Category: Academic Reportage

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Hamza Benattia, Prehistory, Universitat de Barcelona

A new archaeological discovery at Kach Kouch in Morocco challenges the long-held belief that the Maghreb (north-west Africa) was an empty land before the arrival of the Phoenicians from the Middle East in around 800 BCE. It reveals a much richer and more complex history than previously thought.

Everything found at the site indicates that during the Bronze Age, more than 3,000 years ago, stable agricultural settlements already existed on the African coast of the Mediterranean.

This was at the same time as societies such as the Mycenaean flourished in the eastern Mediterranean.

Our discovery, led by a team of young researchers from Morocco’s National Institute of Archaeology, expands our knowledge of the recent prehistory of north Africa. It also redefines our understanding of the connections between the Maghreb and the rest of the Mediterranean in ancient times.

How the discovery was made

Kach Kouch was first identified in 1988 and first excavated in 1992. At the time, researchers believed the site had been inhabited between the 8th and 6th centuries BCE. This was based on the Phoenician pottery that was found.

Nearly 30 years later, our team carried out two new excavation seasons in 2021 and 2022. Our investigations included cutting-edge technology such as drones, differential GPS (global positioning systems) and 3D models.

A rigorous protocol was followed for collecting samples. This allowed us to detect fossilised remains of seeds and charcoal.

Subsequently, a series of analyses allowed us to reconstruct the settlement’s economy and its natural environment in prehistoric times.

What the remains revealed

The excavations, along with radiocarbon dating, revealed that the settlement underwent three phases of occupation between 2200 and 600 BCE.

The earliest documented remains (2200–2000 BCE) are scarce. They consist of three undecorated pottery sherds, a flint flake and a cow bone.

The scarcity of materials and contexts could be due to erosion or a temporary occupation of the hill during this phase.

In its second phase, after a period of abandonment, the Kach Kouch hill was permanently occupied from 1300 BCE. Its inhabitants, who probably numbered no more than a hundred, dedicated themselves to agriculture and animal husbandry.

They lived in circular dwellings built from wattle and daub, a technique that combines wooden poles, reeds and mud. They dug silos into the rock to store agricultural products.

Analysis shows that they cultivated wheat, barley and legumes, and raised cattle, sheep, goats and pigs.

They also used grinding stones for cereal processing, flint tools, and decorated pottery. In addition, the oldest known bronze object in north Africa (excluding Egypt) has been documented. It is probably a scrap metal fragment removed after casting in a mould.

Interactions with the Phoenicians

Between the 8th and 7th centuries BCE, during the so-called Mauretanian period, the inhabitants of Kach Kouch maintained the same material culture, architecture and economy as in the previous phase. However, interactions with Phoenician communities that were starting to settle in nearby sites, such as Lixus, brought new cultural practices.

For example, circular dwellings coexisted with square ones made of stone and wattle and daub, combining Phoenician and local construction techniques.

Furthermore, new crops began to be cultivated, like grapes and olives. Among the new materials, wheel-made Phoenician ceramics, such as amphorae (storage jugs) and plates, and the use of iron objects stand out.

Around 600 BCE, Kach Kouch was peacefully abandoned, perhaps due to social and economic changes. Its inhabitants likely moved to other nearby settlements.

So who were the Bronze Age inhabitants?

It’s unclear whether the Maghreb populations in the Bronze Age lived in tribes, as would later occur during the Mauretanian period. They were probably organised as families. Burials suggest there were no clear signs of hierarchy.

They may have spoken a language similar to the Amazigh, the indigenous north African language, which did not become written until the introduction of the Phoenician alphabet. The cultural continuity documented at Kach Kouch suggests that these populations are the direct ancestors of the Mauretanian peoples of north-west Africa.

Why this matters

Kach Kouch is not only the first and oldest known Bronze Age settlement in the Maghreb but also reshapes our understanding of prehistory in this region.

The new findings, along with other recent discoveries, demonstrate that north-west Africa has been connected to other regions of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Sahara since prehistoric times.

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Read more:
Discovery of 5,000-year-old farming society in Morocco fills a major gap in history – north-west Africa was a central player in trade and culture

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Our findings challenge traditional narratives, many of which were influenced by colonial views that portrayed the Maghreb as an empty and isolated land until it was “civilized” by foreign peoples.

As a result, the Maghreb has long been absent from debates on the later prehistory of the Mediterranean. These new discoveries not only represent a breakthrough for archaeology, but also a call to reconsider dominant historical narratives. Kach Kouch offers the opportunity to rewrite north Africa’s history and give it the visibility it has always deserved.

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Read more:
Ancient DNA reveals Maghreb communities preserved their culture and genes, even in a time of human migration

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We believe this is a decisive moment for research that could forever change the way we understand not only the history of north Africa, but also its relationship with other areas of the Mediterranean.

Hamza Benattia, director of the Kach Kouch Archaeological Project, received funding from the National Institute of Archaeology and Heritage of Morocco (INSAP), the Prehistoric Society Research Fund, the Stevan B. Dana Grant of the American Society of Overseas Research, the Mediterranean Archaeological Trust Grant, the Barakat Trust Early Career Award, the Centre Jacques Berque Research Grant, the Institute of Ceutan Studies Research Fund and the University of Castilla La Mancha.

– ref. Discovery of a 4,000-year-old Bronze Age settlement in Morocco rewrites history – https://theconversation.com/discovery-of-a-4-000-year-old-bronze-age-settlement-in-morocco-rewrites-history-253172

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Papa Sow, Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

Benin’s Pendjari Biosphere Reserve, also called Pendjari National Park, and its surroundings have been targeted by non-state armed groups since 2019.

Pendjari National Park, which covers approximately 4,800km², is one of five protected areas in Benin and is one of the main biodiversity conservation areas in west Africa. It has been a World Heritage Site since 2017.

It is an integral part of the W-Arly-Pendjari complex, a transboundary biosphere reserve. The W Park is shared by Niger, Benin and Burkina Faso. Arly is located in Burkina Faso and Pendjari in Benin.

