Agroecology: rethinking global policy efficiency and funding priorities to overcome the blind spot in climate action

Source: The Conversation – France – By Fabio G. Santeramo, Associate Professor, Università di Foggia

Amid mounting concerns surrounding climate mitigation in the agriculture and forestry sectors, science-based evidence suggests a need for more effective, fair and coherent policy frameworks for cutting greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union and further afield.

International policies to protect the environment are at a crossroads: bold targets coexist with fragmented priorities, threatening the agenda. The debate is often dominated by the least effective measures, while high-impact solutions struggle to gain space and resources. Funding streams show only a faint prioritisation of green objectives, eroding the consistency of environmental action. These dynamics become especially evident in sectors where emissions are high and policies are numerous, yet strategic alignment and assessment remain scarce.

The Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector, responsible for over 20% of global emissions, continues to fall through the cracks of climate policy. In the European Union, it is often described as “the missing piece in climate policy.” Yet, it continues to be regulated with several national and local initiatives, while suffering from weak coordination at the macro level (e.g. EU, multilateral agreements).

Calls for policy efficiency and multilateral climate governance

Despite a wide range of local and national initiatives targeting emissions reductions in the AFOLU sector, there remains a striking lack of assessment studies evaluating their real-world effectiveness.

Ex-post analyses, though far fewer in number, provide evidence-based insights that are key to refining future strategies. Many initiatives prioritise conventional agricultural goals (i.e income growth, yield improvement) over environmental ones. A recent OECD review on policy effectiveness, echoed by university researchers, warns of incoherence in political agendas when it comes to lowering emissions. The findings highlight differences in the performance of policy tools, raising the question: Are the most effective instruments being prioritised and funded within current policy agendas?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered one of the largest increases in conflict-related food insecurity. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warns that, due to the war, millions of people could still be chronically undernourished by 2030. The crisis has pushed food security to the top of the political agenda, with the need to ensure food supply often putting environmental and climate priorities in the background.

On June 20 2025, the European Commission withdrew its Green Claims Directive, a planned crackdown on misleading environmental claims. In the EU Parliament, the move sparked strong criticism from Socialists and Liberals and marked a setback in the fight against greenwashing.

Ahead of COP30, the UN’s annual meeting for climate cooperation, held in the Amazonian city of Belém in November 2025, Brazil’s National Secretary for the Environment and Climate Change, Ana Toni, raised serious concerns about the world’s “uncertain” response to the climate crisis.

One month before COP30, only one third of the nearly 200 countries had submitted plans to meet the requirements required by the 2015 Paris Agreement, while ongoing military and trade conflicts continued to divert attention and resources away from climate action.

India’s plans for one, still remain to be seen. Described as the world’s fifth largest economy and third biggest emitter of global greenhouse gases, the country was closely watched at the UN meeting.

Highest emitting economies are on the UN’s radar

COP30 absentees included China’s President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump. China and the US are the two biggest emitters of planet-warming gases. At the summit China came under the closest scrutiny as the world’s second-largest economy and the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. What alarms analysts is that China approved 11.29 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-fired power plants in the first three months of 2025, already surpassing the 10.34 GW approved in the first half of 2024. Reducing coal use is essential for China to meet its targets of peaking carbon emissions by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060.

Meanwhile, last June, in the US, Donald Trump was already laying the groundwork to open up 58 million acres of national forest backcountry to road construction and development, rolling back protections that have been in place since 2001. In detail, the Trump administration announced plans to repeal the 2001 Roadless Rule (describing it as outdated) which had preserved the wild character of nearly one-third of the land in national forests across the United States.

These trends could ultimately be summed up in one sentence: a policy agenda whose attention toward the environment is slowly declining, despite the growing urgency of sustainability challenges.

The Environmental impact of agricultural policies: Beyond market instruments

The expectations on the debate about agriculture’s inclusion in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) may be exaggerated. Our research shows that similar policies (i.e. carbon taxes, emissions trading schemes, and subsidies) are barely effective and tend to reduce emissions by percentage as high as 9%.

Agriculture potentially becoming part of the ETS is a major topic in the current policy debate. However, turning this into action faces challenges. Denmark’s recent decision to introduce a carbon tax on agricultural emissions by 2030, aiming to cut emissions by up to 70%, shows the level of ambition.

Setting a price on emissions through a fair and balanced application of the polluter pays principle makes sense. It helps cleaner alternatives compete, raises money to support a fair transition, and makes polluters take financial responsibility for the damage they cause. But for a future agricultural ETS to truly work, it must be designed properly: it needs a strict emissions cap, no free pollution permits, and a fair and efficient use of the revenues.

In the current Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the adoption of eco-scheme uptake has been poor. To make matters worse, CAP rules have been watered down, weakening several of the “good agricultural and environmental conditions” and giving EU member stateseven more flexibility in the approval process of their strategic plans. In this context, putting a price on pollution won’t change much if the rest of the system keeps supporting polluting practices. A carbon price only works if the broader framework stops rewarding emissions in the first place.

By co ntrast, non-market policies – i.e. Protected Areas (PA), Forest Management Programs (FMP), Payments for Environmental Services (PES), and Non-Tariff Measures (NTM) – often deliver better results, with stronger impacts on reducing emissions than market-based policies. PA, broadly adopted in Indonesia and Thailand, can achieve emission reductions of up to 60%, placing them among the most impactful policy instruments available. FMP and PES show encouraging results in land-use changes, such as the conversion of croplands into forests.

Research finds that FMP, widely adopted in Brazil, are the most effective in triggering substantial shifts in land use, with forest cover increasing to as much as 50%. One reason for this is that this type of policy makes it more appealing for farmers to transition: by conserving their land, they gain access to valuable resources such as timber and other ecosystem services. It’s a win-win, for the environment and for local communities.

While non-market-based policies demonstrate strong effectiveness in reducing emissions, they continue to face significant challenges. The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) is an example of this. Although the EUDR was introduced as a landmark effort to curb global deforestation by ensuring that products sold in the EU are deforestation-free, it is now facing significant political pushback. Eighteen EU member states have called on the European Commission to ease the regulation, arguing that it imposes disproportionate and costly administrative burdens even on countries with negligible deforestation risk. They warn that the law, in its current form, could hurt competitiveness, drive up production costs, and disrupt supply chains; pressures that have already led to the postponement of its enforcement and risk diluting its environmental ambition before it is fully implemented.

Effective agricultural policy vs current funding priorities

If we are truly committed to climate goals, especially in the AFOLU sector, we must focus on policies that are direct, enforceable, and grounded on solid science. The research evidence illustrates that the most meaningful progress comes from mandatory rules-based approaches, such as PA.

According to the European Commission’s financial report for 2023, a total of €378.5 billion has been made available under the CAP since January 2021.

Of this, “The vast majority, around €283.9 billion, goes to direct payments and market measures through the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), primarily to support farmers’ incomes. Meanwhile, just €94.2 billion is allocated to rural development via the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), the branch of the CAP that funds environmental protection and biodiversity efforts, such as PA.”

In theory, the CAP aims to place environmental protection at the heart of its strategy. But when we follow the money, the picture is less balanced. Between 2021 and 2027, over €40 billion per year was directed to market-related expenditure and direct payments, while rural development, the pillar supporting green initiatives, receives less than half of that.

What’s the upshot?

Most of the funding still goes to policies that are least effective at protecting the environment, especially when it comes to cutting emissions, while the more impactful measures remain underfunded. It is a mismatch that risks undermining Europe’s climate and biodiversity ambitions.


This article was co-authored with Irene Maccarone, a Research Fellow at the University of Foggia (Italy).


A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!


The Conversation

Fabio G. Santeramo is also affiliated with the European University Institute.

ref. Agroecology: rethinking global policy efficiency and funding priorities to overcome the blind spot in climate action – https://theconversation.com/agroecology-rethinking-global-policy-efficiency-and-funding-priorities-to-overcome-the-blind-spot-in-climate-action-275839

Lissages capillaires : attention au risque d’insuffisance rénale aiguë

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Pauline Guillou, Chargée de projet scientifique, Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire de l’alimentation, de l’environnement et du travail (Anses)

L’Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire (Anses) a conclu, en janvier 2025, à un lien fortement probable entre la présence d’acide glyoxylique, un ingrédient utilisé dans certains produits de lissages capillaires, et la survenue de cas d’insuffisances rénales aiguës. En attendant une évaluation des risques au niveau européen, cette substance ne fait l’objet d’aucun encadrement ni restriction d’usage. Les consommateurs sont appelés à ne pas utiliser ces produits afin de limiter les risques pour leur santé.


