Que retenir de la présidence malaisienne de l’Asean ?

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Paco Milhiet, Visiting fellow au sein de la Rajaratnam School of International Studies ( NTU-Singapour), chercheur associé à l’Institut catholique de Paris, Institut catholique de Paris (ICP)

Avec désormais 11 membres, l’Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est a toujours l’ambition de jouer un rôle central en Asie du Sud-Est. La Malaisie, qui a exercé la présidence tournante de l’organisation en 2025, a profité de l’occasion pour se repositionner comme un acteur important dans la région et au-delà.


Cet article a été co-rédigé avec Colin Doridant, analyste des relations entre la France et l’Asie.

Ancienne colonie britannique, la Malaisie est l’un des rares États d’Asie du Sud-Est à être passé d’une stratégie d’alliance à une posture de non-alignement sur la scène internationale. Indépendante depuis 1957, sa politique étrangère est restée, dans un premier temps, étroitement liée aux garanties de sécurité britanniques à travers l’Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (1957-1971), puis les Five Power Defence Arrangements, un pacte défensif non contraignant réunissant le Royaume-Uni, la Malaisie et Singapour, l’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Le progressif retrait britannique, la reconnaissance de la République populaire de Chine (RPC) en 1974 ainsi que l’arrivée au pouvoir de Mahathir Mohamad – une figure politique majeure en Asie – ont posé les bases d’une politique étrangère plus autonome et tournée vers le continent asiatique.

En 2025, la Malaisie a cherché à exploiter sa présidence de l’Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est (Asean) pour affirmer son rôle sur la scène régionale et internationale. Une stratégie qui s’est révélée payante pour Kuala Lumpur, mais en demi-teinte pour l’Asean.

Une politique étrangère neutre mais proactive

Après avoir adhéré au mouvement des non-alignés en 1970 et réaffirmé son non-alignement dans son Livre Blanc de la défense de 2020, la Malaisie semble aujourd’hui poursuivre une politique étrangère d’équilibre stratégique dynamique entre Pékin et Washington, centrée autour de l’Asean dont elle a été l’un des cinq membres fondateurs en 1967 (l’organisation compte désormais 11 membres).

Si la Malaisie, publiquement, n’hésite pas à aller dans le sens de la RPC – comme l’a encore montré la visite d’État de Xi Jinping en avril –, elle a également fait du respect de sa souveraineté en mer de Chine méridionale une de ses priorités stratégiques face à Pékin.

Avec les États-Unis, la relation bilatérale est de plus en plus tendue – que ce soit à propos du conflit israélo-palestinien ou de la nomination du très controversé prochain ambassadeur des États-Unis en Malaisie. La coopération reste néanmoins résiliente, comme en témoigne la signature d’accords de défense et d’accès aux terres rares lors de la visite de Donald Trump en octobre 2025.

Dans les relations avec ses voisins, la Malaisie privilégie un pragmatisme discret en matière de gestion des litiges frontaliers, comme avec les Philippines sur l’État de Sabah ou avec l’Indonésie autour d’Ambalat en mer de Célèbes.

Vis-à-vis de Singapour, ancien membre de la fédération qui s’est détaché en 1965, les relations sont largement normalisées avec des initiatives comme l’ouverture prochaine du Johor Bahru–Singapore Rapid Transit System ou la formalisation en janvier 2025 de la Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone qui illustrent une approche axée sur l’interdépendance économique, évitant les confrontations publiques.

La présidence de l’Asean 2025 : un succès politique pour Anwar Ibrahim et diplomatique pour la Malaisie

Dix ans après sa dernière présidence de l’Asean, la Malaisie reprenait en 2025 les rênes de l’organisation dans un climat interne et international bien différent de celui qui prévalait une décennie auparavant.

Premier ministre depuis novembre 2022, Anwar Ibrahim, ancien dauphin puis rival de Mahathir, assurait cette présidence de l’Asean, plateforme unique pour rétablir une position d’acteur régional clé. La présidence malaisienne de l’Asean s’est inscrite dans la continuité de sa politique étrangère, qui vise à promouvoir le multilatéralisme et faire de Kuala Lumpur une capitale diplomatique en Asie du Sud-Est. Une mission réussie, avec les visites de plus de 25 chefs d’État différents en Malaisie au cours de l’année 2025, dont celles de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, de Xi Jinping, de Donald Trump ou encore l’organisation de la rencontre Rubio-Lavrov en juillet.

Autre facette de la diplomatie malaisienne en 2025 : une forte solidarité avec les peuples « opprimés », en particulier les Palestiniens, et une critique des « doubles standards » occidentaux. Les efforts d’Anwar pour concrétiser l’organisation du premier sommet « Asean-GCC-China » entre l’Asean, les six pays du Conseil de coopération du Golfe et la RPC, sont également à souligner. La Malaisie tente de se positionner comme un pont (bridging linchpin vision) entre les différentes régions et cultures, particulièrement entre le monde islamique, l’Occident, mais aussi le « Sud Global », le pays ayant obtenu le statut de partenaire des BRICS en 2024.

Une année 2025 où la Malaisie aura donc pu rayonner à l’international, à l’instar de son premier ministre qui prépare déjà les prochaines élections générales de février 2028.

Asean : des horizons incertains

Point d’orgue d’une année intense, le 47e sommet de l’Asean, organisé concomitamment avec d’autres réunions (Partenariat économique régional global, Sommet de l’Asie orientale) et en présence de Donald Trump, fut historique par l’adhésion d’un onzième membre : le Timor-Leste.

Néanmoins, sur les plans économique et diplomatique, les résultats ont été mitigés. En effet, si le renforcement de l’Asean Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) et de l’Asean-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) ont marqué des avancées vers plus d’intégration régionale, des critiques ont surtout été formulées à l’encontre des accords bilatéraux de réduction des tarifs douaniers signés par la Malaisie et le Cambodge avec les États-Unis. Ces derniers contiendraient des « clauses empoisonnées » visant à renforcer le commerce avec les États-Unis et à limiter celui avec la RPC. Des accords-cadres similaires ont été signés avec le Vietnam et la Thaïlande. Ces dispositions symbolisent les difficultés de l’Asean à s’adapter à la diplomatie économique trumpienne, qualifiée par certains de « diplomatie du cowboy ».

Sur le plan régional, c’est principalement le réveil du conflit larvé entre la Thaïlande et le Cambodge en mai 2025 qui a pesé sur la présidence malaisienne de l’Asean. Malgré des efforts – plus sino-malaisiens qu’états-uniens – qui ont mené à la conclusion lors du sommet de l’Asean de « l’accord de paix de Kuala Lumpur » entre les deux belligérants en octobre, les hostilités ont repris dès le mois de novembre.

En s’ajoutant à l’échec d’avancées concrètes sur le dossier birman et de la mer de Chine méridionale, la confrontation entre Bangkok et Phnom Penh n’a fait que souligner l’incapacité de l’Asean à régler les conflits régionaux. Un rappel supplémentaire de la complexité de ces défis persistants et des limites des mécanismes dont dispose l’Asean pour y faire face.

Les prochaines présidences de l’Asean – les Philippines en 2026, qui ont annoncé qu’elles feraient du Code de conduite en mer de Chine méridionale leur priorité, et Singapour en 2027, année des 60 ans de l’organisation et du prochain Congrès national du Parti communiste chinois – sont d’ores et déjà toutes deux sous pression face à l’accumulation des crises en Asie du Sud-Est.

Ces dynamiques auront des ramifications géopolitiques qui dépassent le seul cadre régional et offrent à des acteurs extérieurs, la France par exemple, des opportunités de coopération et d’influence dans la région.

Les perspectives françaises

Dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle stratégie Indopacifique française, la Malaisie constitue aujourd’hui un partenaire important en Asie du Sud-Est.

Le pays accueille environ 300 filiales d’entreprises françaises représentant quelque 30 000 emplois. Mais c’est dans le domaine de la défense que la coopération s’est révélée la plus soutenue, la Malaisie s’imposant, dans la première décennie du XXIe siècle, comme le principal partenaire de défense de la France en Asie du Sud-Est (aux côtés de Singapour), notamment à travers la vente de matériel militaire (sous-marins Scorpène, avions A400M, hélicoptères H225). La coopération militaire se poursuit actuellement, qu’il s’agisse des déploiements français (missions CLEMENCEAU 25 et PEGASE), de l’exercice terrestre conjoint MALFRENCH DAGGERT, ou encore des escales et exercices navals réguliers.

