Category: Analysis

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Some people just don’t like music – it may be down to their brain wiring

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Catherine Loveday, Professor, Neuropsychology, University of Westminster

Krakenimages.com/Shutterstock

When I ask a lecture theatre full of students how they would feel if they could never listen to a piece of music again, most are horrified. Many have been plugged into their headphones until the moment the class begins. But without fail, one or two will shyly admit that their lives would not change at all if music didn’t exist.

Psychologists call this “music anhedonia”, meaning an absence of pleasure for music. And a new paper from neuroscientists in Spain and Canada suggests it is caused by a problem with communication between different parts of the brain.

For many of us, apathy towards music seems unfathomable. Yet, for 5%-10% of the population, this is their norm.

I see it often in my own research and practice in people with memory loss, where I ask people to select favourite songs as a way of accessing significant memories.

It has always fascinated me that some people look at me blankly and say, “I’ve never been that bothered by music”. It is such a contrast to the majority who love to talk about their first record, or the tune played at their wedding.

Recent evidence shows considerable variation in the depth of people’s emotional response to music. Around 25% of the population are hyperhedonic, which is an almost obsessive urge to engage intensely and frequently with music.

Research in this field typically uses the Barcelona Music Reward Questionnaire (BMRQ), which asks people about the significance of music in daily life: how often they listen to records, whether they hum along, and if there are songs that give them a shiver down the spine.

Low scorers are classified as having music anhedonia and many researchers further verify this in the lab by measuring heart rate, sweat response and breathing while music is playing. For most of us, these physiological markers change dramatically during emotional songs. But in those with music anhedonia, there are often no physiological effects at all.

One theory is that reduced enjoyment for music may reflect a more generalised anhedonia, an absence of pleasure for anything. Often, this is linked to disruption to the reward pathways in the brain, in areas such as the nucleus accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex and insula.

It is a common feature of depression, which, along with other mood disorders, can correlate with a lack of response to music . However, this does not explain specific music anhedonia, where people happily enjoy other rewards such as food, socialising and films, but remain indifferent to music.

Man scowling at violin
Not every child made to take music lessons grows up to thank their parents.
foto-lite/Shuttersock

An alternative possibility is that people with reduced interest in music simply don’t understand it, perhaps due to difficulties with processing melody and harmony. To test this, we can look at people with amusia – a deficit in music perception, which affects the ability to identify familiar tunes or detect wrong notes. This occurs when there is reduced activity in key regions in the frontotemporal cortex in the brain, which handles complex processing of pitch and melody. However, some people with the condition have an extreme and obsessional love of music.

In any case, other research shows that those with music anhedonia often have normal musical perception, with no problem recognising songs or distinguishing major from minor chords.

So, what is going on? The new paper provides a detailed analysis of all the research in this field to date. The researchers explain that while the brain networks underlying music perception and reward are both intact in people with music anhedonia, the communication between them is severely disrupted. There is little to no traffic between the auditory processing parts of the brain and the reward centre.

People with typical responses to music have significant activity in this pathway, which is higher for pleasant music than for neutral sounds. A 2018 study showed that you can increase music-induced pleasure by artificially stimulating these communication tracts using magnetic pulses.

The new analysis may give scientists insights into clinical conditions where everyday rewards seem to be reduced or enhanced, for example eating disorders, sex addictions and gambling problems.

These findings also challenge the common assumption that everyone loves music. Most people do, but not all, and the variation comes down to differences in the wiring of the brain. Sometimes it follows brain injury, but more often people are born this way, and a March 2025 study found evidence of a genetic link.

Music is everywhere – in shops, gyms, restaurants, healthcare settings – and it can be incredibly powerful. But perhaps we should resist the urge to see it as a panacea and respect the fact that for some, silence is golden.

The Conversation

Catherine Loveday does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Some people just don’t like music – it may be down to their brain wiring – https://theconversation.com/some-people-just-dont-like-music-it-may-be-down-to-their-brain-wiring-263066

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The ‘third nuclear age’ is a politically motivated label that seeks to justify a renewed arms race

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tom Vaughan, Lecturer in International Security, University of Leeds

US nuclear weapons testing in Nevada, 1953. National Nuclear Security Administration

In August 1945 the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing more than 200,000 people, overwhelmingly civilians. Eighty years on from this slaughter – which the then US army commander and later president Dwight D. Eisenhower called “completely unnecessary” – is an apt time to ask how the world has changed since Japan’s skies lit up with atomic fire.

Many in the military as well as academics and nuclear theorists argue that a “third nuclear age” has begun. By this they mean that a new and different set of nuclear threats are emerging which fundamentally challenge the existing tenets of nuclear “deterrence”. The response, some argue, is to invest heavily in our nuclear weapons systems to secure ourselves against this new age of uncertainty.

To understand this claim, it’s worth looking back at the history of the nuclear era. Most (but not all) scholars working on “nuclear ages” accept that the first nuclear age, between 1945 and 1991, was characterised by the cold war nuclear stand-off between the world’s two nuclear armed superpowers: the US and the Soviet Union.

The second nuclear age, from 1991 to 2014, is usually understood to have started when the cold war ended. Policymakers worried about “proliferation” – the spread of nuclear weapons to new states and even non-state terrorist groups. Western policy focused on countering this process, often through military means.

The third nuclear age, which is thought to have begun in 2014, it thought to reflect a new set of challenges. This will involve the entry of more nuclear-armed states into the fray, erosion of longstanding non-proliferation and arms control agreements and the development of so-called “strategic non-nuclear weapons”. This term refers to non-nuclear technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI) command and control networks, hypersonic missiles and advanced missile defence systems.

There are fears that non-nuclear armed “adversaries” might use these systems to directly attack other states’ nuclear arsenals, undermining their ability to deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike. This is likely to pose a challenge to established practices on which the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is based.

But how much has really changed in the past decade? No new nuclear powers have emerged – the most recent was North Korea in 2006. China, often seen as the bogeyman of the third nuclear age, has had a nuclear weapons capability since 1964. AI integration into nuclear command and control systems, while extremely risky, has yet to happen.

Reliable missile defence against modern nuclear warheads is still widely considered to be technologically impossible. The impact of hypersonic missiles on the calculus of nuclear deterrence is debated, since intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are already very fast.

In short, what’s different this time around?

Western-centric thinking

A more penetrating line of questioning is to ask about the politics underlying the idea of a third nuclear age. Ideas are never neutral, and they shape our understanding of the world. The third nuclear age concept (like that of the second nuclear age before it) came out of the US defence establishment, which was trying to understand how it could remain globally dominant against challenges to its supremacy from China.

The idea has since been filtered through academia and back into the policy world, where it has started to gain “common sense status”: as night follows day, the dawn of the third nuclear age is around the corner. But this is neither objective nor inevitable. It’s a conceptual tool for thinking about nuclear politics in a particular way.

It’s a US-centric perspective reflecting a fear that western dominance of the nuclear arena is under threat. US and allied militaries need to progressively integrate new technologies into their nuclear systems and modernise their arsenals to deal with a “more uncertain” world, ignoring the fact that massive risk and uncertainty have always been a built-in feature of nuclear deterrence strategies.

Here, the biggest threats to nuclear stability come not from the thousands of nuclear warheads held by the established nuclear weapons states, but from would-be disruptors who can threaten nuclear arsenals with non-nuclear systems – echoing old second nuclear age fears about proliferation.

This is why Iran remains a villain of the story alongside China, as we can see from the hyperbole about Iran’s “hypersonic” missile capabilities and how its behaviour gave Israel and the US the excuse to launch “counter-proliferation” strikes against its nuclear facilities in June this year.

Graphic showing nuclear stockpiles 2025.
Nuclear stockpiles, 2025.
Federation of American Scientists, CC BY-NC

It bears repeating that Iran is still not a nuclear-armed state. But the new emphasis placed on non-nuclear technologies in third nuclear age thinking also puts states which don’t even have nuclear programmes in the crosshairs of Iraq-style wars of aggression in the name of “counter-proliferation”.

New arms race

To be crystal clear: the nuclear world is as dangerous as ever. The problem is that third nuclear age thinking, with its focus on supposedly unprecedented disruptions, leads us to think that new solutions are necessary. “Old” ideas about nuclear disarmament become irrelevant, because the instabilities introduced by new technologies supposedly make it impossible for nuclear weapons states to give up their arsenals.

