Analysis – Page 560 – MIL Submissions Engine

October 31, 2025

How the Day of the Dead is being used to protest violence against women

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jane Lavery, Associate Professor in Latin American Studies, University of Southampton

Known in Spanish as Día de Muertos, the Day of the Dead is celebrated every year on November 1 and 2. Blending Mesoamerican, Roman Catholic and pagan roots, this celebration sees families gather in many parts of Mexico and around the world to honour and commemorate their departed loved ones.

Enjoying a festive atmosphere, people build altars or visit cemeteries where they bring flowers and picnics, light candles and celebrate cherished relatives with storytelling and song.

The ritual is celebrated globally by many migrant Mexican and non-Mexican communities, and is in a process of continual reinvention responding to different social and cultural needs.

For example, during the COVID pandemic, women leaders from Mexican migrant communities in the UK and Ireland organised Day of the Dead events to celebrate their heritage and remember those who had succumbed to the virus. Elsewhere, a youth group in the US reimagined Día de Muertos as an expression for healing in their community following the killing of George Floyd.

The celebration has also been co-opted by Mexican grassroots feminist organisations protesting against gender-based violence, as our new book, Changing Configurations of Día de Muertos During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Mexico and Beyond, explores.

With a focus on the tumultuous pandemic years of 2020-21, the book charts how the Day of the Dead evolved and changed in that period. These adaptations were also shaped by global anxieties surrounding the so-called “shadow pandemic” – a term used to describe the surge in gender violence over the same period.

La Catrina

The Day of the Dead is associated with the iconic image of the Catrina, depicted in the world-famous illustration La Calavera Garbancera (1910) by artist José Guadalupe Posada. Inspired by Mictēcacihuātl, the Aztec goddess of death, today the Catrina is probably Mexico’s most commodified visual emblem.

Since 2016, Mexico City’s spectacular Mega Desfiles de Catrinas y Catrines parade has also drawn millions of people, with women dressed in traditional Catrina costumes and men wearing skeleton-themed formal attire.

The Catrina has proved an appealing inspiration for women seeking to protest against the unacceptably high levels of gender-based violence in Mexico. The country has one of the highest rates of femicide in the world – a term used to denote deadly violence against women because of their gender.

Alongside the glitzy parade is an alternative event called the Marcha de las Catrinas. In Mexico City, this march follows a route between two monuments dedicated to female victims of violence, starting at the Glorieta de las Mujeres que Luchan on Avenida Reforma and ending at the Anti-monumenta on Avenida Juárez.

There, protesters erect marigold-adorned altars and crosses bearing victims’ names, and post messages of solidarity. But unlike the traditional marigold and monarch butterfly-decorated Catrina costumes, many marchers wear dresses covered in photographs of murdered or missing women and girls.

Día de Muertos and the missing voices

Such was the momentum to channel the Day of the Dead to protest against gender-based violence in Mexico that a specific Día de Muertas (day of the dead women) was proposed by the NGO Voces de la Ausencia (the missing voices), led by journalist Frida Guerrera and held since 2018.

During the COVID pandemic, social distancing measures intended to protect public health inadvertently created conditions that increased the vulnerability of women and girls by sometimes isolating them with abusers and limiting access to support services.

Feminist protests held during these years were both national and international in scope, signalling global anger at the explosion in violence triggered by lockdown policies and social isolation. A strong intergenerational dimension characterises the collective resistance, as was attested by activist Norma García Andrade during the Marcha de las Catrinas in 2020:

I rejoice in the fact that young people have joined our struggle because before, the majority was just us mothers shouting. Now we are accompanied by all these young women who help us to scream for justice.

The practice of taking up public space with one’s own body to protest gender-based violence – known as acuerpamiento – has increased in intensity in Mexico, and is best showcased during International Women’s Day marches every March. Channelling an intergenerational rage, in 2020 and 2021 women dressed as Catrinas adorned themselves with feminist fist symbols and slogans such as #TruthAndJustice, #Niunamás (not one more) and #Nuncamas (never again).

Some wore green scarves around their necks, advocating for the decriminalisation of abortion – an increasingly prominent symbol of international feminist activism across Latin America. Many Catrinas lay on the ground emulating dead corpses, surrounded by marigolds and with photos of the victims placed on altars.

These interventions use what Hispanic studies scholar Francesca Dennstedt calls tactics of feminist disappropriation, and resonate with feminist anthropologist Rita Segato’s ideas around performative disobedience.

With this takeover of public space by protesting Catrinas, these feminist groups re-imagine Mexico’s most visually alluring representation of death for a 21st-century global audience.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How the Day of the Dead is being used to protest violence against women – https://theconversation.com/how-the-day-of-the-dead-is-being-used-to-protest-violence-against-women-267559

October 31, 2025

‘You can’t eat electricity’: how rural solar farms became the latest battlefront in Britain’s culture war

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alex Heffron, PhD Candidate in Geography, Lancaster University

Sean Matthews, the Reform UK leader of Lincolnshire County Council, has said he’ll “lie down in front of bulldozers” to stop Britain’s largest solar farm being built in the county. He’s taking sides in a new rural culture war that pits green energy against the countryside’s traditional image of food and farming.

Reform’s opposition to renewables isn’t surprising. Fossil fuel interests have provided around 92% of the party’s funding according to research by DeSmog (when contacted by DeSmog, Reform did not comment on that finding). But solar farms have become a way for the party to mask these interests by presenting itself as a defender of farms, fields and “common sense” against what Matthews called the “nonsense” of net zero.

Meanwhile, the protest group Farmers to Action has urged supporters to “keep the land growing, not glowing”. Its leader, Justin Rogers, has called climate change “one of the biggest scams that has ever been told”, and the group now operates in lockstep with the Together Declaration, a rightwing campaign group with an explicit anti-net zero agenda.

Yet a recent protest organised by these groups in Liverpool, at the Labour party conference, suggests there is limited enthusiasm in the farming community for these culture wars. While most of the speakers were farmers, very few working farmers showed up. (One of us, Tom, who has been to around 15 of these protests, was there in person and estimates about 50 out of around 300 people present were farmers.)

Those mobilising the culture wars are trying to turn localised rural resentments against solar panels into a wedge issue, and in the process win over rural voters to Reform as the party of anti-net zero. If Reform wins the election, it will seek to impede necessary renewable energy projects.

However, this conflicts with the majority of farmer sentiment, which shows they are concerned by climate change. So, while Reform UK is positioning itself as anti-climate, is the party, despite the rhetoric, actually anti-farmer?

‘You can’t eat electricity’

Research by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) found 80% of UK farmers are “concerned about the impact of climate change on their ability to make a living”, while 87% have experienced reduced productivity due to heatwaves, floods or other climate change-induced extreme weather.

For farmers, productivity isn’t just about profit – it’s a central pillar of what sociologists have called the “good farmer” identity. This is the idea that being a successful food producer is central to how many farmers see themselves and their role.

Since the second world war, agricultural innovations have largely been aimed at producing more food, as a way to improve domestic food security.

Now, in essence, they are being asked to shift their identity to embrace energy production along with food production. But planting fields with solar panels clashes with the productivity aspect of what it means to be a good farmer. The truism that “you can’t eat electricity”, as Farmers to Action put it, is trying to speak to this sentiment.