Après plusieurs signalements de cas d’insuffisance rénale aiguë à la suite de la réalisation de lissages capillaires en France et à l’étranger, des études scientifiques ont montré qu’une substance contenue dans ces produits, l’acide glyoxylique, pouvait être à l’origine de ces effets.

Dans un avis rendu en janvier 2025, l’Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire, de l’alimentation, de l’environnement et du travail (Anses) a confirmé un lien fortement probable entre cet ingrédient et cet effet indésirable et préconise une évaluation des risques au niveau européen.

Quelles recommandations pour la sécurité des consommateurs ?

Pour l’heure, les autorités sanitaires conseillent d’éviter d’utiliser des produits capillaires contenant de l’acide glyoxylique et d’être vigilant en cas de symptômes inhabituels après un lissage.

En attendant d’éventuelles mesures réglementaires, l’Anses émet les recommandations suivantes :

  • Ne pas utiliser de produits de lissage capillaire contenant de l’acide glyoxylique ;
  • En cas de symptômes inhabituels pendant l’application ou dans les heures suivant la réalisation d’un lissage capillaire (douleurs lombaires, fatigue, nausées…), que le produit contienne de l’acide glyoxylique ou non, il est recommandé de consulter un médecin ou de contacter un centre antipoison en indiquant la réalisation d’un lissage capillaire ;
  • Pour contacter un centre antipoison : se rendre sur le site Internet Centres-antipoison.net ou appeler le (33)1 45 42 59 59 ;
  • En cas de symptômes inhabituels pendant l’application ou dans les heures suivant la réalisation d’un lissage capillaire (douleurs lombaires, fatigue, nausées…), que le produit contienne de l’acide glyoxylique ou non, il est également recommandé de déclarer l’incident sur le portail de signalement des évènements sanitaires indésirables du ministère en charge de la santé : Signalement.social-sante.gouv.fr/

À noter que la vigilance doit être de mise pour des lissages capillaires réalisés chez le coiffeur, en salon ou à domicile, mais aussi directement par le consommateur. Les produits capillaires lissants susceptibles de contenir de l’acide glyoxylique (même si leur étiquetage ne le précise pas) sont en effet disponibles dans le commerce et peuvent être achetés directement par le grand public. Ces lissages sont parfois – mais pas systématiquement – présentés sous certaines dénominations (« lissages brésiliens », « lissages indiens », etc.).

Une première alerte auprès du dispositif de cosmétovigilance en France

En janvier 2024, l’Anses, nouvellement en charge de la cosmétovigilance en France, a reçu de la part d’un néphrologue le signalement d’un cas d’insuffisance rénale aiguë supposée en lien avec l’utilisation d’un produit de lissage capillaire. Ce signalement concernait une femme ayant connu trois épisodes d’insuffisance rénale aiguë en trois ans qui se sont déclarés systématiquement quelques heures après la réalisation d’un lissage capillaire. Le seul événement commun aux trois épisodes était en effet l’application d’un soin capillaire le jour du début des symptômes (La cosmétovigilance consiste à assurer une surveillance et, le cas échéant, à identifier des effets indésirables chez l’humain liés à des produits d’hygiène ou de beauté que l’on classe, selon la réglementation, dans la catégorie dite des « cosmétiques », ndlr.)

Lors des trois épisodes, les premiers symptômes étaient une sensation de brûlure du cuir chevelu durant toute la durée de l’application, puis l’apparition d’ulcérations du cuir chevelu. Une douleur lombaire apparaissait dans l’heure suivant le soin, suivie de nausées et d’asthénie le jour même. Les produits utilisés lors des deux premiers soins lissants n’ont pu être identifiés. Le troisième produit, lui, était connu.

Des effets indésirables graves qui suscitent l’attention

Les néphrologues ayant pris en charge cette patiente ont mené des recherches afin d’identifier l’origine de cet effet. Ils ont ainsi établi un lien de causalité entre l’insuffisance rénale aiguë et une substance contenue dans le produit utilisé lors du troisième soin, l’acide glyoxylique. Ces conclusions résultent, d’une part, de l’observation de la toxicité rénale de l’acide glyoxylique chez la souris et, d’autre part, de l’existence de cas humains similaires identifiés dans plusieurs pays, notamment en Israël.

L’acide glyoxylique est utilisé dans les produits de lissage capillaire en remplacement du formaldéhyde. Le formaldéhyde était utilisé dans les produits cosmétiques et notamment pour les lissages capillaires, mais a été interdit en 2019 du fait de son classement comme substance cancérogène en 2014 dans le cadre du règlement européen CLP. L’industrie a alors développé des alternatives, dont l’acide glyoxylique.

Au regard de ces éléments, l’Anses s’est autosaisie pour dresser un état des lieux des connaissances sur la toxicité rénale de l’acide glyoxylique présent dans les produits lissants et déterminer si un encadrement des conditions d’utilisation de cette substance était nécessaire.

En août 2024, deux nouveaux signalements d’insuffisance rénale aiguë chez des personnes s’étant fait lisser les cheveux ont été adressés à l’Anses. Ces signalements concernaient des femmes, ayant présenté des symptômes tels que des maux de tête, des douleurs lombaires, des nausées, de la fatigue, ou encore une soif excessive dans les heures suivant le soin. Leurs analyses de sang ont mis en évidence une augmentation significative des taux de créatinine, un marqueur biologique de l’insuffisance rénale. Aucune autre cause explicative n’a pu être identifiée. L’évolution de leur état de santé a été favorable, après une hydratation, voire une hospitalisation de plusieurs jours pour l’une d’elles.

Appliqué sur le cuir chevelu, l’acide glyoxylique peut pénétrer dans l’organisme

L’analyse de la littérature scientifique menée par l’Anses a permis d’identifier des données à la fois expérimentales et cliniques établissant un lien entre l’utilisation de produits lissants pouvant contenir de l’acide glyoxylique et la survenue d’une insuffisance rénale aiguë dans les heures qui suivent.

Concernant les 26 cas similaires survenus entre 2019 et 2022 en Israël, pour certains d’entre eux, des biopsies rénales ont révélé la présence des dépôts de cristaux d’oxalate de calcium. Ces derniers peuvent constituer des calculs rénaux qui altèrent le fonctionnement des reins de façon parfois sévère. Parmi ces 26 cas, 11 patientes ont été exposées à des produits de lissage à base de kératine affichant, dans leur composition, des « dérivés de l’acide glycolique ». Pour les autres, le type de produit lissant n’a pas été identifié.

À également été recensé en Suisse, et présenté dans une publication datant de 2024, le cas d’une femme d’une quarantaine d’années ayant développé une insuffisance rénale aiguë après un lissage des cheveux. La biopsie rénale avait également montré des dépôts de cristaux d’oxalate de calcium. La composition du produit utilisé reste cependant inconnue.

Par ailleurs, des tests expérimentaux menés sur des rongeurs ont confirmé le rôle néphrotoxique de l’acide glyoxylique lors d’une exposition par voie cutanée. Enfin, la formation de cristaux d’oxalate dans l’organisme à partir de l’acide glyoxylique a également été démontrée.

L’ensemble de ces données suggèrent donc que l’acide glyoxylique, lorsqu’il est appliqué sur le cuir chevelu, peut pénétrer dans l’organisme et se transformer en oxalate de calcium.

Une substance dont l’utilisation n’est ni encadrée ni limitée

À la suite de l’analyse de l’ensemble des données existantes, l’Anses a donc publié en janvier 2025 un avis qui conclut au rôle causal fortement probable de l’acide glyoxylique dans la survenue d’insuffisances rénales aiguës observées après l’application de produits lissants.

À ce jour, cette substance ne fait cependant pas l’objet de dispositions spécifiques dans le cadre du règlement cosmétique (en particulier selon les annexes II et III, qui correspondent respectivement aux substances interdites et aux substances faisant l’objet de restrictions). Son utilisation n’est donc ni encadrée ni limitée.

Comme l’interdiction ou la restriction d’une substance cosmétique ne peut se faire au niveau national, l’Anses recommande donc de réaliser une évaluation des risques au niveau européen afin de statuer sur la sécurité de l’utilisation de cette substance dans les produits de soins capillaires et, par voie de conséquence, sur la nécessité de telles mesures réglementaires.

De plus, l’Anses préconise qu’une attention particulière soit portée aux substances (présentes dans les produits capillaires et autres produits cosmétiques) pouvant se métaboliser en acide glyoxylique.

En mars 2025, l’Anses a présenté ses travaux devant le groupe de travail sur les cosmétiques organisé par la Commission européenne réunissant les États membres et les parties prenantes. À la suite de quoi, un appel à données a été lancé par la Commission européenne dans le but de compiler toutes les informations scientifiques disponibles afin d’évaluer la sécurité de cette substance dans les produits cosmétiques. Cet appel à données est ouvert jusqu’au 8 avril 2026.

