly complex tasks and process huge amounts of data).

As a result of these professional strengths, AI already has a pretty impressive CV. It has carried out repetitive manual work, intensive tasks on assembly lines and makes risk evaluations in space.

Meanwhile, research confirms that for many of us, AI is already a colleague of sorts, supporting businesses and human workers as they go about their daily tasks.

There are of course also jobs that have been lost, and people who feel justifiably threatened by AI’s increasing presence.

But for many organisations, AI has already proved invaluable. Recent research has shown that AI has increased the efficiency of marketing strategies, improved energy saving, and enhanced problem solving abilities – skills that take humans years of training and experience to match.

AI can also work 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It does not complain and never goes on strike.

Meet the new boss?

But can AI replace human managers? Recent research I was involved in suggests that it can.

We took one of the most important tasks a business can engage in – recruiting the members of its workforce – and entrusted it to an AI system that my colleague and I had developed.

Generally speaking, recruitment is a managerial task, carried out by senior employees or outsourced to specialist firms. But for our project, AI handled the whole recruitment process independently and competently, from selecting candidates to drafting contracts. Using online interviews, questionnaires and filters, over 100 people were offered jobs at an electronic manufacturing plant in China.

Overall, we showed that AI is capable of implementing managerial tasks, at least in the field of recruitment. The success of our project suggests to us that AI could carry out managerial tasks on a much larger scale within the next ten years, supervising, leading and managing human employees.

We also think that AI working at managerial level will first emerge in the tech industry, where it has already been extensively used in operational roles.

People power

But other industries will surely follow. Other research has shown that AI offers businesses much in terms of better performance, financial gain and competitive advantage.

There are downsides too, of course. For all its benefits, AI poses an existential threat to many people’s jobs and careers. And human managers may not be keen to work with technology which impedes on their own decision making freedom – or their status.

Robotic hand pointing.
‘You’re hired.’
Willyam Bradberry/Shutterstock

Nor is AI yet skilled in the kind of relationship building, camaraderie or team spirit which can drive successful organisations.

So while the competition between AI and human colleagues will probably continue to grow in some sectors, people still have valuable strengths which make them attractive as line managers. First, they are are capable of vision, passion and hopes for the future, which provide momentum for social and economic progress and development. AI does not operate in this manner.

Second, AI always needs external – human – power to direct its tasks. For the moment, it cannot manage or reason without the involvement of people.

But some form of AI management is probably heading for many of our offices and work places. It could enhance these places, through pre-programmed reliability and efficiency.

But we need to be ready for it, and to be familiar with its characteristics and functions, rather than fearing or belittling its existence. The more we understand AI, the better we can learn to live with it, even if it is one day tasked with managing our own working lives.

The Conversation

Kirk Chang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. AI could be your next line manager – https://theconversation.com/ai-could-be-your-next-line-manager-199937

How realistic is Mattel’s new autistic Barbie?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Aimee Grant, Associate Professor in Public Health and Wellcome Trust Career Development Fellow, Swansea University

Autistic people are so rarely depicted in media and entertainment, it’s no wonder most people don’t really understand much about the neurotype.

So we were pleased to see the launch of autistic Barbie.

Autism is a life-long neurodevelopmental difference, meaning autistic children grow into autistic adults. As autistic researchers, who advocate for the increased meaningful representation of our community, it was a good sign that multinational toy company Mattel worked with an autistic-led advocacy organisation based in the US, the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, in creating this new toy.

We have seen mixed reviews from autistic people since the launch, with some praising representation while others have been more critical of the doll.

Here are some considerations about her features to help you make up your own mind.

The tablet

Autistic Barbie is shown with a tablet with an augmented and alternative communication (AAC) application, which speaks aloud when buttons are pressed.

Some autistic people find communicating extremely challenging, and around a third cannot communicate reliably by speaking. This leads to needs going unmet, feeling misunderstood and often significant distress.

That is, unless an alternative mode of communication is available. Applications available on tablets, such as Proloquo2Go and Coughdrop, are helpful for some autistic people to communicate their needs and preferences.

Although some non-speaking autistic people find it easier to communicate with non-digital options such as printed cards, or using a low-tech signboard with letter tiles alongside a skilled communication partner, we think it’s great that this Barbie comes with a tablet.