The geographical configuration of the park facilitates all kinds of movements. Non-state armed groups attempt to exploit the porous borders to hide, stock up on natural resources — including gold and poached wildlife — or turn them into rear bases. Non-state armed groups take advantage of the park’s inaccessibility and its dense, wild forests to turn them into refuges.

Bloody battles are underway to conquer special forest territories, which I call “protected jihadism areas” because of their use by armed movements claiming to be jihadists.

As part of a study on the causes of migration in and from the northern parts of Benin Republic, close to Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo and Nigeria, I analysed the impact that these non-state armed groups were having on local populations and protected areas.

I have been working on migration issues for about 25 years, and most of my observations in west Africa show that armed groups cause displacements in the sub-region. They contribute to a land and pastoral crisis, inconsistency in the distribution of forest resources, and a poorly integrated approach to the management of protected areas.

I interviewed experts, local journalists, research assistants who I worked with during several years and displaced people in Benin and the west African sub-region about the direct impacts of smuggling, the depletion of natural resources, threats, and the use of violence in forest reserves.

My observations are that the spiral of violence by non-state armed groups is dangerously disrupting the conservation and protection of the environment, increasing fear and insecurity among communities, and ruining the local economy, especially activities that revolve around the tourism sector.

The violence

On 8 January 2025, close to 30 soldiers were killed in the north of Benin, in Karimama near the “Triple Point” – an extensive area in the W-Arly-Pendjari complex where Benin, Niger and Burkina Faso meet.

More than 120 soldiers were killed in the area between 2021 and 2024. There has also been carnage of the animals and plants.

Since 2018, the Katiba Ansar-ul Islam, Serma, Sekou Muslimou and Abou Hanifa have been operating in Burkina Faso. They are considered jihadists – mostly under the aegis of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), the Al Qaeda branch in the Sahel.

Reasons for the proliferation of non-state armed groups in the park are multiple. It’s difficult for the state authorities to reach them there. There is the battle among non-state armed groups over the control of pastures and water bodies in the area. The park is also a place where non-state armed groups work with traffickers of adulterated gasoline from Nigeria, called Kpayo in Benin. They buy thousands of litres of gasoline from them every week at exorbitant prices.

The Beninese state is is not very visible in some places despite the anti-terrorist Operation Mirador launched in 2021 with more than 3,000 soldiers. Since the first attack in 2019, more than US$120 million has been spent on security by Benin. But the number of attacks and kidnappings has multiplied.

The main reason is the fragility of the security of the three state border areas.

The non-State armed groups have their own crossing points that they control. Sub-regional collaboration between states is almost non-existent. The 2017 Accra Initiative, composed of five countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo – seems to have stagnated since some member states pulled out of the regional grouping Ecowas. A genuine regional force capable of countering the activities of these non-state armed groups is necessary.

Benin is developing a military partnership with France. But the already tense diplomatic relationship between Benin and its neighbours – Niger and Burkina Faso – and the ambivalent policy of Togo, which “threatens” to join the Alliance of Sahel States – are not factors conducive to effective regional military cooperation.

How people are being affected

The park depends, in part, on funding generated by tourism and external partners. Conservation has been managed, since 2020, by the APN – Rangers African Parks Network. In 2024, it employed 337 eco-guards, including six expatriates. These eco-guards, on the front lines against non-state armed groups, are also being killed. Their work in gathering threat-related information is important to the Beninese Armed Forces.

The activities of residents living near the park, transport networks and systems, and trekking services are the hardest hit. The work of NGOs that supported local populations has been reduced. Many NGOs have withdrawn from their activities. Small businesses are under threat.

But the hardest-hit sector is tourism, which has affected the livelihoods of people. There has been a significant decline in the number of tourists. This directly affects local communities for whom tourism activities remain an important source of income.

Tanguiéta, a town 70km from the border with Burkina Faso and not far from Pendjari Park, has been the worst affected due to a decline in income from accommodation and catering activities. Jobs have been lost.

Migrants from the sub-region who had specialised in tourism entrepreneurship, including tour guides and artisans, have turned to other activities or left the town.

What needs to be done

The following measures could help protect the park and local people:

• strengthen communication and surveillance capabilities

• increase surveillance aircraft, helicopters and drones with the support of international donors and the Ecowas

• train Beninese Armed Forces in conservation practices

• increase support for community development projects

• diversify activities to reduce dependence on tourism.

Papa Sow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Armed groups are invading Benin’s forest reserves. Why and what to do about it – https://theconversation.com/armed-groups-are-invading-benins-forest-reserves-why-and-what-to-do-about-it-256136

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africans are wearily attuned to governments’ Orwellian misuse of language. After all, South Africa is a country where a one-time government passed a law (the Natives Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952) which extended rather than abolishing the notorious pass system. This made it compulsory for black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a passbook. And the same government passed the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 which made it more, not less, difficult for black students to register at “open” (or white) universities.

So perhaps they should not be unduly surprised that the government of the US has imported 49 Afrikaners and labelled them as “refugees”. The claim is that they are escaping from the persecution of Afrikaners – and white people more broadly – in South Africa today.

The Trump administration knows perfectly well this claim is a complete fabrication. As President Cyril Ramaphosa and his government have pointed out, there is no evidence whatsoever that Afrikaners or white people more generally are subject to genocide.

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Read more:
Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy?

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True, South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world. But it is poor black South Africans – not whites – who are principal victims of such deadly violence. Nor are Afrikaners/whites subject to persecution. Along with all other South Africans, their human rights are protected by a constitution. This is no mere piece of paper. Its provisions are (albeit imperfectly, and unlike in the US these days) largely enforced by the courts.

Furthermore, genocide implies the deliberate elimination of a people on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds. Therefore, if a genocide of whites and Afrikaners was taking place, we might assume that their numbers would be falling. In fact the reverse is true. The white population has continued to grow (albeit slowly) in absolute numbers since 1994.

Worse, the characterisation of Afrikaners as refugees at a moment in time when the people of Gaza are daily subject to a regime of death, terror, and murder inflicted on them by the Israeli government is not merely an absurdity but a downright insult to those genuinely subject to genocide.

So, what is really going on?