The third nuclear age becomes a conceptual stalking horse for a fresh nuclear arms race.

When the British armed forces chief Admiral Sir Tony Radakin warned of a dawning third nuclear age in December 2024, he was not making a neutral observation. He was arguing for resources to be funnelled into nuclear modernisation at the expense of welfare and healthcare programmes. Today, before any modernisation, Britain maintains a first-strike deliverable total of 31 megatons of nuclear explosive power. That’s more than 2,000 Hiroshimas’ worth of destruction.

So we should be sceptical of this concept. The threat of nuclear annihilation has been with us since August 1945 and comes – as always – from nuclear weapons and the states who operate them.

The Conversation

Tom Vaughan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The ‘third nuclear age’ is a politically motivated label that seeks to justify a renewed arms race – https://theconversation.com/the-third-nuclear-age-is-a-politically-motivated-label-that-seeks-to-justify-a-renewed-arms-race-263009

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Who was Jane Austen’s best leading man? These experts think they know

Source: The Conversation – UK – By James Vigus, Senior Lecturer in English, Queen Mary University of London

To mark the 250th anniversary of her birth, we’re pitting Jane Austen’s much-loved novels against each other in a battle of wit, charm and romance. Seven leading Austen experts have made their case for her ultimate leading man, but the winner is down to you. Cast your vote in the poll at the end of the article, and let us know the reason for your choice in the comments. This is Jane Austen Fight Club – it’s breeches at dawn.

Edward Ferrars, Sense and Sensibility

Championed by James Vigus, senior lecturer in English, Queen Mary University of London

Edward Ferrars, supposedly “idle and depressed”, gets a bad press. Even Elinor, who loves him, struggles to decipher his reserve. The explanation – his secret engagement to scheming Lucy Steele – seems discreditable. Yet among Sense and Sensibility’s showy, inadequate men, reticent Edward (alongside Colonel Brandon) is a hero.

Unlike Willoughby, who jilts Marianne to marry for money, Edward dutifully sticks with Lucy, wanting her to avoid penury. Significantly, Elinor approves. Edward has an “open affectionate heart”, this inwardness contrasting Willoughby’s more superficial “open affectionate manners”. And his “saucy” teasing of Marianne’s fashionable love of picturesque landscapes elicits her first-name-terms affection for him.

Edward, though, is serious – a Christian stoic like Elinor. Resistant to family pressure, he “always preferred” the church, an understated vocation. No orator, Edward speaks plainly: “I am grown neither humble nor penitent by what has passed. – I am grown very happy.” This happiness, the moral luck of gaining Elinor and a clergyman’s living, is credible because it’s deserved.

Henry Tilney, Northanger Abbey

Championed by Sarah Annes Brown, professor of English literature, Anglia Ruskin University

There are many reasons why I love Jane Austen, but the charm of her leading men isn’t high on the list. In Austen’s novels, a witty and charming male should be approached with extreme caution. He is likely to prove an unsuitable suitor who must be rejected in favour of someone worthier – and duller.

But Northanger Abbey’s Henry Tilney is the exception. This is particularly true of the earlier part of the novel. There, he teases Catherine by imagining how she’ll describe her first meeting with him at the Lower Rooms in Bath in her diary.

He then goes on to gossip about ladies’ fashions with chaperone Mrs Allen. She asks for his opinion on Catherine’s own gown: “It is very pretty, madam,” said he, gravely examining it; “but I do not think it will wash well; I am afraid it will fray.”

It is very difficult to imagine Mr Darcy concerning himself with such trifles.
Admittedly Henry becomes a bit more finger-wagging in the second half of the novel – but then, he has been saddled with Austen’s silliest heroine.

This article is part of a series commemorating the 250th anniversary of Jane Austen’s birth. Despite having published only six books, she is one of the best-known authors in history. These articles explore the legacy and life of this incredible writer.

Colonel Brandon, Sense and Sensibility

Championed by Michael Meeuwis, associate professor of literature, University of Warwick

Austen wrote Colonel Brandon’s background to reflect the violence and seductions of the 18th-century novel. He nearly elopes with his brother’s wife Eliza, then he rescues Eliza and her daughter (also named Eliza) after seduction by someone else. Finally, he fights a duel with Willoughby over Eliza junior.

Here, Austen suggests that women in the 18th-century novel were generally so interchangeable they didn’t even need separate names. Sense and Sensibility’s heroine, Elinor, is magnificently unimpressed by his story. She “sighed over the fancied necessity of this; but to a man and a soldier she presumed not to censure it.”

Such wry commentary is only possible in a novel where quieter life prevails – and Brandon becomes a romantic hero of that world too. In marrying him, Marianne gains access to his library, where she may read – and perhaps even write – the kinds of books where women have names.

Edmund Bertram, Mansfield Park

Championed by Jane E. Wright, senior lecturer in English literature, University of Bristol

Edmund Bertram, the older cousin of Austen’s heroine, Fanny Price, in Mansfield Park, isn’t as dashing, wildly rich, or immediately appealing as some of Austen’s other leading men. A second son with a compromised inheritance, he is a matter-of-fact character training to be clergyman. He also exhibits misjudgment in falling in love (or infatuation) with the unsuitable Mary Crawford.

However, in addition to his seriousness about the church and responsibility in managing his father’s estate, he is the only one of Austen’s leading men who – against his family’s unkindness – is not only consistently caring towards the leading lady, but both notices her intelligence and takes trouble to support it.

In the fluctuations of the novel’s plot, he and Fanny offer care, caution, and comfort to each other, so that, in some respects, they might be said to come to their eventual marriage on slightly more equal terms.

Fitzwilliam Darcy, Pride and Prejudice

Championed by Penny Bradshaw, associate professor of English literature, University of Cumbria

On one level, Mr Darcy needs no championing. Cultural evidence (from branded tea-towels and other merchandise, to multiple portrayals on screen) suggests that he remains the most popular of Austen’s heroes.

His “fine, tall person” and “handsome features” are clearly important factors here, but his chilly reserve and initial dismissal of Elizabeth Bennet as merely “tolerable” do not immediately endear him to the reader.

The source of Darcy’s very great appeal lies partly in the fact that he begins to love her in spite of his own prejudices and because, while Darcy does undoubtedly admire Lizzie’s appearance (including her “fine eyes”), his admiration extends to qualities which, at this point in time, were hardly typical of the fictional heroines of romance.

Lizzie bears little resemblance to the usually rather passive and often victimised heroines encountered in countless popular novels of the late-18th and early-19th century. Crucially, Darcy is drawn to the “liveliness” of Lizzie’s mind and as a hero he therefore validates a new kind of heroine: a woman whose wit and intelligence is as much a part of her attraction as physical appearance.

Captain Wentworth, Persuasion

Championed by Emrys D. Jones, senior lecturer in 18th-century literature and culture, King’s College London

Frederick Wentworth isn’t meant to be admired from a distance like certain other Austen love interests. At various points in Persuasion, his thoughts are relayed to us through the free indirect discourse that more usually channels the inner lives of Austen’s heroines. And then, in the extraordinary penultimate chapter of the novel, we get his longing and his frustration straight from the source, in probably the most beautiful love letter in the history of literary fiction.

“Tell me not that I am too late,” he implores Anne Elliot. Notwithstanding his illustrious naval career, Wentworth is more vulnerable in that moment than any of the leading men before him. He writes of his soul being pierced, of his feelings overpowering him, using language that would, anywhere else in Austen, be mocked as excessive or indulgent. Wentworth carries it off, and in doing so proves that he’s a different kind of hero.

George Knightley, Emma

Championed by Christine Hawkins, teaching associate in school of the arts, Queen Mary University of London

George Knightley is underappreciated. “A sensible man about seven or eight and thirty” of a “cheerful manner” he is often undemonstrative, unshowy and cool. Not the classic dreamboat. But Knightley shows his worth through his honesty, trustworthiness and reliability.

Unlike the ostentatious Darcy, Knightley doesn’t offend and alienate everyone he meets. He is thoughtful and kind to others, championing the derided farmer Mr Martin, covering Harriet’s social embarrassment, and soothing the wounded feelings of Miss Bates. Knightley shows his sense of social responsibility. He is intelligent, practical and grounded.