Se mobiliser pour protéger le public en Europe et dans l’Union européenne

Il est à noter que, depuis octobre 2024, 15 nouveaux cas d’insuffisance rénale aiguë ont été signalés en France. Ces nouveaux cas ont, par ailleurs, montré que l’acide glyoxylique pouvait être présent dans les produits même si ce n’était pas mentionné sur l’étiquette.

En effet, parmi les six produits pour lesquels il n’était pas fait mention de la substance dans la composition, l’analyse de trois d’entre eux a confirmé qu’ils en contenaient. Deux nouveaux cas ont également été publiés dans la littérature scientifique en Tunisie et en Algérie.

Cet exemple démontre par ailleurs l’importance de signaler tout effet indésirable lié à ces produits et aux produits cosmétiques sur le portail de signalement des événements indésirables du ministère en charge de la santé. Ces signalements sont essentiels afin de mieux comprendre les risques et protéger les consommateurs.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Lissages capillaires : attention au risque d’insuffisance rénale aiguë – https://theconversation.com/lissages-capillaires-attention-au-risque-dinsuffisance-renale-aigue-275738

3 ways Canada can navigate an increasingly erratic and belligerent United States

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Charles Conteh, Professor of Public Policy and Administration, Department of Political Science, Brock University

The United States Supreme Court recently struck down President Donald Trump’s sweeping global tariffs imposed under the country’s International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The court stated that the law, intended for national emergencies, does not grant the government the authority to impose tariffs.

In early 2025, Trump invoked the act to impose tariffs on Canada, along with Mexico and China, claiming the countries failed to stop illicit drug trafficking into the United States.

The ruling is the latest episode in a political dust-up between Canada and its neighbour to the south which recently involved the Gordie Howe International Bridge linking Ontario and Michigan.

More than steel or stone, the bridge is a symbol of a shared destiny that both respects and transcends differences. Despite their historical, institutional and political differences, Canada and the United States have bonded economically as neighbours, generating shared prosperity over the past two centuries.

In 2023, I wrote a book chapter Canada and the United States: A Symbiotic Relationship or Complex Entanglement? In that chapter, I posed a question: What if the United States becomes more aggressive and even less open to working co-operatively with Canada? To answer that question, Canada can draw lessons from its centuries-long coexistence with an often erratic neighbour to successfully navigate the economic volatility of the present era.

While the recent Supreme Court ruling presents a setback for Trump, it is unlikely to stop him from using U.S. economic and military might as leverage against Canada and other countries. As Canada navigates this belligerent U.S. government, a lingering question is whether this history of interwoven reciprocity is deteriorating into a complex entanglement of vulnerability.

Two neighbours, different worlds

In the book chapter, I describe the Canada-U.S. relationship as a complex picture of deep interdependence, marked by significant power imbalances, and the creative ways Canada has learned to adapt and prosper.

The economic and political interests of the two countries have diverged and converged in undulating waves over the past 200 years. The two economies are inextricably intertwined across a range of sectors, from natural resources and agriculture to advanced manufacturing. Around 70 per cent of Canadian exports go to the U.S., and the share of Canada’s merchandise imports from south of the border was around 59 per cent in 2025.

But for Canada, the relationship is more than just economic interdependence. The U.S. has a population of about 342 million and a gross domestic product about 10 times larger than Canada’s. That sets the stage for an asymmetrical relationship whose threads are woven into the fabric of trade and geopolitics.

For Canada, this can sometimes feel like vulnerability. And that vulnerability is increasingly being exploited by the U.S., creating a general feeling of existential crisis and entrapment.

Nevertheless, Canada can draw from its centuries-long experience to navigate the current headwinds. While the smaller of the two neighbours, it is not entirely dependent on the U.S. for influencing global events or harnessing international opportunities.

Canada has been, and still is, an influential power on the international stage. As a G7 nation, Canada is one of the key pillars in the scaffolding of the global economy. This global standing and international influence give it some room to manoeuvre.

Navigating an existential crossroads

First, in the international arena, Canada must diversify economically and geopolitically to build strategic resilience. Prime Minister Mark Carney is already moving on this front by agreeing to ease mutual tariffs with China. With negotiations to renew the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) slated for this year, a diversified trading economy will give Canada much greater leverage to navigate the vulnerabilities of asymmetry.

Second, Canada should draw from its record of championing a rules-based order. In recent years, the country has had to skilfully navigate the crossroads of projecting and defending its global and liberal-democratic values during periods of U.S. flirtations with populism, isolationism and anti-international rhetoric. As a middle power, it derives its strength from the rule of law and by presenting a united front with like-minded nations. A wider set of partners means more buffers against trade policy whiplashes and geopolitical shocks from the U.S.

Third, domestically, loosening inter-provincial trade flows, updating anachronistic regulatory frameworks and pursuing digital data sovereignty strategies should be high priorities to fire the full engine of the economy.

Similarly, as I’ve previously argued, Canada should use its comparative advantages in natural resources to create a strong, well-connected critical minerals supply chain. This would give it significant strategic leverage in the global economy as the world shifts to electrification and renewable energy.

Over the past two centuries, Canada has mastered the complex dance of asymmetry. However, the current crisis takes on an existential proportion that will require new agility, courage and decisiveness. It is an inflection point that will mark a consequential shift for the next generation.

Canada’s nimbleness and agility in navigating this political moment could be an model for other countries that must manoeuvre a world where the old rules no longer apply. It can serve as an example for small and middle powers who must navigate a world where great powers are increasingly belligerent.

The Conversation

Charles Conteh receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

ref. 3 ways Canada can navigate an increasingly erratic and belligerent United States – https://theconversation.com/3-ways-canada-can-navigate-an-increasingly-erratic-and-belligerent-united-states-276035

La muerte de ‘El Mencho’ desata una ola violenta que revela el poder del narco y su capacidad para reconfigurarse

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Francisco Pérez Fernández, Profesor de Psicología Criminal, Psicología de la Delincuencia, Historia de la Psicología, Perfilación e investigador psicosocial. Experto en historia de la novela gráfica., Universidad Camilo José Cela

El ejército mexicano patrulla por una carretera tras el operativo que acabó con la vida de _El Mencho_. RTVE

El operativo que acabó con la vida del líder del Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, ha desatado una ola de violencia sin precedentes en las calles de México. Esta respuesta, organizada y repartida por diferentes estados, revela que la hidra del crimen organizado está lejos de extinguirse. Más bien, la muerte de El Mencho encaja en un patrón ya conocido del crimen organizado mexicano: la eliminación del líder no destruye la estructura existente, muy consolidada sociocultural, económica y políticamente, sino que previsiblemente catalizará hacia transformaciones internas y reacomodos violentos.

Los orígenes del cártel más poderoso

El Cártel Jalisco Nueva generación (CJNG) surgió alrededor de 2009, cuando Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (1966-2026), natural de la comunidad de Naranjo de Chila (Aguililla, Michoacán) y más conocido por su alias de El Mencho, consolidó en una única organización criminal a un grupo escindido del Cártel de Sinaloa y a las células de Los Matazetas que él mismo controlaba.

Con anterioridad, Oseguera había pertenecido al cartel del Milenio, encabezado por Nacho Coronel Villarreal (1954-2010) y dedicado al tráfico de metanfetamina. Esta organización trabajaba en los territorios de Jalisco, Michoacán y Colima y tuvo cierta relevancia a inicios de los 2000. Pero cayó en declive cuando Coronel murió en un operativo en Zapopan, Jalisco, en 2010, posiblemente traicionado por los hermanos Beltrán Leyva, del cartel de Sinaloa.

Lo cierto es que el CJNG adquirió notoriedad rápidamente por su violencia extrema. Ejemplo de ello fue la macabra exhibición de 35 cadáveres –23 hombres y 12 mujeres– en Boca del Río (Veracruz) en 2011, acto que motivó que esta organización criminal se hiciera un hueco en el panorama nacional mexicano. El hecho es que, desde entonces, el grupo consolidó su presencia en al menos 25 estados del país, operando siempre mediante células regionales autónomas de alta capacidad paramilitar, con cadenas de comunicación funcionales y protocolos de respuesta rápida muy estructurados y eficientes que, por lo que parece, la muerte de El Mencho no ha desarticulado.

Estructura, capacidades y actividad

El CJNG se había venido empoderando a lo largo de la última década al no encontrar contrapesos, pues las guerras intestinas del Cartel de Sinaloa habían debilitado su capacidad de respuesta. Su crecimiento fue rápido y no tardó en contar con capacidad de violencia coordinada para la realización de narcobloqueos, quema de vehículos, cierres de carreteras y ataques simultáneos.