The drivers

Extensive commentary has correctly highlighted the motivations of the Trump administration.

First, the administration has launched an attack on what it terms the “tyranny” of “diversity, equity and inclusion” policies across the entire spectrum of public and private institutions in America. Critics argue this is driven by an appeal to Trump’s white Christian nationalist political base. Because post-apartheid South Africa, rightly or wrongly, has become the poster-country of diversity, equity and inclusion policies internationally, because of its constitutional commitment to non-racialism and diversity, it has been singled out for attack.

Secondly, labelling Afrikaners as refugees plays to the insecurities of Trump’s political base. This finds the idea of a white minority being ruled by a black majority government difficult to swallow.

Third, characterising Afrikaners as subject to genocide is a very deliberate response to South Africa’s charging of Israel as guilty of genocide against the Palestinian people before the International Court of Justice. But this is unacceptable to the US Christian nationalist right. For them the existence of Israel represents the realisation of Biblical truth – the return of Jews to the Holy Land.

Trump is saying that the US can and will play the same game, using it to clobber South Africa regardless of the groundlessness of the charge. But, being Trump, he will balance pandering to his support base against what economic benefits he can extract from South Africa.

The landscape

But what of the 49 Afrikaners themselves? Why have they chosen to accept the opportunity offered to them by the US government? After all, extensive attention in the South African media has been given to Afrikaners who have defiantly stated that they are committed to staying in South Africa. The reasons they give are that it’s their home. And they fully accept that, at least formally, South Africa has become a non-racial democracy.

Likewise, as I have detailed in my book on Whites and Democracy in South Africa, Afrikaners and whites have not only survived in democratic South Africa but, generally, have prospered economically. Furthermore, whites as a “population group” (to use outdated apartheid-era terminology) have participated fully in South African democracy. They are more highly disposed to voting in elections than other racial groupings, and de facto, they are well represented in parliament and local government by the Democratic Alliance, which is a vigorous defender of their interests.

But (there is always a but), if we want to guess the motivations of Trump’s 49 “refugees”, we need to bear in mind the following.

First, until we know more about the personal circumstances of the individuals involved, we cannot really know what has driven them to take the drastic step of leaving families and their personal history behind by moving to America.

Second, most whites have responded to the arrival of democracy pragmatically. They have their numerous complaints, notably about equity employment (affirmative action policies in favour of blacks) which they view as discriminatory against whites. But they have continued to enjoy high rates of employment. Indeed they continue to occupy the higher ranks of employment in the private sector in disproportionate numbers.

However, although many whites continue to live in a de facto overwhelmingly white world, both at work and at their homes in suburbia, there remains a minority which has remained wholly unreconciled to the changes which have taken place politically and economically since 1994. The armed opposers linked to the far-right have long been defeated. But we may presume the 49 belong to a broader category of passive resisters who have withdrawn into a white world as much as possible.

Third, although most whites continue to do well economically, the changes which have taken place since 1994 have led to the re-appearance of a small class of largely uneducated poor whites who feel excluded from employment by equity employment legislation. And who generally feel the loss of their racial status under democracy.

Opportunists, not refugees

Having said all that, some interesting questions remain.

Presumably the Afrikaner 49 belonged to that category of whites which, for one reason or another, is disposed to leave South Africa. However, emigrating requires jumping through numerous hoops; meeting educational and professional qualifications, getting a job offer, having sufficient financial resources to take with them to support themselves and their families before they can qualify for recipient countries’ social security systems, and so on. Apart from the emotional costs involved, emigration is not always the easiest of options, even for those who wish to “escape”.

The evidence suggests that the heads of household among the Afrikaner 49 are drawn not only from that minority of Afrikaners who are totally unreconciled to democracy, but who – quite simply – are opportunists who have availed themselves of a short cut to emigrate.

Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s Afrikaners are South African opportunists, not refugees: what’s behind the US move – https://theconversation.com/trumps-afrikaners-are-south-african-opportunists-not-refugees-whats-behind-the-us-move-257017

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Egodi Uchendu, Professor (of History and International Studies), University of Nigeria

The west Africa–Sahel region has seen a proliferation of militant Islamist groups since the 1990s.

One of the most vicious groups operating in the region is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims). The militant group emerged in 2017 in Algeria and Mali, and has targeted civilian populations.

The UN listed the group as an al-Qaeda affiliate in 2018. Al-Qaeda is an Islamist organisation founded by Osama bin Laden in the 1980s.

The 2024 global terrorism index listed Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin as one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organisations. Its influence has expanded in most parts of the Sahel. The group emerged to strengthen the jihadist insurgency under al-Qaeda. It combines violence with diplomacy to expand its influence and challenge state authorities.

Despite growing pressure from counter militancy campaigns spearheaded by local, regional and international militaries, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin continues to survive and adapt by regrouping and reorganising. This was demonstrated in its latest operation in Burkina Faso in 2024. The group exerted significant control by closing schools, setting up taxation checkpoints and abducting locals.

Its engagement in illicit economies has been key to the group’s successful expansion. This revenue is used to carry out devastating attacks.

We research jihadi-based insurgencies, and have found that this is a common tactic among terrorist groups in the west Africa-Sahel axis, including Boko Haram militants.

From our research, we find that Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin funds its activities by relying on

• artisanal mining

• kidnapping

• livestock theft

• money laundering.

Dismantling the group’s illicit economies and blocking its financial flows are key to countering its activities.

Financial resources

The group needs money for fighting, and to sustain political and social influence in its areas of operation.

Artisanal gold mining has proven to be a major factor in its expansion and resilience. In areas where the group exerts influence, illicit gold mining generates over US$30 billion annually. According to a report by Swissaid, a development group based in Switzerland, the main destinations for this gold are the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Switzerland.

The jihadists gain access to gold by controlling mining sites and transport routes to and from mines. They sometimes allow trusted allies, who include local armed groups, bandits and other criminal networks, to mine in exchange for a payout. The extent of gold mining funds is not exactly known, but the artisanal sites in areas controlled by the group have the capacity to produce 725 kilograms of gold per year, valued at US$34 million.