Knightley is also Emma’s devoted lover: “I have not a fault to find with her … I love to look at her”. He sees her best qualities. But crucially, he questions her behaviour when he must (“I will tell you truths”) offering guidance and support when she acts wrongfully. Knightley is a secure, confident man, and his happy union with Emma is based on what every woman surely wants – equality and respect.

Now the experts have made their case, it’s your turn to decide which of Austen’s seven leading men is her best. Click the image below to vote in our poll, and see if other readers agree with you.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who was Jane Austen’s best leading man? These experts think they know – https://theconversation.com/who-was-jane-austens-best-leading-man-these-experts-think-they-know-252756

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George P. Marsh, pionnier de la protection de l’environnement au XIXᵉ siècle

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Hans Schlierer, Professeur et coordinateur RSE, EM Lyon Business School

Cet été, « The Conversation » vous emmène à la rencontre de figures de pionnières, mais souvent méconnues, en matière d’écologie. Aujourd’hui, redécouvrons la figure de l’Américain George Perkins Marsh, diplomate, savant du XIXe siècle et précurseur du concept de durabilité.

Pionnier de l’écologie oublié des universitaires comme du grand public, George Perkins Marsh (1801–1882) est un diplomate et savant américain du XIXe siècle, mais aussi l’un des premiers environnementalistes, qui a marqué le début de la réflexion moderne sur l’impact de l’industrialisation.

Bien avant que le terme de durabilité ne s’impose, George P. Marsh a reconnu les effets destructeurs des actions humaines sur la Terre. Il est un des premiers à avoir identifié les menaces que le développement du capitalisme faisait peser sur les dynamiques écologiques. Son livre Man and Nature, publié en 1864, a été l’un des premiers à discuter de la gestion des ressources naturelles et de la conservation.

Initialement philologue, c’est-à-dire spécialiste des langues, Marsh parlait couramment une vingtaine de langues, dont le suédois, l’allemand ou encore l’italien. Ce polymathe a été membre de l’Académie américaine des arts et des sciences, de la Royal Society, de l’American Antiquarian Society et de l’Académie américaine des sciences. Il a également enseigné à l’Université Columbia (New York) et écrit de nombreux articles pour des encyclopédies et des revues scientifiques.

Des forêts du Vermont à la Méditerranée

Né en 1801 dans le Vermont rural, le jeune George P. Marsh se révèle vite grand lecteur, autodidacte et intéressé par de nombreux sujets. À l’âge de six ans, il apprend tout seul le grec ancien et le latin pour devenir, plus tard, spécialiste de l’islandais. Contraint cependant d’abandonner la lecture durant plusieurs années à cause de problèmes de vue – il devient presque aveugle –, George P. Marsh se réfugie dans la nature.

George Perkins Marsh entre 1843 et 1849.
Library of Congress

Très jeune, il apprend de son père à distinguer les essences d’arbres et à comprendre la dynamique des eaux dans les montagnes du Vermont. Lui-même se déclare « porté sur les forêts ». Tous ses souvenirs montrent à quel point ce contact direct, sensible et accompagné a été fondateur pour toute sa pensée environnementale.

Ces observations précoces du paysage serviront de socle à sa future et riche réflexion sur les relations entre l’humain et la nature, notamment lorsqu’il constate que la déforestation dans le Vermont entraîne une érosion des sols, une perte de biodiversité et conduit à une désertification du paysage en seulement quelques années.

Il complète plus tard ses propres observations par la lecture d’ouvrages scientifiques et historiques. Ce sont ses années en tant qu’ambassadeur des États-Unis dans l’Empire ottoman (1849–1854) et en Italie (de 1861 jusqu’à sa mort) qui lui permettent de lier observations et analyse historique du bassin méditerranéen.

Il constate en particulier que la perte de productivité agricole des sols érodés peut rendre la terre infertile pendant des siècles, entraînant maladies et famines pour les populations et l’affaiblissement du pouvoir des nations. C’est d’ailleurs ce problème qui aurait contribué, selon lui, à mettre l’Empire romain à genoux – une hypothèse qui figure aujourd’hui parmi celles retenues par les historiens comme élément déterminant de la chute de Rome.

Dans son livre Man and Nature, il ne cesse de multiplier les exemples historiques pour renforcer sa thèse centrale : l’avenir du monde dépend des décisions que prendra l’humanité quant à l’utilisation et à la conservation de ses ressources naturelles. L’essentiel du livre illustre la dégradation environnementale, avec quatre chapitres principaux consacrés à des exemples spécifiques parmi les plantes et les animaux, les forêts, les eaux et les sables.

George P. Marsh s’intéresse, d’abord et avant tout, aux forêts, car, pour lui, leur destruction est la « première violation par l’humanité des harmonies de la nature inanimée », non seulement dans le temps, mais aussi en termes d’importance.

Déjà, au XIXᵉ siècle, un lien entre forêts et climat

Le chapitre sur les forêts commence par une description méticuleuse de l’influence de la forêt sur l’ensemble de l’environnement, des variations de température locales aux propriétés électriques et chimiques de l’air, en passant par les schémas climatiques régionaux. Mais le plus important, ce sont ses effets sur les précipitations et l’humidité du sol.

Les forêts, selon lui, rendent des services inestimables à l’humanité par leur effet modérateur sur le cycle hydrologique. Elles protègent le sol des pluies violentes, réduisant ainsi l’érosion. Les feuilles et les végétaux morts permettent au sol d’absorber d’énormes quantités d’humidité et de les libérer lentement, ce qui non seulement réduit les inondations, mais maintient également le débit des cours d’eau et des sources pendant les saisons sèches. Leur évapotranspiration, enfin, rafraîchit l’air et apporte la pluie à des terres qui en seraient autrement dépourvues.



À lire aussi :
Éloge des feuilles mortes, carburant indispensable des écosystèmes

Mais lorsque les êtres humains font disparaître les forêts, ces avantages cessent. Le sol est emporté par les pluies, des rivières placides se transforment en torrents dévastateurs et les terres s’assèchent lorsque les pluies disparaissent. Les coûts humains, poursuit-il, pourraient être énormes.

Son travail a influencé de nombreux penseurs et décideurs dans le domaine de la conservation et de la protection environnementales. Il a notamment inspiré Gifford Pinchot (1865–1946), un des pères philosophiques et politiques du mouvement environnementaliste aux États-Unis, qui a joué un grand rôle dans la protection des forêts et, plus généralement, des ressources naturelles.

Il a été aussi une référence importante pour John Muir (1838–1914), le chef de file d’un courant qui vise à préserver une nature non affectée par l’activité humaine (« wilderness »). Ce mouvement a aussi initié la création des parcs nationaux aux États-Unis. George P. Marsh lui-même a joué un rôle clé dans la création de l’Adirondack Park (dans l’État de New York), l’un des premiers parcs forestiers aux États-Unis.

Des analyses visionnaires

Au-delà de la réception historique de ses travaux, les constats de George P. Marsh sont d’une actualité brûlante.

Les feux de forêt récurrents l’été, en France et ailleurs dans le monde, causés par des sécheresses elles-mêmes amplifiées par l’activité humaine, le rappellent encore. De même la déforestation en Amazonie et en Indonésie entraîne-t-elle aujourd’hui une érosion massive des sols, affectant la productivité agricole et les écosystèmes locaux.

Bien que Marsh n’ait pas utilisé le terme de « changement climatique », il a compris que la disparition des forêts pouvait modifier les régimes climatiques locaux.

Aujourd’hui, nous savons que la déforestation contribue au réchauffement climatique en libérant le carbone stocké dans les arbres et en réduisant la capacité des forêts à absorber le CO₂. La réduction des émissions provenant du déboisement et de la dégradation des forêts, ainsi que la gestion durable des forêts, la conservation et l’amélioration des stocks de carbone forestier sont des éléments essentiels des efforts mondiaux visant à atténuer le changement du climat.

Avec ses observations et ses conclusions, Marsh s’est forgé la conviction que l’humanité dépend de son environnement, et non l’inverse. Une position qui ébranle la certitude de la suprématie de l’être humain sur la nature, très répandue à son époque. Il arrive finalement à la conclusion que l’être humain « possède un pouvoir bien plus important sur ce monde que n’importe quel autre être vivant », position qui s’apparente à celle plus moderne qui fonde le concept d’anthropocène.