The accusation is that taking land out of production threatens food security. In fact, only around 0.5% of UK farmland needs to be converted to solar to achieve the government’s target figure.

At the same time, as the research by ECIU has found, the very productivity of farming is being threatened by climate change. This presents an apparent tension.

Without urgent climate action, British farms will continue to bear the costs and consequences. Environmentalists and climate activists might wish to take advantage of this tension between what farmers need and what Reform is offering. While Nigel Farage, Richard Tice and co shake their fists at the sun, farmers suffer in the heat.

Corporate profits or community interest?

Many objections to large solar farms are driven by a sense of fairness. For example, a tenant farming family in Yorkshire is about to lose 110 acres of their best arable land – half their farm – to solar panels, without any compensation. This will have a devastating impact on their business – where they have lived and farmed for many decades.

For the landowner, the switch will probably be very lucrative, with energy companies reportedly offering rents as high as £1,000 per acre per year, on long-term contracts.

In this scenario, the landowner wins and the tenant loses, which goes against the principle of a just transition, the idea that those affected by the shift to net zero should not lose out. This is despite the prime minister, Keir Starmer, making a pre-election pledge that tenant farmers would be protected.

Effective green policy must ensure that green transitions benefit those doing the work or opposition will grow. Perhaps if the profits were recouped by local communities, not far-off corporations and large absentee landowners, nimbyism wouldn’t fester so easily.

There are fairer ways to deploy renewables, via initiatives which involve and benefit local communities. An example of this is Cwm Arian Renewable Energy, near to where one of us, Alex, lives. It has used the income from wind energy to support the local community in various ways, such as offering good employment, putting on community events and teaching land skills.

Farmers, like the rest of society, are paying the price of high energy costs. Recent research has shown that wind energy alone has reduced British energy costs by at least £104 billion. Making clear that renewable energy developments can help with lowering energy bills could go some way to overcoming opposition.

Ultimately, farmers still want to farm and produce food. At the same time, agriculture must fit into broader green transitions. The challenge is to take on board the voices and concerns of farmers and see them as part of the transition – not treat them as obstacles to it. If not, there are plentiful voices on the right who are eager to offer them an alternative.

Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

Tom Carter-Brookes receives funding from Leverhulme Trust.

Tom Carter-Brookes is a member of the Green Party.

Alex Heffron does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘You can’t eat electricity’: how rural solar farms became the latest battlefront in Britain’s culture war – https://theconversation.com/you-cant-eat-electricity-how-rural-solar-farms-became-the-latest-battlefront-in-britains-culture-war-268128

October 31, 2025

Bamako under siege: why Mali’s army is struggling to break the jihadist blockade of the capital

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Oluwole Ojewale, Research Fellow, Obafemi Awolowo University, Regional Coordinator, Institute for Security Studies

When the military overthrew the democratically elected government in Mali in 2020, coup leader General Assimi Goita promised to root out jihadists in the north of the country. Mali had been struggling to defeat them for nearly a decade.

Multiple terrorist groups operate in Mali. An al Qaida-linked group known locally as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is the most lethal, considering the audacity and scale of its attacks. The group rejects the state’s authority, and seeks to impose its interpretation of Islam and sharia.

Despite the military government’s pledge to enhance security, there has been a 38% rise in violence directed at civilians in Mali in 2023, as reported by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Human Rights Watch reports that Islamist armed groups carried out 326 attacks against civilians between 1 January and 31 October 2024, and 478 people were killed.

In September 2024, JNIM attacked Bamako’s international airport and a military barracks in the capital city.

After years of mounting attacks, Mali’s insurgency has entered a new phase. Violence has now diffused from northern and central Mali to southern Mali. JNIM’s blockade of southern Mali since September 2025 has cut off trade routes, starved towns, and tested the limits of the Malian state’s control over the landlocked country.

As a security scholar with a focus on west and central Africa, I have researched security in Mali on broader issues like terrorism and arms trafficking. I believe JNIM’s latest strategy is particularly dangerous because the objective is strategic, economic, psychological and political.

Such blockades are deliberate instruments of coercive governance and asymmetric warfare (a conflict between irregular combatants and the army), designed to weaken the military government, incite the public and possibly consolidate control.

My view is that the Malian military has been unable to dislodge the terrorists because the blockade zones are vast, semi-arid, and crisscrossed by ungoverned routes that defy easy surveillance. Many of these areas lie beyond the reach of effective state presence. There, the army’s movements are predictable and slow, while insurgents blend into local communities and forests with relative ease.

The terrain favours guerrilla tactics: narrow roads, bush paths and seasonal rivers create natural obstacles to mechanised military movement. Terrorist groups with motorbikes can easily get around.

The blockade

The blockade of southern Mali, which began in September 2025, has cut off the region from essential supplies. It’s creating severe humanitarian and economic consequences.

Mali recently suspended schools and universities due to a severe fuel scarcity caused by the blockade. The siege underscores the fact that the Malian army is ill-equipped, overstretched and strategically disadvantaged in countering evolving terrorist tactics.

The blockade is not a conventional military siege involving trenches or fortified positions. Instead, it operates as a networked disruption, blocking roads that link Mali to its coastal neighbours, particularly Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.

These roads are vital arteries in Mali’s economy, serving as corridors for trade, fuel and humanitarian supplies. Cutting them off not only isolates communities but also undermines public confidence in the state’s ability to govern and secure its peripheries.

The army’s constraints

The inability of the Malian army to lift the blockades is rooted in the fact that it is fighting an irregular, asymmetric conflict against a mobile and deeply entrenched insurgent group. The Malian Armed Forces are structured for conventional warfare but are being drawn into a battle that requires flexibility, intelligence dominance, and rapid response capabilities.

JNIM, on the other hand, thrives on mobility and decentralisation. Its fighters move lightly, using motorcycles and small arms. They can strike swiftly and retreat into difficult terrain before state forces can respond.

The army also has logistical and operational shortcomings. As I’ve written elsewhere, Mali lacks military capabilities and cannot easily acquire them under current sanctions and international isolation.

Although the junta has sought help from military partnerships with Russia’s Wagner Group (now the Africa Corps), such collaborations have yielded little.

When JNIM imposes multiple blockades simultaneously in southern Mali, the army faces an impossible task. Its forces are too dispersed to mount a coordinated and sustained counteroffensive. Reinforcements face ambushes on poorly maintained roads or find themselves in unfamiliar terrain.

Geography, governance and strategic decentralisation

Geography helps explain Mali’s military paralysis. The blockade zones are vast and out of reach. The terrain is full of natural obstacles.

The Malian state has long struggled to extend state presence beyond urban centres like Bamako and Segou. In rural areas, the army’s arrival is often seen not as a return of governance but as an intrusion, with the risk of human rights abuses.

Decades of neglect, corruption and abusive counterinsurgency practices have alienated local populations and eroded intelligence networks.

The blockade operations aim to paralyse Bamako. Once confined to the country’s northern deserts and central plains, JNIM has, over the past few years, steadily advanced southward, carrying out sporadic attacks near the capital.

What explains this growing audacity of a group armed with little more than motorcycles and Kalashnikovs?