De la misma manera, su capacidad militar es alta. Posee y maneja armamento pesado, e incluso vehículos blindados. Ha venido sosteniendo una narrativa de desafío permanente al Estado mediante la difusión de imágenes de las maniobras de sus sicarios. Estas capacidades, así como su papel clave en el tráfico de drogas sintéticas, violencia transnacional y desestabilización regional, motivaron que Estados Unidos clasificara al CJNG como Organización Terrorista Extranjera (FTO) y Terrorista Global Especialmente Designado (SDGT).

La DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), por su parte, había puesto a la cabeza de Oseguera un precio nada desdeñable de 15 millones de dólares.

El CJNG, debido a sus fuentes de financiación diversas, ha venido operando como una empresa criminal multifacética vinculada al narcotráfico (fentanilo, metanfetamina, cocaína y heroína) hacia Estados Unidos, siendo un actor central en la crisis de opioides estadounidense, que ha podido costar la vida ya a más de 500 000 personas y actualmente se encuentra en su tercera oleada.

Otros delitos asociados al CJNG son extorsión, robo y contrabando de combustible, tráfico de personas, lavado de dinero y control territorial mediante violencia extrema. Esto explica que la organización se hubiera convertido en un punto crítico en la agenda de seguridad de México y Estados Unidos. De manera muy especial en lo tocante al control del tráfico de fentanilo, la coordinación de operaciones militares binacionales y las políticas de seguridad del Gobierno mexicano.

Lo cierto es que desde que Donald Trump amenazara en marzo de 2025 con la imposición de aranceles a México, el gabinete presidido por Claudia Sheinbaum, en una política que claramente pretendía apaciguar al gobierno estadounidense y dirigirlo hacia una negociación económica sosegada, recrudeció su lucha contra el narco.

Sin embargo, pese a haber entregado a su vecino del norte a 29 de los narcos más buscados y establecido un control de fronteras mucho más riguroso, Sheinbaum no parece haber logrado avanzar de forma significativa en su objetivo. Consecuentemente, cabe enmarcar movimientos, como la presente operación contra el CJNG, en el mismo contexto de acercamiento y normalización de relaciones con el gabinete Trump.

La muerte de El Mencho: hechos y expectativas

El 23 de febrero de 2026, el ejército mexicano, en una operación informada y coordinada con la inteligencia estadounidense, que llevaba años realizando seguimientos satelitales y financieros, ha abatido a Nemesio Oseguera durante un operativo en Tapalpa, Jalisco. Este se saldó con 25 militares muertos y otros 12 componentes de la organización criminal fallecidos.

La reacción de los miembros del cártel ha sido extremadamente violenta, incluyendo bloqueos de vías públicas, incendio de vehículos, ataques indiscriminados y violencia coordinada en múltiples estados. Esto ha venido a confirmar, como ya se temía, su estructura celular autónoma y su alta capacidad para operar, incluso sin instrucciones procedentes de una autoridad central. La zona metropolitana de Guadalajara ha vivido alguna de las jornadas más violentas de los últimos años.

El hecho es que la muerte del líder Oseguera y la elevada capacidad operativa de las células que constituyen el CJNG abren escenarios inciertos con respecto a las posibles luchas internas por la sucesión. El Mencho no parece haber dejado una línea sucesoria establecida. Esto implica una reconfiguración territorial de la organización y una posible y previsible escalada de violencia en regiones donde el cártel mantiene presencia activa.

Dos precedentes: El Mayo y El Chapo

En términos de historia del crimen organizado, la muerte de Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes puede interpretarse como un acontecimiento central comparable a la caída del elusivo Ismael El Mayo Zambada (nacido en 1948), actualmente encerrado en el Centro Metropolitano de Detención de Brooklyn a la espera de una sentencia firme de la justicia estadounidense, o de Joaquín El Chapo Guzmán (nacido en 1957), en la actualidad cumpliendo una cadena perpetua también en Estados Unidos.

Históricamente, ha venido ocurriendo que la caída de los grandes capos no ha significado el desmantelamiento de sus organizaciones, sino, a menudo, incluso su dispersión y complicación. La estructura celular del CJNG, alejada del modelo piramidal clásico, parece apuntar en esta dirección. Por su alto grado de penetración social y diversificación económica, el CJNG ha llegado a convertirse en una organización cuya presencia permea aspectos cotidianos, económicos y sociales de amplias regiones.

Tras el operativo que ha dado muerte a El Mencho, el cártel no solo ha reaccionado con rapidez, sino que lo ha hecho con una violencia coordinada y de alcance multimodal en varios estados del país. Una respuesta que revela la presencia de estructuras regionales autónomas capaces de operar sin instrucciones centrales, con protocolos de reacción preestablecidos que explican la simultaneidad de las acciones y, claro está, con cadenas de comunicación funcionales y eficaces incluso tras la muerte del líder.

Sin embargo, también parece cierto que las caídas sucesivas de El Chapo, El Mayo y ahora El Mencho podrían sugerir un avance coyuntural –posiblemente no decisivo– del Estado frente a las viejas estructuras del narcotráfico, quizá demasiado acomodadas a un estado de la cuestión que parece haber venido transformándose a lo largo de los últimos diez años.

Narcopoder de base con una raíz social

En efecto, la existencia de un nuevo modelo de cooperación en materia militar y de inteligencia entre México y Estados Unidos, centrado en golpes quirúrgicos más que en una guerra abierta y la implementación de una vigilancia reforzada, contrasta con épocas anteriores y da pie a una reevaluación de la situación por parte de los carteles. Con todo, y en tanto que estructuras psicosociales y culturales fuertemente ancladas entre las clases más desfavorecidas y marginales de la población mexicana, esta reconfiguración de las políticas criminales no eliminará el poder de base de las organizaciones criminales, sino que provocará, a buen seguro, su reconfiguración estructural.

Parece claro, de hecho, que la nueva cooperación abierta entre México y Estados Unidos ha motivado que los grandes capos ya no puedan refugiarse en las mismas formas de protección política o territorial de antaño. Pero, al mismo tiempo, el Estado captura o elimina a los líderes sin lograr desmontar las redes económicas, armadas y territoriales del crimen organizado, con lo cual se llega a una curiosa situación de empate estratégico.

Este hecho parece indicar que la violencia no tenderá a disminuir, sino que se transformará, se fragmentará y se redistribuirá. El caso del CJNG ilustra esto con claridad: la persistencia del cartel, incluso tras la desaparición de su líder histórico, pone en evidencia que la impunidad no ha desaparecido, sino que tiende a adoptar nuevas formas.

Muere el símbolo, vive el sistema

La historia de la criminalidad organizada y su implantación sociocultural muestran que la muerte de las figuras criminales descollantes, como El Mencho en este caso, no implica necesariamente el fin del poder y la capacidad de las organizaciones que estas dirigían.

Y ello porque dicho poder no depende exclusivamente de un individuo, sino que se cimenta en estructuras económicas sólidas –muchas de ellas insertas en mercados legales e ilegales globales–, se sostiene por la capacidad paramilitar y de control territorial de células o nodos regionales, y se legitima (o normaliza) socialmente en regiones donde el Estado, por los motivos que fuere, es débil, corrupto, inoperante o simplemente ausente. Así pues, lo que muere es la figura simbólica, el póster que idolatra el imaginario popular, pero no el sistema que la sostiene.

Cabe deducir de todo ello que más que hacia un final del narco mexicano tal y como lo conocemos, los indicios parecen apuntar hacia una atomización y diversificación del modelo.

La lucha por el liderazgo traerá más violencia

La lucha por el liderazgo traerá más violencia. Primeramente, porque las luchas internas que se avecinan provocarán fracturas en el CJNG y disputas por el control de territorios estratégicos. En segundo lugar, porque es muy probable una escalada de violencia territorial mediante la cual las células autónomas podrían volverse más competitivas entre sí y más agresivas frente a rivales externos. En tercer lugar, porque el debilitamiento de la organización dominante puede observarse como una oportunidad para otros carteles, de suerte que la fragmentación del CJNG podría abrir espacios a grupos como el cartel de Sinaloa u otras organizaciones locales más pequeñas. Y en cuarto lugar, porque se producirá un reacomodo político y regional motivado por el hecho de que el CJNG mantiene relaciones y redes profundas en estados como Jalisco, Michoacán o Nayarit. Esto significa que su reconfiguración afectará también y de manera muy previsible a las dinámicas políticas y económicas locales.

La muerte de El Mencho, por lo tanto, no marca el fin de una forma de poder, sino que implica el cierre de un capítulo dentro de un fenómeno más amplio: la persistencia del crimen organizado como estructura social, cultural, económica y territorial en México. En todo caso, si algo revela la caída del líder es el agotamiento del viejo modelo del “gran capo”, pero no tanto de la estructura criminal-institucional en sí misma.