The headphones

Sensory sensitivities are a core element of autistic lived experience. Autistic people are commonly sensitive to noise, light, smells, textures and taste. To represent this, autistic Barbie comes with noise-cancelling headphones which can be vital for some autistic people with noise sensitivities. However, other autistic people may find them too uncomfortable to wear and prefer in-ear options. For this reason, autistic people should be allowed to wear ear protection any time it is safe.

Eye contact

The development team reportedly gave Barbie a sideways glance, which aimed to show that eye contact may be uncomfortable and thus avoided in autistic people. An additional way to strengthen autistic Barbie could be to show the potential of visual distress, and to provide her with a coloured glasses accessory. Coloured lenses are a helpful tool to reduce the pain some autistic people feel in response to light, movement and colours. In reality, a specialist test can be used to help autistic people figure out what colour is best for them.

The outfit

Mattel seem to have invested thought in making Barbie’s outfit comfortable from a sensory point of view. Her outfit does not come with labels sewn in – a common cause of irritation to autistic people.

Her dress is loose and flowing, which may appeal to those with tactile hypersensitivity. We didn’t have an autistic Barbie to hand, so we aren’t sure what the fabric is like, but soft and comfortable fabric is a must for many autistic people.

It is worth noting that autistic people often have individual clothing preferences, and some may prefer tight – or even restrictive – clothing as it provides proprioceptive feedback, which can be comforting. It can also support hypermobile joints, which are at least three times as common in autistic people compared to non-autistic people. Furthermore, many autistic people are gender non-conforming, so may not see themselves represented in this outfit.

Autistic Barbie is wearing Mary Jane-style flat shoes, rather than Barbie’s typical high heels. Many autistic people struggle with shoes and rigid slim shoes may be uncomfortable for some. Almost half of autistic young people also walk on their tiptoes as a way of stimming, so allowing a movable ankle would have allowed this to be visible.

The stim tool

Stimming is an important way for autistic people to stay comfortable and regulated. It can undo some of the pain and discomfort of an unsuitable sensory environment. For this reason, we were really pleased to see that Barbie has two opportunities to stim. First, she has bendable elbows and wrists – many autistic people do some form of repetitive movement of their arms and hands as part of stimming. Also, Barbie holds a fidget spinner. This is a small toy that creates an interesting tactile and visual response.

Although not all autistic people will like fidget spinners, most engage in stims with their hands, so this is a good representation of one object that autistic people use to stim.

So how did Mattel do?

Social science researchers have claimed that Barbie – regardless of neurotype – has historically been reductive and problematic. Barbie is unachievably thin, extremely feminine and all too often white. It is important not to ignore these criticisms, however, Barbies are very popular toys and have a reach beyond other brands, and their range of disabled Barbies feels important to raise awareness.

There is no single “look” to being autistic, so the Barbie Mattel created can’t represent everyone, especially as her design is limited to visual elements. Despite these issues, we think, in general, that Mattel and the Autistic Self Advocacy Network have done a great job of creating the autistic Barbie doll.

Her existence is an overall positive. Her inclusion creates a much-needed opportunity for representation, education and normalises the use of disability accommodations.

The Conversation

Aimee Grant receives funding from The Wellcome Trust and UKRI.

Rebecca Ellis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How realistic is Mattel’s new autistic Barbie? – https://theconversation.com/how-realistic-is-mattels-new-autistic-barbie-273277

English lessons shouldn’t be an immigration test – why the UK’s new policy risks deepening exclusion

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Declan Flanagan, Lecturer in Applied Languages and Intercultural Studies, Dublin City University

shutterstock Media_Photos/Shutterstock

What happens when learning English stops being a bridge into society and starts to feel like a test of belonging you can fail?

That is the question raised by the the UK government’s proposed new immigration policy, which would raise English-language requirements for most visa routes, with the aim of improving integration and workforce readiness.

This represents an increase in emphasis on language proficiency. Applicants would have to demonstrate higher proficiency in speaking, reading, writing and listening. There would be stricter testing standards and fewer exemptions, aligning immigration with strong communication skills for employment and community participation.