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West Africa could soon have a jihadist state – here’s why

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Another source of income – and political influence – is kidnapping for ransom. Kidnap victims include cattle owners, businessmen, state officials and foreigners. The group received a ₤30 million ransom in 2020 to release one French and two Italian hostages. Between 2017 and 2023, the group and its affiliated units were responsible for 845 out of approximately 1,100 recorded kidnappings in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Burkina Faso and Mali remain the epicentre of the group’s violent activities. In the first quarter of 2023, over 180 cases of kidnapping were recorded in these countries’ war-torn areas.

Livestock theft has also been a critical source of funds. The practice of livestock theft as economic warfare and a means to generate funds has led to livestock being forcibly taken from herders who fail to pay zakat (a religious fee among Muslims) or subscribe to the group’s ideology. The stolen livestock are sold in Mali, Mauritania or Senegal. The ability to monetise stolen livestock makes their theft a cornerstone of the Sahelian war economy and a source of cash for weapons and vehicles.

Money laundering is another illicit economy central to the militant group’s financing. It lends money to merchants, invests with banks and funds small shops with the aim of getting profits. This helps ensure a constant flow of money and provisions to support the group’s terrorist acts. It has attached much importance to this illicit economy, to the extent of assassinating those who interfere with its investments.

Way out

To cut down Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s financial base – and thereby weaken its capacity for militancy – counterinsurgency efforts need to take the following actions.

• Government security actors should collaborate with local self-defence militias to regulate artisanal mining and thwart kidnappings.

• Financial intelligence units need to identify merchants who receive money from the militant group to block the flow of illicit funds.

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Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship

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• Specialised courts that deal with money laundering and terrorism financing cases should be established and made operational in Burkina Faso and Mali, the epicentres of the group’s activities.

• Burkina Faso and Mali should increase security around civilians to minimise civilian casualties from terror operations.

Since finance is the basis of the militant group’s strength, regional security co-operation should be strengthened. This would help with systematically tracking illicit flows and stopping them.

Egodi Uchendu receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Germany. She has also received funding from TETFund, Nigeria, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Senegal, The A. G. Leventis Foundation, Greece, and the Fulbright Commission, USA.

Muhammed Sani Dangusau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Funding terror: how west Africa’s deadly jihadists get the money they need to survive – https://theconversation.com/funding-terror-how-west-africas-deadly-jihadists-get-the-money-they-need-to-survive-242306

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Tim Baker, Associate Professor, Karolinska Institutet

When someone falls critically ill, hospitals are expected to provide life-saving care. But in many African countries, intensive care units are rare. Critically ill patients are treated in general hospital wards, and the provision of essential emergency and critical care is limited.

Critical illness refers to any life-threatening condition where at least one vital organ – such as the heart, lungs, or brain – is failing. It can arise from any underlying condition including infections, injuries, or non-communicable diseases such as heart attacks and strokes, and can affect anyone of any age.

In high-resourced settings some critically ill patients are treated in intensive care units. They receive continuous monitoring, oxygen support, medication to stabilise their blood pressure, and other life-saving treatments. Until now, most data on critical illness and critical care in Africa has come from small, single-hospital studies. These studies hinted at a serious problem.

For example, a study in Uganda found that 11.7% of inpatients were critically ill, with a 22.6% chance of dying within a week. However, there was no large-scale research showing how widespread this was across the continent.

That is why we, a collaboration of clinical researchers across Africa, conducted the African Critical Illness Outcomes Study, providing the first large-scale look at the state of critical illness care across the continent.

The study builds on a network of clinicians, researchers and policy makers that has been growing for over a decade now, working out how to identify and treat patients who are critically ill.

The findings, published in The Lancet, are striking. One in eight hospital inpatients in Africa is critically ill, over two-thirds of the critically ill are in general wards, and one in five dies within a week.

Most of these patients do not receive the essential emergency and critical care such as oxygen and fluids that could save their lives.

What we found

The African Critical Illness Outcomes Study investigated 20,000 patients at one point in time in 180 hospitals in 22 countries across Africa. Countries throughout the continent were included, from Tunisia in the north to South Africa in the south, from Ghana in the west to Tanzania in the east.

Between September and December 2023, all adult inpatients in each hospital were examined on a single day to collect data about their clinical condition and treatments, and then a week later, their in-hospital outcomes.

The key findings were:

• 12.5% of hospital inpatients were critically ill

• 69% of critically ill patients were treated in general hospital wards, not intensive care units

• more than half of critically ill patients didn’t receive the treatments they needed

• critically ill patients were eight times more likely to die in hospital than other patients.

The study also revealed gaps in the most basic life-saving interventions:

• only 48% of patients with respiratory failure received oxygen therapy

• just 54% of patients with circulatory failure (such as shock) received fluids or medications to stabilise blood pressure

• less than half of patients with a dangerously low level of consciousness received airway protection or were placed in the recovery position.

These findings highlight a clear and urgent problem: many critically ill patients in Africa are not receiving the essential treatments that could keep them alive.

What can be done?

The study suggests that thousands of lives could be saved if hospitals had better access to essential emergency and critical care. This is a set of simple, low-cost interventions that can prevent deaths from critical illness.

The care interventions include:

• ensuring oxygen is available for patients struggling to breathe

• providing fluids or medications to stabilise blood pressure

• training healthcare workers in basic life-support techniques to manage unconscious patients.

Unlike high-tech intensive care unit treatments, essential emergency and critical care can be given in general wards with minimal resources.

Strengthening these systems could dramatically reduce preventable deaths from conditions such as pneumonia, sepsis and trauma.

Urgent action is needed

This study sheds light on a healthcare crisis affecting millions of people, yet one that has remained largely overlooked.

Every critically ill patient, no matter where they are treated, should receive the basic life-saving care they need.

We call for urgent action.

• Governments in Africa should make essential emergency and critical care a core part of universal health coverage. It should be integrated into policies and health benefit packages.

• The World Health Organization should embed essential emergency and critical care measures into its resolutions.

• African health funders should support studies and implementation of essential emergency and critical care.

• Professional medical societies and institutions should include this care in clinical guidelines and training. Frontline healthcare workers must have the tools they need to save lives.