Lo que emerge, pues, es un escenario más fragmentado, impredecible y potencialmente más violento por disputado. No estamos ante un final, sino en un entreacto cuyo desenlace tendrá mucho que ver con la potencial capacidad adaptativa de los cárteles.

The Conversation

Las personas firmantes no son asalariadas, ni consultoras, ni poseen acciones, ni reciben financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y han declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado anteriormente.

ref. La muerte de ‘El Mencho’ desata una ola violenta que revela el poder del narco y su capacidad para reconfigurarse – https://theconversation.com/la-muerte-de-el-mencho-desata-una-ola-violenta-que-revela-el-poder-del-narco-y-su-capacidad-para-reconfigurarse-276724

La Junta de Paz de Trump: legalidad dudosa, delirios empresariales y prepotencia masculina

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Rafael Bustos García de Castro, Profesor e investigador, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Donald Trump da un discurso durante la primera cumbre de la Junta de Paz, celebrada el 19 de febrero en Washington. Casa Blanca

Rodeada por cierta expectativa y confusión se produjo el pasado 19 de febrero de en Washington la inauguración de la Junta de Paz. El motivo de esta confusión: las dudas sobre su encaje legal con Naciones Unidas y los límites de sus competencias.

La Junta de Paz actúa a toda rapidez aprovechando la incertidumbre jurídica que rodea su creación y objetivos. Se trata de un órgano administrativo de carácter transitorio amparado por la Resolución 2803 del CS de Naciones Unidas aprobada el pasado 17 de noviembre de 2025. De hecho, tiene como fecha de caducidad el 31 de diciembre de 2027.

En enero de 2026, el texto de la Carta de la Junta de Paz fue enviada a 60 Estados, algunos de los cuales manifestaron en la última Cumbre de Davos (celebrada entre el 19 y 23 de enero) su intención de unirse a la nueva organización internacional.

Precisamente el motivo alegado por la mayoría de los países para no hacerlo es que la Carta entra en conflicto con las obligaciones asumidas por los Estados al crear las Naciones Unidas y con los poderes y competencias atribuidos a esta organización. Es más, si bien la autorización para crear la Junta de Paz estaba confinada estrictamente a la cuestión de Gaza, el nuevo organismo internacional asume competencias universales de consolidación de paz sin límite geográfico alguno.

Además, mientras que el Consejo de Seguridad fecha su terminación al acabar 2027, el estatuto de la Carta afirma que la Junta se disolverá cuando quiera su presidente.

Pago en metálico por membresía permanente

Una lectura atenta al tratado que crea la Carta deja entrever una extraña combinación de aspectos jurídicos vinculados a las organizaciones internacionales junto con otros que son típicos de la gobernanza de las empresas privadas.

Si por un lado se afirma que la Junta de Paz es una organización internacional con personalidad jurídica regida por el derecho internacional, por otro se otorgan poderes vitalicios a individuos, no a Estados miembros, que son exorbitantes –presidencia vitalicia, designación a dedo del sucesor, pago en metálico por la condición de miembro permanente, poder personal de arbitraje, veto y poder de disolución…– que solo pueden concebirse en el mundo mercantil privado.

Por si hubiera pocas dudas e incluso sospechas sobre la finalidad última de la Junta, el presidente de Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, afirmó durante el evento que aunque la ONU tiene un gran potencial, “la Junta de Paz supervisará seguramente a Naciones Unidas y se asegurará de que haga su trabajo correctamente”.

Obviamente, esto sería completamente ilegal, ya que la Carta de San Francisco (1945) es un tratado internacional especial que tiene preeminencia sobre cualquier otro y crea una organización única de tipo universal y fines generales que no admite subordinación.

Escenificación y mensaje performativo

Aprovechando esta confusión entre el mandato dado por Naciones Unidas y los fines declarados de la Junta de Paz, se reunieron en Washington 26 Estados miembros y dos decenas de países y la UE en calidad de observadores. Es evidente que muchos Estados no querían faltar porque se iba a tratar del futuro de Gaza y Palestina.

Además, asistieron el presidente del Banco Mundial, Ajay Banga; el de la FIFA, Gianni Infantino; el general estadounidense Jasper Jeffers, a quien la Junta ha encargado dirigir la Fuerza Internacional de Estabilización (ISF); y el embajador de Estados Unidos ante Naciones Unidas, Michael Waltz.

A título individual se dieron cita Tony Blair, como exrepresentante político, y Ali Saath, un exministro palestino elegido para liderar el órgano tecnocrático en Gaza bajo las órdenes de la Junta.

Completaban los empresarios y multimillonarios Marc Rowan y Yarik Gabay y Liran Tancman, así como los asesores presidenciales, también empresarios del sector inmobiliario, Steve Witkoff y Jared Kushner.

Ausentes estaban los Estados que han declinado participar en la Junta –como Francia o España– y otros que no han contestado y presumiblemente no participarán –Rusia y China–. No fueron invitados los representantes palestinos y, por supuesto, no había autoridades de Naciones Unidas.

Como habrá adivinado el lector o la lectora, este auditorio era abrumadoramente masculino, no habiendo ni una sola mujer en la zona de presidencia y muy pocas en el conjunto de la sala. La voz de una mujer, eso sí, se escuchaba para presentar a los invitados y cederles el turno de palabra.

La imagen de empresarios y representantes políticos actuando como en un consejo de administración, con intervenciones ordenadas y sin debate, con palabras caballerosas y apretones de manos, destilaba un olor rancio a masculinidad y una monotonía del lenguaje de los negocios que todos parecían compartir –prosperidad, oportunidades, inversiones, rentabilidad–.

De forma triunfalista se celebró el fin del conflicto en Gaza, como si ya estuviera resuelto, afirmando que es un éxito indiscutible de Trump, y dándose el dato de que el número de muertos se ha reducido al 1 % desde el alto el fuego de octubre. Se ocultaba así que Israel ha matado al menos unas 600 personas en Gaza desde entonces sin contar las víctimas cotidianas que dejan los ataques de colonos y militares en Cisjordania.

Un resort turístico difuso

El capital público (unos 10 000 millones de dólares anunciados por EE. UU y otros 7 000 millones por otros países de la Junta) más el capital privado movilizado a través del Banco Mundial convertirán a Gaza en un resort turístico, rentabilizando su “valiosísima costa de playa”. Ni una sola palabra sobre cómo se hará esto, cómo antes se tendrán que retirar las toneladas de escombros –lo que llevará años–, cómo se descontaminará el suelo agrícola o el agua subterránea, quiénes construirán esas viviendas y torres de apartamentos o cómo se conectará con el mundo exterior para la llegada de visitantes. De la soberanía de Gaza ninguna mención.

El discurso performativo logró en parte alejar de la mente del espectador la responsabilidad de Israel (cuestiones como quién debería pagar la reconstrucción de Gaza, qué ocurre con las ordenes de detención por crímenes de guerra y con la causa que tiene abierta por genocidio…) o la complicidad de EE. UU. en la destrucción de Gaza –primer suministrador de bombas y armamento–. Por un momento ofuscó, pero no derribó la idea más poderosa de que Gaza es parte irrenunciable de Palestina y que ningún resort conseguirá eliminar su identidad, ni sus derechos inalienables.

The Conversation

Rafael Bustos García de Castro no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. La Junta de Paz de Trump: legalidad dudosa, delirios empresariales y prepotencia masculina – https://theconversation.com/la-junta-de-paz-de-trump-legalidad-dudosa-delirios-empresariales-y-prepotencia-masculina-276560

Cameos in ‘Marty Supreme’ ask audiences to dig deeper

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Joceline Andersen, Assistant Teaching Professor in Communication and English, Thompson Rivers University

In the lead-up to Oscar season, Josh Safdie, the director of Marty Supreme, has been elaborating on the many cameos in his film that build on real-world associations to create a rich cast of characters.

While usually cameo publicity is all about the director’s vision, Marty Supreme’s director of casting, Jennifer Venditti, has also made appearances in press for the film, amid increased recognition for the art of casting.

Marty Supreme is up for nine Oscars, including for casting, the first year this category will be awarded, and Venditti is nominated.

In Marty Supreme, Timothée Chalamet stars as an ambitious table tennis champion running away from his life as a shoe salesman in a largely Jewish slice of 1950s New York. Alongside this star are many other recognizable faces playing cameos.

Finding a famous face in an unexpected place is strangely thrilling. As some of my research has examined, this recognition is the allure behind cameos — small roles where famous and celebrated people play versions of themselves on screen. Cameos are full of contradictions: audiences are taken aback by famous people appearing in front of the camera. They proudly pick out celebrity faces in a crowd.