Ministers say the proposed policies will promote “integration” and “opportunity”. But it risks doing the opposite, by turning English for speakers of other languages (Esol) into a tool of surveillance rather than inclusion.

We are part of the Coalition for Language Education, a network of academics, teachers and organisations. The group argues that the proposed policy treats the ability to speak English less as a means of empowerment and more as a mechanism of immigration control.

By tying long-term residence and citizenship to staged progress in learning English, the policy reframes language not as a shared public good, but as a condition of acceptance. In effect, English becomes a kind of border.

Language shapes how we live together. It’s how people build relationships, find work, take part in communities and participate in democracy. But it can also be used to divide and exclude.

For non-native speakers, learning English has long been about helping people navigate everyday life, express themselves and feel at home. The government’s proposals, however, position English proficiency as a test of belonging – something to be proved, measured and monitored.

A decade-long test of worthiness

Under the plan, migrants seeking settlement or citizenship would be required to show staged progress in English, moving from basic to upper-intermediate levels over a ten-year period. Language attainment would be linked to a points-based system that also tracks employment and civic participation.

Language acquisition, however, is not linear. Progress is shaped by trauma, health, caring responsibilities, work patterns and previous education. For refugees and others who have experienced displacement or interrupted schooling, the expectation of steady, testable improvement can be unrealistic and punitive.

Reducing these complex learning journeys to tick-box benchmarks turns learning English into a compliance exercise. Linguistic ability becomes confused with effort, morality and even loyalty. Passing tests is seen as proof of trying hard, so failure implies laziness. Fluency becomes linked to being a “good” or “deserving” migrant. High proficiency signals commitment to national identity, while lower ability is framed as resistance.




Read more:
English classes are being targeted by anti-immigration protesters – but they’ve been politicised for years


This is not just a UK issue either. Around the world, language education has increasingly been tied to immigration control. What is new with this proposal is how openly English is framed as something to be audited.

In the UK, attendance, test results and progression targets risk becoming data points used to monitor behaviour, rather than tools to support learning. Teachers are pushed to prioritise performance indicators over dialogue, confidence-building and community connection.

When language becomes a tool of control, it reshapes citizenship itself, testing people against a narrow linguistic ideal and eroding democratic values. Equality, fairness, inclusion and participation erode when language becomes a gatekeeping tool. Narrow linguistic standards exclude diverse speakers, denying equal access to citizenship and civic rights.

A policy detached from reality

Beyond its ideology, the proposed policy also fails on practical grounds. Esol provision across the UK is already underfunded and uneven. Community and voluntary providers, who support many of the most marginalised learners, are expected to deliver high-stakes outcomes with limited resources.

But there are no commitments to teacher training, pay, or access for women, refugees, or rural learners. There is little recognition of the barriers many learners face, including trauma, caring responsibilities or lack of access to childcare and transport. Nor is there any serious engagement with trauma-informed or learner-centred teaching approaches. Instead, the policy doubles down on a technocratic model that values what can be measured over what actually matters in the classroom.

Language should help people connect, not police their right to stay. Integration cannot be engineered through fear of failure or threat of exclusion. It grows when education is welcoming, well resourced and rooted in respect.

Linguistic diversity is not a problem to be solved. It is a public resource that enriches communities and strengthens democracy. Teaching English works best when it builds on what learners already know, rather than treating their languages as obstacles to overcome.

A teacher gives an English lesson using a chalkboard.
shutterstock.
Alone Pik/Shutterstock

Instead of tethering language learning to immigration enforcement, the government should invest in trauma-informed, learner-centred provision that meets learners’ needs. Assessment, too, needs rethinking. It should prioritise real-world communication and participation, not abstract benchmarks that silence voices.

Most importantly, integration must be understood as a two-way process. Host communities have as much to learn as newcomers.

If the government believes in empowerment, then education should amplify voices, not diminish them. Language policy should open doors, not lock them.

By replacing the language of rights and participation – teaching English not just for jobs, but to empower migrants to understand, claim and exercise their rights and engage in civic life – with conditional belonging, the proposed policy risks reinforcing inequality rather than reducing it. Presenting linguistic mastery as proof of national worth corrodes the democratic values language education should uphold.