La relation connut une certaine accalmie, marquée par des périodes de tensions. Ainsi, en 2018, le retrait de l’huile de palme de la liste des biocarburants bénéficiant d’une exonération fiscale en France fut interprété par la Malaisie comme une interdiction déguisée d’importation, fragilisant un secteur stratégique.

La visite officielle à Paris d’Anwar Ibrahim en juillet 2025 semblait indiquer « la relance » de la relation bilatérale pour reprendre les mots du président Emmanuel Macron. Mais le discours d’Anwar à la Sorbonne pouvait toutefois être perçu comme un avertissement adressé aux Européens, les invitant à recalibrer leurs relations avec l’Asie du Sud-Est et à mieux appréhender les sensibilités d’une région qui « a l’habitude d’être décrite, mais beaucoup moins celle d’être écoutée ».

Il pourrait être intéressant pour la France de renforcer son soutien à la gestion des crises en Asie du Sud-Est, dans la dynamique de la nomination en 2024 d’un envoyé spécial pour la Birmanie en appui des efforts internationaux. En effet, le contentieux territorial entre la Thaïlande et le Cambodge trouve son origine dans le découpage territorial de l’Indochine française et des traités franco-siamois de 1904 et 1907. Or, la reprise du conflit coïncide avec l’organisation en 2026 du XXe Sommet de la Francophonie qui se tiendra au Cambodge (la Thaïlande est également membre l’organisation avec le statut observateur) et auquel participera Emmanuel Macron.

Un déplacement français en Asie du Sud-Est qui ne devra pas, cette fois, oublier la Malaisie, comme le rappelait avec humour le premier ministre malaisien à son homologue français dans la cour de l’Élysée en juillet 2025 : « Avant que vous n’atteigniez le Cambodge pour le Sommet de la Francophonie, vous n’aurez aucune excuse de ne pas visiter la Malaisie. »

The Conversation

Paco Milhiet ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Que retenir de la présidence malaisienne de l’Asean ? – https://theconversation.com/que-retenir-de-la-presidence-malaisienne-de-lasean-272485

Nigeria has a high poverty rate – what this has to do with ethnic conflicts

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Tolu Olarewaju, Economist and Lecturer in Management, Keele University; University of Lancashire

Nigeria has endured decades of violent insurgencies and ranks 6th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. Numerous people have been killed and millions displaced. The number of casualties from terrorist attacks in 2025 can be seen in both the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data and the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker. Most of the casualties are in places with high poverty levels, as the Nigerian Poverty Map shows.

Tolu Olarewaju, who has researched ethnic poverty, unpacks why regions of violence and poverty overlap in Nigeria.

What is the state of poverty in Nigeria?

Poverty in Nigeria comes in various forms: a lack of income and productive resources to sustain livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; illness and death; and limited access to education and other basic services. It includes inadequate housing and unsafe environments. It is also seen in a lack of participation in decision-making and civil, social and cultural life.

Nigeria currently has a population of 237 million people and over 133 million Nigerians are living in this kind of poverty. It is higher in rural areas, where 72% of people are poor, compared to 42% of people in urban areas. The current poverty in Nigeria is the result of two key factors:

  • history – particularly the slave trade and British colonial rule, which put the economic gain of the British Empire ahead of the development of the local population

  • corruption and poor governance practices.

My work shows that when initiatives are introduced to reduce poverty in Nigeria, they are often hijacked by corrupt individuals.

There have been numerous government efforts to combat poverty in Nigeria. The current administration launched the “Renewed Hope Conditional Cash Transfer” programme in October 2023 to cushion the effects of its fuel subsidy removal, which had raised the cost of living and caused inflation. The programme hasn’t made much impact on the level of poverty in the country.

The failures of successive Nigerian governments to reduce poverty stem from multiple factors. They include corruption, poor targeting of programmes, limited funding, weak legislative oversight, political interference, and the absence of a flexible, people-centred approach.

Meanwhile, poverty is the common thread across the places experiencing terrorism in Nigeria. Poor people are more likely to be recruited into terrorist groups, and their targets are likely to be poor people like themselves.

What is ethnic poverty?

Ethnic poverty occurs when there is systemic poverty for an ethnic group. An ethnic group is a social group that shares a common and distinctive history, culture, religion, language, or the like.

My work on ethnic poverty also shows that it can lead to conflicts that are easily labelled as ethnic, religious or tribal.

Ethnic poverty disparities, uneven development and radical ideologies will make any country susceptible to violent insurgencies. This has occurred, for example, in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ethiopia.

Ethnic poverty can increase hatred and violence, but economic growth could create a “win-win solution” if wealth can be shared equitably.

Nigeria is a multinational state where more than 250 ethnic groups live, speaking over 500 distinct languages. The three largest ethnic groups are the Hausa in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Igbo in the east. The country is prone to violent insurgencies where armed groups who suffer from ethnic poverty try to overthrow the government.

How does ethnic poverty play out in Nigeria?

Poverty in Nigeria is intertwined with ethnicity. Inequalities in wealth and education persist between ethnic groups and regions. For example, 65% of the poor and less educated live in the north, where the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are predominant. Poverty levels across states also vary. The incidence of multidimensional poverty ranges from a low of 27% in Ondo (in the south) to a high of 91% in Sokoto (in the north).

What are the solutions to ethnic poverty?

There is no single solution, but several that will mature over time. The Nigerian government should:

  • Hold transparent discussions and elections to decide if a regional system of government that focuses on local problems will be better than the current centrally planned government.

  • Devise a strategy that combats corruption and focuses on ethnic groups with higher poverty rates.

  • Expand education and vocational training to promote peace and tolerance, and employable skills linked to local markets.

  • Deliver entrepreneurship training and financial literacy programmes to foster self-reliance and community-based economic growth.

  • Offer incentives for responsible industrial development and local enterprise investment in areas of high ethnic poverty.

  • Implement policies that promote balanced urban–rural economic growth and integrate ethnic populations economically into the national story.

  • Invest in transport, digital and communication infrastructure in remote areas to improve access to education, security and markets.

  • Promote inclusive national narratives that celebrate ethnic diversity.

Together, these measures can create a more equitable social contract that gives every ethnic group a stake in national progress. By being transparent and accountable, the government can rebuild trust.

Sustained investment in people, infrastructure and local economies will help break the cycle of inter-generational ethnic poverty. Over time, these efforts can strengthen unity and share prosperity across Nigeria.

The Conversation

Tolu Olarewaju does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Nigeria has a high poverty rate – what this has to do with ethnic conflicts – https://theconversation.com/nigeria-has-a-high-poverty-rate-what-this-has-to-do-with-ethnic-conflicts-270649

Americans generally like wolves − except when we’re reminded of our politics

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Alexander L. Metcalf, Associate Professor of Human Dimensions of Natural Resources, University of Montana

Wolf reintroduction is often seen as a polarizing issue. Jason Connolly/AFP via Getty Images

Management of gray wolves (Canis lupus) has a reputation for being one of the most contentious conservation issues in the United States. The topic often conjures stark images of supporters versus opponents: celebratory wolf reintroductions to Yellowstone National Park and Colorado contrasted with ranchers outraged over lost cattle; pro-wolf protests juxtaposed with wolf bounty hunters. These vivid scenes paint a picture of seemingly irreconcilable division.

But in contrast to these common caricatures, surveys of public opinion consistently show that most people around the world hold positive views of wolves, often overwhelmingly so. This trend holds true even in politically conservative U.S. states, often assumed to be hostile toward wolf conservation. For example, a recent study of ours in Montana found that an increasing majority of residents, 74% in 2023, are tolerant or very tolerant of wolves.

Still, the perception of deep conflict persists and is often amplified by media coverage and politicians. But what if these exaggerated portrayals, and the assumptions of division they reinforce, are themselves contributing to the very conflict they describe? In a study published Jan. 6, 2026, we explored this question.

A wolf walking through snow, with a herd of deer in the background.
A wolf roams through Yellowstone National Park. Wolves were reintroduced into Yellowstone in 1995.
William F. Campbell/Getty Images

The human side of conservation

We are social scientists who study the human dimensions of environmental issues, from wildfire to wildlife. Using tools from psychology and other social sciences, we examine how people relate to nature and to each other when it comes to environmental issues. These human relationships often matter more to conservation outcomes than the biology of the species or ecosystems in question. Conservation challenges are typically people problems.

A diagram showing how personal identity flows into social identity, which informs social categorization and leads to distinct social groups -- people then sort them into in-groups, 'us,' and out-groups, 'them.'
Social identity theory describes how many people view those with similar identities as part of their group, and those with different identities as an out-group.
w:en:Jfwang/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

One of the most powerful yet underappreciated forces in these dynamics is social identity, the psychological force that compels people to sort themselves into groups and take those group boundaries seriously. Social identity theory, a foundational concept in psychology, shows that once people see themselves as members of a group, they are naturally inclined to favor “us” and be wary of “them.”