The answer lies in organisational logic. Unlike movements that depend on a single command structure, JNIM operates as a highly decentralised network of semi-autonomous cells. This allows it to adapt quickly to local conditions, exploit state weaknesses, and expand its influence without overstretching its resources. Each cell draws upon local grievances to recruit and sustain operations. Adaptability is JNIM’s greatest strength and the Malian state’s most enduring vulnerability.

The paradox of militarisation

Despite increased military spending, new alliances and aggressive rhetoric, JNIM’s territorial reach and tactical sophistication have only deepened.

The more the state militarises, the less secure its citizens appear to become.

This paradox reflects a broader trend in the Sahel. Counterinsurgency efforts are mostly military, without addressing the socioeconomic and governance conditions that sustain insurgencies.

Corruption, inequality and local marginalisation are some of these conditions. Thus, military campaigns become mere exercises in containment rather than resolution. In this context, JNIM’s blockades and incursions are not only military manoeuvres but political statements about who truly controls Mali’s hinterlands.

A war beyond firepower

The blockade in southern Mali reveals the limits of state-centered military power in an asymmetric war. To lift blockades for good requires more than tactical victories; it demands rethinking security.

The military government must cooperate with neighbours such as Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.

More importantly, reclaiming territory must go hand-in-hand with rebuilding trust, restoring governance and addressing grievances. Until then, the motorcycles and AK-47s of JNIM will outpace the tanks and rhetoric of Mali’s military junta.

Oluwole Ojewale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bamako under siege: why Mali’s army is struggling to break the jihadist blockade of the capital – https://theconversation.com/bamako-under-siege-why-malis-army-is-struggling-to-break-the-jihadist-blockade-of-the-capital-268521

October 31, 2025

Jihadists have blockaded Mali’s capital. What’s at stake

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of Florida

A coalition of jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaida have laid siege to landlocked Mali’s capital. For over a month, they have attacked convoys supplying Bamako with fuel, putting considerable pressure on the military junta that has been ruling the country for five years.

The security situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the United States has asked all its citizens to leave the country immediately. After more than 10 years of civil war, will the jihadist blockade lead to the fall of the capital? The Conversation Africa spoke to researchers from the Sahel Research Group at the University of Florida.

What is the current situation in Bamako?

Attacks on transport infrastructure and convoys travelling between urban centres in the Sahel region have increased dramatically since the late 2010s. Our research shows that certain transport routes in Mali are particularly targeted by jihadist groups. One is the route connecting Bamako to Gao, a strategic economic centre with a large military base. These attacks are combined with the blockade of other urban centres like Farabougou, Timbuktu, Kayes and, more recently, Bamako.

Bamako, which is in the south-western part of the country, has experienced jihadist attacks before, notably in 2015 and in 2024. But those were limited terrorist strikes. The current blockade reflects much greater ambition and capacity by the jihadists. In July, coordinated attacks in south-western Mali marked a new stage of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s southward expansion.

For weeks now, Bamako has been isolated from its external sources of supply, particularly fuel, which must be imported from its coastal neighbours. The government was recently forced to declare the closure of schools and universities due to lack of transport.

Why Bamako?

Bamako is by far Mali’s most important city in terms of population, economy and politics. Its fall would have catastrophic consequences and determine the country’s future trajectory.

With a population of 4.24 million in 2025, according to Africapolis, the Bamako urban agglomeration is more than 10 times greater than the second-largest city, Sikasso. Bamako’s importance is not only demographic. All executive functions are concentrated there, including ministries, the national television broadcaster and the international airport.

Bamako also accounts for a large share of the national economy. Our studies suggest that more than 90% of formal businesses are located in the Bamako metropolitan area.

Capturing Bamako would obviate the need to capture larger territories and could decide the fate of the Malian conflict. Control of a capital often serves as the de facto criterion for political recognition. For instance, despite commanding little beyond Kinshasa in his final years, Mobutu Sese Seko remained recognised as Zaire’s leader until Laurent-Désiré Kabila took the capital in May 1997.

Capturing the capital city has also been the central step in the resolution of many African civil wars. In 2011, the capture of Abidjan by the forces of Alassane Ouattara, France and the United Nations brought an end to the second Ivorian civil war.

Would the capture of an African capital by jihadists, rather than by conventional rebels, trigger an external intervention by western or African powers? This is unlikely. With the exception of its partners in the Alliance of Sahel States, Mali’s government is very isolated diplomatically.

France was forced to depart just a few years ago, and was stung by its deep unpopularity in the region. A new French intervention seems unimaginable. The US is currently more interested in transactions than in new interventions, especially in Africa.

Mali’s break with the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) would also seem to prevent a coordinated regional response. Even Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali’s neighbours and its partners in the Sahel alliance, are bogged down with their own jihadist insurgency.

What then for Bamako and Mali?

Three broad scenarios seem imaginable:

a military surge in which the Malian junta manages to break the blockade
a negotiated settlement that would presumably lead to a new form of government
political chaos following the fall of Bamako.

The first scenario would require a successful mass mobilisation by the military regime in power. With the help of the Alliance of Sahel States and most likely Russian mercenaries, Malian forces would need to concentrate in the Bamako metropolitan area and also regain control of key routes.

This strategy seems to us the least likely. Not just because of the limitations of the Malian military, but considering that very little fighting has taken place in urban areas in the Malian conflict. Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal have been variously conquered or “liberated” without fighting. Government forces, rebels and jihadists preferred to withdraw when their opponents advanced.

A second, perhaps more likely, scenario is some sort of a negotiated political settlement between Mali’s military authorities and jihadist actors. We have suggested for many years that a political agreement is the only way to end a conflict that cannot be won militarily by any of the parties.

Calls for dialogue have recently resurfaced and gained traction among religious, political and business leaders in Mali. However, the issue remains divisive. Prominent advocates for this option include Alioune Nouhoum Diallo, former president of the National Assembly, and Mossadeck Bally, president of the National Employers’ Council.

Proponents often cite experiences of settlements reached via dialogue between Islamists and state actors elsewhere in the region, particularly in parts of the Maghreb. Those cases, however, were shaped by very different traditions of state-Islam relations.

A negotiated political settlement in Mali would require substantial revisions to, or even abandonment of, the country’s constitutional principle of laïcité (secularism). Successive elites, including the current military, have refused to consider this. And given the jihadists’ upper hand, government would have to make concessions that would undercut its legitimacy.

That said, a mediated dialogue might be more likely should Bamako fall into the hands of the jihadists. Governing a city of that scale, and securing cross-border flows of fuel and trade, would almost certainly need negotiated arrangements with neighbouring states which are hostile to the jihadists. In such a scenario, jihadist groups might accept a less hostile governing authority as part of a pragmatic settlement. Potential figures to lead or broker such a process include the exiled Imam Mahmoud Dicko. Even in exile, he wields influence over Malian politics.

A final scenario is one in which the jihadist coalition conquers Bamako and displaces the current regime. While an entry into the city is now imaginable, it would be much less likely that the jihadists could form a cohesive government. The groups that form the coalition have a long and convoluted history of splits, mergers and rivalries. They also have a conflictual relationship with the Islamic State – Sahel Province, the Sahelian branch of the Islamic State, which is active in eastern Mali.