The EECC Network, a global community dedicated to sharing knowledge, research and best practices, has been started to help prevent needless deaths.

* Nick Leech, who works on the promotion of essential emergency and critical care on behalf of EECC Global, contributed to this article.

Tim Baker declares technical consultancies with UNICEF, the World Bank, USAID, and PATH, has received research funding from Wellcome Trust and the National Institute for Health and Care Research and is a board member at the non-profit organisation EECC Global.

Karima Khalid is a board member of EECCGlobal

– ref. Critically ill patients in African hospitals aren’t getting the care they need: new survey – https://theconversation.com/critically-ill-patients-in-african-hospitals-arent-getting-the-care-they-need-new-survey-253355

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Oluwaseyi Omowunmi Popogbe, Lecturer, Crawford University

Millions of people in Lagos live in slums. Slums typically have poor housing infrastructure and sanitation, and limited access to education, health facilities and clean drinking water.

These challenges make the people who live in slums vulnerable to health crises, high illiteracy rates and poor standards of living.

A central element of the city authorities’ efforts to address the issue has been to evict people. Over the past decade, more than 50,000 people have been evicted from their homes in Lagos slums.

As a development economist who has carried out studies on urban poverty in Lagos State and social exclusion of slum dwellers from full communal participation, I have observed some notable patterns.

Despite their efforts to contribute to national productivity, these low-income communities are often marginalised and denied access to basic public amenities and a dignified living environment. Instead of addressing their needs, policy and development priorities tend to focus on displacing them. Thereafter, provisions are made for affluent groups, replacing informal settlements with high-rise buildings.

Sadly, survivors of forced eviction usually move to other slum communities as they cannot afford the high cost of living in the city. This shows that forced eviction is not a solution to slum proliferation.

I argue that if Lagos wants to solve the problems faced by the city’s vast population of slum dwellers, it should focus on six things. These are:

• community-led regeneration processes

• communal engagement

• upgrading communities without displacement

• obeying court orders

• inclusivity in regeneration

• adequate compensation to the displaced.

This would help restore trust that the city has all its people’s interests at heart, not just those of the super rich.

Forced evictions are seen as benefiting the rich

In March 2025, a demolition exercise was carried out in the Otumara slum, displacing over 10,000 residents at short notice.

Despite a 2017 Lagos State High Court ruling which condemned forced evictions carried out without due consultation, they have continued.

Known cases are the Otodo-Gbame waterfront eviction (shortly before the court ruling), where over 30,000 residents were displaced, Ilubirin waterfront community, Orisunmibare in Apapa, Otto communities, Ayetoro, and Oko Baba communities.

Mid-April 2025, the Lagos State government revealed plans to regenerate the Otumara slum. Lagos State Urban Renewal Agency (Lasura) then met with community leaders and other stakeholders to discuss how it would be done. That step should have been taken before the demolition.

The idea behind the meeting was to ensure inclusiveness and reduce any challenge to the project. Lasura assured the community representatives of a fair hearing throughout the implementation process. They were told the benefits of the regeneration would extend to the entire community.

As a development economist who has carried out a number of studies on urban vulnerability and inclusion, I’ve found that slum dwellers don’t always trust the government. This lack of trust stems from experiences other slum dwellers have had.

Urban regeneration does not always favour slum dwellers. So government interventions are not seen as a genuine effort to improve their living conditions, but as a mechanism to displace them to make way for the elite.

For instance, Maroko slum residents were forcefully evicted under the guise of improving infrastructural amenities and because the area was below sea level. Now the Oniru Estate, Lekki Phase 1 and other notable residential and commercial buildings are located there.

Luxury apartments on the Lagos lagoon have replaced the former Ilubirin waterfront slum. Lekki foreshore development continues at the former Otodo-Gbame waterfront community.

Survivors of forced eviction usually move to other slum communities as they can’t afford to live in the city.

The attainment of Lagos as a “fair shared city” has been proposed by the Fabulous Urban Foundation in partnership with Heinrich Böll Foundation. These organisations advocate urban inclusiveness and community-driven initiatives. They envision Lagos as an inclusive place where everyone (irrespective of social class or status) has equitable access to amenities and decision-making processes.

The pattern of forced displacement under the guise of urban regeneration, without adequate compensation or resettlement, contradicts the principle of fairness.

Development plans in Lagos follow western ideas and keep widening the gap between the rich and the poor, as amenities are often developed to be accessible by the middle and upper classes.

Specifically, the Lagos State Development Plan (LSDP 2052) contains many lofty ideas and opportunities to make Lagos “Africa’s Model Mega City”. But it’s not clear how the city’s multidimensionally poor population fits into the plan.

Solutions

To include residents of slums marked for regeneration, a more proactive approach would be:

1. Continuous communal engagement, to reaffirm that government and other stakeholders are committed to including all residents.

2. Community-led redesign and regeneration processes. Slum conditions are deplorable and dehumanising, but evicting residents to make way for the high class is unacceptable. The redesign should aim to favour the community.

3. Abiding by court rulings which warn against forced eviction. Lagos courts have often ruled against forced evictions, especially when carried out without due process or resettlement arrangements. The Lagos State government ought to uphold human rights by ceasing all forced eviction procedures, as they are unlawful.

4. Upgrading instead of displacement. Regeneration within existing settlements should be encouraged where feasible, so that livelihoods and social cohesion are not disrupted.

5. Regeneration should include all income groups. It should not only focus on physical infrastructure, but also social and economic issues. It would make affordable housing and basic amenities available for all income groups.

6. Adequate compensation. Where relocation cannot be avoided, a resettlement plan must be in place that will ensure fair treatment and avoid disruption to livelihood.

Oluwaseyi Omowunmi Popogbe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Lagos slum evictions don’t work: 6 ways city planners can actually help the poor – https://theconversation.com/lagos-slum-evictions-dont-work-6-ways-city-planners-can-actually-help-the-poor-255341

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Simone Papale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Parma

Over the last decade, there has been growing international focus on the role of food in conflict, particularly in Africa. The continent has seen an increase in jihadist terrorism in several regions.