But strong group loyalties also come with costs: They can distort how people see and interpret the world and exacerbate conflict between groups.

When identity distorts reality

Social identity can shape how people interpret even objectively true facts. It can lead people to misjudge physical distances and sizes and assume the worst about members of different groups. When this identification runs deep, a phenomenon called identity fusion can occur, when someone’s personal identity becomes tightly linked to their group identity.

This phenomenon can lead people to act in questionable ways, even ways they might otherwise find immoral, particularly when they believe their group is under threat. For example, it’s possible these forces contribute to high-profile cover-ups of reprehensible behavior.

In our recent research, we tested how activating people’s political identities – simply reminding them of their own political party affiliations – affected their perceptions of wolves in the U.S.

Across two studies involving over 2,200 participants from nine states with wolf populations, we found a striking pattern. When we activated people’s political identity, their attitudes toward wolves became more polarized. Democrats’ affinity for wolves increased, as did Republicans’ aversion.

A graph showing attitudes toward wolves on the left, and political ideology on the right, with two lines, one showing activated political views and one not. The activated line declines more sharply, which the other stays constant and relatively high.
People’s attitudes toward wolves are relatively positive and weakly related to political ideology when political identity is inactivated, but they quickly polarize along ideological lines when political identity is activated.
Alexander L. Metcalf

On the other hand, when our particants’ political identities were not activated, they generally liked wolves, regardless of their politics. In a follow-up experiment where we had people guess their fellow and rival party members’ attitudes toward wolves, we found this identity-based polarization was driven by people’s assumptions about their in-group but not their out-group. People incorrectly assumed others in their party held extreme views about wolves, and those assumptions in turn shaped their own attitudes toward the species.

In other words, the caricatures themselves created the conflict.

This is an ironic and tragic outcome: A situation where many people actually agree became polarized not because of deep-seated differences but because of how people imagined others feel.

A wolf walking over snow, with a mountain view in the background.
A wolf from the Snake River Pack passes by a remote camera in Oregon.
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife via AP, File

Bridging the gap

Fortunately, the same psychological forces that divide people can also bring them together. When we showed our research participants the actual views of others, specifically that most of their fellow political party members held positive attitudes toward wolves, their own attitudes moderated.

Other strategies for uniting people involve activating “cross-cutting” identities, or shared identities that span traditional divides. For instance, someone might identify both as a rancher and a conservationist, or a hunter who is also a wildlife advocate. More broadly, our respondents are all Americans and community members who share a common humanity. Highlighting these blended and shared identities can reduce the sense of “us vs. them” and open the door to more productive conversations.

The debate over wolves may seem like an intractable clash of values. But our research suggests it doesn’t have to be. When people move beyond caricatures of conflict and recognize the common ground that already exists, we can begin to shift the conversation and maybe even find ways to live not just with wolves, but with each other.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Americans generally like wolves − except when we’re reminded of our politics – https://theconversation.com/americans-generally-like-wolves-except-when-were-reminded-of-our-politics-267511

Le Venezuela, un dominion des États-Unis ?

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Florent Parmentier, Secrétaire général du CEVIPOF. Enseignant, Sciences Po

Dans la nuit du 2 au 3 janvier 2026, les forces armées américaines ont lancé et conduit l’opération militaire massive « Absolute resolve » afin de kidnapper le président vénézuélien Nicolas Maduro au palais Miraflores, à Caracas. Dans la foulée, Donald Trump a annoncé que les États-Unis « dirigeraient » temporairement le Venezuela en attendant la prise de pouvoir d’un gouvernement favorable aux États-Unis (like minded). Pourtant, la vice-présidente Delcy Rodriguez, légalement au pouvoir depuis l’incarcération de Maduro, annonce désormais son intention d’assumer la direction de l’État. Quel destin se prépare pour le pays, entre interventionnisme trumpiste, sursaut nationaliste anti-impérialiste et protestations internationales ?


Une intervention militaire conduite sans base légale et au nom de la « sécurité des États-Unis » ; la destitution et l’emprisonnement du dictateur au pouvoir ; l’annonce de la future prise de contrôle du pays par les forces armées et les entreprises états-uniennes : tout cela rappelle l’opération contre l’Irak et Saddam Hussein de 2003.

Le parallèle avec l’opération irakienne – officiellement destinée à prévenir l’usage d’armes de destruction massive (demeurées introuvables) – est limité : cette fois, derrière le prétexte de la lutte contre le « narcoterrorisme », Donald Trump reconnaît sans ambages le rôle clé qu’occupent les ressources pétrolières dans les motivations profondes de cette opération. Ceux qui veulent y voir une défense de la démocratie en seront pour leurs frais : la promotion de la démocratie et la lutte contre les dictatures sont au centre des discours européens, mais pratiquement absents de ceux de l’équipe Trump.

En outre, l’invasion de 2003 visait à détruire l’État du parti Baas irakien ; or, ce n’est pas l’opposante Maria Corina Machado, prix Nobel de la paix 2025, qui est appelée à gouverner le Venezuela, mais la vice-présidente en exercice Delcy Rodriguez. La situation fait dès lors penser, à ce stade, à l’accaparement des ressources vénézuéliennes par une puissance extérieure, couplé à un lâchage interne de Maduro au sein du régime, quand bien même Rodriguez a exigé sa libération.

Par conséquent, la question cruciale n’est sans doute pas « qui gouverne », mais « comment gouverner après ».

Le Venezuela de Rodriguez, entre souveraineté limitée et nationalisme blessé

L’enlèvement de Nicolas Maduro n’empêche pas la Constitution vénézuélienne de 1999 de continuer de s’appliquer.

L’opération militaire conduite par les États-Unis destitue un des titulaires du pouvoir, mais ne transforme pas mécaniquement les structures politiques, sociales ou économiques du pays. Elle introduit en revanche une contrainte durable. Le nouveau régime doit gouverner sous le regard simultané d’une puissance extérieure tutélaire, qui a montré sa capacité d’intervention, et dont sa survie dépend aujourd’hui, et d’une société nationale très attentive aux signes d’autonomie ou de mise sous tutelle, et foncièrement divisée.

Le 4 janvier 2026, Delcy Rodriguez, devenue le jour même par décision de la Cour suprême cheffe de l’État vénézuélien, préside un conseil des ministres à Caracas. Sur le mur : des portraits de Simon Bolivar, d’Hugo Chavez et, au centre, de Nicolas Maduro et de son épouse, actuellement détenus aux États-Unis.
Site de la vice-présidence vénézuélienne

Cette tension place le pouvoir de Delcy Rodriguez dans une double contrainte : d’une part, éviter une nouvelle intervention en se conciliant la faveur de l’administration Trump ; d’autre part, satisfaire les aspirations de la population au respect d’une souveraineté mise à mal par l’ingérence américaine. En un mot, elle doit combiner survie face à Trump et rhétorique nationaliste compensatoire : elle a par exemple dénoncé la teneur « sioniste » (comprenez colonisatrice) de l’expédition américaine, qualifiée de « kidnapping » et de « barbarie » violant le droit international.

Si Rodriguez et son entourage optent pour un discours trop musclé et offensif à l’égard de Washington, cela offrira à Donald Trump un prétexte pour procéder à un changement de régime complet, ce qui supposerait une action et un investissement beaucoup plus conséquents. Le Venezuela vit donc dorénavant dans un régime de « souveraineté limitée », comme l’annonçait en décembre la nouvelle stratégie nationale de sécurité américaine.




À lire aussi :
L’internationale trumpiste : la Stratégie de sécurité nationale 2025 comme manifeste idéologique


Dans ce contexte, trois destinées sont aujourd’hui ouvertes pour le pays.

Scénario 1, le chavisme sans Chavez ni Maduro : un Thermidor caribéen sous surveillance états-unienne

Premier scénario : une continuité réelle malgré une rupture affichée. Pour les élites bolivariennes, lâcher Maduro a peut-être été le prix à payer pour sauver l’État, restaurer une forme de rationalité, sortir le pays de l’isolement.

Les visages changent à peine, les uniformes pas encore. Durant les six premiers mois, les sanctions américaines pourraient être partiellement suspendues, les marchés pourraient réagir avec prudence, et les institutions seraient « normalisées » plutôt que transformées. Dans ce scénario, le nouveau pouvoir ne parle que de stabilité, jamais de refondation, et gouverne par décrets techniques sous la surveillance discrète des États-Unis, dont l’attention sera focalisée sur la possession des champs pétroliers.