If the jihadist coalition were to gain control of the capital, it is more than likely that the Islamic State would demand to be involved in the exercise of national power. This could fuel rivalries between the two groups. Somalia and Afghanistan have both experienced versions of this scenario.

The highly fluid and confused situation makes predictions about the likelihood of any of these scenarios highly speculative. What does seem clearer is that the crisis at the heart of the Sahel is not likely to be resolved in the near future.

Olivier Walther receives funding from the OECD.

Leonardo A. Villalón has previously received funding for academic research on the Sahel from the US Governments’s Minerva Initiative.

Alexander John Thurston, Baba Adou, and Cory Dakota Satter do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Jihadists have blockaded Mali’s capital. What’s at stake – https://theconversation.com/jihadists-have-blockaded-malis-capital-whats-at-stake-268692

October 31, 2025

Peace in Sudan? 3 reasons why mediation hasn’t worked so far

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Samir Ramzy, Researcher, Helwan University

Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since April 2023, sparked by a power struggle between the two parties. The war has displaced more than 14 million people. Over half the population of about 50 million is facing acute levels of hunger.

Several mediation initiatives have been launched since the start of the war, with limited success. The African Union has also been unable to get the main warring parties to agree to a permanent ceasefire.

The four countries leading the main peace mediation effort (known as the Quad) are the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They issued a joint statement in September 2025, calling for a ceasefire in Sudan and offering a roadmap to end the internal conflict.

I’ve been researching Sudan for over a decade, and in my view, these countries’ capacity to deliver a final political settlement for Sudan is severely constrained.

The prospects for peace rest on the resolution of three factors:

the sharp differences between the Sudanese army and the Quad over who should participate in post-war politics
a widening rift between the main protagonists in the war on the terms of ending it
internal divisions within the Quad – particularly between Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia – over how to balance support for the army, curb Islamist influence and manage competing regional interests.

The Quad’s plan called for an immediate ceasefire, a three-month humanitarian truce and an inclusive political process to resolve disputes within nine months.

The statement was initially welcomed by the Rapid Support Forces and Sudan’s army leaders.

However, follow-up meetings between the Quad and representatives of the warring parties have failed to translate any of these proposals into action.

Meanwhile, the paramilitary troops and their allies captured the city of El-Fasher in North Darfur after a bloody 500-day siege. This was the army’s last major stronghold in Darfur.

Darfur encompasses nearly 20% of Sudan’s territory. It borders Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. The capture has fuelled concerns of a de facto partition of the country in the western region.

Against this backdrop, the Quad’s latest initiative seems unlikely to achieve more than a fragile ceasefire.

The obstacles

Efforts to broker peace in Sudan are hindered by three key challenges.

1. Diverging agendas between the Quad and the Sudanese army

Despite broad similarities between the Quad’s roadmap and a proposal the army submitted in March 2025 to the United Nations, key differences remain.

The core disagreement lies in the design of the political process to follow the ceasefire. The Quad insists that Islamist factions should be excluded from consultations over fears that these factions have close ties to terrorist groups and Iran. The army’s proposal, by contrast, opposes the exclusion of any party.

The military leadership has alliances with elements of the former Islamic Movement. Its fighters still help stabilise the army’s frontlines.

2. A widening gap between the army and Rapid Support Forces on the terms of ending the war

The army’s roadmap implicitly allows the paramilitary troops to remain in parts of Darfur for up to nine months, provided that local authorities consent. However, it also requires the withdrawal of the group from El-Fasher and North Kordofan.

The Rapid Support Forces’ behaviour on the ground reveals a very different mindset. Rather than preparing to withdraw, the group has expanded militarily in North Kordofan and intensified its drone attacks on Khartoum and other regions.

At its core, the dispute reflects conflicting end goals. The paramilitary group seeks to enter negotiations as an equal to the army. It wants a comprehensive restructuring of the armed forces. The army insists that it should be the only unit that supervises any reform of Sudan’s military institutions – the very issue that triggered the outbreak of war in 2023.

3. Internal divisions within the Quad

The Quad’s own cohesion has been undermined by internal rifts that have derailed several meetings. The most visible divide lies between Egypt and the UAE.

Cairo leans towards the army, seeing it as the guarantor of Sudan’s state institutions against collapse. Abu Dhabi prioritises dismantling the influence of Islamist leaders as the main precondition for peace.

Saudi Arabia is wary of Emirati involvement, especially since the Sudanese army has repeatedly rejected UAE mediation and the Rapid Support Forces has attacked Egyptian policy towards Sudan.

Washington has tried to manage these tensions by limiting direct mediation roles for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE while keeping them within the broader negotiation framework. These nations have significant leverage over the warring factions.

How Sudan got here

Sudan’s fragile transition began after the ousting of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir in 2019.

An uneasy power-sharing arrangement between the army and civilian leaders collapsed in 2021 when army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, jointly seized control in a coup. Their alliance fractured two years later and sparked the 2023 civil war.

Despite international pressure, neither side has given in or gained a decisive advantage since.

The conflict has been devastating for Sudan’s population of 50 million. Death toll reports since the start of the war have varied between 20,000 and 150,000 people. The country is facing the world’s worst displacement crisis, and health and education systems have collapsed. Further, more than 12 million girls and women, and an increasing number of men, are at risk of sexual violence.

Is breakthrough still possible?

Despite existing divisions, shifting dynamics on the ground could still produce a limited breakthrough.

The worst scenario for the military would be the paramilitary group’s renewed advance into territories it had been pushed out of.

That prospect might push army leaders to accept a preliminary ceasefire. This would allow the army to regroup and consolidate existing positions without conceding ground politically.

For the Rapid Support Forces, the calculation is different. After spending more than 18 months battling to capture El-Fasher, the group recognises that advancing further towards the capital would come at a high human and political cost. A temporary truce, therefore, could allow it to entrench its governance structures in Darfur and strengthen its military presence there.

In this sense, a short-term ceasefire remains the most practical outcome for both sides. Washington’s eagerness to secure conflict-ending deals is likely to push the Quad towards this scenario.

But a final political settlement in Sudan remains distant.

For now, the most any diplomatic initiative can achieve is to pause the fighting, not to end the war, as it remains difficult to bridge the political gaps between Sudanese powers.

Samir Ramzy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Peace in Sudan? 3 reasons why mediation hasn’t worked so far – https://theconversation.com/peace-in-sudan-3-reasons-why-mediation-hasnt-worked-so-far-268541

October 31, 2025

Lutte contre le paludisme : les scientifiques découvrent une faille cachée dans le système de défense du parasite

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Tawanda Zininga, Lecturer and Researcher, Stellenbosch University

Le paludisme reste l’une des maladies infectieuses les plus dévastatrices au monde, causant plus d’un demi-million de décès chaque année. En Afrique, la maladie est principalement causée par un parasite transmis par les moustiques, le Plasmodium falciparum.

Lorsque le parasite envahit le corps humain, il se retrouve dans un environnement hostile : forte fièvre, attaques du système immunitaire et stress causé par les médicaments antipaludiques. Il parvient néanmoins à survivre grâce à un système de défense interne composé de molécules « auxiliaires » appelées protéines de choc thermique.