Violence, like that exercised by terrorist organisations, is linked with food security conditions, causing a vicious circle of hunger and conflict.

Terrorism generates food disruptions. It undermines production systems and supply routes.

At the same time, growing food shortages intensify tensions and competition over essential resources at the margins of vulnerable societies. This increases the risk of mobilisation into violence.

We are researchers in international security and contemporary warfare. In a recent article, we explored the role of food in Africa’s terrorist insurgencies. We focused on Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

We show how food is not only a driver or victim of violence. It is also central to how terrorist groups fight, govern and survive.

Terrorists use food as a tool to challenge national authorities and increase their followers. In parallel, they exploit food insecurity to control communities and confront counter-terrorism forces, pushing the state out of contested areas.

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Read more:
How crime is closely linked to Al-Shabaab’s survival strategy

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This has major implications. The use of food as a weapon worsens humanitarian conditions. It causes the displacement of people in vulnerable settings. As a result, it sets in motion dangerous mechanisms of instability that can even undermine militants themselves, reducing their resources and operational capabilities.

State responses need to address these challenges and promote more comprehensive approaches to counter terrorism.

Weaponising supplies

Since the late 2000s, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have engaged African security forces in a strenuous fight. Both groups have sought to overthrow local governments and establish their power.

They have expanded their networks in regions where food security is low. These are Nigeria’s Borno State and southern Somalia.

These areas have witnessed historical frictions between the population and government authorities. Local communities have lamented socioeconomic marginalisation, shortages of essential resources and high levels of unemployment.

Both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have sought to capitalise on inequalities to gain appeal among aggrieved populations, seeking to replace the state in the delivery of essential resources.

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Read more:
Nigeria’s growing security crisis: 6 essential reads

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Boko Haram militants have reportedly provided supplies, such as biscuits, rice and spaghetti, to marginalised villages. As a Borno State resident put it, the militants have shown “love and concern” while addressing local needs.

Al-Shabaab has resorted to similar practices to win the hearts and minds of southern Somalis and enlarge its pool of recruits. The group has supplied struggling communities with meals and goods, and promoted local agricultural activities.

In parallel to these activities, both terrorist groups have adopted more aggressive measures to counter the advance of anti-terrorism forces. They have used food denial to punish civilian insubordination and cooperation with the state, relying on starvation tactics.

Boko Haram has systematically targeted food infrastructures. The group has burned crops, banned farming and fishing activities, and even poisoned water sources. This has happened particularly in places where militants suspected collusion between communities and national authorities.

Likewise, Al-Shabaab has interrupted trade routes. It has destroyed food imports to isolate southern Somali villages controlled by security forces and deprive them of popular support. During Somalia’s 2011–2012 famine, Al-Shabaab militants blocked humanitarian agencies. This was aimed at preventing the distribution of food aid to curb western influence in territories under their control.

The repercussions

The use of food as a weapon has had major repercussions in Borno State and southern Somalia. It is a primary cause of the deterioration of food security in these regions over the last 15 years.

Attacks on food resources and infrastructure have disrupted supply routes. They have pushed people to abandon their crops and pastures. This has decreased the production and availability of essential goods.

As a result, humanitarian conditions have worsened, local economies have weakened and displacement flows have intensified.

This has had detrimental effects for Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, depriving militants of key assets to sustain their activities and attract new recruits.

The two terrorist groups have become victims of the emergencies they have helped generate. They have increasingly struggled to supply nourishment for their troops and supporters. Consequently, they have witnessed a growing number of defections motivated by unsustainable conditions.

Reports highlight increasing cases of jihadists surrendering to security forces while requesting food.

To address these challenges, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have intensified raids on villages, looting goods and livestock.

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Read more:
What drives Al-Shabaab in Somalia: foreign forces out, Sharia law in and overthrow the government

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However, growing frictions with the population have undermined the groups’ operational capabilities, even opening up new fronts of resistance.

Boko Haram has been forced to transfer part of its resources and operations to the Lake Chad area. The group has intensified incursions to capture food in Nigeria’s neighbouring countries.

In Somalia, tensions with farming and pastoralist communities have led to the creation of militias mobilising against Al-Shabaab.

What next

The relocation of Boko Haram’s operations and the mobilisation of communities against Al-Shabaab have not eradicated the terrorist threat. However, these events further highlight food as a crucial factor shaping insurgencies.

African and international authorities need to tackle the dynamics of food weaponisation. They need to refine their approach to enhance local resilience, addressing the inequalities that insurgents exploit.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Terrorists use food as a weapon: how Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab exploit hunger – https://theconversation.com/terrorists-use-food-as-a-weapon-how-boko-haram-and-al-shabaab-exploit-hunger-256162

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Peter Kamerman, Professor, University of the Witwatersrand

An estimated 1 in 10 people worldwide have diabetes. Africa is the region with the fastest growth and it’s estimated that the number of people on the continent with diabetes will more than double in the next 20 years, increasing to about 55 million people by 2045.

Having diabetes has serious consequences for health and is associated with increased risk of developing diseases related to damage to the heart (heart attacks), blood vessels (strokes, foot ulcers), kidneys (chronic kidney failure), and the nervous system (blindness, loss of sensation).

When it comes to nerve damage, it typically affects long nerve fibres that supply the feet and can sometimes affect fibres that supply the hands too (a so-called glove and stocking distribution).

It is the nerve fibres that detect sensations such as touch and temperature that are often worst affected, resulting in numbness. The numbness that develops can be a nightmare for people and is often described as their “feet feeling dead”.

A peculiarity of this numbness is that it may be accompanied by intractable pain. This type of pain, resulting from damage to sensory nerve fibres, is called neuropathic pain.

As scientists in the field of pain and pain management we work on neuropathic pain in people living with diabetes and its management. In this article we aim to draw attention to the problem and discuss how it can be managed.

Nerve damage

It has been estimated that up to 50% of people with diabetes will develop damage to peripheral nerves during their lifetime, and up to 50% will experience pain because of that nerve damage.