Language should unite, not divide. When the English language is turned into an instrument of control, the very medium through which democracy operates is weakened. The task ahead is not to “restore control” over language, but to restore trust – in learners, in teachers and in the power of linguistic diversity to bring people together.

The Conversation

Declan Flanagan is affiliated with NATECLA.

Mike Chick is affiliated with the Welsh Refugee Council.

ref. English lessons shouldn’t be an immigration test – why the UK’s new policy risks deepening exclusion – https://theconversation.com/english-lessons-shouldnt-be-an-immigration-test-why-the-uks-new-policy-risks-deepening-exclusion-268158

Jair Bolsonaro had surgery for his hiccups. How to know when hiccups need medical intervention

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adam Taylor, Professor of Anatomy, Lancaster University

Jair Bolsonaro. Focus Pics/Shutterstock.com

Brazil’s jailed former president Jair Bolsonaro was recently reported to have undergone three medical treatments to stop a bout of persistent hiccups. While hiccups are usually harmless and short-lived, his case highlights a condition that can, in rare circumstances, become medically significant.

Hiccups are one of the few bodily functions named after the sound they make. The sound is caused by a sudden, involuntary spasm of the diaphragm – a large, dome-shaped muscle that separates the chest from the abdomen and plays an essential role in breathing.

When the diaphragm contracts unexpectedly, air is drawn rapidly into the lungs. At the same time, the vocal cords snap shut, producing the characteristic “hic” sound.

Most people hiccup between two and 60 times per minute. Episodes typically last a few minutes, sometimes a few hours, before resolving on their own. They are usually only a minor irritation.

Doctors become more concerned when hiccups persist. Those lasting longer than 48 hours are classified as “persistent”. If they continue for more than a month, they are described as “intractable hiccups” – a rare and often debilitating condition.

The causes of common, short-term hiccups are usually straightforward. They can be triggered by an overfull stomach, alcoholic or fizzy drinks, very hot or very cold drinks, or emotional states such as anxiety and excitement or stress. These factors irritate or stimulate the nerves involved in the hiccup reflex, briefly disrupting the normal control of breathing.

Given how common hiccups are, it is not surprising that there are countless suggested cures. Some are supported by scientific evidence, while others rely on anecdote and personal experience.

Many of the techniques that appear to work best have one thing in common: they affect how the diaphragm functions. By altering breathing patterns or briefly increasing carbon dioxide levels in the blood, they may help reset the nerves that control the muscle.

Several small studies have examined structured breathing techniques. One approach, called “hiccup-relief using prolonged active inspiration” – slowly breathing in very deeply and holding it to stop diaphragm spasms – showed success in 21 patients. Another technique, called supra-supramaximal inspiration (breathing in even more after you already feel completely full of air) relieved hiccups in six people in a separate study.

A device based on similar principles, using controlled sucking and swallowing to regulate diaphragm activity, demonstrated a nearly 92% success rate in over 200 people.

There are also many commonly cited home remedies, although these often have little or no evidence to support them. They include breathing into a bag, drinking or gargling iced water, pulling the tongue, biting a lemon, eating peanut butter, applying pressure to the eyeballs, rectal massage (yes, really), performing the Valsalva manoeuvre (trying to breathe out against a closed nose and mouth), or attempting to induce a sudden fright. However, for most people, a brief change in breathing or swallowing is enough to interrupt the hiccup reflex.

Woman biting into a lemon.
Most home remedies for hiccups lack evidence.
VikaNorm/Shutterstock.com

One reason hiccups are difficult to study is that they usually resolve quickly. Short episodes are hard to capture in controlled research settings, which limits large-scale studies. As a result, most published studies focus on persistent and intractable cases.

Intractable hiccups are rare, affecting about one in 100,000 people. They occur far more often in men, who account for more than 90% of cases, particularly those over the age of 50. In these people, hiccups can be exhausting and distressing, interfering with eating, sleeping and breathing.

In Bolsonaro’s case, the cause of his latest episode has not been made clear. In June 2021, however, he attributed a previous bout of persistent hiccups to medication prescribed after dental surgery. Although the specific drugs were not disclosed, several medications are known to trigger prolonged hiccups.