Parmi celles-ci, un groupe puissant appelé petites protéines de choc thermique agit comme la dernière ligne de défense du parasite. Ces molécules se comportent comme de minuscules gardes du corps, protégeant les autres protéines à l’intérieur du parasite contre les dommages lorsque les conditions deviennent extrêmes. Elles constituent l’équipe de secours d’urgence du parasite lorsque ses réserves d’énergie sont dangereusement faibles, par exemple en cas de forte fièvre ou d’exposition à des médicaments.

Dans mon laboratoire de biochimie, nous cherchons des moyens de perturber ces gardes du corps.

Francisca Magum Timothy, étudiante en master, et moi-même utilisons des outils avancés de chimie des protéines pour examiner trois petites protéines de choc thermique présentes dans le parasite. Celles-ci partagent une structure centrale commune, mais se comportent différemment.

Nous avons découvert qu’elles peuvent être perturbées chimiquement. C’est une piste prometteuse pour la recherche sur le paludisme. Au lieu de tuer directement le parasite, cette approche vise à désarmer ses défenses, permettant ainsi à d’autres traitements ou au système immunitaire de l’organisme de faire le reste.

L’étape suivante consiste à trouver de petites molécules de type médicamenteux qui peuvent cibler et désactiver spécifiquement ces protéines parasitaires sans nuire aux cellules humaines. Cela nécessitera une modélisation informatique avancée, des tests en laboratoire et, à terme, des études sur des modèles animaux afin de s’assurer que cette approche soit à la fois efficace et sûre. En cas de succès, cela pourrait déboucher sur une nouvelle classe de médicaments antipaludiques qui agissent d’une manière complètement différente des traitements actuels. Il s’agit d’un objectif particulièrement important, car la résistance aux médicaments existants continue de croître.

Entre les premiers travaux en laboratoire et le développement d’un médicament pouvant être testé sur des humains, il faudra probablement compter entre huit et dix ans, en fonction des performances des candidats à chaque étape de la recherche. Néanmoins, la découverte de ces cibles protéiques de choc thermique représente un grand pas en avant et offre un réel espoir pour lutter efficacement et durablement contre le paludisme à l’avenir.

Percer les mystères de trois protéines

Nous avons constaté des différences nettes entre les trois protéines que nous avons testées en laboratoire.

L’une était la plus puissante et la plus stable des trois. Une autre était plus flexible mais moins stable, tandis que la dernière était la moins protectrice.

Lorsqu’elles ont été testées dans des conditions de stress, les trois protéines ont agi comme des « éponges moléculaires », empêchant les autres protéines de s’agglutiner. Il s’agit d’une étape cruciale pour la survie du parasite pendant la fièvre. Mais leur pouvoir protecteur variait : l’une offrait la défense la plus constante, tandis que l’autre perdait plus facilement sa structure.

Ces résultats laissent penser que le parasite s’appuie sur une sorte de travail d’équipe entre ces trois protéines, chacune jouant un rôle légèrement différent en situation de stress.

Nous nous sommes donc demandé si des composés naturels présents dans les plantes pouvaient perturber ces gardes du corps. Notre équipe s’est concentrée sur la quercétine, un flavonoïde d’origine végétale. Les flavonoïdes font partie des composés qui donnent aux plantes leurs couleurs vives, comme le rouge des pommes, le violet des baies ou le jaune des citrons. Ils aident à protéger les plantes du soleil, des parasites et des maladies. Ils sont présents en abondance dans les pommes, les oignons et les baies. La quercétine est déjà connue pour ses propriétés antioxydantes et anti-inflammatoires. Certaines études ont déjà suggéré qu’elle pourrait ralentir la progression des parasites du paludisme.

Lorsque nous avons exposé les protéines du parasite à la quercétine, nous avons observé des effets remarquables. Le composé a déstabilisé les petites protéines de choc thermique, modifiant leur forme et réduisant leur capacité à protéger d’autres protéines. En termes simples, la quercétine semblait perturber ou affaiblir les gardes du corps du parasite.

D’autres tests ont confirmé que la quercétine ralentissait également la croissance des parasites du paludisme dans des cultures de laboratoire. Lorsque les parasites du paludisme ont été cultivés dans des conditions de laboratoire contrôlées et exposés à la quercétine, ils se sont multipliés plus lentement que d’habitude, y compris les souches résistantes aux médicaments standard. Ce résultat est encourageant, car il suggère que la quercétine elle-même, ou de nouveaux médicaments conçus pour agir comme elle mais de manière encore plus efficace, pourraient devenir le point de départ du développement d’un nouveau type de médicament antipaludique à l’avenir.

Par ailleurs, les petites protéines de choc thermique entrent en action lorsque les réserves d’énergie du parasite – appelées ATP, son « carburant » principal – sont presque épuisées. Autrement dit, lorsque le parasite est sur le point d’épuiser son énergie et fait face à un danger, ces protéines agissent comme sa dernière ligne de défense.

Prochaines étapes

Nos résultats ouvrent la voie à la conception de médicaments capables de bloquer ces protéines indépendantes de l’ATP, pour frapper le parasite précisément au moment où il est le plus vulnérable.

Bien que la quercétine elle-même soit un composé naturel présent dans de nombreux aliments, sa puissance et sa stabilité ne sont pas encore suffisantes pour un usage médical. L’équipe envisage donc de modifier chimiquement sa structure afin de créer des dérivés plus actifs et dotés de meilleures propriétés thérapeutiques.

Alors que les efforts mondiaux pour éliminer le paludisme sont confrontés à des défis croissants liés à la résistance aux médicaments, des innovations comme celle-ci redonnent espoir. En retournant le mécanisme de survie du parasite contre lui-même, les scientifiques ont peut-être trouvé un moyen subtil mais puissant de vaincre l’un des plus anciens ennemis de l’humanité.

Tawanda Zininga reçoit un financement de la Fondation nationale pour la recherche et du Conseil de la recherche médicale, qui ne jouent aucun rôle dans le projet et ses résultats.

– ref. Lutte contre le paludisme : les scientifiques découvrent une faille cachée dans le système de défense du parasite – https://theconversation.com/lutte-contre-le-paludisme-les-scientifiques-decouvrent-une-faille-cachee-dans-le-systeme-de-defense-du-parasite-268452

October 31, 2025

Trump-Xi meeting: the key takeaways

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor, The Conversation

This newsletter was first published in The Conversation UK’s World Affairs Briefing email. Sign up to receive weekly analysis of the latest developments in international relations, direct to your inbox.

It was “12 out of ten”, Donald Trump reported on emerging from his meeting with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, in Busan, South Korea, this morning. It was the first time the two leaders have sat down face-to-face in since 2019 and a lot has happened to change the relationship between their two counties in the interim.

Particularly since April, when the US president launched his policy of applying punitive tariffs against countries he believes are “ripping off” the US, because of their trade imbalance. Trump’s policy placed Beijing firmly in the economic crosshairs. Having been gradually increasing tariffs in the first months of his second term on exports such as steel and restricting investors with links to China from investing in a range of important sectors, on Liberation Day, April 2, the US announced its plan to slap an extra 34% on export tariffs to China.