Read more:
A brief history of celebrity cameos, from ‘Sunset Boulevard’ to ‘Eurovision Song Contest’


Robert Pattinson, Pico Iyer

At a January screening, Safdie clued in London audiences to a Robert Pattinson voice cameo. In the film, Pattinson voices an announcer at the British Open for table tennis.

Pico Iyer, the travel writer Safdie knew from his 2019 TED Talk about ping pong, wrote in the New York Times in January about his own small role. This cameo began with a formulaic query email and Zoom call with Safdie and Venditti.

Writer Pico Iyer’s 2019 Ted Talk: What ping pong taught me about life.

While classic cameos like Jerry Lewis’s appearance in It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World (1963) were filmed as cutaways that made for a flexible shooting schedule and assembly-line production, Iyer’s role involved shooting on two continents.

Safdie includes Iyer as a fastidious table tennis official, even though Iyer’s talk argues that ping pong transcends competition as the ultimate model for good diplomacy. Iyer’s TED Talk also sketches out the source material for an unusual minor character arc in Marty Supreme. Between the cameo, the New York Times article and the TED Talk, Safdie creates a maze for the viewer to follow outside of the viewing experience.

Stunt casting

Safdie is no stranger to stunt casting. He and his brother’s 2019 drama Uncut Gems starred Adam Sandler as a jeweller, and featured cameos from non-actors such as musical star the Weeknd and former NBA player Kevin Garnett.

The Hollywood Reporter recently detailed allegations about inappropriate behaviour by a non-actor on the Safdie brothers’ 2017 film Good Time that neither brother has commented publicly on. These allegations in the lead-up to the Oscars may have dampened excitement for casting that blurs acting and reality.

In Marty Supreme, many cameos highlight local colour. John Catsimatidis, New York grocery tycoon and former mayoral candidate, plays a well-to-do speculator bankrolling a line of table tennis balls, the Marty Supreme, that gives the film its title.

Kevin O’Leary

Kevin O’Leary, the wealthy Canadian reality-TV investor angel of Dragon’s Den and Shark Tank fame, appears in a supporting role as the sadistic wealthy husband of a faded movie star played by Gwyneth Paltrow. Surrounded by an entourage of sycophants, he bribes Marty to throw a match to the reigning champion as part of a promotional event for his company.

As O’Leary expressed in Vanity Fair, Safdie was looking for an “asshole,” and he knows how to play that.

Drawing on his savage TV persona, and inviting comparison with
U.S. President Donald Trump’s own reality-TV stardom, O’Leary’s performance relies on the audience to do the heavy lifting of association. Canadian viewers may recall that O’Leary’s 2025 “asshole” moves include supporting Trump’s bid to make Canada the 51st state.

As a supporting actor who plays a pivotal plot role in Marty’s return to grace, O’Leary is hardly a cameoist. And yet, in his first acting role, O’Leary’s persona never fully disappears into the character of the cutthroat mid-century businessman.

Marty Supreme could be an episode of Dragon’s Den, with O’Leary sizing up another hopeful contestant for humiliation or a dream come true. The audience sketches out much of O’Leary’s performance from our own memories of similar viewing experiences, just like we do for other celebrities and movie stars.

Casting against type

After Kevin O’Leary’s appearance, the audience’s second cry of recognition at my local screen was for Marty’s mom: Fran Drescher, best known as the brash, colourful New Yorker from the 1990s sitcom The Nanny. During the filming of Marty Supreme, Drescher was the president of SAG-AFTRA, the union that represents screen actors in the U.S.

Spinning a familiar story of cameo happenstance and friendly connection that is as old as Bob Hope and Bing Crosby’s star-studded 1950s Road movies, Drescher told People that the union brought Safdie and Drescher together when he called her for regular updates during the 2023 actors’ strike.

Safdie’s cameos were to feature people with what Drescher called the right “background”: New Yorkers, many of them Jewish, with local accents. According to Drescher, Safdie intrigued her with a promise to showcase her depth demonstrated during calls explaining labour negotiations. Like Iyer, Drescher was cast in this cameo against the type of her superficial sitcom character.

Labour, cultural contexts also shape cameos

Many cameos of the 1920s and 1930s relied on labour conditions where stars and former stars signed to restrictive contracts could be pulled out of the studio canteen to appear as little more than extras.

This wasn’t because extras were in short supply: according to Kate Fortmueller, who has researched film and TV labour histories, almost three per cent of Los Angeles residents in the 1920s were registered as extras. The unionization of movie actors emerged from a desire to give order to the wannabe actors flooding Hollywood.

Comparable concerns were behind the 2023 SAG-AFTRA strike — a key issue was compensation for actors as streaming media changed where audiences watch screens and convenient AI technology threatens real performers.

Marty Supreme commits to depicting the real New York through cameos that recreate the accents, dialects and unfiltered faces of famous New York actors, and these resonances beyond the screen are part of the film’s allure.

The Conversation

Joceline Andersen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Cameos in ‘Marty Supreme’ ask audiences to dig deeper – https://theconversation.com/cameos-in-marty-supreme-ask-audiences-to-dig-deeper-273762

Canada is a global leader in obesity care guidelines, so why are Canadians still waiting months for treatment at home?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Muhammad Ilyas Nadeem, PhD Candidate in Obesity & Diabetes | Public Scholar (2024-2025), Concordia University

Canada is recognized globally for its world-leading obesity care guidelines — yet Canadians continue to struggle to access the very treatment plans we’ve developed. Meanwhile, the same model of care is now the one the World Health Organization (WHO) is urging other countries to adopt.

The WHO recently released its first ever guideline on anti-obesity medications, reinforcing a chronic disease model of care that Canadian experts have championed for years.

WHO’s stance mirrors the Canadian framework laid out in 2020 clinical guidelines: obesity is a chronic, relapsing disease that requires comprehensive, lifelong care — the kind that includes timely diagnosis, trained providers, co-ordination among the various health professionals involved, mental-health support, and — when appropriate — pharmacotherapy and bariatric surgery.

Despite Canada’s leadership in shaping this global shift, progress at home remains slow and uneven. More than one in four adults now live with obesity and wait times for specialist care have soared to a record high of 30 weeks in Canada. What’s more, in high-income countries, obesity and related chronic diseases tend to disproportionately affect people facing social and economic disadvantage.

When will Canadians see this research put into practice?

Either directly or indirectly, all Canadians are affected by obesity. Obesity remains largely framed as a willpower problem solvable through lifestyle change alone, despite decades of evidence showing it is a complex chronic disease shaped both by biology and environment. It is linked to more than 200 health problems worldwide and contributes to more than 3.7 million deaths annually.

Most health-care systems, including Canada’s, still rely on fragmented, weight-centric guidelines rather than holistic, chronic disease approaches. Even clinicians and clinics that want to follow these evidence-based models often find themselves constrained by limited resources, training, inconsistent insurance coverage and a system that still doesn’t put comprehensive obesity care at the forefront.

Canada has invested millions of dollars in obesity research, leading to the development of forward-thinking, science-backed approaches to obesity care, but system-wide implementation remains painfully slow.

The Canadian paradox: world-class guidance, patchy access

Here’s the bright side: Canada has quietly become an unexpected leader in global obesity care guidelines. Over the past five years, Canadian clinicians, researchers and people with lived experience have helped rewrite the international rulebook for treating obesity.

The 2020 adult guideline was a turning point that reframed obesity. It moved beyond using BMI as the main compass, and reorganized care around what matters to patients: quality of life, function and reduction of related complications, not just kilograms lost. That patient-centred, stigma-free model, along with Canada’s guideline process itself, has since been adapted in Ireland using the ADAPTE framework and in Chile through an international pilot. Several other nations are also integrating elements of the Canadian approach into their own guidelines.

In 2025, two major updates pushed the model further. A pediatric guideline in Canadian Medical Association Journal emphasized multicomponent, family-centred support that addresses mental health, quality of life and cardiometabolic risk, while considering medications or surgery for selected adolescents through shared decision-making.

An adult pharmacotherapy update called for long-term, individualized use of modern anti-obesity medicines — including semaglutide and tirzepatide — and urged clinicians to focus on abdominal obesity and complications rather than BMI alone.

Access to care

Yet a paradox remains: while the world begins to follow Canada’s lead on paper, most Canadians living with obesity still cannot access the level of care these very guidelines envision. Public coverage for anti-obesity medications remains limited and inconsistent across provinces, and private coverage reaches only a minority.

Training gaps compound these access issues. Medical education in Canada has historically overlooked obesity care, leaving many clinicians unprepared to treat patients in line with the guidelines.