Au bout d’un an, la démocratie revendiquée par les opposants au chavisme sera renvoyée à plus tard, et les structures du pouvoir resteront quasiment intactes. Comme lors du 9-Thermidor en 1794, les excès ont été liquidés, pas le système.

Scénario 2, la souveraineté limitée : un « moment Kadar » tropical

Tout commence par une fracture interne inattendue. Ni chaviste orthodoxe ni opposition traditionnelle, un nouveau centre de gravité politique émerge dans l’entre‑deux, porté par des acteurs fatigués des extrêmes et décidés à stabiliser le pays. Les différentes oppositions (MAGA-compatibles ou non) convergent et s’allient aux « chavistes modérés » (gouverneurs pragmatiques, militaires de second rang, technocrates issus du Parti socialiste unifié du Venezuela (PSUV)
– la formation chaviste –, qui veulent éviter l’effondrement total) pour proposer au pays un régime de transition qui garantit une certaine souveraineté nationale. Dans les six premiers mois, un pacte social minimal est proposé, la coercition recule temporairement, et l’économie redémarre grâce à une série de mesures pragmatiques.

La surprise vient de la société elle‑même : la demande de « vie normale » devient dominante, affaiblissant (peut-être momentanément) la polarisation. Le pays semble entrer dans une phase de pacification inattendue, presque involontaire.

Mais au bout de quelques mois, probablement vers l’automne 2026, surgissent des troubles internes : grèves sectorielles, protestations corporatistes, tensions régionales. Rien de décisif pour la stabilité du régime, mais suffisamment pour rappeler que celui-ci reste fragile. Le pouvoir répond par une combinaison de concessions ciblées et de fermeté mesurée, évitant l’escalade tout en réaffirmant son autorité.

Ces turbulences, paradoxalement, renforcent le récit du compromis : le régime se présente comme le seul capable de contenir le chaos sans revenir à la répression systématique. Comme avec le pouvoir de Janos Kadar instauré en Hongrie après 1956 (à la suite de l’écrasement par l’URSS de l’insurrection de Budapest), ce n’est ni une victoire idéologique ni une défaite politique : c’est la fatigue historique qui gouverne, et la société accepte le compromis, faute de mieux.

Dans ce scénario, les États-Unis jouent un rôle bien plus important : ils soutiennent l’arrivée au pouvoir d’un dirigeant d’inspiration MAGA à Caracas, à l’instar des Soviétiques qui ont porté Janos Kadar à la tête de la Hongrie.

Scénario 3, une évolution à la cubaine pré-castriste : un dominion américain

Si la souveraineté reste intacte sur le papier, la capacité de négociation du pouvoir chaviste est déjà très entamée en ce début d’année 2026. Une fois installé le nouveau leadership, soutenu par Washington et aligné sur ses priorités, vient alors la phase de réouverture sous contrainte : levée conditionnelle des sanctions, retour des majors états-uniennes, accords d’exploitation conclus dans l’urgence. Les nouveaux contrats s’étendent sur des décennies, verrouillés par des clauses de stabilisation et une fiscalité avantageuse pour les intérêts des majors. Le pétrole demeure vénézuélien, mais la rente, elle, devient extraterritoriale, profitable aux milieux économiques des États-Unis.

La troisième phase consacre la captation de la valeur : technologies, assurances, transport et raffinage sont externalisés, les revenus rapatriés hors du pays, et l’État réduit à une fonction fiscale minimale. Le Venezuela produit beaucoup, capte peu et dépend désormais de flux qu’il ne contrôle plus.

Enfin, cette dépendance se normalise. Le récit dominant affirme que « c’est le prix de la stabilité » ; la souveraineté pétrolière est dépolitisée ; et les fractures sociales s’approfondissent. Le pillage n’est plus seulement visible : il est institutionnalisé.

En somme, le Venezuela subit le sort de Cuba entre l’adoption de l’amendement Platt (1901), qui officialisa le droit d’ingérence des États-Unis sur la République de Cuba, et la révolution castriste (1959) : il devient un dominion des États-Unis.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Le Venezuela, un dominion des États-Unis ? – https://theconversation.com/le-venezuela-un-dominion-des-etats-unis-272730

What the New Year’s fire at a Swiss bar tells us about fire prevention

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Brodie Ramin, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Medicine, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

In the early hours of Jan. 1, 2026, a fire ripped through Le Constellation bar in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, killing 40 people and injuring 116, many of them severely.

Investigators believe the blaze began when sparklers on champagne bottles were held too close to the ceiling, igniting interior materials. The investigation is ongoing, and it is premature to draw conclusions about individual actions or responsibility. But fires do not need villains to be instructive.

What matters is not the spark itself, but the system into which that spark was introduced.

Fire safety, as history keeps reminding us, is not about eliminating ignition. We will always cook, heat, wire, decorate, celebrate and repair. Fire prevention is about ensuring that when ignition happens, as it inevitably will, it does not propagate.

My research has focused on how disasters are prevented, and how warning signs are missed when systems drift or protections are taken for granted. Fire safety is one area I have examined, and it reveals recurring patterns that are relevant to understanding this tragedy.

Fire as a contagion

For one thing, fire behaves less like an accident and more like a virus. It spreads through available fuel, follows paths of least resistance and accelerates when conditions are favourable. The historian Stephen Pyne describes fire as a “contagion of combustion.”

Like disease prevention, fire safety has never relied on a single safeguard. Instead, it depends on layers of them: materials that resist ignition, detection systems that identify problems early, compartmentalization that limits spread, suppression systems that slow or extinguish flames and trained humans who know how to respond when technology falters. When fires become destructive, it is almost always because multiple layers fail at once.

The Reason Model and fire prevention

The Reason Model, often visualized as slices of Swiss cheese, helps explain why disasters occur even in systems designed to be safe.

Each slice represents a layer of defence. Each slice also contains holes, imperfections, gaps and latent weaknesses. Most of the time, those holes do not line up, but when they do, harm passes through.

Latent conditions for fire exist everywhere: dry materials, electrical wiring, human fatigue, budget constraints, informal workarounds. These conditions are usually harmless until they align. The spark is not the cause of the disaster. It is merely the moment when all the holes line up.

Celebration and risk perception

The New Year’s fire at Le Constellation bar occurred in a celebratory setting. That matters, because celebration changes how we perceive risk.

Celebratory spaces often bring together the very conditions fire exploits: crowds, alcohol, decorations, reduced vigilance, temporary installation and informal rule-bending “just for the night.” When those conditions align with flammable materials or limited escape access, the margin for error shrinks dramatically.

Latent conditions are not evenly distributed across time. They cluster during moments of exception — holidays, renovations, special events when normal routines are suspended.

Notre-Dame: when multiple failures occur

When the Notre-Dame Cathedral nearly collapsed in a fire in April 2019, it shocked the world. The building was not neglected. It had a sophisticated fire detection system with more than 160 sensors. Fire wardens patrolled the attic three times daily. A firefighter was permanently stationed on site. The Paris Fire Brigade had trained for exactly such a scenario.

And yet, the fire still spread.

An alarm triggered at 6:18 p.m., but a misinterpreted code sent a guard to the wrong attic. A fatigued technician, covering a double shift, struggled to escalate the alert. The system detected the fire, but it did not automatically summon the fire department. By the time the correct location was identified, 30 minutes had passed. The roof timbers, made of centuries old dry oak, were already burning uncontrollably.

Notre-Dame did not burn because no one cared. It burned because multiple failures aligned: ambiguous alarm codes, human fatigue, delayed escalation and architectural features that lacked compartmentalization or sprinklers. A fire protection engineer later remarked that the only surprise was that the disaster had not happened sooner.

Rarity breeds complacency

One of the paradoxes of modern fire safety is that it works so well it becomes invisible. Between 1980 and 2024, the rate of reported fires per 1,000 people in the United States fell by more than 60 per cent, according to long-term data compiled by the National Fire Protection Association. Sprinklers, fire doors, smoke detectors, compartmentalization and education campaigns have made large fires rare.

But that rarity can breed complacency.

When a system prevents disaster hundreds of times, it becomes tempting to ignore precautions. Doors are left open. Materials are substituted. Alarms are misunderstood. Redundancies are trimmed.

The holes in the safety system widen quietly. Then, eventually, they all line up.

Learning from tragedies

The Swiss fire had its own specific causes, and those details matter. But the broader lesson is neither new nor obscure. Fires do not escalate only because people are reckless. They escalate because systems drift away from the conditions under which they were safe.