Corticosteroids, such as dexamethasone and methylprednisolone, particularly at high doses, are well-recognised triggers.

Unlike food or fizzy drinks, which irritate nerves directly, these drugs affect chemical messengers within the nerve pathways that control the diaphragm. Hiccups have even been reported following corticosteroid injections into the knee or shoulder, which are often given to relieve pain from arthritis.

Benzodiazepines (drugs to treat anxiety and insomnia) can also cause hiccups, sometimes even at low doses. Studies of procedures involving benzodiazepine sedation, such as endoscopy, show that around one in five patients given midazolam develop hiccups, compared with about one in 20 who are not given the drug. The effect is again more common in men.

Some antipsychotic medications, including aripiprazole, have also been linked to hiccups, which often resolve when the drug is stopped. These medications influence the same neurotransmitter systems involved in the hiccup reflex.

Not always benign

Treatment for persistent hiccups usually takes one of two forms: medication or physical procedures. The drugs doctors most often prescribe are baclofen and metoclopramide, which have been tested in small studies comparing them against placebos (dummy pills). If the medication doesn’t work or causes too many side-effects, doctors may consider more invasive treatments.

Bolsonaro underwent a phrenic nerve block, a procedure that temporarily reduces or paralyses the function of the phrenic nerve, which controls the diaphragm. The effect can last for hours, days or up to a few weeks.

Because the phrenic nerve plays a critical role in breathing, the nerves on both sides of the body are rarely blocked at the same time. When used appropriately, the procedure is highly effective.

In more severe cases, or when doctors find out what’s causing the problem, permanent treatments might be needed. These could include destroying the nerve that’s causing the hiccups using heat or freezing, or surgically cutting and sealing off the nerve to stop the signals.

Persistent hiccups after stomach surgery are common. Since Bolsonaro was previously stabbed in the abdomen, this could be playing a role in his hiccup problem.

Damage to the area of the brain responsible for regulating hiccups can also play a role. One well-known example is Charles Osborne who holds the record for the longest continuous bout of hiccups – lasting 68 years from 1922 to 1990.

Research shows they can sometimes be an early symptom of cancers of the oesophagus, colon, kidneys, or conditions affecting the brainstem. Studies have also found that men diagnosed with persistent hiccups have higher rates of certain cancers in the following 12 months.

Thankfully for most people, hiccups remain a harmless inconvenience. However, hiccups that persist for several days without an obvious trigger should be assessed by a doctor.

The Conversation

Adam Taylor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Jair Bolsonaro had surgery for his hiccups. How to know when hiccups need medical intervention – https://theconversation.com/jair-bolsonaro-had-surgery-for-his-hiccups-how-to-know-when-hiccups-need-medical-intervention-272749

The academic study of politics is failing disabled people – with real-world consequences

Source: The Conversation – UK – By David Alexander, Affiliate Researcher, Political & International Studies, University of Glasgow

AnnaStills/Shutterstock

Diversity among students and researchers is a common goal across academia. This has been driven by a desire to increase opportunities for the historically marginalised in higher education – moving away from the straight, white and male personification of academia.

It also comes from a recognition that diversity brings innovation. It enhances the quality of research and teaching. It improves how higher education institutions engage with a diverse student body. Increased representation has affected how academia operates.

This is true in my discipline of political science. As we have worked to expand representation in the profession, we have broadened our understanding of the diversity of politics.

Growing representation in the field has increased our awareness of how different groups engage with politics. These are people often historically discounted in societies and ignored by political science: women, the LGBTQ+ community, people from ethnic minority backgrounds. Increased diversity gives academia invaluable general insight into the organisation of politics.

But disability in politics is in its infancy, as is the representation of the disabled scholar. Underrepresentation will affect any field. In political science, though, this is a particularly hazardous situation. Many of the issues disabled people encounter in society will result from political decision making.

In the UK, 25% of the population is considered to potentially have a disability. This not only includes physical or sensory impairment and neurodiversity, but long-term illness such as HIV, and mental health conditions such as depression.

Disabled students in higher education, from a position of underrepresentation, are also now an expanding group as the sector has made efforts to increase accessibility. Around 18% of UK students report having a disability. Yet only 7% of academics declare a disability in higher education.