Un héritage toujours d’actualité

La modernité de son approche se manifeste aussi dans sa conception globale des phénomènes naturels. George P. Marsh combine une véritable géographie environnementale à une vue historique et à une approche déambulatoire et paysagère. Cela lui permet de relier entre eux des phénomènes épars afin d’aboutir à une compréhension globale des relations entre l’être humain et la nature.

Au moment de la première industrialisation, Marsh a le mérite de débuter la réflexion sur les dépassements et les limites d’une modernité balbutiante. Les sujets de ses observations que sont le sable, la déforestation, l’utilisation des sols ou la question de l’eau font tous partie des neuf limites planétaires que l’humanité a dépassées depuis.

Alors que la conférence des Nations unies sur les océans à Nice, en juin 2025, ne s’est pas conclue par des déclarations suffisamment fortes en faveur de leur protection et que le retard sur la décarbonation nous approche dangereusement du seuil de +1,5 °C par rapport à l’ère préindustrielle, il est urgent de reconsidérer les analyses de George P. Marsh.

The Conversation

Hans Schlierer ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. George P. Marsh, pionnier de la protection de l’environnement au XIXᵉ siècle – https://theconversation.com/george-p-marsh-pionnier-de-la-protection-de-lenvironnement-au-xix-siecle-261189

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Nouvelle-Calédonie : les indépendantistes du FLNKS rejettent l’accord de Bougival. Et maintenant ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Pierre-Christophe Pantz, Enseignant-chercheur à l’Université de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (UNC), Université de Nouvelle Calédonie

Le FLNKS, le principal regroupement de mouvements indépendantistes, a officiellement désavoué le 13 août dernier l’accord de Bougival, qui devait renouer le dialogue avec l’État et permettre à la Nouvelle-Calédonie d’accéder à davantage d’autonomie. Qu’adviendra-t-il de ce texte, toujours soutenu par une partie du camp indépendantiste ?

Quelques semaines à peine après la ratification inespérée d’un accord politique entre l’État et dix-huit représentants politiques néocalédoniens – indépendantistes et non-indépendantistes – les voix dissonantes s’amplifient et contestent parfois avec virulence un compromis politique qu’elles considèrent comme « mort-né ».

Dans un premier temps, l’Union Calédonienne (UC), l’un des principaux partis indépendantistes de l’archipel, a vivement réagi en reniant la signature de ses trois représentants. Logiquement, le Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste (FLNKS) – coalition de 7 groupes de pression dont l’UC est le principal membre – a suivi, en actant le 13 août son rejet de ce projet d’accord en raison de son « incompatibilité avec les fondements et acquis de sa lutte ». Il réclame par ailleurs des élections provinciales en novembre 2025. Face à cette levée de boucliers, l’accord de Bougival, qualifié d’« historique » par le ministre des Outre-mer Manuel Valls, a-t-il encore des chances d’aboutir ?

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Le rejet de l’UC et du FLNKS condamne-t-il l’accord ?

Dans ce contexte tendu, certains signataires – notamment ceux du FLNKS – se retrouvent désormais contestés par leur propre parti politique et leurs militants. Quelques jours après les signatures et la publication in extenso de l’accord, l’Union Calédonienne et le FLNKS avaient rapidement précisé que la délégation de signataires ne disposait pas du mandat politique pour signer un tel document au nom de leur parti. Sous la pression des militants, ce sont essentiellement de nouveaux responsables politiques qui ont contribué à l’ampleur de la contestation contre l’accord, puis à sa remise en cause. Rappelons tout de même que les trois signataires de l’UC occupent des rôles fondamentaux dans la gouvernance du parti, ce qui les rendait a priori légitimes à le représenter.

Après le rejet formel de l’Union Calédonienne (UC), principale composante du Front, l’organisation a précisé lors de son comité directeur que « le mandat des signataires et des équipes tombe de fait » : une nouvelle équipe devrait donc prendre le relais. Dans la continuité, le congrès extraordinaire du FLNKS du 9 août dernier a entériné cette position. L’organisation annonce désormais une mobilisation active contre le projet : « Nous utiliserons toutes nos forces et toutes les formes de lutte à notre disposition pour que ce texte n’aille pas au vote », affirme ainsi le président du FLNKS, Christian Tein.

Si le FLNKS considère désormais comme acté la mort de l’Accord de Bougival, il se positionne néanmoins pour la poursuite du dialogue, à condition toutefois de n’aborder que « les modalités d’accession à la pleine souveraineté » avec « le colonisateur ».

Si un consensus global autour de l’accord de Bougival semble désormais s’éloigner, qu’en est-il de la viabilité de cet accord, au regard notamment des 5 autres délégations de signataires – l’Union Nationale pour l’Indépendance (UNI), l’Éveil Océanien (EO) et les partis non indépendantistes – qui continuent de défendre et de soutenir ce compromis politique ? Au regard du paysage politique actuel, dont le Congrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie est l’émanation représentative, et en considérant l’hypothèse d’une unanimité au sein des groupes, ceux en faveur de l’accord de Bougival représenteraient 40 membres sur 54 (12 membres de l’UNI, 3 pour l’EO et 25 pour les non-indépendantistes), contre 13 élus du groupe UC-FLNKS et nationalistes et 1 non-inscrit.

Si ce calcul théorique représente une majorité significative au Congrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, il ne tient pas compte d’une crise de légitimité qui frappe les élus territoriaux, dont le mandat de cinq ans a expiré en mai 2024. Il avait à l’époque été prolongé jusqu’en novembre 2025, en raison d’une situation politique particulièrement tendue résultant des émeutes en cours à l’époque.

Un rejet qui clarifie la fragmentation dans le camp indépendantiste

En parallèle du rejet de l’UC et du FLNKS, le soutien renouvelé de l’UNI (rassemblant les partis indépendantistes Palika et UPM – Union progressiste en Mélanésie) à l’accord de Bougival confirme la scission au sein du camp indépendantiste. En effet, durant les émeutes de 2024, l’unité du FLNKS avait déjà été fragilisée avec la mise en retrait des deux partis de l’UNI (Palika et UPM), qui faisaient auparavant partie du Front.

L’une des conséquences de cette fragilisation du Front indépendantiste a été une recomposition institutionnelle : alors que le FLNKS détenait auparavant les présidences des deux principales institutions du Territoire (le Gouvernement et le Congrès), la combinaison des divisions en son sein et de la prise de distance de l’Éveil Océanien, un parti non aligné détenant une position de pivot, a entraîné un recul politique et institutionnel des indépendantistes. Ils ont ainsi perdu successivement la présidence du congrès en août 2024 et celle du gouvernement en décembre 2024.

Au sein du camp indépendantiste, cette recomposition du paysage politique s’apparente à une guerre d’influence entre UC et UNI, notamment sur la question de la stratégie et de la méthode à adopter en vue d’obtenir l’indépendance. L’UNI privilégie ainsi la voie du compromis politique pour parvenir à une souveraineté partagée à moyen terme. L’UC actuelle, quant à elle, se montre plus intransigeante et défend un rapport de force visant une pleine souveraineté immédiate.

Le FLNKS dans sa configuration actuelle se retrouve désormais sous domination de l’UC, marquée depuis août 2024 par la présidence de Christian Tein. Ce dernier s’est d’abord démarqué comme leader de la Cellule de coordination des actions de terrain (CCAT), mise en place par l’UC le 18 novembre 2023 pour lutter contre le projet de dégel du corps électoral. Le FLNKS se revendiquant comme seul mouvement légitime de libération du peuple kanak, son retrait vaudrait donc retrait de ce peuple de l’accord politique, le rendant mécaniquement caduc. L’UNI de son côté assume désormais son soutien au « compromis politique » de Bougival, prévoyant un statut que le parti estime évolutif, et qui permettrait in fine à la Nouvelle-Calédonie d’accéder à une « souveraineté partagée avec la France ».

Cette division risque d’être accélérée par le rejet en bloc de l’accord de Bougival par le FLNKS, qui marginalise en interne une ligne plus consensuelle, incarnée par les trois signataires qui sont désormais désavoués par leur propre camp. Des sanctions disciplinaires sont désormais réclamées par une partie des militants, contribuant à rendre intenable une ligne favorable au compromis politique.