There followed a game of chicken, whereby each side saw the other’s announcement and raised them. At one point, US tariffs on exports to China reached 145%, while China raised theirs to 125%. Americans started to hurt: prices to ordinary consumers began to rise, something that Trump had campaigned on fixing, while farmers – a key Maga constituency – howled in pain when China stopped buying their soybeans. And the tech industry worried about China’s restrictions on the rare earth minerals they need to continue to manufacture so many high-tech products.

Thankfully that’s all fixed. For now. The two leaders emerged having agreed on a 12-month truce. China will start buying soybeans again and will relax many (not all) of its restrictions on rare earth minerals. The US will reduce its tariffs and relax some of its investment restrictions. Trump has said he will visit Beijing and Xi may well pay a visit to Mar-a-Lago.

But will this change the two countries’ trajectory? That’s hard to tell at this point, says Tom Harper, an expert in Chinese foreign policy at the University of East London. Fresh from catching up with details of the Busan meeting, he agreed to answer some of our key questions – namely: who will be happier, the two countries’ priorities, any remaining areas of tension and what appears to be the deliberate omission of any mention of either Taiwan or human rights.

This last point could be significant, marking as it does a major point of difference between the Trump administration and his predecessors going back decades, for whom a ticking off on the human rights front was always on the agenda.

The analysis of the meeting between the two leaders released by China’s foreign ministry was revealing, in that while the US president’s post-meeting entry on TruthSocial celebrated the deals on soybeans, fentanyl and rare earths, China’s was more circumspect, stressing the country’s steady progress to a plan that had been in place for “generation after generation”.

Part of that plan involves self-reliance. “The Chinese economy is like a vast ocean, big, resilient and promising,” the foreign ministry commentary said. “We have the confidence and capability to navigate all kinds of risks and challenges.”

To be sure, writes Chee Meng Tan, an economist at the University of Nottingham, this ocean has had to weather some pretty serious storms of late. The vast real estate and infrastructure sector has been under huge pressure in recent years. So barriers to China’s export of manufactured goods – the other key component of Chinese economic growth – have also been extremely worrying for Beijing, even if, as Xi has insisted, the Chinese people are capable of “eating bitterness” (his way of saying that the people can thrive on hardship).

The continuing restrictions on Chinese access to US tech will also be a problem for Xi. China has set great store by its development into a high-tech behemoth and has telegraphed its intentions to become an AI giant in the next few decades. To do that, it either needs access to US know-how or will have to rapidly develop its own capabilities in the sector.

Rise and fall of globalisation

It’s been fascinating over the past few years to watch the way global power has been shifting. Over the first 25 years of the 21st century, this has largely reflected two competing narratives. In 2000, when George W. Bush won his first term as president, his senior aides talked of a “new American century” dominated by Washington’s neo-conservative ideas. At the same time, in many people’s eyes, the 21st century seemed certain to be the “Asian century” as the region’s tiger economies woke up and began to fulfil their potential.

A world map showing the extent of the British empire in 1886. — The empire on which the sun didn’t set. Until it did.
Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center, Boston Public Library/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

Xi’s meeting with Trump today and the two leaders’ apparently different approaches are the latest reflection of those competing narratives.

Steve Schifferes has been considering the global shifts in economic and political (and military) power that have shaped the world since the 16th century. Working with our Insights team, he has written a superb two-part analysis. The first instalment charts the rise and fall of the European mercantile empires and the irresistible rise of the US.

Part two considers the likely consequences of the end of US hegemony, warning that the shift away from French and British dominance brought painful consequences and imagining what a world without a dominant world power might look like.

Europe scrambles to help Ukraine

America’s apparent shift away from its old role as security guarantor in Europe has left its transatlantic Nato allies desperately trying to fill the vacuum. But, as Stefan Wolff and Richard Whitman point out, the fact remains that without US buy-in, Kyiv’s European friends are woefully short of the wherewithal to provide Ukraine what it needs to stem Russia’s advances on the battlefield.

ISW map showing the state of the conflict in Ukraine, October 28, 2025. — Without financial assistance, Ukraine looks set to run out of money to fund its war effort in 2026.
Institute for the Study of War

Without substantial assistance, Ukraine will run out of money to fight this war next year, but talks at how to use the estimated €210 billion (£185 billion) in frozen Russian assets have stalled once again and the decision kicked down the road until December.

Like the US last week, Europe has announced a fresh package of sanctions – its 19th – against Russia in the hope that the considerable damage this conflict is doing to Russia’s economy will finally force Putin to the negotiating table. But that looks like a vain hope.

As Wolff and Whitman conclude: “There’s mounting evidence suggesting that [Europe] will not stretch themselves to go beyond securing Ukraine’s immediate survival. Unsurprisingly, a credible pathway to ending the war with a just and stable peace is still lacking.”

Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.

– ref. Trump-Xi meeting: the key takeaways – https://theconversation.com/trump-xi-meeting-the-key-takeaways-268709

October 31, 2025

Why was it ‘necessary’ for King Charles to take action on Andrew – and why now?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesca Jackson, PhD candidate, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

The man formerly known as Prince Andrew will now simply be known as Andrew Mountbatten Windsor after he was stripped of all his official titles. In a statement, Buckingham Palace said the king has “initiated a formal process” to remove his brother’s titles. This refers to letters patent – the mechanism by which the monarch can remove titles like “prince”.

At the heart of the matter is Mountbatten Windsor’s relationship with convicted paedophile sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, and the allegations by Epstein victim Virginia Giuffre that she was forced to have sex with the then prince as a teenager. Mountbatten Windsor denies the accusations. The palace said:

Their Majesties wish to make clear that their thoughts and utmost sympathies have been, and will remain with, the victims and survivors of any and all forms of abuse.

Mountbatten Windsor will also be evicted from his Windsor residence, Royal Lodge, and will reportedly move to a property at Sandringham, the royal residence privately owned by the king.

But why was it, in the words of Buckingham Palace, “necessary” for King Charles to “censure” his brother in this way – and why now?

Ever since Mountbatten Windsor announced that he would no longer use his official titles, including Duke of York, public and political pressure had been mounting on the King to go further. There was a sense that the promise not to use the titles didn’t go far enough – and that they should be formally removed.

His titles were technically only in abeyance. They still existed, even if he was not going to use them. He was also still a prince and lived as such in his 30-bedroom Royal Lodge mansion.

Royal image tainted

The last royal to have his “prince” title removed was the Duke of Cumberland in 1917. But he was a traitor who fought for the Germans during the first world war. “De-princing” Mountbatten Windsor in this way conveys the sense that he has betrayed the confidence of his family and country.

Image is vitally important for the royal family, so the public perception that Mountbatten Windsor was tainting the brand will have added to the pressure on the king.

According to the 19th-century writer Walter Bagehot, known for his work on constitutional matters, the monarchy is the “dignified” part of the constitution which provides a “moral example” for people to follow by displaying “virtues”. King Charles is part of a long line of monarchs who have strained to project (and protect) this image.

Clearly it is unrealistic for royals to, in Bagehot’s words, “do no wrong” all the time. But historically where an individual member has been engulfed in scandal, the palace has been quick to take action to protect the rest of the institution. For example, in 1937 when Edward VIII wanted to marry the American divorcee Wallis Simpson, he was forced to abdicate the throne and effectively exiled to the Bahamas as its governor (before later moving to Paris).