The predictors of developing nerve damage are well established. Older age, increased duration of diabetes, and poor control of blood glucose concentration are the main culprits. What determines whether the nerve damage is associated with pain is largely unknown.

Neuropathic pain is often described as a “burning” pain, and is frequently
accompanied by other sensations such as “pins and needles”, and pain that feels like stabbing, shooting, electric-like shocks, and deep aching.

In some people there is very little or no numbness. In these people pain can often be triggered by gentle touch and movement across the skin (for example, bed sheets brushing across a foot, putting on socks), and cool and warm temperatures that are not normally felt as painful.

Sometimes my feet will hurt really badly and I can’t get up and can hardly walk. – Anonymous patient

Having such intractable pain has devastating consequences for quality of life.

Pain sufferers have less social interaction with family and friends, and find it much more difficult to enjoy their favourite activities. Sleep is significantly disrupted.

Having neuropathic pain is associated with high rates of anxiety and depression. To make matters worse, the sleep disruption, anxiety and depression may feed back into a vicious cycle to worsen and maintain the pain.

There are days when I’d really like to go somewhere or do something and just
don’t go. I know it will hurt. There’s no point in doing it. – Anonymous patient

Medications to manage the pain

Neuropathic pain is not responsive to the medications used to treat conditions such as headaches and joint pains (for example, paracetamol and ibuprofen).

Instead, neuropathic pain is responsive to medications that in some cases are also used to treat conditions such as depression and epilepsy.

Examples include:

• low doses of tricyclic antidepressants (for example, amitriptyline)

• a class of antidepressants called serotonin and noradrenaline re-uptake inhibitors (for example, duloxetine)

• anti-seizure drugs like gabapentinoids (for example, gabapentin and pregabalin).

However, there is very little information to guide doctors to predict which drug will work best for a patient.

So, often finding the correct treatment is a trial-and-error approach, which can be frustrating for both patients and doctors.

Coping mechanisms

Chronic pain management is also about teaching people to cope with their pain so that they get back to enjoying their lives and are no longer consumed by the pain.

Such interventions include the practice of mindfulness, cognitive behavioural therapy, and other self-management activities specifically designed for people with chronic pain.

With the rapidly growing number of individuals with diabetes, it is more important than ever that we detect and treat the pain caused by nerve fibre damage.

Public education and increased awareness of this painful consequence of diabetes will hopefully encourage affected people to seek early medical attention, thus allowing management of the condition, maintaining well-being and restoring function.

Peter Kamerman receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. He is the sole proprietor of Blueprint Analytics, and consults for Partners in Research.

Andreas C Themistocleous receives funding from UK Medical Research Council.

– ref. Diabetic foot pain: expert tips on how to cope – https://theconversation.com/diabetic-foot-pain-expert-tips-on-how-to-cope-251937

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Aduragbemi Banke-Thomas, Associate professor, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine

Nigerian women make up a significant proportion of foreign women giving birth in several countries.

A study done in Calgary in Canada found 24.5% of foreign women identified as having travelled abroad to give birth were from Nigeria.

Research in Chicago in the US found the majority (88%) of those seeking obstetric care in a hospital were Nigerian citizens.

In the UK, the phenomenon is labelled by some as the “Lagos Shuttle”, highlighting the high number of Nigerian women said to be so-called “birth tourists”.

It is estimated that over 23% of pregnant Nigerian women would like to travel abroad to give birth.

Why is this? As medical and legal scholars we asked women who had travelled overseas for the birth of their babies to share their experiences.

Existing research has not done enough to capture their voices, which matter in framing service delivery and immigration policies.

We reported findings from this first-of-its-kind study in PLOS Global Public Health.

As there is no registry of foreign pregnant women who gave birth abroad, it is a challenge to find them. For our study, we used social media platforms to recruit 27 Nigerian women who had given birth to at least one child abroad and conducted in-depth interviews with them to understand their motivations and experiences.

Why women do it

Of all recruited, 23 gave birth to at least one child in the US, and four gave birth to at least one child in the UK. One woman each gave birth in Canada, Ireland and Zambia.

All the women in the study had at least a university degree.

We found that reasons for seeking childbirth abroad varied.

Some women were motivated by both perceived and experienced gains of foreign citizenship, which they believed might give their children a good education, a better living environment, and easier access to jobs and loans.

However, it was not all about citizenship. Another motivation was to benefit from “better healthcare”, especially for those who had either had bad experiences during previous births in Nigeria or were concerned because they were carrying what they called a “precious baby”, for example after years of infertility.

Many women in the study also sought childbirth abroad because it is where they had loved ones to support them through pregnancy, childbirth and having a newborn – a motivation not previously reported.

Indeed, the number of Nigerians living in the US has increased over time and as of 2023, over 760,000 Americans identify as being of Nigerian origin. Essentially, more than one in 10 African immigrants in the US are Nigerians.

Some Nigerian women planned to give birth abroad long before they even got pregnant. Others were encouraged to do so by family, friends or colleagues.

Some decided to seek childbirth abroad after their income increased.

Mostly positive

Childbirth abroad is mostly a positive experience, but some women reported feeling treated badly because they were “self-paying” patients, “black”, or not native to the country.

While travel for many was mostly uneventful, some experienced life-threatening situations en route to their destination or upon arrival.

They found the cost of care to be exorbitant, but many reported that they were able to pay it off in instalments, or negotiated rebates or discounts from hospitals. A separate study showed that four in five foreign pregnant women who gave birth in a Canadian hospital, including some from Nigeria, had no outstanding bill after discharge.

In our study, those who struggled to pay said they incurred unexpected costs due to complications that resulted in caesarean sections or other surgical procedures.

Support during childbirth abroad was considered crucial and included loved ones from Nigeria who would travel with the pregnant woman to their destination.

Push and pull syndrome

With an ongoing exodus of Nigerians out of the country due to push and pull factors, known locally as jàpa, it is more likely that there will be more Nigerian pregnant women who have their support system abroad.

Countries like Nigeria should do more to improve the quality of care obtainable in their health systems.