L’État parviendra-t-il à poursuivre le processus tout en maintenant le dialogue ?

Face au rejet catégorique exprimé par une partie du camp indépendantiste, la réaction de l’État, notamment par la voix du ministre des Outre-mer Manuel Valls, n’a pas tardée. Il a insisté sur le fait que l’accord représente un « compromis » et que son rejet risquerait de ramener le territoire au « chaos ». Il précise également qu’un « non-accord » aurait des conséquences sociales et économiques délétères, ce qui a pu être perçu par certains comme un chantage néocolonial.

Le ministre des Outre-mer a également réaffirmé sa disponibilité permanente au dialogue, annonçant se rendre en août une quatrième fois sur le territoire calédonien pour la mise en place d’un comité de rédaction chargé d’affiner les textes, de lever les ambiguïtés et de clarifier l’esprit de l’accord, sans toutefois en altérer l’équilibre. Toutes les forces politiques, y compris l’UC et le FLNKS, sont conviées à ce travail. Mais il y a peu de chances que ces deux organisations, en boycott actif du processus, y participent.

Malgré cette main tendue, Manuel Valls reste déterminé à tenir le calendrier prévisionnel de l’accord : report des élections provinciales à mai-juin 2026, adoption des réformes constitutionnelles et organiques à l’automne 2025, et surtout consultation populaire visant à adopter définitivement l’accord en février 2026.

Interrogé par la chaîne publique Nouvelle-Calédonie la Première peu de temps après le rejet de l’accord par l’UC, Manuel Valls continuait à défendre l’application de ce « compromis politique ».

Deux fragilités majeures pèsent sur ce processus : au plan national, l’instabilité politique et l’incertitude pour le gouvernement d’obtenir la majorité des 3/5e au Congrès, nécessaire à l’adoption finale de l’accord qui implique une révision constitutionnelle ; au plan local, la contestation de la légitimité des signataires, les divisions internes du camp indépendantiste et la menace d’une mobilisation active de l’UC-FLNKS qui compte fermement bloquer la consultation populaire.

Dans un contexte post-émeutes et marqué par de profondes fractures politiques, cette consultation populaire en forme de nouveau référendum interrogera la capacité des signataires à rallier une large majorité de Calédoniens, et conditionnera la viabilité durable de l’accord de Bougival.

The Conversation

Pierre-Christophe Pantz ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Nouvelle-Calédonie : les indépendantistes du FLNKS rejettent l’accord de Bougival. Et maintenant ? – https://theconversation.com/nouvelle-caledonie-les-independantistes-du-flnks-rejettent-laccord-de-bougival-et-maintenant-263130

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Is Israel committing genocide in Gaza? International court will take years to decide, but states have a duty to act now

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Magnus Killander, Professor, Centre for Human Rights in the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria

South Africa instituted a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague in late December 2023, claiming Israel was violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide through its actions in Gaza, and requesting provisional measures. Human rights law scholar Magnus Killander explains the process and why it’s so slow. International law, including the ICJ’s provisional measures, are binding on states. However, international law does not enforce itself and all states have an obligation to attend to the situation.

Why could it take until 2028 to get a final decision?

On 5 April 2024, the ICJ set two deadlines. It wanted to receive memorials, that is the full arguments related to the case, from South Africa by 28 October 2024 and counter-memorials from Israel by 28 July 2025. Following a request by Israel, the court on 14 April 2025 extended the time for submission of Israel’s counter-memorials to 12 January 2026.

It is likely that Israel, in a bid to delay the proceedings, will file preliminary objections, such as dealing with the jurisdiction of the ICJ to hear the case. South Africa would then have a few months to respond. Then an oral hearing on preliminary objections would be held, probably towards the end of 2026 or early 2027.

A few months after the hearing, the ICJ would deliver a judgment on the preliminary objections. Preliminary objections are unlikely to be successful, so the ICJ would then set a new deadline for Israel’s counter-memorial on the merits, which might again be extended. When Israel’s counter-memorial has been submitted, there may be a request from South Africa for a reply and from Israel for a rejoinder.



Read more:
South Africa’s genocide case against Israel: expert sets out what to expect from the International Court of Justice

At some point, the court would consider requests from states to intervene, and set timelines for their submissions.

So far, the following states have filed requests to intervene: Nicaragua, Colombia, Libya, Mexico, Palestine, Spain, Türkiye, Chile, the Maldives, Bolivia, Ireland, Cuba and Belize. Nicaragua subsequently revoked its request.

After the written submissions, the ICJ will schedule an oral hearing. Following this the judges will write the final judgement on the merits of the case. The judgment will be hundreds of pages of detailed factual and legal analysis with separate opinions from many of the 16 judges. The court has 15 permanent judges (including South Africa’s Dire Tladi) and an Israeli ad hoc judge in the South Africa v Israel case.

It is this final judgement that will decide whether Israel breached the Genocide Convention through its actions in Gaza.

Given these lengthy procedures, it is unlikely that the final judgement in the case will be handed down before 2028.

Does it usually take this long?

Yes.

The South Africa v Israel case can be compared to the Gambia v Myanmar case. In November 2019 The Gambia brought the case that Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya constituted genocide.

The ICJ handed down a judgment on preliminary objections on 22 July 2022. A hearing on the merits is yet to be scheduled. The case is likely to be concluded in 2026.

The first case brought to the ICJ under the Genocide Convention, Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, was submitted in 1993. The final judgment was delivered in 2007.

The second case, Croatia v Serbia, was submitted in 1999 and the final judgment was delivered in 2015.

The ICJ has so far held a state accountable for genocide in one case.

In its 2007 case, it held Serbia and Montenegro responsible for the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica. The ICJ case had limited impact. However, it should be noted that Ratko Mladić, a Bosnian Serb military leader, was arrested in Serbia in 2011 and transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as called for in the ICJ judgment. In 2017 he was convicted by the tribunal for the genocide in Srebrenica, a judgment which was confirmed on appeal in 2021, 26 years after the Srebrenica massacre.

In the two cases against Serbia, the court held that, apart from the Srebrenica massacre, the mens rea, the “specific intent” to destroy a group or part of a group, had not been proven. The main difference with the Myanmar and Israel cases is that the state of Serbia did not participate itself directly in the conflict.

In both the Gambia v Myanmar and the South Africa v Israel final judgments, the main discussion will likely be in relation to whether the mens rea requirement has been met.

In my view most of the ICJ judges will find that both acts of genocide and incitement to genocide have taken place.

What’s the point then?

The orders of the ICJ are binding on states, but are often ignored. This is in line with the general difficulty of enforcing international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Only political pressure from outside and inside Israel will bring about change, as it is clear that the Israeli government considers only itself as the judge of its actions. In addition, enforcement measures by the UN security council are not possible given the position of the United States. It is a permanent member of the council, with veto power, but does not want to criticise Israel and is its main supplier of weapons.

The issue of Palestine has also been raised in a case before the ICJ that does not directly involve Israel. In March 2024, Nicaragua instituted a case against Germany in relation to its export of weapons to Israel, which it argued facilitated genocide in Gaza. On 30 April 2024, the court decided not to issue provisional measures against Germany since it had shown the measures it had taken to restrict weapons exports to Israel following the invasion of Gaza.

It was only in August 2025, however, that Germany declared it would suspend the export of weapons that could be used in the war in Gaza.

Another international court based in The Hague is also trying to hold violators of international crimes to account. The International Criminal Court (ICC) deals with international criminal responsibility as opposed to state responsibility – the purview of the ICJ. Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant have been indicted by the ICC. The three Hamas leaders against whom the ICC prosecutor sought indictments have been killed by Israel.

It is unlikely that we will see Netanyahu in the dock in The Hague since he avoids travelling to countries that are parties to the ICC Statute and would thus be obliged to surrender him to the ICC.

Of course, the ICC is not the only possibility in relation to criminal accountability. For example, prosecutors in Sweden are investigating war crimes in Gaza.

The wheels of international justice grind exceedingly slowly and will never be sufficient on their own to bring about lasting change.

And the latest developments?

The provisional measures issued by the ICJ on 26 January 2024, 28 March 2024 and 24 May 2024 remain in force and are binding. These included the provision of

urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance.