But the late queen allowed Mountbatten Windsor to try to control the narrative around his friendship with Epstein – and, in trying to continue to present a dignified account of himself, he failed spectacularly.

First came his infamous 2019 Newsnight interview in which he claimed that he “did not regret” his friendship with Epstein and did not end their friendship sooner because he was “too honourable”. The disastrous appearance forced him to step down as a working member of the royal family.

But he was allowed to continue to take what he saw as his rightful place, among the most senior royals at the grandest state occasions, including the queen’s funeral and the king’s coronation. He also continued to live a life of entitled luxury at the palatial Royal Lodge.

What seems to have made it necessary for the king to intervene now is the revelation that his brother remained in contact with Epstein for longer than he had previously claimed. In an email, Mountbatten Windsor also told Epstein – who by that point had been to prison for procuring a minor for prostitution – “Let’s play some more soon!”

This, coupled with the publication of his accuser Virginia Giuffre’s posthumous autobiography, which included damning new claims about their relationship, led to Mountbatten Windsor’s announcement that he would no longer use the title Duke of York. However, his statement on the matter lacked contrition and represented yet another missed opportunity for him to show sympathy towards Epstein’s victims. Instead, he said that, in deciding not to use his titles, he was “putting my duty to my family and country first”.

It all meant that he had become deeply unpopular with the public: 80% wanted him to be formally stripped of his dukedom. However, the formal removal of titles could only be done by either parliament or, as the public preferred, the king himself.

In failing to take this action against his brother, Charles risked being viewed as complicit in the scandal, as illustrated when he was heckled by a member of the public asking how long he had known about Mountbatten Windsor and Epstein.

Political pressure

Political pressure was also mounting on the monarch to act. Ministers initially said it was a matter for the royal family, but as public clamour grew the tone started to change. Rachael Maskell, MP for York Central, tabled a bill to strip Mountbatten Windsor of his title.

Unusually for a high-profile government minister, the chancellor Rachel Reeves also publicly criticised him, stating that he “shouldn’t have been associated with a convicted paedophile”. And the push by MPs to launch an inquiry questioning him about Royal Lodge – where he has effectively paid no rent for more than 20 years – was publicly backed by Keir Starmer.

The threat by Liberal Democrat MPs to “humiliate” Mountbatten Windsor by using their opposition day debate to discuss him in Parliament and bring him before a parliamentary select committee appears to have been the final straw.

Mountbatten Windsor was sparking wider scrutiny of the monarchy’s constitutional affairs more generally, from its secretive funding to outdated rules preventing MPs from criticising the royals in parliament.

That’s why Charles had to act now. Bagehot wrote that the monarchy needs to maintain an air of “mystery” in order to survive: “When there is a select committee on the Queen, the charm of royalty will be gone.” The king appears to have shared Bagehot’s view that the “poking around” of politicians would be too damaging to the monarchy’s dignified façade.

Francesca Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why was it ‘necessary’ for King Charles to take action on Andrew – and why now? – https://theconversation.com/why-was-it-necessary-for-king-charles-to-take-action-on-andrew-and-why-now-268797

October 31, 2025

Benedict Cumberbatch, John Grisham and Ursula K. Le Guin’s fantasy maps: what to watch, read and see this week

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jane Wright, Commissioning Editor, Arts & Culture, The Conversation

The more I see Benedict Cumberbatch on screen the more I marvel at his talent as an actor. Recently I have watched him in Eric on Netflix, as an unravelling Sesame Street-style puppeteer looking for his abducted son; in old re-runs of smartypants Sherlock Holmes on the BBC; and as a humiliated husband in The Roses with a truly ghastly Olivia Colman.

His latest film, The Thing With Feathers, promises another affecting performance, this time as a bewildered father struggling to look after his two small sons after the sudden death of his wife.

Based on Max Porter’s beautifully written novella Grief Is The Thing With Feathers, Cumberpatch plays Dad, a graphic artist who is unbearably sad, overwhelmed and increasingly untethered. In a film that is part tender human drama and part horror, this grief manifests as a large black crow, menacing but benevolent in its presence as a kind of guardian figure.

Harry Potter actor David Thewlis voices the character of Crow with thick Lancashire-accented sarcasm, at one point berating Dad for listening to “middle-aged, middle-class, Guardian-reading, beard-stroking, farmer’s-market widow music”, which has got to be my favourite line. But gradually Crow’s hardness shifts Dad, leading him through his sadness and apathy to something at least more bearable and liveable. “I won’t leave until you don’t need me any more,” Crow hisses, almost like a threat.

Our reviewer Dan O’Brien says it is easily the most poignant film he has seen this year, praising it for its nuanced handling of the subject. “Rather than something to be vanquished, the film suggests grief must be accommodated, even befriended. It’s a persuasive portrayal of mourning that recognises grief not as a wound to be sealed, but a permanent, unpredictable companion that you learn to live with.” Definitely on my list this spooky weekend.

The Thing With Feathers is in cinemas now

Like many people I am mad for maps. I find them not merely useful but endlessly fascinating – there is always something new to spy on close examination. So writers who include maps and invented places as part of the fabric of their stories intrigue me.

JRR Tolkien springs to mind, of course, but now a new exhibition in London is showcasing the wonderful maps created by the revered sci-fi writer Ursula K Le Guin, who rooted her genre-defying stories in fantasy worlds. Cartographer Mike Duggan finds the exhibition a fascinating insight into Le Guin’s process of other-world building.

The Word for World: Maps of Ursula K Le Guin is showing in the Architectural Association Gallery, London until December 6

Lies, spies and sleazy lawyers

I can honestly say I am never happier than when I am settling down on the sofa with a big bag of Maltesers and the latest episode of Slow Horses on the telly. And season five has not disappointed. Based on the brilliant series of Mick Herron novels, the drama plays out against a sinister and depressing landscape of dodgy politicians, media manipulation, radical terrorism and moral panics. But this is offset by much lighter tone that mines a rich seam of humour running beneath the serious plotlines.

From the sneaky, snooty toffs at the top of MI5 to the bored office bantz at Slough House, all the real-world ghastliness is leavened by the japes, sarcasm and eyerolling that go on.

I just adore the obnoxious Jackson Lamb and his spectacular insults, holey socks and suspect personal hygiene. Gary Oldman is enjoying the role of his life – you can practically smell the reek from the TV. But you also occasionally get the impression that the more Lamb insults, the more he cares. Maybe.

Spycraft expert Robert Dover examines how the series has managed to pull of this tricky combo of tense drama and hilarity, while claiming Lamb as the 21st-century version of John Le Carré’s George Smiley.

Slow Horses is on AppleTV

In John Grisham’s latest novel The Widow, a sleazy lawyer with less than ethical motives finds himself the main suspect after an elderly woman with a secret fortune that he has been “advising” is found murdered. When his shady legal dealings are uncovered, Simon F Latch looks like a man with opportunity and motive. But he’s innocent – so how does Grisham create a dodgy victim character the reader can muster up some sympathy for? Expert in human rights law Sarah Jane Coyle examines this grey area.