Fire safety is an engineering and organizational project. It requires constant attention to small details, especially when nothing seems wrong. It demands respect for fire and its destructive potential.

We have learned, repeatedly, how to prevent fires from spreading. Every major advance, from fire doors to sprinklers to automatic shutoff systems, came from studying failures where containment broke down.

The tragedy is not that we do not know what works. It is that, over time, we forget to be afraid.

The Conversation

Brodie Ramin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. What the New Year’s fire at a Swiss bar tells us about fire prevention – https://theconversation.com/what-the-new-years-fire-at-a-swiss-bar-tells-us-about-fire-prevention-272777

Denaturalization in the Trump era: When the State questions the citizenship of millions of Americans

Source: The Conversation – France – By Ashley Mantha-Hollands, Max Weber Fellow, Max Weber Programme for Postdoctoral Studies, European University Institute

It is recognised in US law that the government may not take away a naturalized person’s citizenship except in cases of fraud or error on a naturalization application. The Supreme Court has clearly established that unless citizenship was unlawfully procured, denaturalization is unconstitutional. However, a memo issued by the Department of Justice (DoJ) in June attempts to broaden the grounds for denaturalization, potentially putting over 24.5 million naturalized US citizens at risk.

The memo states that the current US administration has directed the DoJ’s Civil Division to “advance the administration’s policy objectives”, among which is “prioritizing denaturalization”. Under this directive, the division is to investigate individuals who either “illegally procured” or “conceal[ed] a material fact” in their naturalization applications. The text outlines 10 “categories” of priority cases, which include individuals who “pose a potential danger to national security”; who “engaged in various forms of financial fraud”, including fraud associated with the Medicaid and Medicare healthcare programmes; and “any other cases referred to the Civil Division that the Division determines to be sufficiently important to pursue”.

The memo could broaden the scope of grounds previously used for denaturalization and will likely face legal challenge. Since September, the DoJ has filed denaturalization complaints against individuals for reasons such as providing false testimony and concealing identity, and for other crimes. In November, following a DoJ complaint filed in August, a US judge revoked the citizenship of a naturalized individual who had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud. President Donald Trump, in a recent post on Truth Social, reaffirmed his commitment to “denaturalize migrants who undermine domestic tranquillity” and further stated, on November 30, in response to a shooting in Washington, DC, “if I have the power to do it… I would denaturalize, absolutely”.**

The DoJ memo represents a departure from 50 years of US policy between 1967 and mid-June 2017 – nearly five months into Donald Trump’s first term as president. During this period, the practice of citizenship stripping was rare and used primarily in extreme cases, such as for war criminals. In contrast, between 1906 and 1967, the US denaturalized more citizens than any other democracy. Several news and academic sources have highlighted what some see as similar motivations behind the current administration’s directive and past initiatives. It is also important to note that the DoJ memo will afford a discretion that could be much wider than in the past.

Denaturalization in the 20th Century

The original purpose of denaturalization in the US, put into force by the Naturalization Act of 1906, was to wipe out so-called “disbelievers in organized government” from society. The early cases were against political dissidents – some self-described, and some alleged socialists, anarchists and radicals – and often included journalists or labour unionists. One notable case is that of Emma Goldman, the first person to be denaturalized for her political views. Goldman was an anarchist who eventually lost her citizenship due to her activism against US involvement in the First World War. Denaturalization for political views was linked to two provisions in naturalization law: the requirement that a person have “good moral character” and that applicants be “attached to the principles of the US Constitution.”

One of the largest citizenship-stripping campaigns started in the 1940s, after the Nationality Act of 1940 gave naturalization authority to the DoJ. Once more, the primary targets were those with so-called “subversive” beliefs, particularly those with any affiliations to the Communist Party or the German American Bund. After the government denaturalized more than 22,000 people, this particular wave was halted by the Supreme Court in 1943, which declared that a person could not be denaturalized without “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that they were planning for the violent overthrow of the government. This became a standard impossible to prove, and cases of denaturalization subsided. In 1967, the Court decided that denaturalization was altogether unconstitutional except in cases of fraud or error in a naturalization application, and since, there have been only a handful of cases per year.

The DoJ memo doesn’t refer to ideological views such as “communism” or “socialism”, although the policy manual for US Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) states that an individual may be denaturalized “if the person becomes a member of, or affiliated with, the Communist party”. However, the first priority in the memo mentions anyone who “[poses] a potential danger to national security”, which can be broadly interpreted.

Threatening comments

In July, Trump made comments that raised questions about whether the beliefs of some naturalized individuals may put them at risk. These comments were about New York City mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani and actor Rosie O’Donnell. After US Congressman Andy Ogles threatened Mamdani, then a mayoral candidate, with a denaturalization investigation for rap lyrics Mamdani wrote in 2017 that Ogles viewed as “publicly praising” individuals convicted of supporting the militant Palestinian group Hamas, Trump said “a lot of people are saying he’s here illegally” and “we’re going to look at everything”. And the president threatened the birthright citizenship of O’Donnell, who was born in New York, saying that she “is not in the best interests of our Great Country”. Because O’Donnell is a natural-born citizen, there is no provision in US law to revoke her citizenship unless she provides her explicit consent. It’s also worth noting that Trump said he would “take a look” into the question of deporting billionaire Elon Musk, who became a naturalized citizen in 2002, after the Tesla CEO criticised the spending bill that passed into law in early July.“

Threatening denaturalization for opinions or statements, that while perhaps controversial are peaceful, reaches much further than the historical standard of believing in the “violent takeover of government” used to start a denaturalization proceeding in the past. Such threats generate a climate of fear where certain individuals and groups may be scared to voice opinions out of the threat of ending up in a denaturalization trial.

The expanded notion of ‘fraudulent acquisition’

Since 1967, fraudulent acquisition of citizenship has been the exclusive justification for denaturalization. Up until recently, this has been interpreted as a nondisclosure of information on a naturalization application that would have impacted the outcome of the application.

There has been an increasing number of investigations of fraudulent acquisition since 2008, the year that saw “Operation Janus”. This Obama-era policy targeted individuals who had been sent a deportation letter as an immigrant but had subsequently naturalized using a different name. The main driver was the digitization of records and fingerprint testing, which made it easier to identify discrepancies. In 2016, Trump expanded the operation to allow USCIS to investigate over 700,000 cases, marking the first push to “revive denaturalization”.

As scholars have argued, identifying fraud or a mistake is not always clear cut. For example, the US naturalization form asks whether a person has ever committed a crime, but does not specify what is included in its definition of a crime. It is unknown whether a crime committed in another jurisdiction that is not a crime under US law would count. This could have implications for same-sex couples or trans persons who come from countries where their status is illegal – such as in Uganda.

The June DoJ memo further expands what is considered as fraud for denaturalization to include instances of “loan fraud” or “Medicaid/Medicare fraud.” These types of fraud would likely not have previously met the standard of “willful misrepresentation” or “concealing material fact” that would have impacted the outcome of the naturalization process, since they are not related to a person’s immigration history.

Looking at denaturalization through the lens of race

While the memo does not mention race or ethnicity, some lawyers and legal scholars are concerned that, read alongside other developments in the current administration’s management of immigration, it will disproportionately affect certain minority and low-income communities.

Historically, race has been an explicit factor in immigration and denaturalization. Up until 1952, US citizenship law stated that only “white persons, persons of African nativity or descent, and descendants of races indigenous to the Western hemisphere” could be naturalized. In the 1920s, more than 50 naturalized individuals of Indian origin had their citizenship revoked after the Supreme Court decided that people from India were not “white” in “the understanding of the common man”

The DoJ memo came nearly three months after the deportation of hundreds of Venezuelan men with tenuous or non-existent ties to gangs or drug cartels, and nearly two months before a Supreme Court decision that allowed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents to use racial profiling in immigration raids in Los Angeles.

Some human rights groups and journalists have compared ICE immigration enforcement to how the US “War on Drugs” fuelled the mass incarceration of certain low-income and minority groups. As Sarah Tosh, a professor at Rutgers University, wrote in 2021, “these processes draw from a long history of targeted drug enforcement that has served to scapegoat, punish, and exclude immigrants and native-born racial minorities”.

Repeat of history or something bigger?

Unlike some European countries, the US previously had strong safeguards against denaturalization since the Supreme Court’s 1967 ruling. Since the end of September, the government has filed at least thirteen denaturalization actions (exact numbers are not publicly available), 11 of these actions were filed and publicly disclosed between September 30 and January 20, 2025, the beginning of Trump’s second term.