Students in lecture theatre
Around one-fifth of UK students report having a disability.
VisualBricks/Shutterstock

Politics can deeply affect the lives of the disabled person. A change in policy may leave them unable to work or contribute to society, creating more barriers in life.

The unease in the disabled community about being represented in the assisted dying debate and the prospective fallout is one key example. Debate has also focused on what cars disabled people should be allowed to drive.

But because political science rarely recognises disability, politics and politicians are provided with little information on the impact of policy. We need more disabled political scientists to increase awareness, and this awareness will help better interrogate political issues around disability. More lived experiences of disability should provide insight, but also help create acknowledgement that the issues exist, from those who may never experience disability. But barriers exist.

Changing research

In my research, I argue that this lack of diversity has been entrenched by the marginalisation of disabled political scientists. We are not present or visible in research positions. At best, we are considered a novelty (as has been said to me on more than one occasion).

We – disabled scholars – are trying to highlight the disabling barriers that prevent career progress. These are usually hidden from non-disabled colleagues, who I believe are unaware of the issues, rather than looking to maintain exclusion.

One such barrier is hidden labour. A disabled scholar must make greater sacrifices to “make it” compared to non-disabled colleagues. This includes, for example, the energy required to access inaccessible teaching spaces, fieldwork travel and overcoming sensory overload or burnout. This effort must be put in to not have aspersions placed on a disabled scholar’s academic capacity. But there is often little or no acknowledgement from universities and other scholars of the barriers that mean this extra work is required.

We may be slowly approaching a turning point in the research of disability in politics. Several scholars are showing disability can provide understanding on how politics operates. Researchers are focusing on issues such as the political representation of the disabled person, and disability’s place within political theory. Others are exploring how disability affects support for political parties.

Research like this on disability is providing understanding of how far assumptions based on the non-disabled person are influential in politics. For instance, it is developing our knowledge about who gets to be represented in politics, and the barriers that exist for disabled people to actively engage in political participation.

There is a small but growing awareness that disability potentially offers a new perspective to frame our understanding of politics. Currently, this understanding is built on the image of the non-disabled person and what they believe politics should look like. The disabled person is an important part of society, but one that has often suffered from political decision making.

Once the disabled political scientist becomes a norm rather than exception, the importance of disability will be more undeniable. We will be better able to address and understand the impact politics has upon disabled people.

The Conversation

David Alexander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The academic study of politics is failing disabled people – with real-world consequences – https://theconversation.com/the-academic-study-of-politics-is-failing-disabled-people-with-real-world-consequences-259222

How Ukraine is fighting environmental damage and building its resilience amid war

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ievgeniia Kopytsia, Research Associate in the Law Faculty, University of Oxford

A Ukrainian soldier holds the national flag in a sunflower field. Pavlovska Yevheniia / Shutterstock

Russia’s war in my home country Ukraine has caused environmental damage on a vast scale. Roughly 2.4 million hectares of agricultural land – an area almost the size of Wales – are now littered with unexploded ordnance. Thousands of oil, chemical and ammunition facilities have also been damaged, releasing toxic substances into rivers, wetlands and the Black Sea.

The 2023 destruction of the Kakhovka dam on the Dnipro River alone flooded 600 sq km of land, destroying entire ecosystems. And total war-related emissions are now estimated to stand at the equivalent of around 230 million tonnes of CO₂. This is comparable to the annual emissions of Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia combined.

Yet even under this pressure, Ukraine remains able to build a sustainable future. As outlined in a policy brief presented at Cop30 in Brazil by my colleagues from Oxford Net Zero and I, Ukraine has an opportunity to build a carbon market that can support its postwar recovery and strengthen its ability to withstand future conflict.


Wars and climate change are inextricably linked. Climate change can increase the likelihood of violent conflict by intensifying resource scarcity and displacement, while conflict itself accelerates environmental damage. This article is part of a series, War on climate, which explores the relationship between climate issues and global conflicts.


A carbon market allows companies to trade “carbon credits”, each of which represent one tonne of CO₂ reduced or removed from the atmosphere. These credits are generated by projects like reforestation or renewable energy and can be bought by companies to compensate for their own greenhouse gas emissions.