The Widow is in bookshops now

Set in Paris, Souleymane’s Story follows an asylum seeker from Guinea as he seeks work as a delivery cyclist. Seen through his perspective, the French capital becomes an unforgiving landscape fraught with danger and hardship as he strives to find work and survive. But Souleymane’s days are constantly taken up with exhausting negotiations with technology, bureaucracy, racism and threats. First-time actor Abou Sangaré won a best actor award at Cannes in 2024 for his raw but restrained performance, making Souleymane’s Story a compelling watch.

Souleymane’s Story is in cinemas now

– ref. Benedict Cumberbatch, John Grisham and Ursula K. Le Guin’s fantasy maps: what to watch, read and see this week – https://theconversation.com/benedict-cumberbatch-john-grisham-and-ursula-k-le-guins-fantasy-maps-what-to-watch-read-and-see-this-week-263743

October 31, 2025

Mission to Mars: how space exploration pushes the human body to its limits

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Damian Bailey, Professor of Physiology and Biochemistry, University of South Wales

On January 14 2004, the United States announced a new “Vision for Space Exploration”, promising that humans would not only visit space but live there. Two decades later, Nasa’s Artemis programme is preparing to return astronauts to the Moon and, eventually, send humans to Mars.

That mission will last around three years and cover hundreds of millions of kilometres. The crew will face radiation, isolation, weightlessness and confinement, creating stresses unlike any encountered by astronauts before. For physiologists, this is the ultimate frontier: a living laboratory where the human body is pushed to, and sometimes beyond, its biological limits.

Space is brutally unforgiving. It is a vacuum flooded with radiation and violent temperature extremes, where the absence of gravity dismantles the systems that evolved to keep us alive on Earth. Human physiology is tuned to one atmosphere of pressure, one gravity and one fragile ecological niche. Step outside that narrow comfort zone and the body begins to fail.

Yet adversity drives discovery. High-altitude research revealed how blood preserves oxygen at the edge of survival. Deep-sea and polar expeditions showed how humans endure crushing pressure and extreme cold. Spaceflight continues that tradition, redefining our understanding of life’s limits and showing how far biology can bend without breaking.

To understand these limits, physiologists are mapping the “space exposome” – everything in space that stresses the human body, from radiation and weightlessness to disrupted sleep and isolation. Each factor is harmful on its own, but combined they amplify one another, pushing the body to its limits and revealing how it truly works.

From this complexity emerges what scientists call the “space integrome”: the complete network of physiological connections that keeps an astronaut alive in the most extreme environment known.

When bones lose minerals, the kidneys respond. When fluid shifts toward the head, it changes pressure in the brain and affects vision, brain structure and function. Immune cells react to stress hormones released by the brain. Every system influences the others in a continuous biological feedback loop.

The body as a biosphere

The spacesuit is the most tangible symbol of this integration. It is a wearable biosphere: a miniature, self-contained environment that keeps the person inside it alive, much as Earth’s atmosphere does for all life. The suit shields the body from the lethal physics of space, protecting against vacuum, radiation and extreme temperatures.

Inside its layered shells of mylar (a reflective plastic that insulates against heat), kevlar (a strong fibre that resists impact) and dacron (a tough polyester that maintains shape and pressure), astronauts live in delicate balance. There is just enough internal pressure to stop their bodily fluids from boiling in a vacuum, yet still enough flexibility to move and work.

Every design choice mirrors a physiological trade-off. At too low pressure, consciousness fades within seconds. At too high pressure, the astronaut becomes trapped in a rigid shell.

Radiation remains spaceflight’s most insidious hazard. Galactic cosmic rays, made up of high-energy protons and heavy ions, slice through cells and fracture DNA in ways that biology on Earth was never built to repair. Exposure to these rays can cause DNA damage and chromosomal rearrangements that raise the risk of cancer.

But research into radiation biomarkers – molecular signals that show how cells respond to radiation exposure – is not only improving astronaut safety, it is also helping transform cancer treatment on Earth. The same biological markers that reveal radiation damage in space are being used to refine radiotherapy, allowing doctors to measure tissue sensitivity, personalise doses and limit damage to healthy cells.

Studies on how cells repair DNA after exposure to cosmic radiation are also informing the development of new drugs that protect patients during cancer treatment.

Microgravity presents another paradox. In orbit, astronauts lose 1–1.5% of their bone mass each month, and muscles weaken despite daily exercise. But this extreme environment also makes space an unparalleled model for accelerated ageing. Studies of bone loss and muscle atrophy in microgravity are helping uncover molecular pathways that could slow degenerative disease and frailty back home.

Astronauts aboard the International Space Station spend more than two hours a day performing “countermeasures”: intensive resistance workouts and sessions in lower-body negative pressure chambers, which draw blood back towards the legs to maintain healthy circulation.

They also eat carefully planned diets to stabilise their metabolism. No single strategy is enough, but together these help keep human biology closer to balance in an environment defined by instability.

Digital physiology

Tiny sensors embedded in spacesuits, or even placed under the skin, can now track heart rate, brain activity and chemical changes in the blood in real time. Multi-omic profiling combines information from across biology (genes, proteins and metabolism) to build a complete picture of how the body responds to spaceflight.

This data feeds into digital twins: virtual versions of each astronaut that allow scientists to simulate how their body will react to stressors such as radiation or microgravity.

The astronaut of the future will not simply endure space. They will work with their own biology, using real-time data and predictive algorithms to spot risks before they happen – adjusting their environment, exercise or nutrition to keep their body in balance.

By studying how humans survive without gravity, we are also learning how to live better with it. Space physiology has already helped shape treatments for osteoporosis and cardiovascular disease, and it is improving our understanding of age-related muscle loss.

Research into spaceflight-associated neuro-ocular syndrome – a condition in which fluid shifts in microgravity cause pressure to build inside the skull, sometimes leading to vision changes – is helping scientists understand intracranial hypertension on Earth.

Even studies of isolation and resilience in astronauts have advanced research into mental health and stress adaptation, offering insights that proved invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic, when millions faced confinement and social separation similar to life aboard a spacecraft.

Ultimately, Mars will test our biology more than our technology. Every gram of muscle preserved, every synapse protected, every cell repaired will be a triumph of physiology. Space may dismantle the human body, but it also reveals our body’s astonishing capacity to rebuild.

Damian Bailey is supported by grants from the European Space Agency, SpaceX and Royal Society Wolfson Research Fellowship. He is Editor-in-Chief of Experimental Physiology and outgoing Chair of the Life Sciences Working Group and outgoing member of the Human Spaceflight and Exploration Science Advisory Committee to ESA. He is also a current member of the ESA-HRE-Biology Panel and Space Exploration Advisory Committees to the UK and Swedish National Space Agencies, and consultant to Bexorg, Inc. (Yale, USA) focused on the technological development of novel biomarkers of cerebral bioenergetic function in humans.

Angelique Van Ombergen works as Chief Exploration Scientist for the Directorate of Human and Robotic Exploration at the European Space Agency. She is an Associate Editor of NPJ Microgravity.

– ref. Mission to Mars: how space exploration pushes the human body to its limits – https://theconversation.com/mission-to-mars-how-space-exploration-pushes-the-human-body-to-its-limits-267837