The “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” that passed in July allocated more than $3 billion in additional funds to the DoJ to exercise the administration’s immigration priorities – such as hiring immigration judges, staffing, and investigations.

The expansion of the potential grounds for denaturalization, the upcoming Supreme Court review of birthright citizenship, and even Ohio Senator Bernie Moreno’s recently proposed legislation to ban dual citizenship mark the potential for some of the most fundamental shifts in US citizenship to date. While some have rightly made the connection between present and past denaturalization initiatives, it remains to be seen how the Justice Department will make use of the memo’s criteria for denaturalization during the rest of Trump’s mandate.


The Conversation

Ashley Mantha-Hollands ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Denaturalization in the Trump era: When the State questions the citizenship of millions of Americans – https://theconversation.com/denaturalization-in-the-trump-era-when-the-state-questions-the-citizenship-of-millions-of-americans-272130

2026 begins with an increasingly autocratic United States rising on the global stage

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Shelley Inglis, Senior Visiting Scholar with the Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Rutgers University

Explosions are seen at Fort Tiuna, Venezuela’s largest military complex, Jan. 3, 2026. Luis Jaimes/AFP via Getty Images

The U.S. military operation in Venezuela and capture of President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3, 2026, topped off months of military buildup and targeted strikes in the Caribbean Sea. It fulfills President Donald Trump’s claim to assert authoritative control over the Western Hemisphere, articulated in his administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy.

Some national security experts say U.S. military action in Venezuela – taken without U.S. congressional approval or U.N. Security Council authorization – is unlawful. It may violate domestic and international law.

The Venezuela attack represents the clearest example during Trump’s second presidency of the shift from traditional American values of democratic freedom and the rules-based international order to an America exerting unilateral power based purely on perceived economic interests and military might. Autocratic leaders are unconstrained by law and balance of power, using force to impose their will on others.

So, what does this transition from a liberal America in the world to an autocratic U.S. look like? After decades of working internationally on democracy and peace-building, I see three interrelated areas of long-standing U.S. foreign policy engagement being unraveled.

1. Peace and conflict prevention

The Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela reflect its “peace through strength” approach to international relations, which emphasizes military power. The actions also follow the emphasis the administration places on economic pressure and wins as a deterrent to war and a cudgel for peace.

This approach contrasts with decades of diplomatic efforts to build peace processes that last.

Foreign policy experts point out that the Trump administration’s emphasis on business deal-making in its conduct of foreign relations, focused on bargaining between positions, misses the point of peacemaking, which is to address underlying interests shared by parties and build the trust required to tackle the drivers of conflict.

Trump’s focus on deal-making also counters the world’s traditional reliance on the U.S. as an honest broker and a reliable economic partner that supports free trade. Trump made it clear that U.S. interest in oil is a key rationale for the Venezuela attack.

A video still shows an oil tanker.
This image from video posted on Attorney General Pam Bondi’s X account shows an oil tanker being seized by U.S. forces off the coast of Venezuela on Dec. 10, 2025.
U.S. Attorney General’s Office/X via AP

Before Venezuela, the limits of the Trump administration’s approach were already showing in the global conflicts Trump claims to have halted. That’s evident in ongoing violence between Thailand and Cambodia and in ceasefire violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Moreover, U.S. expertise and resources for sustainable peacemaking and preventing conflict are gone.

The entire Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations in the U.S. Department of State was dismantled in May 2025, while funding for conflict prevention and key peace programs like Women, Peace and Security was cut.

Trump’s unilateral military action against Venezuela belie an authentic commitment to sustainable peace.

While it’s too soon to predict Venezuela’s future under U.S. control, the Trump administration’s approach is likely to drive more global conflict and violence in 2026, as major powers begin to understand the different rules and learn to play the new game.

2. Democracy and human rights

Since the 1980s, U.S. national security strategies have incorporated aspects of democracy promotion and human rights as U.S. values.

Trump has not highlighted human rights and democracy as rationales for capturing Maduro. And, so far, the administration has rejected claims to the Venezuelan leadership by opposition leader María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, widely considered the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election.

Much of the U.S. foreign policy to build democracy globally and promote human rights was delivered through foreign assistance, worth over US$3 billion in 2024. The Trump administration cut that by nearly 75% in 2025.

These funds sought to promote fair elections, supporting civil societies and free media globally. They were also meant to help enable independent and corruption-free judiciaries in many countries, including Venezuela.

Since 1998, for example, the U.S. has funded 85% of the annual $10 million budget of the U.N Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. The fund, now imperiled, helps survivors recover from torture in the U.S. and around the world.

The congressionally mandated annual Human Rights Report issued by the State Department in August signaled the Trump administration’s intent to undermine key human rights obligations of foreign governments.

However, the White House has used tariffs, sanctions and military strikes to punish countries on purported human rights-related grounds, such as in Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa. Equally concerning to democracy defenders is its rhetoric chastising European democracies and apparent willingness to elevate political parties in Europe that reject human rights.

3. International cooperation

A major aim of U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been to counter threats to America’s security that require cooperation with other governments.

But the Trump administration is ignoring or denying many transnational threats. They include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, new technologies and climate change.

Moreover, the tools that America helped build to tackle shared global threats, like international law and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, have been disparaged and undermined.

Even before the U.S. attack on Venezuela, scholars were warning of the collapse of the international norm, embedded in the U.N. Charter, that prohibits the use of force by one sovereign country against another, except in specific cases of self-defense.

Early in 2025, Trump signaled an end to much of U.S. multilateral engagement, pulling the country out of many international bodies, agendas and treaties.

A man rips an American flag in half.
Venezuelans rip an American flag in half during a protest in Caracas on Jan. 3, 2026.
AP Photo/Ariana Cubillos

The administration proposed eliminating its contributions to U.N. agencies like the fund for children. It is also allocating only $300 million this year to the U.N., which is about one-fifth of the membership dues it owes the organization by law. A looming budgetary crisis has now consumed this sole worldwide deliberation body.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration says migration and drug trafficking, including from Venezuela, pose the greatest security threats. Its solutions – continuing U.S. economic and military might in the Americas – ignore shared challenges like corruption and human trafficking that drive these threats and also undermine U.S. economic security.

There is also evidence that the Trump administration is not only disregarding international law and retreating from America’s long-standing respect for international cooperation, but it’s also seeking to reshape policy in its own image and punish those it disagrees with.

For example, its call to reframe global refugee protections – to undermine the principle that prohibits a return of people to a country where they could be persecuted – would alter decades-old international and U.S. domestic law. The Trump administration has already dismantled much of the U.S. refugee program, lowering the cap for 2025 to historic levels.

Even for those who work in international institutions, there could also be a price to pay for an illiberal America. For instance, the Trump administration has economically sanctioned many judges and prosecutors of the International Criminal Court for their work.

And the administration has threatened more sanctions unless the court promises not to prosecute Trump – a more salient challenge now with the apparent U.S. aggression against Venezuela, which is a party to the International Criminal Court.

Some democracy experts worry that the U.S. military action in Venezuela not only undermines international law, but it may also serve to reinforce Trump’s project to undo the rule of law and democracy at home.

The Conversation

Until July 1, 2025, Shelley Inglis served in the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance at the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D).

ref. 2026 begins with an increasingly autocratic United States rising on the global stage – https://theconversation.com/2026-begins-with-an-increasingly-autocratic-united-states-rising-on-the-global-stage-271670

Virtual National Science Foundation internships aren’t just a pandemic stopgap – they can open up opportunities for more STEM students

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Lisa Bosman, Associate Professor of Technology Leadership and Innovation, Purdue University

Shifts to remote learning during the pandemic showed that there are some benefits for science students undertaking internships. SolStock/Getty Images

Many engineering and science undergraduates are approaching January application deadlines for prestigious summer internships and study abroad programs – or, in some cases, a spot in the National Science Foundation’s highly competitive Research Experience for Undergraduates, a specialized, paid summer research internship.

Roughly 6,000 American undergraduates take part in this internship each year. Landing this competitive research internship is a big deal. It can give young people interested in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) careers hands-on experience, real confidence and a clear picture of what to expect when enrolling in science and engineering graduate programs.

And even if a student decides graduate school isn’t for them, an REU, as it is often known, still shows young people that there are many exciting paths to consider in STEM professions.

A shift for REU internships

These in-person, 10-week summer research experiences mostly take place at approximately 150 to 200 universities in the United States, but also at schools in the United Kingdom, Singapore, Germany and other countries.

REU internships don’t always produce immediate research breakthroughs, but their real purpose is to spark students’ interest in science and prepare them for graduate school and research careers.