Bariatric surgery capacity has been sharply constrained, with reported wait times varying from 1.5 years to nearly nine years, and historic analyses documenting stark interprovincial inequalities. These bottlenecks make it almost impossible to deliver the very guidelines we’ve poured time and funds into.

So far, policy signals are mixed. In March 2025, Alberta became the first — and still only — province to formally recognize obesity as a chronic disease, a move that can unlock more comprehensive coverage and care options. The federal government is reviewing applications for generic GLP-1 drugs which could improve access down the road. But no pan-Canadian policy framework exists, leaving most patients navigating a patchwork system.

In Québec, more bariatric surgeries have been performed relative to need than most provinces but waits remain substantial and public drug coverage for anti-obesity medicines is limited.

Improving the system

Ultimately, before we can improve the lives of our people, we need to improve the system that is supposed to care for them.

The first crucial step would be for more provinces to follow suit with Alberta to recognize obesity as a chronic disease nationwide. Recognition is the gateway to coverage and comprehensive care.

A co-ordinated federal-provincial-territorial framework implementing our guidelines on behavioural/psychological support, pharmacotherapy and surgery should be applied for obesity care in Canada. Make quality of life, mental health, functional capacity and obesity-related complication reduction core performance indicators.

Finally, similar to diabetes care, public and private plans should cover anti-obesity medications where clinically indicated. The absence of coverage continues to hinder access as international guidance embraces modern, chronic-care models for obesity management.

Canada’s impact on modern obesity care is commendable, with countries like Ireland and Chile adapting our model. WHO now supports this same chronic-care approach with its stance on GLP-1 medicines. But if Canada’s own guidelines are not practically applied within our health-care systems, many lives will continue to be at stake, and obesity numbers will continue to climb, as they have for the last several decades.

The Conversation

Muhammad Ilyas Nadeem receives funding from Fonds de recherche du Québec (FRQ)-Santé.

Jessica Murphy has received funding from Fonds de recherche du Québec (FRQ)-Santé.

Sylvia Santosa receives funding from CIHR, NSERC, MITACS, CFDR.

Cristina Sanza does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Canada is a global leader in obesity care guidelines, so why are Canadians still waiting months for treatment at home? – https://theconversation.com/canada-is-a-global-leader-in-obesity-care-guidelines-so-why-are-canadians-still-waiting-months-for-treatment-at-home-273361

Calls for a boycott of the 2026 FIFA World Cup are growing, but how realistic is one?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Noah Eliot Vanderhoeven, PhD Candidate, Political Science, Western University

The next major international sporting event, the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup hosted jointly by the United States, Canada and Mexico, is already garnering international scrutiny. There have been numerous calls to boycott it.

Calls for a boycott were amplified recently following U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to annex Greenland from Denmark, prompting soccer officials in Germany and France to broach the possibility of both countries boycotting the tournament.

Both countries’ soccer federations have pushed back against calls to boycott the World Cup for now, although recent events in Minneapolis have heightened concerns about the U.S.’ role in hosting the tournament and what that will mean for visitors.

Former FIFA President Sepp Blatter — who was suspended by FIFA in 2015 and replaced by current FIFA president Gianni Infantino amid a corruption scandal he was later acquitted of — recently voiced concerns over the marginalization of political opponents and violent crackdowns on immigration in the U.S.

The World Cup has historically been an event that brings together fans from across the world. Many fans rely on tourist visas, and ICE is expected to be responsible for security at the World Cup. ICE’s director has refused to commit to pausing the agency’s operations during the tournament.

Human rights groups have raised concerns over whether World Cup visitors will be detained and handed to ICE if they engage in actions deemed critical of the U.S. government.

Boycotts at international sporting events

In the history of international sporting events, boycotts have been far less common than bans.

Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary and the Ottoman Empire were not invited to attend the 1920 Olympic games after losing the First World War.

South Africa was invited to the 1964 Tokyo Games but saw their invitation rescinded due to apartheid, and only rejoined Olympic competition in 1992. Rhodesia saw its invitation to the 1972 Games rescinded due to its government enacting a white supremacist regime.

Notably, both instances of rescinded invitations to the Olympic Games came after other African nations threatened to boycott the Games if South Africa and Rhodesia were invited to participate.

There were also partial boycotts at the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Several nations announced a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics to protest China’s mistreatment of the Uyghur Muslims, prohibiting many government officials from attending in an official capacity, while still permitting athletes to compete. Russia has been banned from most major international sports competitions since it invaded Ukraine in 2022.

However, the most famous boycott of an international sporting event occurred in 1980 ahead of the Summer Olympics in Moscow following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. More than 60 countries boycotted those Games, led by the U.S. In turn, 19 countries boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, led by the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries.

Yet there has never been a World Cup boycott by qualified teams on political grounds. In 1934, Uruguay famously chose not to travel to the second-ever World Cup in Italy because several European teams, including Italy, declined to travel to Uruguay for the inaugural tournament in 1930.

Prior to the 1966 World Cup, all African teams withdrew from qualifying in protest because FIFA had only allocated all of the teams from Africa, Asia and Oceania one combined place at the tournament. There were calls for Norway to boycott the 2022 Men’s World Cup in Qatar, but they did not qualify for the tournament.

How likely is a boycott?

As of yet, no leaders of major soccer federations have endorsed calls for their country to boycott the tournament, despite pressure from some executives and politicians. It would likely take decisive action from a federation head, akin to the action President Jimmy Carter took prior to the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, to arrive at a country boycotting.

Furthermore, given the relationship Trump has built up with FIFA president Gianni Infantino, the effect of a boycott, or any credible threats of one, on the United States’ immigration policy or hosting responsibilities would likely be rather limited, making a boycott an unpopular decision that may not achieve the desired goal of any boycotting nation.

Infantino attended Trump’s inauguration and controversially awarded Trump FIFA’s inaugural Peace Prize. More recently, he signed an agreement with Trumps’ Board of Peace on behalf of FIFA.

Infantino was also a staunch defender of Qatar’s building practices in the face of heavy human rights criticism and was willing to change FIFA’s policies at the last minute to acquiesce to Qatar’s demands for limited alcohol sales during the 2022 Men’s World Cup.

Trump could still escalate geopolitical tensions enough to spark further boycott discussions. But for now, a boycott remains unlikely, and even credible threats would likely do little to shift Infantino and Trump from the status quo.

The Conversation

Noah Eliot Vanderhoeven does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Calls for a boycott of the 2026 FIFA World Cup are growing, but how realistic is one? – https://theconversation.com/calls-for-a-boycott-of-the-2026-fifa-world-cup-are-growing-but-how-realistic-is-one-275785

Countries in the Americas can act to protect the environment without the United States

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Alexandra R Harrington, Visiting Scholar, McGill University Faculty of Law, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill University

The United States federal government recently revoked a landmark scientific ruling by the Environmental Protection Agency that stated greenhouse gases are a threat to public health. U.S. President Donald Trump said the ruling was a “disasterous” policy that “severely damaged the American auto industry and massively drove up prices for American consumers.”

The revocation is the latest move by a U.S. administration that has framed action to tackle climate change as hampering the U.S. economy. In this context, trade has become a buzzword over the past year. With the focus on tariffs, it is easy to overlook the impacts of U.S. trade policies on the environment and the organizations tasked with bridging the two.

My areas of research focus on international law, specifically environmental law and the intersections between trade and international organizations.

In January, Trump indicated that the U.S. will withdraw from the NAFTA/CUSMA-linked Commission on Environmental Cooperation and the process for dealing with claims that Canada, Mexico or the United States are shirking their environmental commitments — the submission on enforcement matters (SEM) process.

The U.S. withdrawal highlights the importance of these issues at the regional level. It also provides an opportunity for other countries in the Americas to take action on climate change without the United States.




Read more:
Three ways Canada can navigate an increasingly erratic and belligerent United States


What are SEMs?

In 1994, Canada, Mexico and the U.S. adopted the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) along with two side agreements. One of these was the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), establishing the Commission on Environmental Cooperation and the SEM process.

When NAFTA was renegotiated in 2018, the SEM process was incorporated into the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), and the NAAEC was replaced by the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.

The Commission on Environmental Cooperation is charged with overseeing this agreement, while SEM is the process for dealing with claims that Canada, Mexico or the U.S. are not living up to their environmental commitments.

That process can lead to the creation of a “factual record”; an investigative report detailing the commission’s findings. Although not a legal decision, the factual record is a powerful evidentiary and fact-finding tool to generate reforms.

Reporting on derelict environmental commitments through the SEM process remains a vital tool. It has provided important factual records on leakage from Alberta tailings ponds and failures to protect species such as the loggerhead turtle, North Atlantic right whale and vaquita porpoise, among other issues.