Clearly this measure and and others have not been complied with.

South Africa has not requested any additional provisional measures since the last ones were issued in May 2024. However, advisory proceedings provide another way to address the situation.

On 23 December 2024, the UN general assembly requested an advisory opinion on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organisations and third states in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Hearings were held from 28 April to 2 May 2025. The advisory opinion is likely to be delivered soon and address the issue of access to humanitarian aid.

This is the third advisory opinion proceedings dealing with Palestine. In December 2003, the UN general assembly requested an advisory opinion on Israel’s construction of a wall separating it from the occupied territories in the West Bank. The advisory opinion of the ICJ was delivered on 9 July 2004, finding that the construction of the wall was in violation of international law. On 19 January 2023, the UN general assembly requested an advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The court delivered its advisory opinion on 19 July 2024, confirming its view that the occupation was illegal and that Israel had an obligation to leave the occupied territory.

The Conversation

Magnus Killander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Is Israel committing genocide in Gaza? International court will take years to decide, but states have a duty to act now – https://theconversation.com/is-israel-committing-genocide-in-gaza-international-court-will-take-years-to-decide-but-states-have-a-duty-to-act-now-263076

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South Africa has chosen a risky approach to global politics: 3 steps it must take to succeed

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Adam Habib, Vice-Chancellor, SOAS, University of London

South Africa finds itself in a dangerous historical moment. The world order is under threat from its own primary architect. The US wants to remain the premier global political power without taking on any of its responsibilities.

This dangerous moment also presents opportunities.

South Africa’s response has been one of strategic autonomy. This involves taking independent and non-aligned positions on global affairs, to navigate between competing world powers. But South African policymakers lack the political acumen and bureaucratic ability required to navigate this complex global order and to exploit the new possibilities.

Strategic autonomy is not the norm in global affairs. It is very rare for small countries to succeed at it without at least some costs.

Drawing from our expertise – as a political scientist and an economist working on the international economy – we conclude that if South Africa is to succeed in its strategic autonomy ambitions the country must do three things. First, its economic and foreign policy priority must be the African continent. Second, it must pursue bureaucratic excellence, especially in its diplomatic and security apparatus. Third, it must prepare for reprisals that are likely to follow its choice of an independent path to global affairs.

Strategic autonomy

A handful of countries have been able to pursue strategic autonomy in navigating the international system. They include Brazil, India and the Republic of Ireland.

These countries have four necessary assets: global economic importance; leverage; bureaucratic capability; and political will and agency manifested in foreign policy cohesiveness and agility.

India’s size – over 1.4 billion people and the fourth largest market in the world – makes it a location of both production and consumption. This has become more important given the US and western desire to create a counter balance to China as a low-cost producer and a market for exports.

Brazil’s assets are its geographic size, its mid-size population (three times South Africa’s), its mineral wealth, and its political importance to South America. It is also the tenth largest economy in the world.

Ireland is a small country, but it uses its strategic location in the European Union to influence global affairs.

South Africa is currently lacking on all these fronts. But, with strategic planning and reforms, and in partnership with other African countries, it is possible to enhance the country’s strategic importance to the global economy.

Where to from here?

If South Africa is to succeed as a nation, become globally relevant, and have autonomy in the global economy, it must recognise its challenges, understand their drivers and address them pragmatically.

So what should it do?

First, it’s important to recognise that South Africa is a small country. Its economy is marginal to the rest of the world. The continent of Africa has a population of around 1.5 billion people, which is likely to double by 2070 – the only part of the global economy in which demographic growth will occur.

Purely in terms of population size, Africa will be more important than ever before.

This can only be a strategic lever if countries across the continent integrate their economies more strongly. Thus, South Africa’s economic and foreign policy should focus on Africa and on building the African Continental Free Trade Area. Without this, its long-term economic development is in danger and it can’t develop the political leverage that enables independence in global affairs.

With its African partners, South Africa should be rebalancing its international trade. It should shift from being an exporter of raw materials to being a manufacturing and service economy.

Many countries across Africa have deposits of minerals that are strategically important to the global economy, especially as the climate transition shapes relations. This must be used to build integration across the continent so the region engages with powerful economies as a regional bloc.

Second, professional excellence must be taken seriously. South Africa’s political stewardship of the economy has been poor, and driven by narrow political objectives of the ruling party-linked elite. For example, policy in the important mining sector has been chaotic, at best. It has not served as a developmental stimulant or as a political lever for strategic autonomy.

Specific to international affairs, South Africa has to professionalise the diplomatic corps. It has been significantly weakened and its professional capability eroded through political appointments. These make up the vast majority of ambassadorial deployments.

There should be limits to the political appointments of ambassadors from the cohort of former African National Congress politicians and their family members.

In addition, South Africa should have fewer embassies, located in more strategic countries, with appropriate budgets to their job. It is embarrassing that embassies in places like London don’t have enough budget to market the country, undertake advocacy and advance the country’s national agenda.

But professional excellence needs to be extended far beyond the diplomatic corps.

South Africa cannot continue to be compromised by incompetent municipal and national governance. And this is not solely the result of corruption and cadre deployment. It’s also tied to a transformation agenda that eschews academic and professional excellence.

In addition, South Africa cannot pretend to be leading an independent path in global affairs without having the security apparatus that goes with such leadership. On this score, the country is sadly lacking.

Its security apparatus – the South African National Defence Force, police and intelligence service – needs attention. The defence force is poorly funded and, like the police and intelligence, largely a “social service” for former ANC operatives combatants.

Third, South Africa needs to prepare for the reprisals that are likely to follow if it charts an independent path in global affairs, such as the current response from the Trump administration to discipline South Africa for taking an autonomous position on Gaza.

This requires understanding the form that such reprisals could take and their consequences and being prepared for them. This would require diplomatic agility to proactively seek new markets, alternative sources of investment and additional political allies.

In contrast, South Africa’s responses have largely been reactive.

Dangers, as well as opportunities

While it’s a dangerous and uncertain world, it is also full of new possibilities. A new bipolar or multipolar world could enable South Africa and Africa to play off global powers against each other, to maximise opportunities for national economic development and independence.

This will only happen if South Africans collectively become agents of their own change. It will require developing leverage which others take seriously, and a government and public administration that works for the people of the country.

The Conversation

Imraan Valodia receives funding from foundations that support independent academic research.

Adam Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. South Africa has chosen a risky approach to global politics: 3 steps it must take to succeed – https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-chosen-a-risky-approach-to-global-politics-3-steps-it-must-take-to-succeed-262370

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Afghans in US face uncertainty after the cancellation of their humanitarian relief

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Mitra Naseh, Assistant Professor of Migration, Washington University in St. Louis

Members of the Afghanistan community and their supporters take part in a demonstration calling for an ‘open door’ policy for Afghanistan refugees on Aug. 28, 2021, in Los Angeles. AP Photo/Ringo H.W. Chiu

Thousands of Afghans living in the United States face an uncertain future after a federal appeals court ruled on July 21, 2025, that the Trump administration can end a humanitarian relief program that provided them work permits and protection from deportation.

The program, temporary protected status, known as TPS, grants legal status to people from certain foreign countries who are already in the U.S. and have fled armed conflict or natural disasters. It’s usually granted for 18 months, with an option of an extension.

About 8,000 Afghans and 7,900 Cameroonians benefiting from this humanitarian protection were affected by the May 2025 decision from the administration to terminate TPS.

Afghans in the U.S. first received TPS in 2022, after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in late 2021.

The Taliban enforce a repressive interpretation of Islamic law that includes banning women and girls from attending school or working outside their home. The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s and controlled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. They were overthrown after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 but regained control in 2021 after the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces.

In 2023, the Department of Homeland Security extended TPS for Afghans through 2025, as the conditions that triggered the initial designation – namely, armed conflict in Afghanistan – were deemed to be ongoing.

In May 2025, however, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem announced the termination of TPS for Afghans, stating that Afghanistan no longer poses a threat to the safety of its nationals abroad and that Afghan nationals can safely return to their country.

“We’ve reviewed the conditions in Afghanistan with our interagency partners, and they do not meet the requirements for a TPS designation,” Noem said in May 2025. “Afghanistan has had an improved security situation, and its stabilizing economy no longer prevent them from returning to their home country.”