During the pandemic, many universities shifted to running REU programs online. Students participating in online REUs conducted research from home and met mentors online, rather than in person.

Surprisingly, this change not only saved money, but it also improved student outcomes in terms of what they said they learned, entrepreneurial skills they developed and the confidence they gained in applying to engineering and technology graduate programs.

Purdue University, where I work as a researcher and innovation professor, piloted one virtual and facilitated two in-person REU programs between August 2021 and August 2024. We found that the virtual model delivered the same – if not better – learning outcomes at a fraction of the cost.

The 14 students who participated in the virtual REU over the course of one or two semesters reported stronger gains in research skills than those who joined the full-time, in-person summer program.

A group of young people stand in a circle in what looks like a science lab.
Virtual research opportunities can allow students to form deeper connections with their work and advisers.
xavierarnau/iStock/Getty Images

Virtual learning

There are several reasons why this virtual REU approach likely worked.

First, the virtual students met with faculty mentors more often than students who participated in an in-person REU program.

While summer, in-person undergraduate researchers usually met with their mentors around 10 times over the course of 10 weeks, virtual students met weekly with their mentors over 16 to 32 weeks – sometimes having three times as many meetings.

That regular contact helped students stay on track and dive deeper into their renewable energy-focused projects.

Second, because they weren’t spending time in labs, virtual students spent more time doing the kinds of research activities that prepare them for graduate school, like reviewing academic literature, writing up results and thinking through complex problems. These are the kinds of skills that matter most when students make the leap from college to research careers.

Third, the longer, part-time structure of the virtual program gave students more time to absorb new information, reflect on what they were learning and connect ideas. Instead of cramming everything into a 10-week sprint, they took a marathon approach, which helped them learn more.

And finally, virtual REUs made it possible for more students to join the program – especially for those who couldn’t leave home for the summer due to family or other obligations. In our virtual program, we were able to accommodate 14 students, instead of the 10 students who had previously participated in a lab setting.

A woman and a man look at a tablet together in a science lab.
Roughly 6,000 American undergraduates take part in the National Science Foundation’s Research Experience for Undergraduates internships each summer.
andresr/iStock/Getty Images

Cost-effective research

From a financial perspective, the contrast is striking between virtual and in-person research experiences for undergraduates.

The National Science Foundation recommends budgeting about US$1,550 per student per week for summer REUs. Of that, only $600 goes to the student as a stipend – the rest is spent on housing, meals and travel.

For the cost of offering an in-person summer program to two students, we could serve five in a two-semester virtual REU, or even 10 in a one-semester online version. The potential to reach more students, for longer periods, is undeniable.

In other words, virtual REUs are not just a pandemic-era stopgap. They’re a smarter, cheaper and more inclusive way to deliver on the promise of undergraduate research.

To be sure, there can be some downsides.

While virtual REUs still offer valuable research experience and guidance, students participating in remote programs do miss out on working directly in labs and building natural connections with mentors and peers. Because of this, students can feel less connected and less supported than they would in an in-person program.

Also, not everyone thrives with remote learning.

As the National Science Foundation and other agencies that do scientific research grapple with potentially steep budget cuts, I believe that they should take a hard look at what we’ve learned. Virtual REUs aren’t a compromise – they’re a proven, cost-effective strategy that stretches public dollars while giving students more of what they actually need: access, mentorship and real research experience.

I believe that if the U.S. wants to build the next generation of scientists, engineers and innovators, the government needs to try to meet students where they are – and sometimes, that means meeting them online.

The Conversation

Lisa Bosman receives funding from the National Science Foundation.

ref. Virtual National Science Foundation internships aren’t just a pandemic stopgap – they can open up opportunities for more STEM students – https://theconversation.com/virtual-national-science-foundation-internships-arent-just-a-pandemic-stopgap-they-can-open-up-opportunities-for-more-stem-students-257853

Colorado faces a funding crisis for child care − local communities hope to fill the gaps

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Jenn Finders, Assistant Professor of Human Development and Family Studies, Colorado State University

A 2024 Colorado report found that 40,000 parents either quit a job, turned down a job or significantly changed a job due to child care problems. Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images

Colorado is the sixth-least affordable state for child care in the nation. Costs for center-based care average 14% of a two-parent household’s median income and 45% of a single parent’s median income. The federal affordability benchmark is just 7%.

Colorado also faces significant shortages in access to slots in licensed child care programs. In 2023, more than 40,000 Colorado parents reported quitting a job, turning down a job or significantly changing a job because of problems with child care.

Recently, several Colorado counties passed measures to subsidize child care through local taxes. Despite these advancements, Colorado’s child care system is facing a fiscal crisis that is likely to affect families and children for years to come.

Child care disruptions for families with infants and toddlers are estimated to cost the state more than US$2.7 billion in lost economic productivity and revenue. Ensuring access to affordable child care supports workforce participation and enhances the well-being of children and families.

I study early care and education policies and programs that promote children’s cognitive, behavioral and social-emotional learning. My research lab at Colorado State University has been investigating the consequences of a lack of access to high-quality, affordable child care on child and family outcomes.

Colorado’s Child Care Assistance Program

Since the late 1990s, the Colorado Child Care Assistance Program has subsidized the cost of child care for parents and caregivers with lower incomes who are working, searching for work or pursuing education. My research shows these subsidies are a critical lifeline that help lower-income families access child care.

Subsidies allow families to prioritize factors other than cost, such as location, in their search for child care. From 2023 to 2024, the Colorado subsidy program served more than 30,000 children in the state. That’s about 10% of those who qualified, which is typical for most states.

A federal March 2024 rule from the Administration for Children and Families caps family co-payments at no more than 7% of household income. It also requires reimbursement rates to reflect the full cost of care, whereas previously subsidy payments were based on what families could afford to pay.

Although intended to improve affordability for families and adequately compensate child care programs, the rule included no additional federal funding. In Colorado, meeting these new requirements is projected to cost the subsidy system approximately $43 million more per year.

These changes, combined with the expiration of COVID-19 relief funding that provided Colorado an additional $465 million to stabilize and expand child care assistance, has created growing financial instability for the subsidy system.

Approximately one-third of Colorado counties are experiencing an enrollment freeze for their child care subsidies. This means new applicants cannot access subsidized care until the freeze is lifted. There is no set timeline for when that will occur.

Without additional funding that would allow the freeze to be lifted, enrollment in Colorado’s Child Care Assistance Program is estimated to decline by 64%, falling from about 30,000 to just 10,000 enrollees. As children age out or families no longer qualify, spots that would normally open up for new enrollees will remain unfilled during the freeze.

Zooming in on Larimer County

I have been studying the impacts of the enrollment freeze in my hometown of Larimer County, Colorado. It’s a geographically diverse region that includes urban centers such as Fort Collins and Loveland, mountain destinations such as Estes Park, and rural agricultural communities. Like elsewhere in the state, child care costs pose a significant financial strain on local families.

A household in Larimer County with a median income of $64,919 and two children under the age of 5 spends approximately 37% of its income on child care. Due to budget constraints, Larimer County has had an enrollment freeze in the Colorado Child Care Assistance Program since February of 2024. The county has effectively paused the intake of new applicants for subsidies.

The outside of a building that says KinderCare Learning Center.
In Larimer County, Colorado, a household with two children under the age of 5 and an income of just under $65,000 spends about 37% of its income on child care.
UCG/GettyImages

Recently, we administered surveys to 88 families in Larimer County. Approximately half of those surveyed were currently receiving a subsidy and half had applied but were unable to access it because of the freeze. We compared families using advanced statistical modeling that controlled for any differences between groups, allowing us to isolate the effects of the subsidy freeze on family outcomes.

In unpublished research that is being prepared for peer review, we found families affected by the freeze used fewer paid child care hours, faced higher costs, expressed greater concerns about costs, and reported more difficulty paying for care. They also had less reliable and stable arrangements, were less satisfied with their care, experienced higher child care-related stress and displayed greater risk of depression.

But that’s not all. Families without a subsidy reported missing twice as many workdays. When extrapolated across the 425 families in Larimer County affected by the freeze, this translated to over $2.2 million in lost annual earnings.

Local initiatives driving solutions

Recognizing the gaps in affordable child care, counties across Colorado introduced ballot measures to fund local solutions through tax revenue.

These measures come after the state established a universal preschool program in 2022. The following year, the program provided up to 15 hours per week of tuition-free, high-quality preschool for more than 85,000 children.