The SEM model was replicated in U.S. trade agreements with Central American states, Colombia, Panama and Peru. In each of these agreements, however, the U.S. was exempted from SEM jurisdiction because it was already under the jurisdiction of CUSMA.

Given the U.S. decision not to provide the core funding needed for these entities to function, it would be possible for the Central American states, as well as Colombia, Panama and Peru, to enter into a separate agreement regarding SEMs. The same would be true for Canada and Mexico under CUSMA.

A new generation of environmental accountability

The U.S. was a driving influence in the creation of the SEM process. And the U.S. retreat could be accepted as a way to end systems that have brought significant issues in national enforcement of environment law to light.

Examples include the failure to properly monitor implementation of environmental laws and standards, ranging from those intended to protect communities living near pollution discharge points to those intended to protect species on the edge of extinction.

Other countries in the Americas now have an opportunity to create a larger environmental oversight mechanism. This would demonstrate their ability to step into the governance gap left by the U.S. and generate stronger regional alliances. This would not only benefit the Americas. It would also provide a model for other international organizations as they face the loss of a powerful member state.

This alternative would entail creating a new SEM process, along with an equivalent to the Commission on Environmental Cooperation to oversee it, linking all members of the impacted agreements and any other interested countries in the Americas. The most comprehensive way to do this would be to negotiate a new multilateral agreement similar to current regional agreements but without the emphasis being on trade.

Similar to the current SEM process, individuals and groups could make submissions claiming that a member state is failing to fulfill its environmental obligations. Once a submission is received, the SEM unit would determine whether it meets basic requirements. If so, the submission would move on and, ultimately, a factual record could be developed.

This alternative framework would demonstrate the collective commitment of countries across the Americas to environmental protection. It would reflect the reality that the Americas face significant shared environmental threats that are also increasingly threats to national security and economic interests.

Such an agreement could mainstream the SEM process, building on provisions established in NAFTA, NAAEC and CUSMA. Existing regional offices could be maintained to ensure strong connections on the ground, and the procedures used could largely be unchanged.

At a time when many countries seem to be focusing on narrow self-interest and military spending rather than the environment, this is a challenging proposition.

However, integrating the SEM process into a new, broader, collective effort would allow American countries to assert hemispheric leadership without having to reinvent the wheel. It would also allow citizens the continued ability to bring claims and to have some accountability.

As the U.S. government withdraws from its international obligations, reconceiving international organizations that are under existential threat is now a necessity. Reconfiguring SEMs throughout the Americas would serve as a model for other organizations and as a way of shifting international organizations to be less dependent on any one state.

The Conversation

Alexandra R Harrington does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Countries in the Americas can act to protect the environment without the United States – https://theconversation.com/countries-in-the-americas-can-act-to-protect-the-environment-without-the-united-states-275994

Madrugar no le hará más rico y puede perjudicar su salud

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Alfredo Rodríguez Muñoz, Catedrático de Psicología Social y de las Organizaciones, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

En redes sociales y libros de autoayuda se repite una idea seductora. Pertenecer al llamado “club de las 5 de la mañana”, levantándose a esa hora, es el primer paso hacia el éxito. Con este hábito se promete más productividad, más autocontrol y, casi por extensión, una vida mejor. Tim Cook, CEO de Apple, es conocido por empezar su jornada de madrugada, y el actor Mark Wahlberg llegó a popularizar rutinas extremas en las que afirmaba levantarse a las 2:30 para entrenar. La conclusión implícita parece clara: si quiere triunfar, tiene que ganarle horas al sol.

Sin embargo, cuando miramos qué dice la investigación sobre sueño y rendimiento, el mensaje es mucho menos épico. Para muchas personas forzar el madrugón no es una receta para el éxito, sino para rendir peor, tomar decisiones más impulsivas y acumular una deuda de salud que tarde o temprano se paga.

No todos tenemos el mismo reloj interno

Existen diferencias individuales estables en los llamados cronotipos. Algunas personas son más “alondras” y se activan temprano, mientras que otras son más “búhos” y rinden mejor por la tarde o la noche. Estas diferencias no son un capricho ni una cuestión de disciplina, sino en parte biológicas y genéticas.

Además, el cronotipo no es completamente fijo: a lo largo de la vida tendemos, de forma gradual, a volvernos algo más matutinos. La adolescencia suele ser la etapa más vespertina, mientras que en la edad adulta el reloj interno se desplaza lentamente hacia horarios más tempranos. Pero ese cambio es progresivo, no voluntario, y no se puede acelerar simplemente con fuerza de voluntad.

Sin embargo, intentar convertir a un búho en una alondra de un día para otro es, en el mejor de los casos, ineficiente, y en el peor, un choque frontal con nuestra fisiología: el cuerpo puede estar fuera de la cama, pero el cerebro sigue funcionando en “modo noche”.

Cuando forzamos nuestra agenda para que colisione con nuestro reloj interno, entramos en un estado de jet lag social. Este fenómeno no es simplemente estar cansado: es vivir en un desfase crónico donde la biología interna y las exigencias externas operan en zonas horarias distintas. Este desajuste estresa nuestra fisiología de forma constante. Como resultado, altera la regulación metabólica, dispara la resistencia a la insulina y eleva el riesgo cardiovascular.

La trampa real: recortar sueño

El segundo gran riesgo del club de las 5 no es madrugar en sí, sino lo que suele implicar: recortar horas de sueño. La mayoría de adultos necesita entre siete y nueve horas de descanso para un funcionamiento óptimo. Sin embargo, muchas personas adoptan rutinas extremas sin acostarse antes; simplemente duermen menos. En el ecosistema de gurús de la productividad incluso se han popularizado frases tan reveladoras como que “dormir es de pobres”, como si el descanso fuera un defecto moral y no una necesidad biológica.

El sueño, en realidad, no es un tiempo improductivo, sino un proceso activo de recuperación. Durante la noche el cerebro consolida la memoria, regula las emociones, restaura el sistema inmunitario y mantiene el equilibrio metabólico. Cuando el descanso se recorta de forma crónica aumentan la fatiga, la irritabilidad y el riesgo de problemas de salud mental. También se deterioran la atención y el rendimiento cognitivo.

Además, dormir menos no significa solo dormir un poco peor. La arquitectura del sueño funciona en ciclos, y las fases finales cumplen una función crítica: integrar experiencias, procesar la carga emocional y afinar el juicio. Cuando adelantamos sistemáticamente el despertador no solo reducimos el descanso total: sacrificamos el tramo que más contribuye a la lucidez.

Aquí aparece uno de los mitos más persistentes: confundir más horas despierto con más productividad. Un cerebro privado de sueño puede responder correos a primera hora, sí, pero funciona con menos control ejecutivo, más impulsividad y peor capacidad para planificar, evaluar riesgos y liderar con empatía.

Dormir menos para trabajar más es como conducir un coche cada vez más rápido después de haberle quitado los frenos. Quizá se avance, pero el coste llega en la siguiente curva.

La cultura del cansancio no es una medalla

El fenómeno del madrugón extremo encaja en algo más amplio: la glorificación del agotamiento como símbolo de compromiso. Durante años en muchas organizaciones se ha premiado implícitamente a quien presume de dormir poco o de estar siempre disponible.

La evidencia es clara: los líderes fatigados no son héroes estoicos. Suelen ser percibidos como más irritables, menos carismáticos y menos capaces de conectar emocionalmente con sus equipos.

Además, el discurso de las mañanas milagrosas suele ignorar las condiciones reales de vida. No todo el mundo puede permitirse levantarse temprano para meditar, leer o entrenar en silencio. Para muchas personas madrugar significa simplemente añadir una hora más de cansancio a jornadas ya largas, con trabajos exigentes y responsabilidades de cuidado.

Nada de esto significa que madrugar sea negativo para todo el mundo. Hay personas que se sienten bien levantándose temprano y duermen lo suficiente haciéndolo. El problema aparece cuando se vende como receta universal y se ignora la diversidad biológica.

La ciencia del sueño es menos épica que los gurús de la productividad, pero mucho más útil. Lo que importa no es levantarse antes que los demás, sino dormir lo necesario y de forma regular.

Quizá la verdadera ventaja competitiva no sea ganarle horas al sol, sino inaugurar el día con un cerebro realmente descansado. Porque el éxito no empieza a las cinco de la mañana. Empieza cuando dejamos de vivir permanentemente cansados.

The Conversation

Alfredo Rodríguez Muñoz no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Madrugar no le hará más rico y puede perjudicar su salud – https://theconversation.com/madrugar-no-le-hara-mas-rico-y-puede-perjudicar-su-salud-275181