Most Afghans who have arrived in the U.S. since 2021 share a fear of persecution by the Taliban. That includes people who worked for the former government, advocated for women’s rights or worked with the U.S. military in Afghanistan.

As a migration policy scholar, I believe the cancellation of TPS for these Afghans won’t lead to voluntary repatriation, as the fear of persecution by the Taliban remains a serious concern for many. Instead, it will likely force thousands of people into unlawful residency in the U.S. That, in turn, would not only leave thousands at risk of deportation but limit their employment opportunities in the U.S. and keep them from financially supporting the families they left behind in Afghanistan.

US asylum process

Unlawful U.S. residency can disqualify Afghans from accessing benefits such as Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, a federal program that provides cash assistance and support services to low-income families with children.

For Afghan TPS holders without any other pending legal status – such as asylum claims, for example – the termination also means the loss of work authorization, as their employment authorization document was tied to having TPS. This can cut off thousands of Afghans from financial stability, according to the nonprofit group Global Refuge.

Many Afghans are likely to seek alternative legal pathways to remain in the U.S., most commonly through the already underresourced asylum process. For these people, the outlook looks daunting. Filing an asylum application with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services means joining an unprecedented backlog.

Several masked security personnel walk alongside a burqa-clad woman on a street.
Taliban security personnel stand guard as an Afghan woman walks along a street in the Baharak district of Badakhshan province on Feb. 26, 2024.
Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images

At the end of 2024, nearly 1.5 million asylum applications were pending with USCIS, according to the American Immigration Council, a nonprofit advocacy organization. Most applicants faced estimated wait times of up to six years for a decision.

Asylum applicants are allowed to remain in the U.S. while their application is pending. And they can apply for work authorization, but only after the asylum application has been pending for at least 150 days. However, the work authorization is not issued until a minimum of 180 days has passed since filing for asylum.

So Afghan nationals applying for asylum following the TPS termination face a mandatory six-month period without legal work authorization. This period can stretch even longer, depending on how long it takes applicants to retain an attorney and complete the complex application process.

Financial lifelines

Like many forcibly displaced populations, Afghans often arrive in the U.S. with extremely limited financial resources.

Forced migration is typically abrupt and unplanned, leaving little opportunity to liquidate assets or withdraw funds. The small amount of cash or valuables that this population manages to carry is often just enough to reach immediate safety.

Against this background, the ability to work is a critical issue for Afghans in the U.S. Most Afghans in the U.S. are also supporting older parents and immediate or extended family members in Afghanistan, according to unpublished research I’m conducting with my colleagues, Proscovia Nabunya and Nhial Tutlam. This makes timely access to legal employment not only a matter of survival for themselves but also a lifeline for loved ones left behind.

TPS was never intended as a long-term solution. And the number of Afghan nationals who held it as their sole legal status in the U.S. was relatively small – estimated at around 8,000 – compared with the over 180,000 Afghans who have arrived in the U.S. since 2021.

What is more concerning for Afghans in the U.S., however, are the government’s assertions surrounding the termination of TPS for this group. If the U.S. government now maintains that Afghanistan is safe for return, it raises concerns about how this stance may influence the adjudication of Afghan asylum claims.

Although most Afghan asylum applications are grounded in a combination of factors – fears based on nationality, ethnicity, religion and political opinion – labeling Afghanistan as safe for return could undermine claims that rely on nationality as a central basis for protection.

The Conversation

Mitra Naseh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Afghans in US face uncertainty after the cancellation of their humanitarian relief – https://theconversation.com/afghans-in-us-face-uncertainty-after-the-cancellation-of-their-humanitarian-relief-261627

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Sanctuary cities in the US were born in the 1980s as Central American refugees fled civil wars

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Laura Madokoro, Associate Professor of History, Carleton University

Protesters outside the federal courthouse in San Antonio, Texas, rally to oppose a Texas ‘anti-sanctuary cities’ bill on June 26, 2017. AP Photo/Eric Gay

Sanctuary cities in the United States, which limit local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, have drawn the ire of President Donald Trump during both of his administrations.

Border czar Tom Homan said in July 2025 that the Trump administration would target sanctuary cities across the country and “flood the zone” with agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to pursue deportation goals.

I am a historian of migration. I have found that the concept of sanctuary takes many forms, from gestures of kindness and advocacy to more formal approaches such as churches protecting migrants at risk of arrest and deportation.

In the U.S., sanctuary city policies have historically been designed to support undocumented immigrants and refugees, especially those facing deportation. Ordinances based on these policies are often used by local authorities to signal the need for substantive immigration reform.

New public sanctuary policies

Today’s sanctuary practices, and the federal targeting of sanctuary cities, are largely the result of the way sanctuary took shape across the U.S. in the 1980s.

During this period, churches, city officials and activists assisted migrants fleeing the violent conditions created by U.S. proxy wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala.

In the early 1980s, migrants arriving in the U.S. confronted restrictive asylum processes. To a large extent, this was the result of the Reagan administration’s refusal to acknowledge the extent of human rights violations perpetrated by U.S.-supported regimes in Central America.

In 1984, the federal government approved less than 3% of U.S. asylum claims by applicants who had fled El Salvador and Guatemala. By comparison, asylum claims were approved for over 30% – and in some cases, 60% – of refugees from Iran, Afghanistan and Poland.

In response, U.S. activists and church and city leaders began to advocate on behalf of refugees from Central America. They sought to effect change at home and abroad, eventually coalescing into what became known as the Sanctuary Movement.

This largely decentralized coalition focused on protecting refugees by providing safe housing, often in churches, and advocating for their right to seek asylum. And they engaged in public outreach to raise awareness about the conditions in Central America and the U.S. government’s role in conflicts there.

The goal was to change U.S. policy. As one sanctuary worker in Texas said in 1985, according to accounts compiled at the Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin: “Sanctuary offers a way, by which folks can, number one, be safe from the fear of death, and, number two, speak out as to what is really going on in Central America.”

Three men lay down inside a makeshift shelter.
Father Richard Sinner, left, and Salvadoran hunger strikers sit outside the Immigration and Naturalization Service processing center to protest immigration measures on Feb. 21, 1989, in Brownsville, Texas.
Walt Frerck/AFP/Getty Images

The Sanctuary Movement also led to organized visits to the U.S.-Mexico border to witness the ways in which migrants were being treated by U.S. immigration officials. In Texas between 1983 and 1985, for instance, people were invited to document the activities of immigration officials at Port Isabel Detention Center.

Members of the Sanctuary Movement also shared some of the horrors they learned about from missionaries and refugees arriving from Central America, according to accounts in the Benson Latin American Collection.

As a member of the Rio Grande Border Witness group conveyed, according to records preserved in the Benson Latin American Collection, there were repeated stories out of Central America “of women being raped and stabbed” and “of fathers being murdered in front of their families.”

As awareness about violence in Central America increased, more people and congregations in the U.S. became involved in the Sanctuary Movement. At its peak in 1986, the movement included 300 churches that endorsed sanctuary for Central American migrants and the principles underpinning the Sanctuary Movement.

Public and symbolic

It was during this peak that U.S. cities first began making sanctuary declarations and later passed binding ordinances.

In 1985, Berkeley, California, which had previously declared itself a sanctuary city for conscientious objectors to the Vietnam War, made one of the first sanctuary city declarations on behalf of refugees from Central America. Its resolution reaffirmed the city’s “support for the principle of sanctuary and for those groups which engage in this time-honored tradition of humanitarian assistance.”

City officials said that no city employee would “violate the established sanctuaries by assisting in investigations, public or clandestine, by engaging in or assisting with arrests for alleged violation of immigration laws by the refugees in the sanctuaries or by those offering sanctuary.”

A priest walks inside a crowded hallway.
A member of the clergy with New Sanctuary Coalition enters an immigration courtroom as federal agents wait outside on July 8, 2025, in New York.
AP Photo/Olga Fedorova

Cities such as San Francisco and Santa Fe, New Mexico, followed with declarations or binding ordinances. These initiatives were often specifically crafted for migrants from Central America and contained critiques of U.S. foreign policy and asylum policy.

A 1989 San Francisco ordinance, which is still in effect, was inspired by the notion that the U.S. had special obligations to the citizens of El Salvador and Guatemala because of its role in the conflicts there.