Measures in Larimer, San Miguel, Garfield, Pitkin and southwest Eagle counties will directly fund child care through sales or property taxes. Measures in Gilpin, Hinsdale, Ouray and Eagle counties will generate funds through lodging taxes.

In Larimer, voters passed a measure that established an additional countywide sales tax of 0.25%, or 25 cents per 100 dollars. The measure is expected to generate $28 million annually for child care assistance and workforce compensation.

A CBS News report on Larimer County’s measure to increase taxes to support child care.

In San Miguel, voters passed a measure to opt-out of a state limit on the existing property tax levy of 75 cents for every 1,000 dollars of assessed property value. This will allow the county to retain nearly $1 million annually to support local child care affordability.

In Eagle County, voters passed a measure approving a lodging tax increase from 2% to 4% on hotel stays and short-term rentals that will raise approximately $4.5 million annually to lower child care costs.

Revenue from these initiatives will provide child care tuition to families, expand child care slots, support quality improvement and raise wages for child care workers.

These local investments cannot by themselves resolve Colorado’s statewide child care funding deficit, but they have the potential to transform access and quality within communities where they are implemented.

Colorado is not alone in these issues. Many other states are facing subsidy enrollment freezes and are exploring regional solutions to stabilize funding.

For example, ballot measures in Cincinnati, Ohio, and Seattle, Washington, also recently passed, providing reliable funding for child care assistance, preschool quality and workforce compensation.

With the uncertainty of the state and federal funding landscape, municipalities across the country may look to Colorado as a model for locally driven strategies that address community needs.

Read more of our stories about Colorado.

The Conversation

Jenn Finders has received funding from the National Science Foundation, Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, and North Central Regional Center for Rural Development.

ref. Colorado faces a funding crisis for child care − local communities hope to fill the gaps – https://theconversation.com/colorado-faces-a-funding-crisis-for-child-care-local-communities-hope-to-fill-the-gaps-270560

With less charitable giving flowing directly to charities, a tax policy scholar suggests some policy fixes

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Ray Madoff, Professor of Law, Boston College

Sometimes, very rich people approach philanthropy with a degree of whimsy. tiero/iStock via Getty Images Plus

Law professor Ray Madoff is the co-founder and director of the Boston College Forum on Philanthropy and the Public Good. In an interview with Emily Schwartz Greco, The Conversation U.S. philanthropy and nonprofits editor, Madoff sums up some of the main points about charitable giving she makes in her 2025 book, “The Second Estate: How the Tax Code Made an American Aristocracy.” This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

How has charitable giving changed over the past 50 years?

Giving has pretty much remained flat as a percentage of personal disposable income. It’s been stable by that measure at about 2%. What’s changed is where that charitable giving is going.

In the early 1990s, about 6% of all giving was going to intermediaries, like foundations and donor-advised funds, and 94% was going directly to charities: hospitals, universities, churches, organizations curing diseases, all sorts of things.

Donor-advised funds, or DAFs, are charitable investment accounts that can serve many of the functions of a foundation – but with fewer rules and regulations.

Fast-forward to today, and there’s been a huge transformation with dramatic growth in giving to intermediaries. Today, around 40% of U.S. giving from individual donors goes instead to charitable intermediaries, and 60% of those donations go straight to charities.

The cover of a book is shown with the title 'The Second Estate: How the Tax Code Made an American Aristocracy.'

University of Chicago Press

When money donated to charity through intermediaries primarily went to foundations, those assets were subject to a 5% payout rule. It was imperfect, but still, at least 5% of those funds, for the most part, had to go to charity.

Now, due to the rise of donor-advised funds, none of this money going to intermediaries is subject to payout rules.

That’s because there are no payout rules that apply to donor-advised funds, and foundations can meet their payout minimum by giving to a donor-advised fund.

Charitable giving, in other words, used to be more connected to what I’d call “charitable getting.” Now, the money is often landing in what’s essentially a halfway house, with no obligation to get out.

What is the current state of play with respect to the tax rules governing charitable giving?

There’s a tale of two systems for charitable giving.

Most Americans have no ability to get any tax benefits for their charitable giving, while the wealthiest Americans can get benefits that are worth up to 74% of the value of their donations.

The reason most Americans get no tax benefits is that they can only offset their income tax if they itemize their tax returns, instead of taking the standard deduction.

Prior to the tax reform package that President Donald Trump signed into law in 2017, about 70% took the standard deduction and 30% didn’t. Once those reforms took effect, the share of taxpayers who were itemizing fell below 10%.

The more than 90% of taxpayers who claimed the standard deduction in 2022, for example, couldn’t get any tax breaks tied to their charitable giving.

What do you expect to see change due to provisions in the big tax and spending package that Trump signed into law on July 4, 2025?

The government is adding a new deduction for non-itemizers. Starting in 2026, they will be able to deduct up to US$1,000 of their taxable income when they file their taxes, if they give at least that amount to charity. That means some charitable tax benefits will be available for people who take the standard deduction.

It’s very hard to tell what kind of impact that is going to have.

If charities publicize this, it might encourage some people to give who might not otherwise give to donate. But it could also cause a lot of confusion and make other people think that there is a $1,000 cap on tax benefits for all charitable donations. I think it’s going to be a difficult messaging problem.

As a matter of policy, I also think it’s not very well drafted. I do think we should be giving charitable tax benefits to non-itemizers, but a better format would be to give everybody a tax credit so they have the same dollar-for-dollar benefit, regardless of their income bracket.

And rather than imposing a ceiling, we should impose a floor, as a certain amount of giving is going to happen even with no incentives.

It’s going to be interesting to see what happens.

Ray Madoff sums up some of the main points made in her book ‘The Second Estate: How the Tax Code Made an American Aristocracy.’

Are there other policy changes that you support?

I have two proposals.

First, I believe that private foundations and donor-advised funds should have to distribute their funds that are reserved for charity within some set time period.

Second, I think that just as other Americans are subject to limitations on their tax benefits, the wealthiest should be subject to limitations on their tax benefits too.

If it’s important for you and me to help pay down the national debt, then why isn’t it important for Warren Buffett to do so?

Is there a risk that giving might decline due to these changes?

If they had to spend it quickly, maybe there would be less money set aside in these charitable intermediaries.

But if someone has no intention to disburse those funds, then I think it wouldn’t matter that their money is no longer getting halfway to actually being received by charities.

Do you believe that the philanthropy of rich people is helpful?

Philanthropy is often used as shorthand for something that is great for society.

But philanthropy includes a lot of not-great things.

Sometimes people make mistakes. Just because someone is good at making money, it doesn’t mean they’re good at solving other people’s problems.

For example, actor Brad Pitt, maybe with good intentions, decided he was going to fix housing problems after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans’ 9th Ward. He got architects to build houses that are now falling apart. It’s a massive problem.

Sometimes their gifts aren’t so well-intentioned.

Rich philanthropists may donate to groups calling for lower taxes. Or they try to curry favor with the White house by helping pay for the construction of Trump’s new ballroom, which is going to be built with charitable money.

Charity expert Bill Schambra has brought to light what he calls “philanthropy’s original sin: Early U.S. foundations supported eugenics – the pseudoscience movement that sought to encourage “fit” people to have kids and to stop people deemed “unfit” from doing so, sometimes through forced sterilization.

Today, there’s another common problem: the philanthropy of whimsy.

One example is what happened with the nonprofit pre-K-8 school for low-income children in East Palo Alto, California, that Facebook co-founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan, funded. He was saying “Oh hey, I think I’m going to solve the problems of poverty in East Palo Alto.” And then, “Oops, I changed my mind.”

The school is slated to close at the end of the 2025-2026 year.

That’s why, generally speaking, I don’t think we should assume that what’s done with philanthropy is better than what’s done with tax dollars.

A nonprofit East Palo Alto school that had been funded by Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan lost that funding. It will close.

What about MacKenzie Scott, Jeff Bezos’ ex-wife? She’s given about $26 billion to charity since 2019.

I am a big supporter of how MacKenzie Scott does her philanthropic giving. She seems to be trying to do the right thing. She’s trying to build civil society, which I think is good. She’s giving to existing organizations, with no strings attached.

A lot of it is about power. If you give money to institutions, as Scott is doing, then the institutions have power. If you keep the money yourself, and you drip it out, then you have power.

The Conversation

Ray Madoff was an adviser to and supporter of the Initiative to Accelerate Charitable Giving, a coalition of philanthropists, foundations and academics.

ref. With less charitable giving flowing directly to charities, a tax policy scholar suggests some policy fixes – https://theconversation.com/with-less-charitable-giving-flowing-directly-to-charities-a-tax-policy-scholar-suggests-some-policy-fixes-271677