There are two main types of carbon market: a compliance market and a voluntary market. In a compliance market, a government controls the supply of carbon credits. They cap emissions at certain levels and issue tradable permits to companies, with a company that does not use all of its carbon credits able to sell them to one that expects to exceed its limits.

In a voluntary market, companies purchase carbon credits from project developers voluntarily to offset their own emissions. They often do so to enhance their own reputation or to meet demands from investors, with purchasing carbon credits usually a faster way to show climate action than cutting emissions directly.

The global compliance market is far larger than the voluntary market, valued at US$851 billion (£634 billion) in 2021. The voluntary market was valued at only US$2 billion that year. But a functioning voluntary carbon market could still be vital for Ukraine.

According to Morgan Stanley, a global financial services firm, the global voluntary carbon market is expected to grow to about US$100 billion in 2030 and US$250 billion by 2050. A well-designed national market could open access to private capital to support Ukraine’s recovery at a time when the public budget is stretched to breaking point.

Revenue from carbon credits could, for example, help finance more projects to reforest Ukraine’s war-damaged land and restore its degraded agricultural soil. It could also support the development of more decentralised renewable energy in the country.

Various assessments, including one by the World Bank, suggest these are all areas that will require billions of dollars in investment over the coming years. Carbon finance will not replace public funding, but it could complement it at a moment of acute fiscal pressure.

The technology and projects that are commonly financed through voluntary carbon markets, particularly renewable energy, could also make Ukraine better able to withstand the effects of conflict in the future.

Fossil fuel-based infrastructure is extremely vulnerable during war because it depends on centralised facilities, long supply chains and the continuous delivery of fuel. Refineries, pipelines and substations are immobile targets, while fuel convoys are exposed to attack.

Decentralised renewable energy systems reduce these risks. For example, localised solar power systems that operate independently from the national grid can keep hospitals, shelters and communication centres running even when the main electricity network is attacked.

Designing a market

The foundations for Ukraine to design its own national carbon market are already in place. Ukraine’s parliament adopted a law in 2024 that formally mandated the creation of an emissions trading system. The system is set to start in 2026 with a pilot phase, with the aim of establishing a framework for trading carbon credits.

There are also several voluntary nature restoration initiatives emerging in the country. A project called Rewilding Ukraine, for example, has begun restoring around 13,500 hectares of wetlands and grassland in southern Ukraine – an area comparable to the size of the Isle of Wight’s inland forests and farmland combined.

These projects are currently operated independently, while remaining fragmented and generally small in scale. But many are being developed with the expectation that they will eventually be integrated into a carbon market, which would allow them to generate verified carbon credits.

Rolling grasslands in Ukraine.
The Tarutino Steppe is a rolling area of grassland in the Danube delta that supports a diverse range of plants.
Max Yakovlev / Rewilding Ukraine

If Ukraine can begin building a credible carbon market under fire, then any country facing instability or crisis can do the same. But countries currently enjoying relative peace and stability should recognise the privilege they hold.

They can restore nature, strengthen resilience to climate change, and cut emissions without living under the constant threat of missiles and blackouts. I hope they choose to act now, before a crisis forces them to.

The Conversation

Ievgeniia Kopytsia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How Ukraine is fighting environmental damage and building its resilience amid war – https://theconversation.com/how-ukraine-is-fighting-environmental-damage-and-building-its-resilience-amid-war-271889

Trump’s attacks on the Federal Reserve risk fuelling US inflation and ending dollar dominance

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Emre Tarim, Lecturer in Behavioural Sciences, Lancaster University

Natali-Natali love/Shutterstock

US president Donald Trump’s attacks on the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell, are yet another signal of a new era of economic policymaking and governance.

After repeatedly calling Powell “stupid” for not lowering interest rates quickly enough, Trump has now directed government prosecutors to launch a criminal investigation into Powell for allegedly misleading the Senate about the costs of renovations at the central bank’s buildings, allegations he denies.

While the immediate risk of forcing an interest rate cut too quickly would be higher inflation in the US, Trump’s unprecedented attacks on Powell cannot be seen merely as a domestic matter.

This is not just because of the US economy being the largest in the world, but also due to how businesses, consumers and governments use the US dollar in their economic affairs.