There was powerful rhetoric and symbolism in the sanctuary city resolutions passed in the 1980s. This holds true for the present, as sanctuary declarations and policies have become increasingly polarizing in today’s political climate.

Moreover, as I note in my own work, public acts of sanctuary can come at a cost, often at the expense of the very people they are meant to help. In an effort to raise public awareness and sympathy, those in need of refuge often have their most harrowing moments laid bare for public consumption.

The Sanctuary Movement that began in the 1980s, in part to protest U.S. support for repressive governments, has endured for more than 40 years as an expression of concern for and solidarity with immigrants who come to the U.S.

The question now is how the movement will evolve in the face of the Trump administration’s threats.

Some sanctuary city leaders, such as Boston Mayor Michelle Wu, have responded by pointing to the value of policies that foster community trust and help keep all residents safe. How other leaders and communities respond remains to be seen.

The Conversation

Laura Madokoro receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and the Fonds de Recherches de Québec Société et Culture (FRQSC).

– ref. Sanctuary cities in the US were born in the 1980s as Central American refugees fled civil wars – https://theconversation.com/sanctuary-cities-in-the-us-were-born-in-the-1980s-as-central-american-refugees-fled-civil-wars-257718

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Grand Canyon’s Dragon Bravo megafire shows the growing wildfire threat to water systems

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Faith Kearns, Scientist and Director of Research Communication for the Arizona Water Innovation Initiative, Arizona State University

Tourists watch smoke from the Dragon Bravo wildfire float through the Grand Canyon. Scott Olson/Getty Images

As wildfire crews battled the Dragon Bravo Fire on the Grand Canyon’s North Rim in July 2025, the air turned toxic.

A chlorine gas leak had erupted from the park’s water treatment facility as the building burned, forcing firefighters to pull back. The water treatment facility is part of a system that draws water from a fragile spring. It’s the only water source and system for the park facilities on both rims, including visitor lodging and park service housing.

The fire also damaged some of the area’s water pipes and equipment, leaving fire crews to rely on a fleet of large water trucks to haul in water and raising concerns about contamination risks to the water system itself.

By mid-August, Dragon Bravo was a “megafire,” having burned over 140,000 acres, and was one of the largest fires in Arizona history. It had destroyed more than 70 structures, including the iconic Grand Canyon Lodge, and sent smoke across the region.

A worker in a hard hat picks his way carefully over wet rocks below a split in an exposed water line.
A National Park Service worker assesses a split in an exposed section of the Grand Canyon’s fragile water lines in 2014. The water pipeline, installed in the mid-1960s, feeds water from Roaring Springs, located approximately 3,500 feet below the North Rim.
Grand Canyon National Park via Flickr

Wildfires like this are increasingly affecting water supplies across the U.S. and creating a compounding crisis that experts in water, utilities and emergency management are only beginning to wrestle with.

A pattern across the West

Before 2017, when the Tubbs Fire burned through neighborhoods on the edge of Santa Rosa, California, most research on the nexus of wildfire and water had focused on issues such as drought and how climate change effects ecosystems.

The Tubbs Fire destroyed thousands of buildings and also melted plastic water pipes. After the fire, a resident’s complaint about the taste and odor of tap water led to the discovery that the fire’s damage had introduced contaminants including benzene, a carcinogen, into parts of the public water system.

It quickly became obvious that the damage discovered at the Tubbs Fire was not unique.

Similar damage and pollutants were discovered in another California water system after the 2018 Camp Fire destroyed much of Paradise, a town of over 25,000 people.

The list of incidents goes on.

In southern Oregon, the 2020 Almeda Fire damaged water pipes in buildings, leaving water to flow freely. That contributed to low system pressure just when people fighting the fire needed the water.

A fire melted the plastic cover of a water meter
Water meters and pipes are vulnerable to damage during a fire.
Andrew Whelton/Purdue University, CC BY

In Colorado, the 2021 Marshall Fire burned through urban water lines, damaging six public drinking-water systems along with more than 1,000 structures in the Boulder suburbs. All six systems lost power, which in some cases led to a loss of water pressure, hampering firefighting.

As firefighters worked on the Marshall Fire, water system operators raced to keep water flowing and contaminants from being transported into the water systems. But tests still detected chemical contamination, including benzene, in parts of the systems a few weeks later.

Then, in January 2025, the Los Angeles fires supercharged concerns about water and wildfire. As firefighters raced to put out multiple fires, hydrants ran dry in some parts of the region, while others at higher elevations depressurized. Ultimately, over 16,000 structures were damaged, leading to insured losses estimated to be as high as US$45 billion.

A firefighter sprays water from a hose on flames in a canyon area below a porch.
Water supplies are crucial to fighting fires. In cities, fire crews like this one battling the Palisades Fire in Los Angeles in January 2025 can often rely on hydrants. But water systems can lose pressure and potentially the power to run their pumps during fires.
AP Photo/Etienne Laurent

Water infrastructure is not merely collateral damage during wildfires – it is now a central concern.

It also raises the question: What can residents, first responders and decision-makers reasonably expect from water systems that weren’t designed with today’s disasters in mind?

Addressing the growing fire and water challenge

While no two water systems or fires are the same, nearly every water system component, ranging from storage tanks to pipelines to treatment plants, is susceptible to damage.

The Grand Canyon’s Roaring Springs system exemplifies the complexity and fragility of older systems. It supplies water to both rims of the park through a decades-old network of gravity-fed pipes and tunnels and includes the water treatment facility where firefighters were forced to retreat because of the chlorine leak.

Many water systems have vulnerable points within or near flammable wildlands, such as exposed pump houses that are crucial for pulling water from lower elevations to where it is needed.

A burned area with a blackened pipe.
A stand pipe at Zorthian Ranch in Altadena, Calif., failed during the January 2025 fire there, making it even more difficult for Alan Zorthian to fight the flames sweeping across his property. He used a pump drawing water from a swimming pool to try to fight the flames, but numerous structures were destroyed.
Myung J. Chun/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

In addition, hazardous materials such as chlorine or ammonia may be stored on-site and require special considerations in high fire risk areas. Staff capacity is often limited; some small utilities depend on a single operator, and budgets may be too constrained to modernize aging infrastructure or implement fire mitigation measures.

As climate change intensifies wildfire seasons, these vulnerabilities can become disaster risks that require making water infrastructure a more integral part of fighting and preparing for wildfires.

Ways to help everyone prepare

As a researcher with Arizona State University’s Julie Ann Wrigley Global Futures Laboratory, I have been working with colleagues and fire and water systems experts on strategies to help communities and fire and water managers prepare.

Here are a few important lessons:

  • Prioritizing fire-resistant construction, better shielding of chemicals and, in some cases, decentralizing water systems can help protect critical facilities, particularly in high-risk zones. Having backup power supplies, mobile treatment systems and alternate water sources are essential to provide more security in the face of a wildfire.

  • Emergency command protocols and interagency coordination are most effective when they include water utilities as essential partners in all phases of emergency response, from planning to response to recovery. Fire crews and water operators can also benefit from joint training in emergency response, especially when system failure could hinder firefighting itself.

  • Longer term, protecting upstream watersheds from severe fire by thinning forests and using controlled burns, along with erosion control measures, can help maintain water quality and reduce water pollution in the aftermath of fires.

  • Smaller and more isolated systems, particularly in tribal or low-income communities, often need assistance to plan or implement new measures. These systems may require technical assistance, and regional support hubs could support communities with additional resources, including personnel and equipment, so they can respond quickly when crises strike.

Looking ahead

The Dragon Bravo Fire isn’t just a wildfire story, it’s also a water story, and it signals a larger, emerging challenge across the West. As fire seasons expand in size and complexity, the overlap between fire and water will only grow.

The Grand Canyon fire offers a stark illustration of how wildfire can escalate into a multifaceted infrastructure crisis: Fire can damage water infrastructure, which in turn limits firefighting capabilities and stresses water supplies.

The question is not whether this will happen again. It’s how prepared communities will be when it does.

The Conversation

Faith Kearns does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Grand Canyon’s Dragon Bravo megafire shows the growing wildfire threat to water systems – https://theconversation.com/grand-canyons-dragon-bravo-megafire-shows-the-growing-wildfire-threat-to-water-systems-263104