Clearly motivations vary, and it is not always about birthright citizenship. While most women have mostly positive experiences, some have negative experiences that require attention and safeguards. For example, care guidelines in host countries specifically assuring good quality care for all pregnant women, including women who have crossed the border to seek childbirth.

The return of US president Donald Trump makes the need to install these safeguards particularly urgent. In his first term he ordered the United States Department of State to discontinue the approval of visas for pregnant women.

In his second term he has focused on abolishing birthright citizenship altogether.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigerians having babies abroad: women explain their reasons – https://theconversation.com/nigerians-having-babies-abroad-women-explain-their-reasons-251067

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of Johannesburg

A 2024 Unicef report found that 23% of South African children experience severe food poverty, eating less than two of the recommended five food groups per day. Unemployment, food insecurity, limited access to basic services and a lack of knowledge about nutrition all contribute to this. The lead researcher of this multidisciplinary study, Leila Patel, and collaborating researchers Matshidiso Sello and Sadiyya Haffejee suggest ways to tackle this dire situation.

What’s in place to protect children from poverty?

Since a call for prioritising the needs of children was adopted by the Mandela government in 1994, much progress has been made in expanding access to education, to immunisations, other primary healthcare services and social grants. Just over 13 million children now receive a child support grant. This has reduced child hunger rates from the high levels seen during the apartheid and immediate post-apartheid eras.

But the grant doesn’t get to all the children who qualify for it. Around 17.5% of eligible children still don’t receive it. Reasons include a lack of proper documentation, lack of awareness of eligibility criteria and insufficient outreach by government agencies to reach vulnerable populations.

Also, the grant isn’t close enough to the food poverty line, which is R796 (about US$43) per month per person based on the daily energy intake that a person needs. From 1 April 2025, the child support grant will increase to R560 (about US$30) per month per child.

Secondly, although school feeding schemes are in place, many children fall outside the net. Close to 10 million children in low income communities in South Africa have access to a school lunch via the National School Nutrition Programme. This programme is an excellent intervention which improves the health of children. However, in 2024, about a quarter of the children who are eligible did not receive school meals. Some of the reasons are procurement issues, funding delays, problems with provisioning, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, when school feeding ceased. Uptake has recovered to some extent but there is a need to improve the quality and effectiveness of the school feeding programme to improve nutritional outcomes.

You designed a system to help alleviate child poverty: what did it involve?

The South African Research Chairs Initiative and the Centre for Social Development in Africa at the University of Johannesburg implemented a study to strengthen social and care systems across health, education and social development. The project, which was started in 2020, involved tracking early grade learners and their caregivers in Johannesburg over a three-year period, looking at their health, material circumstances, food security, educational performance and mental health. Our research revealed a concerning picture of child hunger in Johannesburg, Africa’s wealthiest city.

The number of children in our study who went to bed hungry in the past week decreased from 13.7% in 2020 to 4.9% in 2022. Zero hunger was achieved in 2021 but it increased again in 2022 due to broader economic pressures like rising food prices and unemployment. While stunting rates showed a slight downward trend over the three years (from 13.5% in 2020 to 11.1% in 2022), we observed worrying increases in wasting, a severe form of malnutrition (from 5.6% in 2020 to 20.3% in 2022), and underweight (from 5.6% in 2020 to 11.4% in 2022).

Increases in wasting may be due to the COVID-19 pandemic and slow economic recovery. Nevertheless, the fluctuating figures underscore the complex interplay of factors contributing to severe child hunger.

The teams who worked on the project – called the Community of Practice intervention – set about creating a tighter, more supportive net around children experiencing severe and moderate risk. This integrated approach brought together government agencies, NGOs, schools, social workers, families and community leaders, to build sustainable solutions for child wellbeing.

The focus was on strengthening existing systems and fostering collaboration to ensure that children’s needs were identified and addressed effectively. On average, 157 children were reached each year over a three year period.

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Read more:
COVID-19 has hurt some more than others: South Africa needs policies that reflect this

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What did you find?

Several promising practices emerged from the collaborations, demonstrating the potential for positive change. These included:

• Strengthening school nutrition programmes by improving the quality and consistency of meals received and providing nutrition education through radio and WhatsApp messaging. More children had access to school meals.

• Tailored interventions: The team conducted screenings to assess the needs of children and their families. Children requiring specific interventions were referred to appropriate services such as child protection services and grants. Caregivers facing mental health challenges were connected to psychosocial support services, and families experiencing hunger were provided with food parcels by NGOs. Providing food top-ups for children resulted in zero hunger in the second year of the pandemic.

The number of children experiencing learning and social and emotional difficulties decreased between 2020 and 2022. Access to food and nutrition improved, higher vaccination rates were achieved and caregivers were more responsive to their health needs.

What does this tell you about what needs to change?

A significant barrier in addressing severe child poverty is the fragmentation of services across the Departments of Health, Basic Education and Social Development. Since the departments run standalone programmes, the synergies between the different social systems are not optimised. Children and their families who need additional support are often referred to the appropriate services, but there is poor follow-up.

The Integrated School Health Policy of 2012 makes provision for better coordination between these departments. But implementation has been uneven and poor in some instances. Improving and strengthening these inter-connected social systems of service provision across government departments is critical to improving child food poverty outcomes.

While managing food inflation, economic growth, job creation, and reduced inequality are important longer-term goals, immediate interventions are essential to address severe child food poverty. Failure to do so will compromise school progression and delay their overall health and social wellbeing. Simply improving economic indicators will not automatically translate to food on the table for every child; targeted interventions are vital.

Ending severe child hunger in South Africa demands a comprehensive and coordinated response, involving government, NGOs, community organisations, schools, and families themselves.

Leila Patel receives funding from the National Research Foundation for the Communities of Practice (CoP) study for social systems strengthening for better child wellbeing outcomes.

Matshidiso Valeria Sello receives funding from the Centre of Excellence in Human Development for a project on Household Economic Shocks.

Sadiyya Haffejee receives funding from the National Research Foundation.

– ref. 23% of South Africa’s children suffer from severe hunger: we tested some solutions – experts – https://theconversation.com/23-of-south-africas-children-suffer-from-severe-hunger-we-tested-some-solutions-experts-252566