Since the 1980s when Trump was a celebrity businessman, he has been making his vision of economics clear. Now, as the most powerful man in the world, he is trying to put that vision into practice.

In this vision, there are clear winners and losers in any economic transaction. And instead of mutual benefits, the US must always be the winner.

While the fairness of trade relations is always open to academic and political scrutiny, the global economic order after the second world war has had a way of resolving disputes through bodies like the World Trade Organisation.

A rule-based international trade regime helped to generate spectacular economic growth in the second half of the 20th century. Yet, the start of the 21st century hasn’t been great for the world economy, with two major financial crises in the early 2000s (the dotcom bubble and global financial crisis).

Added to these are the rise of populist and authoritarian politics and the COVID pandemic. These have shifted the ground on which the rule-based global economy had been thriving since the 1950s. Threats to that world economic order also threaten the pre-eminent place of the dollar within it.

Trump is gunning for Powell, supposedly over building costs at the Fed.

The US dollar was the official reserve currency of the world economy between 1944 and 1976 through international agreements backed by gold reserves. International trade imbalances, which initially favoured the US but then benefited the fast-recovering European and Asian economies, put an end to this gold standard.

Yet, because of what some scholars call path dependence (where society tends to stick to familiar processes), the dollar has continued to act like the world’s reserve currency.

Advances in finance theory and practice, such as new valuation models and increased computing power, have also helped businesses and governments manage their affairs in this deregulated yet highly integrated economic environment.

The autonomy question

Another important factor in the dollar’s dominance has been the strength of institutions, including the rule of law in the US. A pinnacle of this is the Fed, and its autonomy over monetary policy to ensure maximum employment and price stability in the US economy.

This autonomy is enshrined in the US constitution and many developed and developing countries followed suit and gave policy autonomy to their central banks. This was often after turmoil caused or exacerbated by politicians. Since the 1980s, the Fed has been the most important source of economic information for business, investors and governments around the world.




Read more:
The 1970s inflation crisis shaped modern central bank independence. Now it’s under populist threat – podcast


But now Trump is threatening to reverse this autonomy and replace it with his own vision of economics involving lower interest rates to boost economic activity and decrease government debt payments.

It’s possible that Trump may be following the lead of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who put his country’s economy in negative interest rate territory in 2019. This was followed by soaring annual inflation, which some commentators calculated to be in triple digits.

Any politically driven cut in interest rates in the US, ushered in with a new Fed chairman (Powell’s term ends in May) will almost certainly lead to inflationary pressures. This is because it will trigger consumer borrowing and consumption, especially if people realise how the value of their dollars is deteriorating compared to goods, services and other currencies.

This can become a vicious cycle, where inflation gets out of control and US consumers avoid holding dollars. They may seek alternatives like gold and cryptocurrencies until a more orthodox monetary policy is adopted again. Of course, Trump is now a champion of cryptocurrencies, after once likening bitcoin to a “scam”.

None of this fits well with Trump’s election promise to bring down consumer prices.

fruit and vegetables with price labels in a us supermarket
Trump’s dream of lower interest rates could fuel inflation for American consumers.
Kenishirotie/Shutterstock

Global trust and interest in US assets are already declining, as many investors are openly or anonymously (for fear of retaliation by the Trump administration) discussing their growing aversion to the US economy. This does not help the dollar. A depreciated and politically controlled dollar would likely herald the beginning of the end of dollar hegemony.

Over the years, commentators wrongly announced the beginning of this decline after events such as the introduction of the euro and moves by China to foster a new global monetary system. But these ignored how path dependence and inertia in economic affairs reduce uncertainty and can underpin a currency’s status as a reserve currency.

Yet, if Trump and his successors realise their economic vision, the world might finally see a real reversal in the dollar’s fortunes. This could come alongside increased economic regionalisation determined by the “us against them” mentality.

History teaches how such episodes led to open conflict – and how the world once managed to prevent them with a rule-based international order.

The Conversation

Emre Tarim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Trump’s attacks on the Federal Reserve risk fuelling US inflation and ending dollar dominance – https://theconversation.com/trumps-attacks-on-the-federal-reserve-risk-fuelling-us-inflation-and-ending-dollar-dominance-273396